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songer_counsel2 | F | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine the nature of the counsel for the respondent. If name of attorney was given with no other indication of affiliation, assume it is private - unless a government agency was the party
Donald G. GRIFFIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WARDEN, MARYLAND CORRECTIONAL ADJUSTMENT CENTER; Attorney General of the State of Maryland, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 91-6066.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued April 10, 1992.
Decided July 28, 1992.
Mark Lawrence Gitomer, Cardin & Gi-tomer, P.A., Baltimore, Md., argued, for petitioner-appellant.
Gary Eugene Bair, Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Appeals Div., Baltimore, Md., argued (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Crim. Appeals Div., on brief), for respondents-appellees.
Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and HALL and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:
Donald Griffin appeals a final order of the district court denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Concluding that Griffin was denied the minimum level of effective assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment, we reverse.
I.
At 3:45 p.m. on July 24, 1983, a Rite-Aid Drug Store in Baltimore, Maryland, was robbed by two men armed with handguns. Two security guards were shot and wounded during the robbery.
Two days later, one of the security guards picked appellant Donald Griffin out of a photo array. When he learned that he was wanted in connection with the robbery, Griffin surrendered to police. He was charged with robbery and using a handgun during a crime of violence. Attorney Charles Howard entered an appearance for Griffin in December, 1983, and represented him when he tendered a not guilty plea. On or about February 22, 1984, Griffin and his mother, Dorothy Josey, provided attorney Howard with a list of five alibi witnesses. Howard failed to contact these witnesses or to respond to the state’s discovery requests, among which were requests to be notified of intent to rely on alibi and for the identities of alibi witnesses. See Md.Rule 4-263.
From his personal standpoint, Howard had moré serious concerns than his representation of Griffin.' On June 1, 1984, he was disbarred for misappropriating client funds, commingling funds, failing to keep records, and neglecting a legal matter. In concluding that the ultimate sanction of disbarment was warranted, the Maryland Court of Appeals pointed out that it had previously reprimanded Howard for neglecting cases, including, on three occasions, failing to be present when a case was called. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Howard, 299 Md. 731, 737-738, 475 A.2d 466 (1984), citing, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Howard, 282 Md. 515, 385 A.2d 1191 (1978).
George David, who shared office space with Howard, took over Griffin’s file. Howard advised David to “take a plea” for Griffin. David, expecting Griffin to plead guilty, did nothing. He contacted no witnesses, though he “imagine[s]” he “glanced” at the file, and he failed to confirm that the state’s discovery requests had been answered. At a hearing on October 25, 1984, four months after he entered his appearance in Howard’s stead, David met his client for the first time. At this hearing, David expected Griffin to plead guilty. Griffin refused.
On November 19, 1984,' Griffin’s case was scheduled for trial. David still expected Griffin to change his mind and plead guilty, and he had done nothing more to prepare for trial. Instead, Griffin reiterated his not guilty plea and told the court he was
Question: What is the nature of the counsel for the respondent?
A. none (pro se)
B. court appointed
C. legal aid or public defender
D. private
E. government - US
F. government - state or local
G. interest group, union, professional group
H. other or not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_appel1_1_2 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to classify the scope of this business into one of the following categories: "local" (individual or family owned business, scope limited to single community; generally proprietors, who are not incorporated); "neither local nor national" (e.g., an electrical power company whose operations cover one-third of the state); "national or multi-national" (assume that insurance companies and railroads are national in scope); and "not ascertained".
ST. REGIS PAPER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROYAL INDUSTRIES, and Plas-Ties Subsidiary, Defendants-Appellants. ST. REGIS PAPER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROYAL INDUSTRIES, and Plas-Ties Subsidiary, Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 74-3268 and 74-3336.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
April 19, 1977.
Robert M. Newell, Newell & Chester, Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for defendants-appellants.
Nicholas L. Coch, Anderson, Russell, Kill & Olick, New York City, argued, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before ELY and WALLACE, Circuit Judges, and SOLOMON, District Judge.
Honorable Gus J. Solomon, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
SOLOMON, District Judge:
This case involves the validity of a patent on a plastic tie strip and a method for manufacturing the product. It also involves a license agreement for the patent rights and for the know-how used to manufacture the patented tie strips. The District Court held the patent invalid and permitted rescission of the license agreement. The Court denied the licensor royalties after the filing of this action, denied the licensee recovery of royalties paid before the filing of this action, and granted the licensor some compensation for its know-how. Both parties appeal.
Some time before June 1950, Gerald Bower formed a partnership to develop and market a plastic tie strip which could be used to tie bunches of fresh vegetables. In June 1950, the business was incorporated under the name of Plas-Ties Corporation (Plas-Ties).
On June 2, 1952, Bower filed an application for a patent on a plastic tie strip and a method for making the tie strip. The Patent Office rejected all of Bower’s original claims, but he later succeeded by amendments to the application in getting some claims allowed on a narrower basis. A patent (U.S. Patent No. 2,767,113) was issued to Bower on October 16, 1956 (the Bower patent). The patented device consists of two plastic strips reinforced by a wire between them. The wire is embedded in one of the plastic strips and secured with a “cementitious substance” so that the casing cannot slide from or bunch up on the wire. The wire permits fastening the tie by merely twisting it. The plastic outer casing permits easy handling and prevents the wire from cutting the stalks of the vegetables.
In April 1963, Bower assigned his patent to Royal Industries (Royal), and Royal acquired 80 per cent of the outstanding stock of Plas-Ties. Bower owned the remaining 20 per cent of the stock, and he became president of Plas-Ties. In 1965, Royal acquired Bower’s shares and Plas-Ties became a wholly owned subsidiary.
St. Regis Paper Company (St. Regis) supplies wrapping paper to the bakery industry through one of its subsidiaries, Pollack Paper Company. The use
Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What is the scope of this business?
A. local
B. neither local nor national
C. national or multi-national
D. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_genapel2 | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed appellant. If there are more than two appellants and at least one of the additional appellants has a different general category from the first appellant, then consider the first appellant with a different general category to be the second appellant.
MONTGOMERY et al. v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO.
No. 1473.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
March 26, 1937.
Suits & Jeffrey, of Oklahoma City, Okl., and Gordon Stater, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellants.
Robert M. Rainey, Streeter B. Flynn, and Geo. M. Green, all of Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS and BRATTON, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON, District Judge.
BRATTON, Circuit Judge.
This is an action to recover damages from the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railway Company for the asserted wrongful discontinuance and removal of a switch or industrial track, and for the alleged wrongful obstruction o'f a roadway over and across the right of way of the company.
These facts were set forth in the amended petition with its attached exhibits: Plaintiffs own lots 25 and 26 in block 7 in Oklahoma City. The city passed ordinance No. 203 in 1899, authorizing the company to build, maintain, and operate a switch in the alley running east and west through block 7, beginning at the west line of the company’s right of way and extending west to the west line of lot 5. It provided that the company should cease to operate the switch upon the desire and request of the owners of two-thirds of the abutting property. The switch was built in 1899, and the property owners have not requested its discontinuance and removal. The city and the company entered into a contract in 1927, which provided for the elevation of the tracks of the company in order to eliminate grade crossings. The contract expressly provided that it was subject to the approval of the Corporation Commission of the state. While engaged considering the matter of the elimination of grade crossings within the city, the commission took up the contract. Hearings were conducted and in January, 1931, the commission entered its order disapproving the contract, but directing and ordering the company to elevate its tracks and construct specified subways at First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Main streets, and at Chickasaw, Choctaw, Grand, and Reno avenues, in accordance with its plan Z-3. In March thereafter, the city passed ordinance No. 4201 granting the company the right and authority to construct, maintain, and operate an elevated track in the alley. The ordinance provided that it should not become effective unless the company filed a written acceptance of its terms within fifteen days; and the acceptance was filed within that time. The elevated track was not constructed and use of the switch was discontinued in August, 1933. A five-story building was constructed on the lots belonging to plaintiffs and used for wholesale purposes. It was dependent on the switch for the movement of incoming and outgoing freight in connection with the conduct of the business, and it would not have been constructed except for reliance upon the existence, maintenance, and operation of the switch.
For about thirty years, a roadway extending southward from
Question: What is the nature of the second listed appellant whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed appellant?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_fedlaw | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine whether there was an issue discussed in the opinion of the court about the interpretation of federal statute, and if so, whether the resolution of the issue by the court favored the appellant.
DEERING MILLIKEN RESEARCH CORPORATION, Appellant, v. TEXTURED FIBRES, INC., Virginia Mills, Inc., and Throwing Corporation of America, Appellees.
No. 13214.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued June 9, 1969.
Decided Sept. 11, 1969.
See also D.C., 302 F.Supp. 487.
Kurt Shaffert, New York City (Robert F. Conrad, Washington, D. C., and Thomas A. Evins, and Means, Evins, Browne & Hamilton, Spartanburg, S. C., on the brief), for appellant.
Edward P. Perrin, Spartanburg, S. C. (Perrin & Perrin, Spartanburg, S. C., Smith, Moore, Smith, Schell & Hunter, Greensboro, N. C., and Pell & Leviness, New York City, on the brief), for appel-lees.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, WINTER and BUTZNER, Circuit Judges.
BUTZNER, Circuit Judge:
Deering Milliken Research Corp. appeals from an order of the district court quashing service of process on Textured Fibres, Inc., Virginia Mills, Inc., and Throwing Corp. for want of personal jurisdiction. We hold that South Carolina’s long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over a person who breaches a contract after the effective date of the statute, although the contract was made before that date. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
In May 1964, Deering Milliken licensed the defendants to use a process it had developed. The licensees agreed to pay Deering Milliken a percentage of the price of all yarn produced by the process. In its complaint, Deering Milliken alleged a series of underpayments from January 1, 1966 through March 31, 1968. It filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina alleging diversity of citizenship and obtaining service of process under South Carolina’s long-arm statute, S. C. Code Ann. § 10.2-801 to -809 (1966), and Fed. R.Civ.P. 4(e). On a motion to quash service of process under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), the district judge held South Carolina’s long-arm statute did not apply to a contract entered into before January 1, 1968.
South Carolina's pertinent statutes are:
“A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person’s
“(g) entry into a contract to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State * * *."
* * * * * *
“This act shall become effective at 12:01, January 1, 1968. It applies to transactions entered into and events occurring after that date.”
The licensees reason that because entry into a contract is necessary to subject a person to the court’s jurisdiction, entry must also mark the date for application of the long-arm statute.
However, we do not read the language of the South Carolina law so restrictively. The provisions governing the effective date are not limited to transactions entered into after January 1, 1968. They also embrace “events occurring after that date.” Literally, the breach of a contract and the simultaneous accrual of a cause of action are events. And, since a literal construction of “events” is consistent with the intention of the South Carolina legislature to expand the state’s jurisdiction, we are not at liberty to deny effect to this part of the statute. Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115, 25 L.Ed. 782 (1879).
Here the alleged underpayments were significant breaches of the licensing agreement, and with each a new cause of action accrued. Those underpayments that occurred after January 1, 1968 were, we hold, events sufficient to bring the long-arm statute into effect.
The licensees rely upon Johnson v. Baldwin, 214 S.C. 545, 53 S.E.2d 785 (1949), and related cases, to support their argument that South Carolina does not give retrospective effect to statutes dealing with service of process. But here, in contrast to Johnson, the statute applies prospectively, because the breach of contract that caused the action to accrue occurred after the statute’s
Question: Did the interpretation of federal statute by the court favor the appellant?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_origin | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the type of court which made the original decision. Code cases removed from a state court as originating in federal district court. For "State court", include habeas corpus petitions after conviction in state court and petitions from courts of territories other than the U.S. District Courts. For "Special DC court", include courts other than the US District Court for DC. For "Other", include courts such as the Tax Court and a court martial.
GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA CO. v. JONES.
No. 5956.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued Oct. 7, 1949.
Decided Oct. 10, 1949.
J. E. Belser, Jr., Columbia, S.C., for appellant.
Henry H. Edens, Columbia, S.C. (Henry Hammer, Columbia, S.C., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SOPER, and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This appeal is taken from a judgment of the District Court in a case tried without a jury wherein the District Judge found that injuries suffered by the plaintiff in the defendant’s store were caused by the carelessness of one of its employees. Under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., the findings of the District Judge in such a suit may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
In our opinion, the conclusion reached by the District Judge was clearly correct. He made in effect the following findings of fact which were fully supported by the evidence. On the occasion of the accident the plaintiff, an elderly woman, was a customer in the store when an employee in the course of his work pushed a truck, mounted on four small wheels and loaded with three cases of oil each weighing twenty-five pounds, to a point near the plaintiff and behind her and slightly to her right. The employee then without observing the plaintiff started to unload the truck and in doing so one of the cases was dislodged and fell upon the plaintiff’s ankle causing painful and serious injuries. From these findings the Judge reached the inevitable conclusion that the injuries were due to the failure of the employee to use due care.
The plaintiff had no warning before she was struck and the employee was unable to explain how the case fell upon her ankle. The defendant therefore contends that the plaintiff’s cause must fail because the courts of South Carolina do not recognize the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Gilland v. Peter’s Dry Cleaning Co., 195 S.C. 417, 11 S.E.2d 857. It is plain, however, that there is no need for the plaintiff to rely on this doctrine in this case because the evidence clearly shows that the accident was caused by the action of the employee in unloading the truck, and that the fall of the heavy case must have been due to his negligence.
At the conclusion of the testimony the judge permitted the plaintiff, over the objection of the defendant, to amend her complaint to show that she was injured not by being run into by the truck, as alleged in the original complaint, but by the fall of the case during the process of unloading the truck, as shown by the testimony of tne defendant’s employee. This ruling of the court was clearly in harmony with Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Gvil Procedure which ' provide that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires. The defendant was not taken by surprise by the amendment for the new matter was furnished by its own witness.
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
Question: What type of court made the original decision?
A. Federal district court (single judge)
B. 3 judge district court
C. State court
D. Bankruptcy court, referee in bankruptcy, special master
E. Federal magistrate
F. Federal administrative agency
G. Special DC court
H. Other
I. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_applfrom | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court).
Dawn Elaine BROWN, by and through Gayle (Brown) Marden, as her mother and next friend, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross Appellees, v. Dixie Herlong CHASTAIN et al., Defendants-Appellees, Cross Appellants.
No. 26848.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Aug. 4, 1969.
Rehearing Denied and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 2,
Tobias Simon, Miami, Fla., for appellants.
Thomas C. Britton, County Atty., John G. Fletcher, Joseph D. Komansky, Asst. Co. Attys., Miami, Fla., for appellees.
Before RIVES, BELL and DYER, Circuit Judges.
DYER, Circuit Judge:
We are here presented with the question whether the District Court had jurisdiction to directly review a final determination of federal constitutional questions voluntarily submitted to and decided by the state courts of Florida in connection with litigation pending in the state courts, no review by the United States Supreme Court having been sought. The District Court had no jurisdiction, and we reverse.
In 1961 Gayle and James Brown were divorced. Gayle was awarded custody of their child, Dawn Elaine Brown. In 1966 James Brown filed suit in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Dade County, Florida, and on May 8, 1967, an order was entered changing the custody of the child from the mother to the father. An appeal was filed in the Florida Third District Court of Appeal, but counsel for the mother and child soon discovered that the cost of preparing a transcript of the testimony in the lower court was beyond the financial means of the mother and child. A petition to the Juvenile Court praying that either the State of Florida or the father be required to pay for the transcript was denied; a similar petition in the Court of Appeal was denied; and finally an appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida from the order denying a free transcript was dismissed. No attempt for direct Supreme Court review of the state court decisions through certiorari under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257 was made.
The appellants then filed their complaint in the District Court alleging that the denial by the State of a free transcript for use in their state civil appeal constituted a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the very same allegation which the state courts had considered and rejected. The complaint prayed for relief in the form of a mandatory injunction requiring the State of Florida to provide a transcript at the expense of the State or the father, or alternatively to strike the order changing the custody of the child. Soon afterwards a hearing was held. In open court the parties stipulated that the facts alleged in the complaint were correct and further that the defendants did not have to file an answer or other response. The District Court then entered judgment on the merits in favor of the defendants based on the pleadings, and this appeal ensued.
It is obvious from the complaint and the requested relief that the appellants are here attempting to re-litigate their federal constitutional claims by obtaining a form of direct federal district court review of the state decisions, since independent equitable proceedings to prevent the enforcement of a judgment are considered a direct attack upon it. See Restatement, Judgments § 11, comment a (1942). The District Court was patently without jurisdiction to engage in such a review. As noted in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 1923, 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362
Question: What is the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court)?
A. Trial (either jury or bench trial)
B. Injunction or denial of injunction or stay of injunction
C. Summary judgment or denial of summary judgment
D. Guilty plea or denial of motion to withdraw plea
E. Dismissal (include dismissal of petition for habeas corpus)
F. Appeals of post judgment orders (e.g., attorneys' fees, costs, damages, JNOV - judgment nothwithstanding the verdict)
G. Appeal of post settlement orders
H. Not a final judgment: interlocutory appeal
I. Not a final judgment: mandamus
J. Other (e.g., pre-trial orders, rulings on motions, directed verdicts) or could not determine nature of final judgment
K. Does not fit any of the above categories, but opinion mentions a "trial judge"
L. Not applicable (e.g., decision below was by a federal administrative agency, tax court)
Answer: |
sc_certreason | L | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari.
HATAHLEY et al. v. UNITED STATES.
No. 231.
Argued March 26-27, 1956.
Decided May 7, 1956.
Norman M. Littell argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Marvin J. Sonosky and Frederick Bernays Wiener.
Roger P. Marquis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Morton and S. Billingsley Hill.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners, eight families of Navajo Indians, seek damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the destruction of their horses by agents of the Federal Government. The District Court allowed damages of $100,000 and enjoined the Government and its agents from further interference with petitioners. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, 220 F. 2d 666, on the ground that the Utah abandoned horse statute, Utah Code Ann., 1953, 47-2, was properly invoked by the government agents. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners are wards of the Government. They have lived from time immemorial in stone and timber hogans on public land in San Juan County, Utah. This bleak area in the southeastern corner of the State is directly north of the Navajo Indian Reservation. While some Indian families from the reservation come into the area to graze their livestock, petitioners claim to have always lived there the year round. They are herdsmen and for generations they have grazed their livestock on this land. They are a simple and primitive people. Their living is derived entirely from their animals, from the little corn they are able to grow in family plots, and the wild game and pine nuts that the land itself affords. The District Court found that horses, as petitioners’ beasts of burden and only means of transportation, were essential to their existence.
In 1934 the Government enacted the Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1269, 43 U. S. C. § 315, which provided for the regulation and use of these public lands. Grazing permits were issued to white livestock operators, and for a number of years these permittees grazed their livestock in common with petitioners, who continued in peaceable occupation and use of the land they claimed as their ancestral home. Limited forage made disputes between the stockmen and the Indians inevitable, and about 1950 both the Government and the white livestock operators filed suits to remove the Indians from this land. In addition to legal proceedings, another method was employed by the government agents. Beginning in September 1952 and continuing until sometime after the present suit was filed in the District Court, the Department of Interior’s range manager vigorously prosecuted a campaign to round up and destroy petitioners’ horses. This action was taken pursuant to the Utah abandoned horse statute, Utah Code Ann., 1953, 47-2, which provides that the Board of County Commissioners may authorize the elimination of “abandoned” horses on the open range. An “abandoned” horse is defined as one running at large on the open range which is either not branded or, if branded, one on which the tax for the preceding year has not been paid. During the roundup a total of 115 horses and 38 burros belonging to petitioners were taken and sold or destroyed. Some horses were sold locally. Some were shot and their carcasses left on the range. Most of the animals, however, were trucked some 350 miles away to Provo, Utah, where they were sold to a horse-meat plant or a glue factory. The total amount derived from such sales, about $1,700, has been retained by the District Advisory Board composed of local stockmen. No part of it has been paid or offered to petitioners.
There is considerable evidence in the record to show that the Utah abandoned horse statute was applied dis-criminatorily against the Indians. In one instance the assistant range'manager watched from a
Question: What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari?
A. case did not arise on cert or cert not granted
B. federal court conflict
C. federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question
D. putative conflict
E. conflict between federal court and state court
F. state court conflict
G. federal court confusion or uncertainty
H. state court confusion or uncertainty
I. federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty
J. to resolve important or significant question
K. to resolve question presented
L. no reason given
M. other reason
Answer: |
sc_casesource | 059 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state.
Question: What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
001. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
002. U.S. Court of International Trade
003. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
004. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
005. U.S. Court of Military Review
006. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
007. U.S. Customs Court
008. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
009. U.S. Tax Court
010. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
011. U.S. Court for China
012. U.S. Consular Courts
013. U.S. Commerce Court
014. Territorial Supreme Court
015. Territorial Appellate Court
016. Territorial Trial Court
017. Emergency Court of Appeals
018. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
019. Bankruptcy Court
020. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
021. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
022. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
023. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
024. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
025. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
026. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
027. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
028. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
029. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
030. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
031. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
032. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
033. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
034. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
035. Alaska U.S. District Court
036. Arizona U.S. District Court
037. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
038. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
039. California Central U.S. District Court
040. California Eastern U.S. District Court
041. California Northern U.S. District Court
042. California Southern U.S. District Court
043. Colorado U.S. District Court
044. Connecticut U.S. District Court
045. Delaware U.S. District Court
046. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
047. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
048. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
049. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
050. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
051. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
052. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
053. Guam U.S. District Court
054. Hawaii U.S. District Court
055. Idaho U.S. District Court
056. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
057. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
058. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
059. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
060. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
061. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
062. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
063. Kansas U.S. District Court
064. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
065. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
066. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
067. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
068. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
069. Maine U.S. District Court
070. Maryland U.S. District Court
071. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
072. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
073. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
074. Minnesota U.S. District Court
075. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
076. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
077. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
078. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
079. Montana U.S. District Court
080. Nebraska U.S. District Court
081. Nevada U.S. District Court
082. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
083. New Jersey U.S. District Court
084. New Mexico U.S. District Court
085. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
086. New York Northern U.S. District Court
087. New York Southern U.S. District Court
088. New York Western U.S. District Court
089. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
090. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
091. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
092. North Dakota U.S. District Court
093. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
094. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
095. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
096. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
097. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
098. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
099. Oregon U.S. District Court
100. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
101. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
102. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
103. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
104. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
105. South Carolina U.S. District Court
106. South Dakota U.S. District Court
107. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
108. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
109. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
110. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
111. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
112. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
113. Texas Western U.S. District Court
114. Utah U.S. District Court
115. Vermont U.S. District Court
116. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
117. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
118. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
119. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
120. Washington Western U.S. District Court
121. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
122. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
123. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
124. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
125. Wyoming U.S. District Court
126. Louisiana U.S. District Court
127. Washington U.S. District Court
128. West Virginia U.S. District Court
129. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
130. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
131. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
132. Alabama U.S. District Court
133. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
134. Georgia U.S. District Court
135. Illinois U.S. District Court
136. Indiana U.S. District Court
137. Iowa U.S. District Court
138. Michigan U.S. District Court
139. Mississippi U.S. District Court
140. Missouri U.S. District Court
141. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
142. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
143. New York U.S. District Court
144. North Carolina U.S. District Court
145. Ohio U.S. District Court
146. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
147. Tennessee U.S. District Court
148. Texas U.S. District Court
149. Virginia U.S. District Court
150. Norfolk U.S. District Court
151. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
152. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
153. New Jersey U.S. District Court
154. California U.S. District Court
155. Florida U.S. District Court
156. Arkansas U.S. District Court
157. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
158. State Supreme Court
159. State Appellate Court
160. State Trial Court
161. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
162. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
163. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
164. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
165. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
166. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
167. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
168. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
169. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
170. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
171. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
172. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
173. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
174. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
175. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
176. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
177. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
178. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
179. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
180. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
181. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
182. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
183. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
184. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
185. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
186. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
187. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
188. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
189. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
190. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
191. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
192. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
193. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
194. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
195. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
196. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
197. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
198. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
199. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
200. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
201. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
202. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
203. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
204. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
205. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
206. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
207. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
208. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
209. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
210. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
211. Court of Private Land Claims
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_1-3-2 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "criminal - state offense".
Edna Mae BOOKER, Appellant, v. Miriam B. PHILLIPS, Superintendent, Kansas State Industrial Reformatory for Women, Appellee.
No. 132-68.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Nov. 12, 1969.
Russell Shultz, Wichita, Kan., for appellant.
Edward G. Collister, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Topeka, Kan. (Kent Frizzell, Atty. Gen., Topeka, Kan., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BREITENSTEIN, HILL and HOLLOWAY. Circuit Judges.
HILL, Circuit Judge.
Edna Mae Booker filed this petition for habeas corpus seeking release from the Kansas State Industrial Farm for Women. The district court, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, denied the writ and dismissed the petition. We are thus faced with the question of whether the court erred in determining that appellant’s present conviction was not obtained in violation of that portion of the Fifth Amendment that protects an individual against being twice placed in jeopardy for the same criminal offense.
In March, 1965, the appellant was charged in the district court of Sedgwick County, Kansas, with the first degree murder of her husband. She entered a plea of not guilty and both sides presented evidence to the jury. The jury was then instructed that the charge of first degree murder encompassed the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and first, third and fourth degree manslaughter. After deliberation, the jury found appellant guilty of first degree manslaughter. On appeal it was determined that an instruction relating to the carrying of a concealed weapon was erroneous and the conviction was reversed. State v. Booker, 197 Kan. 13, 415 P.2d 411 (1966).
On remand the appellant was again charged with first degree murder. However, before the second trial began, the defense of double jeopardy was raised based on the contention that appellant could not be reprosecuted for any degree of homicide greater than first degree manslaughter. The objection was overruled, appellant was once more tried for first degree murder, and was again convicted of first degree manslaughter. In a second appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, the double jeopardy defense was rejected and the sentence which appellant is presently serving was approved. State v. Booker, 200 Kan. 166, 434 P.2d 801 (1967).
Subsequent to this decision of the Kansas Supreme Court and the decision of the district court in this case, the Supreme Court held in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed.2d 707 (1969) that the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Justifiably, those two distinguished courts relied upon the law as enunciated by Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288, and the line of cases following, but which cases are now overruled by the Benton case. Accordingly, it is now clear that the validity of appellant’s conviction must be judged under the federal double jeopardy standards enunciated inter alia, in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). That case invalidated a conviction for first degree murder obtained in a retrial after a previous conviction for second degree murder had been reversed on appeal.
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "criminal - state offense"?
A. murder
B. rape
C. arson
D. aggravated assault
E. robbery
F. burglary
G. auto theft
H. larceny (over $50)
I. other violent crimes
J. narcotics
K. alcohol related crimes, prohibition
L. tax fraud
M. firearm violations
N. morals charges (e.g., gambling, prostitution, obscenity)
O. criminal violations of government regulations of business
P. other white collar crime (involving no force or threat of force; e.g., embezzlement, computer fraud,bribery)
Q. other state crimes
R. state offense, but specific crime not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_numappel | 1 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case. If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
McWILLIAMS v. SHEPARD et al.
No. 7942.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Argued March 10, 1942.
Decided April 6, 1942.
Samuel J. McWilliams, pro se.
Mr. Burton A. McGann, of Washington, D. C., for appellees.
Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and MILLER and EDGERTON, Associate Justices.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court entered upon the verdict of a jury awarding $4,500 and $3,000, respectively, to Ruth Shepard, a minor, and George Shepard, her father, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from an automobile collision alleged to have been caused by the negligence of appellant. Appellant is a resident of the District of Columbia. Appellees are residents of Connecticut. The accident occurred in Plymouth, Massachusetts. Appellant was driving his own car. Appellee Ruth Shepard was a guest rider in a car driven by a resident of Plymouth. The collision occurred on North Russell Street at the intersection of a driveway from a public parking lot and that street. The car in which appellee was riding was proceeding west along North Russell Street, which at the point of collision is approximately 24 feet wide. The evidence as to how the accident happened is conflicting. That of the appellant is that he drove out of the parking lot in a northerly direction onto North Russell Street; that he stopped at the curb and looked in both directions; that he saw no cars approaching; that he then went forward in second gear at about 5 or 6 miles an hour; that when he
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
sc_lcdisposition | B | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded.
PENSICK & GORDON, INC., v. CALIFORNIA MOTOR EXPRESS et al.
No. 222.
Decided December 3, 1962.
Carl M. Gould for petitioner.
Theodore W. Russell, George L. Catlin and Joseph P. Loeb for respondents.
Per Curiam.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., ante, p. 84.
Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice White would affirm the judgment below for the reasons given in the dissenting opinion in Hewitt-Robins.
Question: What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed
C. reversed
D. reversed and remanded
E. vacated and remanded
F. affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part
G. affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. modify
K. remand
L. unusual disposition
Answer: |
songer_usc1 | 29 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if no U.S. Code titles are cited. If one or more provisions are cited, code the number of the most frequently cited title.
Charles GOLDSTEIN, Appellant, v. Megerdich DABANIAN and Emma K. Dabanian t/a East Tioga Check Service. Louis SERNOVITZ, Herbert Sabulsky and Sidney Singer, Appellants, v. Irving HERTZ, t/a Terminal Check Service.
Nos. 13470, 13471.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued May 1, 1961.
Decided June 2, 1961.
Rehearing Denied June 29, 1961.
Stanley Bernard Singer, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants.
Robert E. Nagle, Washington, D. C. (Charles Donahue, Solicitor, Bessie Margolin, Asst. Solicitor, U. S. Dept, of Labor, Washington, D. C., Ernest N. Votaw, Regional Atty., Chambersburg, Pa., on the brief), for Secretary of Labor, amicus curiae.
Oscar Spivack, Charles W. Woolever, Philadelphia, Pa. (Raymond L. Shapiro, Wexler, Mulder & Weisman, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellees.
Before GOODRICH, STALEY and FORMAN, Circuit Judges.
GOODRICH, Circuit Judge.
These two appeals present the same question, namely, whether employees of the two defendants are engaged in interstate commerce or the production of goods for commerce under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a). The plaintiffs sued to recover unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages and counsel fees. The district court held that they were not engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce and dismissed the action. The decision is unreported.
It is agreed by all persons concerned that the question here is not determined by the nature of the business in which the employer is engaged but by the duties of the individual employees. Mitchell v. H. B. Zachry Co., 1960, 362 U.S. 310, 80 S.Ct. 739, 4 L.Ed.2d 753; Mitchell v. Household Finance Corporation, 3 Cir., 1953, 208 F.2d 667. These employees did three things for their respective employers. One, for a fee they cashed non-personal checks presented to them. These checks, usually but not always, are payroll checks. Two, they issued money orders drawn on American Express or National Express. Three, they accepted payment, for a small fee, of utility company bills. Most of the customers were persons who did not have individual bank accounts of their own. The trial court decided that these plaintiffs were not engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce. He found it unnecessary to determine whether they qualified under exceptions to the rule for coverage described in the statute.
Contrary to the district court’s determination we think that these employees fell within the general coverage of the act. What they did was to cash these checks and at the end of a business day total them up for deposit in the employer’s bank account. While 91% of the checks were drawn on local banks in Pennsylvania, 9% of them were drawn on banks out of the state.
That the checks are “goods” within the meaning of the statute was decided by the Second Circuit in Bozant v. Bank of New York, 1946, 156 F.2d 787, applying Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 1945, 323 U.S. 490, 65 S.Ct. 335, 89 L.Ed. 414. The Bozant case was discussed and approved in our decision, Mitchell v. Household Finance Corporation, supra.
Nine percent of the checks had an out-of-state destination for presentment and payment. This, of course, constitutes interstate commerce on the part of the employer. See Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 1946, 327 U.S. 178, 66 S.Ct. 511, 90 L.Ed. 607.
The handling of the checks by these employees was also a part of interstate commerce. In cashing the checks and making the deposits in the appropriate bank, these employees were forwarding goods in interstate commerce just as truly as an initiating intrastate carrier is part of the process of interstate commerce when it delivers the goods consigned to an out-of
Question: What is the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
sc_casesource | 028 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state.
Question: What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
001. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
002. U.S. Court of International Trade
003. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
004. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
005. U.S. Court of Military Review
006. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
007. U.S. Customs Court
008. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
009. U.S. Tax Court
010. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
011. U.S. Court for China
012. U.S. Consular Courts
013. U.S. Commerce Court
014. Territorial Supreme Court
015. Territorial Appellate Court
016. Territorial Trial Court
017. Emergency Court of Appeals
018. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
019. Bankruptcy Court
020. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
021. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
022. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
023. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
024. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
025. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
026. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
027. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
028. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
029. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
030. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
031. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
032. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
033. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
034. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
035. Alaska U.S. District Court
036. Arizona U.S. District Court
037. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
038. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
039. California Central U.S. District Court
040. California Eastern U.S. District Court
041. California Northern U.S. District Court
042. California Southern U.S. District Court
043. Colorado U.S. District Court
044. Connecticut U.S. District Court
045. Delaware U.S. District Court
046. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
047. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
048. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
049. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
050. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
051. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
052. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
053. Guam U.S. District Court
054. Hawaii U.S. District Court
055. Idaho U.S. District Court
056. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
057. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
058. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
059. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
060. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
061. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
062. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
063. Kansas U.S. District Court
064. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
065. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
066. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
067. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
068. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
069. Maine U.S. District Court
070. Maryland U.S. District Court
071. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
072. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
073. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
074. Minnesota U.S. District Court
075. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
076. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
077. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
078. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
079. Montana U.S. District Court
080. Nebraska U.S. District Court
081. Nevada U.S. District Court
082. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
083. New Jersey U.S. District Court
084. New Mexico U.S. District Court
085. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
086. New York Northern U.S. District Court
087. New York Southern U.S. District Court
088. New York Western U.S. District Court
089. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
090. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
091. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
092. North Dakota U.S. District Court
093. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
094. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
095. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
096. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
097. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
098. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
099. Oregon U.S. District Court
100. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
101. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
102. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
103. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
104. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
105. South Carolina U.S. District Court
106. South Dakota U.S. District Court
107. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
108. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
109. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
110. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
111. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
112. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
113. Texas Western U.S. District Court
114. Utah U.S. District Court
115. Vermont U.S. District Court
116. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
117. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
118. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
119. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
120. Washington Western U.S. District Court
121. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
122. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
123. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
124. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
125. Wyoming U.S. District Court
126. Louisiana U.S. District Court
127. Washington U.S. District Court
128. West Virginia U.S. District Court
129. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
130. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
131. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
132. Alabama U.S. District Court
133. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
134. Georgia U.S. District Court
135. Illinois U.S. District Court
136. Indiana U.S. District Court
137. Iowa U.S. District Court
138. Michigan U.S. District Court
139. Mississippi U.S. District Court
140. Missouri U.S. District Court
141. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
142. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
143. New York U.S. District Court
144. North Carolina U.S. District Court
145. Ohio U.S. District Court
146. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
147. Tennessee U.S. District Court
148. Texas U.S. District Court
149. Virginia U.S. District Court
150. Norfolk U.S. District Court
151. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
152. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
153. New Jersey U.S. District Court
154. California U.S. District Court
155. Florida U.S. District Court
156. Arkansas U.S. District Court
157. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
158. State Supreme Court
159. State Appellate Court
160. State Trial Court
161. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
162. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
163. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
164. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
165. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
166. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
167. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
168. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
169. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
170. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
171. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
172. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
173. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
174. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
175. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
176. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
177. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
178. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
179. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
180. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
181. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
182. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
183. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
184. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
185. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
186. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
187. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
188. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
189. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
190. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
191. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
192. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
193. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
194. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
195. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
196. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
197. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
198. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
199. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
200. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
201. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
202. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
203. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
204. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
205. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
206. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
207. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
208. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
209. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
210. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
211. Court of Private Land Claims
Answer: |
songer_dueproc | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in any civil law cases including civil government, civil private, and diversity cases. The issue is: "Did the interpretation of the requirements of due process by the court favor the appellant?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".
ROBINSON v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 6125.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
March 17, 1933.
A. J. Levin, of Detroit, Mich. (Butzel, Levin & Winston, of Detroit, Mich., and Frederick L. Pearce, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for petitioner.
J. Louis Monarch, of Washington, D. C. (G. A. Youngquist, Sewall Key, Wm. Cutler Thompson, C. M. Charest, and Frank T. Horner, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for respondent.
Before MOORMAN, HICKENLOOPER, and SIMONS, Circuit Judges.
MOORMAN, Circuit Judge.
Bernard Wurzburger and Ms wife, Laura Wurzburgor, were residents of Michigan from 1910 until his death on July 10, 1926. Prior to September 8, 1916, the effective date of the first federal estate tax (39 Stat. 777), they acquired two pieces of real estate as tenants by the entirety. Upon the death of the husband the Commissioner assessed an estate tax against the properties. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed (21 B. T. A. 1373), and the petitioner, executor of the husband’s estate, appeals, contending that section 302 (e) (h) of the Revenue Aet of 1924 (43 Stat. 304, 305 (26 USCA § 1094 note) is unconstitutional, in so far as it requires the inclusion in the gross estate of a decedent of the value of real estate acquired by a decedent and spouse as tenants by the entirety prior to September 8, 1916.
“Tho clear language of the 1924 statute repels the notion that it has no application to joint tenancies created prior to September 8, 1916.” Gwinn v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 287 U. S. 224, 53 S. Ct. 157, 158, 77 L. Ed.- (December 5, 1932). Whether its application in the present case is within the limitations of the Constitution depends upon the existence of a taxable event after September 8> 1916, to which it may attach. The death occurred after that date, and if it was a “generating source of definite accessions to the survivor's property rights,” then the tax was constitutionally levied. Sueh was held to he the effect of the death of the joint tenant in the Gwinn Case and in Third National Bank v. White, Collector, 53 S. Ct. 290, 77 L. Ed. -. In the latter ease, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals [58 F.(2d) 1085] sustaining a'judgment of the District Court applying the tax to a tenancy created prior to 1916 [45 F.(2d) 911],
The petitioner relies upon a statement in the Gwinn Case to the effect that under the laws of California the estate
Question: Did the interpretation of the requirements of due process by the court favor the appellant?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_usc2 | 28 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
The most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case is 11. Your task is to identify the second most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if fewer than two U.S. Code titles are cited. To choose the second title, the following rule was used: If two or more titles of USC or USCA are cited, choose the second most frequently cited title, even if there are other sections of the title already coded which are mentioned more frequently. If the title already coded is the only title cited in the headnotes, choose the section of that title which is cited the second greatest number of times.
ISAACS v. HOBBS TIE & TIMBER CO.
No. 7656.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
March 15, 1935.
William R. Watkins, of Fort Worth, Tex., for appellant.
Norman A. Dodge, of Fort Worth, Tex., and W. N. Ivie, John R. Duty, Claude Duty, and Jeff Duty, all of Rogers, Ark., for appellee.
Before BRYAN, HUTCHESON, and WALKER, Circuit Judges.
Rehearing denies April 8, 1935. Writ of certiorari denied 55 S. Ct. 834, 79 L. Ed. —.
WALKER, Circuit Judge.
On August 7, 1928, Henrietta E. Cunningham was adjudged bankrupt in the Northern District of 'Texas. Her estate included lands located in the Western District of Arkansas which were subject to a mortgage given to secure a debt. A short time after the bankruptcy adjudication and an order requiring the sale, by the trustee, of all the bankrupt’s property were made, the appellee, Hobbs Tie & Timber Company, bought that mortgage from the then owner thereof, paying $30,000 therefor, and in December, 1928, brought suit in an Arkansas state court for the foreclosure of that mortgage; the bankrupt and the trustee of the bankrupt estate being made parties defendant to the suit. On the petition of the bankrupt and the trustee that suit was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. In that court the right of the appellee to maintain its foreclosure suit was unsuccessfully resisted, and that court rendered a decree of foreclosure and sale. From that decree an appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was taken. That court certified to the Supreme Court the question of appellee’s right to maintain the foreclosure suit in the circumstances stated. 282 U. S. 734, 51 S. Ct. 270, 75 L. Ed. 645. The decision of the Supreme Court was to the effect that the Arkansas foreclosure suit was not maintainable save by consent of the bankruptcy court; arid the decree of the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas was reversed, and the ■ cause was remanded to that court, for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & T. Co., 282 U. S. 734, 51 S. Ct. 270, 75 L. Ed. 645. Following the remandment of the foreclosure suit, the appellee filed in the court below a petition which asserted that it was entitled as of right to proceed with its foreclosure in the suit pending in Arkansas, and prayed the court’s consent to do so. The denial of that petition by the court below was affirmed by this court, without prejudice to the right of petitioner (appellee here) to further apply to the bankruptcy court for such relief as it may be advised it can show itself entitled to. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co. v. Isaacs (C. C. A.) 61 F.(2d) 1006. While the last-mentioned proceeding was pending on appeal, the appellee filed in the court below its petitition praying that it be permitted to proceed with its foreclosure suit in the Western District of Arkansas, and for all other relief to which petitioner is entitled. That petition contained allegations to the effect that since 1928 the trustee in bankruptcy has failed to pay taxes on the mortgaged lands, that appellee has paid such taxes, amounting to more than $5,000, to prevent the forfeiture and sale of such lands because of nonpayment of taxes, that the value of said lands is far less than the amount of the debt secured by the mortgage thereon, that the
Question: The most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case is 11. What is the second most frequently cited title of this U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_geniss | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. Consider the following categories: "criminal" (including appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence), "civil rights" (excluding First Amendment or due process; also excluding claims of denial of rights in criminal proceeding or claims by prisoners that challenge their conviction or their sentence (e.g., habeas corpus petitions are coded under the criminal category); does include civil suits instituted by both prisoners and callable non-prisoners alleging denial of rights by criminal justice officials), "First Amendment", "due process" (claims in civil cases by persons other than prisoners, does not include due process challenges to government economic regulation), "privacy", "labor relations", "economic activity and regulation", and "miscellaneous".
A.J. CARLSON and Stener Carlson, Executors of the Estate of Ruth Evenson, Deceased, Appellants, v. Clifford PETERSON, d/b/a Cliffs Texaco, Appellee.
No. 84-1730.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 11, 1984.
Decided March 5, 1985.
Steven C. Beardsley, Rapid City, S.D., for appellants.
Wayne Gilbert, Rapid City, S.D., for ap-pellee.
Before ARNOLD, FAGG, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.
FAGG, Circuit Judge.
A.J. and Stener Carlson, on behalf of the estate of their mother, Ruth Evenson, appeal a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Clifford Peterson. Mrs. Even-son died after a fall at Peterson’s gasoline service station in April 1980. The Carlsons claim that the trial court committed several errors, including instructing the jury on the defense of assumption of the risk when no evidence supports such a charge. We affirm.
Cliff Peterson owned and operated a Texaco service station in Lemmon, South Dakota, until he retired shortly before trial. On April 10, 1980, a friend drove Ruth Evenson, in Evenson’s car, to Peterson’s station to have her snow tires removed. To do the job, Peterson raised the car or; a hoist about six inches, while Evenson remained in the passenger seat. Peterson finished the job, and Evenson and her friend drove away.
A short time later, Evenson and her friend returned to the station upon discovering a noise coming from underneath the car. Peterson said he would have to raise the car to check underneath and inquired whether Evenson would like to get out. She declined, expressing a desire to stay in the car and read the newspaper. Peterson raised the car over five feet in the air. As Peterson began work on a detached muffler, he saw Evenson tumble from the car to the ground. Evenson suffered head injuries from which she later died.
At trial, Peterson introduced into evidence testimony of a private investigator who rode up on the same hoist. The witness testified that the sights, sounds, and sensations surrounding the upward movement of the hoist made it obvious that he sat five or six feet above the ground. From that evidence, Peterson claims that Mrs. Evenson had constructive knowledge of her peril, yet chose to encounter it and thus assumed the risk of her injury. See Myers v. Lennox Co-op Ass’n, 307 N.W.2d 863, 864-65 (S.D.1981).
We agree. In South Dakota, the defense of assumption of the risk bars recovery if the injured party had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the danger involved in a situation; appreciated the risk of that situation; and voluntarily accepted that risk. Id.; Stenholtz v. Modica, 264 N.W.2d 514, 517-18 (S.D.1978). One has constructive knowledge of a risk if the risk is so plainly observable that anyone of competent faculties will be charged with knowledge of it. E.g., Bartlett v. Gregg, 77 S.D. 406, 92 N.W.2d 654, 657 (S.D.1958); Prosser, Torts § 68, at 448 (4th ed. 197
Question: What is the general issue in the case?
A. criminal
B. civil rights
C. First Amendment
D. due process
E. privacy
F. labor relations
G. economic activity and regulation
H. miscellaneous
Answer: |
songer_typeiss | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court. Choose among the following categories. Criminal and prisioner petitions- includes appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence or the validity of continued confinement. Civil - Government - these will include appeals from administrative agencies (e.g., OSHA,FDA), the decisions of administrative law judges, or the decisions of independent regulatory agencies (e.g., NLRB, FCC,SEC). The focus in administrative law is usually on procedural principles that apply to administrative agencies as they affect private interests, primarily through rulemaking and adjudication. Tort actions against the government, including petitions by prisoners which challenge the conditions of their confinement or which seek damages for torts committed by prion officials or by police fit in this category. In addition, this category will include suits over taxes and claims for benefits from government. Diversity of Citizenship - civil cases involving disputes between citizens of different states (remember that businesses have state citizenship). These cases will always involve the application of state or local law. If the case is centrally concerned with the application or interpretation of federal law then it is not a diversity case. Civil Disputes - Private - includes all civil cases that do not fit in any of the above categories. The opposing litigants will be individuals, businesses or groups.
SMITH v. JIM DANDY MARKETS, Inc. et al. CENTRAL MFRS. MUT. INS. CO. et al. v. JIM DANDY MARKETS, Inc.
No. 11982.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Feb. 11, 1949.
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1949.
Clyde Thomas and Milan Medigovich, both of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant Smith.
Thomas P. Menzies and Harold L. Watt, both of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellants Central Mfg. Mut. Ins. Co. and others.
Harry G. Sadicoff, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee Jim Dandy Markets.
E. Eugene Davis and W. W. Hindman, both of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee, Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.
Before STEPHENS, BONE and ORR, Circuit Judges.
ÓRR, Circuit Judge.
Appellants, Central Manufacturers’ Mutual Insurance Company, hereinafter called Central, and Indiana Lumbermen’s Mutual Insurance Company, hereinafter called Indiana, some time during the year 1946, issued insurance policies to appellee Jim Dandy Markets, Inc., on a building known as the Atlantic Market. Appellee Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, a corporation, hereinafter referred to as Fireman’s, issued a policy to appellant Smith on the same building. The building was subsequently destroyed by fire. Uncertainty existing as to their liability, if any, Central and Indiana brought an action pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 400 [now §§ 2201, 2202],
The facts are: Smith leased two adjoining lots situate in Bell, California. The period of the lease was from August 1, 1942, to August 1, 1947, with an option to extend the period for an additional five years. One of the provisions of the lease was that existing improvements on the premises and those added during the term of the lease were the property of Smith and could be removed by him at the expiration of the lease.
In July 1945 the Atlantic Market, and seven others owned or leased by Smith, including fixtures, machinery and equipment, were by him leased or subleased to Jim Dandy Markets who operated them under that arrangement for approximately one year. Later Smith and Jim Dandy Markets entered into a supplementary agreement for the sale of Smith’s interest in the various properties and leases connected with the business. By the terms of the agreement Jim Dandy Markets agreed to buy “ * * * all of the fixtures, machinery and equipment located and contained in all of the markets * * * ”, and it was further agreed that the original leases under which some of the lots, including the Atlantic Market, were held by Smith, were to be assigned to Jim Dandy Markets. The total consideration for the transfer was $225,000. Under the earlier agreement Jim-Dandy Markets was given an option to buy-fixtures and equipment at the termination of the ten year lease for the sum of $192
Question: What is the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court?
A. criminal and prisoner petitions
B. civil - government
C. diversity of citizenship
D. civil - private
E. other, not applicable
F. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_2-2 | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "civil rights".
UNITED STATES ex rel. DANIKAS v. DAY, Commissioner of Immigration, and three other cases.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
July 20, 1927.
Nos. 240, 384, 385, 387.
1. Aliens <3=54(5) — Warrant for deportation of alien seaman unlawfully remaining in country must issue within three years, rather than five, under statute (Immigration Act 1917, §§ 19, 34 [Comp. St. §§ 4289'AÜ. 4289'/4s]).
Under Immigration Act 1917, § 34 (Comp. St. § 4289%s), providing that any alien seaman landing contrary to provisions of such act shall be deemed to be unlawfully in the United States, “and shall at any time within three years thereafter, upon the warrant of the Secretary of Labor, be taken into custody * * * for examination, and if not admitted shall be deported,” warrant for deportation of seaman unlawfully entering must issue within three years, notwithstanding section 19 (section 428914X1), establishing a five-year limitation as to other aliens.
2. Aliens <3=54(5) — Under statute, date when alien is taken Into custody, rather than date of issuance of warrant of arrest, determines whether proceedings were commenced within three-year period of limitation (Immigration Act 1917, § 34 [Comp. St. § 4289'/4s]).
Under Immigration Act 1917, § 34 (Comp. St. § 428914s), providing that alien seaman landing contrary to provisions of such act shall be deemed unlawfully in the United State*, “and shall at any time within three years thereafter, upon the warrant of the Secretary of Labor, be taken into custody” for examination, and if not admitted shall be deported, the date on which the alien is taken into custody, and not that on which the warrant of arrest is issued, determines whether proceedings are commenced within three-year period.
3. Appeal and error <3=345(1) — 'Time for appeal does not run until motion for rehearing is disposed of.
Time within which an appeal must be taken does not begin to run until motion for rehearing has been disposed of.
4. Habeas corpus <@=II3(3) — Appeal from order denying roargument in habeas corpus proceeding held improperly taken, and dismissible.
In habeas corpus proceeding on relation of alien held for deportation, appeal by government from order denying motion for reargument held improperly taken, and dismissible.
5. Appeal and error <S=77(I) — Order denying reargument in habeas corpus proceeding is not final and appealable. jn habeas corpus proceeding, order denying reargument is not final and appealable.
Appeals from, the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
Writs of habeas corpus were granted on the relation of Yasillios Danikas, of Yineenzo Di Giacomo, of George Depastas, and of Mauro Lorusso against Benjamin M. Day, Commissioner. Orders were granted in each ease, sustaining the writ and discharging the relator, and respondent appeals.
Appeal in Danikas Case dismissed, and the orders in the other cases affirmed.
Danikas.
The relator, an alien, is a native and subject of Greece. On January 2, 1922, he arrived at the port of New York as a member of the crew of the steamship Constantinople and deserted his ship. He was not examined by the immigration authorities for permanent admission to the United States at the time of his arrival, nor was he charged to the quota allotted to Greece for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1922. After his desertion he remained in this country, and on October 30, 1924, voluntarily appeared at Ellis Island for inspection at the suggestion of his attorney, and requested that his entry be legalized. On the facts ascertained as to the manner and time of his entry, a warrant of arrest was issued November
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "civil rights"?
A. civil rights claims by prisoners and those accused of crimes
B. voting rights, race discrimination, sex discrimination
C. other civil rights
Answer: |
songer_capric | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in civil law issues involving government actors. The issue is: "Did the courts's use or interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard support the government? Note that APA allows courts to overturn agency actions deemed to be arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Overton Park emphasized this is a narrow standard, and one must prove that agency's action is without a rational basis. This also includes the "substantial justification" doctrine. Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO, a corporation; Western Slope Gas Company, a corporation; and Public Service Company of Colorado, Successor by Merger to Pueblo Gas and Fuel Company, a corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 85-1049.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
April 15, 1987.
Timothy Fox of Kelly, Stansfield & O’Donnell, Denver, Col., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Roger M. Olsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael L. Paup, Jonathan S. Cohen, and Francis M. Allegra, Tax Division, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., of counsel, Robert N. Miller, U.S. Atty., Denver, Col., for defendant-appellee.
Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
LOGAN, Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R. App.P. 34(a); Tenth Cir.R. 34.1.8(c) and 27.-1.2. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
In this appeal we decide whether an Internal Revenue Service classification of certain vehicles as truck-trailer combinations was contrary to the Highway Revenue Act, 26 U.S.C. § 4481-84.
Section 4481(a) of the Act, before amendments effective in 1984, provided, in part, as follows:
“A tax is hereby imposed on the use of any highway motor vehicle which (together with the semitrailers and trailers customarily used in connection with highway motor vehicles of the same type as such highway motor vehicle) has a taxable gross weight of more than 26,000 pounds____”
(Emphasis added). The term “taxable gross weight” was defined in § 4482(b) as the sum of
“(1) the actual unloaded weight of—
(A) such highway motor vehicle fully equipped for service, and
(B) the semitrailers and trailers (fully equipped for service) customarily used in connection with highway motor vehicles of the same type as such highway motor vehicle, and
(2) the weight of the maximum load customarily carried on highway motor vehicles of the same type as such highway motor vehicle and on the semitrailers and trailers referred to in paragraph (1)(B
Question: Did the courts's use or interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard support the government? Note that APA allows courts to overturn agency actions deemed to be arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Overton Park emphasized this is a narrow standard, and one must prove that agency's action is without a rational basis. This also includes the "substantial justification" doctrine.
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_usc1 | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if no U.S. Code titles are cited. If one or more provisions are cited, code the number of the most frequently cited title.
GIBSON v. VINTON et al.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
July 28, 1927.
No. 7738.
1. Courts <©=>264(3) — Federal court has jurisdiction of ancillary suit by its receiver, irrespective of parties’ citizenship or amounts involved.,
Federal court has jurisdiction of an ancillary suit by its receiver, without regard to citizenship of -the parties or amounts involved.
2. Abatement and revival <©=>45 — Receiver’s suit to wind up affairs of corporation held not abated by decree directing return of property to corporation.
A suit brought by a receiver of a federal court in winding up affairs of the receivership, or for the collection of assets, was not abated by a decree directing return of the property held by the receiver to defendant corporation, where court retained jurisdiction of the suit by the express terms of the decree.
3. Sales <©=>202(6) — Goods shipped, consigned to seller, with draft attached to bill óf lading, remain property of seller until draft is paid, as regards liability for loss.
Where a seller ships goods consigned to himself, with sight draft for the price attached to bill of lading, he retains title and possession until draft is paid, and any loss from damage to the goods before that time falls on him.
In *Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas; Jacob Trieber, Judge.
Action at law by T. 0. Vinton, receiver, and another, against John K. Gibson. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
Basil Baker, of Jonesboro, Ark., and G. M. Gibson, of Walnut Ridge, Ark., for plaintiff in error.
R. G. Brown, of Memphis, Term., for defendants in error.
Before KENYON, Circuit Judge, and MOLYNEAUX and JOHN B. SANBORN, District Judges.
MOLYNEAUX, District Judge.
This action was brought by T. 0. Vinton, as receiver for the National Cottonseed Products Corporation, against the defendant, John K. Gibson, to recover damages in the sum of $1,710.71, on account of the damaged condition of two cars of cottonseed shipped under conditions hereinafter stated.
The National Cottonseed Products Corporation, hereinafter referred to as “National,” was placed in the hands of four receivers in the federal courts for the Western district of Tennessee and the Eastern district of Arkansas, September 16, 1925. T. 0. Vinton, succeeding' the four receivers, was appointed receiver of the National on the 7th day of October, 1925, by the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee, Western Division, and a similar order was entered in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Little Rock Division. Vinton qualified in accordance with the orders of said court. He, as such receiver, brought this action. At the time the receivers were appointed on the 16th day of September, 1925, John K. Gibson, defendant, was indebted to the corporation in the sum of $5,000, evidenced by note.
In September, 1925, A. G. Ba.ttison, manager of the Roberts Cotton Oil Mill, located at Jonesboro, Ark., one of the properties of: the National, made a verbal contract with Gibson to ship five ears of cottonseed to the Roberts mill at a price of $40 per ton, f. o. b., the proceeds to be credited upon said note. Written confirmation of this purchase was drawn up by Pattison and forwarded to Gibson, who executed the same on September 21st, 1925. After confirmation was sent to Gibson, a clause was added as follows:
“This contract is accepted with the understanding that should the Roberts Cotton Oil Company fail to get into position to operate they will take these seed at the Dixie mill in Memphis, and that I will be protected from all loss or damage on account of receivership which these two mills are contemplated to be operated under.” Gibson testified that he had a telephone conversation with James Roberts, manager of the Dixie mill, as a result of which the memorandum was placed on the confirmation. This conversation took place September 22d, as shown by Gibson’s letter of that date. On
Question: What is the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_counsel2 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine the nature of the counsel for the respondent. If name of attorney was given with no other indication of affiliation, assume it is private - unless a government agency was the party
Julia SUMPTER, Appellant, v. Robert HARPER, Appellee.
No. 81-2002.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued June 10, 1982.
Decided July 21, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 20, 1982.
Edward M. Brown, Charleston, S. C. (Moore, Brown & Davis, Charleston, S. C., on brief), for appellant.
William W. Doar, Jr., Georgetown, S. C., for appellee.
Before BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges.
ALBERT V. BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Julia Sumpter appeals the District Court’s dismissal of her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b), and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, see id. 12(b)(6). Determining the judgment of the Court to be beyond reproach, we affirm.
I
With her complaint viewed most favorably, it appears that Julia Sumpter was a patient of defendant physician Robert Harper from 1963 until at least February 7, 1980. On the latter date, she visited Dr. Harper’s office with a blood pressure problem. The defendant then, she alleges, improperly diagnosed her as having breast cancer and thereupon recklessly performed a mastectomy without proper facilities or concern for her health and welfare.
In addition to these accusations which, if true, would constitute medical malpractice, plaintiff asserted that Dr. Harper maintained segregated waiting rooms and otherwise treated blacks discriminatorily. Specifically, his allegedly outrageous conduct towards her on February 7 was said to be a product of racial animus. Charging that Dr. Harper was licensed by the State of South Carolina and that he received Federal Medicare-Medicaid funds, plaintiff sought to establish causes of action under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 2000d (1976).
After argument ore tenus, the District Court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. It observed that both parties are residents of South Carolina, thus concluding that unless the plaintiff could demonstrate the existence of a Federal claim, the suit must be dismissed. Rather than finding a well-pleaded Federal cause of action, the decision was that plaintiff’s complaint actually alleged nothing more than a tort under State law, compelling dismissal. On this appeal, the District Court’s judgment is challenged in each respect save as to the decision as to § 1981.
II
Under both the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983, a plaintiff charging an unconstitutional deprivation of civil rights (§ 1983), or denial of equal protection (Fourteenth Amendment), must plead and prove, inter alia, action under color of State law. To keep within these straits, plaintiff pleads that South Carolina’s grant of a license to practice medicine establishes an adequate nexus between the State and an otherwise private party to convert his behavior into that of the State’s. This contention, however, is foreclosed by our decision in Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 999, 71 L.Ed.2d 293 (1982).
In Hall, we reviewed the dismissal of a § 1983 action against a State judge who issued an involuntary commitment order, the court-appointed physician who examined the plaintiff, and the attorney appointed to represent the plaintiff. Although the District Court had dismissed the action against all defendants on immunity grounds, we concluded that it properly should have been dismissed because no State action was disclosed. Citing decisions of six other Circuits, we held that a physician, even when acting under court appointment
Question: What is the nature of the counsel for the respondent?
A. none (pro se)
B. court appointed
C. legal aid or public defender
D. private
E. government - US
F. government - state or local
G. interest group, union, professional group
H. other or not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_stpolicy | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in any civil law cases including civil government, civil private, and diversity cases. The issue is: "Did the interpretation of state or local law, executive order, administrative regulation, doctrine, or rule of procedure by the court favor the appellant?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Fernando Luis RODRIGUEZ-SANDOVAL, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 72-1003.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Argued Feb. 5, 1973.
Decided March 23, 1973.
Gerardo Ortiz Del Rivero, San Juan, P. R., by appointment of the Court, for appellant.
Jorge Rios Torres, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Julio Morales Sanchez, U. S. Atty., was on brief, for appellee.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, MeENTEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.
. “Indeed the better practice would be to instruct the jurors that they may draw the inference unless the evidence in the case provides a satisfactory explanation for the rproved fact], omitting any explicit reference to the statute itself in the charge.” United States v. Gainey, supra at 71 n. 7, 85 S.Ct. at 759.
McENTEE, Circuit Judge.
Fernando Luis Rodriguez Sandoval was tried and convicted for the purchase, sale, concealment and transportation of heroin in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 4704 (a), 4705(a), 21 U.S.C. § 174, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of fifteen years imprisonment. He appeals from this conviction as well as from the district court’s denial of his motion for a reduction of sentence. We affirm.
Sandoval’s primary contention on appeal relates to the prosecution’s alleged misuse of the evidentiary presumptions written into 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 174. The latter section authorizes conviction upon evidence that the defendant had possession of a narcotic drug “unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.” Similarly, § 4704(a) provides that “the absence of appropriate taxpaid stamps from narcotic drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this subsection by the person in whose possession the same may be found.” In making his opening statement, the United States Attorney informed the jury that the government would rely on these presumptions, which he said would “authorize conviction unless the possession [of heroin] is explained to you by the defendant to your satisfaction.” In addition to these comments, the prosecutor made several similar references to the presumptions, both in his opening statement and in his summation. Appellant contends that these statements necessarily and impermissibly drew the jury’s attention to the defendant’s failure to testify, and that his conviction must therefore be reversed under our decision in United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1971). This argument is without merit. When read in context, it is clear that the prosecutor’s remarks were intended only to explain to the jury what the government’s evidence would be and the theory under which it would press for conviction. Such an explanation could hardly have been made without some
Question: Did the interpretation of state or local law, executive order, administrative regulation, doctrine, or rule of procedure by the court favor the appellant?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_initiate | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify what party initiated the appeal. For cases with cross appeals or multiple docket numbers, if the opinion does not explicitly indicate which appeal was filed first, assumes that the first litigant listed as the "appellant" or "petitioner" was the first to file the appeal. In federal habeas corpus petitions, consider the prisoner to be the plaintiff.
BRUNER v. UNITED STATES.
No. 13411.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
June 1, 1951.
Denmark Groover, Jr., Thos. W. Johnson, Macon, Ga., for appellant
Irvin M. Gottlieb, Atty. Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., John P. Co-wart, U. S. Atty., James H. Fort, Asst. U. S. Atty., Macon, Ga., for appellee.
Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and SIBLEY and STRUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Brought under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(d) (2), to recover moneys claimed to be due plaintiff for services rendered under contract with the United States and not paid for, plaintiff’s suit was met by a motion to dismiss on the ground that, under the controlling decision in this circuit, Kennedy v. United States, 146 F.2d 26, plaintiff was an officer of the United States, and the court was without jurisdiction.
The district judge, on evidence sufficient to support his conclusion, found: that the plaintiff was appointed by the Secretary of War, pursuant to Art. II, Sec. 2, Clause 2, of the Constitution; that he was an officer of the United States; and that the court was without jurisdiction of his claim. So determining, he dismissed the suit on that ground, and this appeal followed.
We agree that the case is ruled by Kennedy v. United States, supra, and that the judgment should be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Question: What party initiated the appeal?
A. Original plaintiff
B. Original defendant
C. Federal agency representing plaintiff
D. Federal agency representing defendant
E. Intervenor
F. Not applicable
G. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_r_fed | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
AMERICAN DREDGING COMPANY, Appellant v. LOCAL 25, MARINE DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO and Stephen J. Leslie,
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
sc_casesourcestate | 02 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state or territory of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed.
WATTS et al. v. SEWARD SCHOOL BOARD et al.
No. 923.
Decided May 3, 1965.
George Kaufmann for petitioners.
George N. Hayes for respondent Seward School Board.
Per Curiam.
Petitioners Watts and Blue were dismissed from their positions as schoolteachers in Seward, Alaska, on grounds of “immorality,” which under Alaska Statutes 1962, § 14.20.170 was defined as “conduct of the person tending to bring the individual concerned or the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect.” Petitioners’ dismissals were upheld by the Alaska Superior Court (Third Judicial District), and on appeal the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. 395 P. 2d 372. The Alaska Supreme Court noted that “[t]he immoral conduct complained of as to the appellant Watts was his holding of private conversations with various teachers in which he solicited their support in an attempt to oust the school superintendent from his job. The allegedly immoral conduct of the appellant Blue was his making of a speech to a labor union at Seward in which he stated, We have been unable to get rid of the [school] Superintendent, so we are going to get rid of the Board/ or words to that effect.” 395 P. 2d, at 374. The Alaska Supreme Court held that this conduct “had a tendency to bring the [petitioners]... and the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect,” within the terms of the statute, 395 P. 2d, at 375, and it therefore sustained their dismissals. Petitioners contend that their dismissals for engaging in the conduct here described unconstitutionally infringe their rights to political expression guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
We need not consider petitioners’ contentions at this time, for since their petition for certiorari was filed Alaska has amended its statutes in this area. House Bill 27, adopted by the Alaska Legislature and signed by the Governor on March 31, 1965, now defines “immorality” as grounds for revocation of a teaching certificate, as “the commission of an act which, under the laws of the state, constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.” Moreover, Alaska Statutes, Tit. 14, c. 20, have been amended by the addition of a new section which reads:
“Sec. 14.20.095. Right to Comment and Criticize Not to be Restricted. No rule or regulation of the commissioner of education, a local school board, or local school administrator may restrict or modify the right of a teacher to engage in comment and criticism outside school hours, relative to school administrators, members of the governing body of any school or school district, any other public official, or any school employee, to the same extent that any private individual may exercise the right.”
This Court has held that supervening changes in state law that may be relevant to the disposition of a case may require that the cause be remanded for appropriate action by the state court. See, e. g., Missouri ex rel. Wabash R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 273 U. S. 126,
Question: What is the state of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
01. Alabama
02. Alaska
03. American Samoa
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. District of Columbia
11. Federated States of Micronesia
12. Florida
13. Georgia
14. Guam
15. Hawaii
16. Idaho
17. Illinois
18. Indiana
19. Iowa
20. Kansas
21. Kentucky
22. Louisiana
23. Maine
24. Marshall Islands
25. Maryland
26. Massachusetts
27. Michigan
28. Minnesota
29. Mississippi
30. Missouri
31. Montana
32. Nebraska
33. Nevada
34. New Hampshire
35. New Jersey
36. New Mexico
37. New York
38. North Carolina
39. North Dakota
40. Northern Mariana Islands
41. Ohio
42. Oklahoma
43. Oregon
44. Palau
45. Pennsylvania
46. Puerto Rico
47. Rhode Island
48. South Carolina
49. South Dakota
50. Tennessee
51. Texas
52. Utah
53. Vermont
54. Virgin Islands
55. Virginia
56. Washington
57. West Virginia
58. Wisconsin
59. Wyoming
60. United States
61. Interstate Compact
62. Philippines
63. Indian
64. Dakota
Answer: |
songer_usc2 | 18 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
The most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case is 18. Your task is to identify the second most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if fewer than two U.S. Code titles are cited. To choose the second title, the following rule was used: If two or more titles of USC or USCA are cited, choose the second most frequently cited title, even if there are other sections of the title already coded which are mentioned more frequently. If the title already coded is the only title cited in the headnotes, choose the section of that title which is cited the second greatest number of times.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. John D. McGREGOR et al., Appellants.
No. 74-1347.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 11, 1974.
Decided Oct. 7, 1974.
Jack S. Nordby, St. Paul, Minn., for appellants.
Thorwald Anderson, Asst. U. S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.
Before LAY, ROSS and WEBSTER, Circuit Judges.
ROSS, Circuit Judge.
John D. McGregor, Robert Fletcher, and Fountain Agency, Inc. were each charged in a twenty-six count indictment with the use of the mail for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Specifically, the indictment alleged that the defendants, acting as agents for Northland Insurance Co., caused notification of insurance policy cancellations to be sent to Northland for the purpose of obtaining premium refunds from Northland. However, the defendants’ customers, whose policies were cancelled, were never informed of the cancellation. From a verdict finding them guilty of all twenty-six counts, McGregor, Fletcher and Fountain appeal contending that the court erred in denying their motion for transfer to another district and that the evidence was insufficient to establish that they acted with intent to defraud.
During the relevant time period, Fountain Agency, Inc., an insurance agency incorporated in Louisiana, was primarily involved in selling automobile collision insurance, generally on vehicles newly purchased by high risk drivers. The policies were often written by the auto dealer himself acting as Fountain’s subagent and financed together with the purchase price of the auto through finance companies such as General Motors Acceptance Corporation. Fountain, itself, was not the insurer, but merely the agent for several insurance companies, chief among which was Northland Insurance Co., a licensed insurance company in Minnesota.
Fountain had negotiated a retrospective contract with Northland, under the terms of which Fountain earned 80% of the premium and Northland earned 20%. The total premium, however, was forwarded to Northland; the 80% was credited to Fountain’s account at North-land and used as a fund out of which all claims by Fountain’s insureds were paid. After claims adjustment, if the losses did not exceed the agent’s earned premium pool, Northland would refund a pro rata amount of earned premium to Fountain.
These retrospective contracts added to cash flow problems already suffered by Fountain. Not only did Fountain experience a need for revenues to pay operating expenses but it also negotiated collateral contracts with subagents who sold policies under which the subagent, usually the automobile dealer, could retain 20% of the face value of the insurance premium as a commission for the sale of the insurance policy. Fountain thus committed 120% of the premium at the outset.
After it was realized that expanding its business under retrospective contracts did nothing to remedy the cash flow problems, McGregor consulted with other insurance agencies who were also experiencing the same difficulties with retrospective contracts. After consulting with these other agencies and with an employee of the Louisiana Insurance Commission, McGregor determined to undertake a program of cancelling policies without notifying or forwarding refunds to the insured.
Under the plan, notices of cancellation were prepared on arbitrarily selected policies, the originals of which notices were sent to Northland. Copies were prepared for the policyholder and lien-holder, but were not sent. Rather, they mailed other documents to the policyholder and the lienholder by registered mail. Certificates of mailing were obtained for these mailings and sent to Northland with the original of the notice of cancellation as false proof that notices of cancellation had been sent to the policyholder and the lienholder. Northland then refunded to Fountain the prorated unearned portion of the premium on the cancelled policy. In effect, these policies were cancelled to the insuror, but not to the policyholders or lien
Question: The most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case is 18. What is the second most frequently cited title of this U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_counsel2 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine the nature of the counsel for the respondent. If name of attorney was given with no other indication of affiliation, assume it is private - unless a government agency was the party
RICHTER v. HOGLUND et al. SAME v. FARMERS MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INS. CO. et al.
No. 8104, 8107.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Jan. 20, 1943.
Fred W. Genrich, Jr., and Herbert L. Terwilliger, both of Wausau, Wis., for appellant.
A. J. O’Melia, of Rhinelander, Wis., Charles F. Smith and Richard P. Tinkham, Jr., both of Wausau, Wis., and Gerald P. Hayes and John A. Kluwin, both of Milwaukee, Wis., for appellees.
Before SPARKS, KERNER, and MIN-TON, Circuit Judges.
MINTON, Circuit Judge.
George Richter, the plaintiff-appellee, sued Lawrence Paul and his insurance carrier, the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, and Elvera Hoglund and her insurance carrier, the Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, to recover for personal injuries he received when Paul’s car, in which Richter was riding as a guest, collided with Miss Hoglund’s car, driven hy herself. Paul in turn filed a counterclaim for personal injuries and property damage against Miss Hoglund and her insurance carrier, and she in turn filed a counterclaim against Paul and his insurance carrier for personal injuries and property damage.
The accident happened near Tomahawk, Wisconsin, and the actions were tried before a jury in the Western District of Wisconsin. Under the comparative negligence statute of Wisconsin, the jury found the defendant-appellant Hoglund one hundred per cent negligent. Richter recovered a judgment on his complaint against Miss Hoglund and the Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for $15,379.70. On his counterclaim Paul recovered a verdict against Miss Plogluiid of $4,697. After suit was filed but before the trial, the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company took from Richter a partial release in the nature of a covenant not to sue, in consideration of the payment of $2,750. Nothing was said in the pleadings or on the trial about this transaction, and the release is printed in the record here without having been considered below at all. The court reduced the verdict of Richter to.$11,500, and that of Paul to $4,000, and entered judgment on the verdicts. From this judgment, Miss Hoglund and the Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Company appeal.
These facts appear from substantial evidence in the record. About ten o’clock on the evening of May 23, 1940, Lawrence Paul was driving northward on State Highway 51. Elvera Hoglund was driving south along the same road. She was alone, while Richter was a guest in the Paul car and was asleep at the time of the accident. As Paul came around a curve in the road, driving at a speed between forty and fifty miles per hour, he saw Miss Hoglund’s car coming south at a distance of two hundred to three hundred feet. She was driving at a speed between thirty and thirty-five miles per hour. The cars approached on their respective sides of the road until almost opposite each other, when one of the cars got over the center line of the road and on the other car’s side of the road, and a collision resulted.
Paul testified Miss Hoglund’s car came over on his side of the road, and Miss Hoglund testified Paul drove his car over on her side of the road. A disinterested witness, William Yeschek, visited the scene of -the accident the night it happened and saw the skid marks of Paul’s car clearly on the east side of the center line as he traveled north to the point of the collision. At the point of the collision, there was much debris on the east side of the road, and there were deep cuts in the blacktop
Question: What is the nature of the counsel for the respondent?
A. none (pro se)
B. court appointed
C. legal aid or public defender
D. private
E. government - US
F. government - state or local
G. interest group, union, professional group
H. other or not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_appnatpr | 2 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
DENICKE et al. v. ANGLO CALIFORNIA NAT. BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO et al.
No. 10329.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
March 1, 1944.
Re
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_usc1 | 28 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if no U.S. Code titles are cited. If one or more provisions are cited, code the number of the most frequently cited title.
John P. O’BRIEN, Appellant, v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION.
No. 13308.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued Dec. 6, 1960.
Decided June 29, 1961.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 1, 1961.
William J. Ruano, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
Walter T. MeGough, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Ralph H. Swingle, Pittsburgh, Pa., William L. Standish, IV, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and GOODRICH and FORMAN, Circuit Judges.
FORMAN, Circuit Judge.
In the first count of his complaint plaintiff-appellant John P. O’Brien, charged that defendant-appellee, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse), infringed his Patent No. 2,694,-951, issued on November 23, 1954, on an application filed on November 29, 1947, for a drawing die and method of making the same. In the second count he alleged that Westinghouse committed acts of unfair competition by misappropriating his invention prior to its being patented as a related claim arising under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(b). There was no diversity of citizenship between the parties.
The case came on for trial on the complaint, answer and a pretrial order before the court and a jury. The court endeavored to channel the evidence toward the first count (patent infringement) only, but inevitably much evidence was admitted as to the second count (unfair competition).
The record discloses that O’Brien offered proofs substantially as follows: In 1943 Westinghouse had orders for manufacturing commutator bars for dynamos on B-24 bombers. It was having difficulty producing them in proper quantity because in many instances the dies through which the copper was drawn in the production of the commutator bars failed to meet the desired tolerances which were very small or if they met the drawing sizes they would be produced with a twist. Both split steel and solid tungsten-carbide dies were tried without success.
O’Brien, long an employee of Westinghouse, was working as a die setter and group leader at the draw bench in the Westinghouse Copper Mill in Wilkins Township, Pennsylvania. He addressed himself to the problems which were being experienced and in early 1943 submitted suggestions to Westinghouse for a method of making split tungsten-carbide dies, under a suggestion system operated by Westinghouse. Forms were provided by the company for the submission of suggestions which were used by O’Brien in making his submission.
O’Brien testified that he expected to receive ten per cent of the savings effected by his suggestion in its first year of use. This expectation was based on an “Industrial Relations Manual” put out by Westinghouse which stated:
“The Company will grant monetary awards for suggestions which are adopted and put into operation.”
On September 22, 1943, the Suggestion Committee formally acknowledged O’Brien’s suggestion stating:
“This suggestion has been adopted and the following is a consolidated statement of the action involved:
“Split carbide dies in place of solid dies will be used in drawing copper in Section CM-20.”
A token award of $25 was recommended and it was stated that O'Brien's suggestion “will be reopened as soon as savings can be determined.”
There were a number of problems involved in the use of the method of making the dies as suggested by O’Brien which were submitted for solution to the engineers and technicians of Westinghouse. The first split tungsten-carbide die made pursuant to his suggestion was completed by employees of Westinghouse in 1943 on Westinghouse time and with Westinghouse materials. It was used in the years 1943 and 1944 for drawing a large quantity of copper in regular production of the copper commutator bars for Westinghouse’s orders as mentioned above and continued to be used thereafter. Westinghouse purchased machine tools for the production of the die in question. Some difficulty arose in making other dies, but the problems connected with the use of the suggested method were fully solved not later than November 22, 1944. From that time the method was in regular use and at least 55 different dies were made prior to May 1945.
During 194
Question: What is the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_state | 56 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the state or territory in which the case was first heard. If the case began in the federal district court, consider the state of that district court. If it is a habeas corpus case, consider the state of the state court that first heard the case. If the case originated in a federal administrative agency, answer "not applicable". Answer with the name of the state, or one of the following territories: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Panama Canal Zone, or "not applicable" or "not determined".
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. CHICAGO ROLL FORMING CORPORATION, and Machinery, Scrap Iron, Metal and Steel, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, Handlers, Helpers and Alloy Fabricators Union, Local 714, I.B. of T., Respondents.
No. 17318.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
Nov. 6, 1969.
Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Ian Lanoff, Atty., N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Michael N. Sohn, Jerome Weinstein, Attys., N. L. R. B., for petitioner.
Marvin Sacks, Chicago, 111., Levin & Berger, Chicago, 111., of counsel, for respondent Union.
Before DUFFY, Senior Circuit Judge, SWYGERT and CUMMINGS, Circuit Judges.
DUFFY, Senior Circuit Judge.
The National Labor Relations Board (Board) petitions for enforcement of its decision and order issued on October 23, 1967, finding respondent Chicago Roll Forming Corporation (Company) and the Union guilty of violating respectively Section 8(a) (1) and (3) and Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act) as amended, (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seq.) Although the Company has acquiesced in the Board’s ruling, the Union challenges it.
The Board found that the Company and Union through their agent Bone respectively violated the Act by threatening various employees with reprisals and in discharging and causing the discharge of employees Scott, Hawkins and Walker because they engaged in protected union activities.
James Bone was the Union steward for the Company’s production, maintenance and shipping employees. Harold Beebe was the Company’s president; Gobal Stalker was the plant superintendent. Richard Schumacher was the Union business representative.
Bone, as Union steward, signed up employees for the Union. He would also present grievances including the matter of discharges to superintendent Stalker. Bone would aid an employee in his presentation of grievances to Stalker. If the matter was not resolved, Bone would then.confer with Beebe.
Bone had additional responsibilities to those pertinent to his position as Union steward. For a period he was identified as “foreman” and leadman in the Company’s paintshop and in September 1965, he became the leadman in charge of fifteen employees in the welding and fabrication department. As leadman, Bone was responsible for the completion by his department of work orders which had been given to him to fill.
Bone assigned jobs to the employees under him and described to them the welding work to be done. He trained new welders, inspected the work and ordered corrections when necessary. Bone had a desk in the welding department for the performance of paper work.
When Bone was short handed, he would inform superintendent
Question: In what state or territory was the case first heard?
01. not
02. Alabama
03. Alaska
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. Florida
11. Georgia
12. Hawaii
13. Idaho
14. Illinois
15. Indiana
16. Iowa
17. Kansas
18. Kentucky
19. Louisiana
20. Maine
21. Maryland
22. Massachussets
23. Michigan
24. Minnesota
25. Mississippi
26. Missouri
27. Montana
28. Nebraska
29. Nevada
30. New
31. New
32. New
33. New
34. North
35. North
36. Ohio
37. Oklahoma
38. Oregon
39. Pennsylvania
40. Rhode
41. South
42. South
43. Tennessee
44. Texas
45. Utah
46. Vermont
47. Virginia
48. Washington
49. West
50. Wisconsin
51. Wyoming
52. Virgin
53. Puerto
54. District
55. Guam
56. not
57. Panama
Answer: |
songer_r_fed | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
McCARTHY et al. v. SAFEWAY STORES, Inc.
No. 21, Docket 20239.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Oct.
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
sc_authoritydecision | G | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. AMERADA PETROLEUM CORP. et al.
No. 585.
Decided February 1, 1965.
Solicitor General Cox, Richard A. Solomon, Howard E. Wahrenbrock, Robert L. Russell and Peter H. Schiff for petitioner.
William H. Webster, Edwin S. Nail and Joseph W. Morris for Amerada Petroleum Corp., and William R. Allen and Cecil E. Munn for Signal Oil & Gas Co., respondents.
Per Curiam
Montana-Dakota (MDU) is an interstate natural gas pipeline company, selling and transporting gas in Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. The lines involved here run to the east and west from the Tioga processing plant in North Dakota, jointly owned by. Amerada and Signal, producers of natural gas in North Dakota. Also, running north from the Tioga point is a line extending to the gasoline extraction plants of Hunt-Herbert and TXL (now Texaco), both in North Dakota.
On a peak winter day in 1962-1963 MDU was expected to purchase a total of 70,000 Mcf of North Dakota-produced gas from these four producers: 55,000 Mcf from Amerada-Signal, 10,000 Mcf from TXL, and 5,000 Mcf from Hunt-Herbert. Of the 55,000 Mcf from Amerada-Signal, 50,000 Mcf would flow to the east and be consumed in North Dakota. All of the Hunt-Herbert and TXL gas, plus the remaining 5,000 Mcf of the Amerada; Signal gas, would flow to the west — a total of 20,000 Mcf. Of this westward-flowing gas, 10,200 Mcf would be consumed in North Dakota; the remaining 9,800
Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?
A. judicial review (national level)
B. judicial review (state level)
C. Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
D. statutory construction
E. interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
F. diversity jurisdiction
G. federal common law
Answer: |
songer_treat | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below; i.e., how the decision below is "treated" by the appeals court. That is, the basic outcome of the case for the litigants, indicating whether the appellant or respondent "won" in the court of appeals.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Laura TROMBLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 83-1492.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued March 15, 1984.
Decided April 25, 1984.
See also, D.C., 563 F.Supp. 564.
Gershwin A. Drain, Kenneth R. Sasse, argued, Detroit, Mich., for defendant-appellant.
Leonard R. Gilman, U.S. Atty., Michael J. Lavoie, Art Noel, argued, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before KEITH and KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
KEITH, Circuit Judge.
The appellant, Laura Trombley, was indicted in a multiple count indictment in which she and four other individuals were charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2, § 2312 and § 2313. A jury trial was held, and appellant was convicted on Count Three of transporting a stolen motor vehicle in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312 and 2. She was convicted on Count Four of receiving a stolen motor vehicle which was part of and constituted interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2313. Appellant was sentenced to three years probation with a fine of $1,000 to be paid within two years. This appeal followed. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
In March of 1982, the FBI conducted an undercover project in Detroit known as Project Derings. The goal of the project was to have undercover agents introduced to individuals who were involved in large scale commercial auto theft rings. To facilitate the introduction, undercover FBI agents represented themselves as corrupt employees of the Michigan Secretary of State’s office who were selling fraudulent titles, registrations, and license plates to automobile thieves for $1,000.
Joseph Finnegan, an undercover agent, adopted the identity of Joe Booker and posed as a corrupt official of the Secretary’s Office. On June 16, 1982, Agent Finnegan prepared a Michigan vehicle title, registration, and a license plate for Laura Irene Trombley, who resided at 23072 North Brookside Drive, Dearborn Heights, Michigan. Finnegan delivered these documents to Gwen Clemens, who conveyed them to the appellant through Eric Fair (Eric Fair was also indicted in this case).
Approximately six months later, on December 9, 1982, Agent Finnegan recorded a telephone conversation with Ms. Trombley. The overall thrust of the conversation was her complaint that the paperwork for the 1981 Seville, which she had obtained from Eric Fair, did not adequately legitimize the stolen automobile. During this conversation, she made several admissions. The appellant admitted that she had acquired a 1981 Cadillac Seville for $3,700, instead of a Lincoln Continental, in approximately March of 1982. She also admitted that she took out a loan for $3,000 from General Finance, using the car as collateral. The loan was used to take a trip to Texas to visit her son who was in the hospital. In driving to Texas, appellant indicated that she had travelled across sixteen state lines, and in doing so, was concerned about the result if she had been stopped by police. She further admitted that she knew the car was “hot”. In response to the undercover agent’s question as to why she decided to acquire the car knowing it was “hot”, the appellant stated: “Well, because my son owed me some money and uh, my son knew Eric and Sam.” The appellant acknowledged that she knew that the vehicle identification number had been altered on the automobile.
Question: What is the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed; or affirmed and petition denied
C. reversed (include reversed & vacated)
D. reversed and remanded (or just remanded)
E. vacated and remanded (also set aside & remanded; modified and remanded)
F. affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified or affirmed and modified)
G. affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. certification to another court
K. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_respondent | 256 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
001. attorney general of the United States, or his office
002. specified state board or department of education
003. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
004. state commission, board, committee, or authority
005. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
006. court or judicial district
007. state department or agency
008. governmental employee or job applicant
009. female governmental employee or job applicant
010. minority governmental employee or job applicant
011. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
012. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
013. retired or former governmental employee
014. U.S. House of Representatives
015. interstate compact
016. judge
017. state legislature, house, or committee
018. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
019. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
020. state or U.S. supreme court
021. local school district or board of education
022. U.S. Senate
023. U.S. senator
024. foreign nation or instrumentality
025. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
026. state college or university
027. United States
028. State
029. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
030. advertising business or agency
031. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
032. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
033. airline
034. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
035. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
036. American Medical Association
037. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
038. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
039. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
040. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
041. author, copyright holder
042. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
043. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
044. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
045. water transportation, stevedore
046. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
047. brewery, distillery
048. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
049. construction industry
050. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
051. business, corporation
052. buyer, purchaser
053. cable TV
054. car dealer
055. person convicted of crime
056. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
057. chemical company
058. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
059. religious organization, institution, or person
060. private club or facility
061. coal company or coal mine operator
062. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
063. consumer, consumer organization
064. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
065. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
066. defendant
067. debtor
068. real estate developer
069. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
070. distributor
071. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
072. drug manufacturer
073. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
074. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
075. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
076. electric equipment manufacturer
077. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
078. eleemosynary institution or person
079. environmental organization
080. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
081. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
082. father
083. female employee or job applicant
084. female
085. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
086. fisherman or fishing company
087. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
088. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
089. franchiser
090. franchisee
091. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
092. person who guarantees another's obligations
093. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
094. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
095. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
096. hospital, medical center
097. husband, or ex-husband
098. involuntarily committed mental patient
099. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
100. insurance company, or surety
101. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
102. investor
103. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
104. juvenile
105. government contractor
106. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
107. magazine
108. male
109. medical or Medicaid claimant
110. medical supply or manufacturing co.
111. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
112. minority female employee or job applicant
113. manufacturer
114. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
115. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
116. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
117. mother
118. auto manufacturer
119. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
120. radio and television network, except cable tv
121. nonprofit organization or business
122. nonresident
123. nuclear power plant or facility
124. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
125. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
126. tender offer
127. oil company, or natural gas producer
128. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
129. out of state noncriminal defendant
130. political action committee
131. parent or parents
132. parking lot or service
133. patient of a health professional
134. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
135. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
136. public interest organization
137. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
138. pipe line company
139. package, luggage, container
140. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
141. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
142. indigent defendant
143. private person
144. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
145. professional organization, business, or person
146. probationer, or parolee
147. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
148. public utility
149. publisher, publishing company
150. radio station
151. racial or ethnic minority
152. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
153. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
154. realtor
155. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
156. resident
157. restaurant, food vendor
158. retarded person, or mental incompetent
159. retired or former employee
160. railroad
161. private school, college, or university
162. seller or vendor
163. shipper, including importer and exporter
164. shopping center, mall
165. spouse, or former spouse
166. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
167. retail business or outlet
168. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
169. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
170. tenant or lessee
171. theater, studio
172. forest products, lumber, or logging company
173. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
174. trucking company, or motor carrier
175. television station
176. union member
177. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
178. union, labor organization, or official of
179. veteran
180. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
181. wholesale trade
182. wife, or ex-wife
183. witness, or person under subpoena
184. network
185. slave
186. slave-owner
187. bank of the united states
188. timber company
189. u.s. job applicants or employees
190. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
191. Atomic Energy Commission
192. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
193. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
194. Alien Property Custodian
195. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
196. Board of Immigration Appeals
197. Bureau of Indian Affairs
198. Bonneville Power Administration
199. Benefits Review Board
200. Civil Aeronautics Board
201. Bureau of the Census
202. Central Intelligence Agency
203. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
204. Department or Secretary of Commerce
205. Comptroller of Currency
206. Consumer Product Safety Commission
207. Civil Rights Commission
208. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
209. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
210. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
211. Drug Enforcement Agency
212. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
213. Department or Secretary of Energy
214. Department or Secretary of the Interior
215. Department of Justice or Attorney General
216. Department or Secretary of State
217. Department or Secretary of Transportation
218. Department or Secretary of Education
219. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
220. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
221. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
222. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
223. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
224. Federal Bureau of Prisons
225. Farm Credit Administration
226. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
227. Federal Credit Union Administration
228. Food and Drug Administration
229. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
230. Federal Energy Administration
231. Federal Election Commission
232. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
233. Federal Housing Administration
234. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
235. Federal Labor Relations Authority
236. Federal Maritime Board
237. Federal Maritime Commission
238. Farmers Home Administration
239. Federal Parole Board
240. Federal Power Commission
241. Federal Railroad Administration
242. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
243. Federal Reserve System
244. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
245. Federal Trade Commission
246. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
247. General Accounting Office
248. Comptroller General
249. General Services Administration
250. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
251. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
252. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
253. Interstate Commerce Commission
254. Indian Claims Commission
255. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
256. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
257. Information Security Oversight Office
258. Department or Secretary of Labor
259. Loyalty Review Board
260. Legal Services Corporation
261. Merit Systems Protection Board
262. Multistate Tax Commission
263. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
264. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
265. National Credit Union Administration
266. National Endowment for the Arts
267. National Enforcement Commission
268. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
269. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
270. National Mediation Board
271. National Railroad Adjustment Board
272. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
273. National Security Agency
274. Office of Economic Opportunity
275. Office of Management and Budget
276. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
277. Office of Personnel Management
278. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
279. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
280. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
281. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
282. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
283. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
284. U.S. Public Health Service
285. Postal Rate Commission
286. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
287. Renegotiation Board
288. Railroad Adjustment Board
289. Railroad Retirement Board
290. Subversive Activities Control Board
291. Small Business Administration
292. Securities and Exchange Commission
293. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
294. Selective Service System
295. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
296. Tennessee Valley Authority
297. United States Forest Service
298. United States Parole Commission
299. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
300. United States Sentencing Commission
301. Veterans' Administration
302. War Production Board
303. Wage Stabilization Board
304. General Land Office of Commissioners
305. Transportation Security Administration
306. Surface Transportation Board
307. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
308. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
309. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
310. Unidentifiable
311. International Entity
Answer: |
songer_state | 54 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the state or territory in which the case was first heard. If the case began in the federal district court, consider the state of that district court. If it is a habeas corpus case, consider the state of the state court that first heard the case. If the case originated in a federal administrative agency, answer "not applicable". Answer with the name of the state, or one of the following territories: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Panama Canal Zone, or "not applicable" or "not determined".
UNITED STATES of America v. John W. JENRETTE, Appellant.
No. 83-2281.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued May 23, 1984.
Decided Sept. 18, 1984.
Kenneth M. Robinson and W. Gary Kohl-man, Washington, D.C., with whom Dennis M. Hart and Stanley Brand, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellant.
Michael W. Farrell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., and Reid H. Weingarten, Atty., U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before WRIGHT, TAMM and STARR, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge TAMM.
TAMM, Circuit Judge:
Former Congressman John Jenrette appeals his conviction on bribery charges stemming from the undercover operation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) known as “Abscam.” Jenrette contends that 1) the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury on the defense of duress; 2) the evidence adduced at trial established entrapment as a matter of law; 3) the FBI’s conduct during the investigation violated principles of due process; and 4) the government failed to disclose certain evidence required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the conviction.
I. Background
This court is by now quite familiar with the FBI’s undercover operation known as Abscam. See United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 416-17 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, -, 104 S.Ct. 1285, 1305, 79 L.Ed.2d 688, 704 (1984); United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1461-63 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 264, 78 L.Ed.2d 247 (1983). The Abscam operation involved a fictitious, FBI-created entity, Abdul Enterprises, which was purportedly operated by wealthy Arabs interested in United States investments. During the period relevant to this case, FBI agent Anthony Amoroso assumed the role of president of the organization, and Melvin Weinberg posed as its financial advisor. Through various “middlemen,” Weinberg and Amoroso offered bribes to members of Congress. In return, the Abscam operatives asked the congressmen to introduce private legislation that would permit their Arab clients to immigrate to the United States.
Jenrette became involved in the Abscam operation through his friend and co-defendant John Stowe. In November 1979, Weinberg told St
Question: In what state or territory was the case first heard?
01. not
02. Alabama
03. Alaska
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. Florida
11. Georgia
12. Hawaii
13. Idaho
14. Illinois
15. Indiana
16. Iowa
17. Kansas
18. Kentucky
19. Louisiana
20. Maine
21. Maryland
22. Massachussets
23. Michigan
24. Minnesota
25. Mississippi
26. Missouri
27. Montana
28. Nebraska
29. Nevada
30. New
31. New
32. New
33. New
34. North
35. North
36. Ohio
37. Oklahoma
38. Oregon
39. Pennsylvania
40. Rhode
41. South
42. South
43. Tennessee
44. Texas
45. Utah
46. Vermont
47. Virginia
48. Washington
49. West
50. Wisconsin
51. Wyoming
52. Virgin
53. Puerto
54. District
55. Guam
56. not
57. Panama
Answer: |
songer_counsel1 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine the nature of the counsel for the appellant. If name of attorney was given with no other indication of affiliation, assume it is private - unless a government agency was the party
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Louis MARTIN, Appellant.
No. 77-1111.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted June 13, 1977.
Decided Aug. 22, 1977.
Henry L. Jones, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant; Wiley A. Branton, Washington, D. C., on brief.
Samuel A. Perroni, Asst. U. S. Atty., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee; W. H. Dilla-hunty, U. S. Atty., and Sandra W. Cherry, Asst. U. S. Atty., Little Rock, Ark., on brief.
Before HEANEY, STEPHENSON and HENLEY, Circuit Judges.
STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Louis Martin was charged on November 4, 1975, in a two-count indictment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152. The first count charged Martin with making a false oath and account in relation to a bankruptcy proceeding, in that he filed a schedule representing that he and his wife had $50.00 on hand, wherein he fraudulently failed to disclose other assets of money and cash totalling $565.12. The second count charged Martin with fraudulently transferring and concealing assets in the amount of $2,060.12 in contemplation of bankruptcy. On May 4, 1976, Martin’s first trial was terminated when the district court, pursuant to Martin’s motion, declared a mistrial. On November 29,1976, Martin’s second trial began and on December 1, 1976, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. The district court sentenced Martin to 18 months’ imprisonment on the first count and 2 years’ supervised probation on the second count. In this appeal Martin alleges the following errors: (1) the district court erred in denying Martin’s motion to dismiss the indictment because (a) the Double Jeopardy Clause barred Martin’s retrial, (b) the government’s conduct before the grand jury required dismissal, and (c) the government’s conduct following the grand jury required dismissal; (2) the district court erred in failing to grant Martin’s motion in limine; (3) the district court prejudiced the jury by the manner in which it questioned Martin’s expert witness; (4) the district court erred in refusing to give one of Martin’s requested instructions and in giving one of the government’s requested instructions. We are persuaded that under the circumstances of this case, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred Martin’s retrial. Accordingly, we reverse.
Background
On December 16, 1974, Martin, a lawyer employed by Pulaski County, Arkansas, and his wife, employed by the state of Arkansas, filed their voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the Eastern District of Arkansas. The petition contained a schedule of debts which listed eight creditors and a total indebtedness of $19,447.62. Of the total indebtedness, $18,382.61 represented debts that Martin and his wife owed to six student loan creditors.
Before evidence was presented in his first trial, Martin filed a motion in limine requesting that the district court prohibit any mention or reference to student loans and exclude any documents referring to student loans or that reference to student loans be excised. Martin attached as exhibits to his motion in limine 22 Arkansas Gazette newspaper articles illustrating the publicity which accompanied his attempt to discharge the student loan debts. In addition to the newspaper articles, affidavits by Martin and his wife were filed attesting to obscene and racial remarks directed at the Martins as a result of their bankruptcy petition. Martin’s counsel stated to the court during the hearing on the motion that the defense would agree to stipulate “to the amount of money in certain accounts at a certain
Question: What is the nature of the counsel for the appellant?
A. none (pro se)
B. court appointed
C. legal aid or public defender
D. private
E. government - US
F. government - state or local
G. interest group, union, professional group
H. other or not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_caseorigin | 160 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.
Question: What is the court in which the case originated?
001. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
002. U.S. Court of International Trade
003. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
004. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
005. U.S. Court of Military Review
006. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
007. U.S. Customs Court
008. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
009. U.S. Tax Court
010. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
011. U.S. Court for China
012. U.S. Consular Courts
013. U.S. Commerce Court
014. Territorial Supreme Court
015. Territorial Appellate Court
016. Territorial Trial Court
017. Emergency Court of Appeals
018. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
019. Bankruptcy Court
020. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
021. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
022. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
023. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
024. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
025. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
026. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
027. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
028. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
029. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
030. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
031. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
032. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
033. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
034. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
035. Alaska U.S. District Court
036. Arizona U.S. District Court
037. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
038. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
039. California Central U.S. District Court
040. California Eastern U.S. District Court
041. California Northern U.S. District Court
042. California Southern U.S. District Court
043. Colorado U.S. District Court
044. Connecticut U.S. District Court
045. Delaware U.S. District Court
046. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
047. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
048. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
049. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
050. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
051. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
052. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
053. Guam U.S. District Court
054. Hawaii U.S. District Court
055. Idaho U.S. District Court
056. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
057. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
058. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
059. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
060. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
061. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
062. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
063. Kansas U.S. District Court
064. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
065. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
066. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
067. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
068. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
069. Maine U.S. District Court
070. Maryland U.S. District Court
071. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
072. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
073. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
074. Minnesota U.S. District Court
075. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
076. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
077. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
078. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
079. Montana U.S. District Court
080. Nebraska U.S. District Court
081. Nevada U.S. District Court
082. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
083. New Jersey U.S. District Court
084. New Mexico U.S. District Court
085. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
086. New York Northern U.S. District Court
087. New York Southern U.S. District Court
088. New York Western U.S. District Court
089. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
090. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
091. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
092. North Dakota U.S. District Court
093. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
094. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
095. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
096. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
097. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
098. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
099. Oregon U.S. District Court
100. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
101. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
102. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
103. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
104. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
105. South Carolina U.S. District Court
106. South Dakota U.S. District Court
107. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
108. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
109. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
110. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
111. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
112. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
113. Texas Western U.S. District Court
114. Utah U.S. District Court
115. Vermont U.S. District Court
116. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
117. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
118. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
119. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
120. Washington Western U.S. District Court
121. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
122. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
123. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
124. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
125. Wyoming U.S. District Court
126. Louisiana U.S. District Court
127. Washington U.S. District Court
128. West Virginia U.S. District Court
129. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
130. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
131. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
132. Alabama U.S. District Court
133. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
134. Georgia U.S. District Court
135. Illinois U.S. District Court
136. Indiana U.S. District Court
137. Iowa U.S. District Court
138. Michigan U.S. District Court
139. Mississippi U.S. District Court
140. Missouri U.S. District Court
141. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
142. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
143. New York U.S. District Court
144. North Carolina U.S. District Court
145. Ohio U.S. District Court
146. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
147. Tennessee U.S. District Court
148. Texas U.S. District Court
149. Virginia U.S. District Court
150. Norfolk U.S. District Court
151. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
152. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
153. New Jersey U.S. District Court
154. California U.S. District Court
155. Florida U.S. District Court
156. Arkansas U.S. District Court
157. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
158. State Supreme Court
159. State Appellate Court
160. State Trial Court
161. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
162. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
163. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
164. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
165. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
166. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
167. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
168. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
169. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
170. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
171. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
172. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
173. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
174. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
175. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
176. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
177. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
178. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
179. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
180. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
181. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
182. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
183. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
184. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
185. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
186. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
187. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
188. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
189. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
190. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
191. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
192. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
193. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
194. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
195. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
196. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
197. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
198. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
199. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
200. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
201. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
202. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
203. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
204. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
205. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
206. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
207. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
208. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
209. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
210. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
211. Court of Private Land Claims
212. United States Supreme Court
Answer: |
songer_circuit | F | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the circuit of the court that decided the case.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Felix WALLS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 20771.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
June 14, 1971.
Wilfred C. Rice, Detroit, Mich., for appellant.
Marilu Marshall, U. S. Department of Justice, Detroit, Mich., Ralph B. Guy, Jr., U. S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., on the brief; Laurence Leff, Sp. Atty., U. S. Department of Justice, Detroit, Mich., of counsel, for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and CELEBREZZE, and McCREE, Circuit Judges.
McCREE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant was convicted on June 15, 1970 on both counts of an indictment charging violations of narcotics laws of the United States, and was sentenced to serve concurrently ten years imprisonment imposed on each count. In this appeal, he asserts that the District Court, sitting without a jury, committed several errors which require reversal of his conviction. We hold that it was reversible error for the Trial Judge to view the scene of the alleged offense without permitting appellant or his attorney to attend and to preclude summation and closing argument by defense counsel.
Walls was arrested in Detroit, Michigan, during the early morning hours of April 9, 1969, as he emerged from a house which was under the surveillance of federal agents. Arrested with him were James Riley, Jr., who proved to be a police informer, and Sylvia Laster, who occupied an upstairs flat in the house. At the time of the arrest, Riley held a paper bag containing heroin. The cocaine specified in the indictment was subsequently found during a search of the upstairs flat where Laster was arrested.
The surveilling agents testified that they saw Walls hand the heroin bag to Riley as the two men emerged from the house. This testimony was crucial to the Government’s case because Riley, who presumably would have supplied this evidence, was unavailable for trial. The arresting agents apparently relied upon that transfer, because it corroborated Riley’s earlier information that Walls and Laster illegally possessed narcotics, and provided a basis for arresting Walls and Laster without a warrant, and for conducting the search incident to those arrests. Appellant vigorously contended that it would have been impossible for the agents to have seen a transfer on the porch because of darkness, trees, and other impediments.
At trial, on June 10, 1970, defense counsel moved that the judge, in the company of counsel, view the scene to see whether it would have been possible for the agents to have seen the porch from their vantage point. The prosecutor objected, and pointed out that there had been no showing that the premises were in the same condition at the time of trial as they had been on April 9, 1969. The court denied the motion. However, on June 11, after having heard the testimony of the principle defense witness on June 10, the court stated:
The only issue that I can see and I think it’s the one the Court of Appeals would want to know about, and that is the issue that you have raised now that no witness would be able to see that doorway or anyone coming out of that doorway by reason of obstructions that exist at the place.
On June 12, defense counsel renewed his request that the court view the premises. In reply the court stated:
Well, I would suspect that now that we have got some time that probably the Court will inspect the premises. I will advise you when I have. I am going to do it alone, not with anyone else and in my own manner. I am not going to testify as to What I see. It will be involved in my findings of facts. \
Thereafter, a defense witness testified that he was familiar with the\house in question and its surroundings, ahd that the agents would have been unable to see the porch, in part, because of a large tree which stood in front of the house and had been removed after the event and prior to trial. On Monday, June 15, the next day of trial, the court informed the parties that he had viewed the scene.
Friday afternoon, with my Bailiff, I drove out to the residence * * * and there viewed the * * * scene and placed myself in the position where I would judge
Question: What is the circuit of the court that decided the case?
A. First Circuit
B. Second Circuit
C. Third Circuit
D. Fourth Circuit
E. Fifth Circuit
F. Sixth Circuit
G. Seventh Circuit
H. Eighth Circuit
I. Ninth Circuit
J. Tenth Circuit
K. Eleventh Circuit
L. District of Columbia Circuit
Answer: |
songer_state | 02 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the state or territory in which the case was first heard. If the case began in the federal district court, consider the state of that district court. If it is a habeas corpus case, consider the state of the state court that first heard the case. If the case originated in a federal administrative agency, answer "not applicable". Answer with the name of the state, or one of the following territories: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Panama Canal Zone, or "not applicable" or "not determined".
Thomas S. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. CENTRAL SOYA COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.
No. 83-7468.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Dec. 10, 1984.
Champ Lyons, Jr., Mobile, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant, cross-appellee.
William C. Tidwell, III, Kathryn Anne Eckerlein, Mobile, Ala., for defendant-ap-pellee, cross-appellant.
Before HILL and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and WISDOM, Senior Circuit Judge.
Honorable John Minor Wisdom, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
ALBERT J. HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:
Thomas S. Jones and Central Soya Company, Inc. (“Central”) both challenge the reasonableness of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Jones by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama in a successful action against Central alleging a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (“ADEA”). The jury found Central’s conduct to be willful and awarded Jones double damages in the amount of $41,666.42. The district court later granted Jones an additional interim amount of $18,796.00 as well as reinstatement with full pension benefits.
Pursuant to a provision in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) authorizing reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing plaintiff in an ADEA action, the district court awarded Jones approximately $24,000.00 allocable to counsel fees. On appeal, Jones alleges that the amount was insufficient because of 1) the exceptional result obtained in the litigation, 2) the purported contingency fee arrangement between Jones and his counsel, and 3) the delay in payment of the attorney’s fees. Central cross appeals, contending that the district court improperly awarded Jones attorney’s fees for the time billed for the work of an unnecessary second trial lawyer.
Awards of attorney’s fees in age discrimination actions are governed by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) which provides: “[t]he court... shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant....” See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (rendering section 216(b) applicable to ADEA actions). A number of factors are relevant to the determination whether such an award is reasonable, the most familiar of which were discussed at length in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974).
In this case, the district court based its award on a “lodestar” figure consisting of the product of the time invested by Jones’ counsel and an hourly rate. Record, vol. 1, pp. 381-84. In doing so, the district court addressed each of the factors listed in Johnson and concluded that no adjustment of the lod
Question: In what state or territory was the case first heard?
01. not
02. Alabama
03. Alaska
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. Florida
11. Georgia
12. Hawaii
13. Idaho
14. Illinois
15. Indiana
16. Iowa
17. Kansas
18. Kentucky
19. Louisiana
20. Maine
21. Maryland
22. Massachussets
23. Michigan
24. Minnesota
25. Mississippi
26. Missouri
27. Montana
28. Nebraska
29. Nevada
30. New
31. New
32. New
33. New
34. North
35. North
36. Ohio
37. Oklahoma
38. Oregon
39. Pennsylvania
40. Rhode
41. South
42. South
43. Tennessee
44. Texas
45. Utah
46. Vermont
47. Virginia
48. Washington
49. West
50. Wisconsin
51. Wyoming
52. Virgin
53. Puerto
54. District
55. Guam
56. not
57. Panama
Answer: |
songer_appel2_8_3 | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the second listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "miscellaneous", specifically "fiduciary, executor, or trustee". Your task is to determine which of the following specific subcategories best describes the litigant.
MINNEAPOLIS NAT. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, KAN., et al. v. LIBERTY NAT. BANK OF KANSAS CITY.
No. 1028.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Aug. 7, 1934.
La Rue Royee, of Salina, Kan. (C. W. Burch and B. I. Litowieh, both of Salina, Kan., on the brief), for appellants.
Wallace Sutherland, of Kansas City, Mo. (A. L. Cooper, E. A. Neel, and William E. Kemp, all of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, MeDERMOTT, and BRATTON, Circuit Judges.
BRATTON, Circuit Judge.
This is a suit instituted by Liberty National Bank, of Kansas City, Mo., against Minneapolis National Bank, of Minneapolis, Ottawa County, Kan., a failed national bank -in process of liquidation, and J. G. Hammond, its receiver to establish a trust against the assets of the bank and to compel its payment as a preferred claim, or in the alternative as a common claim.
Goldie C. Morton was engaged in the business of raising, buying, feeding, and fattening cattle in Ottawa county for sale on the market. For many years prior to the events giving rise to this litigation, he had been a customer of Minneapolis Bank of which Roy C. Gafford was president. and directing officer. Morton and Gafford were intimate personal friends, and for about fifteen years Gafford bad arranged credit for Morton with which to conduct his business. Gafford frequently charged Morton’s notes to his account in the bank as they matured, paying them in that manner. The financial needs of cattle growers in that part of the state were beyond the ability of the local banks to serve. As a result, the officers of the hanks located in Ottawa eounty organized the Central Kansas Cattle Loan Company which made loans to stockmen and rediscounted the notes with outside banks. The Guaranteed Finance Investment Company was organized later for a similar1 purpose. Gafford was elected president of both companies. Morton secured loans through one and perhaps both of those sources, and plaintiff rediscounted notes and mortgages executed by other stockmen in that manner. But in October, 1928, plaintiff discontinued that practice and determined to take future notes and mortgages direct from the stoekgrower to itself, using its own forms for that purpose. It made Morton a loan of $17,000 in.December, 1928, taking therefor a note due ninety-one days thereafter secured by a chattel morí gage on two hundred and sixty head of cattle then being fed for the market, one hundred and fifty hogs, and five thousand bushels of corn. Gafford arranged with plaintiff to make the loan. The, proceeds, less a discount charge thereon, were credited to the Minneapolis bank on the hooks of plaintiff. The Minneapolis bank then credited Morton’s account with a corresponding sum. The mortgage was
Question: This question concerns the second listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "miscellaneous", specifically "fiduciary, executor, or trustee". Which of the following specific subcategories best describes the litigant?
A. trustee in bankruptcy - institution
B. trustee in bankruptcy - individual
C. executor or administrator of estate - institution
D. executor or administrator of estate - individual
E. trustees of private and charitable trusts - institution
F. trustee of private and charitable trust - individual
G. conservators, guardians and court appointed trustees for minors, mentally incompetent
H. other fiduciary or trustee
I. specific subcategory not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_adminaction_is | A | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.
UNITED STATES v. JIM et al.
No. 71-1509.
Decided November 20, 1972
Together with No. 71-1612, Utah et al. v. Jim et al., on appeal from the same court.
Per Curiam.
The motion of the Navajo Tribe of Indians for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 71-1509, is granted.
These cases are here on appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the District of Utah that declared an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional. Jurisdiction in this Court is conferred by 28 U. S. C. §§ 1252 and 2101 (a).
In 1933, the Congress withdrew certain lands in Utah, known as the “Aneth Extension,” from the public domain and added them to the Navajo Reservation. Though no oil or gas was believed to be located on these lands, it was provided that should such mineral resources be produced in commercial quantities, “37% per centum of the net royalties accruing therefrom derived from tribal leases shall be paid to the State of Utah: Provided, That said 37% per centum of said royalties shall be expended by the State of Utah in the tuition of Indian children in white schools and/or in the building or maintenance of roads across the lands described in section 1 hereof, or for the benefit of the Indians residing therein.” 47 Stat. 1418. The remaining 62%% of the royalties generated by any such tribal mineral leases were, by implication, to go to the Navajo tribe.
After the passage of the Act, oil and gas were discovered on the Aneth Extension, and royalties were divided pursuant to the statute. The State of Utah created an Indian Affairs Commission to manage and expend the funds received by the State under the Act. As time went on, the language of the 1933 Act came to create administrative problems regarding the expenditure of the funds channeled through the State. A report of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs noted in 1967 that the word “tuition” in the 1933 Act had created uncertainty as to the breadth of the educational program the State was authorized to finance from the royalty funds. The report also noted a difficulty in discerning precisely who was properly a beneficiary of the funds, since “many Navajo families do not live permanently within the lands set aside in 1933, but move back and forth between this area and other locations.” S. Rep. No. 710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1967).
To make the administration of these funds more flexible and to spread the benefits of the royalties more broadly among the Navajo community, the Congress enacted a statute in 1968 that directed the State to expend the 37%% of royalties “for the health, education, and general welfare of the Navajo Indians residing in San Juan County.” 82 Stat. 121. This statutory change expanded the pool of beneficiaries substantially, and a class action was brought on behalf of the residents of the Aneth Extension, seeking inter alia a declaration that the statute was an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. The District Court concluded that the 1933 Act vested certain property rights in the plaintiffs, and held the 1968 Act, with its changed pool of beneficiaries, to be unconstitutional.
The judgment of the District Court is in
Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?
A. No
B. Yes
Answer: |
songer_genresp2 | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed respondent. If there are more than two respondents and at least one of the additional respondents has a different general category from the first respondent, then consider the first respondent with a different general category to be the second respondent.
BUDER et al. v. FRANZ et al., and three other cases.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
May 16, 1928.
Nos. 7903, 7904, 7906, 7911.
1. Action <@=>62 — Suit by remaindermen against trustees of life tenant before life tenant’s death, for accounting as to securities, held not premature, where trustees denied interest of remaindermen.
Where life tenant placed securities in trust under agreement that all of the life tenant’s property should be held by the trustees to be administered as part of life tenant’s estate, and trustees’ bond was fixed at an amount far below the worth of the securities, and trustees’ power extended to sale and transfer thereof, remaindermen had right to sue the trustees for an accounting before death of life tenant; trustees having refused accounting and denied remainder
Question: What is the nature of the second listed respondent whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_r_fiduc | 1 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
Orie DUNN v. UNITED STATES (two cases).
Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
June 14, 1928.
Nos. 5192, 5193.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_respond1_1_3 | J | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to determine what category of business best describes the area of activity of this litigant which is involved in this case.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner v. PRINTERS SERVICE, INC., Photo-Composition Service, Inc., Respondent.
No. 20376.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Dec. 14, 1970.
Alice Andrews, N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., Arnold Ordman, General Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate General Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. General Counsel, Nancy M. Sherman, Attys., N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., on the brief, for petitioner.
John H. Doesburg, Chicago, 111., for respondents.
Before WEICK, McCREE, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
ORDER.
This case is before the court upon the application of the National Labor Relations Board for enforcement of its order issued April 30, 1969, and reported at 175 N.L.R.B. No. 120. Reference is made to the Decision and Order of the Board and to the adopted findings and conclusions of the Trial Examiner for a statement of facts.
Upon consideration of the briefs, oral arguments, and the entire record, the court concludes that the order of the Board is supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.
It is ordered that the order of the Board be, and it hereby is, enforced.
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What category of business best describes the area of activity of this litigant which is involved in this case?
A. agriculture
B. mining
C. construction
D. manufacturing
E. transportation
F. trade
G. financial institution
H. utilities
I. other
J. unclear
Answer: |
songer_district | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify which district in the state the case came from. If the case did not come from a federal district court, answer "not applicable".
Patricia Ann KEELER and William Joseph Keeler, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. RICHARDS MANUFACTURING CO., INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 86-1201.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
June 1, 1987.
E. Earl Harcrow, Tim G. Sralla, Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff & Miller, Fort Worth, Tex., for defendants-appellants.
Roger Turner, T. Ray Guy, Jennifer A. Youpa, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before GARZA, WILLIAMS and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.
JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
Defendants Richards Manufacturing Company and Richards Medical Company (collectively Richards) are appealing the judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs Patricia Keeler and her husband, William Keeler. The jury found that Richards had defectively manufactured a compression hip screw which broke after being implanted in Mrs. Keeler’s hip. The Keelers were awarded over five hundred thousand dollars in damages after 32% of the total award was deducted as that part of the damages caused by the fault of Mrs. Keel-er. Richards claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.
I. Facts
Patricia Keeler broke her hip on the evening of July 18, 1982, when she accidentally slipped and fell in a friend’s kitchen. She was taken to Plano General Hospital in Plano, Texas. Dr. Neal C. Small, an orthopedic surgeon at the hospital, decided to implant a compression hip screw into Mrs. Keeler’s broken hip in order to assist in the healing process. After the operation, Mrs. Keeler’s hip appeared to be mending normally, and she did not experience any unusual complications as a result of the surgery.
On November 27, 1982, Mrs. Keeler entered Gaston Episcopal Hospital for additional surgery unrelated to her hip injury. A few days prior to her admission to the hospital, Mrs. Keeler reported experiencing a great deal of pain in her hip. Dr. William C. Head, Mrs. Keeler’s regular orthopedic surgeon, examined her and discovered that the compression hip screw had broken. The broken screw was replaced with a hip prosthesis. This surgical implant eventually proved to be unsuccessful, and a second hip prosthesis had to be installed in August 1984.
Mr. and Mrs. Keeler filed this diversity action against Richards, the manufacturer and distributor of the broken hip screw, in the United States District Court. The Keelers alleged that the break in the compression hip screw was the result of a manufacturing or design defect, while Richards claimed that Mrs. Keeler had misused the screw by putting more than the recommended amount of weight on her hip. The jury determined that the screw had been defectively manufactured and that the defect was a producing cause of appellees’ damages. The jury also found that appellants’ defective manufacture of the compression hip screw breached an express warranty and an implied warranty of merchantability.
The jury did not make a finding that the breach of warranty was committed knowingly or that the compression hip screw was defectively designed. Additionally, Mrs. Keeler was determined to have been misusing the screw at the time the screw apparently broke because she put excess pressure on it by lifting a portable television set. The jury found her thirty-two percent at fault for the damages she sustained.
The jury awarded Mrs. Keeler the following amounts of damages:
' A. Past Physical Pain and Mental Anguish $100,000.00
B. Future Physical Pain and Mental Anguish $100,000.00
C. Past Physical Impairment $100,000.00
D. Future Physical Impairment $150,000.00
E. Past Medical Expenses $ 39,400.00
F. Future Medical Expenses $150,000.00
G. Past Disfigurement $ 50,000.00
H. Future Disfigurement $100,000.00
Mr. Keeler was compensated for his losses as follows:
A. Past Lost Consortium $ 20,000.00
B. Future Lost Consortium $ 20,000.00
Appellants moved for a directed verdict before submission of the case to the jury and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. They further requested a rem
Question: From which district in the state was this case appealed?
A. Not applicable
B. Eastern
C. Western
D. Central
E. Middle
F. Southern
G. Northern
H. Whole state is one judicial district
I. Not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_issue_9 | 15 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
TOLEDO-FLORES v. UNITED STATES
No. 05-7664.
Argued October 3, 2006
Decided December 5, 2006
Timothy Crooks argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Marjorie A. Meyers, H. Michael Sokolow, and Brent E. Newton.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorneys General Keisler and Fisher, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Patricia M. Millett, and Donald E. Keener
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bar Association by Michael S. Greco and David W. DeBruin; for the Asian American Justice Center et al. by Jayashri Srikantiah; for Human Rights First by Linda T. Coberly and Gene C. Schaerr;
Question: What is the issue of the decision?
01. comity: civil rights
02. comity: criminal procedure
03. comity: First Amendment
04. comity: habeas corpus
05. comity: military
06. comity: obscenity
07. comity: privacy
08. comity: miscellaneous
09. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
10. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
11. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
12. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
13. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
14. venue
15. no merits: writ improvidently granted
16. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
17. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
18. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
19. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
20. no merits: miscellaneous
21. standing to sue: adversary parties
22. standing to sue: direct injury
23. standing to sue: legal injury
24. standing to sue: personal injury
25. standing to sue: justiciable question
26. standing to sue: live dispute
27. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
28. standing to sue: statutory standing
29. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
30. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
31. standing to sue: miscellaneous
32. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
33. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
34. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
35. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
36. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
37. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
38. judicial administration: review of non-final order
39. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
40. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
41. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
42. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
43. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
44. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
45. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
46. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
47. judicial administration: interpleader
48. judicial administration: untimely filing
49. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
50. judicial administration: miscellaneous
51. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
52. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
Answer: |
songer_r_nonp | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "groups and associations". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
Phyllis CHAMBERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PARCO FOODS, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 90-1419.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Dec
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "groups and associations"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_genresp2 | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed respondent. If there are more than two respondents and at least one of the additional respondents has a different general category from the first respondent, then consider the first respondent with a different general category to be the second respondent.
HARTFORD-EMPIRE CO. v. OBEAR-NES-TER GLASS CO. OBEAR-NESTER GLASS CO. v. HARTFORD-EMPIRE CO.
Nos. 8658, 8659.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Feb. 24, 1930.
W. J. Belknap, of Detroit, Mich., and A. C. Paul, of Minneapolis, Minn. (John H. Bruninga, of St. Louis, Mo., C. P. Byrnes, of Pittsburgh, Pa., V. if. Dorsey, of Washington, D. C., and B. D. Brown, of Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for Hartford-Empire Company.
E. W. McCallister, of Pittsburgh, Pa. (Green & Mc
Question: What is the nature of the second listed respondent whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_state | 56 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the state or territory in which the case was first heard. If the case began in the federal district court, consider the state of that district court. If it is a habeas corpus case, consider the state of the state court that first heard the case. If the case originated in a federal administrative agency, answer "not applicable". Answer with the name of the state, or one of the following territories: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Panama Canal Zone, or "not applicable" or "not determined".
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. MASTER SLACK AND/OR MASTER TROUSERS CORP., Hardeman Garment Corp., Morehouse Garment Corp., Lauderdale Garment Corp., and Lobel-ville Garment Corp., Respondents.
No. 84-5387.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued April 4, 1985.
Decided Sept. 17, 1985.
Elliott Moore, W. Christian Schumann, Michael David Fox, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B., National Labor Relations Board, Margaret Bezou, argued, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Thomas J. Hughes, Jr. (argued), Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, Ann Bach-man Hale, Atlanta, Ga., for respondents.
Before KEITH and KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judges, and COHN, District Judge.
The Honorable Avern Cohn, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
COHN, District Judge.
The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) petitions to enforce a supplemental back pay order directing respondents to make whole 28 discriminatees who were wrongfully discharged by Hardeman Garment Corp. (Hardeman), a subsidiary of Master Slack and/or Master Trousers Corp. Respondents challenge the Board order only as it relates to 11 discrimina-tees, and do not dispute the back pay awards ordered for the other 17. Their primary contention is that the Board erred in holding that certain findings made in the underlying unfair labor practices proceeding precluded respondents from contending in the back pay proceeding that a plant shutdown should cut off the back pay awards. Respondents also contend the Board’s back pay awards to two discrimina-tees are not supported by substantial evidence.
For the reasons stated below, we enforce the order only in part.
I. HISTORY
On July 20, 1973, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO (the Union), won an election among Hardeman’s production and maintenance employees at a plant located in Bolivar, Tennessee. The Union was certified by the Board on January 4, 1974.
Hardeman opposed the Union’s certification and continued to operate on the whole as if the Union didn’t exist. The Union filed several unfair labor practice charges from 1973 through 1974 over various company practices. The charges were consolidated and a single hearing was held before administrative law judge Thomas A. Ricci. As relevant here Judge Ricci found that Hardeman had violated Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), in terminating the night shift at the Bolivar plant, which resulted in the lay off of 20 workers, 3 days before the union election.
The Board, after exceptions were filed by both sides to Judge Ricci’s order, affirmed this ruling and determined that Hardeman had also violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, 29 U.S
Question: In what state or territory was the case first heard?
01. not
02. Alabama
03. Alaska
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. Florida
11. Georgia
12. Hawaii
13. Idaho
14. Illinois
15. Indiana
16. Iowa
17. Kansas
18. Kentucky
19. Louisiana
20. Maine
21. Maryland
22. Massachussets
23. Michigan
24. Minnesota
25. Mississippi
26. Missouri
27. Montana
28. Nebraska
29. Nevada
30. New
31. New
32. New
33. New
34. North
35. North
36. Ohio
37. Oklahoma
38. Oregon
39. Pennsylvania
40. Rhode
41. South
42. South
43. Tennessee
44. Texas
45. Utah
46. Vermont
47. Virginia
48. Washington
49. West
50. Wisconsin
51. Wyoming
52. Virgin
53. Puerto
54. District
55. Guam
56. not
57. Panama
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_7-2 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "economic activity and regulation".
Cleophas L. COX and Rose M. Cox, Petitioners-Appellants, v. Manuel CHACO, Director of Revenue and Taxation, and Government of Guam, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 78-2208.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted June 11, 1980.
Decided Feb. 2, 1981.
As Amended on Denial of Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc June 22, 1981.
Gerald E. Stinson, Crain & Shoecraft, Agana, Guam, for petitioners-appellants.
Roger E. Willmeth, Agana, Guam, for respondents-appellees.
Before CHOY and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and SCHNACKE, District Judge.
The Honorable Robert H. Schnacke, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
CHOY, Circuit Judge:,
Cleophas and Rose Cox, taxpayers, petition from a judgment of the district court denying their claim for a tax refund. We find that the district court correctly held that the taxpayers could not exclude certain rental payments from their gross income, and accordingly we affirm the judgment below.
I. FACTS
Mr. Cox was an employee of the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) during the relevant tax year. He was assigned to the Guam region and he and his family lived in FAA housing there. Cox was the FAA Resident Director for Guam, and his responsibilities included air traffic control and crash investigations, as well as overseeing day-to-day housing matters. He received a standard FAA salary for such a position, and from that salary the Government deducted a portion for rental of Cox’s FAA quarters. Thus Cox never physically handed over his rent payments to the FAA and his take-home pay did not include the amount allocated to rent.
Cox’s home is eight-tenths of a mile from his office. Both the home and office are within the FAA complex. Cox testified that he would not be able to manage the FAA complex “long distance” and that his job required his physical presence in the complex at all hours. He received long distance business phone calls at night and on weekends because of date and time differences; other FAA employee-residents would come to Mr. Cox with housing complaints, although there was a housing director who had primary responsibility for housing matters. Cox’s superior testified that Cox was required to live in the FAA complex.
The district court found, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to show that Cox was required to live in the FAA complex as a condition of employment. The district court noted that answering phone calls and handling housing complaints were a minor part of Cox’s overall responsibilities.
There is no evidence in the record that non-government housing was not available, or that Cox’s salary would be reduced if he did not live in the FAA complex. Cox told a government auditor that he would not be fired if he chose to live elsewhere.
II. ISSUES
Cox’s unique living and working arrangement gives rise to the question here. Cox claims that under 26 U.S.C. § 119, he is entitled to exclude the amount of his salary allocated to rent from his gross income since he is required to live on FAA premises as a condition of employment. The Guam Director of Taxation, on the other hand, contends that § 119 does not apply in this case because Cox pays rent for his housing, rather than receiving housing in kind; and that even if § 119 does apply, Cox has failed to prove the elements of a § 119 exclusion.
III. DISCUSSION
Cox claims that the amount withheld from his salary for rent should be excluded from his gross income. Such exclusion would have the effect of taxing Cox as if he made less than other FAA directors, since the amounts withheld for rent would not be treated as income.
In order to receive this obviously advantageous tax treatment under § 119, the taxpayer must prove three elements:
(1) that such lodging be furnished for the convenience of the employer; (2) that
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "economic activity and regulation"?
A. taxes, patents, copyright
B. torts
C. commercial disputes
D. bankruptcy, antitrust, securities
E. misc economic regulation and benefits
F. property disputes
G. other
Answer: |
sc_issuearea | I | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
PANAMA CANAL CO. v. GRACE LINE, INC., et al.
No. 251.
Argued April 2-3, 1958.
Decided April 28, 1958.
Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for the Panama Canal Co. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Doub, Paul A. Sweeney and Herman Marcuse.
C. Dickerman Williams argued the cause for petitioners in No. 252 and respondents in No. 251. With him on the brief were Gregory A. Harrison and J. Stewart Harrison.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Lawrence Hunt for the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and James M. Estabrook for Aktieselskabet Dampskibsselskabet Svendborg et al.
Together with No. 252, Grace Line, Inc., et al. v. Panama Canal Co., also on certiorari to the same Court.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents, American shipping companies using the Panama Canal, brought this suit in the District Court to compel petitioner, the Panama Canal Co., to prescribe new tolls for the use of the Canal and to refund tolls which it was alleged had been illegally collected in the past. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. 143 F. Supp. 539. The Court of Appeals refused relief for a refund but on other phases of the complaint entered a summary judgment for the respondent. 243 F. 2d 844. The cases are here on petitions for certiorari which we granted because of the importance of the questions presented. 355 U. S. 810.
Petitioner was created by Congress in 1950. 64 Stat. 1041. It holds the assets of the Panama Canal and has the duty of operating and maintaining it. It may sue and be sued in its corporate name. Canal Zone Code, Tit. 2, § 248, 62 Stat. 1078, as amended, 64 Stat. 1038. Prior to 1950 the Panama Canal was
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: |
songer_typeiss | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court. Choose among the following categories. Criminal and prisioner petitions- includes appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence or the validity of continued confinement. Civil - Government - these will include appeals from administrative agencies (e.g., OSHA,FDA), the decisions of administrative law judges, or the decisions of independent regulatory agencies (e.g., NLRB, FCC,SEC). The focus in administrative law is usually on procedural principles that apply to administrative agencies as they affect private interests, primarily through rulemaking and adjudication. Tort actions against the government, including petitions by prisoners which challenge the conditions of their confinement or which seek damages for torts committed by prion officials or by police fit in this category. In addition, this category will include suits over taxes and claims for benefits from government. Diversity of Citizenship - civil cases involving disputes between citizens of different states (remember that businesses have state citizenship). These cases will always involve the application of state or local law. If the case is centrally concerned with the application or interpretation of federal law then it is not a diversity case. Civil Disputes - Private - includes all civil cases that do not fit in any of the above categories. The opposing litigants will be individuals, businesses or groups.
WILLIAMS v. CONTINENTAL INS. CO. OF NEW YORK.
No. 11052.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Jan. 7, 1946.
George Penney, of Los Angeles, Cal. (Jean Wunderlich, of Los Angeles, Cal., of counsel), for appellant.
W. W. Hindman, E. Eugene Davis, Huntington P. Bledsoe, and Hindman & Davis, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for appel-lee.
Before GARRECHT, MATHEWS, and HEALY, Circuit Judges.
HEALY, Circuit Judge.
Appellee insured appellant Sydney M. Williams and his wife, Elizabeth, against loss by robbery of certain jewelry. Thereafter the insured persons, claiming that the jewelry had been taken from them in a holdup, presented proof of loss and were paid the amount claimed.
Subsequently appellee sued to recover on the ground that the claim of loss was false and fraudulent in that in fact no robbery had occurred. The wife, Elizabeth Williams, admitted the allegations of the complaint and on the trial testified for appellee. The trial resulted in a judgment against appellant in the amount paid on the claim.
Appellant contends that the suit is predicated on a charge of conspiracy, hence, he says, recovery can not properly be predicated on the uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice, namely, the wife. The contention has several answers, of which we shall mention but two. In the first place, the gravamen of the action is fraud, not conspiracy. Cf. 5 Cal.Jur. 530; Revert v. Hesse, 184 Cal. 295, 193 P. 943; Kittle Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 8 Cal.App.2d 504, 47 P.2d 1089; Andrews v. Young, 21 Cal. App.2d 523, 69 P.2d 891. Secondly, assuming for any reason that corroboration of the wife’s testimony was necessary, there was ample corroboration.
Affirmed.
Question: What is the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court?
A. criminal and prisoner petitions
B. civil - government
C. diversity of citizenship
D. civil - private
E. other, not applicable
F. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_caseorigin | 094 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.
Question: What is the court in which the case originated?
001. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
002. U.S. Court of International Trade
003. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
004. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
005. U.S. Court of Military Review
006. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
007. U.S. Customs Court
008. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
009. U.S. Tax Court
010. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
011. U.S. Court for China
012. U.S. Consular Courts
013. U.S. Commerce Court
014. Territorial Supreme Court
015. Territorial Appellate Court
016. Territorial Trial Court
017. Emergency Court of Appeals
018. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
019. Bankruptcy Court
020. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
021. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
022. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
023. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
024. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
025. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
026. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
027. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
028. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
029. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
030. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
031. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
032. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
033. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
034. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
035. Alaska U.S. District Court
036. Arizona U.S. District Court
037. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
038. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
039. California Central U.S. District Court
040. California Eastern U.S. District Court
041. California Northern U.S. District Court
042. California Southern U.S. District Court
043. Colorado U.S. District Court
044. Connecticut U.S. District Court
045. Delaware U.S. District Court
046. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
047. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
048. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
049. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
050. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
051. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
052. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
053. Guam U.S. District Court
054. Hawaii U.S. District Court
055. Idaho U.S. District Court
056. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
057. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
058. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
059. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
060. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
061. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
062. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
063. Kansas U.S. District Court
064. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
065. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
066. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
067. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
068. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
069. Maine U.S. District Court
070. Maryland U.S. District Court
071. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
072. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
073. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
074. Minnesota U.S. District Court
075. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
076. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
077. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
078. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
079. Montana U.S. District Court
080. Nebraska U.S. District Court
081. Nevada U.S. District Court
082. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
083. New Jersey U.S. District Court
084. New Mexico U.S. District Court
085. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
086. New York Northern U.S. District Court
087. New York Southern U.S. District Court
088. New York Western U.S. District Court
089. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
090. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
091. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
092. North Dakota U.S. District Court
093. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
094. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
095. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
096. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
097. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
098. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
099. Oregon U.S. District Court
100. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
101. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
102. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
103. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
104. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
105. South Carolina U.S. District Court
106. South Dakota U.S. District Court
107. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
108. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
109. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
110. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
111. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
112. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
113. Texas Western U.S. District Court
114. Utah U.S. District Court
115. Vermont U.S. District Court
116. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
117. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
118. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
119. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
120. Washington Western U.S. District Court
121. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
122. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
123. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
124. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
125. Wyoming U.S. District Court
126. Louisiana U.S. District Court
127. Washington U.S. District Court
128. West Virginia U.S. District Court
129. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
130. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
131. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
132. Alabama U.S. District Court
133. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
134. Georgia U.S. District Court
135. Illinois U.S. District Court
136. Indiana U.S. District Court
137. Iowa U.S. District Court
138. Michigan U.S. District Court
139. Mississippi U.S. District Court
140. Missouri U.S. District Court
141. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
142. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
143. New York U.S. District Court
144. North Carolina U.S. District Court
145. Ohio U.S. District Court
146. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
147. Tennessee U.S. District Court
148. Texas U.S. District Court
149. Virginia U.S. District Court
150. Norfolk U.S. District Court
151. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
152. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
153. New Jersey U.S. District Court
154. California U.S. District Court
155. Florida U.S. District Court
156. Arkansas U.S. District Court
157. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
158. State Supreme Court
159. State Appellate Court
160. State Trial Court
161. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
162. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
163. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
164. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
165. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
166. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
167. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
168. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
169. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
170. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
171. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
172. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
173. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
174. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
175. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
176. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
177. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
178. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
179. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
180. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
181. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
182. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
183. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
184. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
185. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
186. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
187. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
188. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
189. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
190. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
191. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
192. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
193. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
194. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
195. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
196. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
197. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
198. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
199. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
200. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
201. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
202. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
203. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
204. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
205. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
206. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
207. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
208. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
209. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
210. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
211. Court of Private Land Claims
212. United States Supreme Court
Answer: |
songer_appel1_1_4 | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "construction". Your task is to determine what subcategory of business best describes this litigant.
ARROW DRILLING COMPANY, Appellant, v. Richard T. BROOKS and Bituminous Casualty Corporation, Appellee.
No. 19299.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
May 25, 1962.
Otto Atchley, Victor Hlavinka, Atchley, Russell, Hutchinson & Waldrop, Texarkana, Tex., for appellant.
Franklin Jones, Sr., Marshall, Tex., L. L. Lockard, Shreveport, La., Larry Oubre, Dallas, Tex., Franklin Jones, Jr., Marshall, Tex. (Jones, Brian & Jones, Marshall, Tex., of counsel), for appellees.
Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and HUTCHESON and WISDOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment for plaintiff in a suit for personal injuries received in Texas by appellee, as the employee of Griggs Casing Crews Co., Inc., a sub-contractor of appellant, the drilling contractor.
The grounds of negligence alleged were: (1) furnishing unsafe equipment used in the work performed by the Griggs crew; (2) employing a method of work which was unsafe; and (3) arranging the derrick and its appurtenances so as to cause a condition of danger and hazard.
In addition to these specific allegations of negligence, there was a general claim of negligence based upon res ipsa loquitur.
The defendant denied generally and pleaded contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk. In addition to these defenses, the defendant relied below and relies here upon two affirmative defenses styled First Defense-A and First Defense-B. These defenses in effect were a plea of res judicata based upon a judgment for compensation obtained by appellee in Louisiana and under its laws against Griggs Casing Crews, Inc. and its compensation carrier in Louisiana, and the claim that under Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation laws it was a statutory employer of appellee, liable solidarily with Griggs Casing Crews, Inc. for injuries suffered by plaintiff; and the compensation judgment was a bar to this suit against defendant.
The district judge, on a full hearing, struck these defenses on the ground that there was no final judgment in the Louisiana case. The cause was submitted to the jury, a verdict for plaintiff resulting; and defendant is here attacking the submission of the cause to the jury and the verdict as unsupported by the evidence, and, in addition, insisting: that defendant’s defenses A and B should have been sustained, and a verdict for defendant should have been directed on the defense of voluntary assumption of risk.
Appellee vigorously contests defendant’s claim on its special defenses A & B on the ground (1) that the district judge correctly held that the judgment in Louisiana disposing of plaintiff’s workmen’s compensation insurance was not shown to be a final judgment; and (2) that in no event could the Louisiana judgment for workmen’s compensation insurance deprive appellee-plaintiff of his right to bring a third party action for damages in Texas under the express authority of its compensation act. Appellee further insists that there was ample testimony to sustain the jury’s finding in favor of plaintiff-appellee on the assumed risk issue and the defendant’s motion for directed verdict was therefore properly denied.
The special defenses aside, we think it clear that the case was one for a jury verdict and that the defendant’s insistence that a verdict for defendant should have been directed on the ground that plaintiff, as matter of law,
Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "construction". What subcategory of business best describes this litigant?
A. residential
B. commercial or industrial
C. other
D. unclear
Answer: |
songer_method | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine the nature of the proceeding in the court of appeals for the case, that is, the legal history of the case, indicating whether there had been prior appellate court proceeding on the same case prior to the decision currently coded. Assume that the case had been decided by the panel for the first time if there was no indication to the contrary in the opinion. The opinion usually, but not always, explicitly indicates when a decision was made "en banc" (though the spelling of "en banc" varies). However, if more than 3 judges were listed as participating in the decision, code the decision as enbanc even if there was no explicit description of the proceeding as en banc.
Harry and Amanda SCHROEDER, Petitioners, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
No. 16439.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
June 23, 1961.
Bert B. Rand, Washington, D. C., Leland C. White, Harlan, Iowa, Hans A. Nathan, Laurence D. Pearl, of Trammell, Rand & Nathan, Washington, D. C., on brief, for petitioners.
Gilbert E. Andrews, Jr., Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., Charles K. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson and Robert N. Anderson, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, D. C., were with Gilbert E. Andrews, Jr., Washington, D. C., on brief, for respondent.
Before VOGEL and BLACKMUN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIES, District Judge.
RONALD N. DAVIES, District Judge.
This case comes to us on petition of Harry and Amanda Schroeder for a review of the decision of the Tax Court of the United States, 16 TCM 707, Amending Order 17 TCM 836, which sustained a determination by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of deficiencies in the income taxes of Harry Schroeder for 1944 and 1945 and of deficiencies in the income taxes of both petitioners for 1946 and 1947. Addition to tax was determined under § 291(a) for the year 1946 for failure to file a return as required by § 51(a) within the time prescribed, and further additions were determined for the years 1944 through 1946 under § 293(b) because of fraud with intent to evade tax.
The petitioners are residents of Tabor, Iowa, where Harry Schroeder has been engaged in cattle feeding a good share of his life. Although the petitioner dealt in other animals, most transactions herein concerned cattle which were purchased from livestock commission merchants, brokers and dealers. Normally, two and three year old grass fed cattle were selected, the number purchased at any one time ranging from a few dozen to more than two thousand head. These cattle were placed in feed lots for periods from thirty days to four or five months before being marketed. Immature cattle were grazed until ready for feed lots, and as many as twenty months could elapse between time of purchase and sale. The cattle were commingled in various feed lots irrespective of purchase date or price paid. Petitioner financed his cattle purchases with loans, and a part of approximately eighty per cent of his purchases was mortgaged.
Petitioner Harry Schroeder reported his annual income on a cash receipts and disbursements basis, deducting from gross receipts the computed cost of cattle sold in that year without regard to purchase date. Cost of the livestock sold was based upon an estimate prepared by petitioner and his accountant. In preparing the estimate a cutoff date was chosen, usually on or about September 15th, it being assumed that all cattle purchased after that time were on hand at the end of the year. The 1945 return indicated that the livestock carry-over from 1945 to 1946 was $680,010.70. On the 1946 return the livestock carry-over from 1945 was $496,281.05. The return for 1946 showed a livestock carry-over to 1947 in the amount of $605,300.58.
Question: What is the nature of the proceeding in the court of appeals for this case?
A. decided by panel for first time (no indication of re-hearing or remand)
B. decided by panel after re-hearing (second time this case has been heard by this same panel)
C. decided by panel after remand from Supreme Court
D. decided by court en banc, after single panel decision
E. decided by court en banc, after multiple panel decisions
F. decided by court en banc, no prior panel decisions
G. decided by panel after remand to lower court
H. other
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_applfrom | L | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court).
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. PACIFIC COAST UTILITIES SERVICE, INC., Respondent, and Industrial, Technical & Professional Employees Division, National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO, Respondent.
No. 78-3677.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
April 14, 1980.
Corinna L. Metcalf, NLRB, Washington, D. C., argued, for petitioner; Elliott Moore, Deputy Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, Washington, D. C., on brief.
Lawrence Drasin, San Francisco, Cal., for respondents; William A. Polkinghorn, Jr., Webster, Jeppson & Jones, Los Angeles, Cal., Gartland & Tilly, San Francisco, Cal., on brief.
Before BROWNING, KENNEDY and SKOPIL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding of the Board that the company’s discharge of Barone was in violation of section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) & (3) (1976). Barone’s action as shop steward in advising the employees not to sign warning slips presented by the foreman of another company until Barone could discuss the matter with his supervisor was protected union activity. F. J. Buckner Corp. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084, 89 S.Ct. 868, 21 L.Ed.2d 777 (1969); NLRB v. Ferguson, 257 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1958). See also NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965).
There was substantial evidence as well to support the finding that the union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The record shows that the union failed to represent Barone in a fair and impartial manner because of his support of a rival union and his insistence that union dues not be paid until health insurance coverage was provided.
It was proper for the Board to rule that the employer and the union had joint and several liability to compensate the employee for any loss of back pay. Given the determination that discharge was wrongful, it follows that the failure of the union to represent the employee was damaging to him and a contributing factor to his loss of pay. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 197 (1978). The amount of back pay, if any, can be determined in further proceedings before the Board.
ENFORCEMENT GRANTED.
Question: What is the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court)?
A. Trial (either jury or bench trial)
B. Injunction or denial of injunction or stay of injunction
C. Summary judgment or denial of summary judgment
D. Guilty plea or denial of motion to withdraw plea
E. Dismissal (include dismissal of petition for habeas corpus)
F. Appeals of post judgment orders (e.g., attorneys' fees, costs, damages, JNOV - judgment nothwithstanding the verdict)
G. Appeal of post settlement orders
H. Not a final judgment: interlocutory appeal
I. Not a final judgment: mandamus
J. Other (e.g., pre-trial orders, rulings on motions, directed verdicts) or could not determine nature of final judgment
K. Does not fit any of the above categories, but opinion mentions a "trial judge"
L. Not applicable (e.g., decision below was by a federal administrative agency, tax court)
Answer: |
songer_state | 56 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the state or territory in which the case was first heard. If the case began in the federal district court, consider the state of that district court. If it is a habeas corpus case, consider the state of the state court that first heard the case. If the case originated in a federal administrative agency, answer "not applicable". Answer with the name of the state, or one of the following territories: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Panama Canal Zone, or "not applicable" or "not determined".
BURKA et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 6020.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Jan. 12, 1950.
Decided Jan. 28, 1950.
Bert B. Rand, Washington, D. C, for petitioners.
Francis W. Sams, Special Assistant to the Attorney General (Theron Lamar Caudle, Assistant Attorney General; Ellis N. Slack, Lee A. Jackson and Virginia H. Adams, Special Assistants to the Attorney General, on brief), for respondent.
Before SOPER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges, and WARLICK, District Judge.
SOPER, Circuit Judge.
The petitioning taxpayers were equal partners in a laundry business in Washington, D. C. during the taxable year 1944. They seek a review of a determination of deficiencies in income tax growing out of a finding that the distributable net income of the partnership for the year should be increased by the sum of $12,508.93.
During the year 1944, the business of the laundry grew rapidly and the books of the firm were not accurate or complete, but were in a state of great confusion. Accordingly, the firm employed a certified public accountant in the fall of the year and' turned over to him its available records which included bank books, cancelled checks and sales sheets. The accountant endeavored to reconstruct the income for the first ten months and introduced standard accounting practices for the balance of the year. In reconstructing the income for the period from January 1 to October 31, he assumed that the gross bank deposits represented sales and the gross bank disbursements represented expenses of the business which he endeavored to allocate to running expenses, drawing or capital items.
The trial balance of October 31, 1944, stated by the accountant, showed “unrecorded expense” of $12,463.93. This amount, plus $45 listed as contributions, makes up the deficiency. The larger bills during the year were paid by check but the smaller bills for supplies, gas, oil and lost laundry were paid in cash by one or another of the partners. Some of these items, but not all of them, were recorded 9n the reverse side of sales sheets which were prepared by six or seven different employees who were changed from time to time during a rapid turnover. These notations amounted to $6,368.12 during the five months prior to October 31. There were no such notations on the sales slips for the first five months of 1944. To meet this situation the accountant in his endeavor to show the true income of the firm set up an account which he designated “unrecorded expense.” He credited this account with the sum of $500 representing checks marked petty cash, but not broken down as to items, $595.81 representing checks marked supplies for rug department not used in 1944, and also the above sum of $6,368.12 making a total of $7,463.93. He also concluded that similar expenses must have been incurred, although not recorded, during
Question: In what state or territory was the case first heard?
01. not
02. Alabama
03. Alaska
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. Florida
11. Georgia
12. Hawaii
13. Idaho
14. Illinois
15. Indiana
16. Iowa
17. Kansas
18. Kentucky
19. Louisiana
20. Maine
21. Maryland
22. Massachussets
23. Michigan
24. Minnesota
25. Mississippi
26. Missouri
27. Montana
28. Nebraska
29. Nevada
30. New
31. New
32. New
33. New
34. North
35. North
36. Ohio
37. Oklahoma
38. Oregon
39. Pennsylvania
40. Rhode
41. South
42. South
43. Tennessee
44. Texas
45. Utah
46. Vermont
47. Virginia
48. Washington
49. West
50. Wisconsin
51. Wyoming
52. Virgin
53. Puerto
54. District
55. Guam
56. not
57. Panama
Answer: |
songer_genapel1 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed appellant.
Elliot SANDLER, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., Defendant, Appellant.
No. 80-1771.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Argued April 8, 1981.
Decided May 13, 1981.
Lloyd M. Starrett, Boston, Mass., with whom Marc D. Greenbaum, Kenneth T. Lopatka, and Foley, Hoag & Eliot, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for defendant, appellant.
Joseph R. Doktor, Randolph, Mass., with whom Abelson & Cohen, Randolph, Mass., was on brief, for plaintiff, appellee.
Before CAMPBELL, BOWNES and BREYER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
In December 1977, Elliot Sandler filed a complaint in federal district court against Eastern Airlines, appellant herein, alleging that,
11. The plaintiff on or about August 29, 1972, applied for the job of steward with the defendant. He was rejected for the job because, he was told, of the policy of the defendant not to hire married men, or to hire individuals with children.
12. The effect of the policies and practices of the defendant complained of in paragraph eleven (11) above, has been to deprive married men, married men with children or men with children of equal employment opportunities because of their sex and marital status.
13. As a further result of the defendant’s above stated actions, the plaintiff has been deprived of income in the form of wages and of protective retirement benefits, Social Security and other benefits due to him as a worker solely because of his sex and marital status, in a sum to be proven at trial.
Eastern responded to the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that,
4. The allegations of the complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in that, among other things, the said allegations show no discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and, as appears from the complaint, defendant’s alleged policy was applied equally to all applicants for employment as a flight attendant, regardless of sex.
The district court denied the motion, stating that,
because the plaintiff indicates he is proceeding on a facially-neutral disparate impact theory, and because the record is not clear as to exactly what the defendant’s policy was at the time, we cannot say on the record that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief.
Eastern then moved for certification for immediate appellate review, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), of,
the legality, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., of an employment practice precluding married individuals and/or parents from being considered for employment as flight attendants with Eastern.
The district court granted the motion, and we granted permission for interlocutory appeal.
Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and heard oral argument, we are no longer satisfied that the question certified “involves a controlling question of law” and that an immediate appeal “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,” as required by section 1292(b). We therefore dismiss the appeal without addressing the merits of the question certified.
Our conclusion that the section 1292(b) criteria are not met is based on four considerations. First, we
Question: What is the nature of the first listed appellant?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_authoritydecision | G | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.
MIDDLESEX COUNTY ETHICS COMMITTEE v. GARDEN STATE BAR ASSOCIATION et al.
No. 81-460.
Argued March 31, 1982
Decided June 21, 1982
BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 438. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 438.
Mary Ann Burgess, Assistant Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General, James R. Zazzali, former Attorney General, Erminie L. Conley and James J. Ciancia, Assistant Attorneys General, and Richard M. Hinchan and Jaynee LaVecchia, Deputy Attorneys General.
Morton Stavis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Bernard K. Freamon and Louise Halper.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Charles S. Sims and Arthur N. Eisenberg for the American Civil Liberties Union; and by Max D. Stem for the National Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression.
Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Bill Lann Lee filed a brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. as amici curiae.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to determine whether a federal court should abstain from considering a challenge to the constitutionality of disciplinary rules that are the subject of pending state disciplinary proceedings within the jurisdiction of the New
Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?
A. judicial review (national level)
B. judicial review (state level)
C. Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
D. statutory construction
E. interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
F. diversity jurisdiction
G. federal common law
Answer: |
songer_r_natpr | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
JEW TEN, also known as George K. Jue, also known as Jue Gar King, also known as Chow Ka King, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.
No. 17625.
United
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
sc_caseorigin | 112 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.
Question: What is the court in which the case originated?
001. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
002. U.S. Court of International Trade
003. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
004. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
005. U.S. Court of Military Review
006. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
007. U.S. Customs Court
008. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
009. U.S. Tax Court
010. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
011. U.S. Court for China
012. U.S. Consular Courts
013. U.S. Commerce Court
014. Territorial Supreme Court
015. Territorial Appellate Court
016. Territorial Trial Court
017. Emergency Court of Appeals
018. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
019. Bankruptcy Court
020. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
021. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
022. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
023. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
024. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
025. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
026. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
027. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
028. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
029. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
030. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
031. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
032. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
033. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
034. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
035. Alaska U.S. District Court
036. Arizona U.S. District Court
037. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
038. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
039. California Central U.S. District Court
040. California Eastern U.S. District Court
041. California Northern U.S. District Court
042. California Southern U.S. District Court
043. Colorado U.S. District Court
044. Connecticut U.S. District Court
045. Delaware U.S. District Court
046. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
047. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
048. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
049. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
050. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
051. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
052. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
053. Guam U.S. District Court
054. Hawaii U.S. District Court
055. Idaho U.S. District Court
056. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
057. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
058. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
059. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
060. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
061. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
062. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
063. Kansas U.S. District Court
064. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
065. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
066. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
067. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
068. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
069. Maine U.S. District Court
070. Maryland U.S. District Court
071. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
072. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
073. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
074. Minnesota U.S. District Court
075. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
076. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
077. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
078. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
079. Montana U.S. District Court
080. Nebraska U.S. District Court
081. Nevada U.S. District Court
082. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
083. New Jersey U.S. District Court
084. New Mexico U.S. District Court
085. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
086. New York Northern U.S. District Court
087. New York Southern U.S. District Court
088. New York Western U.S. District Court
089. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
090. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
091. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
092. North Dakota U.S. District Court
093. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
094. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
095. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
096. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
097. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
098. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
099. Oregon U.S. District Court
100. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
101. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
102. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
103. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
104. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
105. South Carolina U.S. District Court
106. South Dakota U.S. District Court
107. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
108. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
109. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
110. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
111. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
112. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
113. Texas Western U.S. District Court
114. Utah U.S. District Court
115. Vermont U.S. District Court
116. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
117. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
118. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
119. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
120. Washington Western U.S. District Court
121. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
122. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
123. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
124. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
125. Wyoming U.S. District Court
126. Louisiana U.S. District Court
127. Washington U.S. District Court
128. West Virginia U.S. District Court
129. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
130. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
131. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
132. Alabama U.S. District Court
133. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
134. Georgia U.S. District Court
135. Illinois U.S. District Court
136. Indiana U.S. District Court
137. Iowa U.S. District Court
138. Michigan U.S. District Court
139. Mississippi U.S. District Court
140. Missouri U.S. District Court
141. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
142. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
143. New York U.S. District Court
144. North Carolina U.S. District Court
145. Ohio U.S. District Court
146. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
147. Tennessee U.S. District Court
148. Texas U.S. District Court
149. Virginia U.S. District Court
150. Norfolk U.S. District Court
151. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
152. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
153. New Jersey U.S. District Court
154. California U.S. District Court
155. Florida U.S. District Court
156. Arkansas U.S. District Court
157. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
158. State Supreme Court
159. State Appellate Court
160. State Trial Court
161. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
162. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
163. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
164. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
165. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
166. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
167. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
168. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
169. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
170. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
171. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
172. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
173. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
174. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
175. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
176. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
177. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
178. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
179. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
180. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
181. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
182. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
183. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
184. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
185. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
186. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
187. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
188. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
189. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
190. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
191. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
192. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
193. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
194. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
195. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
196. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
197. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
198. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
199. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
200. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
201. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
202. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
203. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
204. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
205. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
206. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
207. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
208. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
209. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
210. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
211. Court of Private Land Claims
212. United States Supreme Court
Answer: |
sc_casedisposition | G | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss.
LEHNERT et al. v. FERRIS FACULTY ASSOCIATION et al.
No. 89-1217.
Argued November 5, 1960
Decided May 30, 1991
Blackmun, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-B, III-C, IV-B (except for the final paragraph), IV-D, IV-E, and IV-F, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts III-A and IV-A, the final paragraph of Part IV-B, and Parts IV-C and V, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White and Stevens, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 533. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which O’Connor and Souter, JJ., joined, and in all but Part III-C of which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 550. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 562.
Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr., argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners.
Robert H. Chanin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Bruce R. Lerner
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Marsha S. Berzon and Laurence Gold; for the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Councils 1, 52, 71, 73, et al. by Lawrence A. Poltrock, Richard Kirschner, Paul Schachter, Patrick M. Scanlon, and James B. Coppess.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Landmark Legal Foundation by Jerald L. Hill and Mark Bredemeier; for the Center on National Labor Policy by Michael E. Avakian and Robert F. Gore; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Ronald A. Zumbrun, Anthony T. Caso, and Sharon L. Browne; and for the Public Service Research Council, Inc., by Edwin Vieira, Jr.
Justice Blackmun
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-B, III-C, IV-B (except for the final paragraph), IV-D, IV-E, and IV-F, and an opinion with respect to Parts III-A and IV-A, the final paragraph of Part IV-B, and Parts IV-C and V, in which The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Stevens join.
This case presents issues concerning the constitutional limitations, if any, upon the payment, required as a condition of employment, of dues by a nonmember to a union in the public sector.
I
Michigan’s Public Employment Relations Act (Act), Mich. Comp. Laws §423.201 et seq. (1978), provides that a duly selected union shall serve as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of public employees in a particular bargaining unit. The Act, which applies to faculty members of a public educational institution in Michigan, permits a union and a government employer to enter into an “agency-shop” arrangement under which employees within the bargaining unit who decline to become members of the union are compelled to pay a “service fee” to the union.
Respondent Ferris Faculty Association (FFA), an affiliate of the Michigan Education Association (MEA) and the National Education Association
Question: What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed (includes modified)
C. reversed
D. reversed and remanded
E. vacated and remanded
F. affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part
G. affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. certification to or from a lower court
K. no disposition
Answer: |
songer_r_state | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
Archie E. SIMONSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and The Associated Press, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 80-270
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
sc_lcdispositiondirection | A | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations
NORFOLK MONUMENT CO., INC. v. WOODLAWN MEMORIAL GARDENS, INC., et al.
No. 1040.
Decided April 21, 1969.
Howard I. Legum and Louis B. Fine for petitioner.
Frederick S. Albrink for Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., William C. Worthington for Rosewood Memorial Park, Inc., et al., Jefferson B. Brown for Greenlawn Cemetery Park Corp., Bernard Glosser and Stuart D. Glosser for Roosevelt Memorial Park & Cemetery Corp., and William H. King for Jas. H. Matthews & Co. of Virginia et al., respondents.
Per Curiam.
The petitioner, a retailer of burial monuments and bronze grave markers, brought this action for damages and injunctive relief under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 15, 26, alleging that the respondents had violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2, by conspiring to monopolize and monopolizing the manufacture and sale of bronze grave markers. The respondents — Matthews, a manufacturer of such markers, and five operators of cemeteries (called “memorial parks”) that sell the markers — were charged with having jointly adopted various restrictive devices to prevent, restrict, and discourage sales of markers by the petitioner for installation in the cemeteries. After extensive pretrial discovery, the District Court granted the respondents’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that there was no material issue of fact and no evidence of conspiracy. 290 F. Supp. 1.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer: |
songer_state | 18 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the state or territory in which the case was first heard. If the case began in the federal district court, consider the state of that district court. If it is a habeas corpus case, consider the state of the state court that first heard the case. If the case originated in a federal administrative agency, answer "not applicable". Answer with the name of the state, or one of the following territories: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Panama Canal Zone, or "not applicable" or "not determined".
William McKinley STEGALL, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 11210.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
March 6, 1951.
Leon Wolf, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.
David C. Walls, Charles F. Wood, and Norris W. Reigler, all of Louisville, Ky., for appellee.
Before HICKS, Chief Judge, and ALLEN and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This case came on to 'be heard on the record and briefs, and oral argument of counsel.
And it appearing that the Government concedes that count 1 of the indictment is duplicitous;
And it appearing that no demurrer to the indictment was filed, nor objection thereto made prior to the verdict, and that the accused thus waived any right to complain because of the duplicity existing in count 1; Beauchamp v. United States, 6 Cir., 154 F.2d 413, certiorari denied, 329 U.S. 723, 67 S.Ct. 66, 91 L.Ed. 626, rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 826, 67 S.Ct. 183, 91 L.Ed. 702; Sparks v. United States, 6 Cir., 90 F.2d 61, 63;
And it appearing that the material allegations of both counts of the indictment were proved by convincing and undisputed evidence ;
And it appearing that the court sentenced the accused under count 2 of the indictment and that no sentence was imposed under count 1;
And it appearing that no error prejudicial to the accused is presented in the record or in the charge of the trial court (Cf. Sparks v. United States, supra):
It is ordered that the judgment be, and it hereby is, affirmed.
Question: In what state or territory was the case first heard?
01. not
02. Alabama
03. Alaska
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. Florida
11. Georgia
12. Hawaii
13. Idaho
14. Illinois
15. Indiana
16. Iowa
17. Kansas
18. Kentucky
19. Louisiana
20. Maine
21. Maryland
22. Massachussets
23. Michigan
24. Minnesota
25. Mississippi
26. Missouri
27. Montana
28. Nebraska
29. Nevada
30. New
31. New
32. New
33. New
34. North
35. North
36. Ohio
37. Oklahoma
38. Oregon
39. Pennsylvania
40. Rhode
41. South
42. South
43. Tennessee
44. Texas
45. Utah
46. Vermont
47. Virginia
48. Washington
49. West
50. Wisconsin
51. Wyoming
52. Virgin
53. Puerto
54. District
55. Guam
56. not
57. Panama
Answer: |
songer_state | 21 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the state or territory in which the case was first heard. If the case began in the federal district court, consider the state of that district court. If it is a habeas corpus case, consider the state of the state court that first heard the case. If the case originated in a federal administrative agency, answer "not applicable". Answer with the name of the state, or one of the following territories: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Panama Canal Zone, or "not applicable" or "not determined".
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Warren KING, Appellant.
No. 77-1180.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued July 18, 1978.
Decided Sept. 22, 1978.
Michael Schatzow, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Md. (Charles G. Bernstein, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellant.
Daniel F. Goldstein, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., for appellee.
Before BOREMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and WINTER and HALL, Circuit Judges.
BOREMAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
Warren King was convicted by a jury of two counts of kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. § 1201, after a bifurcated trial in which the jury first found him guilty of the substantive offenses and then determined that King was not insane at the time of his commission of the charged offenses.
The evidence disclosed that King kidnapped James Krouch in the District of Columbia and forced him to drive to Maryland where he took ■ Krouch’s car, leaving Krouch bound and gagged in a wooded area near a road. King next broke into the home of one Jay Disbrow in Havre de Grace, Maryland, where he tied up Dis-brow’s wife and children and then forced Disbrow to drive him to New Jersey where he released him unharmed and took his car. At trial Krouch and Mr. and Mrs. Disbrow all positively identified King as their assailant-kidnapper. Also there was evidence that King’s Florida driver’s license was found in Krouch’s car and King’s fingerprints were found in the Disbrow home.
At a pretrial hearing King told the judge that he did not want to have his court-appointed counsel represent him and insisted on representing himself. The judge engaged in a lengthy colloquy with King in an attempt to dissuade him from self-representation. He warned King of the seriousness of the charges, the potential penalty, the advantages of legal training and the likelihood of complex legal issues arising at trial. Nevertheless, even after consulting with his court-appointed attorney, King insisted on representing himself. The judge ordered court-appointed counsel to stay in the courtroom with King throughout trial, to give advice if necessary, and to take over the defense if King should so desire.
The court also decided, after a suggestion by government counsel, that King’s trial should be bifurcated on the issues of guilt and insanity. During voir dire King’s behavior became so bizarre that the judge informed the prospective jurors that the defendant’s mental competence would be an issue later in the trial:
that is to say, there will first be a trial as to the question of defendant’s guilt or innocence of the charges in the indictment, that is whether or not he did the acts with which he has been charged. Then only if a guilty verdict is returned will there be a second trial which would follow immediately thereafter on the question of whether or not the Defendant was or was not legally sane at the time of the commission
Question: In what state or territory was the case first heard?
01. not
02. Alabama
03. Alaska
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. Florida
11. Georgia
12. Hawaii
13. Idaho
14. Illinois
15. Indiana
16. Iowa
17. Kansas
18. Kentucky
19. Louisiana
20. Maine
21. Maryland
22. Massachussets
23. Michigan
24. Minnesota
25. Mississippi
26. Missouri
27. Montana
28. Nebraska
29. Nevada
30. New
31. New
32. New
33. New
34. North
35. North
36. Ohio
37. Oklahoma
38. Oregon
39. Pennsylvania
40. Rhode
41. South
42. South
43. Tennessee
44. Texas
45. Utah
46. Vermont
47. Virginia
48. Washington
49. West
50. Wisconsin
51. Wyoming
52. Virgin
53. Puerto
54. District
55. Guam
56. not
57. Panama
Answer: |
songer_genapel1 | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed appellant.
SOCHANSKI, Stanley J., Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO. et al., The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. John F. SOLOMON, Jr., Palmer Tire Company, Geneva Metal Wheels Co.
No. 79-1963.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Jan. 17, 1980.
Decided May 2, 1980.
August J. Lacko, Lyons & Lacko, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
John J. O’Brien, Jr., O’Brien & O’Brien Associates, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Before HUNTER, HIGGINBOTHAM and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, Jr., Circuit Judge.
Stanley Sochanski brought suit in the federal district court under diversity jurisdiction alleging that he had been injured while repairing a defective tire of a garden cart sold by Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Sears). A jury awarded damages to Sochanski but the district court granted a motion for judgment n.o.v. stating that Sochanski had not met the burden of proof which Pennsylvania law required to prove that the tire was defective. We disagree and will reverse so that judgment may be entered for the plaintiff.
I.
Sochanski was injured while attempting to repair a tire from a garden cart sold by Sears, Roebuck & Co. The tire was manufactured by Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. (Goodyear). The tire was mounted onto a metal frame (the wheel). This wheel unit (the tire and wheel) was purchased by the Palsgrove Manufacturing Co., which used the unit to make the garden cart, which was sold to Sears which, in turn, sold the cart to John Solomon in April, 1971.
In July, 1974 Solomon noticed that one of the garden cart’s tires was losing air and took the tire to the Palmer Tire Co. (Palmer) to have an inner tube inserted. The tire was originally a tubeless tire; Solomon felt that an inner tube would stop the leakage problem. Sochanski, an employee of Palmer, was assigned the repair job. At trial he testified about how he had tried to repair the tire. He stated that he first removed the tire from the wheel so that he could remove the valve stem from the wheel because the inner tube had its own valve. After removing the original valve stem, he put one side of the tire onto the wheel, pulling it over the edge of the wheel (flange) with a small crowbar specially designed for that purpose. He explained that the edge of the tire (the bead) was built up slightly so that it would fit snugly against the flange. (Goodyear’s expert explained that the bead is constructed of steel wires). He also explained that the edge of the tire was slightly smaller than the wheel on which it was to be placed so that the tire would lie taut against the flange when stretched to fit on the wheel.
After removing the tire he fit the inner tube on the wheel, checked the valve stem, and inflated the inner tube slightly. He explained that he inflated the tube so it would mold onto the wheel and thus not become folded or twisted. Next he lubricated the other side of the tire so that it could be put onto the wheel easily and pulled that side over
Question: What is the nature of the first listed appellant?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_respond1_7_2 | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. BRISTOL.
No. 3658.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit
June 27, 1941.
L. W. Post, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen. (Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., on the brief), for the Commissioner.
George D. Brabson, of Washington, D. C. (D. H. Blair, of Washington, D. C., and Frank H. Noyes, of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for Bristol.
Before MAGRUDER, MAHONEY, and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges.
MAHONEY, Circuit Judge.
This is a petition by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to review a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in which the Board decided that there was no deficiency owing but that there was an overpayment by the respondent of a gift tax for the year 1937 in the amount of $4,641.60.
Pursuant to an ante-nuptial agreement between the taxpayer and his intended wife, the taxpayer purchased two annuities for her and transferred two pieces of realty to himself and her as tenants by the entirety in consideration of her relinquishment of the statutory rights she might have in certain stocks then owned by him. The question is whether the wife’s relinquishment of these prospective rights constituted adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth for the transfers made to her by the taxpayer.
The taxpayer and his brother owned and controlled the Foxboro Company, a manufacturing corporation in Foxboro, Massachusetts, which had been in his family for many years. He desired to keep control of the stock of the Company and to insure that upon his death it would go to some of his six children by his first marriage. He was about to remarry, and he consulted his attorney as to the effect of his remarriage upon the family plan to retain control of the Company. The.attorney informed the taxpayer that in the event of his death, under the laws of Massachusetts, his widow would acquire a one-third interest in all his property.
The attorney also informed the taxpayer that it would be possible to transfer other property to his intended wife in lieu of her statutory interests. He advised him that the desired result could be accomplished by a will executed by the taxpayer and assented to by the intended wife, plus a transfer of certain other property to her. The taxpayer discussed the matter with the intended wife in the presence of his attorney, and she agreed to accept two annuities and an interest in two pieces of real estate as tenant by the entirety in lieu of any interest which she might have otherwise acquired in the Company’s stock. At the time this agreement was made the taxpayer owned 130,230 shares of the Company’s stock, valued at $6 per share, i. e., $781,380, the two pieces of real estate transferred to him and his wife as
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.
A. not ascertained
B. male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
C. male - assumed because of name
D. female - indication in opinion of gender
E. female - assumed because of name
Answer: |
songer_direct1 | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision, coded as "liberal" or "conservative". Consider liberal to be for government tax claim; for person claiming patent or copyright infringement; for the plaintiff alleging the injury; for economic underdog if one party is clearly an underdog in comparison to the other, neither party is clearly an economic underdog; in cases pitting an individual against a business, the individual is presumed to be the economic underdog unless there is a clear indication in the opinion to the contrary; for debtor or bankrupt; for government or private party raising claim of violation of antitrust laws, or party opposing merger; for the economic underdog in private conflict over securities; for individual claiming a benefit from government; for government in disputes over government contracts and government seizure of property; for government regulation in government regulation of business; for greater protection of the environment or greater consumer protection (even if anti-government); for the injured party in admiralty - personal injury; for economic underdog in admiralty and miscellaneous economic cases. Consider the directionality to be "mixed" if the directionality of the decision was intermediate to the extremes defined above or if the decision was mixed (e.g., the conviction of defendant in a criminal trial was affirmed on one count but reversed on a second count or if the conviction was afirmed but the sentence was reduced). Consider "not ascertained" if the directionality could not be determined or if the outcome could not be classified according to any conventional outcome standards.
KANDLE et al. v. UNITED STATES.
(Circuit Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
March 2, 1925.)
No. 3212.
I. Courts <@=332 — Equity rules promulgated by Supreme Court have force andi effect of law and apply to proceedings to abate liquor nuisance.
Equity rules promulgated by Supreme Court under Kev. St. §§ 862, 917 (Comp. St. §§ 1470, 1543), have force and effect of law and are applicable to cases brought under National Prohibition Act for abatement of liquor nuisances.
2. United States <@=124 — United States as litigant does not have attribute of sovereignty, but stands as ordinary suitor subject to equity rules.
When the United States becomes a party litigant, it divests itself of sovereignty and stands as ordinary suitor, bound by equity rules as are other litigants.
3. Courts <@=350 — Time for application for taking of deposition under equity rule, stated.
Under equity rules 47 and 50, plaintiff’s application to take depositions must be made in time for taking and filing of such depositions before lapse of 60 days from time cause is at issue.
4. Courts <@=352 — In absence of application for taking of deposition, cause may be tried as soon as it is at issue.
Under equity rules 47 and 56, if no application to take depositions is made, ease may be put on trial calendar as soon as cause is at issue.
5. Courts <@=352 — Placing suit to abale nuisance on trial calendar before expiration of time for taking depositions held not error.
In proceedings under National Prohibition Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 10138% et seq.) to abate liquor nuisance, where neither party made or intended to make application to take deposition, it was not error to place case on trial calendar before time for taking and filing depositions had expired.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; John Rellstab, Judge.
Suit to abate liquor nuisance by the United States against Aaron Handle and the Paramount Realty Company. Decree for the. United States, and defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Harold Simandl, of Newark, N. J., for appellant Handle.
James Lafferty and Porter, Zink & Lafferty, all of Newark, N. J., for appellant Paramount Realty Co.
Walter G. Winno, U. S. Atty., of Hackensack, N. J., and Harlan Besson, of Hoboken, N. J., for the United States.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
DAVIS, Circuit Judge.
The United States attorney for the district of New Jersey filed a bill of complaint against Aaron Handle and the Paramount Realty Company for maintaining a public and common nuisance at No. -557 Market street, Newark, N. J., in that they manufactured, kept, and sold intoxicating liquor there in violation of the National Prohibition Act (Comp.
Question: What is the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision?
A. conservative
B. liberal
C. mixed
D. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_lcdispositiondirection | B | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations
ALABAMA POWER CO. v. DAVIS
No. 76-451.
Argued April 25-26, 1977
Decided June 6, 1977
H. Hampton Boles argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were John Bingham and Marshall Timberlake.
Allan A. Ryan, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Babcock, Robert E. Kopp, and William H. Berger.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Hugh M. Finneran for PPG Industries, Inc.; and by Carl E. Sanders, Michael C. Murphy, and John L. Taylor, Jr., for Lockheed-Georgia Co., a division of Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
Me. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Davis became a permanent employee of petitioner Alabama Power Co. on August 16, 1936, and continued to work until March 18, 1943, when he left to enter the military. After serving in the military for 30 months, he resumed his position with Alabama Power, where he worked until he retired on June 1, 1971. Davis received credit under the company pension plan for his service from August 16, 1937, until the date of his retirement, with the exception of the time he spent in the military and some time spent on strike. Davis claimed that § 9 of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U. S. C. App. § 459 (b), requires Alabama Power to give him credit toward his pension for his period of military service. With the assistance of the United States Attorney, he sued to vindicate that asserted right. The District Court,
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer: |
songer_applfrom | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court).
FRIEDMAN v. UNITED STATES.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
May 7, 1925.)
No. 4272.
1. Forgery <s=>5 — Indictment charging sale of altered Liberty Bonds with intent to defraud others to whom they might be sold held to state offense.
Indictment, charging sale and delivery of Liberty Bonds which had been altered with intent to defraud others to whom purchaser might sell them, stated violation of Criminal Code, § 151, notwithstanding person to whom accused sold bonds was not deceived; intent to defraud being sufficient, if it is to operate against future transferees.
2. Criminal law <§=»l 167(2) — Where conviction on one count of indictment is sustainable, defects in other counts are immaterial.
Where conviction under one count is sustainable, and sentence is not excessive under that count, defects in other counts are immaterial.
3. Forgery <®=»I0 — Uttering or selling altered Liberty Bonds is an offense.
Uttering or selling altered Liberty Bonds violates Criminal Code, § 151, notwithstanding alteration makes bonds void.
4. Forgery <S=>44('/2) — Accused’s knowledge that Liberty Bonds sold by him had been altered held proved.
Evidence helé to warrant finding that accused delivered Liberty Bonds to purchaser, knowing that they had been altered, in violation of Criminal Code, § 151.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Kentucky; Charles H. Moorman, Judge.
Sol Eriedman was convicted of uttering and selling Liberty Bonds which had been altered, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
Leopold Saltiel, of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff in error.
Claude Hudgins, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Louisville, Ky. (W. S. Ball, U. S. Atty., and Lilburn Phelps, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Louisville, Ky., on the brief), for the United States.
Before DENISON, DONAHUE, and KNAPPEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Eriedman was convicted under two counts of an indictment charging that he violated section 151 of the Criminal Code by uttering and selling Liberty Bonds which had been altered. The bonds in question had been in fact stolen, and then altered by erasing the name of the registered holder and substituting therefor another and fictitious name. They were then transferred by Eriedman in connection with an assignment by the purported registered holder.
One count charged that he had sold and delivered these bonds to Erey, with intent to defraud Frey. The 'other count charged the same delivery with intent to defraud others, to whom Erey might sell them. It is now said that Erey had knowledge of the alteration, and so the proofs do not sustain a conviction under the first count, while the second count does not state an offense. We think the second count is not defective in this respect. The intent to defraud is sufficient, if it is to operate against a future transferee, even though the person to whom delivery is made is not deceived. U. S. v. Nelson, 27 Fed. Cas. 80. The conviction under one count being sustainable, and the sentence being not excessive under that count, defects under other counts are immaterial.
It is urged that, upon the making of the alteration, the bonds became void and were no longer an obligation of the United States and that to utter or sell a void paper is not within the statute. We cannot accept this construction
Question: What is the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court)?
A. Trial (either jury or bench trial)
B. Injunction or denial of injunction or stay of injunction
C. Summary judgment or denial of summary judgment
D. Guilty plea or denial of motion to withdraw plea
E. Dismissal (include dismissal of petition for habeas corpus)
F. Appeals of post judgment orders (e.g., attorneys' fees, costs, damages, JNOV - judgment nothwithstanding the verdict)
G. Appeal of post settlement orders
H. Not a final judgment: interlocutory appeal
I. Not a final judgment: mandamus
J. Other (e.g., pre-trial orders, rulings on motions, directed verdicts) or could not determine nature of final judgment
K. Does not fit any of the above categories, but opinion mentions a "trial judge"
L. Not applicable (e.g., decision below was by a federal administrative agency, tax court)
Answer: |
songer_appfed | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
In the Matter of Grand Jury Witness Charles Joseph BATTAGLIA. Charles Joseph BATTAGLIA, Witness, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America,
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_appnatpr | 1 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry Michael GETCHEL, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 71-3048.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Sept. 25, 1972
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_direct1 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision, coded as "liberal" or "conservative". Consider liberal to be for government tax claim; for person claiming patent or copyright infringement; for the plaintiff alleging the injury; for economic underdog if one party is clearly an underdog in comparison to the other, neither party is clearly an economic underdog; in cases pitting an individual against a business, the individual is presumed to be the economic underdog unless there is a clear indication in the opinion to the contrary; for debtor or bankrupt; for government or private party raising claim of violation of antitrust laws, or party opposing merger; for the economic underdog in private conflict over securities; for individual claiming a benefit from government; for government in disputes over government contracts and government seizure of property; for government regulation in government regulation of business; for greater protection of the environment or greater consumer protection (even if anti-government); for the injured party in admiralty - personal injury; for economic underdog in admiralty and miscellaneous economic cases. Consider the directionality to be "mixed" if the directionality of the decision was intermediate to the extremes defined above or if the decision was mixed (e.g., the conviction of defendant in a criminal trial was affirmed on one count but reversed on a second count or if the conviction was afirmed but the sentence was reduced). Consider "not ascertained" if the directionality could not be determined or if the outcome could not be classified according to any conventional outcome standards.
Francis J. DONDERO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Anthony J. CELEBREZZE, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 206, Docket 27666.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued Jan. 16, 1963.
Decided Jan. 18, 1963.
Edgar T. Schleider, New York City (David Altschul, New York City, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
Kalman V. Gallop, Asst. U. S. Atty., Brooklyn, N. Y. (Joseph P. Hoey, U. S. Atty. for Eastern Dist. of New York, Brooklyn, N. Y., on the brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before MEDINA, WATERMAN and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Upon attaining age 65, plaintiff applied for and received old-age insurance benefits of $85.00 per month beginning January 1954. In 1958 plaintiff reported a real estate commission of $8,800, precipitating a review of his social security status and resulting in a suspension by the Bureau of further payments and a direction of restitution of amounts previously paid to him in the years 1954 through 1957, totalling $4,620. Upon plaintiff’s request a hearing was held on February 17, 1959. The Referee’s Decision of April 15, 1959 affirmed the decision of the Board and held that plaintiff had received and was receiving wages in excess of $2,080 per annum, the amount at which benefits were to be totally suspended under Sections 203(b) and 203 (e) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 403(b) and 403(e). Upon denial of review by the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration this decision became final and plaintiff then sought review in the District Court which dismissed his complaint, and he appeals. Opinion below reported at 205 F.Supp. 683. We hold this dismissal was proper.
The evidence showed that when plaintiff filed his retirement claim, he was president, general manager, principal stockholder and the only paid employee of the Dondero Holding Company, Inc., a real estate corporation formed in 1930, whose principal assets were a parcel of improved real estate yielding an annual rental of $10,000 and bank accounts and securities yielding annual interest and dividends of $1,000. Plaintiff’s salary of $4,200 and business expenses consumed most of the earnings. Plaintiff’s apartment served as office, with light secretarial work performed without compensation by his wife. After his “retirement” in 1954, plaintiff’s salary was reduced to $900 per annum and for the first time the wife was put on the payroll at $60 a week, although the somewhat minimal duties and services performed by each did not materially change and the plaintiff at all times remained the “moving force” of the operation.
The Referee thought that plaintiff’s testimony was discredited by the circumstances above outlined, and that the record established a “scheme of shifting wages
Question: What is the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision?
A. conservative
B. liberal
C. mixed
D. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_lcdispositiondirection | A | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations
SIEGERT v. GILLEY
No. 90-96.
Argued February 19, 1991
Decided May 23, 1991
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, O’Connor, Scalia, and SouteR, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 235. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, and in Parts II and III of which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 236.
Nina Kraut argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Michael R. Lazerwitz argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Roberts, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro, and Barbara L. Herwig.
David H. Remes, David Rudovsky, Steven R. Shapiro, and Arthur B. Spitzer filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit properly directed dismissal of petitioner’s Bivens claim on the grounds that he had not overcome respondent’s claim of qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals relied on its “heightened pleading standard,” but we hold that petitioner’s claim failed at an analytically earlier stage of the inquiry into qualified immunity: His allegations, even if accepted as true, did not state a claim for violation of any rights secured to him under the United States Constitution.
Petitioner Frederick A. Siegert, a clinical psychologist, was employed at St. Elizabeth
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer: |
songer_genapel2 | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed appellant. If there are more than two appellants and at least one of the additional appellants has a different general category from the first appellant, then consider the first appellant with a different general category to be the second appellant.
James ROCHE, Petitioner-Appellee, v. G. H. SIZER, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution, The United States Parole Commission, and William French Smith, Attorney General of the United States, Respondents-Appellants.
No. 422, Docket 81-2236.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Feb. 1, 1982.
Decided April 1, 1982.
Barry K. Stevens, Asst. U. S. Atty. for the District of Connecticut, Hartford, Conn. (Alan H. Nevas, U. S. Atty., District of Connecticut, Bridgeport, Conn., of counsel), for respondents-appellants.
John L. Pottenger, Jr., Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, Yale Law School, New Haven, Conn. (Stephen Wizner, Renee D. Chotiner, P. J. Pittman, New Haven, Conn., on the brief), for petitionerappellee.
Before LUMBARD and VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judges, and BONSAL, District Judge.
Of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
BONSAL, District Judge:
On January 29, 1979 petitioner, James Roche, was arrested by federal agents, charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana (the Federal charges), and was sent to the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Hartford (“CCI Hartford”) where federal defendants are held while awaiting trial. On March 20, 1979 the State of Connecticut issued a warrant for petitioner’s arrest, charging him with the sale of cocaine in violation of the Connecticut General Statutes (the Connecticut charges).
On April 30,1979 petitioner posted a bond with respect to the Federal charges. However, since he had not posted bond with respect to the Connecticut charges, he remained incarcerated at CCI Hartford.
On May 7,1979 Chief Judge Clarie issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum directing that petitioner be turned over to the United States Marshal for trial on the Federal charges, the writ providing that “immediately after prosecution has been concluded, the United States Marshal for the District of Connecticut... shall return the said James Roche to the Connecticut Commissioner of Corrections, Community Correctional Center, Hartford, Connecticut____”
On June 13, 1979 petitioner pled guilty to the Federal charges and was sentenced by Judge Clarie to imprisonment for three years. He was then returned to Connecticut custody at CCI Hartford pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. On September 20, 1979, having pled guilty to the Connecticut charges, petitioner was sentenced to one-to-two years’ imprisonment by Judge Brennan of the Connecticut Superior Court and was incarcerated in the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers, Connecticut.
On December 3, 1979 petitioner was released on parole from Connecticut custody and, pursuant to a federal detainer, was delivered to the Federal Correctional Institution at Danbury to commence his federal sentence (18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1976)). He was given credit for time served for the period from January
Question: What is the nature of the second listed appellant whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed appellant?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_partywinning | A | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case.
PERKINS v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF CALIFORNIA.
No. 624.
Argued April 22-23, 1969.
Decided June 16, 1969.
Earl W. Kintner and George R. Kucik argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the briefs were Thomas L. Siegel, Roger Tilbury, Ernest Bonyhadi, and Bruce M. Hall.
Richard J. MacLaury argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Francis R. Kirkham and H. Helmut Loring.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1959 petitioner, Clyde A. Perkins, brought this civil antitrust action against the Standard Oil Company of California seeking treble damages under § 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, for injuries alleged to have resulted from Standard’s price discriminations in the sale of gasoline and oil during a period of over two years from 1955 to 1957. In 1963, after a lengthy and complicated trial, the jury returned a verdict for Perkins and assessed damages against Standard of $333,404.67, which, after trebling by the court and after the addition of attorney’s fees, resulted in a total judgment against Standard of $1,298,213.71. On review, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the assessment of damages included injuries to Perkins that were not recoverable under the Act and therefore ordered a new trial. Standard Oil Co. of California v. Perkins, 396 F. 2d 809. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals, in reversing the judgment, had correctly construed the Robinson-Patman Act.
Petitioner Perkins entered the oil and gasoline business in 1928 as the operator of a single service station in the State of Washington. By the mid-1950’s he had become one of the largest independent distributors of gasoline and oil in both Washington and Oregon. He was both a wholesaler, operating storage plants and trucking equipment, and a retailer through his own Perkins stations. From 1945 until 1957, Perkins purchased substantially all of his gasoline requirements from Standard. From 1955 to 1957 Standard charged Perkins a higher price for its gasoline and oil than Standard charged to its own Branded Dealers, who competed with Perkins, and to Signal Oil & Gas Co., a wholesaler whose gas eventually reached the pumps of a major competitor of Perkins. Perkins contends that Standard’s price and price-related discriminations against him seriously harmed his competitive position and forced him, in 1957, to sacrifice by sale what remained of his once independent business to one of the major companies in the gasoline business, Union Oil.
Many of the elements of liability on the part of Standard are not in dispute. Standard has admitted that it sold gasoline and oil to its Branded Dealers and to Signal Oil at discriminatorily lower prices than those at which it sold to Perkins. The Court of Appeals found that Standard’s liability for the harm done Perkins by the favorable treatment of the Branded Dealers was beyond dispute. Of this aspect of the damages, the Court of Appeals said:
“The Branded Dealers purchased gasoline and oil from Standard which they in turn sold at retail. With respect to them, Perkins’ story is quickly told. Because of Standard’s favoritism and discrimination they were able to and did offer lower prices and better services and facilities than Perkins in marketing at retail.” 396 F. 2d, at 812.
With regard to Perkins’ damage resulting from Standard’s discrimination in favor of Signal Oil, however, the Court of Appeals took a different view because of the following
Question: Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case?
A. Yes
B. No
Answer: |
songer_jurisdiction | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to some threshold issue at the trial court level. These issues are only considered to be present if the court of appeals is reviewing whether or not the litigants should properly have been allowed to get a trial court decision on the merits. That is, the issue is whether or not the issue crossed properly the threshhold to get on the district court agenda. The issue is: "Did the court determine that it had jurisdiction to hear this case?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".If the opinion discusses challenges to the jurisdiction of the court to hear several different issues and the court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear some of the issues but did not have jurisdiction to hear other issues, answer "Mixed answer".
Ingridhutte Kurt WOKAN v. ALLADIN INTERNATIONAL, INC., Appellant.
No. 72-2106.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12 (6) July 2, 1973.
Resubmitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) Sept.. 12, 1973.
Decided Sept. 13, 1973.
David S. Malis, Malis, Tolson & Malis, Marvin Krasny, Adelman & Lavine, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
Frederich H. Ehmann, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) July 2, 1973
Before GIBBONS and HUNTER, Circuit Judges.
Resubmitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) Sept. 4, 1973
Before GIBBONS, HUNTER and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.
In this diversity contract action, the defendant, Alladin International, Inc. (Alladin), appeals from the refusal of the district court to set aside a default judgment. The plaintiff, Ingridhutte Kurt Wokan (Ingridhutte), a West German glassware manufacturer, on April 20, 1972, filed a complaint in two counts. The first count sought $3,048.00, the price of goods actually delivered to Alladin. The second count sought $17,498.75 plus interest and storage charges, for goods ordered by Alladin, never delivered, but allegedly specially manufactured and not resalable. Process was served on Alladin’s president on May 2, 1972. Alladin did not respond in any manner, and a default judgment in the amount of $23,495.26 was entered on July 21, 1972. Thereafter, Ingridhutte issued execution attaching Alladin’s bank account at Fidelity Bank. Judgment was entered against the garnishee bank on August 17, 1972, in the amount of $9,796.36. This left an unsatisfied balance on the judgment of $13,698.90.
Counsel for Alladin (who is also an officer of the corporation) learned on August 14, 1972, that the account at Fidelity Bank had been attached. That day he called Ingridhutte’s attorney, advising that the funds attached represented money which had been advanced to Alladin by two of his acquaintances for the purpose of permitting Alladin to make a 20% settlement offer to its creditors, and that such a settlement offer had been made to
Question: Did the court determine that it had jurisdiction to hear this case?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_respond1_3_2 | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)". Your task is to determine which category of federal government agencies and activities best describes this litigant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ishmael GALLOP, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 86-5175.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Oct. 9, 1987.
Decided Jan. 28, 1988.
Robert Leon Pierson, for defendant-appellant.
Elizabeth Hartley Trimble, Asst. U.S. Atty. (Breckinridge L. Willcox, U.S. Atty., on brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before RUSSELL, MURNAGHAN and ERVIN, Circuit Judges.
MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge:
Ishmael Gallop appeals from a conviction after a jury trial on a count of bank larceny in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b). On April 15, 1986, a federal grand jury in the District of Maryland indicted Ishmael Gallop. Anthony R. Gallagher, a public defender, was designated as the defendant’s counsel. Magistrate Paul M. Rosenberg arraigned the defendant on April 26, 1986 at which time he pled not guilty. Subsequently, Gallagher and the United States Attorney’s Office worked out a plea agreement and the rearraignment was set for June 13th.
At the rearraignment, Gallagher advised the district court that his client wished to strike the appearance of the federal public defender’s office. The defendant had complained to Gallagher that the office had not represented his interests adequately. Gallagher stated that there were obvious disagreements between himself and the defendant, and he felt that he would be unable to work with the defendant any longer as counsel. Finding that an irreconcilable difference existed, the court discharged the public defender. The court also granted a motion to postpone the trial.
On June 19, 1986, the court appointed James F. Garrity to represent the defendant pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act. Garrity filed a motion to suppress the defendant’s confession, challenging the volun-tariness of the statement. The district judge denied the motion after a hearing on September 11,1986. The suppression issue was reopened for additional testimony on September 18th and September 22nd, but was again denied.
On September 18th, Garrity informed the court that the defendant no longer wished to be represented by him. Garrity told the court that the relationship between himself and Gallop had entirely broken down. The defendant stated that his second attorney had done an inadequate job because he should have sought a postponement of the first suppression hearing until all parties were present. The district judge noted that the defendant had previously discharged his first counsel and indicated his concern that the defendant was attempting to obstruct the orderly procedure of the court. Under the circumstances, the district judge gave the defendant the choice of proceeding pro se or continuing with his second attorney. When the defendant indicated that he did not know how to represent himself, the court said that it would proceed with Garrity as counsel.
Garrity then indicated that he had another problem relating to his representation of the defendant but that the problem could not be revealed because of the confidential
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)". Which category of federal government agencies and activities best describes this litigant?
A. cabinet level department
B. courts or legislative
C. agency whose first word is "federal"
D. other agency, beginning with "A" thru "E"
E. other agency, beginning with "F" thru "N"
F. other agency, beginning with "O" thru "R"
G. other agency, beginning with "S" thru "Z"
H. Distric of Columbia
I. other, not listed, not able to classify
Answer: |
songer_respond1_3_3 | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)", specifically "other agency, beginning with "O" thru "R"". Your task is to determine which specific federal government agency best describes this litigant.
Application of William BALDWIN for Appointment of Counsel, William Baldwin, Appellant, and John M. Espinoza, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Charles L. BENSON, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas, United States Parole Commission, Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of the United States, and United States Bureau of Prisons, Respondents-Appellees.
Nos. 77-1739, 77-1794.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Sept. 28, 1978.
Clayton D. Knowles, Denver, Colo., for appellant.
Leonard D. Munker, Federal Public Defender, on brief, for petitioner-appellant John M. Espinoza.
Roger M. Theis, Asst. U. S. Atty., Topeka, Kan. (James P. Buchele, U. S. Atty., Topeka, Kan., on brief), for respondents-appel-lees.
Before SETH, Chief Judge, and HOLLOWAY, McWilliams, BARRETT, DOYLE, McKAY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.
WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge.
The question here presented is whether a person who is charged with violation of parole is entitled, as a matter of right, to appointed counsel in parole revocation proceedings before both the Commission and court, under 18 U.S.C. § 4214. Both of these defendants have been charged with parole violation and in the applicable proceedings have had parole revoked following hearings in both cases. This is the only question raised in the appeal of William Baldwin.
The case of John M. Espinoza is an appeal from the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus which raised other points besides the right of counsel. Both appellants have been in the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, and the prior court proceedings from which the appeals are taken occurred in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas.
BALDWIN PROCEEDINGS
William Baldwin was originally convicted of bank robbery and was sentenced to 18 years in prison. He commenced serving his sentence on February 20, 1967, and was released on parole May 15, 1974. He originated in Connecticut and was supervised in that district. His offense was theft, on November 19, 1976, of $1,154.00 from a retail shop in Manchester, Connecticut. He pleaded nolo contendere to this on April 20, 1977, and was fined $250.00. On April 28, 1977, a parole revocation warrant was issued for Baldwin and this was executed on May 2, at which time he was arrested and placed in the Correctional Center at Hartford, Connecticut, without preliminary hearing on revocation. Thereafter, he was transferred to Leavenworth, where the parole revocation hearing took place. In connection with the parole violation proceeding, he
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)", specifically "other agency, beginning with "O" thru "R"". Which specific federal government agency best describes this litigant?
A. Occupational Safety & Health Administration
B. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission
C. Office of the Federal Inspector
D. Office of Management & Budget
E. Office of Personnel Management
F. Office of Workers Compensation Program
G. Parole board or parole commisssion, or prison official, or US Bureau of Prisons
H. Patent Office
I. Postal Rate Commission (U.S.)
J. Postal Service (U.S.)
K. RR Adjustment Board
L. RR Retirement Board
Answer: |
songer_respond2_4_3 | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the second listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)", specifically "bureaucracy providing services". Your task is to determine which specific substate government agency best describes this litigant.
BUICK MOTOR CO. v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE, WIS., et al.
No. 4418.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
April 6, 1931.
O. A. Oestreieh, M. O. Mouat, and P. J. E. Wood, all of Janesville, Wis., and John Thomas Smith, of New York City, for appellant.
Walter J. Mattison and John M. Niven, both of Milwaukee, Wis., for appellees.
Theo. W. Brazeau, of Wisconsin Rapids, Wis., for Wisconsin Tax Commission.
Before ALSCHULER, EVANS, and SPARKS, Circuit Judges.
ALSCHULER, Circuit Judge.
The appeal involves the validity of a reassessment by the Wisconsin tax commission for state income taxes for the years 1917 to 1924, inclusive, of appellant, Buiek Motor Company, a Michigan corporation licensed to do business in Wisconsin.
The company has a capital stock of $10,-000, all owned by General Motors Company, a Delaware corporation, and carried in the names of its nominees.
Under date of January 2, 1917, “General Motors Company * * * termed the Seller” contracted in writing with “Buiek Motor Company * * * termed the Buyer” whereby “the Seller agrees to sell to the Buyer and the Buyer hereby agrees to buy from the Seller the entire output of automobiles and their parts of the (seller’s) ‘Buiek’ factory at Flint, Michigan, upon a basis which will result in an annual net profit of Twenty-five Hundred Dollars to the Buyer on said business.” The contract has unlimited duration.
To appellant’s Wisconsin branch, with headquarters at Milwaukee, there was assigned as its territory the northern peninsula' of Michigan and all the state of Wisconsin, except the southern tier ofi e.ounties, which counties were part of the territory assigned to and served from the Chicago branch.
During the years in question appellant’s annual sales of cars and parts ranged from a minimum of $89,000,000 to a maximum of $231,000,000; whereof the annual sales of the Wisconsin branch were from $2,454,000 to $6,800,000. The ears and parts’sold by the Wisconsin branch were billed to the branch by appellant at about the same price as to independent distributors, and were shipped from General Motors’ factory at Flint, Mich., and remittances were made by the customers to the Wisconsin branch, whieh, having no bank account of its own, sent the remittances as received to General Motors.
For the year 1917 appellant returned for Wisconsin tax an income of $5,018.42, but later contended that its income was only $2,-500, which was the income whieh it annually returned for some years thereafter. For 1919 the tax commission, over appellant’s protest, added as further income $80,051, whieh represented, in the main, Wisconsin’s proportion of an aggregate amount of $1,419,290'.16 withheld by appellant as reserve for dealers’ rebates.
In 1920 the tax
Question: This question concerns the second listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)", specifically "bureaucracy providing services". Which specific substate government agency best describes this litigant?
A. Police, Sheriff
B. Fire
C. Taxation
D. Human Services/Welfare/Health Care
E. Streets and Highways
F. Transportation
G. Election Processes
H. Education - Not School Board
I. Other Service Activity
J. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_counsel | E | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. The issue is: "Did the court rule that the defendant had inadequate counsel?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed". If the court answered the question in the affirmative, but the error articulated by the court was judged to be harmless, answer "Yes, but error was harmless".
Erna YAFFE and James Hornsby, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James E. POWERS, as Chief of Police of the Fall River Police Department and Ronald Andrade, as a Police Officer in the Fall River Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 71-1269.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard Dec. 8, 1971.
Decided Jan. 26, 1972.
Matthew H. Feinberg, Boston, Mass., with whom John Reinstein, Cambridge, Mass., Ronald F. Kehoe, C. Michael Malm, and Hausserman, Davison & Shattuck, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellants.
James P. McGuire, Fall River, Mass., with whom McGuire & Collias, Fall River, Mass., was on brief, for appellees.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, Mc-ENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
COFFIN, Circuit Judge.
On May 5, 1970, some two hundred citizens attended a memorial service, commencing at the campus of Bristol Community College and terminating at the post office in Fall River, Massachusetts, to protest United States military action in Cambodia and Ohio National Guard action at Kent State University. Prior to this gathering, Fall River authorities had been concerned over the activities of a “Regional Action Group” which they feared to be organizing a violent demonstration along with activists who had taken part in recent riots in other Massachusetts cities. In order to keep track of “the extent of infiltration and participation by known violent activists of the Regional Action Group into the conduct of the memorial services”, the Fall River police department sent a police photographer, not in uniform, to take pictures of the activities at the campus and post office.
Plaintiff Yaffe, invited by the sponsors to speak as a substitute for her husband who was then running for Congress, and plaintiff Hornsby, a clergyman and member of the Fall River school committee, were among those present who were included in one or more photographs taken. One or more photographs of Hornsby was purportedly displayed in a public area of the Fall River police station for several weeks. A police photograph of a speaker, an alleged member of the Regional Action Group, at the memorial service, and three onlookers, including plaintiff Yaffe, was allegedly given to the Providence Journal and published in connection with a story on “Fall River Radicals”, based on defendant Andrade’s testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. The testimony related to surveillance of the Regional Action Group prior to a planned march on May 1, 1970 — which was called off at the last minute.
The plaintiffs brought suit against the Fall River police chief and Sergeant Andrade, alleging that surreptitious police photography, surveillance, the keeping of notes, and the maintaining and circulating of photographs and dossiers on participants at meetings such as that held on May 5, 1970, harass the plaintiffs and deter others from participating in public meetings held to express unconventional views. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that such surveillance, photographing, maintaining files, and circulating the contents thereof have violated
Question: Did the court rule that the defendant had inadequate counsel?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Yes, but error was harmless
D. Mixed answer
E. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_method | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine the nature of the proceeding in the court of appeals for the case, that is, the legal history of the case, indicating whether there had been prior appellate court proceeding on the same case prior to the decision currently coded. Assume that the case had been decided by the panel for the first time if there was no indication to the contrary in the opinion. The opinion usually, but not always, explicitly indicates when a decision was made "en banc" (though the spelling of "en banc" varies). However, if more than 3 judges were listed as participating in the decision, code the decision as enbanc even if there was no explicit description of the proceeding as en banc.
SIMMONS et al. v. BROOKS.
No. 6133.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Argued May 14, 1934.
Decided June 11, 1934.
Henry I. Quinn, of Washington, D. C., for appellants.
John S. Barbour, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, HITZ, and GRO-NER, Associate Justices.
MARTIN, Chief Justice.
An appeal from a judgment recovered in an action for damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident.
In the declaration the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, Sol A. Simmons, Louis A. Simmons, and Abraham Simmons, were partners trading as the Simmon's Motor Company; that in April, 1931, plaintiff was driving his automobile upon a public highway in, Stafford county, Va.;.that at the same time one J. F. Letcher was driving a car on the same road, slightly ahead of the plaintiff and. going in the same direction; that plaintiff and Letcher were driving with due care; that as they were going up a grade which curved to their left a third automobile, belonging to the defendants, then and there operated by one J. R. Proetor as the agent and employee of the defendants, approached them from the opposite direction; that Proetor carelessly and negligently drove the defendants’ car upon the wrong side of the road and at a high and dangerous rate of speed and collided first, with the automobile operated by Letcher and immediately thereafter and in consequence thereof with the ear operated by the plaintiff, whereby plaintiff suffered serious injuries for which he prayed judgment in damages.
The defendants for their plea admitted their ownership of the automobile driven by-Proctor at the time of the accident and the fact that it was in collision with the automobile owned and operated by the plaintiff at the time and place alleged in the declaration; hut denied that Proctor was operating the automobile at that timo as their agent or employee or that he was then engaged in any manner in and about their business; and they averred that the collision was due solely to the negligence of Letcher in operating his automobile.
The (¡ase was tried to the jury and a verdict was returned for the plaintiff. A motion for a new trial was overruled by the court and judgment was entered for plaintiff upon the verdict. Whereupon the present appeal was taken.
It is disclosed by the record that the plaintiff introduced testimony in chief describing the collision of which he complained, together with the injuries which he suffered because of it; also testimony tending to show that the car driven by Proctor at the time of the collision had oil it a dealers’ tag for the year 1831, which had been issued to the defendants by the District of Columbia, and the regulations in force in the District at the time of the accident, which provided that such dealers’ tags should not be transferred from one vehicle to another, nor be loaned to another by the person to whom issued, but should be applied to- automobiles held by dealers for sale or demonstration only; and that under the laws of Virginia it was lawful for a car with the dealers’ tags thereon to ho operated over the highways of the state of Virginia without registering the vehicle under the laws of Virginia, but only when such machine was being used by the dealer or his agent for sale purposes. The plaintiff then rested.
Question: What is the nature of the proceeding in the court of appeals for this case?
A. decided by panel for first time (no indication of re-hearing or remand)
B. decided by panel after re-hearing (second time this case has been heard by this same panel)
C. decided by panel after remand from Supreme Court
D. decided by court en banc, after single panel decision
E. decided by court en banc, after multiple panel decisions
F. decided by court en banc, no prior panel decisions
G. decided by panel after remand to lower court
H. other
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_adminactionstate | 27 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state of the state agency associated with the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation.
Greg McQUIGGIN, Warden, Petitioner
v.
Floyd PERKINS.
No. 12-126.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Feb. 25, 2013.
Decided May 28, 2013.
John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, for Petitioner.
Chad A. Readler, Columbus, OH, for Respondent.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Michigan Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Lansing, MI, B. Eric Restuccia, Deputy Solicitor General, John S. Pallas, Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Division, for Petitioner.
Jason Burnette, Jones Day, Atlanta, GA, Chad A. Readler, Counsel of Record, Eric E. Murphy, Allison E. Haedt, Jones Day, Columbus, OH, for Respondent.
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the "actual innocence" gateway to federal habeas review applied in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995), and further explained in House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). In those cases, a convincing showing of actual innocence enabled habeas petitioners to overcome a procedural bar to consideration of the merits of their constitutional claims. Here, the question arises in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), the statute of limitations on federal habeas petitions prescribed in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Specifically, if the petitioner does not file her federal habeas petition, at the latest, within one year of "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence," § 2244(d)(1)(D), can the time bar be overcome by a convincing showing that she committed no crime?
We hold that actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar, as it was in Schlup and House, or, as in this case, expiration of the statute of limitations. We caution, however, that tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare: "[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Schlup, 513 U.S., at 329, 115 S.Ct. 851; see House, 547 U.S., at 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (emphasizing that the Schlup standard is "demanding" and seldom met). And in making an assessment of the kind Schlup envisioned, "the timing of the [petition]" is a factor bearing on the "reliability of th[e] evidence" purporting to show actual innocence.
Schlup, 513 U.S., at 332
Question: What is the state of the state agency associated with the administrative action?
01. Alabama
02. Alaska
03. American Samoa
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. District of Columbia
11. Federated States of Micronesia
12. Florida
13. Georgia
14. Guam
15. Hawaii
16. Idaho
17. Illinois
18. Indiana
19. Iowa
20. Kansas
21. Kentucky
22. Louisiana
23. Maine
24. Marshall Islands
25. Maryland
26. Massachusetts
27. Michigan
28. Minnesota
29. Mississippi
30. Missouri
31. Montana
32. Nebraska
33. Nevada
34. New Hampshire
35. New Jersey
36. New Mexico
37. New York
38. North Carolina
39. North Dakota
40. Northern Mariana Islands
41. Ohio
42. Oklahoma
43. Oregon
44. Palau
45. Pennsylvania
46. Puerto Rico
47. Rhode Island
48. South Carolina
49. South Dakota
50. Tennessee
51. Texas
52. Utah
53. Vermont
54. Virgin Islands
55. Virginia
56. Washington
57. West Virginia
58. Wisconsin
59. Wyoming
60. United States
61. Interstate Compact
62. Philippines
63. Indian
64. Dakota
Answer: |
sc_issuearea | H | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
BILSKI et al. v. KAPPOS, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
No. 08-964.
Argued November 9, 2009
Decided June 28, 2010
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except for Parts II-B-2 and II-C-2. Roberts, C. J., and Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined the opinion in full, and Scalia, J., joined except for Parts II-B-2 and II-C-2. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined, post, p. 613. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia, J., joined as to Part II, post, p. 657.
J Michael Jakes argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Erika H. Arner, Ronald E. Myrick, and Denise W. DeFranco.
Deputy Solicitor General Stewart argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Kagan, Assistant Attorney General West, Ginger D. Anders, Scott R. McIntosh, Cameron F. Kerry, Raymond T. Chen, Thomas W. Krause, and Scott C. Weidenfeller.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Intellectual Property Law Association by William K. West, Jr.; for the Association Internationale Pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle et al. by R. Mark Halligan; for AwakenIP, LLC, by Joel H. Thornton and Jeffrey R. Kuester; for Borland Software Corp. by Scott S. Kokka; for the Boston Patent Law Association by Joel R. Leeman, Steven J. Henry, and Han N. Barzilay; for Caris Diagnostics, Inc., by Gideon A. Schor; for the Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund by Andrew L. Schlafly; for Entrepreneur
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_1-3-1 | P | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "criminal - federal offense".
LEA v. UNITED STATES.
No. 11736.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 15, 1947.
Rehearing Denied March 17, 1947.
Edwin H. Grace, of New Orleans, La., for appellant.
Herbert W. Christenberry, U. S. Atty., and N.E. Simoneaux and Robert Weinstein, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of New Orleans, La., for appellee.
Before HOLMES, McCORD, and WALLER, Circuit Judges.
WALLER, Circuit Judge.
When his demurrer to an indictment, brought under Section 100, Title 18 U.S. C.A., was overruled, the defendant pleaded nolo contendere, was adjudged guilty, and received the sentence of the Court. He now appeals, assigning as error the overruling of the demurrer.
An indictment should state every material fact necessary to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge against him so that he would be able successfully to interpose a plea of former jeopardy against any other prosecution for this same offense. The indictment here alleges: That the defendant did unlawfully, feloniously, and fraudulently embezzle and convert to his own use certain monies of the United States; that said monies were the proceeds of the sale of certain United States War Savings Bonds, which sales were made by the United Theatres, Incorporated; that the United Theatres, Incorporated, were duly authorized to act as issuing agent for the sale of said bonds; that the defendant came into lawful possession of said monies as an agent and employee of said United Theatres, Incorporated. Thus the ownership of the money, the source from whence it came, the lawful possession of the money by the defendant, as an agent, or employee, of the United Theatres, Incorporated, and the felonious conversion of the money by the defendant to his own use, were alleged.
We think: That the allegation that “the defendant having then and there come into the lawful possession of said monies • as an agent and employee of the said United Theatres, Incorporated,” should be taken in connection with the other allegations in the indictment and', so considered, it is an allegation of fact; that the facts alleged are sufficient to show that when the defendant, as an agent or employee, came into the lawful possession of said money, his possession was in trust; that the indictment is amply sufficient to sustain a plea of former jeopardy to any other indictment for the same offense, and that no omission therein hampered the defendant in preparing his defense.
Sec. 556, Title 18 U.S.C.A., is as follows:
“No indictment found and presented by a grand jury in any district or other court of the United States shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant.”
Sec. 391, Title 28 U.S.C.A., commands that we “shall give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”
The defendant, by his plea of-nolo con-tendere, admits the truth of the facts appropriately alleged in the indictment, and we think the facts alleged are sufficient to charge him with the crime of embezzling monies of the United States as defined in the statute under which the indictment here was brought.
The
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "criminal - federal offense"?
A. murder
B. rape
C. arson
D. aggravated assault
E. robbery
F. burglary
G. auto theft
H. larceny (over $50)
I. other violent crimes
J. narcotics
K. alcohol related crimes, prohibition
L. tax fraud
M. firearm violations
N. morals charges (e.g., gambling, prostitution, obscenity)
O. criminal violations of government regulations of business
P. other white collar crime (involving no force or threat of force; e.g., embezzlement, computer fraud,bribery)
Q. other crimes
R. federal offense, but specific crime not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_method | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine the nature of the proceeding in the court of appeals for the case, that is, the legal history of the case, indicating whether there had been prior appellate court proceeding on the same case prior to the decision currently coded. Assume that the case had been decided by the panel for the first time if there was no indication to the contrary in the opinion. The opinion usually, but not always, explicitly indicates when a decision was made "en banc" (though the spelling of "en banc" varies). However, if more than 3 judges were listed as participating in the decision, code the decision as enbanc even if there was no explicit description of the proceeding as en banc.
UNITED STATES of America v. Sherman KENDIS, Appellant.
Nos. 89-5260, 89-5261.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) July 5, 1989.
Decided Aug. 18, 1989.
Sherman Kendis, Fort Worth, Tex., pro se.
Donna A. Krappa, Edna Ball Axelrod, Newark, N.J., for appellee.
Before SLOVITER, HUTCHINSON and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by Sherman Kendis, pro se, from the order of the district court denying his motion for reconsideration of the court’s order denying his motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Fed.R. Crim.P. 35. Kendis, an attorney, pled guilty on February 9, 1987 to one count of bank fraud for unlawfully converting $144,976.29 while acting as an attorney for Ocean Club in Atlantic City by forging the signature of payees on checks given him for purposes of settlement of their claims. We shall refer to this matter as Kendis I. Pursuant to his plea agreement, Kendis was required, inter alia, to pay restitution to all potential victims. On April 10, 1987 Kendis was sentenced to five years imprisonment but all but six months of the incarceration were suspended and he was placed on five years probation to commence upon release. Execution of the sentence was stayed until May 4, 1987 when he reported for prison. On the same day he filed for personal bankruptcy.
Kendis was released from custody on September 21, 1987. In October 1987, the government moved to revoke Kendis’ probation on the ground that the money he had used to make restitution to clients during the period between the acceptance of his guilty plea and his sentencing was actually money which had been entrusted to him by other clients and which he had improperly converted to his own use.
In November, 1987 Kendis was indicted on five counts of bank fraud committed during the period between March 11, 1987 and May 4, 1987 while he was released on bail and awaiting sentencing in Kendis I. We shall refer to this matter as Kendis II.
On December 14, 1987, following a hearing on the revocation of probation issue, the district court revoked Kendis’ probation. Thereafter on September 30, 1988 Kendis pled guilty to two counts of the five count indictment in Kendis II. He was sentenced on October 13, 1988 to three years incarceration and a fine of $10,000 on each of the two counts to which he had pled guilty, the sentences to run consecutively, and was also ordered to pay $264,925 in restitution and a $100 special assessment. On the same day the district court vacated its sentence in Kendis I as a result of the revocation of Kendis’ probation, and sentenced him to four years incarceration to be served consecutively to that imposed in Kendis II. The court also directed that Kendis pay restitution as previously ordered.
On appeal Kendis contends first that the district court abused its discretion in revoking his probation on Kendis I because the offense on which the district court relied for such revocation occurred prior to his sentencing and hence while he was not on
Question: What is the nature of the proceeding in the court of appeals for this case?
A. decided by panel for first time (no indication of re-hearing or remand)
B. decided by panel after re-hearing (second time this case has been heard by this same panel)
C. decided by panel after remand from Supreme Court
D. decided by court en banc, after single panel decision
E. decided by court en banc, after multiple panel decisions
F. decided by court en banc, no prior panel decisions
G. decided by panel after remand to lower court
H. other
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_7-3-4 | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "economic activity and regulation - bankruptcy, antitrust, securities".
COCLIN TOBACCO CO., Inc., Creditor, Appellant, v. Robert J. GRISWOLD, Trustee, et al., Appellees. In the Matter of Louis G. GREENFIELD, Bankrupt.
No. 7057.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
April 9, 1969.
C. Delos, Putz, Jr., New York City, with whom Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, New York City, was on brief, for appellant.
Leonard Toboroff, Yonkers, N. Y., with whom Norman S. Isko, Yonkers, N. Y., was on brief, for Carvel Creditors, ap-pellee.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, Mc-ENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
COFFIN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico sitting in bankruptcy. The issues presented for our determination pertain to the allowance of the claims of the two major unsecured creditors of the bankrupt estate — appellant Coclin Tobacco and appellee Carvel, Inc.
Louis G. Greenfield, the bankrupt, was a partner in the now defunct New York City law firm of Greenfield, Rothstein, Klein & Yarnell. Both claims involved in this appeal arose out of the activities of the bankrupt’s law firm. In the interest of clarity the factual background of each claim will be set forth separately.
In March, 1962, Coclin engaged the bankrupt’s law firm for the purpose of bringing a private antitrust suit against Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company and British American Tobacco Company. Coclin paid a $15,000 retainer and on April 25, 1962, a complaint was filed in the Southern District of New York. In June of 1963 the bankrupt’s law firm failed to appear when Coclin’s case was called and the case was dismissed for lack of prosecution.
When Coclin discovered the dismissal it retained a new law firm and sought to restore the case to the docket. When attempts to restore the case failed, a new complaint was filed.
Coclin seeks to recover $15,000 paid under the retainer and $15,000 alleged to have been expended in the attempt to restore the original complaint and in the filing of the new complaint. Coclin is a partnership creditor.
Carvel’s claim rests upon a judgment of the New York Supreme Court rendered against the bankrupt for conspiracy to bring false and baseless lawsuits. The memorandum of decision directing judgment for Carvel in the amount of $11,580,488.34 was issued on April 11, 1966. The judgment was entered by the Clerk on July 25, 1966. Carvel is an individual creditor of the bankrupt.
On May 16, 1966, the bankrupt filed his petition in bankruptcy in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. After receiving proofs of claim, the referee allowed Carvel’s claims “provisionally” and disallowed Coclin’s claims as being contingent and unliquidated.
The district court affirmed the referee, holding that under New York law there must be an abandonment by. an attorney in order to entitle the client to recover money paid for legal services. The court found that Coclin had discharged the bankrupt’s firm and therefore its claim was disallowed. The court then held that Coclin was not a “person aggrieved” under § 39 of the Bankruptcy Act, and therefore had no standing to seek review of the Carvel claims.
Coclin brings this appeal. We reverse for the following reasons. In rejecting Coclin’s claim the court relied upon
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "economic activity and regulation - bankruptcy, antitrust, securities"?
A. bankruptcy - private individual (e.g., chapter 7)
B. bankruptcy - business reorganization (e.g., chapter 11)
C. other bankruptcy
D. antitrust - brought by individual or private business (includes Clayton Act; Sherman Act; and Wright-Patman)
E. antitrust - brought by government
F. regulation of, or opposition to mergers on other than anti-trust grounds
G. securities - conflicts between private parties (including corporations)
H. government regulation of securities
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_7-2 | E | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "economic activity and regulation".
The DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc., Intervenor, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION and United States of America, Respondents.
Nos. 78-3187, 78-3196.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued June 17, 1980.
Decided Sept. 5, 1980.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 22, 1980.
Harry H. Voigt, Michael F. McBride, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, Washington, D. C., for petitioner in No. 78-3187 and for intervenor.
Charles W. Campbell, Plainfield, Ind., for intervenor in No. 8-3187.
Peter A. Marquardt, Detroit, Mich., for petitioner in No. 78-3187.
Stephen S. Ostrach, Sheldon L. Trubatch, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., Washington, D. C., for respondents in Nos. 78-3187 and 78-3196.
Paul Rodgers, William R. Nusbaum, Nat. Ass’n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Charles Gray, Washington, D. C., for petitioner in No. 78-3196.
Stephen F. Eilperin, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., Washington, D. C., Griffin B. Bell, Atty. Gen. of U. S. Dept, of Justice, James W. Moorman, Edward Shawaker, Anne S. Almy, Washington, D. C., for respondents.
Before BROWN, MARTIN, and JONES, Circuit Judges.
BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge.
This care requires us to rule on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s present practice of regulating the location of electric transmission lines constructed in connection with proposed nuclear power facilities. We must determine whether or not the Commission’s policy of conditioning approval of license applications on environmentally acceptable routing of transmission lines exceeds the agency’s authority under the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. and the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (NEPA).
The Commission’s position on transmission line regulation has evolved over the past decade. Prior to the 1969 enactment of NEPA, the Commission perceived its duties under the Atomic Energy Act primarily in terms of protecting the public from radiation hazards. NEPA, however, made “environmental protection a part of the mandate of every federal agency and department... [The Commission] is not only permitted, but compelled, to take environmental values into account” in carrying out its regular functions. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C.Cir. 1971). Under NEPA, federal agencies must “use all practicable means” to avoid environmental “degradation” to the extent consistent with “other essential considerations of national policy.” 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b). Thus, in the early 1970’s the Commission began to consider the environmental implications of proposed nuclear facilities.
By 1974, the Commission had adopted an aggressive approach to its environmental responsibilities in the context of transmission line siting. In that year, the Commission’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board ruled that the Commission could, as a condition of licensure, insist that off-site transmission lines built solely to serve a nuclear facility be designed to minimize environmental disturbance. Detroit Edison (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 and 3) ALAB-247, 8 A.E.C. 936 (Greenwood).
The response to Greenwood among utility companies and local utility regulatory bodies was immediate. Public Service Company of Indiana and Detroit Edison Company filed a petition for rule-making pursuant to Section 2.802 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice. The
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "economic activity and regulation"?
A. taxes, patents, copyright
B. torts
C. commercial disputes
D. bankruptcy, antitrust, securities
E. misc economic regulation and benefits
F. property disputes
G. other
Answer: |
songer_genresp1 | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.
COOK v. UNITED STATES.
No. 4355.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
Dec. 28, 1948.
Writ of Certiorari Denied March 7, 1949.
See 69 S.Ct. 647.
William B. Sleigh, Jr., of Boston, Mass., for appellant.
Thomas P. O’Connor, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Boston, Mass. (William T. McCarthy, U. S. Atty., and Edward A. Counihan, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellee.
Before MAGRUDER, Chief Judge, and GOODRICH (by special assignment), and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges.
MAGRUDER, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from an order denying appellant’s motion to vacate judgment and sentence in Criminal No. 17205 and on Count 1 of the indictment in Criminal No. 17206, on which appellant had been tried in the court below and found guilty by a verdict of the jury.
In No.
Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_numresp | 1 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case. If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
UNITED STATES v. DICKINSON. SAME v. WITHROW.
Nos. 5419, 5420.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Jan. 4, 1946.
"Roger P.'Marqüis, Atty., Department of Justice, of Washington, D. C. (J.. Edward' Williams, Acting Head, Lands Division,' Department of Justice, of Washington, D. C., and Leslie E. Given, Ú. S. Atty., of Charleston, W. Va.,' on the brief), for appellant.
Ernest K. James, of Charleston,'W. Va., for appellees.
Before S'OPER, Circuit Judge, and COLEMAN and BARKSDALE, District Judges.
SOPER, Circuit Judge.
These appeals were taken by the United States from judgments against it'in two suits brought by landowners under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (20), to recover compensation for the taking of their, lands and for the erosion and intermittent flooding thereof caused by raising the water level of the Kanawha River in South Charleston, West Virginia, by the erection and operation of the Winfield Lock and Dam.
Dickinson’s land consisted of a tract 3.1 acres in extent which bounded on the low-water mark of the river for a distance of 411 'feet. Dickinson acquired the land on August 16, 1937, and between that date and September 22, 1938, which the court found to be the date of the taking, he made substantial improvements thereon in the form of' grading and filling, construction of sewers, water and gas lines, the installation of a gasoline filling station and the erection of a
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_respond1_3_3 | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)", specifically "other agency, beginning with "F" thru "N"". Your task is to determine which specific federal government agency best describes this litigant.
BANGOR AND AROOSTOOK RAILROAD COMPANY, Petitioner, v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent, Maine Central Railroad Company et al., Intervenors. MAINE CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, and Interstate Commerce Commission, Respondents, Bangor and Aroostook Railroad Company, Intervenor. Robert W. MESERVE and Benjamin H. Lacy, Trustees of the Property of Boston and Maine Corporation, Debtor, Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES of America, and Interstate Commerce Commission, Respondents.
Nos. 77-1082, 77-1105 and 77-1108.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Argued Sept. 12, 1977.
Decided March 30, 1978.
Rehearing Denied No. 77-1082 May 12, 1978. See 578 F.2d 444.
Laurence S. Fordham, Boston, Mass., with whom Verne W. Vance, Jr., Scott C. Moriearty, Boston, Mass., Todd D. Rakoff, Foley, Hoag & Eliot, Boston, Mass., William M. Houston, Edward T. Robinson, and Ga-ston, Snow & Ely Bartlett, Boston, Mass., were on briefs, for Bangor and Aroostook Railroad Co.
Peter J. Nickles and Eugene D. Gulland, Washington, D. C., with whom Covington & Burling, Washington, D. C., and Scott W. Scully, Portland, Me., were on briefs, for Maine Central Railroad Co.
Sidney Weinberg, Boston, Mass., for Robert W. Meserve and Benjamin H. Lacy, Trustees of the Property of Boston and Maine Corp., Debtor.
Lee A. Monroe and Sidley & Austin, Washington, D. C., on brief for intervenor Canadian Pacific Limited.
Charles H. White, Jr., Associate Gen. Counsel, Washington, D. C., with whom Mark L. Evans, Gen. Counsel, John H. Shenefield, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Carl D. Lawson, Daniel J. Conway, Attys., Dept, of Justice, and Raymond Michael Ripple, Atty., Washington, D. C., were on briefs, for I. C. C. and the United States.
Before CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge, TUTTLE, Circuit Judge, and WOLLENBERG, District Judge.
Of the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Of the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge.
These are consolidated petitions to review cease and desist orders and damage awards entered by the Interstate Commerce Commission in a report and order of February 4, 1977. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321, 2342, 2344. The Commission’s actions followed administrative proceedings concerning the legality of interchange arrangements between the Bangor and Aroostook Railroad Co.
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)", specifically "other agency, beginning with "F" thru "N"". Which specific federal government agency best describes this litigant?
A. Food & Drug Administration
B. General Services Administration
C. Government Accounting Office (GAO)
D. Health Care Financing Administration
E. Immigration & Naturalization Service (includes border patrol)
F. Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
G. Interstate Commerce Commission
H. Merit Systems Protection Board
I. National Credit Union Association
J. National Labor Relations Board
K. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Answer: |
songer_counsel2 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine the nature of the counsel for the respondent. If name of attorney was given with no other indication of affiliation, assume it is private - unless a government agency was the party
ZERBST, Warden, v. McPIKE.
No. 8634.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
June 16, 1938.
Lawrence S. Camp, U. S. A tty., and Flarvey H. Tisinger, H. T. Nichols, and J. Ellis Mundy, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.
Before FOSTER, SIBLEY, and HUT-CHESON, Circuit Judges.
SIBLEY, Circuit Judge.
Will McPike by habeas corpus challenged the legality of his imprisonment in the federal penitentiary at Atlanta, on the ground that the sentence of three years imposed on him Nov. 7, 1933, in the District Court for the Western District of Louisiana had expired. He obtained a judgment of discharge and the warden of the penitentiary appeals.
The undisputed evidence is that Mc-Pike was arrested by the State of Louisiana and was in the parish jail awaiting trial. On Nov. 6, 1933, he was 'indicted in the federal court for fraudulently impersonating a United States officer. On Nov. 7th the State officers brought McPike into the federal court and suffered him to be tried. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to serve in the penitentiary for three years, no time being fixed for the commencement of the sentence. He was then taken by the State officers back to jail. On Nov. 13th he was tried and convicted for a State offense and sentenced to the State penitentiary for three to five years. The commitment which the clerk of the federal court issued on Nov. 7th was not executed but was returned Nov. 24th with an entry that McPike was confined as a prisoner in the Louisiana penitentiary as a State prisoner. After serving the State sentence he was taken on an alias commitment to the federal penitentiary Aug. 2, 1936. The deputy marshal testifies that McPike was maintained in the jail as a State prisoner before and after his trial in federal court, and was never maintained there as a federal prisoner and the District Attorney who handled the case testifies that the State never yielded jurisdiction over him to the federal government, except to try him.
Under the inviolable rules of comity, which are reciprocal, the State having first arrested and imprisoned McPike could not without its consent be deprived of his custody until through with him. Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 16 L.Ed. 169; Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 4 S.Ct. 355, 28 L.Ed. 390. But the State could “lend” the prisoner to the federal government in order to afford him a speedy trial and to convenience the witnesses who might be necessary to be assembled for or against him. 'This can be done without a complete surrender of the prior jurisdiction over him which the State had acquired. This we think is fairly decided in the case of Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 42 S.Ct. 309, 66 L.Ed. 607, 22 A.L.R. 879. There the prisoner was serving a federal sentence and was taken on habeas corpus to the State court to be tried for a State offense, the federal officer accompanying him and maintaining federal custody. Ponzi was evidently to be returned to his federal service after the trial. It was held that the procedure was lawful. The fact that Ponzi was originally in federal rather than State custody does not alter the principle, nor does the fact that he had been already convicted when “loaned” to the State distinguish that case from this. The prior right acquired by first arrest continues unchanged until the arresting government has completed
Question: What is the nature of the counsel for the respondent?
A. none (pro se)
B. court appointed
C. legal aid or public defender
D. private
E. government - US
F. government - state or local
G. interest group, union, professional group
H. other or not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_usc1 | 26 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if no U.S. Code titles are cited. If one or more provisions are cited, code the number of the most frequently cited title.
SEELEY TUBE & BOX CO. v. MANNING.
No. 9693.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued Nov. 18, 1948.
Decided Dec. 20, 1948.
Albert Freeman, of Newark, N. J. (Bilder, Bilder & Kaufman, of Newark, N. J., and George G. Tyler and William J. Nolan, Jr., both of New York City, on the brief), for appellant.
S. Dee Hanson, of Washington, D. C. (Tfaeron Lamar Caudle, Asst. Atty. Gen., George A. Stinson and Robert N. Anderson, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., Isaiah Mat-lack, U. S. Atty., and Edward V. Ryan, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Newark, N. J., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and GOODRICH and O’CONNELL, Circuit Judges.
GOODRICH, Circuit Judge.
This is a suit by a taxpayer to get back some money from the Government. The taxpayer was entitled to a refund for taxes paid in 1941. It was repaid $40,384.66 and the Government kept back $4513.34 which it claimed as interest upon an alleged deficiency. The District Court denied relief to the taxpayer who, therefore, seeks help here.
The point of the case can best he understood if non-technically stated, leaving statutory references and the like for footnote elaboration. The taxpayer paid the tax it thought due for income and excess profits for 1941. Later deficiencies on both income and excess profits taxes were asserted by the Commissioner. Because the taxpayer had gone into bankruptcy the assessments were perfected in the accelerated fashion provided for in the statute. Then in 1943 the taxpayer had a severe operating loss. By the terms of the statute there is a carry-back provision for the operating loss and the taxpayer is entitled to credit therefor back through 1941. As a result of the application of the statutory rule the alleged deficiency in the taxpayer’s 1941 'tax disappeared. Not only that, but the taxpayer became entitled to a refund on the amount it had paid for the same year. It is the difference between what it paid and what the Government paid it back that is -the subject-matter of this suit.
It is argued on behalf of the Commissioner that the money was due when the deficiency was asserted. The Government is, on this argument, 'entitled to interest on the difference between what the taxpayer paid and what the Government claimed until the debt due the Government was swept away by the application of the carry-back provisions of the statute already mentioned. The taxpayer, on the other hand, says that it does not owe interest for non-payment of deficiencies in taxes which, in the light of subsequent events, have been found not to exist.
We think the argument here is overwhelmingly on the side of the taxpayer. It should be noted at the outset that the taxpayer is not claiming any interest from the United States. If it were, a different sort of problem would be presented and some of the rather elaborate argument made on behalf of the Commissioner would be in point. All the taxpayer wants is to get back the money it paid the Government which is undisputedly coming to it because of the carry-back provisions. It asks, in other words, for the return of principal only.
Interest not contracted for by the terms of an agreement between parties is generally described as damages for the detention -of money to which another is entitled. The Government adopts that theory in this case. But what money was the Government entitled to here? As it turned out, taxpayer not only did not owe any money, but had money coming back to it. The only thing on which an interest claim could be predicated is the inchoate liability of the taxpayer which disappeared under the application of the carry-back provisions of the statute. We think that inchoate liability is not sufficient to call for the payment of anything but inchoate interest, whatever that may be, and so far as real money is concerned the taxpayer is entitled to get it back.
Both sides admit there is little decided case law that is very helpful. The taxpayer certainly has analogous authority in its favor in one line of cases. These decisions allowed the recovery by the taxpayer against the Government of interest paid on a tax by the taxpayer in
Question: What is the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_initiate | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify what party initiated the appeal. For cases with cross appeals or multiple docket numbers, if the opinion does not explicitly indicate which appeal was filed first, assumes that the first litigant listed as the "appellant" or "petitioner" was the first to file the appeal. In federal habeas corpus petitions, consider the prisoner to be the plaintiff.
BISHOP et al. v. E. A. STROUT REALTY AGENCY, Inc.
No. 6066.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued April 19, 1950.
Decided May 29, 1950.
Sol C. Berenholtz, Baltimore, Md. (Solomon Kaplan, Baltimore,.Md., on brief), for appellants.
John W. T. Webb and William W. Travers, Salisbury, Md. (Webb, Bounds, Travers & Adkins, Salisbury, Md., on brief), for appellee.
Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SOPER.and DOBIE,,Circuit Judges.
PARKER, Chief Judge.
This is an' appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment for defendant on a directed verdict in an action to recover damages for deceit. Plaintiffs are husband and wife who purchased a tract of land with water frontage for the purpose of using it as an angler’s camp. The defendant is the real estate agency that is alleged to have sold the property acting through its local representative or “associate”, one Oscar C. Davis, who was not joined in the action. The complaint alleges that plaintiffs were induced to purchase the land through the false and fraudulent representations of Davis as to the depth of the adjacent water and that they suffered damage as a result. The case was heard before a jury' and the trial judge directed verdict for defendant on the ground that the falsity of the representations -could have been discovered by plaintiffs by an examination of the property purchased. Defendant contends that the direction of. the verdict should be sustained on the ground given 'by the trial judge and also on the additional 'grounds that no fraudulent intent was shown, that there was no proof of damage and that it was not shown that Davis was acting for defendant in the sale of the property.
As the case must be tried again it is not desirable to discuss the evidence in detail. It is sufficient to say that when taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as it must be on motion for, directed verdict, it was amply sufficient to take the case to the jury. There was evidence tending to show that the property was listed with defendant for sale, that Davis handled business for defendant in the locality where the land was situate and that defendant after-wards recognized the sale as having been made through its agency. There was evidence that' plaintiffs notified Davis of the purpose for which they desired the property and of the necessity of having deep water adjacent to it-so that boats could be brought in, and that they were assured by him that this property would suit them to a “T” and that the water adjacent was not less than six feet deep at low tide and nine feet or more deep at high tide. They testified that they were shown- the property at high tide and relied upon these statements of Davis without making soundings because they trusted him and had no reason to believe that he was not telling the truth. Plaintiffs paid $3,000 down, giving a $4,000 mortgage for the remainder of.the purchase price, and entered into possession and made certain expenditures for improvements. Shortly thereafter they discovered that the water adjacent to the property was very shallow. Because of this, it was not at all suited for the purpose for which it had been purchased and plaintiffs had to abandon it. When they attempted to see Davis, they were unable to get -him to meet with them to discuss the matter. The mortgage given by plaintiffs was foreclosed and the property was bought in at the foreclosure sale for the amount of the mortgage debt. The evidence thus presents all the elements necessary to a recovery on the ground of actionable fraud, which are set forth by the Court of--Appeals of Maryland in Gittings v. Von Dorn, 136 Md. 10, 15, 109 A. 553, 554, as follows:
“To entitle the plaintiff to recover it must be shown: 1. That the representation made is false; 2. that its falsity was either known to the speaker, or the misrepresentation was made with such a reckless indifference to truth as to be equivalent to actual knowledge; 3. that it was made for the purpose of defrauding the person claiming
Question: What party initiated the appeal?
A. Original plaintiff
B. Original defendant
C. Federal agency representing plaintiff
D. Federal agency representing defendant
E. Intervenor
F. Not applicable
G. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_r_stid | 14 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is a respondent.
Sampath K. HEMMIGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Cross-Appellee, v. CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al., Defendanfs-Appellees, and Cross-Appellants.
Nos. 83-1443, 83-1548.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Feb. 20, 1985.
Decided March 10, 1986.
Kathern MacKinnon, Northwestern Univ. Leg. Clinic, Chicago, 111., for plaintiff-appellant, and cross-appellee.
Maria Campo, Chicago Board of Educ. Legal Dept., Chicago, 111., for defendantsappellees, and cross-appellants.
Before CUDAHY, POSNER, Circuit Judges
Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is a respondent?
01. not
02. Alabama
03. Alaska
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. Florida
11. Georgia
12. Hawaii
13. Idaho
14. Illinois
15. Indiana
16. Iowa
17. Kansas
18. Kentucky
19. Louisiana
20. Maine
21. Maryland
22. Massachussets
23. Michigan
24. Minnesota
25. Mississippi
26. Missouri
27. Montana
28. Nebraska
29. Nevada
30. New
31. New
32. New
33. New
34. North
35. North
36. Ohio
37. Oklahoma
38. Oregon
39. Pennsylvania
40. Rhode
41. South
42. South
43. Tennessee
44. Texas
45. Utah
46. Vermont
47. Virginia
48. Washington
49. West
50. Wisconsin
51. Wyoming
52. Virgin
53. Puerto
54. District
55. Guam
56. not
57. Panama
Answer: |
sc_jurisdiction | B | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction. The Court uses a variety of means whereby it undertakes to consider cases that it has been petitioned to review. The most important ones are the writ of certiorari, the writ of appeal, and for legacy cases the writ of error, appeal, and certification. For cases that fall into more than one category, identify the manner in which the court takes jurisdiction on the basis of the writ. For example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), an original jurisdiction and a mandamus case, should be coded as mandamus rather than original jurisdiction due to the nature of the writ. Some legacy cases are "original" motions or requests for the Court to take jurisdiction but were heard or filed in another court. For example, Ex parte Matthew Addy S.S. & Commerce Corp., 256 U.S. 417 (1921) asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal judge. Do not code these cases as "original" jurisdiction cases but rather on the basis of the writ.
UNITED STATES v. OREGON STATE MEDICAL SOCIETY et al.
No. 19.
Argued January 4, 7, 1952.
Decided April 28, 1952.
Stanley M. Silverberg argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Morison, J. Roger Wollenberg and Daniel M. Friedman.
Nicholas Jaureguy argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Clarence D. Phillips and John J. Coughlin.
Mr. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a direct appeal by the United States from dismissal by the District Court of its complaint seeking an injunction to prevent and restrain violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2.
Appellees are the Oregon State Medical Society, eight county medical societies, Oregon Physicians’ Service (an Oregon corporation engaged in the sale of prepaid medical care), and eight doctors who are or have been at some time responsible officers in those organizations.
This controversy centers about two forms of “contract practice” of medicine. In one, private corporations organized for profit sell what amounts to a policy of insurance by which small periodic payments purchase the right to certain hospital facilities and medical attention. In the other¡ railroad and large industrial employers of labor contract with one or more doctors to treat their ailing or injured employees. Both forms of “contract practice,” for rendering the promised medical and surgical service, depend upon doctors or panels of doctors who cooperate on a fee basis or who associate themselves with the plan on a full- or part-time employment basis.
' Objections of the organized medical profession to contract practice are both monetary and ethical. Such practice diverts patients from independent practitioners to contract doctors. It tends to standardize fees. The ethical objection has been that intervention by employer or insurance company makes a tripartite matter of the doctor-patient relation. Since the contract doctor owes his employment and looks for his pay to the employer or the insurance company rather than to the patient, he serves two masters with conflicting interests. In many cases companies assumed liability for medical or surgical service only if they approved the treatment in advance. There was evidence of instances where promptly needed treatment was delayed while obtaining company approval, and where a lay insurance official disapproved treatment advised by a doctor.
In 1936, five private associations were selling prepaid medical certificates in Oregon, and doctors of that State, alarmed at the extent to which private practice was being invaded and superseded by contract practice, commenced a crusade to stamp it out. A tooth-and-claw struggle ensued between the organized medical profession, on the one hand, and the organizations employing contract doctors on the other. The campaign was bitter on both sides. State and county medical societies adopted resolutions and policy statements condemning contract practice and physicians who engaged in it. They brought pressure on individual doctors to decline or abandon it. They threatened expulsion from medical societies, and one society did expel several doctors for refusal to terminate contract practices.
However, in 1941, seven years before this action was commenced, there was an abrupt about-face on the part of the organized medical profession in Oregon. It
Question: What is the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction?
A. cert
B. appeal
C. bail
D. certification
E. docketing fee
F. rehearing or restored to calendar for reargument
G. injunction
H. mandamus
I. original
J. prohibition
K. stay
L. writ of error
M. writ of habeas corpus
N. unspecified, other
Answer: |
songer_typeiss | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court. Choose among the following categories. Criminal and prisioner petitions- includes appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence or the validity of continued confinement. Civil - Government - these will include appeals from administrative agencies (e.g., OSHA,FDA), the decisions of administrative law judges, or the decisions of independent regulatory agencies (e.g., NLRB, FCC,SEC). The focus in administrative law is usually on procedural principles that apply to administrative agencies as they affect private interests, primarily through rulemaking and adjudication. Tort actions against the government, including petitions by prisoners which challenge the conditions of their confinement or which seek damages for torts committed by prion officials or by police fit in this category. In addition, this category will include suits over taxes and claims for benefits from government. Diversity of Citizenship - civil cases involving disputes between citizens of different states (remember that businesses have state citizenship). These cases will always involve the application of state or local law. If the case is centrally concerned with the application or interpretation of federal law then it is not a diversity case. Civil Disputes - Private - includes all civil cases that do not fit in any of the above categories. The opposing litigants will be individuals, businesses or groups.
In re MILLER & HARBAUGH. HARBAUGH v. CLARK.
No. 6433.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Feb. 23, 1932.
Barnett H. Goldstein, H. E. Collier, and S. J. Bischoff, all of Portland, Or., for appellant.
Coan & Rosenberg, of Portland, Or., for appellee.
Before WILBUR and SAWTELLE, Circuit Judges and WEBSTER, District Judge.
Rehearing denied April 4, 1932.
PER CURIAM.
January 6, 1931, the order adjudging Paul C. Harbaugh in contempt of court was made and entered in the District Court of the United States for' the District of Oregon, for disobeying a turnover order made and entered in In re bankruptcy of Miller & Harbaugh, a corporation.
January 28, 1931, petition for allowance of appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was filed in the District Court of the United States for the District of Oregon.
January 28, 1931, assignment of errors was filed.
January 28, 1931, an order was made and entered allowing an appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
January 28, 1931, citation on appeal was issued and served on the appellee, and due and timely and legal service was admitted the same day.
April 7, 1931, the transcript in this cause was filed with the 'clerk of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the cause was duly docketed.
April 13, 1931, appellee entered his appearance in this court.
April 14, 1931, appellant’s brief was filed.
September 11, 1931, appellee’s brief was filed herein.
September 17, 1931, appellant’s reply brief was filed herein.
September 17, 1931, this cause was tried at the Portland, Or., session of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
September 21, 1931, appellee filed an additional brief.
October 26, 1931, a judgment was entered herein, 53 F.(2d) 176, reversing the order of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.
Thereafter appellee filed a petition and brief for a rehearing.
December 14, 1931, an order was entered herein denying the petition for a rehearing, 54 F.(2d) 612.
December 14, 1931, “upon application of Messrs. Coan & Rosenberg, counsel for the appellee,” an order Staying issuance of mandate was made and entered herein pending petition for a writ of certiorari to be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.
January 2, 1932, the clerk of this court forwarded (as of December 28, 1931), to the clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States the original and copies of the transcript
Question: What is the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court?
A. criminal and prisoner petitions
B. civil - government
C. diversity of citizenship
D. civil - private
E. other, not applicable
F. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_respondent | 080 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
001. attorney general of the United States, or his office
002. specified state board or department of education
003. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
004. state commission, board, committee, or authority
005. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
006. court or judicial district
007. state department or agency
008. governmental employee or job applicant
009. female governmental employee or job applicant
010. minority governmental employee or job applicant
011. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
012. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
013. retired or former governmental employee
014. U.S. House of Representatives
015. interstate compact
016. judge
017. state legislature, house, or committee
018. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
019. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
020. state or U.S. supreme court
021. local school district or board of education
022. U.S. Senate
023. U.S. senator
024. foreign nation or instrumentality
025. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
026. state college or university
027. United States
028. State
029. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
030. advertising business or agency
031. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
032. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
033. airline
034. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
035. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
036. American Medical Association
037. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
038. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
039. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
040. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
041. author, copyright holder
042. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
043. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
044. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
045. water transportation, stevedore
046. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
047. brewery, distillery
048. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
049. construction industry
050. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
051. business, corporation
052. buyer, purchaser
053. cable TV
054. car dealer
055. person convicted of crime
056. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
057. chemical company
058. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
059. religious organization, institution, or person
060. private club or facility
061. coal company or coal mine operator
062. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
063. consumer, consumer organization
064. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
065. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
066. defendant
067. debtor
068. real estate developer
069. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
070. distributor
071. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
072. drug manufacturer
073. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
074. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
075. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
076. electric equipment manufacturer
077. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
078. eleemosynary institution or person
079. environmental organization
080. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
081. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
082. father
083. female employee or job applicant
084. female
085. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
086. fisherman or fishing company
087. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
088. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
089. franchiser
090. franchisee
091. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
092. person who guarantees another's obligations
093. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
094. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
095. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
096. hospital, medical center
097. husband, or ex-husband
098. involuntarily committed mental patient
099. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
100. insurance company, or surety
101. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
102. investor
103. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
104. juvenile
105. government contractor
106. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
107. magazine
108. male
109. medical or Medicaid claimant
110. medical supply or manufacturing co.
111. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
112. minority female employee or job applicant
113. manufacturer
114. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
115. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
116. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
117. mother
118. auto manufacturer
119. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
120. radio and television network, except cable tv
121. nonprofit organization or business
122. nonresident
123. nuclear power plant or facility
124. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
125. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
126. tender offer
127. oil company, or natural gas producer
128. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
129. out of state noncriminal defendant
130. political action committee
131. parent or parents
132. parking lot or service
133. patient of a health professional
134. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
135. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
136. public interest organization
137. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
138. pipe line company
139. package, luggage, container
140. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
141. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
142. indigent defendant
143. private person
144. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
145. professional organization, business, or person
146. probationer, or parolee
147. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
148. public utility
149. publisher, publishing company
150. radio station
151. racial or ethnic minority
152. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
153. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
154. realtor
155. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
156. resident
157. restaurant, food vendor
158. retarded person, or mental incompetent
159. retired or former employee
160. railroad
161. private school, college, or university
162. seller or vendor
163. shipper, including importer and exporter
164. shopping center, mall
165. spouse, or former spouse
166. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
167. retail business or outlet
168. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
169. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
170. tenant or lessee
171. theater, studio
172. forest products, lumber, or logging company
173. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
174. trucking company, or motor carrier
175. television station
176. union member
177. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
178. union, labor organization, or official of
179. veteran
180. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
181. wholesale trade
182. wife, or ex-wife
183. witness, or person under subpoena
184. network
185. slave
186. slave-owner
187. bank of the united states
188. timber company
189. u.s. job applicants or employees
190. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
191. Atomic Energy Commission
192. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
193. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
194. Alien Property Custodian
195. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
196. Board of Immigration Appeals
197. Bureau of Indian Affairs
198. Bonneville Power Administration
199. Benefits Review Board
200. Civil Aeronautics Board
201. Bureau of the Census
202. Central Intelligence Agency
203. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
204. Department or Secretary of Commerce
205. Comptroller of Currency
206. Consumer Product Safety Commission
207. Civil Rights Commission
208. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
209. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
210. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
211. Drug Enforcement Agency
212. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
213. Department or Secretary of Energy
214. Department or Secretary of the Interior
215. Department of Justice or Attorney General
216. Department or Secretary of State
217. Department or Secretary of Transportation
218. Department or Secretary of Education
219. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
220. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
221. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
222. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
223. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
224. Federal Bureau of Prisons
225. Farm Credit Administration
226. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
227. Federal Credit Union Administration
228. Food and Drug Administration
229. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
230. Federal Energy Administration
231. Federal Election Commission
232. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
233. Federal Housing Administration
234. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
235. Federal Labor Relations Authority
236. Federal Maritime Board
237. Federal Maritime Commission
238. Farmers Home Administration
239. Federal Parole Board
240. Federal Power Commission
241. Federal Railroad Administration
242. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
243. Federal Reserve System
244. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
245. Federal Trade Commission
246. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
247. General Accounting Office
248. Comptroller General
249. General Services Administration
250. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
251. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
252. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
253. Interstate Commerce Commission
254. Indian Claims Commission
255. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
256. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
257. Information Security Oversight Office
258. Department or Secretary of Labor
259. Loyalty Review Board
260. Legal Services Corporation
261. Merit Systems Protection Board
262. Multistate Tax Commission
263. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
264. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
265. National Credit Union Administration
266. National Endowment for the Arts
267. National Enforcement Commission
268. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
269. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
270. National Mediation Board
271. National Railroad Adjustment Board
272. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
273. National Security Agency
274. Office of Economic Opportunity
275. Office of Management and Budget
276. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
277. Office of Personnel Management
278. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
279. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
280. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
281. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
282. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
283. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
284. U.S. Public Health Service
285. Postal Rate Commission
286. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
287. Renegotiation Board
288. Railroad Adjustment Board
289. Railroad Retirement Board
290. Subversive Activities Control Board
291. Small Business Administration
292. Securities and Exchange Commission
293. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
294. Selective Service System
295. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
296. Tennessee Valley Authority
297. United States Forest Service
298. United States Parole Commission
299. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
300. United States Sentencing Commission
301. Veterans' Administration
302. War Production Board
303. Wage Stabilization Board
304. General Land Office of Commissioners
305. Transportation Security Administration
306. Surface Transportation Board
307. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
308. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
309. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
310. Unidentifiable
311. International Entity
Answer: |
songer_typeiss | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court. Choose among the following categories. Criminal and prisioner petitions- includes appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence or the validity of continued confinement. Civil - Government - these will include appeals from administrative agencies (e.g., OSHA,FDA), the decisions of administrative law judges, or the decisions of independent regulatory agencies (e.g., NLRB, FCC,SEC). The focus in administrative law is usually on procedural principles that apply to administrative agencies as they affect private interests, primarily through rulemaking and adjudication. Tort actions against the government, including petitions by prisoners which challenge the conditions of their confinement or which seek damages for torts committed by prion officials or by police fit in this category. In addition, this category will include suits over taxes and claims for benefits from government. Diversity of Citizenship - civil cases involving disputes between citizens of different states (remember that businesses have state citizenship). These cases will always involve the application of state or local law. If the case is centrally concerned with the application or interpretation of federal law then it is not a diversity case. Civil Disputes - Private - includes all civil cases that do not fit in any of the above categories. The opposing litigants will be individuals, businesses or groups.
Winthrop C. CONDICT and Elsie E. Condict, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Alden Revelle CONDICT, Karen K. Condict, Leland Thomas Grieve, Kermit Brown, John MacPherson, James W. Hearne, Keith Schafer, Sharen Schafer, Ted Jenkins, Walter Junior Leavelle, Garland Bartlett, Sr., and Garland Bartlett, Jr., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 85-2001.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
March 25, 1987.
Herbert K. Doby of Elletson, Doby & Felde, Cheyenne, Wyo., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Randall R. Steichen (Raymond J. Turner, with him on the brief) of Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colo., for Alden Revelle Condict, Karen K. Condict, Keith Schafer, Sharen Schafer, Ted Jenkins, Garland Bartlett, Sr., Garland Bartlett, Jr., and James W. Hearne, defendants-appellees.
Blair J. Trautwein of Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, Cheyenne, Wyo. (Kermit C. Brown of Brown & Davidson, Rollins, Wyo., with him on the brief), for Leland Thomas Grieve and Kermit C. Brown, defendantsappellees.
James A. Applegate of Hirst & Apple-gate, Cheyenne, Wyo., for John MacPherson, defendant-appellee.
Robert A. Van Vooren (of counsel) of Lane & Waterman, Davenport, Iowa, for James W. Hearne, defendant-appellee.
Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, and BALDOCK and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
This case was formerly published at 815 F.2d 579. Republication was required because of inadvertent omission of a portion of footnote 3.
McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
This case represents an effort to fit a family dispute over a family ranching operation into the RICO mold. The district court held that it didn’t fit and entered summary judgment on June 5,1985, for the defendants on the RICO claim and also dismissed a pendant claim based on common law fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. We see no fit either, and on that basis we affirm.
The Condict ranch properties at one time occupied approximately 26,000 acres in Carbon County, Wyoming, and ranching operations were begun in about 1885 by Winthrop C. Condict. His son, Winthrop C. Condict II, ran the ranch until his death in 1955. The will of Winthrop C. Condict II distributed the ranch property as follows: one-half interest to his wife, Aurilla, and one-sixth interests to each of his three children, Alden Condict, Winthrop C. Condict III, and Maysel Condict Beales. Thereafter the Condict Ranch was operated under a general partnership agreement by Aurilla Condict, the surviving widow; Ald
Question: What is the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court?
A. criminal and prisoner petitions
B. civil - government
C. diversity of citizenship
D. civil - private
E. other, not applicable
F. not ascertained
Answer: |
Subsets and Splits