innateness i made the following claim in my 22 - dec-94 posting : " if x happens because y is innate , then this is a perfectly valid explanation for x 's occurrence ; if x happens for some other reason , then it 's not valid . " i thought that this claim , being tautologous ( if we know what causes x , then we ' ve got an explanation for it ) , required no justification , but apparently i was wrong , since david powers ( 13 - jan-95 ) objects , on the basis that ` " innateness " amounts to saying " because it [ ' ] s a fact of life " . . . and saying that " we are born with it " is not an explanation . ' that is , apparently , even if we know that we are born with y , and that x happens because of this , we still have n't explained x 's occurrence . huh ? ( granted , we may now want to explain why " we are born with y " , too . but surely we ' ve got an explanation of some sort here , however partial it ultimately turns out be . and it 's got to be better than the relevant alternative : x happens because we learn x on the basis of " general learning principles " . ) i do think he has a legitimate objection to something , however , as discussed below . but first : perhaps i can put it another way , as i have elsewhere in the context of a fuller discussion ( " on explaining the phoneme : why ( some of ) phonology { \ bf is } natural " , bls 11 : 25-38 ( 1985 ) , p . 31 ) : a claim about innateness ( or lack thereof ) ` . . . should [ be ] evaluate [ d ] on the same basis [ as any other ] : does the evidence support the claim about innateness or does it not ? it would be just as wrong to claim that something that is innate is not , as to claim that something that is not innate is ' . it is true that making a claim about innatenes without evidence reveals " laziness of the mind " , but so does making a claim about lack of innateness . powers continues : ` . . . the science comes when we show ( a ) the sufficiency ; ( b ) the necessity & ( c ) the source of the posited [ innate ] constructs . ug is concentrating on ( a ) and there is a tendency to deprecate those who are interested in ( b ) and ( c ) - which go beyond the bound set by innateness . ' if ` ug ' really is out there running around making innateness claims solely on the basis of sufficiency arguments ( and i do n't doubt that some folks do this , alas ) , then i can understand why innateness has gotten a bad name . translating into syllogism-ese , such an argument would have the following form : " y is innate " entails x ; x is true ; therefore y is innate . logicians have a name for arguments of this form : " affirming the consequent " ; this is a classical logical fallacy . but , while individual practicioners may be guilty as charged , it is at least not always the case that innateness claims are made with disregard for ( b ) : arguments from " the poverty of the stimulus " , the unavailability of negative ( ungrammaticality ) evidence , and the ( alleged ) lack of errors by children that violate structure dependency are all clearly cases in point . ( see , e . g . , chomsky 's _ reflections on language _ . ) note further that my requirement in the above quote is stronger than requiring just ( a ) and ( b ) : " y causes x " entails " y is necessary and sufficient for x " , but not vice versa ( e . g . , if z causes both y and x ) . and , while i agree that deciding to pursue ( c ) should not be grounds for deprecation , neither should , i would think , deciding not to pursue it . this elephant is too big for any one " blind man " to figure out alone ! don churma , dept . of english , ball state univeristy , muncie , in 47306