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songer_genapel1 | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed appellant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerry V. MITCHELL and Roger Woods, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 90-7423.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Feb. 26, 1992.
Frank W. Donaldson, U.S. Atty., Anthony A. Joseph, James A. Sullivan, Asst. U.S. Attys., Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant U.S.
John C. Robbins, Doug Jones, Birmingham, Ala., for defendant-appellee Jerry V. Mitchell.
Jo Allison Taylor, Birmingham, Ala., for defendant-appellee Roger Woods.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, CLARK, Senior Circuit Judge, and KAUFMAN, Senior District Judge.
See Rule 34-2(b), Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Honorable Frank A. Kaufman, Senior U.S. District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
TJOFLAT, Chief Judge:
The Government appeals from an order in the Northern District of Alabama granting a motion in limine to preclude certain expert testimony on the basis of Fed. R.Evid. 403 and 702. In the absence of a record of the pre-trial hearing on this motion, we find ourselves unable to affirm the challenged order. We therefore vacate the district court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings.
I.
Defendants Jerry V. Mitchell, Chief of Police for Albertville, Alabama, and Roger Woods are charged with three counts of conspiracy to commit extortion, and defendant Mitchell individually with twelve counts of extortion, all in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988). Specifically, defendants stand accused of “fixing” tickets for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in exchange for money. In order to obtain a conviction under the Hobbs Act, the Government must establish a connection between the extortionate conduct and interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
On the morning of the scheduled trial date, June 11, 1990, both defendants, prior to the empaneling of the jury, filed motions in limine to preclude the testimony of Dr. Robert A. Voas. Upon hearing arguments from counsel and receiving the Government’s proffer of Dr. Voas’ testimony in camera, the district court orally granted the motions. No record of the arguments, the proffer, or the court’s oral ruling exists because the in camera hearing on the motions occurred in the absence of a court reporter. In a written order issued later that day, the court precluded Dr. Voas’ testimony “under [Fed.K.Evid.] 702 and 403.”
Left without the assistance of a record of the Government’s proffer, we turn to the court’s written order for a brief summary of the proffer. According to the court’s order, Dr. Voas, “[i]f permitted to testify... would establish his qualifications as an expert in alcoholism and highway safety and then testify to the same matters that were presented by him as a witness in United States v. Wright, 797 F.2d 245, 249 (5th Cir.1986) [, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013, 107 S.Ct. 1887, 95 L.Ed.2d 495 (198
Question: What is the nature of the first listed appellant?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_usc2 | 18 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
The most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case is 18. Your task is to identify the second most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if fewer than two U.S. Code titles are cited. To choose the second title, the following rule was used: If two or more titles of USC or USCA are cited, choose the second most frequently cited title, even if there are other sections of the title already coded which are mentioned more frequently. If the title already coded is the only title cited in the headnotes, choose the section of that title which is cited the second greatest number of times.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Richard A. DOUGHERTY, Appellant.
No. 84-5152.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted April 11, 1985.
Decided May 31, 1985.
Peter Thompson, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant.
Janice M. Symchych, Asst. U.S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.
Before LAY, Chief Judge, McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, and WOODS, District Judge.
The Honorable Henry Woods, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.
HENRY WOODS, District Judge.
After a jury trial, the appellant, Richard A. Dougherty, was found guilty of twenty-five counts of misapplying $14,500,000 in funds of the First National Bank of St. Paul, Minnesota, and falsifying the bank’s books and records. The nine counts of misapplication dealt with the improper issuance of bankers’ acceptances in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656. The remaining sixteen counts charged a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1005 in that appellant willfully failed to record these transactions. Appellant was given concurrent sentences of a year and a day on three counts, five years of probation, and a $15,000 fine on the remaining counts by the trial judge. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the correctness of the jury instructions. We affirm the convictions.
Appellant was a vice president in charge of the International Banking Division of the third largest bank in the Ninth Federal Reserve District. The offenses charged were mainly related to the financial difficulties of a seafood processing venture by Transalaska Fisheries Corporation (Transalaska). Based in Seattle, the company proposed to convert a ship into a floating seafood processor and to harvest mainly king crab. In April, 1979, Dougherty secured approval of the bank’s loan committee for a $3,500,000 advance for which Transalaska gave a term note. Conversion of the ship ran into delays and cost overruns, with the result that the ship was not ready for the 1979 king crab harvest. The 1980 season fell far below expectations. During conversion in September, 1979, Dougherty disbursed $350,000 beyond the approved limit, documenting the excess amount in a memo to the bank’s president and in comments placed in the Transalaska credit file (T. 162-63). Transalaska’s financial difficulties worsened, and its officers began calling on Dougherty for more financing. He complied by using the device of unapproved bankers’ acceptances. The First National Bank of St. Paul required approval of its senior loan committee for loans and credit extensions in excess of $100,000 (T. 143-45). Dougherty sat on the senior loan committee and participated in its weekly discussion and decisions on lending (T. 123-27, 1078-80). He presented none of the bankers’ acceptances for Transalaska to the loan committee for approval (T. 15, 1361-62, 1378-79). Nor were they posted in the bank’s general ledger. Proceeds of the acceptances were deposited into the company’s checking account. On maturity date Dougherty paid off the maturing acceptance with a new one, in an amount equal to or greater than the maturing acceptance, since the customer was unable to meet the obligation on its due date. An overdraft would have resulted if he had allowed the account to be charged on the due dates. When a customer’s account suffers an overdraft of $1,000 for five days, a computerized printout automatically goes to the loan review personnel (T. 169, 1090). This pattern of roll-overs prevented what would have
Question: The most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case is 18. What is the second most frequently cited title of this U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_geniss | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. Consider the following categories: "criminal" (including appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence), "civil rights" (excluding First Amendment or due process; also excluding claims of denial of rights in criminal proceeding or claims by prisoners that challenge their conviction or their sentence (e.g., habeas corpus petitions are coded under the criminal category); does include civil suits instituted by both prisoners and callable non-prisoners alleging denial of rights by criminal justice officials), "First Amendment", "due process" (claims in civil cases by persons other than prisoners, does not include due process challenges to government economic regulation), "privacy", "labor relations", "economic activity and regulation", and "miscellaneous".
THOMASSON v. BURLINGTON TRANSP. CO.
No. 2405.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
May 19, 1942.
Rehearing Denied June 26, 1942.
Emmett Thurmon, of Denver, Colo., for appellant.
J. L. Rice, of Denver, Colo. (J. C. James and J. H. Cummins, both of Denver, Colo., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, BRATTON, and HUXMAN, Circuit Judges.
HUXMAN, Circuit Judge.
William R. Thomasson instituted an action against the Burlington Transportation Company in the District Court of the United States for the District of Colorado to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by him in an automobile collision at the intersection of Eighteenth Street and Glenarm Place, in the City of Denver. At the conclusion of the evidence offered by plaintiff, the court instructed a verdict for the defendant. Judgment was entered thereon and plaintiff has appealed.
There is a conflict between the state law and the ordinances of the City of Denver defining the rights and duties of persons' who approach a street intersection ■ at right angles. Ch. 16, § 208, of the Colorado Statutes Annotated, 1935, provides:.
“(a) The driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to a vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway.
“(h) When two vehicles enter an intersection from different. highways at the same time the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right.”
Ordinance No. 16 (Series of 1932), § 65(a), of the City of Denver, as far as material herein, provides: “Every.driver of a vehicle approaching the intersection of a street shall yield the right-of-way at such intersection to the driver of any vehicle approaching from the right, and the driver of the vehicle on the left shall decrease the speed of the vehicle operated by him and have said vehicle under- control before crossing such intersection, and it shall be his duty to yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right;...”
Plaintiff contends that where there is a conflict, as here, between the city ordinance and the state law, the former must give way and that the respective rights and duties of the parties are to be measured by the state law. The Supreme Court of Colorado does not sustain plaintiff in this position. In City and County of Denver v. Henry, 95 Colo. 582, 38 P.2d 895, 898, the Supreme Court said: “Our conclusion is that the right of way at street intersections in the city of Denver is controlled by the ordinance in question, not by the statute.” The question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence therefore must be measured by the requirements of the city ordinance of the City of Denver.
Eighteenth Street and Glenarm Place intersect at right angles. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was driving his automobile on Eighteenth Street and approached the intersection from a northwesterly direction. Defendant’s bus was being driven along Glenarm Place, and approached the intersection from a southr westerly direction. Defendant’s bus therefore appeared on plaintiff’s right and had the right of way at the intersection. The duty which rested upon plaintiff as he approached this intersection under these circumstances has been clearly defined by the Supreme Court of Colorado. In Golden Eagle Dry Goods
Question: What is the general issue in the case?
A. criminal
B. civil rights
C. First Amendment
D. due process
E. privacy
F. labor relations
G. economic activity and regulation
H. miscellaneous
Answer: |
songer_respond1_7_2 | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. KENDALL
Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Submitted May 3, 1927.
Decided May 26, 1927.
No. 4544.
Criminal law <§=»1024(5)~ Court of Appeals held without jurisdiction to review by writ of error judgment of not guilty found by court sitting without jury (Code, §§ 44 and 935).
Where prosecution for violation of Employment Agency Act, § 8, as amended by 35 Stat. 641, was tried to court without jury on agreed statement of facts, and the defendant adjudged not guilty and discharged, held, under District of Columbia Code, §§ 44, 935, Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction of writ of error by District of Columbia to review trial court’s action.
In Error to Police Court of the District of Columbia.
John D. Kendall was charged with violation of statute, and to review a judgment of the police court finding him not guilty and discharging him, the District of Columbia brings error.
Writ of error dismissed.
F. II. Stephens and E. W. Thomas, both of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff in error.
S. A. Syme, of Washington, D. C., for defendant in error.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.
MARTIN, Chief Justice.
The District of Columbia filed an information in the police court of the District against John D. Kendall, charging him with violation of section 8 of the Employment Agency Act (as amended by 35 Stat. 641), by unlawfully receiving from an applicant for employment a sum of money greater than $2, as a fee for the procurement of employment and work for the applicant.
The defendant pleaded not guilty, and the issue was tried to the court without a jury, upon an agreed statement of facts. The court found and adjudged the defendant not guilty, and he was discharged. The District of Columbia noted an exception to the finding and judgment of the police court “on the matters of law contained therein,” and filed various assignments of error, all of which challenged the interpretation placed by the court upon the statute in question. A writ of error was issued from this court, upon application of the District, for a review of these proceedings.
We are satisfied, however, that we are without jurisdiction in the case. The right of the plaintiff in error to such a review by this court is based upon the provisions of section 935, D. C. Code, which section reads as follows, to wit:
“In all criminal prosecutions the United States or the District of Columbia, as the ease may be, shall have the same right of appeal that is given to the defendant, including the right to a bill of exceptions: Provided, that if on such appeal it shall be found that there was error in the rulings of the court during a trial, a verdict in favor of the defendant shall not be set aside.”
It may be noted, under section
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.
A. not ascertained
B. male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
C. male - assumed because of name
D. female - indication in opinion of gender
E. female - assumed because of name
Answer: |
songer_circuit | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the circuit of the court that decided the case.
INTERNATIONAL VIDEO CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMPEX CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 71-1935.
United. States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Sept. 4, 1973.
Francis A. Even (argued), John F. Flannery, of Fitch, Even, Tabin & Lue-deka, Chicago, 111., J. Bruce McCubbrey, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
Karl A. Limbach (argued), Richard E. Peterson, Thomas A. Gallagher, of Lim-bach, Limbach & Sutton, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before CHAMBERS and TRASK, Circuit Judges, and TAYLOR, District Judge.
Honorable Fred M. Taylor, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Idaho, sitting by designation.
TRASK, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from an order dismissing both a complaint for declaratory-judgment and a counterclaim for patent infringement on the basis that there was no actual or justiciable controversy between the parties. Appellant, Ampex Corporation (Ampex), claims the court had no authority to dismiss its counterclaim over its objection and challenges the court’s discretion in refusing to award attorneys’ fees. We affirm.
International Video Corporation (International), the plaintiff-appellee, originally sought a declaratory judgment that it was not infringing an Ampex patent covering video tape recording apparatus. Ampex unsuccessfully sought dismissal of the action asserting by way of Motion to Dismiss, that there was no justiciable controversy. Thereafter, Ampex “reluctantly” filed a compulsory counterclaim to prevent waiver of its right to sue International for patent infringement. Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(a). The counterclaim alleged :
“Without hereby waiving its denial of the existence heretofore of a justi-ciable controversy between the Plaintiff, International Video Corporation, and the Defendant, Ampex Corporation, with respect to the Defendant’s Patent 2,956,114, or to infringement thereof by the Plaintiff; and without waiving its right of review of the District Court’s denial of the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment complaint herein for want of justiciable controversy; and to prevent possible loss of right for failure to assert what may be held to be a compulsory counterclaim, the Defendant counterclaims against the Plaintiff, IVC,...” C.T. at 71.
A year later, International having changed its position completely, filed a Motion to Reopen Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the factual context of the action had changed and that the action should be dismissed as Ampex had previously suggested. The court granted International’s motion explaining:
“In effect, plaintiff argues that the circumstances giving rise to this action have so changed that it would serve no useful purpose to proceed further. In light of plaintiff’s presentation, this argument is persuasive. Although the parties may still be in some disagreement over the patent in question, the changes in circumstances referred to by plaintiff demonstrate that ‘there are no longer adverse parties with sufficient legal interests to maintain the litigation.’ 6A Moore’s Federal Practice j[ 57.13, at 3074 (2d ed. 1966). See Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 319 U.S. 748, [63 S.Ct. 1158, 87 L.Ed. 1703] (1942). Therefore, the motion to reopen is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
“Dismissal of the complaint does not require dismissal of the counterclaim. See Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, [63 S.Ct. 1115, 87 L.Ed. 1450] (1943). However, defendant has made it clear both in the counterclaim itself, and in opposing plaintiff’s motion, that the counterclaim was reluctantly filed to protect against a waiver under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a). Since the complaint has been dismissed, defendant need fear waiver no longer. There being no actual controversy between the parties, the counterclaim is also dismissed.” C.T. at 236.
Ampex does not challenge that part of the court’s order dismissing International’s complaint. However, it has appealed dismissal of its counter
Question: What is the circuit of the court that decided the case?
A. First Circuit
B. Second Circuit
C. Third Circuit
D. Fourth Circuit
E. Fifth Circuit
F. Sixth Circuit
G. Seventh Circuit
H. Eighth Circuit
I. Ninth Circuit
J. Tenth Circuit
K. Eleventh Circuit
L. District of Columbia Circuit
Answer: |
songer_dueproc | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in any civil law cases including civil government, civil private, and diversity cases. The issue is: "Did the interpretation of the requirements of due process by the court favor the appellant?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".
FLYNN ex rel. YOUNG QUONG ON v. TILLINGHAST, Commissioner of Immigration.
No. 2760.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Feb. 18, 1933.
MORTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Everett Flint Damon, of Boston, Mass. (A. Warner Parker, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.
John W. Schenck, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Boston, Mass. (Frederick H. Tarr, U. S. Atty., of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BINGHAM, WILSON, and MORTON, Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge.
The issue in this class of eases where admission is denied is (3) whether tho applicant was given a fair hearing, that is, was permitted to introduce all the evidence he desired and have it made a part of tho record of the administrative board before which his ease was heard; (2) whether there was an entire lack of convincing evidence, or any substantial evidence contra, on which the conclusion of the immigration officials could rest.
The burden of proving his right to enter the country as a citizen is on the applicant. This burden involves satisfying the immigration officials, "who have the sole power to determine the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence as to the facts entitling the applicant to enter as a citizen. The conclusion of a Special Inquiry Board may rest, therefore, on a lack of evidence of sufficient weight in the minds of the members to carry conviction.
Bearing in mind that they have the power to determine the credibility of witnesses, and whether the evidence has sufficient weight to sustain the burden on the applicant, to reverse a decision of the immigration officials refusing admission to an applicant, and of the District Court in denying a petition for habeas corpus, this court must find that the evidence in favor of the applicant is so clear and convincing that the immigration officials must have acted arbitrarily in rejecting the evidence in favor of the applicant because in their opinion the witnesses for the applicant were unworthy of belief, or in finding,that all the evidence in applicant’s favor did not satisfy the members of the board that the applicant was a citizen of this country.
It is often difficult to determine, not only what evidence the immigration officials rejected as unworthy of belief and on what ground, but also what weight they attached to the evidence in favor of or against the applicant.
The question is not what this court would have found on the evidence that appears in the printed record. • The Supreme Court said, in Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, at page 13, 28 S. Ct. 201, 203, 52 L. Ed. 369: “But, unless and until it is proved to the satisfaction of the judge that a hearing properly so called was denied, the merits of the case are not open,, and, we may add, the denial of a hearing cannot be established by proving that the decision was wrong.” U. S. ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of
Question: Did the interpretation of the requirements of due process by the court favor the appellant?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_appnatpr | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
William Ernest DICKERSON et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross Appellants, v. CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants-Cross Appellees, and Charles N. Dudd
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
sc_respondent | 163 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
001. attorney general of the United States, or his office
002. specified state board or department of education
003. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
004. state commission, board, committee, or authority
005. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
006. court or judicial district
007. state department or agency
008. governmental employee or job applicant
009. female governmental employee or job applicant
010. minority governmental employee or job applicant
011. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
012. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
013. retired or former governmental employee
014. U.S. House of Representatives
015. interstate compact
016. judge
017. state legislature, house, or committee
018. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
019. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
020. state or U.S. supreme court
021. local school district or board of education
022. U.S. Senate
023. U.S. senator
024. foreign nation or instrumentality
025. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
026. state college or university
027. United States
028. State
029. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
030. advertising business or agency
031. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
032. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
033. airline
034. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
035. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
036. American Medical Association
037. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
038. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
039. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
040. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
041. author, copyright holder
042. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
043. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
044. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
045. water transportation, stevedore
046. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
047. brewery, distillery
048. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
049. construction industry
050. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
051. business, corporation
052. buyer, purchaser
053. cable TV
054. car dealer
055. person convicted of crime
056. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
057. chemical company
058. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
059. religious organization, institution, or person
060. private club or facility
061. coal company or coal mine operator
062. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
063. consumer, consumer organization
064. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
065. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
066. defendant
067. debtor
068. real estate developer
069. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
070. distributor
071. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
072. drug manufacturer
073. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
074. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
075. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
076. electric equipment manufacturer
077. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
078. eleemosynary institution or person
079. environmental organization
080. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
081. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
082. father
083. female employee or job applicant
084. female
085. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
086. fisherman or fishing company
087. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
088. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
089. franchiser
090. franchisee
091. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
092. person who guarantees another's obligations
093. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
094. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
095. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
096. hospital, medical center
097. husband, or ex-husband
098. involuntarily committed mental patient
099. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
100. insurance company, or surety
101. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
102. investor
103. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
104. juvenile
105. government contractor
106. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
107. magazine
108. male
109. medical or Medicaid claimant
110. medical supply or manufacturing co.
111. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
112. minority female employee or job applicant
113. manufacturer
114. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
115. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
116. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
117. mother
118. auto manufacturer
119. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
120. radio and television network, except cable tv
121. nonprofit organization or business
122. nonresident
123. nuclear power plant or facility
124. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
125. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
126. tender offer
127. oil company, or natural gas producer
128. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
129. out of state noncriminal defendant
130. political action committee
131. parent or parents
132. parking lot or service
133. patient of a health professional
134. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
135. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
136. public interest organization
137. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
138. pipe line company
139. package, luggage, container
140. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
141. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
142. indigent defendant
143. private person
144. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
145. professional organization, business, or person
146. probationer, or parolee
147. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
148. public utility
149. publisher, publishing company
150. radio station
151. racial or ethnic minority
152. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
153. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
154. realtor
155. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
156. resident
157. restaurant, food vendor
158. retarded person, or mental incompetent
159. retired or former employee
160. railroad
161. private school, college, or university
162. seller or vendor
163. shipper, including importer and exporter
164. shopping center, mall
165. spouse, or former spouse
166. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
167. retail business or outlet
168. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
169. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
170. tenant or lessee
171. theater, studio
172. forest products, lumber, or logging company
173. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
174. trucking company, or motor carrier
175. television station
176. union member
177. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
178. union, labor organization, or official of
179. veteran
180. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
181. wholesale trade
182. wife, or ex-wife
183. witness, or person under subpoena
184. network
185. slave
186. slave-owner
187. bank of the united states
188. timber company
189. u.s. job applicants or employees
190. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
191. Atomic Energy Commission
192. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
193. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
194. Alien Property Custodian
195. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
196. Board of Immigration Appeals
197. Bureau of Indian Affairs
198. Bonneville Power Administration
199. Benefits Review Board
200. Civil Aeronautics Board
201. Bureau of the Census
202. Central Intelligence Agency
203. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
204. Department or Secretary of Commerce
205. Comptroller of Currency
206. Consumer Product Safety Commission
207. Civil Rights Commission
208. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
209. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
210. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
211. Drug Enforcement Agency
212. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
213. Department or Secretary of Energy
214. Department or Secretary of the Interior
215. Department of Justice or Attorney General
216. Department or Secretary of State
217. Department or Secretary of Transportation
218. Department or Secretary of Education
219. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
220. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
221. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
222. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
223. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
224. Federal Bureau of Prisons
225. Farm Credit Administration
226. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
227. Federal Credit Union Administration
228. Food and Drug Administration
229. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
230. Federal Energy Administration
231. Federal Election Commission
232. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
233. Federal Housing Administration
234. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
235. Federal Labor Relations Authority
236. Federal Maritime Board
237. Federal Maritime Commission
238. Farmers Home Administration
239. Federal Parole Board
240. Federal Power Commission
241. Federal Railroad Administration
242. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
243. Federal Reserve System
244. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
245. Federal Trade Commission
246. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
247. General Accounting Office
248. Comptroller General
249. General Services Administration
250. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
251. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
252. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
253. Interstate Commerce Commission
254. Indian Claims Commission
255. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
256. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
257. Information Security Oversight Office
258. Department or Secretary of Labor
259. Loyalty Review Board
260. Legal Services Corporation
261. Merit Systems Protection Board
262. Multistate Tax Commission
263. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
264. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
265. National Credit Union Administration
266. National Endowment for the Arts
267. National Enforcement Commission
268. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
269. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
270. National Mediation Board
271. National Railroad Adjustment Board
272. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
273. National Security Agency
274. Office of Economic Opportunity
275. Office of Management and Budget
276. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
277. Office of Personnel Management
278. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
279. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
280. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
281. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
282. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
283. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
284. U.S. Public Health Service
285. Postal Rate Commission
286. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
287. Renegotiation Board
288. Railroad Adjustment Board
289. Railroad Retirement Board
290. Subversive Activities Control Board
291. Small Business Administration
292. Securities and Exchange Commission
293. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
294. Selective Service System
295. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
296. Tennessee Valley Authority
297. United States Forest Service
298. United States Parole Commission
299. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
300. United States Sentencing Commission
301. Veterans' Administration
302. War Production Board
303. Wage Stabilization Board
304. General Land Office of Commissioners
305. Transportation Security Administration
306. Surface Transportation Board
307. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
308. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
309. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
310. Unidentifiable
311. International Entity
Answer: |
songer_oththres | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to some threshold issue at the trial court level. These issues are only considered to be present if the court of appeals is reviewing whether or not the litigants should properly have been allowed to get a trial court decision on the merits. That is, the issue is whether or not the issue crossed properly the threshhold to get on the district court agenda. The issue is: "Did the court refuse to rule on the merits of the appeal because of a threshhold issue other than lack of jurisdiction, standing, mootness, failure to state a claim, exhaustion, timeliness, immunity, frivolousness, or nonjusticiable political question?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".
George DUCKETT and Delores Duckett, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Eve SILBERMAN, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 31, Docket 77-7164.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Sept. 15, 1977.
Decided Jan. 6, 1978.
James I. Meyerson, New York City (Nathaniel R. Jones, Thomas Hoffman, and N. A. A. C. P., New York City, on the brief), for píaintiffs-appellants.
Gerald Murray, Jamaica, N. Y., for defendant-appellee.
Before MANSFIELD and TIMBERS, Circuit Judges, and DOOLING, District Judge.
Hon. John F. Dooling, Senior United States District Judge, Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
TIMBERS, Circuit Judge:
On this appeal from an order entered after a bench trial in the Eastern District of New York, Thomas C. Platt, District Judge, which dismissed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief plus damages brought by plaintiffs who alleged violation of their constitutional and civil rights resulting from defendant’s refusal to sell her house to plaintiffs assertedly because of plaintiffs’ race, the issue is whether the district court was clearly erroneous in finding that defendant refused to sell her house to plaintiffs for reasons unrelated to race and that plaintiffs were not willing to purchase it on the terms specified by defendant. We hold that the district court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. We affirm.
I.
In October 1974 defendant, Mrs. Eve Silberman, a white citizen, decided to sell her one-family house in the Kew Garden Hills section of Queens, New York. She and her daughter, Mrs. Ravelle Brickman (the “sellers”), engaged a realtor, Peter Smetana, who stated that he could get at least $60,-000 for the house. Subsequently Mrs. Silberman went to live in Wisconsin with her son, whereupon Mrs. Brickman assumed responsibility for selling the house. Thereafter the sellers received several offers ranging from $40,000 to $50,000, all of which were rejected. In February 1975 the asking price was reduced from $60,000 to $55,-000, but no acceptable offers within this range were received. The house remained vacant after Mrs. Silberman left for Wisconsin, until eventually a buyer was found.
In late June 1975 plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. George Duckett, a black couple, conferred with Smetana about purchasing a house
Question: Did the court refuse to rule on the merits of the appeal because of a threshhold issue other than lack of jurisdiction, standing, mootness, failure to state a claim, exhaustion, timeliness, immunity, frivolousness, or nonjusticiable political question?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_district | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify which district in the state the case came from. If the case did not come from a federal district court, answer "not applicable".
UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner-Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 63.04 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATE AT LIDO BEACH, NEAR CITY OF LONG BEACH, TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD, COUNTY OF NASSAU, State of NEW YORK, and Irving A. Nemerov et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 251, Docket 24886.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued March 14, 1958.
Decided June 24, 1958.
Paul Windels, Brooklyn, N. Y., for defendants-appellants. (On the brief: Nathan D. Shapiro, Brooklyn, N. Y., for Bessie N. Shapiro, Samuel Kresberg and Benjamin Kresberg; Jacob Patent, Brooklyn, N. Y., for Gilbert D. Paisner et al.; Leonard R. Fisher, New York City, for Irving A. Nemerov; Isidor E. Leinwand, New York City, for Sam H. Lipson, Trustee in Bankruptcy for William T. Nemerov and Joseph Margolis.)
Harry T. Dolan, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., for petitioner-plaintiff-appellee. (On the brief: Perry W. Morton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roger P. Marquis and Elizabeth Dudley, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.)
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, HINCKS, Circuit Judge, and BRENNAN, District Judge.
PER CURIAM.
Shortly after the remand of this condemnation case as ordered in our earlier opinion, 245 F.2d 140, Chief Judge Inch, who had served as trier at the first trial, assigned the case for prompt hearing and announced that he construed the appellate order to require only a reopening of the judgment and of the record already made to permit of the introduction of evidence of the September 1954 sale, the exclusion of which had been the only ground of reversal. We think this interpretation not unreasonable: it is consistent with procedure sanctioned when a trial judge grants a “motion for a new trial” under Rule 59(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Even though the opinion several times spoke of a “new trial” and remanded “for a new trial on the valuation of the condemned property,” it also noted that the “new trial” was necessary only because of the exclusion of the September sale and thus might be deemed to imply that the proceedings on remand need go no further than to expand the record by proofs as to the September sale and a redetermination of the value on the record thus enlarged. This interpretation was obviously in harmony with considerations of expedition and of economy in judicial administration. Cf. United States v. City of New York, 2 Cir., 165 F.2d 526. And the practice which it envisaged had previously been utilized in this circuit. United States v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 168 F.2d 393 ; United States v. 25.4 Acres of Land, D. C., 83 F.Supp. 433; Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173; Riordan v. Ferguson, 147 F.2d 983. If the defendants, when first informed of the Judge’s ruling, had promptly applied to the panel of this court which had handed down the former opinion for a clarification, cf. National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 2 Cir., 198 F.2d 927, it is highly likely, especially in view of the cases just above cited, that Judge Inch’s interpretation of the mandate would have been approved. In view of all the foregoing, we dispose of the defendants’ principal ground of appeal by sustaining Judge Inch’s action in limiting the scope of the proceedings on remand.
Other grounds of appeal are still less tenable. In view of the limited scope of the proceedings, we think the celerity with which the hearing was scheduled and held was not improper. The denial of the motion for trial by jury first made after the remand was not erroneous. And we find no error in denying on July 3, 1957 the other requests in the defendants’ motion of June 28, 1957.
Question: From which district in the state was this case appealed?
A. Not applicable
B. Eastern
C. Western
D. Central
E. Middle
F. Southern
G. Northern
H. Whole state is one judicial district
I. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_9-3 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "miscellaneous".
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Thomas Robert HOSMER, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 7639.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Dec. 4, 1970.
U. Charles Remmel, II, Portland, Me., by appointment of the Court, with whom Thompson, Willard, Hewes & Smith, Portland, Me., was on brief for defendant-appellant.
Roy R. Bartlett, Associate Gen. Counsel, Selective Service System, with whom Clarence R. Harris, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Selective Service System, Washington, D. C., and Peter Mills, U. S. Atty., Portland, Me., were on brief, for appellee.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, McENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
McENTEE, Circuit Judge.
Defendant was convicted of refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces of the United States in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1964). He had duly registered with his local draft board in Kennebunk, Maine, on August 29, 1961, shortly after his eighteenth birthday. From January 1964 until August 1968 he held a student deferment, except for a brief period during the winter of 1964-65 when he was reclassified I-A apparently because he had dropped out of college. On September 30, 1968, the local draft board ordered him to report for induction on October 23. But upon learning that he had obtained employment as a teacher at the Hampshire Country School in Rindge, New Hampshire, the board postponed his induction until June 1, 1969.
On May 6,1969, defendant was ordered to report for induction on June 19. Three days later he wrote to the local board claiming a recurrence of a past knee injury, which he substantiated by letters from two doctors. On June 11 the board arranged for defendant’s knee to be examined by an orthopedic specialist in Portland, Maine. Subsequent to that examination, he “fled” to Canada for two weeks and failed to report for induction on June 19. On June 30 he appeared at the local board office and informed the clerk that he had “evaded the draft.” Upon his request for a new induction date, he was ordered to report on August 27. Defendant was notified on July 1 that the Portland physician had found him physically qualified to serve in the armed forces, and on August 26 he wrote to the Surgeon General’s office in Hampton, Virginia, complaining that he had not been properly examined. He reported for induction on August 27, was found qualified but, after all of the proper warnings, refused to step forward.
On September 17 defendant was interviewed by a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He was arrested on October 14, prior to which time he had consulted a Portland and also a Boston attorney. On October 24 he wrote the local board, “I believe that I am a Conscientious Objector.” The board promptly mailed him SSS Form 150
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "miscellaneous"?
A. miscellaneous interstate conflict
B. other federalism issue (only code as issue if opinion explicitly discusses federalism as an important issue - or if opinion explicity discusses conflict of state power vs federal power)
C. attorneys (disbarment; etc)
D. selective service or draft issues (which do not include 1st amendment challenges)
E. challenge to authority of magistrates, special masters, etc.
F. challenge to authority of bankruptcy judge or referees in bankruptcy
G. Indian law - criminal verdict challenged due to interpretation of tribal statutes or other indian law
H. Indian law - commercial disputes based on interpretation of Indian treaties or law (includes disputes over mineral rights)
I. Indian law - Indian claims acts and disputes over real property (includes Alaska Native Claims Act)
J. Indian law - federal regulation of Indian land and affairs
K. Indian law - state/local authority over Indian land and affairs
L. Indian law - tribal regulation of economic activities (includes tribal taxation)
M. other Indian law
N. international law
O. immigration (except civil rights claims of immigrants and aliens)
P. other
Q. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_respond2_7_3 | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the second listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the race or ethnic identity of this litigant as identified in the opinion. Names may be used to classify a person as hispanic if there is little ambiguity. All aliens are coded as "not ascertained".
Gene ALBRIGHT and Bettie J. Page, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The GOOD SHEPHERD HOSPITAL, dba Good Shepherd Medical Center and The Board of Trustees of the Good Shepherd Hospital, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 89-2279
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
April 16, 1990.
John M. Smith, Harbour, Smith, Harris & Cammack, Longview, Tex., Erin E. Lunee-ford, Wood, Luckinger & Epstein, Houston, Tex., Hugh M. Smith, Glen Rose, Tex., for defendants-appellants.
Larry R. Daves, San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before REAVLEY, KING and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendants The Good Shepherd Hospital and its Board of Trustees (collectively “Good Shepherd”) appeal a judgment awarding attorney’s fees and expenses to plaintiffs Gene Albright and Bettie J. Page under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We vacate the award and remand.
I.
Albright initiated this case by suing Good Shepherd under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages resulting from his termination as Personnel Director of Good Shepherd and his subsequent arrest by the Longview Police Department for distributing leaflets on hospital property. His claims were consolidated with those of Page, who sought damages under state law, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for her alleged wrongful termination from Good Shepherd. A jury returned a verdict and an award of damages for each plaintiff. Additionally, the district court found that Good Shepherd had discriminated against Page on the basis of race, in violation of section 1981 and Title VII, and awarded back pay, reinstatement, and accommodations at work for a shoulder injury. Albright v. Longview Police Dep't, 884 F.2d 835, 837-38 (5th Cir.1989). The district court subsequently awarded Page and Albright, who were represented by the same attorney, $74,012.95 in attorney’s fees and $2,342.01 in expenses, as prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The award did not delineate which portion was attributable to each plaintiff’s case.
On appeal of the merits, a Fifth Circuit panel reversed the judgment for Albright’s section 1983 claim and remanded for consideration of Albright’s false arrest claim under state tort law. Id. at 841-43. However, the panel affirmed the judgment for Page on her state and federal claims. Id. at 844. Good Shepherd now appeals the award of attorney’s fees and costs, pointing out that to recover attorney’s fees under section 1988 one must prevail under an applicable federal statute. Since Albright’s section 1983
Question: This question concerns the second listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the race or ethnic identity of this litigant as identified in the opinion?
A. not ascertained
B. caucasian - specific indication in opinion
C. black - specific indication in opinion
D. native american - specific indication in opinion
E. native american - assumed from name
F. asian - specific indication in opinion
G. asian - assumed from name
H. hispanic - specific indication in opinion
I. hispanic - assumed from name
J. other
Answer: |
sc_lcdispositiondirection | A | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations
LINDH v. MURPHY, WARDEN
No. 96-6298.
Argued April 14, 1997
Decided June 23, 1997
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 337.
James S. Liebman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Richard C. Neuhoff and Keith A. Findley.
Sally L. Wellman, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was James E. Doyle, Attorney General
Judy Clarke and Lisa Kemler filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, and Simon B. Karas and Jon C. Walden, Assistant Attorneys General, Christine 0. Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington, and Paul D. Weisser and John J. Samson, Assistant Attorneys General, John M. Bailey, Chief States Attorney of Connecticut, and Gus F. Diaz, Acting Attorney General of Guam, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert Butterworth of Florida,
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer: |
songer_counsel1 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine the nature of the counsel for the appellant. If name of attorney was given with no other indication of affiliation, assume it is private - unless a government agency was the party
In re Weiner MERCHANT, Debtor. ANDREWS UNIVERSITY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Weiner MERCHANT, Defendants Appellee.
No. 90-1969.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued Sept. 16, 1991.
Decided March 11, 1992.
Robert A. Yingst, Holly F. Underwood (argued and briefed), Boothby, Ziprick & Yingst, Berrien Springs, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.
Weiner Merchant, pro se.
Before KEITH and NORRIS, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSTONE, District Judge.
The Honorable Edward H. Johnstone, United States District Judge for the Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
JOHNSTONE, District Judge.
Andrews University appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan holding in a chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding that (1) an educational bank loan guaranteed by a private educational institution is discharge-able, (2) a private educational institution’s extensions of credit for educational expenses are dischargeable, and (3) a prepetition creditor violates 11 U.S.C. § 362 by withholding the transcript of a debtor-student. For the reasons given, the order of the district court is reversed in part and affirmed in part.
I.
, Weiner Merchant, a citizen of Great Britain, came to the United States to attend Andrews University. Merchant received a loan from Michigan National Bank to pay a portion of her educational expenses. The Bank made the loan in connection with a student loan program arranged with the University. The program included a provision to give the Bank full recourse against the University in the event a student defaults on the debt.
In addition to the Bank loan, Merchant received assistance for educational expenses which are evidenced by promissory notes payable to the University.
After graduation, Merchant defaulted on both her obligations to the Bank and the University. The University, pursuant to the guaranty agreement, paid the Bank, took assignment of the note, and became the sole student loan creditor for Merchant’s educational expenses.
One year after graduation, faced with $28,892.40 in debts, of which $23,614.00 was attributable to these educational loans, Merchant filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy. Soon thereafter, in an effort to gain citizenship, Merchant asked the University for a copy of her academic transcript. When her request was refused she filed an adversary proceeding against the University claiming its refusal violated the automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The University claimed that both the educational loan and credit extensions are excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) and thus it had a right to withhold the transcript.
The bankruptcy court held that neither the Bank loan nor the extensions of credit fall within the exceptions to discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) and that the University violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) by withholding the transcript. On appeal, the district court affirmed.
Three issues are raised in this appeal. First, whether educational loans, made by commercial lenders and guaranteed by private educational institutions, are discharge-able under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). Next, whether extensions of credit for educational expenses are dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). Finally, whether a school may withhold the transcript of a student who has defaulted on educational loans and filed for bankruptcy under chapter 7.
II.
Under In re Vause, 886 F.2d 794, 798 (6th Cir.1989), the court applies a de novo standard of review in determining Congress’ intent when enacting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). This statute provides:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b) or
Question: What is the nature of the counsel for the appellant?
A. none (pro se)
B. court appointed
C. legal aid or public defender
D. private
E. government - US
F. government - state or local
G. interest group, union, professional group
H. other or not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_treat | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below; i.e., how the decision below is "treated" by the appeals court. That is, the basic outcome of the case for the litigants, indicating whether the appellant or respondent "won" in the court of appeals.
ALEXANDRINE v. COE, Commissioner of Patents.
Patent Appeal No. 6107.
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
Argued April 3, 1934.
Decided May 14, 1934.
Maurice Leon, of New York City, and Edmund H. Parry, Jr., of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
T. A. Hostetler, Solicitor of the Patent Office, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, HITZ, and GRO-NER, Associate Justices.
ROBB, Associate Justice.
Appeal from a decree in the Supreme Court of the District dismissing appellant’s bill to enjoin the Commissioner of Patents from canceling appellant’s trade-mark No. 206729, for gloves, registered December 8, 1925, and consisting of a fanciful design with the word “Alexandrine” across it.
in August, 1928, Marshall Field & Co., an Illinois corporation, applied for the registration, under the 10-year clause of section 5 (b) of the Trade Mark Act of 1905 (33 Stat. 724, 725), as amended (section 85 (b), tit. 15, U. S. C., 15 USCA § 85 (b), of the name “Alexandre” for gloves. Thereupon interference was declared between the two marks and, after due proceedings, priority was awarded to Marshall Field & Co., as a result of which registration was granted to that company.
In December, 1931, Marshall Field & Co. instituted proceedings in the Patent Office for the cancellation of appellant’s trademark. The application was sustained by the Examiner of Interferences, and on October 18, 1932, was affirmed by the Commissioner. Thereupon, on December 5, 1932) appellant filed this bill under section 4915, R. S., as amended (section 63, tit. 35, U. S. C., 35 US CA § 63). On December 7, 1932, due notice was given Marshall Field & Co. The court below ruled that Marshall Field & Co., being an adver'se party in the Patent Office, is an indispensable party to this suit and that the Commissioner of Patents is neither a necessary nor a proper party.
The answers to the questions involved are to be found in United States ex rel. Baldwin Co. v. Robertson, 265 ü. S. 168, 44 S. Ct. 508, 68 L. Ed. 962. The Baldwin Company filed a bill in the Supreme Court of the District against the Commissioner of Patents to enjoin that officer from canceling two registered trade-marks claimed by it. The Howard Company intervened and resisted the injunction to prevent the cancellation. The Commissioner of Patents filed an answer denying the right of the Baldwin Company to the relief sought.
The court said (265 U. S. at page 177, 44 S. Ct. 508, 509, 68 L. Ed. 962) that the main question to be considered was whether “by the statutes applicable to procedure in settling controversies over the registration of trade-marks in interstate and foreign trade, a remedy by bill in equity to enjoin the Commissioner of Patents from canceling a registered trade-mark is given to the owner of the trade-mark so registered.” The court further said (page 179 of 265 U. S., 44 S. Ct. 508, 510): “The defeated party in the hearing before the Commissioner is not asking registration of a trade-mark, but is
Question: What is the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed; or affirmed and petition denied
C. reversed (include reversed & vacated)
D. reversed and remanded (or just remanded)
E. vacated and remanded (also set aside & remanded; modified and remanded)
F. affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified or affirmed and modified)
G. affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. certification to another court
K. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_respondent | 028 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
001. attorney general of the United States, or his office
002. specified state board or department of education
003. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
004. state commission, board, committee, or authority
005. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
006. court or judicial district
007. state department or agency
008. governmental employee or job applicant
009. female governmental employee or job applicant
010. minority governmental employee or job applicant
011. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
012. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
013. retired or former governmental employee
014. U.S. House of Representatives
015. interstate compact
016. judge
017. state legislature, house, or committee
018. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
019. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
020. state or U.S. supreme court
021. local school district or board of education
022. U.S. Senate
023. U.S. senator
024. foreign nation or instrumentality
025. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
026. state college or university
027. United States
028. State
029. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
030. advertising business or agency
031. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
032. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
033. airline
034. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
035. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
036. American Medical Association
037. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
038. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
039. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
040. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
041. author, copyright holder
042. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
043. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
044. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
045. water transportation, stevedore
046. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
047. brewery, distillery
048. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
049. construction industry
050. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
051. business, corporation
052. buyer, purchaser
053. cable TV
054. car dealer
055. person convicted of crime
056. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
057. chemical company
058. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
059. religious organization, institution, or person
060. private club or facility
061. coal company or coal mine operator
062. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
063. consumer, consumer organization
064. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
065. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
066. defendant
067. debtor
068. real estate developer
069. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
070. distributor
071. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
072. drug manufacturer
073. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
074. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
075. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
076. electric equipment manufacturer
077. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
078. eleemosynary institution or person
079. environmental organization
080. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
081. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
082. father
083. female employee or job applicant
084. female
085. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
086. fisherman or fishing company
087. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
088. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
089. franchiser
090. franchisee
091. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
092. person who guarantees another's obligations
093. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
094. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
095. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
096. hospital, medical center
097. husband, or ex-husband
098. involuntarily committed mental patient
099. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
100. insurance company, or surety
101. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
102. investor
103. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
104. juvenile
105. government contractor
106. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
107. magazine
108. male
109. medical or Medicaid claimant
110. medical supply or manufacturing co.
111. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
112. minority female employee or job applicant
113. manufacturer
114. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
115. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
116. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
117. mother
118. auto manufacturer
119. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
120. radio and television network, except cable tv
121. nonprofit organization or business
122. nonresident
123. nuclear power plant or facility
124. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
125. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
126. tender offer
127. oil company, or natural gas producer
128. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
129. out of state noncriminal defendant
130. political action committee
131. parent or parents
132. parking lot or service
133. patient of a health professional
134. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
135. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
136. public interest organization
137. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
138. pipe line company
139. package, luggage, container
140. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
141. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
142. indigent defendant
143. private person
144. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
145. professional organization, business, or person
146. probationer, or parolee
147. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
148. public utility
149. publisher, publishing company
150. radio station
151. racial or ethnic minority
152. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
153. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
154. realtor
155. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
156. resident
157. restaurant, food vendor
158. retarded person, or mental incompetent
159. retired or former employee
160. railroad
161. private school, college, or university
162. seller or vendor
163. shipper, including importer and exporter
164. shopping center, mall
165. spouse, or former spouse
166. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
167. retail business or outlet
168. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
169. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
170. tenant or lessee
171. theater, studio
172. forest products, lumber, or logging company
173. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
174. trucking company, or motor carrier
175. television station
176. union member
177. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
178. union, labor organization, or official of
179. veteran
180. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
181. wholesale trade
182. wife, or ex-wife
183. witness, or person under subpoena
184. network
185. slave
186. slave-owner
187. bank of the united states
188. timber company
189. u.s. job applicants or employees
190. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
191. Atomic Energy Commission
192. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
193. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
194. Alien Property Custodian
195. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
196. Board of Immigration Appeals
197. Bureau of Indian Affairs
198. Bonneville Power Administration
199. Benefits Review Board
200. Civil Aeronautics Board
201. Bureau of the Census
202. Central Intelligence Agency
203. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
204. Department or Secretary of Commerce
205. Comptroller of Currency
206. Consumer Product Safety Commission
207. Civil Rights Commission
208. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
209. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
210. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
211. Drug Enforcement Agency
212. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
213. Department or Secretary of Energy
214. Department or Secretary of the Interior
215. Department of Justice or Attorney General
216. Department or Secretary of State
217. Department or Secretary of Transportation
218. Department or Secretary of Education
219. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
220. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
221. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
222. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
223. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
224. Federal Bureau of Prisons
225. Farm Credit Administration
226. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
227. Federal Credit Union Administration
228. Food and Drug Administration
229. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
230. Federal Energy Administration
231. Federal Election Commission
232. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
233. Federal Housing Administration
234. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
235. Federal Labor Relations Authority
236. Federal Maritime Board
237. Federal Maritime Commission
238. Farmers Home Administration
239. Federal Parole Board
240. Federal Power Commission
241. Federal Railroad Administration
242. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
243. Federal Reserve System
244. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
245. Federal Trade Commission
246. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
247. General Accounting Office
248. Comptroller General
249. General Services Administration
250. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
251. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
252. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
253. Interstate Commerce Commission
254. Indian Claims Commission
255. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
256. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
257. Information Security Oversight Office
258. Department or Secretary of Labor
259. Loyalty Review Board
260. Legal Services Corporation
261. Merit Systems Protection Board
262. Multistate Tax Commission
263. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
264. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
265. National Credit Union Administration
266. National Endowment for the Arts
267. National Enforcement Commission
268. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
269. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
270. National Mediation Board
271. National Railroad Adjustment Board
272. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
273. National Security Agency
274. Office of Economic Opportunity
275. Office of Management and Budget
276. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
277. Office of Personnel Management
278. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
279. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
280. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
281. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
282. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
283. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
284. U.S. Public Health Service
285. Postal Rate Commission
286. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
287. Renegotiation Board
288. Railroad Adjustment Board
289. Railroad Retirement Board
290. Subversive Activities Control Board
291. Small Business Administration
292. Securities and Exchange Commission
293. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
294. Selective Service System
295. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
296. Tennessee Valley Authority
297. United States Forest Service
298. United States Parole Commission
299. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
300. United States Sentencing Commission
301. Veterans' Administration
302. War Production Board
303. Wage Stabilization Board
304. General Land Office of Commissioners
305. Transportation Security Administration
306. Surface Transportation Board
307. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
308. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
309. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
310. Unidentifiable
311. International Entity
Answer: |
songer_applfrom | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court).
Darrell G. NIMNICHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DICK EVANS, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 72-3125
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
March 19, 1973.
Darryl J. Tschirn, C. T. Williams, Jr., New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.
John O. Charrier, Jr., New Orleans, La., for defendants-appellees.
Before GEWIN, COLEMAN and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.
Rule 18, 5 Cir.; See Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Company of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.
PER CURIAM:
This is a seaman’s action for damages for personal injuries sustained while working on a barge off the coast of Louisiana.
Darrell G. Nimnicht was employed by Dick Evans, Inc. on Lay Barge No. 23 owned by J. Ray McDermott and Company, Inc. On February 13, 1970, Nimnicht was assigned to remove a small hand-operated hydraulic pump from a gondola cart on a total saturation diving system aboard Barge No. 23. The diving system was owned by Evans. This gondola cart was used to move a diving bell into position so that the divers could be transferred from the system to the bell and vice-versa. While in the process of removing this pump, Nimnicht sustained an injury to his back.
Alleging the unseaworthiness of the barge and negligence of his employer, Nimnicht filed suit under the Jones Act and General Maritime Law against Evans, McDermott, and McDermott’s insurer, Travelers Insurance Company. The case was submitted to the jury on interrogatories.
On the special interrogatories submitted to it, the jury found that Nimnicht was a seaman but that his employer was not negligent and that the barge was not unseaworthy. Nevertheless, in response to another interrogatory pertaining to compensatory damages, the jury entered an award of $13,500. In addition, the jury made certain findings regarding maintenance and cure which are not on appeal here. The relevant interrogatories answered by the jury are as follows:
1. Was plaintiff, Darrell G. Nimnicht, injured aboard McDermott Barge #23 on February 13, 1970?
A. Yes.
2. Was plaintiff a seaman or a member of the crew of Mc-Dermott #23?
A. Yes.
3. Was the barge McDermott #23 unseaworthy?
A. No.
5. Did Dick Evans own, operate, control or have an operational interest in the barge in question?
A. Yes.
6. Was the defendant, Dick Evans, Inc., through its employees, negligent?
A. No.
9. Was the plaintiff, Darrell Nimnicht, negligent?
A. No.
11. Without any reduction for negligence on the part of the plaintiff, if any, what amount do you find will fairly and adequately compensate plaintiff for the damages he sustained?
A. $13,500.
After receiving the verdict responding to the interrogatories, the trial court pointed out to the jury that finding no negligence or unseaworthiness on the part of appellees there was no party which could be held liable to pay the damage award. Then, the Court, acting on the authority of Rule 49(b) F.R.Civ
Question: What is the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court)?
A. Trial (either jury or bench trial)
B. Injunction or denial of injunction or stay of injunction
C. Summary judgment or denial of summary judgment
D. Guilty plea or denial of motion to withdraw plea
E. Dismissal (include dismissal of petition for habeas corpus)
F. Appeals of post judgment orders (e.g., attorneys' fees, costs, damages, JNOV - judgment nothwithstanding the verdict)
G. Appeal of post settlement orders
H. Not a final judgment: interlocutory appeal
I. Not a final judgment: mandamus
J. Other (e.g., pre-trial orders, rulings on motions, directed verdicts) or could not determine nature of final judgment
K. Does not fit any of the above categories, but opinion mentions a "trial judge"
L. Not applicable (e.g., decision below was by a federal administrative agency, tax court)
Answer: |
songer_initiate | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify what party initiated the appeal. For cases with cross appeals or multiple docket numbers, if the opinion does not explicitly indicate which appeal was filed first, assumes that the first litigant listed as the "appellant" or "petitioner" was the first to file the appeal. In federal habeas corpus petitions, consider the prisoner to be the plaintiff.
MINE HILL & SCHUYLKILL HAVEN R. CO. v. SMITH.
Nos. 10171, 10172.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit
Argued June 9, 1950.
Decided Oct. 4, 1950.
Morse Garwood, Philadelphia, (Harold Evans, Philadelphia, Pa., MacCoy, Evans & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.
Harry Baum, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen. (Theron Lamar Caudle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ellis N. Slack, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., and Gerald A. Gleeson, U. S. Atty., and Thomas J. Curtin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before MARIS, GOODRICH and KALODNER, Circuit Judges.
KALODNER, Circuit Judge.
These are appeals from judgments f&r the defendant entered by the District Court in two actions brought by the Mine Hill & Schuylkill Haven Railroad Company (“taxpayer”) for the recovery of income taxes.
The cases involve a common question, but different tax years. They were consolidated for trial in the Court below and for argument in this Court.
The facts as stipulated and found by the District Court may be summarized as follows :
Taxpayer owns certain railroad lines in eastern Pennsylvania which are leased to the Reading Company under a 999 year lease entered into in 1896. The lease required the Reading Company to maintain the lines in good order and repair, but expressly excepted from this requirement any lines or portions thereof “which are or may be from time to time used exclusively by any one colliery which is now or may hereafter be abandoned, or the working thereof may be discontinued, or which does not furnish and supply sufficient traffic to pay the needful repairs and expenses of the portion of said railroad leading to said colliery.”
No. 10,171
In 1941 taxpayer and the Reading Company jointly filed an application with the Interstate Commerce Commission for a certificate of public convenience permitting taxpayer to abandon certain branch lines of a total distance of 5.89 miles. The application and Return to Questionnaire stated that these lines had not been operated or maintained since 1933, that practically all the ties were decayed and a substantial part of the rails and track materials had been stolen, that there had been no train service or traffic over them for many years, and that the collieries which these lines were constructed to serve had been abandoned for some years.
In 1942 the Interstate Commerce Commission granted the application on the grounds requested and issued a certificate of convenience authorizing taxpayer and the Reading Company to abandon the lines.
In its income tax return for 1942 taxpayer claimed a loss deduction of $95,078.05, on the theory that the lines had been abandoned in that year. The amount of loss claimed represented taxpayer’s investment in the lines less salvage value. The Commissioner disallowed the claim. The taxpayer then paid the resulting deficiency and when its claim for refund was rejected brought suit in the District Court.
No. 10,172
In 1943 taxpayer and the Reading Company jointly filed another application with the Interstate Commerce Commission for a certificate of public convenience permitting taxpayer to abandon a certain branch line of a total distance of 2.06 miles. The application and Return to Questionnaire stated that the line had not been operated or maintained for the past 12 years, the track proposed to be abandoned was in a poor state of maintenance with some of the rails and ties missing, that there had been no train service or traffic over it for many years, and that the colliery served by it 'had long since been abandoned.
Within the same year the Interstate Commerce Commission granted the application on the grounds requested and issued a certificate of convenience authorizing taxpayer and the Reading Company to abandon the line.
In its income tax return for 1943 taxpayer claimed a loss deduction of $69,324.28, on the theory that the line had been abandoned in that year. The amount of loss claimed represented taxpayer’s investment less estimated salvage value. Actual salvage
Question: What party initiated the appeal?
A. Original plaintiff
B. Original defendant
C. Federal agency representing plaintiff
D. Federal agency representing defendant
E. Intervenor
F. Not applicable
G. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_treat | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below; i.e., how the decision below is "treated" by the appeals court. That is, the basic outcome of the case for the litigants, indicating whether the appellant or respondent "won" in the court of appeals.
Eda Mae PAGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BARKO HYDRAULICS, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 80-3642.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
April 16, 1982.
Frank S. Thackston, Jr., Greenville, Miss., for plaintiff-appellant.
Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada, Walter G. Watkins, Jr., Roger C. Land-rum, Jackson, Miss., for defendant-appellee.
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, THORN-BERRY and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
CLARK, Chief Judge:
Rufus Page, an employee of the City of Greenville, Mississippi, died in the course of his employment when he was engulfed in flames while operating a hydraulic knuckle-boom loader manufactured by Barko Hydraulics, Inc. His mother, Eda Mae Page, administratrix of her son’s estate, brought a wrongful death action in the Circuit Court of Washington County, Mississippi against Barko and the City on theories of strict liability in tort and negligence. Page settled with the City and thereafter Barko removed the case to the United States District Court claiming diversity jurisdiction. At the conclusion of the evidence the district court directed a verdict for Barko on the strict liability claim. The negligence claim was permitted to' go to the jury, which returned a verdict for Barko. Applying Mississippi law, we affirm the jury’s verdict, but reverse the directed verdict and remand for a new trial on the issue of strict liability.
The limb loader, as it is called by the parties, is a machine designed to be mounted on a truck. It has hydraulically powered arms located at the end of a boom which can pick up felled tree limbs and load them onto the bed of the truck for removal and disposal. The limb loader in question was sold to the City by one of Barko’s dealers, Tri-State Equipment Company of Memphis, Tennessee. City of Greenville employees originally mounted the limb loader on one of the city’s trucks. After that vehicle was involved in a minor accident the limb loader was removed and mounted on a second city truck. The proof at trial demonstrated that the method of mounting on both trucks conformed to Barko’s instructions.
The parties stipulated in the pre-trial order that the day prior to the fatal fire, August 16, 1978, there were two fires on the limb loader, and that Rufus Page reported these fires to the city maintenance shop. A city mechanic, Eugene Watson, went out to where Page was working and determined that a hose coupling known as the Aeroquip 90° coupling, or swivel, was leaking hydraulic fluid. Watson brought the swivel back to the city shop for repair. He took it apart and then consulted with his superior, Oscar Worbington. Together, they discovered that the leak resulted from two worn “0” rings in the swivel. Lacking identical replacement parts, Watson and Worbington proceeded to insert four smaller “0” rings into the space provided for the original two. They then reconnected the parts of the swivel and used the original snap ring to lock them back together. Watson reattached the swivel onto the limb loader, and then watched the machine operate for several minutes without incident. Watson testified that he returned that afternoon to where Page was operating the limb loader and once again found no leaking from the repaired swivel.
The fatal fire occurred the next morning approximately thirty minutes after Page began operating the limb loader. The parties stipulated that the Aeroquip swivel separated, allowing hydraulic fluid to spew onto the truck’s hot exhaust manifold which caused it to ignite. The manifold was hot because the truck’s engine had to be running for the limb loader to operate.
Question: What is the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed; or affirmed and petition denied
C. reversed (include reversed & vacated)
D. reversed and remanded (or just remanded)
E. vacated and remanded (also set aside & remanded; modified and remanded)
F. affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified or affirmed and modified)
G. affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. certification to another court
K. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_opinstat | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify whether the opinion writter is identified in the opinion or whether the opinion was per curiam.
REPUBLIC OF FRANCE and Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Appellees.
No. 18064.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Aug. 24, 1962.
Edwin Longcope, New York City, Clarence S. Eastham, Houston, Tex., for appellants.
John R. Greene, Asst. U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., Samuel D. Slade, Carl C. Davis, Alan S. Rosenthal, Edward A. Groobert, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Preston Shirley, Galveston, Tex., for appellees.
Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and HUTCHESON, RIVES, CAMERON and JONES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
In entering the judgment in this ease pursuant to the opinion reported at 5 Cir., 290 F.2d 395, certiorari denied 369 U.S. 804, 82 S.Ct. 644, 7 L.Ed.2d 550, no express provision was made as to costs. The petitioners-appellants, Republic of France and Compagnie Generale Trans-atlantique, present their bill of costs, the correctness of which is not questioned, as follows:
"1. Clerk’s docketing fee $ 25.00
“2. Clerk’s charges for printing record on appeal 9,024.25
“3. Printing brief on appeal $ 75.00
“4. Proctor’s fee on appeal 100.00
“5. Transcript of oral argument on appeal 261.30
$9,485.55”
Petitioners-appellants concede that costs are not taxable against the United States, but, under New Orleans Coal & Bisso Towboat Co. v. United States, 5 Cir., 1937, 89 F.2d 967, move for an order allowing recovery to them of one half of the costs aforesaid from the claimant-ap-pellee, Texas City Terminal Railway Company.
Texas City Terminal, on its part, “has no quarrel with the total amount of costs listed by appellants in their motion,” “does not here contest the ruling in New Orleans Coal & Bisso Towboat Co. v. United States, et al.,” and “recognizes that it is responsible for some of the costs in this Court.” It states its position as follows:
“(1) Reconstruction Finance Corporation, as a separate corporate entity, filed its claim contesting the limitation proceedings and continued to do so (R. 114, 119 and 188). Under the authority of R. F. C. v. [J. G.] Menihan, 312 U.S. 81 [61 S.Ct. 485, 85 L.Ed. 595], it should bear its proper proportion of the costs.
“(2) As a prerequisite for assessing costs, Appellants must show who were and who were not Appellees and under the record in this case, it appears that there may be numerous Appellees who under the prior rulings of this Court would also share in the cost assessment.”
Position (2) may be quickly disposed of by noting that the only appellee other than the United States was the Texas City Terminal Railway Company. As said in our original opinion:
“The claims of all persons who made assignments to the United States were dismissed on January 27, 1958. Many persons who had not made assignments to the United States thereafter voluntarily withdrew their claims. The only remaining claimant, other than the United States, is the Texas City Railway Terminal Co. That Company did not file under the Texas City Relief Act because it was not willing to assign an uninsured loss of nearly five million dollars for the $25,000.00 maximum allowed under the Relief Act. In addition to its assigned claims, the United States filed a claim in the amount of $350,000, as successor to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, for the loss of goods in a warehouse awaiting loading on another vessel.”
Republic of France v. United States, 5 Cir., 1961, 290 F.2d 395, 396.
Thus, as the issue remains, the petitioners-appellants contend that Texas City Terminal should be assessed one half of the taxable costs. Texas City Terminal, on the other hand, relying upon R. F. C
Question: Is the opinion writer identified in the opinion, or was the opinion per curiam?
A. Signed, with reasons
B. Per curiam, with reasons
C. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_origin | H | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the type of court which made the original decision. Code cases removed from a state court as originating in federal district court. For "State court", include habeas corpus petitions after conviction in state court and petitions from courts of territories other than the U.S. District Courts. For "Special DC court", include courts other than the US District Court for DC. For "Other", include courts such as the Tax Court and a court martial.
COCHRAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 9386.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued June 4, 1947.
Decided July 9, 1947.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 19, 1947.
Morse Garwood, of Philadelphia, Pa. (Shippen Lewis and MacCoy, Brittain, Evans & Lewis, all of Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for petitioner.
Louise Foster, of Washington, D. C. (Sewall Key, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., and George A. Stinson, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., on the brief), for respondent.
Before McLAUGHLIN and O’CONNELL, Circuit Judges, and LEAHY, District Judge.
O’CONNELL, Circuit Judge.
In 1925, petitioner inherited real estate valued at $67,000 in the decedent’s estate tax return. In 1927, she sold the property. The sale price was $97,500, of which $27,-500 was paid in cash and the remaining $70,000 was covered by a purchase money bond and mortgage bearing 6% interest. She did not report the taxable gain in either her 1927 or any subsequent income tax return.
In 1932, on the due date of the mortgage, the purchaser defaulted. Petitioner agreed to let the purchaser remain on the property in return for the payment of the 6% interest as it accrued. This arrangement continued until 1936, when the interest rate was reduced to 3%.
In 1941, the purchaser failed to pay the interest and asked that the mortgage be reduced from $70,000 to $5,000. This request was refused. Petitioner investigated the' purchaser’s financial condition, as a result of which she concluded that the mortgage debt, over and above the value of the collateral, was uncollectible. She thereupon instructed her agent to write off on the agent’s records the difference between $70,-000 and $26,800, the value of the property at that time. Entry on the agent’s records-was made accordingly, and petitioner claimed on her 1941 return the difference, $43,200, as a partial bad debt deduction. Respondent, disallowing most of that deduction, determined a deficiency in petitioner’s 1941 tax return.
In an unreported memorandum opinion, the Tax Court held that petitioner was entitled to claim a partial bad debt in 1941, since that was the date when “she ascertained * * * that the debtor had no assets other than the property in question from which she might reasonably have expected to make any substantial recovery on the indebtedness.” The Tax Court further held, however, that petitioner had erred in computing the deduction. It said, “No evidence was offered by petitioner as to the value of the note as of the date of ■sale in 1927. The only evidence in the case •as to such value is the determination by the respondent fixing said value at $37,238.75 * * *.” Petitioner was accordingly held entitled to a deduction of only $10,438.75.
Petitioner urges that the purchase money bond and mortgage in 1927 was worth its face value, $70,000. The Tax 'Court finding is alleged to be wrong on two grounds: (a) petitioner did introduce evidence of the value of the note, in that the sale price of $97,500 was evidence that the note was worth face value, and (b) respondent’s “deficiency letter is not evidence before the Tax Court, unless it is stipulated to be,” and consequently respondent’s valuation of $37,238.75 “was not in evidence at all.”
There can be no doubt that the value of the note in 1927 — be it $70,000, $37,238.75, or some third figure — as well as the value of the
Question: What type of court made the original decision?
A. Federal district court (single judge)
B. 3 judge district court
C. State court
D. Bankruptcy court, referee in bankruptcy, special master
E. Federal magistrate
F. Federal administrative agency
G. Special DC court
H. Other
I. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_r_subst | 1 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "sub-state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
In the Matter of JERSEY CITY MEDICAL CENTER, Debtor. Appeal of FINCH FUEL OIL COMPANY. Appeal of FINCH FUEL OIL COMPANY, a general
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "sub-state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
sc_issue_2 | 41 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES CORP. v. MALESKO
No. 00-860.
Argued October 1, 2001
Decided November 27, 2001
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-nor, Scajua, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 75. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 75.
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Frank R. Volpe, George P. Stasiuk, and Karen M. Morinelli.
Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Barbara L. Herwig, and Thomas M. Bondy.
Steven Pasternak argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was David C. Vladeck.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Elizabeth Alexander, Margaret Winter, David Fathi, and Steven R. Shapiro; and for the Legal Aid Society of the City of New York by Daniel L. Greenberg and John Boston.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We decide here whether the implied damages action first recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), should, be extended to allow recovery against a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons. We decline to so extend Bivens.
Petitioner Correctional Services
Question: What is the issue of the decision?
01. voting
02. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
03. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
04. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
05. desegregation, schools
06. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
07. affirmative action
08. slavery or indenture
09. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
10. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
11. debtors' rights
12. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
13. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
14. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
15. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
16. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
17. Indians, state jurisdiction over
18. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
19. poverty law, constitutional
20. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
21. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
22. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
23. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
24. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
25. military: active duty
26. military: veteran
27. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
28. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
29. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
30. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
31. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
32. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
33. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
34. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
35. indigents: payment of fine
36. indigents: costs or filing fees
37. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
38. indigents: transcript
39. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
40. indigents: miscellaneous
41. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
42. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
Answer: |
songer_appnatpr | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
William L. COMER Family Equity Pure Trust; Myra L. Comer, Trustee; William L. Comer & Myra, T.R.Y.E.-A. Trust; William L. Comer, Trustee, American Way Trust
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_r_natpr | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
Esther KOSBERG, Administratrix, Estate of Roberta Ann Clark, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER, INC., et al., Appellees.
No. 20792.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_fedlaw | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine whether there was an issue discussed in the opinion of the court about the interpretation of federal statute, and if so, whether the resolution of the issue by the court favored the appellant.
R. Wayne JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. O.L. McCOTTER, Director of Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 86-1219.
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Oct. 31, 1986.
R. Wayne Johnson, pro se.
David B. Fannin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellee.
Before RUBIN, RANDALL and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In 1978 Ronald Wayne Johnson was convicted of aggravated rape by a jury in Texas and was sentenced to serve ninety-nine years. On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction.
In 1984 Johnson filed a pro se § 2254 petition alleging that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the state court jury charge was fundamentally defective; (3) his court-appointed trial counsel was ineffective; and (4) his fourth amendment right to be free from unlawful search and seizure was violated. Johnson alleged his trial counsel was ineffective because he (1) failed to object to the allegedly defective jury charge; (2) failed to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress; (3) failed to argue on appeal that the evidence of his prior conviction was insufficient; and (4) failed to challenge the array of the jury. The district court denied Johnson’s petition.
In February 1985 Johnson filed the present pro se § 2254 petition alleging that his state court trial counsel was ineffective and that he was denied his constitutional right to represent himself at his state court trial. Specifically, Johnson claimed his counsel was ineffective because he (1) failed to conduct a proper pretrial investigation so as to present an insanity defense; (2) failed to file a motion for rehearing; (3) failed to present several witnesses; (4) failed to request a jury charge requiring the jury to disregard illegally obtained evidence; and (5) failed to request a jury charge that Johnson had a right to remain silent during the punishment phase of his trial. In his petition Johnson stated he did not present these grounds for his ineffective-assistance claim in his prior petition because he did not discover their legal significance until he performed legal research on September 1, 1984. Johnson also alleged he did not present his self-representation claim in his prior petition because he did not discover the legal basis for the claim until October 13, 1984, while in the Ector County Jail.
The state filed a motion to dismiss alleging that Johnson’s petition was an abuse of the writ. The state also filed an answer addressing the substantive merits of Johnson’s petition. Johnson filed responses in opposition to the state’s motion to dismiss and answer. After an evidentiary hearing was held on the substantive merits of Johnson’s petition, the district court dismissed Johnson’s petition. Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal.
I
Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foil. § 2254, provides:
Successive petitions. A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
“The purpose of [Rule 9(b)] is to avoid piecemeal litigation, with petitioners advancing claims one at a time.” Hamilton v. McCotter, 772 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Rudolph v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir.1984)). A habeas petitioner abuses the writ by failing to raise his present claim in a previous habeas petition without legal excuse. Daniels v. Blackburn, 763 F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir. 1985); Jones v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 159, 163 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 976, 104 S.Ct. 2356, 80 L.Ed.2d 829 (1984).
Abuse of the writ may be raised by the state or the
Question: Did the interpretation of federal statute by the court favor the appellant?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
sc_casesource | 031 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state.
Question: What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
001. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
002. U.S. Court of International Trade
003. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
004. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
005. U.S. Court of Military Review
006. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
007. U.S. Customs Court
008. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
009. U.S. Tax Court
010. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
011. U.S. Court for China
012. U.S. Consular Courts
013. U.S. Commerce Court
014. Territorial Supreme Court
015. Territorial Appellate Court
016. Territorial Trial Court
017. Emergency Court of Appeals
018. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
019. Bankruptcy Court
020. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
021. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
022. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
023. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
024. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
025. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
026. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
027. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
028. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
029. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
030. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
031. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
032. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
033. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
034. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
035. Alaska U.S. District Court
036. Arizona U.S. District Court
037. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
038. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
039. California Central U.S. District Court
040. California Eastern U.S. District Court
041. California Northern U.S. District Court
042. California Southern U.S. District Court
043. Colorado U.S. District Court
044. Connecticut U.S. District Court
045. Delaware U.S. District Court
046. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
047. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
048. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
049. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
050. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
051. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
052. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
053. Guam U.S. District Court
054. Hawaii U.S. District Court
055. Idaho U.S. District Court
056. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
057. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
058. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
059. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
060. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
061. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
062. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
063. Kansas U.S. District Court
064. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
065. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
066. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
067. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
068. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
069. Maine U.S. District Court
070. Maryland U.S. District Court
071. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
072. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
073. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
074. Minnesota U.S. District Court
075. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
076. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
077. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
078. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
079. Montana U.S. District Court
080. Nebraska U.S. District Court
081. Nevada U.S. District Court
082. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
083. New Jersey U.S. District Court
084. New Mexico U.S. District Court
085. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
086. New York Northern U.S. District Court
087. New York Southern U.S. District Court
088. New York Western U.S. District Court
089. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
090. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
091. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
092. North Dakota U.S. District Court
093. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
094. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
095. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
096. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
097. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
098. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
099. Oregon U.S. District Court
100. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
101. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
102. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
103. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
104. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
105. South Carolina U.S. District Court
106. South Dakota U.S. District Court
107. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
108. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
109. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
110. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
111. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
112. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
113. Texas Western U.S. District Court
114. Utah U.S. District Court
115. Vermont U.S. District Court
116. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
117. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
118. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
119. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
120. Washington Western U.S. District Court
121. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
122. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
123. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
124. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
125. Wyoming U.S. District Court
126. Louisiana U.S. District Court
127. Washington U.S. District Court
128. West Virginia U.S. District Court
129. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
130. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
131. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
132. Alabama U.S. District Court
133. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
134. Georgia U.S. District Court
135. Illinois U.S. District Court
136. Indiana U.S. District Court
137. Iowa U.S. District Court
138. Michigan U.S. District Court
139. Mississippi U.S. District Court
140. Missouri U.S. District Court
141. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
142. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
143. New York U.S. District Court
144. North Carolina U.S. District Court
145. Ohio U.S. District Court
146. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
147. Tennessee U.S. District Court
148. Texas U.S. District Court
149. Virginia U.S. District Court
150. Norfolk U.S. District Court
151. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
152. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
153. New Jersey U.S. District Court
154. California U.S. District Court
155. Florida U.S. District Court
156. Arkansas U.S. District Court
157. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
158. State Supreme Court
159. State Appellate Court
160. State Trial Court
161. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
162. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
163. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
164. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
165. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
166. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
167. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
168. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
169. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
170. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
171. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
172. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
173. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
174. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
175. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
176. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
177. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
178. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
179. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
180. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
181. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
182. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
183. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
184. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
185. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
186. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
187. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
188. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
189. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
190. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
191. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
192. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
193. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
194. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
195. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
196. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
197. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
198. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
199. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
200. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
201. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
202. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
203. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
204. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
205. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
206. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
207. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
208. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
209. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
210. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
211. Court of Private Land Claims
Answer: |
songer_stpolicy | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in any civil law cases including civil government, civil private, and diversity cases. The issue is: "Did the interpretation of state or local law, executive order, administrative regulation, doctrine, or rule of procedure by the court favor the appellant?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".
Alan ADAMS, Appellee, v. Roger AGNEW, et al., Appellants.
Nos. 88-7012, 88-7013.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Oct. 3, 1988.
Decided Oct. 28, 1988.
Harry F. Cole, Washington, D.C., for appellants.
Barry H. Gottfried, with whom Martin R. Leader and Andrew R. Polott, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellees.
Before RUTH BADER GINSBURG and SILBERMAN, Circuit Judges, and POLLACK, Senior United States District Judge.
Of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d).
Opinion Per Curiam.
PER CURIAM:
Moana Kai Broadcasting Associates and Agnew-Sachs Broadcasting, both general partnerships, were competing applicants for a permit from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) to construct an FM broadcast station in Honolulu, Hawaii. This case concerns the vitality of an agreement under which Agnew-Sachs would dismiss its permit application in exchange for payments from Moana Kai, personally guaranteed by George Kimble, one of Moana Kai’s principals. The district court, upon finding that the parties had reached an enforceable agreement, granted Moana Kai’s motion for a declaratory judgment.
We reverse. If indeed there was ever an enforceable agreement, a matter we need not and do not decide, the failure of Moana Kai promptly to demonstrate readiness to carry out its side of the bargain released Agnew-Sachs from its undertaking.
I.
The episode-in-suit opened when Moana Kai, Agnew-Sachs, and a third party, Alan Adams, filed mutually exclusive applications at the FCC for a permit to build and operate a new radio station in Honolulu. The FCC scheduled a comparative hearing for May 7, 1985. On May 6, Adams and Moana Kai agreed that Adams would dismiss his application in exchange for a 25 percent interest in Moana Kai and a payment of $15,000 by Moana Kai’s principals. Moana Kai and Agnew-Sachs, at that same time, were attempting to reach a settlement whereby Moana Kai would pay Agnew-Sachs to withdraw its application.
On May 7, the parties advised the FCC Administrative Law Judge (AU) of their negotiations and asked for additional time to complete them. The AU expressed concern, based on past experience with announced settlements that later fell apart; he therefore sought concrete assurance that the parties would reach a dispositive agreement. The next day, May 8, the parties submitted to the AU a Joint Motion to Suspend Hearing Dates (Joint Motion), reprinted in Appendix (App.) at 19-24, which set forth in some detail the terms that had been discussed and “agreed to in principle.” Id. at 1; App. at 19. According to the Joint Motion, Agnew-Sachs would dismiss its application in exchange for
Question: Did the interpretation of state or local law, executive order, administrative regulation, doctrine, or rule of procedure by the court favor the appellant?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_1-3-2 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "criminal - state offense".
Frank STEWART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles H. DAMERON, District Attorney ad hoc, East Baton Rouge Parish, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 71-1483
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Sept. 16, 1971.
Benjamin E. Smith, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.
Emile C. Rolfs, III, Baton Rouge, La., Durrett, Hardin, Hunter, Dameron & Fritehie, Baton Rouge, La., for Charles H. Dameron, Dist. Atty., Ad Hoc, defendant-appellee.
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr., Ralph L. Roy, Baton Rouge, La., for Sargent Pitcher.
Carlos G. Spaht, Baton Rouge, La., for John S. Covington,
Joseph F. Keogh, Baton Rouge, La., William M. Shaw, Homer, La., for Capt. Watson & Sargent Pitcher.
Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, INGRAHAM and RONEY, Circuit Judges.
Rule 18, 5 Cir.; See Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409.
INGRAHAM, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant Stewart brought this action seeking injunctive relief and damages under the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against defendants-appellees, who are various law enforcement officers for the Parish and City of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Plaintiff, a VISTA worker active in a black community in the Baton Rouge area, alleged that he was a victim of a police conspiracy to entrap him. Plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendants from further state court prosecution on a pending charge of conspiracy to commit murder.
The district court, after holding a hearing on the merits, denied the in-junctive relief sought and dismissed plaintiff’s suit, 321 F.Supp. 886. At this hearing the district court placed the burden of proof on the State to prove the good faith of its prosecution, and plaintiff Stewart was not allowed to put on any evidence concerning his allegations of bad faith prosecution and harassment. In essence, the court placed the entire burden of proof on the prosecution, a move to which both parties disagreed.
We hold that the district court erred by placing the burden of proof on the defendants. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for reconsideration in light of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and for the appropriate evidentiary hearing required thereby, in which plaintiff shall be allowed to introduce evidence regarding his allegations of bad faith prosecution and harassment.
Vacated and remanded.
. The attorney for defendant Dameron told the court:
“My appreciation of the law, your Honor, is that in a matter such as this, the plain-
tiff would be required to put on any evidence that he may have with respect to improper motivation of the prosecuting attorney.”
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "criminal - state offense"?
A. murder
B. rape
C. arson
D. aggravated assault
E. robbery
F. burglary
G. auto theft
H. larceny (over $50)
I. other violent crimes
J. narcotics
K. alcohol related crimes, prohibition
L. tax fraud
M. firearm violations
N. morals charges (e.g., gambling, prostitution, obscenity)
O. criminal violations of government regulations of business
P. other white collar crime (involving no force or threat of force; e.g., embezzlement, computer fraud,bribery)
Q. other state crimes
R. state offense, but specific crime not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_treat | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below; i.e., how the decision below is "treated" by the appeals court. That is, the basic outcome of the case for the litigants, indicating whether the appellant or respondent "won" in the court of appeals.
William Reece JOHNSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 622-69.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
April 17, 1970.
William L. Panagulis for plaintiff-appellant.
Richard Oxandale, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Robert J. Roth, U. S. Atty., on the brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before LEWIS, BREITENSTEIN and SETH, Circuit Judges.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Johnston was convicted in 1957 of bank robbery and the conviction was affirmed. Johnston v. United States, 10 Cir., 260 F.2d 345, cert. denied 360 U.S. 935, 80 S.Ct. 1454, 4 L.Ed.2d 1547. This is his seventh application for post-conviction relief.
The first was in 1960 on the ground that the trial judge was improperly assigned to the District of Kansas. It was denied and no appeal taken.
The second was in 1960 and alleged mental incompetency because of administration of drugs. After an evidentiary hearing, relief was denied and we affirmed. Johnston v. United States, 10 Cir., 292 F.2d 51, cert. denied 368 U.S. 906, 82 S.Ct. 186, 7 L.Ed.2d 100.
The third was in 1961 and was based on denial of the right of allocution. After a hearing, relief was denied and we again affirmed. Johnston v. United States, 10 Cir., 303 F.2d 343.
The fourth was in 1963 and claimed trial errors. It was denied without hearing and we affirmed. Johnston v. United States, 10 Cir., 331 F.2d 997.
The fifth was in 1965 and was based on the legality; a search of an automobile. An evidentiary hearing was held and relief denied. On appeal, we affirmed in an unreported decision based on Gaitan v. United States, 10 Cir., 317 F.2d 494. Certiorari was denied, Johnston v. United States, 384 U.S. 920, 86 S.Ct. 1371, 16 L.Ed.2d 441.
The sixth was in 1966 and complained of illegal surveillance of conversations between applicant and his attorney. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief. No appeal was taken.
The seventh, and pending, application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, was filed in 1969, and raises the question of the car search which was disposed of by the fifth application.
We again call to the attention of the district judges the decision in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15-19, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148, which sets out the principles governing successive applications for post-conviction relief. The Court pointed out that a “judge is not required to limit his decision on the first motion to the grounds narrowly alleged” and “is free to adopt any appropriate means for inquiry into the legality of the prisoner’s detention in order to ascertain all possible grounds upon which the prisoner might claim to be entitled to relief.” Ibid at 22, 83 S. Ct. at 1081. One method of meeting the problem is described in the article “PreTrial Suggestions” by Judge James M. Carter in 32 F.R.D. 391.
Counsel for the
Question: What is the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed; or affirmed and petition denied
C. reversed (include reversed & vacated)
D. reversed and remanded (or just remanded)
E. vacated and remanded (also set aside & remanded; modified and remanded)
F. affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified or affirmed and modified)
G. affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. certification to another court
K. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_district | H | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify which district in the state the case came from. If the case did not come from a federal district court, answer "not applicable".
James W. PRICE, Appellant, v. FRANKLIN INVESTMENT COMPANY, INC., et al.
No. 76-1022.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued April 27, 1977.
Decided Feb. 23, 1978.
Al J. Daniel, Jr., Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Charles R. Donnenfeld, Washington, D. C., with whom Cameron M. Blake, Washington, D. C., Dennis A. Davison and Bernard D. Lipton, Silver Spring, Md., were on the brief for appellee, Franklin Inv. Co., Inc.
Stanley M. Karlin, Silver Spring, Md., for appellee, Center Motors, Inc.
Before MacKINNON, ROBB and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge MacKINNON.
MacKINNON, Circuit Judge:
The principal question raised by this appeal is whether, on the facts of this case, a finance company that purchased a consumer installment contract from an automobile dealer shared the dealer’s liability for violations of the Truth in Lending Act, Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-66 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), and the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1002 (1977). The district court, in granting summary judgment in favor of the finance company, answered this question in the negative. We reverse on this issue, but affirm the order of the district court in other respects.
I.
The facts are substantially undisputed. On June 5, 1972, appellant, a District of Columbia resident, purchased a used 1971 Ford Pinto automobile from appellee Center Motors, Inc. (Center), an automobile dealer located in Maryland about a mile outside the District of Columbia. On November 5, 1973, appellant traded the Pinto in to Center on a used 1972 Ford Torino. In each case, appellant signed a “Conditional Sales Contract” filled out by Center. While Center was denominated in the contracts as the lender, the contract forms were supplied by appellee Franklin Investment Company, a financial concern whose sole office was located in the District of Columbia and the forms provided that payments were to be made not to Center but to the “assignee.” Center and Franklin enjoyed a close and long-standing relationship. Center normally did no credit investigation of its own, and admittedly did no such investigation in connection with either advance of credit to appellant. Franklin financed at least a portion of Center’s car inventory on a “floor plan” basis (App. 286-87) and purchased at a discount a substantial percentage of Center’s loan contracts. From 1970 to 1973 not less than 16% of the total conditional sale contracts purchased by Franklin were acquired from Center (App. 257). On each assignment, $25 was placed into a “reserve account” available to compensate Center for its liabilities on contracts sold with recourse or repurchase rights.
The loan contract on the Pinto was assigned to Franklin on the day of the sale. When appellant traded in the Pinto, Center initially wrote the conditional sales contract for the Torino to require payment in a lump sum on the following day, and then on November 7, 1973, substituted a rewritten contract providing for installment payment. Franklin had apparently reapprovéd appellant’s credit during the interim, and the rewritten contract was then assigned to Franklin. Franklin subsequently sent appellant a coupon book and letters referring to him as its “customer” and soliciting his further business.
Soon after the trade-in, appellant had mechanical problems with the Torino.' Repairs by Center did not cure the problems, and Center refused to make further repairs. Appellant arranged for transmission repairs by a private shop and notified appellees of this fact, but declined to pay the repair charges or make any further payments on the contract. Franklin then repossessed the car from the repair shop, paying for the transmission repairs, and notified appellant that he could redeem the car by paying an amount totaling about $644. This sum consisted principally of the amount claimed to be due on the contract, the repair charges, and storage charges. Appellant did not redeem, and Franklin gave notice that the Tor
Question: From which district in the state was this case appealed?
A. Not applicable
B. Eastern
C. Western
D. Central
E. Middle
F. Southern
G. Northern
H. Whole state is one judicial district
I. Not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_adminaction_is | B | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC.
No. 492.
Argued April 27, 1961.
Decided June 12, 1961.
John F. Davis argued the cause for petitioner in No. 492. On the briefs were former Solicitor General Rankin, Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Loevinger, Assistant Attorney General Bicks, Richard A. Solomon, Irwin A. Seibel, O. D. Ozment and Franklin M. Stone.
Albert F. Grisard argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 493.
R. S. Maurer argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were James W. Callison and Robert Reed Gray.
Together with No. 493, Lake Central Airlines, Inc., v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., also on certiorari to the same Court.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the power of the Civil Aeronautics Board to alter a certificate of public convenience and necessity, granted to respondent Delta Air Lines, after that certificate had become effective under § 401 (f) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 72 Stat. 731, 755, 49 U. S. C. § 1371 (f). The administrative proceedings from which the present dispute arises date back to May 1955, and involve consideration by the Board of a number of applications for new service between cities located in an area extending from the Great Lakes to Florida. The Board divided the proceedings into two general categories, consolidating the applications for long-haul service in the Great Lakes-Southeast Service Case and those for short-haul flights in the Great Lakes Local Service Investigation Case. In order to protect fully the interests of local service carriers, the Board allowed these carriers, including petitioner Lake Central Airlines, to intervene in the hearings on the long-haul applications.
At the conclusion of the Great Lakes-Southeast Service Case a number of awards were made, including one permitting Delta to extend an existing route northwest so as to provide service from Miami to Detroit and to add Indianapolis and Louisville as intermediate points on its existing Chicago-to-Miami route. Certain restrictions for the protection of local carriers were imposed on many of the awards, these restrictions generally providing that flights between specified intermediate cities had to originate at or beyond given distant points. The stated purpose of these restrictions was to prevent the long-haul carrier from duplicating so-called “turn-around” service already provided by existing local carriers. One such restriction was applied to Delta’s run between Detroit and various locations in Ohio but, by and large, Delta’s award was free of protective, limitations.
The Board’s order issued on September 30, 1958, and it specified that Delta’s certificate was to become effective on November 29, 1958, unless postponed by the Board prior to that date. Shortly thereafter,within time limits set by the Board, numerous petitions for reconsideration were filed, including one by Lake Central protesting the breadth of Delta’s certificate. Lake Central requested that, if the Board should be unable to decide its petition for reconsideration before November 29, the effective date of the certificate be put off. On November 28, one day before Delta’s certificate was to become effective, the Board issued a lengthy memorandum and order, which stated in substance that
Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?
A. No
B. Yes
Answer: |
songer_appel1_1_2 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to classify the scope of this business into one of the following categories: "local" (individual or family owned business, scope limited to single community; generally proprietors, who are not incorporated); "neither local nor national" (e.g., an electrical power company whose operations cover one-third of the state); "national or multi-national" (assume that insurance companies and railroads are national in scope); and "not ascertained".
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GLEANERS AND FARMERS CO-OPERATIVE ELEVATOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 72-1064.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Jan. 7, 1973.
Decided July 3, 1973.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 31, 1973.
See, also, 314 F.Supp. 1148.
Victor John Roberts, Lowell, Ind., Charles W. Grubb, Cedar Lake, Ind., for defendant-appellant.
William C. Lee, U. S. Atty., Charles W. Larmore, Asst. U. S. Atty., Fort Wayne, Ind., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before KILEY, PELL and STEVENS, Circuit Judges.
KILEY, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff, United States, brought suit against defendant, Gleaners and Farmers Co-operative Elevator Company (Gleaners), for satisfaction of a lien on crops which Gleaners had purchased from borrowers of the United States who defaulted on their obligation to repay the loans. The district court, sitting without a jury, entered judgment for the United States in the amount of $1,920.18. Gleaners has appealed. We affirm.
On January 13, 1966, the United States Department of Agriculture made a loan of $12,000.00 to Donald and Judith Jurs (debtors) and in return accepted a promissory note executed on that date. To secure the indebtedness security agreements were executed in favor of the United States on April 10, 1967 and March 21, 1968 covering, inter alia, crops to be grown by the debtors. Financing statements were also signed by the parties and filed in the appropriate manner on March 24, 1965 and April 13, 1967. Subsequently, Gleaners, a grain elevator in the business of purchasing crops of farmers, purchased a large quantity of grain from the debtors’ 1968 crop which was subject to a security interest under the security agreement executed on March 21, 1968. Thereafter the debtors defaulted on their obligations under the promissory note and the litigation subject of this appeal followed.
The vital issue before us is whether the United States had a perfected security interest in the debtors’ crops which was effective against Gleaners as purchaser. It is undisputed that the United States is bound by Article IX of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).
The U.C.C. as adopted by Indiana provides, in pertinent part: that a security interest does not attach to crops planted more than one year after the security agreement is executed, Burns Ind.Stats. § 19-9-204(4)(a), IC 1971, 26-1-9-204(4) (a); and that a financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest, Burns Ind.Stats. § 19-9-302, IC 1971, 26-1-9-302, and
Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What is the scope of this business?
A. local
B. neither local nor national
C. national or multi-national
D. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_issue_1 | 47 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
CALLANAN v. UNITED STATES.
No. 47.
Argued November 15-16, 1960.
Decided January 9, 1961.
Morris A. Shenker and Sidney M. Glazer argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Theodore George Gilinsky argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Wilkey and Beatrice Rosenberg.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner
Question: What is the issue of the decision?
01. involuntary confession
02. habeas corpus
03. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
04. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
05. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
06. search and seizure, vehicles
07. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
08. contempt of court or congress
09. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
10. Miranda warnings
11. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
12. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
13. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
14. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
15. line-up
16. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
17. double jeopardy
18. ex post facto (state)
19. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
20. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
21. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
22. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
23. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
24. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
25. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
26. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
27. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
28. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
29. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
30. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
31. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
32. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
33. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
34. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
35. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
36. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
37. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
38. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
39. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
40. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
41. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
42. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
43. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
44. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
45. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
46. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
47. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
48. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
49. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
50. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
51. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
52. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
53. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
54. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
55. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
56. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
57. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
58. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
59. speedy trial
60. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
Answer: |
sc_partywinning | A | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case.
UNITED STATES v. JIM et al.
No. 71-1509.
Decided November 20, 1972
Together with No. 71-1612, Utah et al. v. Jim et al., on appeal from the same court.
Per Curiam.
The motion of the Navajo Tribe of Indians for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 71-1509, is granted.
These cases are here on appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the District of Utah that declared an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional. Jurisdiction in this Court is conferred by 28 U. S. C. §§ 1252 and 2101 (a).
In 1933, the Congress withdrew certain lands in Utah, known as the “Aneth Extension,” from the public domain and added them to the Navajo Reservation. Though no oil or gas was believed to be located on these lands, it was provided that should such mineral resources be produced in commercial quantities, “37% per centum of the net royalties accruing therefrom derived from tribal leases shall be paid to the State of Utah: Provided, That said 37% per centum of said royalties shall be expended by the State of Utah in the tuition of Indian children in white schools and/or in the building or maintenance of roads across the lands described in section 1 hereof, or for the benefit of the Indians residing therein.” 47 Stat. 1418. The remaining 62%% of the royalties generated by any such tribal mineral leases were, by implication, to go to the Navajo tribe.
After the passage of the Act, oil and gas were discovered on the Aneth Extension, and royalties were divided pursuant to the statute. The State of Utah created an Indian Affairs Commission to manage and expend the funds received by the State under the Act. As time went on, the language of the 1933 Act came to create administrative problems regarding the expenditure of the funds channeled through the State. A report of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs noted in 1967 that the word “tuition” in the 1933 Act had created uncertainty as to the breadth of the educational program the State was authorized to finance from the royalty funds. The report also noted a difficulty in discerning precisely who was properly a beneficiary of the funds, since “many Navajo families do not live permanently within the lands set aside in 1933, but move back and forth between this area and other locations.” S. Rep. No. 710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1967).
To make the administration of these funds more flexible and to spread the benefits of the royalties more broadly among the Navajo community, the Congress enacted a statute in 1968 that directed the State to expend the 37%% of royalties “for the health, education, and general welfare of the Navajo Indians residing in San Juan County.” 82 Stat. 121. This statutory change expanded the pool of beneficiaries substantially, and a class action was brought on behalf of the residents of the Aneth Extension, seeking inter alia a declaration that the statute was an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. The District Court concluded that the 1933 Act vested certain property rights in the plaintiffs, and held the 1968 Act, with its changed pool of beneficiaries, to be unconstitutional.
The judgment of the District Court is in error. Congress in 1933 did not create constitutionally protected property rights in the appellees. The Aneth Extension was added to a tribal reservation, and the leases which give rise to mineral royalties are tribal leases. It is settled that “[w]hatever title the Indians have is in
Question: Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case?
A. Yes
B. No
Answer: |
songer_usc2 | 12 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
The most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case is 26. Your task is to identify the second most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if fewer than two U.S. Code titles are cited. To choose the second title, the following rule was used: If two or more titles of USC or USCA are cited, choose the second most frequently cited title, even if there are other sections of the title already coded which are mentioned more frequently. If the title already coded is the only title cited in the headnotes, choose the section of that title which is cited the second greatest number of times.
UNITED STATES v. CONSOLIDATED GAS ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER CO. OF BALTIMORE.
No. 4546.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Jan. 8, 1940.
Edward H. Hammond, Atty., Department of Justice, of Baltimore, Md. (Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Sewall Key, Norman D. Keller, and Stephen J. Angling, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., and Bernard J. Flynn, U. S. Atty., and G. Randolph Aiken, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Baltimore, Md., on the brief), for appellant.
Edwin M. Sturtevant, William C. Baxter, and Clyde T. Warren, all of Baltimore, Md., for appellee.
Before PARKER and SOPER, Circuit Judges, and DOBIE, District Judge.
SOPER, Circuit Judge.
Certificates of indebtedness were issued to depositors of the Baltimore Trust Company, an insolvent banking institution of the City of Baltimore, on August 4, 1933, in accordance with a plan of reorganization which became- effective on that date. The certificates represented the unpaid balances due the depositors, plus accrued interest. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Company of Baltimore, a Maryland corporation, received a certificate in the face amount of $1,031,094.48, which was subsequently reduced to $825,523.58 by a partial distribution of the bank’s assets. On November 12, 1935, the Gas Company sold and assigned the certificate for $257,-976.12 to the Federal Water Service Corporation, but no revenue stamps were affixed to the certificate or to any of the transfer papers. In January, 1938, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue made an assessment against the Gas Company in the amount of $330.24, representing the stamp tax alleged to be due on the trans fer; and on March 17, 1938, the Gas Company paid the tax and filed its claim for refund on the ground that the tax had been wrongfully collected. The claim was rejected and the pending suit was filed, resulting in a judgment for the taxpayer.
The statutes, under which the tax in suit was imposed, are § 800, Schedule A (1) of Title VIII of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9, 99, 101, and the amendment thereof by § 724 of the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 169, 274, 26 U.S.C.A. § 900 note. They are as follows:
Revenue Act of 1926, c. 27, 44 Stat. 99. Title VIII, Stamp Taxes:
“Sec. 800. On and after the expiration of thirty days after the enactment of this Act there shall be levied, collected, and paid, for and' in respect of the several bonds, debentures, or certificates of stock and of indebtedness, and other documents, instruments, matters, and things mentioned and described in Schedule A of this title, or for or in respect of the vellum, parchment, or paper upon which such instruments, matters, or things, or any of them, are written or printed, by any person who makes, signs, issues, sells, removes, consigns, or ships the same, or for whose use or benefit the same are made, signed, issued, sold, removed, consigned, or shipped, the several taxes specified in such schedule. The taxes imposed by this section shall, in the case of any article upon which a corresponding stamp tax is now-imposed by law, be in lieu of such tax.
* *
“Schedule A,- — Stamp Taxes
“1. Bonds of indebtedness: On all
Question: The most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case is 26. What is the second most frequently cited title of this U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_sentence | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. The issue is: "Did the court conclude that some penalty, excluding the death penalty, was improperly imposed?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed". If the court answered the question in the affirmative, but the error articulated by the court was judged to be harmless, answer "Yes, but error was harmless".
KING v. UNITED STATES.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
April 5, 1928.
No. 4889.
1. Criminal law <@=>l 129(1)— Sufficiency oí journal record of trial court is not open for consideration by appellate court, in absence of assignment (Circuit Court Rule 11).
Under Circuit Court Rule Tl, sufficiency of journal record of trial court is not open for consideration by appellate court, in absence of assignment, except that appellate court may, at its option, notice a plain error.
2. Criminal law <@=>262 — Defendant’s proceeding to trial without objection for lack of formal arraignment and failure to plead to indictment implied waiver (Jud. Code, § 269 [28 USCA § 391]).
Defendant’s proceeding to trial without raising objection to lack of formal arraignment or fact that he had not pleaded to indictment implies waiver thereof, or at least did not constitute such formal defect as would be prejudicial within meaning of Judicial Code, § 269 (28 USCA § 391), so as to authorize reversal in absence of assignment of error thereto.
3. Criminal law <@=>977(3) — Sentence may be postponed pending decision on motion for new trial.
Trial court may properly postpone sentence pending decision on motion for new trial.
4. Criminal law <§=»950 — Successor to trial judge, dying after verdict, was competent to pass on new trial and allow bill of-exceptions (28 USCA § 776).
Under 28 USCA § 776, successor in office to trial judge who died after verdict was returned was competent to pass oh motion for new. trial and to allow bill of exceptions.
5. Criminal law <@=>1144(15) — Publication of newspaper article while jury was separated for night held not to show error;-there being no assumption jury were not admonished.
Failure of trial court to declare mistrial because of publication, on morning after jury had been permitted to- separate for the night, of article relative to defendant’s arrest on another charge, held not error, in absence of showing in record of exception and as to whether inquiry had been made of jury relative to reading article and jury thereafter cautioned against allowing such to influence the verdict, since it cannot be assumed, in absence of affirmative showing, that jury was not so admonished.
6. Post office <@=>50 — Complicity' of defendant in mailing letters pursuant to scheme to defraud by inducing addressees to ship goods on credit held for jury (Pen. Code, §§ 215, 332 [18 USCA §§ 338, 550]).
In prosecution under Penal Code, § 215 (18 USCA § 338), for placing various letters in mails pursuant to a scheme to defraud by inducing addressees of letter to ship goods on credit, evidence of complicity on part of the defendant held, sufficient to require submission of ease to jury, in view of section 332 (18 USCA § 550).
7. Criminal law <@=>564(3) — Venue, held sufficiently proven by circumstances in prosecution
Question: Did the court conclude that some penalty, excluding the death penalty, was improperly imposed?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Yes, but error was harmless
D. Mixed answer
E. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_appnatpr | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
SANTA CRUZ OIL CORPORATION v. ALLBRIGHT-NELL CO.
No. 7195.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Nov. 1, 1940.
George I. Haight and Fred Gerlach
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_geniss | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. Consider the following categories: "criminal" (including appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence), "civil rights" (excluding First Amendment or due process; also excluding claims of denial of rights in criminal proceeding or claims by prisoners that challenge their conviction or their sentence (e.g., habeas corpus petitions are coded under the criminal category); does include civil suits instituted by both prisoners and callable non-prisoners alleging denial of rights by criminal justice officials), "First Amendment", "due process" (claims in civil cases by persons other than prisoners, does not include due process challenges to government economic regulation), "privacy", "labor relations", "economic activity and regulation", and "miscellaneous".
STITZEL-WELLER DISTILLERY v. WICKARD, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.
No. 7642.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Decided Feb. 3, 1941.
George R. Beneman and Norman J. Morrison, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Edward M. Curran, U. S. Atty., John L. Laskey, Asst. U. S. Atty., John S. L. Yost, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., and Melva M. Graney, all of Washington, D. C., for appellees.
Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and VINSON and EDGERTON, Associate Justices.
GRONER, C. J.
This is a suit against the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Treasurer of the United States, officially and individually, to obtain the distribution of a fund in excess of a million dollars, now in the United States Treasury and earmarked — “Proceeds, distilled spirits industry, parity payments”. The fund was accumulated under the following circumstances. In 1933 Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48 Stat. 31, in a declared effort to raise the prices of farm products and re-establish at the 1909-14 level their purchasing power with respect to the articles that farmers buy. The plan contemplated the reduction of the planted acreage of certain basic crops by agreement, the avoidance thereby of surplus production, and the payment to farmers of rentals and benefits based upon the acreage withdrawn from cultivation. The Act further authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into marketing agreements with processors, and to issue licenses permitting them to engage in the handling of any agricultural commodity or product thereof, or any competing commodity, in the current of interstate or foreign commerce.
When the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed a few months later, this Act created various problems for distillers. Whiskey is made more largely of corn than of any other grain, though rye, barley, and wheat are used in certain types. The use of corn and wheat subjected distillers to a processing tax under the Act which might be as great as the difference between the current average farm price and “the fair exchange value” of the commodity, which was defined as the price that will give the commodity the same purchasing power, with respect to the articles that farmers buy, as such commodity had in the pre-war period, August 1909-July 1914. The use of rye and barley was not subject to the tax, nor was molasses, sugar cane, or sugar beets, which could be used to make beverage alcohol for the manufacture of blended whiskey, gin, cordials, and liqueur. The cost of producing whiskey from beverage alcohol or molasses is less than from corn or rye, though the quality of the latter is superior. Presumably, therefore, distillers of grain whiskey had good reason, in order to avoid disorderly marketing conditions, to enter into a marketing agreement under the terms of the Act. In any case most, if not all, of the distillers did make such an agreement with the Secretary of Agriculture. They promised to use only cereal grains in the manufacture of distilled.spirits, except under special permits to use other materials in limited amounts. They also agreed to pay the “fair exchange value” for all cereal grains used. Whenever the current average farm price, plus the unit processing
Question: What is the general issue in the case?
A. criminal
B. civil rights
C. First Amendment
D. due process
E. privacy
F. labor relations
G. economic activity and regulation
H. miscellaneous
Answer: |
songer_district | F | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify which district in the state the case came from. If the case did not come from a federal district court, answer "not applicable".
Charles F. HANOVICH, Petitioner-Appellant, v. E. L. MAXWELL, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 15895.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
March 3, 1965.
James W. Halloran (Court Appointed), Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.
Leo J. Conway, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbus, Ohio, William B. Saxbe, Atty. Gen., John Cianflona, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbus, Ohio, on brief, for appellee.
Before WEICK, Chief Judge, O’SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge, and McALLIS-TER, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Charles F. Hanovich, was convicted of first degree murder in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, in the year 1929. Upon a recommendation of mercy by the jury, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. We are advised that he is now at liberty on parole. No appeal was taken from his conviction, which followed a trial at which he was represented by competent counsel of his own choosing.
Appellant’s first effort to attack his conviction was in 1960 and his then original application to the Supreme Court of Ohio for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. Hanovich v. Alvis, 170 Ohio St. 360, 164 N.E.2d 739 (1960). Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court, 363 U.S. 851, 80 S.Ct. 1630, 4 L.Ed.2d 1733 (1960). Application for delayed appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio, and certiorari was again denied by the United States Supreme Court, Hano-vich v. Ohio, 372 U.S. 923, 83 S.Ct. 740, 9 L.Ed.2d 728 (1963). A motion for leave to file a petition for habeas corpus in the United States Supreme Court was also denied. Hanovich v. Maxwell, 373 U.S. 930, 83 S.Ct. 1556, 10 L.Ed.2d 701 (1963). Other efforts to attack appellant’s conviction need not be detailed.
In 1961 this Court affirmed dismissal of an application of appellant for habeas corpus made to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Hanovich v. Sacks, 290 F.2d 798 (CA 6, 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 863, 82 S.Ct. 109, 7 L.Ed.2d 61 (1961). The opinion sets forth various procedures employed by Hanovich to obtain release from prison. His chief contention in that habeas corpus action was that the grand jury which indicted him was not composed as required by Ohio law. We held that under Ohio law “[wjhere the accused enters a plea to the indictment and proceeds to trial without raising any question concerning defects in the indictment he is deemed to have waived them.” 290 F.2d 799.
Following our above decision, Hanovich filed a new habeas corpus application in the District Court. He made the same attack upon the indictment as had been found without merit by our above mentioned decision. He added allegations to the effect that in the course of his various legal actions in the state and federal courts, agents of the State of Ohio had altered court records and committed perjury. Although lacking in clarity, such allegations must be fairly read as relating to efforts by Ohio to support the regularity of its indictment. Hanovich complains here that the District Court should have held a hearing upon which he could prove such allegations. Our previous holding that his indictment is not now subject to attack obviated the necessity of taking such proofs.
The District Judge dismissed the instant habeas corpus application without hearing, holding that it presented the same question as had been disposed of by the order of the District Court which had been affirmed by this Court in Hanovich v. Sacks, supra, 290 F.2d 798. We agree that the present application “presents no new ground not theretofore presented and determined.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 224
Question: From which district in the state was this case appealed?
A. Not applicable
B. Eastern
C. Western
D. Central
E. Middle
F. Southern
G. Northern
H. Whole state is one judicial district
I. Not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_lcdisposition | C | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded.
ANDERSON v. CREIGHTON et al.
No. 85-1520.
Argued February 23, 1987
Decided June 25, 1987
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, p. 647.
Andrew J. Pincus argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, Barbara L. Herwig, and Richard A. Olderman.
John P. Sheehy argued the cause pro hac vice for respondents. With him on the brief was Ronald I. Meshbesher
David Rudovsky, Jack D. Novik, and Michael Avery filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether a federal law enforcement officer who participates in a search that violates the Fourth Amendment may be held personally liable for money damages if a reasonable officer could have believed that the search comported with the Fourth Amendment.
I
Petitioner Russell Anderson is an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On November 11, 1983, Anderson and other state and federal law enforcement officers conducted a warrantless search of the home of respondents, the Creighton family. The search was conducted because Anderson believed that Vadaain Dixon, a man suspected of a bank robbery committed earlier that day, might be found there. He was not.
The Creightons later filed suit against Anderson in a Minnesota state court, asserting among other things a claim for money damages under the Fourth Amendment, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). After removing the suit to Federal District Court, Anderson filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that the Bivens claim was barred by Anderson’s qualified immunity from civil damages liability. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982). Before any discovery took place, the District Court granted summary judgment on the ground that the search was lawful, holding that the undisputed facts revealed that Anderson had had probable cause to search the Creighton’s home and that his failure to obtain a warrant was justified by the presence of exigent circumstances. App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a-25a.
The Creightons appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which reversed. Creighton v. St. Paul, 766 F. 2d 1269 (1985). The Court of Appeals held that the issue of the lawfulness of the search could not properly be decided on summary judgment, because unresolved factual disputes made it impossible to determine as a matter of law that the warrantless search had been supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. Id., at 127
Question: What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed
C. reversed
D. reversed and remanded
E. vacated and remanded
F. affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part
G. affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. modify
K. remand
L. unusual disposition
Answer: |
songer_const1 | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the most frequently cited provision of the U.S. Constitution in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if no constitutional provisions are cited. If one or more are cited, code the article or amendment to the constitution which is mentioned in the greatest number of headnotes. In case of a tie, code the first mentioned provision of those that are tied. If it is one of the original articles of the constitution, code the number of the article preceeded by two zeros. If it is an amendment to the constitution, code the number of the amendment (zero filled to two places) preceeded by a "1". Examples: 001 = Article 1 of the original constitution, 101 = 1st Amendment, 114 = 14th Amendment.
Susan P. DALTON, and Bob Warren, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 85-2225.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued July 16, 1986.
Decided Sept. 17, 1986.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 30,1986.
Bob Warren and C. Frank Goldsmith, Jr., Marion, N.C., for appellants.
James H. Love (Roger M. Olsen and Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Michael L. Paup, Chief Appellate Section, Tax Div., Gary R. Allen, Tax Div. Washington, D.C., on brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Susan P. Dalton appeals from a summary judgment entered for the United States denying her a refund of a $500 penalty imposed pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6702(a) (1982) for filing a frivolous income tax return in which she claimed a credit for federal military expenditures to which she objected. Bob Warren, the taxpayer’s attorney, appeals a judgment imposing sanctions on him of $613.22 pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 11 to reimburse the government for its expense in defending the taxpayer’s action. The government questions the jurisdiction of the district court. We hold that the district court had jurisdiction and affirm both judgments.
I
The government asserts that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the taxpayer did not comply with 26 U.S.C. § 6703(c)(2) (1982) by bringing this action within 30 days after her claim for refund of the penalty was denied. The taxpayer contends that the 30-day provision of section 6703(c)(2) pertains only to collection of the penalty and that in any event the Internal Revenue Service extended the time for bringing suit.
The record discloses that the chief of the examination branch of the Memphis Service Center wrote the taxpayer on January 22, 1985, that her claim for a refund of the penalty had been denied and that she could bring suit to recover it within 30 days from the date of the letter. Telephone conversations and correspondence between the taxpayer’s attorney and officials at the Center culminated in a letter dated March 11, 1985, from the manager of an examination unit granting an extension “to reply to the frivolous assessment” to March 22, 1985. On March 22, the taxpayer filed this action.
The district court held that failure to file an action within 30 days from the denial of the refund did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. It construed section 6703(c)(1) and (2) to provide only that the government could collect the penalty if suit were not brought within 30 days. Accord Beard v. Internal Revenue Service, 624 F.Supp. 646, 647 (E.D.Tenn.1985).
We cannot concur in the district court’s construction of section 6703(c)(1) and (2). In our view the 30-day requirement for bringing suit is a limitation on the right to seek judicial review of the penalty. It does not pertain merely to the government’s right to collect the penalty.
In Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 78 S.Ct. 1079,
Question: What is the most frequently cited provision of the U.S. Constitution in the headnotes to this case? If it is one of the original articles of the constitution, code the number of the article preceeded by two zeros. If it is an amendment to the constitution, code the number of the amendment (zero filled to two places) preceeded by a "1". Examples: 001 = Article 1 of the original constitution, 101 = 1st Amendment, 114 = 14th Amendment.
Answer: |
songer_genresp1 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.
SPARTACUS, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Marcia Lynn Poslik, Maureen Bottles, Patricia Ann Herd, April Mancini, Regina Golden, Sandra Blake and Janet Iverson, and Jane Does v. BOROUGH OF McKEES ROCKS, a Municipal Corporation, Thomas Connolly, Mayor of the Borough of McKees Rocks and individually, Ronald Panyko, Donald Panyko, Lou White and John Does, police officers of the Borough of McKees Rocks and as individuals, Spartacus, Inc., Appellant.
No. 82-5312.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) Oct. 26, 1982.
Decided Dec. 10, 1982.
Rochelle S. Friedman, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
Samuel J. Pasquarelli, Jubelirer, Pass & Intrieri, P.C., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
Before ADAMS, HUNTER and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge.
Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_appel1_7_4 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the citizenship of this litigant as indicated in the opinion.
Dona H. SLY and Joann E. Sly, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 86-7773.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Feb. 2, 1988.
Dona H. Sly, pro se.
Joann E. Sly, pro se.
John T. Robertson, Gadsden, Ala., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Frank W. Donaldson, U.S. Atty., Caryl Privett, Asst. U.S. Atty., Birmingham, Ala., Michael L. Paup, Roger Olsen, U.S. Dept, of Justice, Gilbert S. Rothenberg, Tax Div., U.S. Dept, of Justice, Janet A. Bradley, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee.
Before ANDERSON and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and CARR, District Judge.
Honorable George C. Carr, U.S. District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the narrow issue of whether a tax is “paid” at the time the taxpayer’s real property is seized by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for collection of the tax or at the time of the sale of such property. We conclude that the tax is not “paid” until the seized property is sold.
I. FACTS
On March 4, 1981 and October 16, 1981, the IRS filed tax liens in the total amount of $3006.61 against two parcels of real property owned by appellants Dona and Joann Sly. The tax deficiency was from appellants’ 1976 tax year. On March 12, 1982, the IRS filed a notice of levy on the real property and on April 19, 1982, filed a notice of seizure.
The Slys filed a refund claim on June 7, 1982. The IRS made two unsuccessful attempts to sell the property and thereafter determined that its value was insufficient to justify the cost of a sale. Consequently, the IRS returned the real property to the Slys on August 3, 1982. The IRS denied the Slys’ refund claim on October 26, 1983.
The Slys’ outstanding tax liability was satisfied in full on March 25, 1983, following the IRS’ seizure and sale of the Slys’ automobile. The Slys then filed an amended refund claim on April 26, 1985, which the IRS denied on August 27, 1985. The Slys commenced this action for a refund on October 25, 1985, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
At trial, the court granted a directed verdict in the government’s favor. The basis for the court’s decision was that neither of the Slys’ refund claims was filed within the applicable statute of limitations. 26 U.S.C. § 6511. Section 6511 requires that a taxpayer must file a refund claim either within three years following the date on which the return is filed or within two years after the tax is paid.
The Slys assert that the tax was “paid” when the real property was seized on April 19, 1982; and therefore that their June 7, 1982 claim, filed
Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the citizenship of this litigant as indicated in the opinion?
A. not ascertained
B. US citizen
C. alien
Answer: |
sc_issuearea | I | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
TAYLOR v. STURGELL, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, et al.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 07-371.
Argued April 16, 2008
Decided June 12, 2008
Adina H. Rosenbaum argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Brian Wolfman, Scott L. Nelson, and Michael John Pangia.
Douglas Hallward-Driemeier argued the cause for the federal respondent. With him on the brief were former Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bucholtz, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Leonard Schaitman, and Robert D. Kamenshine.
Catherine E. Stetson argued the cause for respondent Fairchild Corporation. With her on the brief were Christopher T Handman and N. Thomas Connolly.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Association for Justice by John Vail and Kathleen Flynn Peterson; for Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation Professors by David L. Shapiro and John Leubsdorf, both pro se; for the National Security Archive et al. by Meredith Fuchs; and for Lavonna Eddy et al. by James A. Feldman and Gerald S. Hartman.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General of Utah, and Philip S. Lott and Peggy E. Stone, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of Utah as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Jack R. Bierig filed a brief for the American Dental Association as amicus curiae.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
“It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.” Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32,40 (1940). Several exceptions, recognized in this Court’s decisions,
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: |
songer_app_stid | 33 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
GREENE COUNTY PLANNING BOARD, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, Respondent, Power Authority of the State of New York, Intervenor.
No. 137, Docket 74-2638.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Oct. 1, 1975.
Decided Dec. 22, 1975.
Robert J. Kafin, Glens Falls, N. Y. (Neil E. Needleman, Kafin & Needle-man, Glens Falls, N. Y., of counsel), for petitioner.
Philip R. Telleen, Atty., Federal Power Commission (Drexel D. Journey, Gen. Counsel, Federal Power Commission, John R. Staffier, Atty., Federal Power Commission, of counsel),
Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?
01. not
02. Alabama
03. Alaska
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. Florida
11. Georgia
12. Hawaii
13. Idaho
14. Illinois
15. Indiana
16. Iowa
17. Kansas
18. Kentucky
19. Louisiana
20. Maine
21. Maryland
22. Massachussets
23. Michigan
24. Minnesota
25. Mississippi
26. Missouri
27. Montana
28. Nebraska
29. Nevada
30. New
31. New
32. New
33. New
34. North
35. North
36. Ohio
37. Oklahoma
38. Oregon
39. Pennsylvania
40. Rhode
41. South
42. South
43. Tennessee
44. Texas
45. Utah
46. Vermont
47. Virginia
48. Washington
49. West
50. Wisconsin
51. Wyoming
52. Virgin
53. Puerto
54. District
55. Guam
56. not
57. Panama
Answer: |
songer_district | H | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify which district in the state the case came from. If the case did not come from a federal district court, answer "not applicable".
K. Chandapillai SETH, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. BRITISH OVERSEAS AIRWAYS CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee. BRITISH OVERSEAS AIRWAYS CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellant, v. K. Chandapillai SETH, Plaintiff, Appellee.
Nos. 6138, 6150.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
Heard Oct. 9, 1963.
Decided March 23, 1964.
Daniel F. Featherston, Jr., Boston, Mass., with whom Stephen F. Ells and Choate, Hall & Stewart, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for K. Chandapillai Seth.
David H. Fulton, Boston, Mass., with whom Robert Fulton, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for British Overseas Airways Corp.
Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and HARTIGAN and ALDRICH, Circuit Judges.
WOODBURY, Chief Judge.
These are appeals from a judgment in the amount of $331.60 entered for the plaintiff in an action for the loss of two pieces of baggage.
The plaintiff below, Kunniparampil Chandapillai Seth, referred to hereinafter for convenience as either the plaintiff or Seth, is a citizen of India and a priest of the Episcopal Church. The World Council of Churches awarded him a year’s fellowship for advanced study at the Episcopal Theological Seminary in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and presented him with two airline tickets it had purchased in his name from British Overseas Airways Corporation, BOAC, hereinafter. One ticket entitled Seth to passage from Trivandrum to Cochin and from Cochin to Bombay by Indian Air Lines and from Bombay to Beirut to London by Middle East Airlines. The other ticket issued by BOAC for its own account entitled Seth to passage on one of its flights from London to Boston. Under both tickets Seth was entitled to 20 kilograms of checked baggage without additional charge.
Seth went by train from Trivandrum to Cochin, where, without declaring excess value, he checked his two bags weighing a total of 20 kilograms at the Indian Air Lines counter and departed on his flight to Bombay. At Bombay he presented the baggage checks he had received in Cochin, reclaimed his baggage, re-checked it with BOAC to London, receiving therefor two baggage claim tags in proper form, and passed his bags through customs. Seth has not seen them since. During a layover between planes at Beirut Seth inquired about his bags from BOAC employees who assured, him that his bags would be forwarded on his flight and that he could reclaim them by presenting his claim checks to BOAC in London. In London he presented his claim checks to BOAC, but his baggage could not be found.
The next morning he presented his claim checks to BOAC again, but his baggage still could not be found, and he boarded his flight to Boston with only his passport and an attache case containing toilet articles. Diligent efforts by BOAC to trace Seth’s bags have proved fruitless. Where they disappeared and under what circumstances remain a mystery.
Seth brought suit against BOAC in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in three counts, each on a different theory, to recover the damage he alleges he sustained by the loss of his baggage, presumably, the court below found, in Beirut. The theory of the first count is that jurisdiction lies under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) because the suit is a civil action wherein the matter in controversy exclusive of interest and costs exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 and arises under a treaty of the United States, that is to say, the Warsaw Convention, so called, to be considered presently. The theory of the second count is that jurisdiction lies under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1337 because the suit is a civil action arising under an Act of Congress regulating commerce. The theory of the third count is that jurisdiction lies under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1350 because it is a civil action by an alien for a tort only committed in violation of a treaty of the United States.
The court below held that it had jurisdiction but only under § 1331(a) supra, and that the limitation of liability for loss of cheeked baggage of the Warsaw Convention applied since the flight from India to the United States,
Question: From which district in the state was this case appealed?
A. Not applicable
B. Eastern
C. Western
D. Central
E. Middle
F. Southern
G. Northern
H. Whole state is one judicial district
I. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_source | J | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the forum that heard this case immediately before the case came to the court of appeals.
SMITH v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 2669.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
May 31, 1932.
Lawrence E. Green (of Hale & Dorr) of Boston, Mass., for the petitioner for review.
J. Louis Monarch, Sp. Asst, to the Atty. Gen. (G. A. Youngquisf, Asst. Atty. Gen., Bewail Key, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., and C. M. Gharest, Gen. Counsel, and Philip A. Bayer, Bp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for the Commissioner.
Before BINGHAM and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and MeLELLAN, District Judge.
BINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
This is a petition to review a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals determining deficiency income taxes for the years 1925 and 1926 in the sum of $498.53 and $494.35 respectively under the provisions of section 219(g) of the Revenue Acts of 1924 (26 USCA § 960 note) and 1926 (44 Stat. 32), which, in the particulars here in question, are the same in both acts.
The petitioner, the wife of Emelins W. Smith, on December 26, 1924, created four trusts, one for each of her sons, Reginald Heber Smith, Cecil H. Smith, Harold C. Smith, and Kendall K. Smith. The trust agreements are the same except as to the name of the beneficiary, and each was accompanied by a schedule of property so given in trust. Two of the sons, Reginald and Cecil, were made trustees of each trust. In the trust to Reginald the income was payable to him during his life, and, on his death, it provided for the payment of the trust fund to his children if any survived him. It further provided:
“C. Upon the death of my said son leaving no issue him surviving the trustees shall distribute and pay over the remaining principal of the trust fund and any unpaid or accumulated income in equal shares to the trustees for my son Cecil H. Smith, my son Harold C. Smith, and my son Kendall K. Smith, under instruments of trust similar to this instrument and bearing even date herewith as aforesaid, except that so far as the trusts under any one or more of said instruments shall have come to an end by the death of the first life tenant without issue or by failure of his issue the distribution shall bo to the trusts for the other sons or son, and if when my said son dies without issue he has survived all'iny other issue then the trustees shall if T still survive repay to me said remaining principal and unpaid or accumulated income, or in ease I have died shall distribute said property to and among those persons who would have been entitled to take my personal estate under the Massachusetts statutes of distribution if I had died domiciled in Massachusetts immediately after the death of such child.”
Each trust agreement further provided:
“5. I hereby create in myself, my husband Emelins W. Smith, Reginald Heber Smith, Cecil II. Smith, and James Adams of Brook-line in (lie County of Norfolk, a joint power exercisable at any time or from time to time by any three of said persons by instrument or instruments in writing signed by said three and delivered to- any trustee hereunder who may be one of themselves:
“A. To remove any trustee hereunder.
“B. To appoint a successor to any trustee who dies, resigns, or is removed.
“C. To change and alter any of or all the trusts herein set forth and declare new trusts of the properly in any way or manner; also to terminate or modify the beneficial interests of any person, or class of persons and to name or appoint any other person or classes of persons as beneficiaries whether by way of addition or substitution;
Question: What forum heard this case immediately before the case came to the court of appeals?
A. Federal district court (single judge)
B. 3 judge district court
C. State court
D. Bankruptcy court, referee in bankruptcy, special master
E. Federal magistrate
F. Federal administrative agency
G. Court of Customs & Patent Appeals
H. Court of Claims
I. Court of Military Appeals
J. Tax Court or Tax Board
K. Administrative law judge
L. U.S. Supreme Court (remand)
M. Special DC court (not the US District Court for DC)
N. Earlier appeals court panel
O. Other
P. Not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_petitioner | 027 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
001. attorney general of the United States, or his office
002. specified state board or department of education
003. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
004. state commission, board, committee, or authority
005. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
006. court or judicial district
007. state department or agency
008. governmental employee or job applicant
009. female governmental employee or job applicant
010. minority governmental employee or job applicant
011. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
012. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
013. retired or former governmental employee
014. U.S. House of Representatives
015. interstate compact
016. judge
017. state legislature, house, or committee
018. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
019. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
020. state or U.S. supreme court
021. local school district or board of education
022. U.S. Senate
023. U.S. senator
024. foreign nation or instrumentality
025. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
026. state college or university
027. United States
028. State
029. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
030. advertising business or agency
031. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
032. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
033. airline
034. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
035. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
036. American Medical Association
037. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
038. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
039. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
040. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
041. author, copyright holder
042. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
043. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
044. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
045. water transportation, stevedore
046. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
047. brewery, distillery
048. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
049. construction industry
050. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
051. business, corporation
052. buyer, purchaser
053. cable TV
054. car dealer
055. person convicted of crime
056. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
057. chemical company
058. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
059. religious organization, institution, or person
060. private club or facility
061. coal company or coal mine operator
062. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
063. consumer, consumer organization
064. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
065. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
066. defendant
067. debtor
068. real estate developer
069. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
070. distributor
071. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
072. drug manufacturer
073. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
074. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
075. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
076. electric equipment manufacturer
077. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
078. eleemosynary institution or person
079. environmental organization
080. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
081. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
082. father
083. female employee or job applicant
084. female
085. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
086. fisherman or fishing company
087. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
088. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
089. franchiser
090. franchisee
091. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
092. person who guarantees another's obligations
093. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
094. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
095. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
096. hospital, medical center
097. husband, or ex-husband
098. involuntarily committed mental patient
099. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
100. insurance company, or surety
101. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
102. investor
103. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
104. juvenile
105. government contractor
106. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
107. magazine
108. male
109. medical or Medicaid claimant
110. medical supply or manufacturing co.
111. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
112. minority female employee or job applicant
113. manufacturer
114. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
115. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
116. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
117. mother
118. auto manufacturer
119. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
120. radio and television network, except cable tv
121. nonprofit organization or business
122. nonresident
123. nuclear power plant or facility
124. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
125. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
126. tender offer
127. oil company, or natural gas producer
128. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
129. out of state noncriminal defendant
130. political action committee
131. parent or parents
132. parking lot or service
133. patient of a health professional
134. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
135. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
136. public interest organization
137. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
138. pipe line company
139. package, luggage, container
140. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
141. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
142. indigent defendant
143. private person
144. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
145. professional organization, business, or person
146. probationer, or parolee
147. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
148. public utility
149. publisher, publishing company
150. radio station
151. racial or ethnic minority
152. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
153. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
154. realtor
155. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
156. resident
157. restaurant, food vendor
158. retarded person, or mental incompetent
159. retired or former employee
160. railroad
161. private school, college, or university
162. seller or vendor
163. shipper, including importer and exporter
164. shopping center, mall
165. spouse, or former spouse
166. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
167. retail business or outlet
168. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
169. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
170. tenant or lessee
171. theater, studio
172. forest products, lumber, or logging company
173. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
174. trucking company, or motor carrier
175. television station
176. union member
177. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
178. union, labor organization, or official of
179. veteran
180. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
181. wholesale trade
182. wife, or ex-wife
183. witness, or person under subpoena
184. network
185. slave
186. slave-owner
187. bank of the united states
188. timber company
189. u.s. job applicants or employees
190. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
191. Atomic Energy Commission
192. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
193. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
194. Alien Property Custodian
195. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
196. Board of Immigration Appeals
197. Bureau of Indian Affairs
198. Bonneville Power Administration
199. Benefits Review Board
200. Civil Aeronautics Board
201. Bureau of the Census
202. Central Intelligence Agency
203. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
204. Department or Secretary of Commerce
205. Comptroller of Currency
206. Consumer Product Safety Commission
207. Civil Rights Commission
208. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
209. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
210. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
211. Drug Enforcement Agency
212. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
213. Department or Secretary of Energy
214. Department or Secretary of the Interior
215. Department of Justice or Attorney General
216. Department or Secretary of State
217. Department or Secretary of Transportation
218. Department or Secretary of Education
219. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
220. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
221. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
222. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
223. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
224. Federal Bureau of Prisons
225. Farm Credit Administration
226. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
227. Federal Credit Union Administration
228. Food and Drug Administration
229. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
230. Federal Energy Administration
231. Federal Election Commission
232. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
233. Federal Housing Administration
234. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
235. Federal Labor Relations Authority
236. Federal Maritime Board
237. Federal Maritime Commission
238. Farmers Home Administration
239. Federal Parole Board
240. Federal Power Commission
241. Federal Railroad Administration
242. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
243. Federal Reserve System
244. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
245. Federal Trade Commission
246. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
247. General Accounting Office
248. Comptroller General
249. General Services Administration
250. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
251. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
252. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
253. Interstate Commerce Commission
254. Indian Claims Commission
255. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
256. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
257. Information Security Oversight Office
258. Department or Secretary of Labor
259. Loyalty Review Board
260. Legal Services Corporation
261. Merit Systems Protection Board
262. Multistate Tax Commission
263. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
264. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
265. National Credit Union Administration
266. National Endowment for the Arts
267. National Enforcement Commission
268. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
269. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
270. National Mediation Board
271. National Railroad Adjustment Board
272. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
273. National Security Agency
274. Office of Economic Opportunity
275. Office of Management and Budget
276. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
277. Office of Personnel Management
278. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
279. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
280. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
281. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
282. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
283. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
284. U.S. Public Health Service
285. Postal Rate Commission
286. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
287. Renegotiation Board
288. Railroad Adjustment Board
289. Railroad Retirement Board
290. Subversive Activities Control Board
291. Small Business Administration
292. Securities and Exchange Commission
293. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
294. Selective Service System
295. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
296. Tennessee Valley Authority
297. United States Forest Service
298. United States Parole Commission
299. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
300. United States Sentencing Commission
301. Veterans' Administration
302. War Production Board
303. Wage Stabilization Board
304. General Land Office of Commissioners
305. Transportation Security Administration
306. Surface Transportation Board
307. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
308. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
309. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
310. Unidentifiable
311. International Entity
Answer: |
songer_r_fed | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
MURARKA et al. v. BACHRACK BROS., Inc.
No. 262, Docket 22960.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_usc2 | 49 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
The most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case is 49. Your task is to identify the second most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if fewer than two U.S. Code titles are cited. To choose the second title, the following rule was used: If two or more titles of USC or USCA are cited, choose the second most frequently cited title, even if there are other sections of the title already coded which are mentioned more frequently. If the title already coded is the only title cited in the headnotes, choose the section of that title which is cited the second greatest number of times.
UNITED STATES ex rel. CITY OF LOS ANGELES v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Submitted January 8, 1929.
Decided February 25, 1929.
No. 4863.
Edwin C. Blanchard, of Washington, D. C., and Max Thelen, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
Daniel W. Knowlton, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.
Judgment reversed 50 S Ct. 53, 74 L. Ed. —.
VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.
The city of Los Angeles, Cal., a municipal corporation, filed a petition for mandamus in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to compel defendant, the Interstate Commerce Commission, to make an order requiring the Southern Pacific, the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé, and the Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Companies to construct, maintain, and operate, a union passenger station in the city of'Los Angeles, at a point near what is known as the Plaza.
It appears that in 1921 the Railroad Commission of California, in a proceeding before it, ordered the carriers named to file plans for the erection of a union station at the point above designated in the city of. Los Angeles, and in a subsequent order required the carriers to secure sufficient land for the construction of the station and terminal, to submit plans therefor, and, upon approval by the commission, to proceed with the construction. The carriers appealed from the decision to the Supreme Court of California. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 190 Cal. 214, 211 P. 460. The court reversed the order on the ground that the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, had vested full authority over union depot facilities of interstate carriers by railroads in the Interstate Commerce Commission, divesting the state commission of jurisdiction in the premises. From this decision the state commission carried the ease to the Supreme Court of the United States.
While the ease was there pending, the city of Los Angeles filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission praying the Commission to require the defendant carriers to construct and operate the union passenger station in question. During the pend-ency of this ease before the Commission, the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Railroad Com. of Cal. v. Southern Pac. Co., 264 U. S. 331, 44 S. Ct. 376, 68 L. Ed. 713, hereafter for convenience referred to as the Los Angeles Case, in which the judgment of the Supreme Court of California (190 Cal. 214, 211 P. 460) was affirmed, the court holding, in substance, however, that defendant carriers could not be required to provide a union station and extend their terminal tracks until the Interstate Commerce Commission had acted under paragraphs 18 to 21 of section 402 of the Transportation Act (49 USCA § 1 (18-21). •
The Commission then issued its report in the proceeding instituted by the City of Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 100 I. C. C. 421, holding that it was powerless “to require carriers to construct union passenger stations under conditions such as are here present.” It, however, made findings in accordance with its interpret tation of the decision of the Supreme Court, to the effect that public convenience and necessity required such extensions and abandonments of lines and service and joint use of terminal tracks as would be necessary in the establishment and operation of a union passenger station at the point designated, and that the expense would not-impair the ability of the roads to perform their respective duties to the public
Question: The most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case is 49. What is the second most frequently cited title of this U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_usc2sect | 841 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the number of the section from the title of the second most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case, that is, title 21. In case of ties, code the first to be cited. The section number has up to four digits and follows "USC" or "USCA".
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pablo CARREON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 79-2130.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued April 30, 1980.
Decided July 9, 1980.
Adam Bourgeois, Chicago, 111., for defendant-appellant.
Thomas P. Sullivan, U.S. Atty., Douglas Miller, Asst. U.S. Atty., Chicago, 111., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before CUMMINGS and BAUER, Circuit Judges, and EAST, Senior District Judge.
The Honorable William G. East, Senior District Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, is sitting by designation.
BAUER, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Pablo Carreon appeals from his conviction on one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and on seven counts of distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Carreon contends that his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights were violated, that he was entrapped, and that his rights under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment were violated. We affirm the judgment of conviction on all counts.
I. Speedy Trial Rights
A. Procedural History
The original indictment against Carreon was filed on April 10, 1975. Shortly thereafter, he failed to appear at a scheduled plea hearing, and his case was placed on the district court’s fugitive calendar, where it remained for over a year. Ultimately, Carreon reappeared, and his case was assigned to Judge Alfred Y. Kirkland. A hearing was set for September 2, 1976, at which time it was contemplated that Carreon would plead guilty to two counts of the indictment and that the government would seek dismissal of the remaining counts.
Because Judge Kirkland was unavailable on September 2, the hearing on Carreon’s guilty plea was held before Judge John F. Grady. After eliciting Carreon’s version of the facts, Judge Grady refused to accept the plea, ruling that an entrapment defense would be available if the facts were as Carreon had stated. On the following day, however, Carreon retendered his guilty plea to Judge Kirkland, who accepted it without detailed questioning. Carreon was sentenced to two concurrent terms of four years of imprisonment to be followed by three years of parole and was duly imprisoned.
On March 10, 1977, Carreon filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to set aside his conviction on the ground that his guilty plea had been involuntarily given. The district court granted summary judgment for the government on the petition, and Carreon appealed to this Court. On May 3,1978, while that appeal was pending, Carreon was released on parole; he had served twenty-six months in prison, including credit for time served prior to his conviction. On June 14, 1978, this Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the § 2255 petition, ruling that Carreon’s guilty plea had not been taking in conformity with Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 and had not been made voluntarily. Carreon v. United States, 578 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1978) (Carreon I).
Prior to June 28, 1978, when this Court’s mandate in Carreon I would have issued, the government moved for an extension of time in which to petition for rehearing. That motion was granted, and the mandate of this Court was stayed until July 28,1978. The government ultimately determined not to petition for rehearing, but, apparently because of a clerical oversight, the mandate did not issue on July 28. Meanwhile, Judge Kirkland conducted status calls in the case on June 22, August 8, and September 20, 1978; at the third status call, Judge Kirkland ordered that the case be removed from his calendar pending disposition by this Court. This Court’s mandate in Carreon I finally reached the district court on December 5,1978, but no further action was taken in the district
Question: What is the number of the section from the title of the second most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case, that is, title 21? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_respond1_3_3 | F | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)", specifically "cabinet level department". Your task is to determine which specific federal government agency best describes this litigant.
Marie Tipton FAIDLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patricia Roberts HARRIS, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 80-1296.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted May 15, 1981.
Decided Aug. 5, 1981.
William E. Benjamin, Adams County Legal Services, Commerce City, Colo., for plaintiff-appellant.
Beverly R. Buck, Asst. U. S. Atty., D. Colorado, Denver, Colo. (Joseph Dolan, U. S. Atty., and Roland J. Brumbaugh, Asst. U. S. Atty., Denver, Colo., on brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before DOYLE and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and O’CONNOR, District Judge.
Of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
McKAY, Circuit Judge.
When the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (now Health and Human Services) determines the eligibility for benefits under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program of an individual married to a person not eligible for SSI benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(l) requires the Secretary to deem that individual’s income and resources to include any income and resources of the ineligible spouse, “except to the extent determined by the Secretary to be inequitable under the circumstances.” Prior to February 1978, appellant was an unmarried person who had been receiving approximately $178 per month in SSI benefits as a disabled person. In February 1978, she reported to the Social Security Administration, which administers the SSI program under the direction of the Secretary, that she had married an ineligible person whose sole income was approximately $295 per month from retirement benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Because her spouse’s includable income was $5.80 above the amount allowed by the Secretary’s regulations, appellant was terminated from all benefits in June 1978. After exhausting her administrative remedies, appellant brought an action for judicial review of the Secretary’s decision in the district court. The court affirmed the Secretary’s termination of appellant’s benefits.
Appellant argues that the Secretary has breached her statutory duty to determine whether, “under [appellant’s] circumstances,” deeming appellant’s income to include so much of her ineligible husband’s income as disqualifies her from SSI benefits is “inequitable.” We find, however, that appellant has not shown that the Secretary has violated any statutory duty. Section 1382c(f)(l) does impose on the Secretary a duty to determine under what circumstances deeming ineligible spouse income to be eligible spouse income is inequitable. Accordingly, the Secretary has promulgated regulations providing for numerous exclusions from the generally applicable deeming requirement of § 1382c
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)", specifically "cabinet level department". Which specific federal government agency best describes this litigant?
A. Department of Agriculture
B. Department of Commerce
C. Department of Defense (includes War Department and Navy Department)
D. Department of Education
E. Department of Energy
F. Department of Health, Education and Welfare
G. Department of Health & Human Services
H. Department of Housing and Urban Development
I. Department of Interior
J. Department of Justice (does not include FBI or parole boards; does include US Attorneys)
K. Department of Labor (except OSHA)
L. Post Office Department
M. Department of State
N. Department of Transportation, National Transportation Safety Board
O. Department of the Treasury (except IRS)
P. Department of Veterans Affairs
Answer: |
songer_casetyp2_geniss | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
There are two main issues in this case. The first issue is economic activity and regulation - bankruptcy, antitrust, securities - other bankruptcy. Your task is to determine the second issue in the case. Consider the following categories: "criminal" (including appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence), "civil rights" (excluding First Amendment or due process; also excluding claims of denial of rights in criminal proceeding or claims by prisoners that challenge their conviction or their sentence (e.g., habeas corpus petitions are coded under the criminal category); does include civil suits instituted by both prisoners and callable non-prisoners alleging denial of rights by criminal justice officials), "First Amendment", "due process" (claims in civil cases by persons other than prisoners, does not include due process challenges to government economic regulation), "privacy", "labor relations", "economic activity and regulation", and "miscellaneous".
MOSS et al. v. SHERBURNE et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
March 3, 1926.
On Petition for Rehearing April 6, 1926.)
No. 1855.
1. Exceptions, bill of <S=4I (1)— Bill of exception filed within extension of time granted therefor held timely (District Court rule 19).
Bill of exceptions, filed within extension of time granted therefor when motion for new trial was overruled, held, under District Court rule 19, timely filed.
2. Sales <@=>89 — Whether buyer, after seller’s attempted cancellation of contract, waived rights thereunder by making new contract for part of same goods, held for jury.
Whether buyer of sugar, after seller’s attempted cancellation of contract by making new contract for part of same sugar, waived or relinquished rights under first contract, held, under conflicting evidence as to whether he was told that he was purchasing same sugar, question for jury.
3. Appeal and error <@=>1050(1) — Error, if any, * in admitting evidence of market value at place other than place of delivery, in action for breach of contract to sell sugar, held not prejudicial.
Where jury, in calculating damages for breach of contract to sell sugar f. o. b. Buenos Aires, did not consider evidence of market value in New York, but clearly considered price fixed in a second contract c. i. f. New York, in determining market value in Buenos Aires, held, error, if any, in admitting proof of” market value in New York, was not prejudicial..
4. Sales <@=>418(2) — Measure of damages for seller’s breach of contract is difference between contract price and market value at time of breach and place of delivery.
Measure of damages for breach, of contract by seller is difference between contract price and market value of goods at time of breach and place of delivery, or, if there is no market value at such place, then at nearest available market.
5. Sales <@=>416(2) — In action for breach of contract to sell sugar, evidence of contract price under second contract between same parties for same sugar held admissible as evidence of market, value.
In action for breach of contract to sell sugar f. o. b. Buenos Aires, evidence of contract price of same sugar under a second contract c. i. f. New York between same parties held properly admitted as evidence of market value of sugar described in first contract.
6. Appeal and error <@=l 151(1).
Clerical error in computing damages for breach of contract, if possible, may be corrected by remittitur, without new trial.
On Petition for Rehearing.
7. Appeal and error <@=>835(2).
Defense, first asserted on petition for rehearing on second appeal of case, held not available.
In. Error to tlie District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts; James M. Morton, Judge.
Action by John H. Sherburne and others, trustees, against Jacinto Moss and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error.
Affirmed, on
Question: What is the second general issue in the case, other than economic activity and regulation - bankruptcy, antitrust, securities - other bankruptcy?
A. criminal
B. civil rights
C. First Amendment
D. due process
E. privacy
F. labor relations
G. economic activity and regulation
H. miscellaneous
Answer: |
songer_method | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine the nature of the proceeding in the court of appeals for the case, that is, the legal history of the case, indicating whether there had been prior appellate court proceeding on the same case prior to the decision currently coded. Assume that the case had been decided by the panel for the first time if there was no indication to the contrary in the opinion. The opinion usually, but not always, explicitly indicates when a decision was made "en banc" (though the spelling of "en banc" varies). However, if more than 3 judges were listed as participating in the decision, code the decision as enbanc even if there was no explicit description of the proceeding as en banc.
BIG Y SUPERMARKETS, INC., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Frank W. McCULLOCH et al., Defendants, Appellees.
No. 6895.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
June 12, 1967.
Jay S. Siegel, Hartford, Conn., for appellant.
Michael N. Sohn, Washington, D. C., Attorney, with whom Arnold Ordman, General Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate General Counsel, and Gary Green, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Washington, D. C., Attorney, were on brief, for appellees.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, Mc~ ENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed on the opinion below. See also Greensboro Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Johnston, 4 Cir., 1967, 377 F.2d 28 (5/12/67).
Question: What is the nature of the proceeding in the court of appeals for this case?
A. decided by panel for first time (no indication of re-hearing or remand)
B. decided by panel after re-hearing (second time this case has been heard by this same panel)
C. decided by panel after remand from Supreme Court
D. decided by court en banc, after single panel decision
E. decided by court en banc, after multiple panel decisions
F. decided by court en banc, no prior panel decisions
G. decided by panel after remand to lower court
H. other
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_respondent | 033 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
001. attorney general of the United States, or his office
002. specified state board or department of education
003. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
004. state commission, board, committee, or authority
005. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
006. court or judicial district
007. state department or agency
008. governmental employee or job applicant
009. female governmental employee or job applicant
010. minority governmental employee or job applicant
011. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
012. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
013. retired or former governmental employee
014. U.S. House of Representatives
015. interstate compact
016. judge
017. state legislature, house, or committee
018. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
019. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
020. state or U.S. supreme court
021. local school district or board of education
022. U.S. Senate
023. U.S. senator
024. foreign nation or instrumentality
025. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
026. state college or university
027. United States
028. State
029. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
030. advertising business or agency
031. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
032. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
033. airline
034. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
035. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
036. American Medical Association
037. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
038. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
039. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
040. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
041. author, copyright holder
042. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
043. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
044. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
045. water transportation, stevedore
046. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
047. brewery, distillery
048. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
049. construction industry
050. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
051. business, corporation
052. buyer, purchaser
053. cable TV
054. car dealer
055. person convicted of crime
056. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
057. chemical company
058. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
059. religious organization, institution, or person
060. private club or facility
061. coal company or coal mine operator
062. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
063. consumer, consumer organization
064. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
065. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
066. defendant
067. debtor
068. real estate developer
069. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
070. distributor
071. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
072. drug manufacturer
073. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
074. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
075. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
076. electric equipment manufacturer
077. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
078. eleemosynary institution or person
079. environmental organization
080. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
081. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
082. father
083. female employee or job applicant
084. female
085. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
086. fisherman or fishing company
087. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
088. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
089. franchiser
090. franchisee
091. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
092. person who guarantees another's obligations
093. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
094. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
095. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
096. hospital, medical center
097. husband, or ex-husband
098. involuntarily committed mental patient
099. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
100. insurance company, or surety
101. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
102. investor
103. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
104. juvenile
105. government contractor
106. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
107. magazine
108. male
109. medical or Medicaid claimant
110. medical supply or manufacturing co.
111. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
112. minority female employee or job applicant
113. manufacturer
114. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
115. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
116. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
117. mother
118. auto manufacturer
119. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
120. radio and television network, except cable tv
121. nonprofit organization or business
122. nonresident
123. nuclear power plant or facility
124. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
125. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
126. tender offer
127. oil company, or natural gas producer
128. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
129. out of state noncriminal defendant
130. political action committee
131. parent or parents
132. parking lot or service
133. patient of a health professional
134. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
135. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
136. public interest organization
137. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
138. pipe line company
139. package, luggage, container
140. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
141. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
142. indigent defendant
143. private person
144. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
145. professional organization, business, or person
146. probationer, or parolee
147. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
148. public utility
149. publisher, publishing company
150. radio station
151. racial or ethnic minority
152. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
153. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
154. realtor
155. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
156. resident
157. restaurant, food vendor
158. retarded person, or mental incompetent
159. retired or former employee
160. railroad
161. private school, college, or university
162. seller or vendor
163. shipper, including importer and exporter
164. shopping center, mall
165. spouse, or former spouse
166. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
167. retail business or outlet
168. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
169. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
170. tenant or lessee
171. theater, studio
172. forest products, lumber, or logging company
173. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
174. trucking company, or motor carrier
175. television station
176. union member
177. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
178. union, labor organization, or official of
179. veteran
180. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
181. wholesale trade
182. wife, or ex-wife
183. witness, or person under subpoena
184. network
185. slave
186. slave-owner
187. bank of the united states
188. timber company
189. u.s. job applicants or employees
190. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
191. Atomic Energy Commission
192. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
193. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
194. Alien Property Custodian
195. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
196. Board of Immigration Appeals
197. Bureau of Indian Affairs
198. Bonneville Power Administration
199. Benefits Review Board
200. Civil Aeronautics Board
201. Bureau of the Census
202. Central Intelligence Agency
203. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
204. Department or Secretary of Commerce
205. Comptroller of Currency
206. Consumer Product Safety Commission
207. Civil Rights Commission
208. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
209. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
210. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
211. Drug Enforcement Agency
212. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
213. Department or Secretary of Energy
214. Department or Secretary of the Interior
215. Department of Justice or Attorney General
216. Department or Secretary of State
217. Department or Secretary of Transportation
218. Department or Secretary of Education
219. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
220. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
221. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
222. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
223. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
224. Federal Bureau of Prisons
225. Farm Credit Administration
226. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
227. Federal Credit Union Administration
228. Food and Drug Administration
229. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
230. Federal Energy Administration
231. Federal Election Commission
232. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
233. Federal Housing Administration
234. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
235. Federal Labor Relations Authority
236. Federal Maritime Board
237. Federal Maritime Commission
238. Farmers Home Administration
239. Federal Parole Board
240. Federal Power Commission
241. Federal Railroad Administration
242. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
243. Federal Reserve System
244. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
245. Federal Trade Commission
246. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
247. General Accounting Office
248. Comptroller General
249. General Services Administration
250. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
251. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
252. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
253. Interstate Commerce Commission
254. Indian Claims Commission
255. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
256. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
257. Information Security Oversight Office
258. Department or Secretary of Labor
259. Loyalty Review Board
260. Legal Services Corporation
261. Merit Systems Protection Board
262. Multistate Tax Commission
263. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
264. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
265. National Credit Union Administration
266. National Endowment for the Arts
267. National Enforcement Commission
268. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
269. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
270. National Mediation Board
271. National Railroad Adjustment Board
272. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
273. National Security Agency
274. Office of Economic Opportunity
275. Office of Management and Budget
276. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
277. Office of Personnel Management
278. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
279. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
280. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
281. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
282. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
283. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
284. U.S. Public Health Service
285. Postal Rate Commission
286. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
287. Renegotiation Board
288. Railroad Adjustment Board
289. Railroad Retirement Board
290. Subversive Activities Control Board
291. Small Business Administration
292. Securities and Exchange Commission
293. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
294. Selective Service System
295. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
296. Tennessee Valley Authority
297. United States Forest Service
298. United States Parole Commission
299. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
300. United States Sentencing Commission
301. Veterans' Administration
302. War Production Board
303. Wage Stabilization Board
304. General Land Office of Commissioners
305. Transportation Security Administration
306. Surface Transportation Board
307. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
308. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
309. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
310. Unidentifiable
311. International Entity
Answer: |
songer_treat | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below; i.e., how the decision below is "treated" by the appeals court. That is, the basic outcome of the case for the litigants, indicating whether the appellant or respondent "won" in the court of appeals.
John VON UTTER, Jr., Petitioner, Appellee, v. Donald P. TULLOCH, Respondent, Appellant.
No. 7471.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard March 2, 1970.
Decided May 14, 1970.
Lawrence P. Cohen, Asst. Atty. Gen,, with whom Robert H. Quinn, Atty. Gen., John Wall, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief, Criminal Div., Edmund Dinis, Dist; Atty., and Peter B. Gay, Asst. Dist. Atty., were on brief, for appellant.
Mitchell Benjoya, Boston, Mass., with whom Kevin M. Keating and Crane, Inker & Oteri, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellee.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, Mc-ENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
McENTEE, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Von Utter was convicted in Massachusetts Superior Court for possession of narcotics in violation of the narcotics drug laws. The narcotics were seized in a search of his car pursuant to a search warrant issued to a Province-town police officer. Petitioner’s motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the application for the warrant did not allege facts constituting probable cause was denied and his conviction was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court. Commonwealth v. Von Utter, 1968 Mass.Adv.Sh. 559, 246 N.E.2d 806. Thereafter, Von Utter filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In the district court, the Commonwealth, in addition to arguing the validity of the search warrant, attempted for the first time to support the seizure on the ground that it was a search incident to a lawful arrest. Although it did not ask for a decision on the merits, it did seek a remand of the case to the state court for an evidentiary hearing. The Commonwealth appeals from the order of the district court discharging the petitioner from custody.
I
The search warrant was accompanied by an affidavit and a memorandum setting forth the basis for the affiant’s belief that a search of the petitioner’s car would reveal quantities of LSD and marijuana. The memorandum, to the extent relevant, appears in the margin.
In Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), the Court elaborated on the test to be applied in judging the validity of search warrants where the information set out in the affidavit is based in part on hearsay. The Court began by reaffirming the two-pronged test announced in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), that “the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant * * * was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable’.” The Court went on to hold, however, that where the affidavit falls short of this standard, the magistrate can go beyond the informer’s tip and consider whether it and any other corroboratory information in the affidavit are sufficiently detailed “so that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual’s reputation.” Spinelli, supra, 393 U.S. at 416, 89 S.Ct. at 589. The Court cautioned that Aguilar’s standards must
Question: What is the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed; or affirmed and petition denied
C. reversed (include reversed & vacated)
D. reversed and remanded (or just remanded)
E. vacated and remanded (also set aside & remanded; modified and remanded)
F. affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified or affirmed and modified)
G. affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. certification to another court
K. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_decisiontype | B | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the type of decision made by the court among the following: Consider "opinion of the court (orally argued)" if the court decided the case by a signed opinion and the case was orally argued. For the 1791-1945 terms, the case need not be orally argued, but a justice must be listed as delivering the opinion of the Court. Consider "per curiam (no oral argument)" if the court decided the case with an opinion but without hearing oral arguments. For the 1791-1945 terms, the Court (or reporter) need not use the term "per curiam" but rather "The Court [said],""By the Court," or "By direction of the Court." Consider "decrees" in the infrequent type of decisions where the justices will typically appoint a special master to take testimony and render a report, the bulk of which generally becomes the Court's decision. This type of decision usually arises under the Court's original jurisdiction and involves state boundary disputes. Consider "equally divided vote" for cases decided by an equally divided vote, for example when a justice fails to participate in a case or when the Court has a vacancy. Consider "per curiam (orally argued)" if no individual justice's name appears as author of the Court's opinion and the case was orally argued. Consider "judgment of the Court (orally argued)" for formally decided cases (decided the case by a signed opinion) where less than a majority of the participating justices agree with the opinion produced by the justice assigned to write the Court's opinion.
MARTIN, SECRETARY OF STATE OF TEXAS, et al. v. BUSH et al.
No. 675.
Decided March 2, 1964.
Waggoner Carr, Attorney General of Texas, Albert P. Jones and Hawthorne Phillips, First Assistant Attorneys General, Mary K. Wall, Assistant Attorney General, Will D. Davis and Frank C. Erwin, Jr. for appellants.
William B. Cassin and Thad T. Hutcheson for appellees.
Pee Curiam.
The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed on the authority of Wesberry v. Sanders, ante, p. 1, without prejudice to the right of the appellants to apply by April 1, 1964, to the District Court for further equitable relief in light of the present circumstances including the imminence of the forthcoming election and “the operation of the election machinery of Texas” noted by the District Court in its opinion. The stay heretofore granted by Mr. Justice Black is continued in effect pending timely application for the foregoing relief and final disposition thereof by the District Court.
Mr. Justice Clark joins this disposition, but upon the grounds stated in his separate opinion in Wesberry v. Sanders, ante, p. 18.
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart would reverse the judgment below for the reasons stated in their dissenting opinions in Wesberry v. Sanders, ante, pp. 20, 50.
224 F. Supp. 499, 513.
Question: What type of decision did the court make?
A. opinion of the court (orally argued)
B. per curiam (no oral argument)
C. decrees
D. equally divided vote
E. per curiam (orally argued)
F. judgment of the Court (orally argued)
G. seriatim
Answer: |
songer_geniss | F | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. Consider the following categories: "criminal" (including appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence), "civil rights" (excluding First Amendment or due process; also excluding claims of denial of rights in criminal proceeding or claims by prisoners that challenge their conviction or their sentence (e.g., habeas corpus petitions are coded under the criminal category); does include civil suits instituted by both prisoners and callable non-prisoners alleging denial of rights by criminal justice officials), "First Amendment", "due process" (claims in civil cases by persons other than prisoners, does not include due process challenges to government economic regulation), "privacy", "labor relations", "economic activity and regulation", and "miscellaneous".
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. LOCAL 810, STEEL, METALS, ALLOYS & HARDWARE FABRICATORS & WAREHOUSEMEN, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, Respondent, and Sid Harvey, Inc. and Sid Harvey Brooklyn Corp., Intervenors.
Nos. 574, 575, Dockets 71-1951, 71-2062.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued March 24, 1972.
Decided May 11, 1972.
Jack H. Weiner, Washington, D. C. (Peter G. Nash, Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Nancy M. Sherman, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for petitioner.
Thomas Canafax, Jr., Washington, D. C. (Shimmel, Hill & Bishop, Washington, D. C., and Henry Brickman, New York City, on the brief), for respondent.
John T. Redmond, New York City (James H. Tully, Jr., Wood, Redmond & Tully, New York City, on the brief), for intervenors.
Before HAYS, MANSFIELD and MULLIGAN, Circuit Judges.
HAYS, Circuit Judge:
The National Labor Relations Board filed this application for enforcement of its order directing respondent Local 810 to cease and desist from conducting a secondary boycott in violation of Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) of the National Labor Relations. Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) (1970). The charging parties, Sid Harvey, Inc. and Sid Harvey Brooklyn Corp., intervened, urging that the application be granted. The Union cross-petitioned to set aside the Board’s order. We deny enforcement of the Board’s order and grant respondent’s cross-petition to set it aside.
I. The Facts
The Trial Examiner’s findings of fact were adopted by the Board and are supported by substantial evidence. These findings establish the following:
A. The Initial Dispute
An employee of Sid Harvey Supply, Inc. was discharged on February 20, 1970, and the Union went on strike after the company refused to reinstate him. The Union began picketing Supply that day, and on March 10 commenced picketing Sid Harvey, Inc. In May and June, members of the Union picketed and distributed handbills in front of stores operated by Sid Harvey Brooklyn Corp., Sid Harvey Nassau, Inc., and Sid Harvey Suffolk, Inc. The picket signs and leaflets, and the verbal exhortations of the pickets, requested the public not to buy Sid Harvey products. The pickets were successful in persuading some of the potential customers of one store operated by Nassau not to patronize that store, and also prevailed on carriers not to make deliveries to Inc. and Brooklyn. On June 11 the Union discontinued the picketing of Inc., Brooklyn, Nassau, and Suffolk after the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York temporarily enjoined the Union from picketing the four corporations in violation of § 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B).
B. Relationships Among the Sid Harvey Companies
Question: What is the general issue in the case?
A. criminal
B. civil rights
C. First Amendment
D. due process
E. privacy
F. labor relations
G. economic activity and regulation
H. miscellaneous
Answer: |
sc_authoritydecision | B | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.
CARROLL et al. v. LANZA, DOING BUSINESS AS LAKE CHARLES ELECTRIC CO.
No. 375.
Argued March 31, 1955.
Decided June 6, 1955.
Shields M. Goodwin argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Alston Jennings argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Edward L. Wright.
Me. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Carroll, the petitioner, was an employee of Hogan, an intervenor, who in turn was a subcontractor doing work for the respondent Lanza, the general contractor. Carroll and Hogan were residents of Missouri; and Carroll’s employment contract with Hogan was made in Missouri. The work, however, was done in Arkansas; and it was there that the injury occurred.
Carroll, not aware that he had remedies under the Arkansas law, received 34 weekly payments for the injury under the Missouri Compensation Act. The Missouri Act is applicable to injuries received inside or outside the State where the employment contract, as here, is made in the State. Mo. Rev. Stat., 1949, § 287.110. The Missouri Act also provides that every employer and employee shall be “conclusively presumed to have elected to accept” its provisions unless “prior to the accident” he shall have filed with the compensation commission a written notice that he “elects” to reject the compensation provision. Id., § 287.060. No such notice, however, was filed in this case. Moreover, the Missouri Act provides that the rights and remedies granted by it “shall exclude all other rights and remedies... at common law or otherwise,” on account of the injury or death. Id., § 287.120.
. Arkansas also has provisions for workmen’s compensation. Ark. Stat., 1947, § 81-1301 et seq. It provides
Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?
A. judicial review (national level)
B. judicial review (state level)
C. Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
D. statutory construction
E. interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
F. diversity jurisdiction
G. federal common law
Answer: |
songer_two_issues | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine whether there are two issues in the case. By issue we mean the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Luis Alphonso HENRIQUEZ, Jose Colon Ortiz, Segundo Zacarias Ortiz, Juan Andres Julio-Cardales, Joaquim G. Mejia, Olivio Omelis-Gundis, Felipe Molina Marrujo, Francisco Javier Gomez, and Rodrigo Roman-Ortiz, Appellants.
Nos. 458, 459, 466, 531, 588, 461, 460, 485, 462, Dockets 83-1186 to 83-1193, and 83-1241.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Dec. 12, 1983.
Decided March 20, 1984.
Carol B. Schachner, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City (Raymond J. Dearie, U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., Gregory J. Wallance, Asst. U.S. Atty., Brooklyn, N.Y., on brief), for appellee.
Phylis Skloot Bamberger, New York City (Robin Charlow, Legal Aid Society, Federal Defender Services Unit, New York City, on brief), for appellant Gomez.
Lawrence Farkash, New York City, for appellant Omelis-Gundis.
Austin V. Campriello, New York City (Polstein, Ferrara & Campriello, New York City, on brief), for appellant Roman-Ortiz.
Gary Schoer, Forest Hills, N.Y., for appellant Marrujo.
Stuart R. Shaw, New York City, for appellant Henriquez.
Frank J. Livoti, Mineóla, N.Y., for appellant Colon Ortiz.
Kenneth Ramseur, New York City, for appellant Segundo Ortiz.
George S. Popielarski, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant Julio-Cardales.
Millard King Roper, Bellerose, N.Y., for appellant Mejia.
Before FEINBERG, Chief Judge, and OAKES and PIERCE, Circuit Judges.
OAKES, Circuit Judge:
This appeal, coming to us on conditional pleas of guilty preserving several questions, raises three issues. The first of these is said to go to “subject matter jurisdiction,” the second relates to the constitutionality of the underlying jurisdictional statute, and the third is based on the government’s failure to preserve certain tapes. The appellants, all foreign nationals, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute marijuana “on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the high seas,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) (Supp. V 1981) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (aiding and abetting). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Jacob Mish-ler, Judge, accepted the defendants’ guilty pleas on the condition that the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and the failure to preserve the tapes would be preserved. We remand for further findings in respect to the status of the vessel involved, the “Juan XXIII.”
FACTS
On January 5, 1983, at about 3:00 p.m., a single-stack motor vessel was sighted by a U.S. Coast Guard aircraft in international waters approximately 73 miles off Long Island. The vessel was headed for Mon-tauk. Fifty minutes later the vessel had altered its course 180 °, and by 5:00 p.m. personnel aboard the aircraft observed an individual jettisoning bale-like objects, some 123 of which were counted by the aircraft. The aircraft subsequently dropped a marker buoy at the spot the bales were jettisoned. A Coast Guard cutter was dispatched and three aircraft successively maintained surveillance of the vessel until the cutter arrived in the vicinity at 2:30 a.m. on January 6.
The cutter came within sight of the vessel at approximately 7:00 a.m. No identifying markings on the vessel were visible from as close as 300 yards. After several unsuccessful attempts to establish contact by radio or bullhorn, the Coast Guard finally elicited a radio response that the vessel was the Juan XXIII of Honduran nationality, and permission was given to board. Circling the vessel prior to boarding, the
Question: Are there two issues in the case?
A. no
B. yes
Answer: |
sc_lcdispositiondirection | A | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations
MOORE, ADMINISTRATRIX, v. CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY CO.
No. 318.
Argued January 4, 1951.
Reargued January 10, 1951.
Decided February 26, 1951.
Geo. E. Allen argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Meade T. Spicer, Jr. and Strother Hynes argued the cause on the original argument and Mr. Hynes on the reargument for respondent. With them on the brief was Walter Leake.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action, brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of a surviving widow and children, charged negligence against respondent railroad in the death of petitioner’s decedent, who was acting in the course of his employment as a brakeman for respondent at the time of his death. The case was tried before a jury. At the conclusion of all the evidence, respondent moved for a directed verdict on the ground, among others, that respondent was not shown to have been negligent. The District Court reserved decision, pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and submitted the case to the jury, which returned a verdict for petitioner. Respondent then renewed its contention by motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was sustained, and the action was dismissed on the merits. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 184 F. 2d 176, and we granted certiorari to determine whether the province of the jury had been invaded by the action of the District Court. 340 U. S. 874.
On September 25, 1948, petitioner’s decedent was employed by respondent as
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_2-3-1 | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "civil rights - civil rights claims by prisoners and those accused of crimes".
Charles McCORKLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W.E. JOHNSON, Warden, Joseph Kolb, Chaplain, Freddie V. Smith, Commissioner, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 88-7478
Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Aug. 24, 1989.
P. David Bjurberg, David Christy, and Beth Jackson Hughes, Asst. Attys. Gen., Montgomery, Ala., for defendants-appel-lees.
Before VANCE, JOHNSON and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED on the basis of the memorandum opinion entered by the district court on July 13, 1988. (Attached hereto as Appendix.)
APPENDIX
In The United States District Court For The Southern District of Alabama Southern Division Charles McCorkle, Plaintiff, vs. W.E. Johnson, et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 84-0918-C
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This action was referred to the Magistrate for submission of recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The Magistrate submitted recommendations, and timely objections to those recommendations were filed by the plaintiff. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the court has made a de novo determination of those portions of the Magistrate’s recommendations to which objections were made.
Charles McCorkle, a state prisoner confined in the Holman facility, filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking redress for the deprivation of his First Amendment right to freely exercise his chosen religion. The defendants are prison officials who allegedly impinged on the plaintiff’s practice of the Satanic “religion” by denying plaintiff’s request for access to certain Satanic books and articles, including The Satanic Bible, The Satanic Book of Rituals, and a Satanic medallion. Their defense is three-fold: (1) Satanism is not a religion entitled to First Amendment protection; (2) assuming it is a religion, the plaintiff is not a sincere believer in Satanism; and (3) access to the requested books and medallion would pose a threat to the security of the prison. The Magistrate held that all three defenses were valid and recommended that judgment be entered in favor of the defendants.
The threshold questions of whether Satanism is a religion and, if it is, whether plaintiff is a sincere believer need not be decided since it is clear that, even if these questions are answered affirmatively, the challenged prison policy does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as it is applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. When it is alleged that a prison policy impinges on an inmate’s constitutional rights, the policy is valid “if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Giving the deference that is due to the officials charged with prison administration, see Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2539, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977), the court finds that the policy at issue in the present case successfully withstands this scrutiny; it is not an exaggerated response to the situation.
There are several factors which are relevant in determining the reasonableness of this policy. First, there must be a “valid, rational connection” between the prison restriction and the legitimate
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "civil rights - civil rights claims by prisoners and those accused of crimes"?
A. suit for damages for false arrest or false confinement
B. cruel and unusual punishment
C. due process rights in prison
D. denial of other rights of prisoners - 42 USC 1983 suits
E. denial or revocation of parole - due process grounds
F. other denial or revocation of parole
G. other prisoner petitions
H. excessive force used in arrest
I. other civil rights violations alleged by criminal defendants
Answer: |
songer_appbus | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick Henry EARLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 72-1803.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
July
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_direct1 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision, coded as "liberal" or "conservative". Consider liberal to be for the defendant. Consider the directionality to be "mixed" if the directionality of the decision was intermediate to the extremes defined above or if the decision was mixed (e.g., the conviction of defendant in a criminal trial was affirmed on one count but reversed on a second count or if the conviction was afirmed but the sentence was reduced). Consider "not ascertained" if the directionality could not be determined or if the outcome could not be classified according to any conventional outcome standards.
Elmer EASLEY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 7672.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
June 8, 1964.
Peter C. Dietze, Denver, Colo., for appellant.
Milton C. Branch, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Lawrence M. Henry, U. S. Atty., was with him on the brief), for appellee.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and PICKETT and LEWIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was found guilty of having transported a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312. He appeals, asserting that his written confession was improperly admitted into evidence under the totality of the circumstances and in view of the rule of Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479. We find no merit to the contentions.
On August 27, 1963, defendant was arrested by an officer of the Colorado State Highway Patrol for operating an improperly equipped automobile upon the highways of that state and for driving without a valid operator’s license. He was immediately taken before a justice of the peace, was adjudged guilty, and sentenced to a 12-day jail term. While in state custody defendant was interrogated by a special agent of the F.B.I. and on August 31 signed a written confession to the commission of the federal offense. On Saturday, September 7, he was placed under federal arrest and appeared before the United States Commissioner on , , n Monday, September 9.
When defendant’s confession was offered in evidence at the trial, objection to its voluntariness was timely made and the trial court properly proceeded to make preliminary inquiry of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument. McHenry v. United States, 10 Cir., 308 F.2d 700. Both the testimony of the special agent and that of the defendant indicated that the interrogation of defendant was conducted with commendable fairness, without taint of threat or promise, and that defendant was fully advised of his rights, including the right to be silent and to consult counsel. There is no indication of unbecoming conduct upon the part of state officers, no offensive “cooperation” between state and federal officers, no exploitation of a physical or mental weakness in defendant’s condition, and nothing in the totality of circumstances that would dictate that the confession was made otherwise than as an expression of free will. Compare Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1037.
Defendant’s appearance before the United States Commissioner was made promptly after he was subject to federal restraint and the prohibition of Mallory against the use of confessions obtained during an unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment is not here applicable. And although defendant s confession was made before he consulted counsel he was denied no right in such regard by either state or federal authority. Compare Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 78 S.Ct. 1287, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448.
The judgment is affirmed.
. Defendant specifically requested that the issue not be submitted as a factual issue to the jury.
Question: What is the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision?
A. conservative
B. liberal
C. mixed
D. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_appfed | 1 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Robert P. ANDERSON et al., Appellees.
No. 8134.
United States Court of Appeals
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_1-3-2 | Q | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "criminal - state offense".
Leroy WILLIAMS, # 004336, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 82-5440.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Aug. 22, 1983.
Mark A. Pizzo, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, Tampa, Fla., for petitioner-appellant.
Frank Lester Adams, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, Fla., for respondent-appellee.
Before HILL, KRAVITCH and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Leroy Williams appeals from denial of federal habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Finding no deprivation of constitutional rights, we affirm.
Appellant was charged with escape from a Florida correctional institution, tried and convicted in the state courts of Florida. The conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial due to violation of appellant’s right to assistance of counsel. Williams v. State, 337 So.2d 846 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976). Prior to retrial appellant filed a motion for psychiatric examination. A court-appointed psychiatrist, applying the M’Naughten test of insanity, which is applicable in Florida, concluded appellant was sane at the time of the crime. Appellant thereafter filed a notice of intent to rely upon an insanity defense and a statement of particulars providing the basis for the defense of insanity.
At request of appellant’s counsel, a pretrial hearing was held to determine whether the defendant would be allowed to raise the insanity defense at trial. The state trial court heard arguments, applied the M’Naughten test of whether or not the defendant knew right from wrong at the time of the crime, and concluded that there was no substantial evidence tending to show appellant was insane at the time of the crime. Cf. Griffin v. State, 96 So.2d 424, 425 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1957). The court therefore refused to appoint additional psychiatrists to examine appellant, ordered that the insanity defense be struck, but specifically ruled that no limitation would be placed on defendant’s right to produce evidence of absence of the requisite criminal intent.
Appellant then entered a plea of nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal on the issue of the insanity defense. The judgment of guilt was affirmed without -written opinion. Williams v. State, 358 So.2d 1198 (Fla. DCA 1978). Appellant next filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief. Based on the report and recommendation of the federal magistrate, the district court denied the petition.
Appellant does not contend that Florida’s use of the M'Naughten definition of insanity is unconstitutional; nor does he challenge the presumption of sanity nor the burden of proof on the issue that is applied in Florida. Rather he alleges that denial of the right to present the insanity defense violated his right to a fair trial by jury, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, even though his attorney conceded at the pretrial hearing that he was not insane under the M’Naughten standard. Record, Exhibit B, Tab 6, page 8.
Federal habeas relief does not lie unless the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The issue before us is whether the Constitution requires that a defendant be allowed to present an affirmative defense and instructions relating thereto to the jury
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "criminal - state offense"?
A. murder
B. rape
C. arson
D. aggravated assault
E. robbery
F. burglary
G. auto theft
H. larceny (over $50)
I. other violent crimes
J. narcotics
K. alcohol related crimes, prohibition
L. tax fraud
M. firearm violations
N. morals charges (e.g., gambling, prostitution, obscenity)
O. criminal violations of government regulations of business
P. other white collar crime (involving no force or threat of force; e.g., embezzlement, computer fraud,bribery)
Q. other state crimes
R. state offense, but specific crime not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_appel1_7_2 | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").
John C. LOAN, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellee.
No. 9804.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued April 8, 1965.
Decided April 20, 1965.
F. Byron Parker, Richmond, Va., for appellant.
H. Merrill Pasco, Richmond, Va. (Robert P. Buford, Jr., and Robert F. Brooks and Hunton, Williams, Gay, Powell & Gibson, Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellee.
Before SOBELOFF and J. SPENCER BELL, Circuit Judges, and STANLEY, District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
John C. Loan, a railroad fireman, brought an action against his employer, Southern Railway Co., under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. He alleged in his complaint that the defendant negligently caused him to slip and fall by leaving metal rods on a step leading to the cab of an engine in which he was working. The case was heard by a jury and a verdict was rendered for the defendant.
The charge to the jury was adequate and there was sufficient evidence offered to support its verdict. The testimony of Loan’s ex-wife, even if privileged, was merely cumulative. Independent witnesses abundantly established the facts testified to by the wife. The error of receiving her testimony, if it was error, was not in our opinion sufficient in the entire context of the trial to warrant reversal.
Affirmed.
Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.
A. not ascertained
B. male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
C. male - assumed because of name
D. female - indication in opinion of gender
E. female - assumed because of name
Answer: |
songer_weightev | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in any civil law cases including civil government, civil private, and diversity cases. The issue is: "Did the factual interpretation by the court or its conclusions (e.g., regarding the weight of evidence or the sufficiency of evidence) favor the appellant?" This includes discussions of whether the litigant met the burden of proof. Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".
Cathy A. WILLIAMS, Appellee, v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, Appellant, v. S & S RECOVERY, INC. Cathy A. WILLIAMS, Ford Motor Credit Company, Appellant, v. S & S RECOVERY, INC., Appellee.
Nos. 79-1911, 79-1947.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted June 12, 1980.
Decided Aug. 12, 1980.
W. R. Nixon, Jr., Little Rock, Ark., for appellant, Ford Motor Credit.
Fines F. Batchelor, Jr., Van Burén, Ark., argued, for appellee, Cathy Williams.
Bradley D. Jesson, Hardin, Jesson & Dawson, Fort Smith, Ark., on brief, for S & 5 Recovery.
Before LAY, Chief Judge, STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge, and HANSON, Senior District Judge.
William C. Hanson, Senior District Judge, Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa, sitting by designation.
LAY, Chief Judge.
Cathy A. Williams filed suit in state court against Ford Motor Credit Company (FMCC) alleging that it wrongfully repossessed an automobile in her possession which had been financed through FMCC. FMCC removed the case to federal court, answered and filed a third-party complaint against S & S Recovery, Inc. (S & S). The third-party complaint alleged that the seizure of Williams’ vehicle was made solely by S & S and that the manner and method used in the repossession was controlled by S 6 S.
A trial was conducted and at the conclusion of all the evidence, S & S’s motion for directed verdict was granted. Plaintiff’s case against FMCC was allowed to go to the jury; a verdict of $5,000 was returned in favor of plaintiff. Thereafter, FMCC made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In response, plaintiff suggested that the court deny defendant’s motion or, if the court decided that the verdict should not be allowed to stand, that an order be entered for a voluntary nonsuit without prejudice to refile in state court. The court ordered a voluntary nonsuit without prejudice to refile and ordered nunc pro tunc that a verdict be directed in favor of S & S and against FMCC. FMCC appeals from the district court’s orders dismissing plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice and directing a verdict in favor of S & S.
Where no responsive pleading is filed, Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1) makes clear that a party may dismiss his action without order of the court. However, Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) reads in part:
By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.
It has long been
Question: Did the factual interpretation by the court or its conclusions (e.g., regarding the weight of evidence or the sufficiency of evidence) favor the appellant?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_constit | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine whether there was an issue discussed in the opinion of the court about the constitutionality of a law or administrative action, and if so, whether the resolution of the issue by the court favored the appellant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald Louis MONROE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 88-3017.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
March 2, 1989.
Thomas S. Keith, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Pensacola, Fla., for defendant-appellant.
Randall J. Hensel, Asst. U.S. Atty., Pensacola, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before RONEY, Chief Judge, HATCHETT, Circuit Judge, and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge.
HATCHETT, Circuit Judge.
In this appeal, we reject the appellant's contentions that the district court erred by admitting hearsay statements, finding the evidence sufficient to convict, and ordering the forfeiture of real property. We affirm.
FACTS
On July 14,1987, the Air Products Chemical Plant in Pace, Florida, received an order placed by Bill Luke for a fifty-five gallon drum of methylamine, a key ingredient in the manufacture of methamphetamine, from Bill’s Supply, Route 1, Seminole, Alabama. On July 17, 1987, Donald Louis Monroe and a person who identified himself as Earl Godwin arrived at the plant in a van to pick up the order. Monroe and Godwin were required to fill out a visitor’s pass. Monroe signed his name as “D. Martin” and indicated that he represented Bill’s Supply.
Godwin drove the van to the loading dock where an Escambia County Sheriffs Department deputy, posing as an employee of Air Products, assisted Monroe and Godwin in loading the fifty-five gallon drum of methylamine into the van. Monroe signed the bill of lading “D. Martin” which reflected the order of the fifty-five gallon drum of methylamine by Bill Luke of Bill’s Supply, Route 1, Seminole, Alabama.
Law enforcement officers on the ground as well as in a helicopter observed the van travel to Monroe’s residence on Bankhead Drive in Pensacola, Florida, where Monroe and Godwin unloaded the drum and placed it in a Quonset hut on Monroe’s property. The total property located at 5225 Bank-head Drive encompasses approximately ten to eleven acres and is situated on a sandy drive where the Quonset hut, a mobile home, storage sheds, and a house are located. Also on the property is a large clay pit area containing abandoned cars, equipment, and other containers. Monroe also kept equipment for his machinery and demolition business on the property.
Based on the July 17, 1987 surveillance and other information, law enforcement officers sought and obtained a search warrant for Monroe’s residence and the surrounding property at 5225 Bankhead Drive. On July 18, 1987, officers of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Escambia County Sheriff’s Department executed the search warrant and seized numerous items.
The chemical apparatus, including flasks, condensers, and tubing were found in the Quonset hut laboratory set up. In a metal storage shed behind Monroe’s house, the officers found a Western Union money transfer application dated February 17, 1987, sent from Donald Moore, 5225 Bank-head Drive, Pensacola, Florida, and made payable to William Luke.
Officers found two keys in the kitchen of Monroe’s house which fit the padlock securing the Quonset hut. Once inside the Quonset hut, officers discovered, among other things, a make-shift laboratory set up, that is, two three-neck round bottom flasks, two cold water condensers with tubing, a drying tube, a hot plate, fans for ventilation, and a tank of nitrogen with tubing attached. A DEA chemist described this as a “reflux set up.” Officers found various chemicals, including the fifty-five gallon drum of methylamine obtained from Air Products the day before, now with a valve attached to gain access to its contents, and a canister of monomethylamine in the Quonset hut.
Officers also found several empty shipping boxes in the Quonset hut. One box had an address label indicating it had been shipped by the D.F. Goldsmith Chemical
Question: Did the court's conclusion about the constitutionality of a law or administrative action favor the appellant?
A. Issue not discussed
B. The issue was discussed in the opinion and the resolution of the issue by the court favored the respondent
C. The issue was discussed in the opinion and the resolution of the issue by the court favored the appellant
D. The resolution of the issue had mixed results for the appellant and respondent
Answer: |
songer_counsel1 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine the nature of the counsel for the appellant. If name of attorney was given with no other indication of affiliation, assume it is private - unless a government agency was the party
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Thomas BOHLE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18604.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
June 2, 1971.
Cummings, Circuit Judge, concurred with opinion.
Enoch, Senior Circuit Judge, dissented with opinion.
James H. Pankow, Joseph T. Helling, Philip C. Potts, South Bend, Ind., for defendant-appellant.
William C. Lee, U. S. Atty., Fort Wayne, Ind., Richard L. Kieser, Asst. U. S. Atty., South Bend, Ind., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before ENOCH, Senior Circuit Judge, CUMMINGS and PELL, Circuit Judges.
PELL, Circuit Judge.
On January 9, 1969, the destined course of Eastern Airlines Flight No. 831 originating at Miami, Florida was diverted from the Bahamas to Cuba by a procedure variously known as hijacking or skyjacking and sometimes more grandiloquently referred to as air piracy.
Ronald Thomas Bohle was indicted for the act pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §§ 1472 (i) and 1473(a) in the Northern District of Indiana where he stood trial before a jury, resulting in his conviction and sentencing of twenty-five years confinement.
We fail to find in the record any serious, or even token, disputation that Bohle did not board the plane in Miami and after the plane was aloft and over open water that he did not with the actual use of a switchblade knife and the threatened use of concealed nitroglycerin and a gun persuade a stewardess to take appropriate steps to divert the course of the plane to Cuba.
While the possibility of an insanity defense was alluded to at a hearing on a motion for bond reduction in December 1969, it was not until the second day of the trial on April 24, 1970, after the Government had concluded its ease-in-ehief, that counsel indicated to the court that insanity was an issue in the case.
Most of the contentions raised on this appeal concern alleged errors occurring during the course of the seven day trial and insofar as pertinent thereto, evi-dentiary aspects of this case will be set forth in connection with the specific contentions of Bohle for reversal. There are, however, two threshold contentions of error.
VENUE CONTENTION
Bohle’s first contention is that venue was improper in the district court for the Northern District of Indiana, under the provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 1473(a). That section, insofar as here relevant, provides that where, as here, the offense takes place outside any district, “the trial shall be in the district where the offender * * * is arrested or is first brought. If such offender * * * [is] not so arrested or brought into any district, an indictment or information may be filed in the district of the last known residence of the offender * *
A complaint charging Bohle with aircraft piracy was filed with the United States Commissioner in the Northern District of Indiana on June 27, 1969. Bohle was transported to the United States border by Canadian officials on November 2, 1969, entering the United States in the Northern District of New York. He was there arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the United States Commissioner in Indiana. Following his removal to the Northern District of Indiana, an indictment was returned in that district on December 15, 1969.
Bohle asserts that venue was lacking in the Northern District of Indiana because he was arrested in the Northern District of New York before the indictment was returned in Indiana. The Government argues in part that the purpose of the venue provision is satisfied by the filing of the complaint in Indiana before Bohle was “arrested or brought into any district. * * * ”
Question: What is the nature of the counsel for the appellant?
A. none (pro se)
B. court appointed
C. legal aid or public defender
D. private
E. government - US
F. government - state or local
G. interest group, union, professional group
H. other or not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_usc1sect | 841 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the number of the section from the title of the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case, that is, title 21. In case of ties, code the first to be cited. The section number has up to four digits and follows "USC" or "USCA".
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank C. McLISTER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 78-3077.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Nov. 21, 1979.
Richard B. Mazer, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
Floy E. Dawson, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before HUFSTEDLER and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges, and JAMESON, District Judge.
The Honorable William J. Jameson, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
JAMESON, District Judge:
A jury found Frank C. McLister guilty of distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and acquitted him of conspiring to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
Factual Background
McLister and three codefendants, John Irwin, Sharon Baker, and Thane Rucker were arrested after participating in a transaction in which a pound of cocaine was sold to an undercover government agent. McLister does not deny his participation or his knowledge that the sale involved cocaine. Rather, he contends that he lacked the requisite criminal intent.
The events leading to the arrests began in Denver, Colorado, where Irwin was arrested by the Denver Police Department in December, 1977, for possession of cocaine. In exchange for a dismissal of the criminal charge against him, Irwin agreed to become an informant for the Police Department. In February, 1978, Irwin met Darrell Wisdom, a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, who was posing as a large scale drug dealer. Wisdom was aware of Irwin’s status, but Irwin did not know that Wisdom was a DEA agent. In subsequent negotiations, Wisdom began to suspect that Irwin was “double dealing”, i. e., acting as an informant and continuing to deal in the illegal distribution of drugs.
On March 6 Irwin told Wisdom that he had set up a transaction in San Francisco for the purchase of a pound or two of cocaine. Irwin and his girl friend, Sharon Baker, flew to San Francisco later that day, and Wisdom followed on March 7. After making final arrangements for the purchase of the cocaine, Wisdom met Irwin and Baker in the lobby of the Hilton Hotel. Shortly thereafter McLister and Rucker arrived in McLister’s camper. After Wisdom entered the camper, Irwin and McLister produced the cocaine and gave it to Wisdom. Shortly thereafter, Wisdom and other agents arrested the four defendants.
At the trial Irwin testified that he had participated in the cocaine sale solely in furtherance of his plea agreement with the Denver Police and that he had intended to turn the participants over to the authorities. He claimed that McLister supplied the cocaine. On the other hand, McLister testified that prior to the transaction Irwin told him that he and Baker were acting as undercover agents for the Denver Police and that he reluctantly agreed to assist them in arranging for the arrest of a narcotics trafficker (Wisdom). McLister testified further that the cocaine he handed to Wisdom in the trailer belonged to either Irwin or Baker, who had placed it in the camper the night before with his permission.
Contentions on Appeal
Appellant contends that the district court erred in (1) restricting appellant’s cross-examination of his codefendant Irwin and Denver Police Detective Meyer; (2) permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine appellant concerning a misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana; and (3) instructing the jury that it would consider evidence that appellant had used cocaine; and (4) that the acquittal of appellant on the conspiracy charge was inconsistent with its verdict of guilty on the substantive charge.
Inconsistent Verdicts
We find no merit in appellant’s last contention that his acquittal on the conspiracy count precluded his conviction on the substantive count of distribution of cocaine. See, e. g., United States v. Livengood, 427 F.2d 420, 423 (9 Cir. 1970), where the jury acquitted the defendants on conspiracy charges to commit mail fraud, but convicted them on substantive counts of
Question: What is the number of the section from the title of the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case, that is, title 21? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_erron | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in civil law issues involving government actors. The issue is: "Did the court's use of the clearly erroneous standard support the government?" That is, a somewhat narrower standard than substantial evidence, or ignoring usual agency standards. Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. S. PRAWER & COMPANY, Respondent.
No. 78-1030.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Argued June 5, 1978.
Decided Sept. 27, 1978.
Jesse I. Etelson, Atty., N.L.R.B, Washington, D. C., with whom John S. Irving, Gen. Counsel, John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy Gen. Counsel, Carl L. Taylor, Associate Gen. Counsel, Elliott Moore, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, and John H. Ferguson, Atty., Washington, D. C., were on brief, for petitioner.
Harold N. Mack, Boston, Mass., with whom Philip J. Moss, and Morgan, Brown, Kearns & Joy, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for respondent.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, CAMPBELL and BOWNES, Circuit Judges.
BOWNES, Circuit Judge.
The National Labor Relations Board (“Board” or “NLRB”) seeks enforcement of its order that S. Prawer & Co. (“Company”) cease and desist from certain unfair labor practices found by the Board, that it bargain with the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, AFL-CIO (“Union”) upon request, and that it post appropriate notices. The Company alleges that the Board’s finding of section 8(a)(5) and (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) and (1), violation does not find substantial evidence in the record as a whole and that the Board erred in not accepting into evidence certain statements by one of the employees and in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing.
On October 5, 1977, the Union requested the Company to recognize and bargain with it. The Company refused. The Union had been certified as the bargaining representative pursuant to an election held on March 19, 1976. The Company had filed timely exceptions to the election alleging that the election was invalid (1) because of a rumor circulated to twelve of fourteen employees the morning of the election to the effect that the plant was moving to a location twenty-five or thirty miles away; (2) because the Union had allegedly misrepresented to employees that a former employee had been terminated for union activities; and (3) that the Union had circulated, nine days prior to the election, a news letter purportedly misrepresenting a claim that it had negotiated a $.60 per hour raise and improvements in vacation and sick pay on behalf of members employed by Ryder Truck Rental of Portland. Following an investigation, the Regional Director found against the Company on all three exceptions. The Company took exceptions to the Director’s report, which the Board rejected in September, 1977, when it adopted the findings of the Regional Director and certified the election. The Company refused to bargain with the Union, persisting in its claim that the election results should be overturned. Subsequent unfair labor practice charges were filed, charging the Company with refusal to bargain. The Board found against the Company
Question: Did the court's use of the clearly erroneous standard support the government? That is, a somewhat narrower standard than substantial evidence, or ignoring usual agency standards.
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
sc_casedisposition | D | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss.
HEFFRON, SECRETARY AND MANAGER OF THE MINNESOTA STATE AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY BOARD OF MANAGERS, et al. v. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS, INC., et al.
No. 80-795.
Argued April 20, 1981
Decided June 22, 1981
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Marshall and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 656. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 663.
Kent G. Harbison, Special Assistant Attorney General of Minnesota, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Warren Spannaus, Attorney General, and William P. Marshall, Special Assistant Attorney General.
Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Barry A. Fisher and David Grosz
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Shirley Adelson Siegel, Solicitor General, and Thomas J. Maroney and George M. Levy, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of New York; by William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Gary Elson Brown, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Ohio; and by John H. Larson and DeWitt W. Clinton for the County of Los Angeles.
Briefs of amici curiae urging aflirmanee were filed by J. Albert Woll, Marsha Berzon, and Laurence Gold for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; and by Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., and Charles S. Sims for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by John Jordan for the Gujarat Cultural Association, Inc., et al.; and by Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., for the India Cultural Society of New Jersey et al.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented for review is whether a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, may require a religious organization desiring to distribute and sell religious literature and to solicit donations at a state fair to conduct those activities only at an assigned location within the fairgrounds' even though application of the rule limits the religious practices of the organization.
I
Each year, the Minnesota Agricultural Society (Society), a public corporation organized under the laws of Minnesota, see Minn. Stat. § 37.01 (1980), operates a State Fair on a 125-acre state-owned tract located in St. Paul, Minn. The Fair is conducted for the purpose of “exhibiting... the agricultural, stock-breeding, horticultural, mining, mechanical, industrial, and other products and resources of the state, including proper exhibits and expositions of the arts, human skills, and sciences.” Ibid. The Fair is a major public event and attracts visitors from all over Minnesota as well as from other parts of the country. During the past five years, the average total attendance for the 12-day Fair has been 1,320,000 persons. The average daily attendance on weekdays has been 115,000 persons and on Saturdays and Sundays 160,000.
The Society is authorized to make all “bylaws, ordinances, and rules, not inconsistent with law, which it may deem necessary or proper for the government of the fair grounds....” Minn Stat. § 37.16 (1980). Under
Question: What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed (includes modified)
C. reversed
D. reversed and remanded
E. vacated and remanded
F. affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part
G. affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. certification to or from a lower court
K. no disposition
Answer: |
songer_genresp2 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed respondent. If there are more than two respondents and at least one of the additional respondents has a different general category from the first respondent, then consider the first respondent with a different general category to be the second respondent.
Kurt J. LINDNER, Edith Lindner; St. Joseph Hospital of Kirkwood; Admiral Insurance Agency; Lindner Fund, Inc.; Petty & Company; Landmark Central Bank & Trust Company, Appellants, v. DURHAM HOSIERY MILLS, INC.; George A. Cralle; H.E. Schoenhut, Jr.; W.K. Bigelow; H.E. Rodenhizer; W.C. Spann and John P. Barnett, individually, Appellees.
No. 84-1593.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Jan. 10, 1985.
Decided May 6, 1985.
William Woodward Webb, Raleigh, N.C. (Broughton, Wilkins & Webb, P.A., Raleigh, N.C., Kevin P. Roddy, Smith, Tag
Question: What is the nature of the second listed respondent whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_typeiss | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court. Choose among the following categories. Criminal and prisioner petitions- includes appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence or the validity of continued confinement. Civil - Government - these will include appeals from administrative agencies (e.g., OSHA,FDA), the decisions of administrative law judges, or the decisions of independent regulatory agencies (e.g., NLRB, FCC,SEC). The focus in administrative law is usually on procedural principles that apply to administrative agencies as they affect private interests, primarily through rulemaking and adjudication. Tort actions against the government, including petitions by prisoners which challenge the conditions of their confinement or which seek damages for torts committed by prion officials or by police fit in this category. In addition, this category will include suits over taxes and claims for benefits from government. Diversity of Citizenship - civil cases involving disputes between citizens of different states (remember that businesses have state citizenship). These cases will always involve the application of state or local law. If the case is centrally concerned with the application or interpretation of federal law then it is not a diversity case. Civil Disputes - Private - includes all civil cases that do not fit in any of the above categories. The opposing litigants will be individuals, businesses or groups.
James B. LATTA, Appellant, v. Hilbert S. SABIN, Appellee.
No. 17664.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Jan. 8, 1964.
Decided Feb. 20, 1964.
Mr. Earl H. Davis, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Donald S. Caruthers, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. J. Joseph Barse, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. H. Mason Welch and J. Harry Welch, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. James A. Welch, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before Danaher, Bastían and McGowan, Circuit Judges.
DANAHER, Circuit Judge.
The District Judge directed a verdict in favor of the appellee on the issue of negligence in a malpractice action. The appellant did not sustain his burden of proving that the surgeon had failed to exercise that degree of care and skill required by the standard of practice which the appellee was bound to afford to the appellant as his patient. The appellant’s claims as to breach of warranty and unauthorized operation were submitted to the jury pursuant to adequate instructions, adapted to the issues.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the appellant awarding damages equal to the amount of the surgeon’s charge for his services. The award is now attacked, as grossly inadequate.
The jury might have decided that except for a comparatively minor phase of the surgery, the special damages claimed by appellant were actually attributable to a later operation by other surgeons. The jury might also have concluded that no credence could be placed in the appellant’s claim that the doctor had warranted a particular result. In any event, no special interrogatories had been submitted to the jury, and its general verdict is not without support in the record. The trial judge denied the appellant’s motion for a new trial. Our review of the record does not disclose such abuse of discretion as to require reversal.
We have examined other contentions of the appellant in respect of certain rulings on evidence as to which we find no error.
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
. Rodgers v. Lawson, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 281, 170 F.2d 157 (1948); and see Brown v. Keaveny, 117 U.S.App.D.C. -, 326 F.2d 660 (rehearing en banc denied).
. Hulett v. Brinson, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 139, 140, 229 F.2d 22, 23, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1014, 76 S.Ct. 659, 100 L.Ed. 874 (1956) ; cf. Muldrow v. Daly, 117 U.S.App.D.C. -, -F.2d- (1964) ; Association of Western Railways v. Riss & Company, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 49
Question: What is the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court?
A. criminal and prisoner petitions
B. civil - government
C. diversity of citizenship
D. civil - private
E. other, not applicable
F. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_r_state | 1 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
Houston McELROY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dr. George J. BETO, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 71-
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_weightev | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in any civil law cases including civil government, civil private, and diversity cases. The issue is: "Did the factual interpretation by the court or its conclusions (e.g., regarding the weight of evidence or the sufficiency of evidence) favor the appellant?" This includes discussions of whether the litigant met the burden of proof. Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".
Irma Jean PEREZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Wayne A. SIMMONS; James Nalls; Thomas Miller; Mark Meske; and City of Santa Barbara, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 86-6663.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted March 7, 1988.
Decided Oct. 26, 1988.
Amended Aug. 31, 1989.
John M. Sink, Santa Barbara, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
David K. Hughes, Asst. City Atty., and Kristofer Kallman, Santa Barbara, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Before HUG, ALARCON and KOZINSKI, Circuit Judges.
HUG, Circuit Judge:
An opinion in this case was filed on October 26, 1988, Perez v. Simmons, 859 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir.1988). Appellees petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. In response to the petition, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded to our court for further consideration in light of City of Canton v. Harris, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). Simmons v. Perez, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 1736, 104 L.Ed.2d 174 (1989). On further consideration, in light of that case, we file this amended opinion.
Plaintiff Irma Perez brought this section 1983 action against the City of Santa Barbara and certain police officers alleging that the officers violated her constitutional rights by entering her house unlawfully in search of her brother. The district judge granted a directed verdict in favor of the City, and a jury found in favor of the remaining defendants. In this appeal, Perez alleges error in the jury instructions and error in granting the directed verdict. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). We reverse.
I.
FACTS
On March 8, 1983, Irma Perez was living in a three-bedroom apartment at 13 South Soledad Street, in Santa Barbara, California. She had lived there over three years with her children.
Irma Perez had a brother named Albert who, Irma testified, never lived in her apartment. Albert was on probation and also had warrants outstanding for his arrest. Officers Nalls, Simmons, and Miller of the Santa Barbara Police Department narcotics detail were aware of the arrest warrants. Between October and December of 1982, the officers went three or four times to the residence of Albert’s other sister, Debbie, to contact Albert. Debbie lived across town from Irma on Bath Street. This was the residence address that Albert had given to the police when he was arrested on August 21, 1982, and this was the address used by the probation department. When the officers spoke
Question: Did the factual interpretation by the court or its conclusions (e.g., regarding the weight of evidence or the sufficiency of evidence) favor the appellant?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_usc1 | 18 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if no U.S. Code titles are cited. If one or more provisions are cited, code the number of the most frequently cited title.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Truman TALK, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 133-69.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Nov. 20, 1969.
Martin E. Threet, Albuquerque, N. M., for defendant-appellant.
Victor R. Ortega, U. S. Atty. (Ruth C. Streeter, former U. S. Atty., and John A. Babington, Asst. U. S. Atty., on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, LEWIS, Circuit Judge, and THEIS, District Judge.
THEIS, District Judge.
Appellant in this case was charged with the crime of rape on an Indian Reservation, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153. In the first trial the jury was unable to reach a verdict. At a second trial he was tried again, convicted, and sentenced to twenty years in prison, with provisions for parole as set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 4208(a) (2).
The facts are simple. On the night of July 12, 1968, within the boundaries of the Navajo Indian Reservation, Gloria Mae Begay, a thirteen-year old Indian girl, was seized by the appellant and dragged to a secluded spot at the rear of a drive-in movie theater. With his fists and by beating her with a chain, the appellant physically abused the girl. Thereafter, he, along with five other young Indians, commenced to rape the girl. During the course of the attack a police car drove by, causing the appellant and those with him to run. The girl went to the police car and made her complaint.
On this appeal, appellant brings to this Court only two questions concerning error by the trial court: one bearing on the prosecution’s cross-examination of the appellant about a previous assault on, and the validity of his claimed marriage to, one Alice Johnson; and the other concerning the trial court’s refusal to disclose the contents of the pre-sentence report to the appellant prior to sentencing.
As to appellant’s first contention, at the trial and after the appellant had testified on direct examination that he was married to Alice Johnson and enjoyed a satisfactory sexual life, the following occurred on cross-examination:
“Q. (Mr. Watkins [Assistant U. S. Attorney] continuing.) Truman, you said you were married to Alice Johnson, is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. When were you married to Alice Johnson?
A. I got married to Alice Johnson— well, I didn’t took our blood tests, March 15, we got married May 15.
Q. Isn’t it true, Truman, that in June of 1968 that you and Alice Johnson were engaged tobe married but that you got mad at her and threw her out of a moving car and broke her shoulder?
MR. THREET: [Appellant’s attorney] Your Honor—
Q. (Mr. Watkins continuing.) She never married you?
MR. THREET: — this is getting into matters—
MR. WATKINS: Your Honor, he says he’s married. I want to find out if he really is.
THE COURT: You might ask him about being married, but all of this other will be stricken and the jury advised not to consider it.” (Emphasis added.)
On the basis of the italicized question above, appellant’s counsel moved for a mistrial at the close of the evidence and moved for a new trial after the guilty verdict was received. Both motions were denied by the trial court. Appellant now contends those rulings were error. We do not agree.
In order to place the question of the United States Attorney in proper perspective, it is necessary to examine the Government’s case and certain events that transpired during the course of the trial, appearing in the record before us. On direct examination the appellant Talk, who had taken the stand in his own defense, told the jury that he was married to Alice Johnson, and that his sex life had been satisfactory. The transcript further shows in the colloquy of counsel before the trial court, that the United States Attorney had stated that Miss Johnson was unavailable as a witness because she gave birth to a child on the second day of the trial, and that the prosecutor had in his hand at the time the objectionable question
Question: What is the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_respond2_1_3 | F | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the second listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to determine what category of business best describes the area of activity of this litigant which is involved in this case.
COLORADO PUMP & SUPPLY COMPANY, a Colorado corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEBCO, INCORPORATED, a corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 72-1204.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Sept. 19, 1972.
Decided Jan. 5, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1973.
James C. Bull, Denver, Colo. (Creamer & Creamer and Quiat & Quiat, Denver, Colo., on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
M. Dee Biesterfeld, Denver, Colo. (E. L. Fraser, Los Angeles, Cal., and Doyle & Biersterfeld, Denver, Colo., on the brief), for defendants-appellees.
Before LEWIS, Chief Judge, and MURRAH and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
In this private antitrust suit the issues are whether actions of defendants-appellees Febeo, Incorporated, and Thompson Pipe & Steel Company violate the federal antitrust laws. The district court held for the defendants and dismissed the action. We affirm.
Febeo manufacturers lawn and turf equipment. Thompson and plaintiff-appellant Colorado Pump & Supply Company are competing wholesale distributors of such equipment in the Colorado area. An important item is the control device for sprinkling systems. Until January 16, 1967, Thompson, Colorado Pump, and other distributors purchased from Febeo and received a 50% discount. Colorado Pump had a franchise agreement with Rainbird, a competitor of Febeo, and limited its Febeo purchases to controllers. The trial court found that other controllers on the market were competitive with, and satisfactory substitutes for, the Febeo controllers.
On the mentioned date Thompson and Febeo made a written agreement whereby Thompson became the exclusive Feb-eo distributor in a geographically defined area. Thompson received a 50/10% discount on package quantities and 50% on broken package quantities. Other contract provisions will be discussed later. After the agreement, Feb-eo refused to sell directly to Colorado Pump which could, and did, purchase Febeo products from Thompson at a 35% discount on parts and 40% discount on complete line equipment. These were the same discounts given all other distributors and jobbers by Thompson.
With the 35% discount Colorado Pump could not make a profit on sales of controllers and discontinued handling the Febeo controller with a resulting loss in business. The complaint alleged that Colorado Pump lost $150,000 in profits; that the actions of Febeo and Thompson violated §§ 1, 2, and 14 of Title 15 U.S.C.; and that Colorado Pump is entitled to treble damages. Trial to the court was had on the issue of liability, with damages reserved for later consideration. The court miade findings of fact and concluded that Febeo and Thompson had not violated the federal antitrust laws.
The contract between Febeo and Thompson authorizes Thompson “to sell within the following territory [here follows a description including Colorado and some adjacent area].” Title to the purchased products passes to Thompson at Febco’s shipping point. Colorado Pump says that these contract provisions are a per se Sherman Act violation because a manufacturer
Question: This question concerns the second listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What category of business best describes the area of activity of this litigant which is involved in this case?
A. agriculture
B. mining
C. construction
D. manufacturing
E. transportation
F. trade
G. financial institution
H. utilities
I. other
J. unclear
Answer: |
songer_typeiss | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court. Choose among the following categories. Criminal and prisioner petitions- includes appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence or the validity of continued confinement. Civil - Government - these will include appeals from administrative agencies (e.g., OSHA,FDA), the decisions of administrative law judges, or the decisions of independent regulatory agencies (e.g., NLRB, FCC,SEC). The focus in administrative law is usually on procedural principles that apply to administrative agencies as they affect private interests, primarily through rulemaking and adjudication. Tort actions against the government, including petitions by prisoners which challenge the conditions of their confinement or which seek damages for torts committed by prion officials or by police fit in this category. In addition, this category will include suits over taxes and claims for benefits from government. Diversity of Citizenship - civil cases involving disputes between citizens of different states (remember that businesses have state citizenship). These cases will always involve the application of state or local law. If the case is centrally concerned with the application or interpretation of federal law then it is not a diversity case. Civil Disputes - Private - includes all civil cases that do not fit in any of the above categories. The opposing litigants will be individuals, businesses or groups.
Clifford O. BOREN, Appellant, v. R. A. RIDDELL, District Director of Internal Revenue, Appellee.
No. 15203.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Feb. 19, 1957.
John A. Brant and Torrance & Wan-sley, San Diego, Cal., for appellant.
Charles K. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., Helen A. Buckley, Washington, D. C., Edward R. McHale, Robert H. Wyshak and Bruce I. Hochman, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for appel-lee.
Before STEPHENS, CHAMBERS and BARNES, Circuit Judges.
BARNES, Circuit Judge.
Appellant sought an injunction in the District Court restraining and enjoining appellee from making any seizure, collection or distraint of any property belonging to appellant under the authority of an assessment for income taxes, interest and penalties made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue against appellant, for the calendar year 1951. This income tax return appellant had duly filed.
Appellee moved to dismiss, filing a supporting affidavit. The District Court treated the motion as one for summary judgment, heard the matter, and ordered dismissal. This is an appeal from that order of dismissal.
A taxpayer’s right to enjoin the collection of taxes is limited by statute under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, effective August 17, 1954.
In that Code, § 7421 provides:
“(a) Tax. — Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), and 6213 (a), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court.”
§ 6212(a) provides that after the Secretary or his delegate determines there is a deficiency, he “is authorized to send notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer by registered mail.”
§ 6213 provides that within ninety days after the notice authorized in § 6212 is mailed, the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the proposed deficiency.
In such an event, § 6212(c) (1) provides that the Secretary or his delegate shall have no right to determine any additional deficiency of the taxpayer for the same taxable year.
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, similar restrictions on the taxpayer’s right of injunction existed.
Section 272, as amended, provided:
“If in the ease of any taxpayer, the Commissioner determines that there is a deficiency in respect of the tax imposed by this chapter, the Commissioner is authorized to send notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer by registered mail * *
This Section then gives the taxpayer the right, within ninety days, to petition for a redetermination of the deficiency, and no assessment, distraint or proceeding in court for collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted “until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such ninety day period,” nor if such a petition is filed, “until the decision of
Question: What is the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court?
A. criminal and prisoner petitions
B. civil - government
C. diversity of citizenship
D. civil - private
E. other, not applicable
F. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_typeiss | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court. Choose among the following categories. Criminal and prisioner petitions- includes appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence or the validity of continued confinement. Civil - Government - these will include appeals from administrative agencies (e.g., OSHA,FDA), the decisions of administrative law judges, or the decisions of independent regulatory agencies (e.g., NLRB, FCC,SEC). The focus in administrative law is usually on procedural principles that apply to administrative agencies as they affect private interests, primarily through rulemaking and adjudication. Tort actions against the government, including petitions by prisoners which challenge the conditions of their confinement or which seek damages for torts committed by prion officials or by police fit in this category. In addition, this category will include suits over taxes and claims for benefits from government. Diversity of Citizenship - civil cases involving disputes between citizens of different states (remember that businesses have state citizenship). These cases will always involve the application of state or local law. If the case is centrally concerned with the application or interpretation of federal law then it is not a diversity case. Civil Disputes - Private - includes all civil cases that do not fit in any of the above categories. The opposing litigants will be individuals, businesses or groups.
John S. PORTER, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Harold NUTTER, et al., Defendants, Appellees.
No. 89-1834.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard Aug. 1, 1990.
Decided Sept. 11, 1990.
Lee C. Nyquist, with whom Devine and Nyquist and Merrick C. Weinstein, were on brief for plaintiff, appellant.
Andrew D. Dunn, with whom Devine, Millimet, & Branch and Cynthia A. Satter, were on brief for defendants, appellees.
Before CAMPBELL and SELYA, Circuit Judges, and BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
Invoking diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, plaintiff-appellant John S. Porter, a Floridian, sued several local citizens, including appellee Ronald Griffin, in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The district court, acting on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, dismissed Porter’s complaint against Griffin for failure to state a cognizable claim. Following entry of judgment under Fed.R. Civ.P. 54(b), Porter appeals.
I
“In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we take the well-pleaded facts as they appear in the complaint, indulging every reasonable inference in plaintiff’s favor.” Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1990). Utilizing this approach, Porter’s amended complaint, read in its most flattering mien, reveals the following:
1. Griffin, Porter, and Raycraft worked for a common employer, Rockingham Venture, Inc. (RVI), which owned and operated a racetrack in Salem, New Hampshire. Griffin was a supervisor whose duties included reviewing safety precautions and directing work crews. Porter and Raycraft were subordinates who did plumbing repairs and general labor.
2. On July 20, 1987, the three men were toiling near the ladies’ rest room at the racetrack. Performance of the job required Porter to work in a trench. He was not furnished with any headgear or other protective equipment.
3. Several times, Porter asked Griffin to remove a propane tank hovering near the trench’s edge. Griffin had both the authority and the wherewithal to relocate the tank, but neglected to do so. Eventually, misfortune struck. Raycraft, said by plaintiff to be a “known user and abuser of alcohol,” attempted to leap across the fissure, causing the omnipresent tank to fall into the trench. The tank struck Porter, seriously injuring him.
The district court, reading these facts liberally in plaintiffs favor, nonetheless believed Griffin to be immune from suit. We agree.
II
State substantive law controls in this diversity case. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Moores v. Green
Question: What is the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court?
A. criminal and prisoner petitions
B. civil - government
C. diversity of citizenship
D. civil - private
E. other, not applicable
F. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_initiate | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify what party initiated the appeal. For cases with cross appeals or multiple docket numbers, if the opinion does not explicitly indicate which appeal was filed first, assumes that the first litigant listed as the "appellant" or "petitioner" was the first to file the appeal. In federal habeas corpus petitions, consider the prisoner to be the plaintiff.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL HEARING BOARD, Robert Broughton, Paul E. Waters, and Ray A. Alberigi, Prothonotary of Lackawanna County, Appellees.
No. 77-2041.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued March 30, 1978.
Decided Aug. 14, 1978.
James Hunter, III, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion.
James W. Moorman, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., S. John Cottone, U. S. Atty., James W. Walker, Asst. U. S. Atty., Scranton, Pa., Raymond N. Zagone, Carl Strass, Attys., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Dennis Jay Harnish, Karin W. Carter, Asst. Attys. Gen., Harrisburg, Pa., for ap-pellees.
Before HUNTER, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GARTH, Circuit Judge.
This appeal requires us to determine whether a private company operating under federal contract is a federal “department, agency or instrumentality” for the purposes of section 313 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Act). That provision requires inter alia that a federal “department, agency or instrumentality” comply with State and local pollution control requirements “to the same extent that any person is subject to such requirements.”
The district court determined that Chamberlain Manufacturing Corporation (Chamberlain), the company whose operations and whose relationship to the Government is involved here, is a private independent contractor and not a federal agency for purposes of section 313. That holding resulted in the district court granting the summary judgment motion brought by the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board (Board). 431 F.Supp. 747 (M.D.Pa.). We affirm.
I
The United States owns the premises, installations and equipment at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant (Plant) in Scranton, Pennsylvania. The primary function of the Plant is the production of metal parts for ammunition shells used solely by the United States. Chamberlain, an Iowa corporation having a certificate of authority to do business in Pennsylvania, operates the Plant under a facilities contract with the United States. That contract designates Chamberlain as “an independent contractor and not an agency of the Government,” and provides that the personnel employed “in carrying out the work hereunder. shall constitute employees of the Contractor [Chamberlain] and not of the Government.”
From July, 1970 through October, 1972, the operation of the plant by Chamberlain resulted in the discharge of 1.5 million gallons per day of untreated wastes from the Plant into Roaring Brook, a tributary of the Lackawanna River. “As a result of the industrial waste discharge, no fish could have lived within a half mile of the plant, and the lower life forms were also depressed.”
During this period, “Chamberlain knew that its operation of the plant and the attendant discharge of industrial wastes from the plant caused substantial pollution of Roaring Brook.” Chamberlain however was not unresponsive: commencing in 1966 and at least through October, 1972, Chamberlain engaged in a series of pollution abatement measures which, by October, 1972, resulted in abatement of the Plant’s industrial waste discharge.
The parties stipulated that in order to receive reimbursement from the United States for its pollution control programs, Chamberlain required the approval of the Department of the Army prior to their implementation. The facilities contract between the Government and Chamberlain nonetheless specified that Chamberlain was to comply with all governmental laws and regulations, and was to “procure all necessary permits and licenses,” including those of state and local authorities. Additionally the facilities contract contains a specific section dealing with Chamberlain’s responsibility to comply with state pollution control laws, and provides among other things that “[i]n the event any Governmental agency, local, state or federal, shall assess fines, institute suit, or otherwise disrupt, curtail, or order cessation of
Question: What party initiated the appeal?
A. Original plaintiff
B. Original defendant
C. Federal agency representing plaintiff
D. Federal agency representing defendant
E. Intervenor
F. Not applicable
G. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_respond1_8_2 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "miscellaneous". Your task is to determine which of the following categories best describes the litigant.
Tom MALOUFF, Plaintiff in Error, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant in Error.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
January 25, 1929.
No. 8129.
T. J. Malouff, for plaintiff in error.
George Stephan, U. S. Atty., and Charles E. Works, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Denver, Colo.
PER CURIAM.
Writ of error dismissed, without costs to either party in this court, for failure to file brief, as provided in stipulation of parties.
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "miscellaneous". Which of the following categories best describes the litigant?
A. fiduciary, executor, or trustee
B. other
C. nature of the litigant not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_state | 22 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the state or territory in which the case was first heard. If the case began in the federal district court, consider the state of that district court. If it is a habeas corpus case, consider the state of the state court that first heard the case. If the case originated in a federal administrative agency, answer "not applicable". Answer with the name of the state, or one of the following territories: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Panama Canal Zone, or "not applicable" or "not determined".
In re ROLLAND STORES CORPORATION. BERMAN v. HALE.
No. 2853.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Feb. 16, 1934.
Harry T. Talty, of Boston, Mass. (Archibald Palmer, of New York City, on the brief), for appellant.
Clifford H. Byrnes, of Boston, Mass., for appellee.
Before WILSON and MORTON, Circuit Judges, and PETERS, District Judge.
WILSON, Circuit Judge.
The appellant was the treasurer of the Rolland Stores Corporation, which was duly adjudged a bankrupt in the District Court of Massachusetts. As such treasurer, he was ordered by the District Court on the report of a referee to turn over to the tras-tee certain merchandise as property of the bankrupt, which it was found he had wrongfully withheld from the trustee, or the value thereof, amounting to $12,949.29.. Prom this order the appellant filed a petition for appeal which, was allowed in the District Court, and also a petition to this court for leave to appeal under section 24b of the Bankruptcy Act (11 USCA § 47 (b). It is conceded that the bankrupt is only entitled to proceed under section 24b.
Both parties being ready to proceed to a hearing on the merits in case his petition for leave to appeal was allowed, the case was fully heard at the January session of this court. The petition for leave to appeal is allowed and the case will be disposed of on the merits.
The trustee filed a petition in the District Court alleging that Prank E. Berman, at various times prior to December 3, 1931, wrongfully received property of the bankrupt which he was withholding without col- or of title or adverse claim, and refused to surrender to the trustee in bankruptcy, to wit:
(1) Approximately $5,000 recorded on. the hooks of the company as loans receivable, which consisted in fact of money misappropriated by Berman.
(2) Trade fixtures of the value of $250.
(3) Merchandise or the proceeds from the sale thereof of approximately $35,000.
(4) Money received from the sale of merchandise, but not deposited to the credit of the corporation amounting to $4,454.84.
(5) Certain checks, records, and books of the corporation.
(6) The record books of the corporation.
The petition was referred to a referee and, after protracted hearings, the referee found and ordered that Frank E. Berman, as treasurer of the bankrupt corporation, either turn over to the trustee merchandise or the value thereof, to wit, $12,949.29) and certain canceled cheeks,' books, and records of the bankrupt, which are more particularly described in the referee’s order.
The order of the referee was affirmed by the District Court. The appellant filed numerous assignments of error, but all were directed to the contention that the evidence before the referee did not warrant a finding that the appellant had in his possession any merchandise belonging to the bankrupt and was wrongfully withholding
Question: In what state or territory was the case first heard?
01. not
02. Alabama
03. Alaska
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. Florida
11. Georgia
12. Hawaii
13. Idaho
14. Illinois
15. Indiana
16. Iowa
17. Kansas
18. Kentucky
19. Louisiana
20. Maine
21. Maryland
22. Massachussets
23. Michigan
24. Minnesota
25. Mississippi
26. Missouri
27. Montana
28. Nebraska
29. Nevada
30. New
31. New
32. New
33. New
34. North
35. North
36. Ohio
37. Oklahoma
38. Oregon
39. Pennsylvania
40. Rhode
41. South
42. South
43. Tennessee
44. Texas
45. Utah
46. Vermont
47. Virginia
48. Washington
49. West
50. Wisconsin
51. Wyoming
52. Virgin
53. Puerto
54. District
55. Guam
56. not
57. Panama
Answer: |
sc_caseorigin | 057 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.
Question: What is the court in which the case originated?
001. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
002. U.S. Court of International Trade
003. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
004. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
005. U.S. Court of Military Review
006. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
007. U.S. Customs Court
008. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
009. U.S. Tax Court
010. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
011. U.S. Court for China
012. U.S. Consular Courts
013. U.S. Commerce Court
014. Territorial Supreme Court
015. Territorial Appellate Court
016. Territorial Trial Court
017. Emergency Court of Appeals
018. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
019. Bankruptcy Court
020. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
021. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
022. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
023. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
024. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
025. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
026. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
027. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
028. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
029. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
030. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
031. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
032. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
033. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
034. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
035. Alaska U.S. District Court
036. Arizona U.S. District Court
037. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
038. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
039. California Central U.S. District Court
040. California Eastern U.S. District Court
041. California Northern U.S. District Court
042. California Southern U.S. District Court
043. Colorado U.S. District Court
044. Connecticut U.S. District Court
045. Delaware U.S. District Court
046. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
047. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
048. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
049. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
050. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
051. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
052. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
053. Guam U.S. District Court
054. Hawaii U.S. District Court
055. Idaho U.S. District Court
056. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
057. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
058. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
059. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
060. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
061. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
062. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
063. Kansas U.S. District Court
064. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
065. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
066. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
067. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
068. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
069. Maine U.S. District Court
070. Maryland U.S. District Court
071. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
072. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
073. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
074. Minnesota U.S. District Court
075. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
076. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
077. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
078. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
079. Montana U.S. District Court
080. Nebraska U.S. District Court
081. Nevada U.S. District Court
082. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
083. New Jersey U.S. District Court
084. New Mexico U.S. District Court
085. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
086. New York Northern U.S. District Court
087. New York Southern U.S. District Court
088. New York Western U.S. District Court
089. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
090. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
091. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
092. North Dakota U.S. District Court
093. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
094. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
095. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
096. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
097. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
098. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
099. Oregon U.S. District Court
100. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
101. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
102. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
103. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
104. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
105. South Carolina U.S. District Court
106. South Dakota U.S. District Court
107. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
108. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
109. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
110. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
111. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
112. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
113. Texas Western U.S. District Court
114. Utah U.S. District Court
115. Vermont U.S. District Court
116. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
117. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
118. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
119. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
120. Washington Western U.S. District Court
121. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
122. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
123. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
124. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
125. Wyoming U.S. District Court
126. Louisiana U.S. District Court
127. Washington U.S. District Court
128. West Virginia U.S. District Court
129. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
130. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
131. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
132. Alabama U.S. District Court
133. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
134. Georgia U.S. District Court
135. Illinois U.S. District Court
136. Indiana U.S. District Court
137. Iowa U.S. District Court
138. Michigan U.S. District Court
139. Mississippi U.S. District Court
140. Missouri U.S. District Court
141. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
142. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
143. New York U.S. District Court
144. North Carolina U.S. District Court
145. Ohio U.S. District Court
146. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
147. Tennessee U.S. District Court
148. Texas U.S. District Court
149. Virginia U.S. District Court
150. Norfolk U.S. District Court
151. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
152. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
153. New Jersey U.S. District Court
154. California U.S. District Court
155. Florida U.S. District Court
156. Arkansas U.S. District Court
157. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
158. State Supreme Court
159. State Appellate Court
160. State Trial Court
161. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
162. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
163. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
164. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
165. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
166. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
167. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
168. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
169. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
170. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
171. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
172. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
173. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
174. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
175. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
176. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
177. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
178. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
179. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
180. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
181. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
182. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
183. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
184. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
185. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
186. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
187. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
188. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
189. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
190. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
191. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
192. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
193. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
194. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
195. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
196. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
197. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
198. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
199. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
200. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
201. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
202. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
203. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
204. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
205. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
206. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
207. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
208. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
209. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
210. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
211. Court of Private Land Claims
212. United States Supreme Court
Answer: |
songer_r_fed | 1 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
Gene R. AUSTIN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 12325.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
June
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
sc_caseorigin | 081 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.
Question: What is the court in which the case originated?
001. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
002. U.S. Court of International Trade
003. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
004. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
005. U.S. Court of Military Review
006. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
007. U.S. Customs Court
008. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
009. U.S. Tax Court
010. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
011. U.S. Court for China
012. U.S. Consular Courts
013. U.S. Commerce Court
014. Territorial Supreme Court
015. Territorial Appellate Court
016. Territorial Trial Court
017. Emergency Court of Appeals
018. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
019. Bankruptcy Court
020. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
021. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
022. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
023. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
024. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
025. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
026. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
027. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
028. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
029. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
030. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
031. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
032. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
033. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
034. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
035. Alaska U.S. District Court
036. Arizona U.S. District Court
037. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
038. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
039. California Central U.S. District Court
040. California Eastern U.S. District Court
041. California Northern U.S. District Court
042. California Southern U.S. District Court
043. Colorado U.S. District Court
044. Connecticut U.S. District Court
045. Delaware U.S. District Court
046. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
047. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
048. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
049. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
050. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
051. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
052. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
053. Guam U.S. District Court
054. Hawaii U.S. District Court
055. Idaho U.S. District Court
056. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
057. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
058. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
059. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
060. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
061. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
062. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
063. Kansas U.S. District Court
064. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
065. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
066. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
067. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
068. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
069. Maine U.S. District Court
070. Maryland U.S. District Court
071. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
072. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
073. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
074. Minnesota U.S. District Court
075. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
076. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
077. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
078. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
079. Montana U.S. District Court
080. Nebraska U.S. District Court
081. Nevada U.S. District Court
082. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
083. New Jersey U.S. District Court
084. New Mexico U.S. District Court
085. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
086. New York Northern U.S. District Court
087. New York Southern U.S. District Court
088. New York Western U.S. District Court
089. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
090. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
091. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
092. North Dakota U.S. District Court
093. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
094. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
095. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
096. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
097. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
098. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
099. Oregon U.S. District Court
100. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
101. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
102. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
103. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
104. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
105. South Carolina U.S. District Court
106. South Dakota U.S. District Court
107. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
108. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
109. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
110. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
111. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
112. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
113. Texas Western U.S. District Court
114. Utah U.S. District Court
115. Vermont U.S. District Court
116. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
117. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
118. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
119. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
120. Washington Western U.S. District Court
121. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
122. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
123. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
124. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
125. Wyoming U.S. District Court
126. Louisiana U.S. District Court
127. Washington U.S. District Court
128. West Virginia U.S. District Court
129. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
130. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
131. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
132. Alabama U.S. District Court
133. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
134. Georgia U.S. District Court
135. Illinois U.S. District Court
136. Indiana U.S. District Court
137. Iowa U.S. District Court
138. Michigan U.S. District Court
139. Mississippi U.S. District Court
140. Missouri U.S. District Court
141. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
142. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
143. New York U.S. District Court
144. North Carolina U.S. District Court
145. Ohio U.S. District Court
146. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
147. Tennessee U.S. District Court
148. Texas U.S. District Court
149. Virginia U.S. District Court
150. Norfolk U.S. District Court
151. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
152. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
153. New Jersey U.S. District Court
154. California U.S. District Court
155. Florida U.S. District Court
156. Arkansas U.S. District Court
157. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
158. State Supreme Court
159. State Appellate Court
160. State Trial Court
161. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
162. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
163. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
164. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
165. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
166. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
167. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
168. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
169. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
170. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
171. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
172. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
173. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
174. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
175. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
176. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
177. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
178. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
179. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
180. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
181. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
182. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
183. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
184. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
185. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
186. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
187. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
188. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
189. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
190. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
191. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
192. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
193. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
194. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
195. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
196. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
197. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
198. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
199. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
200. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
201. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
202. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
203. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
204. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
205. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
206. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
207. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
208. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
209. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
210. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
211. Court of Private Land Claims
212. United States Supreme Court
Answer: |
songer_initiate | F | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify what party initiated the appeal. For cases with cross appeals or multiple docket numbers, if the opinion does not explicitly indicate which appeal was filed first, assumes that the first litigant listed as the "appellant" or "petitioner" was the first to file the appeal. In federal habeas corpus petitions, consider the prisoner to be the plaintiff.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. RALPH PRINTING AND LITHOGRAPHING COMPANY, Respondent.
No. 18570.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
July 6, 1967.
Nancy M. Sherman, Atty., N.L.R.B., for petitioner and Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel and Anthony J. Oba-dal, Atty. for N.L.R.B., were on the brief.
John E. Tate of Nelson, Harding, Ack-lie, Leonard & Tate, Omaha, Neb., for respondent and filed brief.
Before MATTHES, BLACKMUN and MEHAFFY, Circuit Judges.
MATTHES, Circuit Judge.
This case is before the Court upon the petition of the National Labor Relations Board, pursuant to Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1959), for enforcement of its order issued June 6, 1966 against Respondent Ralph Printing and Lithographing Company. The Board’s decision and order are reported at 158 N.L.R.B. No. 128. No jurisdictional issue is presented. We modify the order as hereinafter set out and grant enforcement of it as so modified.
Respondent, a Nebraska corporation, is engaged in the business of commercial printing and lithographing in Omaha, Nebraska. During September, 1964 the Lithographers and Photoengravers International Union, AFL-CIO, Local 38 L, began a union organizational drive among Respondent’s employees. On the evening of September 18, 1964 the Union representative, Melford L. Galbraith, held a meeting with the employees and distributed authorization cards to them. Galbraith explained that in signing the authorization cards the employees were authorizing the Union to act as their collective bargaining representative, that the cards would enable him to demand recognition, and that if recognition were granted the Union would proceed to negotiate with Respondent. Nineteen authorization cards were signed by the employees on September 18th. During the next ten days Galbraith obtained a total of 24 authorization cards in a unit later found to comprise a total of 26 employees.
Armed with his authorization cards Galbraith conferred with Roy and John Ralph, Respondent’s President and Vice-President, and requested recognition for the Union. He asserted that his Union held signed authorization cards from a substantial majority of Respondent’s employees, numbering over 90%. Roy Ralph refused the request for recognition and expressed a desire to proceed only through a Board election. Galbraith offered to submit the authorization cards to a mutually acceptable third party to determine the Union’s majority status, but Ralph declined the offer and reaffirmed his intention to await the outcome of a Board election. Galbraith informed the Ralphs that his Union represented all of Respondent’s production and maintenance employees, including pressmen. Mr. John Ralph denied the purport of this conversation and stated that Galbraith did not specify the composition of the unit he was seeking to represent, and thus left him in doubt as to whether office-clericals, supervisors and certain other employees were included in the unit sought to be represented.
On the same day, after the conference, Galbraith' filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board requesting a representation election among Respondent’s employees. On October 29th, a pre-election hearing was held and on November 20th, the Regional Director ordered an election to be conducted on January 7, 1965.
Subsequently on December 24, 1964 Respondent’s employees, whose normal quitting time was 4:00 P.M., worked through their half-hour lunch period and were released at 1:00 P.M. in the afternoon without loss of pay. Similarly on December 31, 1964 the employees were released at 3:00 P.M., one hour early. Several employees disclosed that Respondent had no set policy on the amount of time off granted on a day preceding a holiday, but that such time off fluctuated with the amount
Question: What party initiated the appeal?
A. Original plaintiff
B. Original defendant
C. Federal agency representing plaintiff
D. Federal agency representing defendant
E. Intervenor
F. Not applicable
G. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_geniss | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. Consider the following categories: "criminal" (including appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence), "civil rights" (excluding First Amendment or due process; also excluding claims of denial of rights in criminal proceeding or claims by prisoners that challenge their conviction or their sentence (e.g., habeas corpus petitions are coded under the criminal category); does include civil suits instituted by both prisoners and callable non-prisoners alleging denial of rights by criminal justice officials), "First Amendment", "due process" (claims in civil cases by persons other than prisoners, does not include due process challenges to government economic regulation), "privacy", "labor relations", "economic activity and regulation", and "miscellaneous".
Albert HARTWICK, Elizabeth Hartwick, Plaintiffs-Appellants. v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 72-1280.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued Oct. 12, 1972.
Decided Jan. 18, 1973.
James A. Tuck, Goodman, Eden, Mil-lender, Goodman & Bedrosian, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs-appellants; William H. Goodman, Detroit, Mich., on brief.
Gilbert E. Gove, Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, Detroit, Mich., for defendant-appellee; John A. Marxer, Detroit, Mich., on brief.
Before CELEBREZZE and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and HOGAN, District Judge.
The Honorable Timothy S. Hogan, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
WILLIAM E. MILLER, Circuit Judge.
This is a negligence action against United States Steel Corporation arising from the injury of Albert Hartwick, the appellant, while he was foreman for the C-Way Construction Company. The United States Army Corps of Engineers had contracted with C-Way, appellant’s employer, for the construction of a lock on the Crooked River near Alanson, Michigan. The appellant was in charge of the steel pile driving crews.
In order to construct the lock it was necessary first to divert the river and to fill the river bed with gravel. Two cells, each 15 feet wide and 80 feet long, were then to be contructed on the sides of the old river bed. The cell walls were to consist of a continuous web of sheet piling to be driven some 27 feet into the ground by a pile driver. The sheet piling was manufactured by the 'appellee, United States Steel Corporation.
The sheets of piling are “Z” shaped, about 18 inches wide and varying in length from 27 to 28 feet. On each edge of the piling and extending the entire length of one edge there is a ball or a socket allowing the sheets of piling to be attached to one another. To assemble the piling around the cell, it is necessary to lift a sheet some 30 feet into the air and align the ball of that sheet with the corresponding socket of the adjacent sheet. After the ball and socket are initially aligned, the sheet piling is lowered into place and driven into the ground. Correctly manufactured, the sheets will form a straight line when installed. The sheets of piling manufactured by the ap-pellee, however, would not align properly. When the pilings were threaded together the sheets would be from 4 to 6 inches out of alignment. It was un-eontradicted at trial that appellee was aware of this defect in the piling when it was manufactured.
In order to correct the defect the appellant’s employer used a system of chains and chain binders to pull the piling back into alignment, so that it could be correctly driven into the ground. During the pile driving process, tension is placed on the chains and binders as they hold the pile in alignment. At the time of the accident the appellant was releasing the tension on a chain and chain binder attached to a pile that had been driven into the ground. When the binder was first attached to the chain holding the pile, a small wire had been placed around the handle of the binder to prevent it from being
Question: What is the general issue in the case?
A. criminal
B. civil rights
C. First Amendment
D. due process
E. privacy
F. labor relations
G. economic activity and regulation
H. miscellaneous
Answer: |
sc_decisiondirection | B | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
McCOMB, WAGE AND HOUR ADMINISTRATOR, v. JACKSONVILLE PAPER CO. et al.
No. 110.
Argued December 14-15, 1948.
Decided February 14, 1949.
Bessie Margolin argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Robert L. Stern and William S. Tyson.
Louis Kurz argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a civil contempt proceeding arising out of Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564, which we decided January 18, 1943. The District Court had held that none of respondents’ employees in specified classes were covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. § 201. We sustained a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals which reversed the District Court, modifying it slightly to include a larger class of employees than the United States Court of Appeals had held to be covered.
On remand the District Court, without a further hearing, entered a decree enjoining respondents from violating the Act in any of the following particulars: (1) by paying the designated classes of employees less than 300 an hour from the date of the judgment to October 24, 1945, or less than 400 an hour thereafter, except as permitted by orders of the Administrator under § 8 or § 14 of the Act; (2) by employing such employees for a workweek longer than 40 hours unless
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer: |
songer_genapel2 | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed appellant. If there are more than two appellants and at least one of the additional appellants has a different general category from the first appellant, then consider the first appellant with a different general category to be the second appellant.
James Edward WINGO, Jr., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 13187.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
May 31, 1957.
James Rutherford, Nashville, Tenn., for appellant.
Fred Elledge, Jr., and James R. Tuck, Nashville, Tenn., for appellee.
Before SIMONS, Chief Judge, and ALLEN and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, in this proceeding under Section 2255, Title 28 U.S.Code, seeks to vacate judgment imposed in the U. S. District Court on the ground of prejudicial newspaper publicity during the overnight recess of the jury, during which the jurors separated and went to their respective homes. Briggs v. United States, 6 Cir., 221 F.2d 636, 638. Following a hearing in which appellant introduced the newspaper articles complained of but no other evidence on the issue, the District Judge dismissed the proceeding.
The question presented could have and should have been raised by motion for mistrial in the trial of the case in the District Court. No appeal was taken from the judgment on the verdict. Compare Briggs v. United States, supra; Krogmann v. United States, 6 Cir., 225 F.2d 220, 228. The provisions of Section 2255, Title 28 U.S.Code, cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178-179, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 91 L.Ed. 1982; Ford v. United States, 6 Cir., 234 F.2d 835, 836.
The appellant is in custody under a state sentence, not the sentence in the federal court, which he is attacking in this proceeding. If the sentence under attack should be held invalid, it would not result in appellant’s release from confinement. The present proceeding is premature and will not lie. Duggins v. United States, 6 Cir., 240 F.2d 479.
The judgment is affirmed.
Question: What is the nature of the second listed appellant whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed appellant?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_geniss | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. Consider the following categories: "criminal" (including appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence), "civil rights" (excluding First Amendment or due process; also excluding claims of denial of rights in criminal proceeding or claims by prisoners that challenge their conviction or their sentence (e.g., habeas corpus petitions are coded under the criminal category); does include civil suits instituted by both prisoners and callable non-prisoners alleging denial of rights by criminal justice officials), "First Amendment", "due process" (claims in civil cases by persons other than prisoners, does not include due process challenges to government economic regulation), "privacy", "labor relations", "economic activity and regulation", and "miscellaneous".
CENTRAL PAPER CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 11508.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Decided Nov. 13, 1952.
Melva M. Graney, Washington, D. C. (Ellis N. Slack, A. F. Prescott, Virginia H. Adams, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for respondent.
Wilbur A. Giffen, Chicago, 111., of counsel, KixMiller, Baar & Morris, Chicago, 111., on the brief, for petitioner.
Before SIMONS, Chief Judge, and Mc-ALLISTER and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
MILLER, Circuit Judge.
The Tax Court dismissed Petitioner’s application for a redetermination of its excess profits tax liability on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction in the matter, from which ruling the Petitioner has appealed.
The Petitioner, Central Paper Company, Inc., a Michigan 'Corporation, filed claims for refund, relating to' the application of § 722 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S. C.A. § 722, with respect to excess profits taxes for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1943, 1944 and 1945. The Commissioner, by letter of September 6, 1950, rejected the applications. The letter also advised the taxpayer — “Within ninety days * * * from the date of the mailing of this letter, you may file a petition with The Tax Court of the United States, at its principal address, Washington 4, D. C., for a redetermination of your excess profits tax liability under the Internal Revenue Code.” This was in accordance with the provisions of § 732(a) Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 732(a).
The taxpayer prepared such a petition which was mailed at Chicago, Illinois, properly stamped and legibly addressed to “The Tax Court of the United States, Washington 4, D. C.” The wrapper on the package which contained the petition shows a Chicago postmark of 3:30 p. m. on December 1, 1950. The docket of the Tax Court carries the following entry: “1950, December 7. Petition received and filed.” The petition itself was rubber stamped “Filed December 7, 1950.” December 7, 1950, was 92 days after the date of the mailing by the Commissioner of the registered notice of disallowance of the claims on September 6, 1950. The Commissioner moved that the proceeding be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, due to the failure of the petitioner to file its petition with the Tax Court within the 90 days provided by the statute. The Tax Court sustained the motion, without opinion.
In connection with the Tax Court’s consideration of the motion to dismiss, it was stipulated between the parties that the Court should consider as being in evidence the cover of the package which.contained the petition; that there was attached to the notice of disallowance in the above matter a slip of instructions which stated that “appeals should be addressed to'The Tax Court of the United States, Washington 4, D. C.”; that the Court should consider as evidence the statement of the postmaster at Chicago, Illinois, that a record is made of pouches of mail that miss connection with intended trains and also unusual conditions that would interrupt normal operation of trains enroute to destination would be recorded, that
Question: What is the general issue in the case?
A. criminal
B. civil rights
C. First Amendment
D. due process
E. privacy
F. labor relations
G. economic activity and regulation
H. miscellaneous
Answer: |
songer_respond2_1_2 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the second listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to classify the scope of this business into one of the following categories: "local" (individual or family owned business, scope limited to single community; generally proprietors, who are not incorporated); "neither local nor national" (e.g., an electrical power company whose operations cover one-third of the state); "national or multi-national" (assume that insurance companies and railroads are national in scope); and "not ascertained".
CUSHING et al. v. MARYLAND CAS. CO. et al.
No. 13887.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
July 31, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 9, 1952.
See 198 F.2d 1021.
James J. Morrison, Arthur A. de la Hous-saye, Raymond H. Kierr, Gerard A. Rault, New Orleans, La., for appellants.
Eberhard P. Deutsch, Brunswick G. Deutsch, New Orleans, La., for appellees.
Before HOLMES, STRUM, and RIVES, Circuit Judges-
STRUM, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is from a summary judgment dismissing, as to the insurers involved, five consolidated actions at law brought to recover damages for the death of five seamen who drowned when the tug boat “Jane Smith” collided with a ¡bridge, capsized and sank in navigable waters within the admiralty jurisdiction in Louisiana. Federal jurisdiction is asserted both under Sec. 33 of the Merchant Marine (Jones) Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, and upon diversity of citizenship.
The suits are against Texas & Pacific Railway Company, owner of the bridge, and Maryland Casualty Company and Home Insurance Company, who are the liability insurance underwriters of the owner and charterer of the tug, insuring against loss of life by, or personal injury to, the crew of said vessel. The complaints allege that the deaths were due to the negligence of the bridge owner, and of the owner and •charterer of the tug.
Plaintiffs assert the right to directly sue the insurers under Louisiana’s “direct action” statute, Title 22, Sec. 655, La.Rev.Stat. 1950, LSA-R.S. 22:655, which provides in part: “The injured person or his or her heirs, at their option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy, * * * and said action may be brought against the insurer alone or against both the insured and the insurer, jointly * * The policies involved were issued and delivered in Louisiana.
The dominant question is whether or not the statute applies to policies which protect the owner and charterer of a vessel against liability for personal injuries or accidental death suffered by the crew of a vessel in navigable waters. The district judge answered the question negatively. He was of the view that Sec. 655, supra, which relates to “liability” insurance, is confined to the ordinary type of liability insurance as defined in Title 22, Sec. 6(4), La.Rev. Stat.1950, LSA-R.S. 22:6(4), and does not extend to “Marine protection and indemnity insurance,” as defined in subd. (13) (e) of that title, which is the type of policy here sued upon. He was further of the view that to give effect to the direct action statute as to these policies would be an invasion of the field of exclusive federal jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime matters which would not only impair the characteristic features of general
Question: This question concerns the second listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What is the scope of this business?
A. local
B. neither local nor national
C. national or multi-national
D. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_usc1sect | 876 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the number of the section from the title of the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case, that is, title 18. In case of ties, code the first to be cited. The section number has up to four digits and follows "USC" or "USCA".
James Emerson MORRIS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 7120.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued Jan. 4, 1956.
Decided Jan. 11, 1956.
No appearance for appellant.
Robert L. Gavin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Greensboro, N. C. (Edwin M. Stanley, U. S. Atty., Greensboro, N. C., on brief), for appellee.
Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SOPER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal in a criminal case in which appellant was indicted for sending threatening letters through the mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876. He pleaded guilty to one of the counts of the two count indictment and not guilty to the other count, but was convicted on that count after a trial at which he was represented by competent counsel appointed by the court. He noted an appeal from the sentence and judgment of the court but has filed no brief as required by our rules. The United States Attorney has made a motion to dismiss or affirm. We have examined the record and find no ground for any contention that the appellant was not properly tried and sentenced or that he was not guilty of the crimes charged against him. The judgment appealed from will accordingly be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Question: What is the number of the section from the title of the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case, that is, title 18? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_9-3 | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "miscellaneous".
STOLTZ v. UNITED STATES.
No. 8790.
Circuit Court oí Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Oct. 24. 1938.
D. W. Doyle, of Conrad, Mont., for appellant.
John B. Tansil, U. S. Atty., and Roy F. Allen, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Butte, Mont., and Norman MacDonald, Thomas E. Harris, and Oscar A. Provost, Attys., Department of Justice, all of Washington, D. C., for the United States.
Before GARRECHT, HANEY, and HEALY, Circuit Judges.
HANEY, Circuit Judge.
The court below granted appellee restitution of certain premises allotted to Indian wards and judgment for triple damages in the sum of $1496.25 with interest and costs. Appellant was defendant below.
The parties refer to the cause as an action for unlawful detainer. The allegations of the pleading filed by appellee, designated as a “Complaint”, however, seem to call for injunctive relief and apparently the cause was intended as a suit in.equity. Since the parties treat the cause as one at law, we assume for the purposes of our decision, that the equitable claims were insufficient or withdrawn.
The complaint alleged that the Indian allottees and wards of appellee leased, by writing and with the consent, authority and approval of appellee, certain real property on an Indian Reservation to appellant for the term from April 1, 1932 to and including March 31, 1936; and that on November 21, 1935, the wards, with the consent, authority and approval of appellee, leased a portion of the premises to one Idso for the term from April 1, 1936, to April 1, 1941. Idso paid the rental for the first year, in the sum of $493.75.. It was further alleged that on May 22, 1936, Idso attempted to enter upon the premises with his tractor and plow and that appellant damaged the same by driving them into a ravine and since has kept Idso from entering the premises by threats of force. Appellee prayed for restitution of the premises and for damages for rents and profits, alleged to be $958.10 per annum.
Appellant, by answer alleged that by virtue of his lease, he had a preference right to a five-year lease beginning on April 1, 1936, “by meeting the highest bid made therefor”;, that he did meet the highest bid, paid the first year’s rental, aftd thereby leased the property for the period claimed by Idso; and that he remained in possession of the property until August 1, 1936.
By stipulation the cause was tried to the court. The evidence disclosed that in the fall of 1936, the superintendent of the reservation gave notice for bids on the premises in question, which notice contained the following: “ * * * Leases will be let to the highest bidder, provided the bid meets with the approval of the office and the Indians consent to
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "miscellaneous"?
A. miscellaneous interstate conflict
B. other federalism issue (only code as issue if opinion explicitly discusses federalism as an important issue - or if opinion explicity discusses conflict of state power vs federal power)
C. attorneys (disbarment; etc)
D. selective service or draft issues (which do not include 1st amendment challenges)
E. challenge to authority of magistrates, special masters, etc.
F. challenge to authority of bankruptcy judge or referees in bankruptcy
G. Indian law - criminal verdict challenged due to interpretation of tribal statutes or other indian law
H. Indian law - commercial disputes based on interpretation of Indian treaties or law (includes disputes over mineral rights)
I. Indian law - Indian claims acts and disputes over real property (includes Alaska Native Claims Act)
J. Indian law - federal regulation of Indian land and affairs
K. Indian law - state/local authority over Indian land and affairs
L. Indian law - tribal regulation of economic activities (includes tribal taxation)
M. other Indian law
N. international law
O. immigration (except civil rights claims of immigrants and aliens)
P. other
Q. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_state | 56 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the state or territory in which the case was first heard. If the case began in the federal district court, consider the state of that district court. If it is a habeas corpus case, consider the state of the state court that first heard the case. If the case originated in a federal administrative agency, answer "not applicable". Answer with the name of the state, or one of the following territories: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Panama Canal Zone, or "not applicable" or "not determined".
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. RICH’S OF PLYMOUTH, INC., Respondent.
No. 77-1497.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Argued April 4, 1978.
Decided June 6, 1978.
Lee Ann Huntington, Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom John S. Irving, Gen. Counsel, John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy Gen. Counsel, Elliott Moore, Deputy Associate General Counsel, and William R. Stewart, Atty., Washington, D. C., were on brief, for petitioner.
Duane R. Batista, Boston, Mass., with whom David E. Watson and Nutter, McClennen & Fish, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for respondent.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, CAMPBELL and BOWNES, Circuit Judges.
COFFIN, Chief Judge.
The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) seeks enforcement of a cease and desist order issued after its finding that respondent violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) (1) by soliciting employee grievances and promising and granting benefits with intent to discourage support for a union campaign and (2) by creating an impression of surveillance among the employees. Also at issue is whether respondent shall be required to reinstate with back pay a union supporter who walked off her job in a fit of pique on a busy night. We first address those portions of the Board’s order which we enforce.
Promise and Grant of Benefits
Respondent is a chain of nine retail stores. In April, 1976, Local 222 of the Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO embarked on a campaign to organize the employees of respondent’s Plymouth, Massachusetts store. A flyer distributed among the employees announced that an initial organizational meeting would be held on April 26.
The same day of the union’s first meeting, Gerald Costello, personnel and operations manager for the chain, convened the entire workforce, scheduling separate meetings for the day and night shift employees. Addressing the day employees first, Costel- ■ lo discussed the union campaign and the effect of signing authorization cards. He then asked if the employees had any problems. Two subjects were raised: health insurance and the establishment of a grievance committee. Costello agreed to investigate both proposals. He explained that if implemented, a health insurance plan would cover all stores in the Rich’s chain, not just the Plymouth branch, and would be jointly financed by management and the employees.
On May 10 Costello met with a group of 15 or 20 night shift employees. This group’s reaction to the two suggestions made by the day personnel was favorable. Costello told them that a grievance committee procedure would be established and that management would pursue the proposal for health insurance.
A short time later a grievance committee ballot box was installed in the Plymouth store. Two days later it was removed. After the May 10 meeting, no further mention was made of the health insurance proposal. Store supervisors were directed to answer any inquiries about the progress of the employees
Question: In what state or territory was the case first heard?
01. not
02. Alabama
03. Alaska
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. Florida
11. Georgia
12. Hawaii
13. Idaho
14. Illinois
15. Indiana
16. Iowa
17. Kansas
18. Kentucky
19. Louisiana
20. Maine
21. Maryland
22. Massachussets
23. Michigan
24. Minnesota
25. Mississippi
26. Missouri
27. Montana
28. Nebraska
29. Nevada
30. New
31. New
32. New
33. New
34. North
35. North
36. Ohio
37. Oklahoma
38. Oregon
39. Pennsylvania
40. Rhode
41. South
42. South
43. Tennessee
44. Texas
45. Utah
46. Vermont
47. Virginia
48. Washington
49. West
50. Wisconsin
51. Wyoming
52. Virgin
53. Puerto
54. District
55. Guam
56. not
57. Panama
Answer: |
songer_origin | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the type of court which made the original decision. Code cases removed from a state court as originating in federal district court. For "State court", include habeas corpus petitions after conviction in state court and petitions from courts of territories other than the U.S. District Courts. For "Special DC court", include courts other than the US District Court for DC. For "Other", include courts such as the Tax Court and a court martial.
UNITED STATES ex rel. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY v. POWELSON et al.
No. 4679.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Oct. 8, 1943.
William C. Fitts, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, of Knoxville, Tenn. (Charles J. McCarthy, Asst. Gen., Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, and Robert H. Marquis, both of Knoxville, Tenn., on the brief), for appellant and cross-appellee.
G. Lyle Jones and George H. Wright, both of Asheville, N. C., for appellee and cross-appellant.
Before PARKER, SOPER, and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.
PARKER, Circuit Judge.
The decision of this Court, rendered on-March 10, 1941, was to the effect that the award of damages by the District Court for property condemned by the United States should be modified by eliminating certain items from the award of damages and that, as so modified, the judgment appealed from should be affirmed. United States v. Powelson, 4 Cir., 118 F.2d 79. This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court because that Court was of the view that in arriving at the award of damages certain elements had been included in the valuation of the property which should not have been considered. United States v. Powelson, U.S., 63 S.Ct. 1047, 1057, 87 L.Ed. 1390. We have given careful consideration to what should be the future procedure in the case, and are of opinion that it should be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, and with leave to the parties to produce additional testimony, if they so desire.
In reversing the decision of this Court, the Supreme Court held that the respondent’s privilege to use the power of eminent domain might not be considered in determining whether there was a reasonable probability of the lands in question being combined with other tracts into a power project in the reasonably near future, and that respondent had not established the basis for proof of the “water power value” which was asserted, except upon the assumption that it possessed the power of eminent domain. The limited nature of the decision was shown by the opening sentence of the next to the last paragraph of the opinion wherein the Court said: “We hold only that profits, attributable to the enterprise which respondent hoped to-launch, are inadmissible as evidence of the value of the lands which were taken.”
The Court went on to say: “Respondent is, of course, entitled to the market value of the property fairly determined. And that value should be found in accordance with the established rules (United States v. Miller, supra [317 U.S. 369, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. -]) — uninfluenced, so far as. practicable, by the circumstance that he whose lands are condemned has the power of eminent domain.”
The Miller case [317 U.S. 369, 63 S.Ct. 280, 87 L.Ed.-] cited in the excerpt from the opinion goes fully into the principles, to be applied in determining valuation and states that “the market value of the property is to be fixed with due consideration of all its available uses”, citing Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 407, 408, 25 L.Ed. 206. The rule is thus, stated in the case last cited:
“In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private parties. The inquiry in such cases must be what is the property worth in the market, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted; that is to say, what is it worth from its availability for valuable uses. Property is not to be deemed worthless
Question: What type of court made the original decision?
A. Federal district court (single judge)
B. 3 judge district court
C. State court
D. Bankruptcy court, referee in bankruptcy, special master
E. Federal magistrate
F. Federal administrative agency
G. Special DC court
H. Other
I. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_circuit | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the circuit of the court that decided the case.
Ruben BENN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank A. EYMAN, Warden, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 25546.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Jan. 19, 1971.
McCafferty & Loftus, Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellant.
Gary K. Nelson, Ariz. Atty. Gen., Carl Wagg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant-appellee.
Before CHAMBERS, BARNES and TRASK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner, a state prisoner, appeals from the order of the district court denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm the order of the district court.
Petitioner was charged with three felonies, one count of attempted rape and two counts of burglary. On the scheduled day of trial on the attempted rape charge, which was to be tried first, the attorney prosecuting that charge was ill. The trial was continued, and one of the burglary counts was set to be tried the next day.
The next day, petitioner’s appointed counsel moved for a continuance because he did not have a copy of the transcript of the preliminary hearing for the burglary count to be tried that day. The state trial court denied the motion because defense counsel had, on the previous day, stated that he had the transcript for the burglary charge.
Petitioner then withdrew his plea of not guilty to the burglary count on trial and entered a plea of guilty. The charge of attempted rape and the other burglary count were dismissed.
Petitioner’s principal contention on appeal is that Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) requires that his writ be granted. Boykin, where there was no allegation that the guilty plea was involuntary, held that it was constitutional error for a state trial judge to accept the guilty plea “without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.” 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. at 1711. Petitioner argues that his conviction must be reversed because the state trial judge made no interrogation to determine whether his guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent before accepting the plea; and also because there was no showing that he changed his plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.
Boykin was decided in 1969. Petitioner’s guilty plea was entered in 1964. This court has held that Boykin is not retroactive. Moss v. Craven, 427 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1970). Other circuits are in accord. Meller v. Missouri, 431 F.2d 120 (8th Cir., 1970); United States ex rel. Hughes v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1969). Therefore, the absence of interrogation of petitioner at the time his plea was entered does not alone require reversal.
The district court at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing held that petitioner’s plea was voluntary. The district court found that the guilty plea was the result of plea bargaining. This court has held that a guilty plea is not involuntary merely because it results' from plea bargaining. Jones v. United States, 423 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Thomas, 415 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1969); Gilmore v. California, 364 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1966); Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1964).
Petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not the result of plea bargaining. He argues that there was nothing in the record to indicate that a deal was entered into or, if there was a deal, that petitioner was aware of it and agreed to it.
The finding of the district court is supported by the record. Defense counsel testified that there was a deal to drop the other two charges if petitioner would plead guilty to burglary. He also testified that he informed petitioner of the deal and suggested, with full knowledge of the facts, that petitioner accept it. Petitioner testified that defense counsel informed him of the deal and advised him to take it. Petitioner
Question: What is the circuit of the court that decided the case?
A. First Circuit
B. Second Circuit
C. Third Circuit
D. Fourth Circuit
E. Fifth Circuit
F. Sixth Circuit
G. Seventh Circuit
H. Eighth Circuit
I. Ninth Circuit
J. Tenth Circuit
K. Eleventh Circuit
L. District of Columbia Circuit
Answer: |
sc_issuearea | A | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Shawn Patrick LYNCH
v.
ARIZONA.
No. 15-8366.
Supreme Court of the United States
May 31, 2016.
PER CURIAM.
Under Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), and its progeny, "where a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole," the Due Process Clause "entitles the defendant 'to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by counsel.' " Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 39, 121 S.Ct. 1263, 149 L.Ed.2d 178 (2001) (quoting Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 165, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000) (plurality opinion)). In the decision below, the Arizona Supreme Court found that the State had put petitioner Shawn Patrick Lynch's future dangerousness at issue during his capital sentencing proceeding and acknowledged that Lynch's only alternative sentence to death was life imprisonment without parole. 238 Ariz. 84, 103, 357 P.3d 119, 138 (2015). But the court nonetheless concluded that Lynch had no right to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. Ibid. The judgment is reversed.
A jury convicted Lynch of first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and burglary for the 2001 killing of James Panzarella. The State sought the death penalty. Before Lynch's penalty phase trial began, Arizona moved to prevent his counsel from informing the jury that the only alternative sentence to death was life without the possibility of parole. App. K to Pet. for Cert. The court granted the motion.
Lynch's first penalty phase jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict. A second jury was convened and sentenced Lynch to death. On appeal, the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: |
Subsets and Splits