Who is Stealing My Power III: An Adnetwork Company Case Study
<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>We recently noticed that one of the ad network provider started to perform in-browser coinhive cryptojacking when users visit websites which use this provider’s ad network service.</p>
<p>As early as mid 2017, this ad network provider has been using domain DGA technology to generate seemingly random domains to bypass adblock to ensure that the ads it serves can reach the end users. The typical domains look like this : [az]{8,14}.(bid|com), we call it <strong>DGA.popad</strong>.</p>
<p>Starting from 2017-12, the bar got raised again and we began to see these DGA.popad domains participating in cryptojacking without end-users acknowledgement.</p>
<p>The confrontation between ad network companies and ad blocking plug-ins is nothing new, but ad network participating web mining using dga domains deserves our attention.</p>
<h4 id="thisadnetworkproviderinanutshell">This Ad Network Provider in a Nut Shell</h4>
<p>As this simple figure shows, most of the advertisements are provided by ad network companies when users visit websites, ad network acts as an important bridge between advertisers and publishers(the website users visit). For more information about Adnetwork please refer to [1].</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/ads-network.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Advertisement in internet is so popular in nowadays, that you can be quite sure most top content site will not only serve numerous visitors the content, but also redirect the traffic to some adnetwork company to sell advertisement. Through this traffic, an adnetwork company technically can deliver anything to the end-users, good, bad, or ugly.</p>
<p>On the other side, most end users do not like advertisement very much when they browse websites, that is why plug-ins like adblock are so popular. As declared in Chrome Store, the adblock plug-in owns 40 million users.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/ad-block.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>However, adnetwork providers are not so keen about this idea as this surely impact their profitability. So, to avoid being blocked, this ad network provider uses dga domains to host its advertisements. As these DGA.popad domain names are not fixed and changed daily, blocking them become more difficult.</p>
<p>Part of these <strong>DGA.popad</strong> domains are shown as below. For those who don’t have necessary resource to track these domains, this  <a href="https://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts"><strong>GitHub page</strong></a> lists the DGA.popad domain names this ad network provider uses.</p>
<pre><code>zyleqnzmvupg.com
zylokfmgrtzv.com
zymaevtin.bid
zzevmjynoljz.bid
zziblxasbl.bid
zzvjaqnkq.bid
zzwzjidz.bid
</code></pre>
<h4 id="startingfrom201712dgapopadareusedforcoinhivecryptojacking">Starting from 2017-12, DGA.popad Are Used for Coinhive Cryptojacking</h4>
<p>We know in-browser cryptojacking uses JavaScript from providers, on a web page to mine for cryptocurrencies. There has been some top websites such as Pirate Bay [6] being reported to mine cryptocurrency by leveraging end users’ computing power when the users visit their webpages.</p>
<p>In this case, these DGA.popad domains were found performing cryptojacking when we were doing an internet scale web mining measurement, and monitoring on Alexa top 300k domains, described in our previous blogs <a href="__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon">here</a> and <a href="__GHOST_URL__/https-blog-netlab-360-com-the-list-of-top-alexa-websites-with-web-mining-code-embedded-on-their-homepage-cn/">here</a>.</p>
<p>During our measurement, we found these DGA.popad domains:</p>
<ul>
<li>having a strong connection with coinhive family domains in DNS traffic</li>
<li>serving coinhive.min.js web miner from coinhive family</li>
<li>at least since December 2017</li>
<li>ranking as high as around 2000 in Alexa top site list. For example, arfttojxv.com ranks 1999 according to Censys:</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>1999 arfttojxv.com
2011 vimenhhpqnb.com
2071 ftymjfywuyv.com
2192 wpqmptpavn.com
2442 buhxsaifjxupaj.com
2965 jeksffryglas.com
3026 wkmuxmlk.com
</code></pre>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/web-mining-sites-with-dga-popad-highlighted.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>For a fact check, we tried to visit one of this website, the moment we load the page, CPU utilization soared to 100%:</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/cpu_usage_when_open_jccdpudtb.bid.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>And we also noticed that the favicon.ico from the DGA.popad sites also runs as a web miner. As shown below:</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/favicon_also_used_to_diliver_web_miner.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<h4 id="thetrafficsourceofthesedgapopaddomains">The Traffic Source of These DGA.popad Domains</h4>
<p>By using our DNSMon system, we can find the content websites which the end users first visit and then redirected to DGA.popad domains. We looked up the history of the last two months, and the result suggests that the majority of these impacted are websites providing porn and downloading services. Some of the domain names are as follows:</p>
<pre><code>www.javjunkies.com
hitomi.la
btdb.to
ouo.io
www.torrentkitty.tv
www.jkforum.net
rarbg.is
hpjav.com
theporndude.com
www.veporn.live
www.thisav.com
watchjavonline.com
syndication.exosrv.com
svscomics.com
openload.co
ancensored.com
www.javdoe.com
torrentsgroup.com
ouo.press
javfor.me
img.yt
www.viralvideos.pro
www.jisutiyu.com
www.javqd.com
www.freebunker.com
www5.javmost.com
v.pptv.com
syndication.exdynsrv.com
sukebei.nyaa.si
streamango.com
sharemods.com
popjav.com
ho.lazada.com.my
fmovies.pe
faptitans.com
dzyqqwixizp.com
dailyuploads.net
</code></pre>
<h4 id="adetailedprocessdescription">A Detailed Process Description</h4>
<p>Let's take a close look at the whole data flow using the first website in the list. To illustrate how this provider works around adblock, let’s run two different scenarios, first without adblock, then with adblock on.</p>
<h6 id="withadblockdisabled">With Adblock Disabled</h6>
<p>The process is as follows:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>#1</strong> No. 237 visit <strong>www.javjunkies.com</strong>/main/. This is a porn site, the java-script at the page's ads position will try to visit this provider's domain.</li>
<li><strong>#2</strong> No. 254 a request to <strong>serve.popads.net</strong>, a standard domain hosted by this provider. Here it is trying to get a URL for the coming advertisement.</li>
<li><strong>#3</strong> No. 268 will try to request for the ad link to get the final advertisement URI, (red box highlighted). Note in addition to get the final advertisement URI, there is also a script to get <strong>coinhive.min.js</strong>, so cryptojacking will happen.</li>
</ul>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-disabled--1-from-javajunkies.com-to-popads.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-disabled--2-from-popads-get-web-miner.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<h6 id="withadblockenabled">With Adblock Enabled</h6>
<p>Most of the steps are the same with above scenario, but with adblock on, serve.popads.net is replaced with one of the <strong>DGA.popad</strong> domain to serve the advertisement. The whole process is as follows:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>#1</strong> No. 449, another request to <strong>www.javjunkies.com</strong></li>
<li><strong>#2</strong> Since adblock is enabled, domain serve.popad.net was blocked.  This provider's js code will switched to one of the DGA.popad domain name <strong>tncexvzu.com</strong>. No.486 is a request for the ad link to get the final advertisement URI</li>
<li><strong>#3</strong> No.495 will load the advertisement, as well as the cryptojacking.</li>
</ul>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-enabled--1-from-javajunkies.com-to-popads.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-enabled--2-from-popads-get-web-miner.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<h4 id="theimpactandminingprofitsofdgapopaddomains">The Impact and Mining Profits of DGA.popad Domains</h4>
<p>The Impact:</p>
<ul>
<li>These cryptojacking actions started at least since December 2017</li>
<li>The affected users may be quite a lot, since these DGA.popad domains have as high as <strong>Alexa scores around 2000</strong></li>
<li>We are not able to make a detailed assessment. This is because only part of all the traffic passing DGA.popad and serve.popads.net will be inserted a web miner, but we are not sure which part will be selected, for now.</li>
</ul>
<p>We have no idea about the mining profits:</p>
<ul>
<li>We do make sure <strong>T3z562MP2Zg1lIa7RUJy19d67woeZmJJ</strong> is the most used site_key by this ad provider.</li>
<li>But we cannot find the related wallet address, or the profits, according to coinhive and Monero's policy.</li>
</ul>
<p>We will continue to keep an eye on such domain name behavior, if you have more detailed or insights, please feel free to ping us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a> or leave a message.</p>
<h4 id="references">References</h4>
<ol>
<li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advertising_network">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advertising_network</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.google.com.hk/search?newwindow=1&amp;safe=strict&amp;q=anti+adblock&amp;spell=1&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiPvMn31prYAhVIopQKHR1mCHMQvwUIIigA&amp;biw=1920&amp;bih=1067">https://www.google.com.hk/search?newwindow=1&amp;safe=strict&amp;q=anti+adblock&amp;spell=1&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiPvMn31prYAhVIopQKHR1mCHMQvwUIIigA&amp;biw=1920&amp;bih=1067</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/firefox/comments/4wpd23/popads_just_announced_that_they_have_a_new_method/">https://www.reddit.com/r/firefox/comments/4wpd23/popads_just_announced_that_they_have_a_new_method/</a></li>
<li><a href="https://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts">https://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.infzm.com/content/131666">http://www.infzm.com/content/131666</a></li>
<li><a href="http://hackernews.cc/archives/14794">http://hackernews.cc/archives/14794</a></li>
<li><a href="https://censys.io/domain?q=%22coinhive.min.js%22">https://censys.io/domain?q=&quot;coinhive.min.js&quot;</a></li>
</ol>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown-->
We recently noticed that one of the ad network provider started to perform in-browser coinhive cryptojacking when users visit websites which use this provider’s ad network service.


As early as mid 2017, this ad network provider has been using domain DGA technology to generate seemingly random domains to bypass adblock to ensure that the ads it serves can reach the end users. The typical domains look like this : [az]{8,14}.(bid|com), we call it DGA.popad.


Starting from 2017-12, the bar got raised again and we began to see these DGA.popad domains participating in cryptojacking without end-users acknowledgement.


The confrontation between ad network companies and ad blocking plug-ins is nothing new, but ad network participating web mining using dga domains deserves our attention.


This Ad Network Provider in a Nut Shell


As this simple figure shows, most of the advertisements are provided by ad network companies when users visit websites, ad network acts as an important bridge between advertisers and publishers(the website users visit). For more information about Adnetwork please refer to [1].





Advertisement in internet is so popular in nowadays, that you can be quite sure most top content site will not only serve numerous visitors the content, but also redirect the traffic to some adnetwork company to sell advertisement. Through this traffic, an adnetwork company technically can deliver anything to the end-users, good, bad, or ugly.


On the other side, most end users do not like advertisement very much when they browse websites, that is why plug-ins like adblock are so popular. As declared in Chrome Store, the adblock plug-in owns 40 million users.





However, adnetwork providers are not so keen about this idea as this surely impact their profitability. So, to avoid being blocked, this ad network provider uses dga domains to host its advertisements. As these DGA.popad domain names are not fixed and changed daily, blocking them become more difficult.


Part of these DGA.popad domains are shown as below. For those who don’t have necessary resource to track these domains, this GitHub page lists the DGA.popad domain names this ad network provider uses.


zyleqnzmvupg.com
zylokfmgrtzv.com
zymaevtin.bid
zzevmjynoljz.bid
zziblxasbl.bid
zzvjaqnkq.bid
zzwzjidz.bid



Starting from 2017-12, DGA.popad Are Used for Coinhive Cryptojacking


We know in-browser cryptojacking uses JavaScript from providers, on a web page to mine for cryptocurrencies. There has been some top websites such as Pirate Bay [6] being reported to mine cryptocurrency by leveraging end users’ computing power when the users visit their webpages.


In this case, these DGA.popad domains were found performing cryptojacking when we were doing an internet scale web mining measurement, and monitoring on Alexa top 300k domains, described in our previous blogs here and here.


During our measurement, we found these DGA.popad domains:


 * having a strong connection with coinhive family domains in DNS traffic
 * serving coinhive.min.js web miner from coinhive family
 * at least since December 2017
 * ranking as high as around 2000 in Alexa top site list. For example, arfttojxv.com ranks 1999 according to Censys:


1999 arfttojxv.com
2011 vimenhhpqnb.com
2071 ftymjfywuyv.com
2192 wpqmptpavn.com
2442 buhxsaifjxupaj.com
2965 jeksffryglas.com
3026 wkmuxmlk.com






For a fact check, we tried to visit one of this website, the moment we load the page, CPU utilization soared to 100%:





And we also noticed that the favicon.ico from the DGA.popad sites also runs as a web miner. As shown below:





The Traffic Source of These DGA.popad Domains


By using our DNSMon system, we can find the content websites which the end users first visit and then redirected to DGA.popad domains. We looked up the history of the last two months, and the result suggests that the majority of these impacted are websites providing porn and downloading services. Some of the domain names are as follows:


www.javjunkies.com
hitomi.la
btdb.to
ouo.io
www.torrentkitty.tv
www.jkforum.net
rarbg.is
hpjav.com
theporndude.com
www.veporn.live
www.thisav.com
watchjavonline.com
syndication.exosrv.com
svscomics.com
openload.co
ancensored.com
www.javdoe.com
torrentsgroup.com
ouo.press
javfor.me
img.yt
www.viralvideos.pro
www.jisutiyu.com
www.javqd.com
www.freebunker.com
www5.javmost.com
v.pptv.com
syndication.exdynsrv.com
sukebei.nyaa.si
streamango.com
sharemods.com
popjav.com
ho.lazada.com.my
fmovies.pe
faptitans.com
dzyqqwixizp.com
dailyuploads.net



A Detailed Process Description


Let's take a close look at the whole data flow using the first website in the list. To illustrate how this provider works around adblock, let’s run two different scenarios, first without adblock, then with adblock on.


With Adblock Disabled


The process is as follows:


 * #1 No. 237 visit www.javjunkies.com/main/. This is a porn site, the java-script at the page's ads position will try to visit this provider's domain.
 * #2 No. 254 a request to serve.popads.net, a standard domain hosted by this provider. Here it is trying to get a URL for the coming advertisement.
 * #3 No. 268 will try to request for the ad link to get the final advertisement URI, (red box highlighted). Note in addition to get the final advertisement URI, there is also a script to get coinhive.min.js, so cryptojacking will happen.







With Adblock Enabled


Most of the steps are the same with above scenario, but with adblock on, serve.popads.net is replaced with one of the DGA.popad domain to serve the advertisement. The whole process is as follows:


 * #1 No. 449, another request to www.javjunkies.com
 * #2 Since adblock is enabled, domain serve.popad.net was blocked.  This provider's js code will switched to one of the DGA.popad domain name tncexvzu.com. No.486 is a request for the ad link to get the final advertisement URI
 * #3 No.495 will load the advertisement, as well as the cryptojacking.







The Impact and Mining Profits of DGA.popad Domains


The Impact:


 * These cryptojacking actions started at least since December 2017
 * The affected users may be quite a lot, since these DGA.popad domains have as high as Alexa scores around 2000
 * We are not able to make a detailed assessment. This is because only part of all the traffic passing DGA.popad and serve.popads.net will be inserted a web miner, but we are not sure which part will be selected, for now.


We have no idea about the mining profits:


 * We do make sure T3z562MP2Zg1lIa7RUJy19d67woeZmJJ is the most used site_key by this ad provider.
 * But we cannot find the related wallet address, or the profits, according to coinhive and Monero's policy.


We will continue to keep an eye on such domain name behavior, if you have more detailed or insights, please feel free to ping us on twitter or leave a message.


References


 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advertising_network
 2. https://www.google.com.hk/search?newwindow=1&safe=strict&q=anti+adblock&spell=1&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiPvMn31prYAhVIopQKHR1mCHMQvwUIIigA&biw=1920&bih=1067
 3. https://www.reddit.com/r/firefox/comments/4wpd23/popads_just_announced_that_they_have_a_new_method/
 4. https://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts
 5. http://www.infzm.com/content/131666
 6. http://hackernews.cc/archives/14794
 7. https://censys.io/domain?q="coinhive.min.js"

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"We recently noticed that one of the ad network provider started to perform in-browser coinhive cryptojacking when users visit websites which use this provider’s ad network service.\n\nAs early as mid 2017, this ad network provider has been using domain DGA technology to generate seemingly random domains to bypass adblock to ensure that the ads it serves can reach the end users. The typical domains look like this : [az]{8,14}\\.(bid|com), we call it **DGA.popad**.\n\nStarting from 2017-12, the bar got raised again and we began to see these DGA.popad domains participating in cryptojacking without end-users acknowledgement.\n\nThe confrontation between ad network companies and ad blocking plug-ins is nothing new, but ad network participating web mining using dga domains deserves our attention.\n\n#### This Ad Network Provider in a Nut Shell\n\nAs this simple figure shows, most of the advertisements are provided by ad network companies when users visit websites, ad network acts as an important bridge between advertisers and publishers(the website users visit). For more information about Adnetwork please refer to [1].\n \n![](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/ads-network.png)\n\nAdvertisement in internet is so popular in nowadays, that you can be quite sure most top content site will not only serve numerous visitors the content, but also redirect the traffic to some adnetwork company to sell advertisement. Through this traffic, an adnetwork company technically can deliver anything to the end-users, good, bad, or ugly.  \n\nOn the other side, most end users do not like advertisement very much when they browse websites, that is why plug-ins like adblock are so popular. As declared in Chrome Store, the adblock plug-in owns 40 million users.\n\n![](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/ad-block.png)\n\nHowever, adnetwork providers are not so keen about this idea as this surely impact their profitability. So, to avoid being blocked, this ad network provider uses dga domains to host its advertisements. As these DGA.popad domain names are not fixed and changed daily, blocking them become more difficult. \n\nPart of these **DGA.popad** domains are shown as below. For those who don’t have necessary resource to track these domains, this  [**GitHub page**](https://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts) lists the DGA.popad domain names this ad network provider uses.\n\n```\nzyleqnzmvupg.com\nzylokfmgrtzv.com\nzymaevtin.bid\nzzevmjynoljz.bid\nzziblxasbl.bid\nzzvjaqnkq.bid\nzzwzjidz.bid\n```\n\n#### Starting from 2017-12, DGA.popad Are Used for Coinhive Cryptojacking\n\nWe know in-browser cryptojacking uses JavaScript from providers, on a web page to mine for cryptocurrencies. There has been some top websites such as Pirate Bay [6] being reported to mine cryptocurrency by leveraging end users’ computing power when the users visit their webpages. \n\nIn this case, these DGA.popad domains were found performing cryptojacking when we were doing an internet scale web mining measurement, and monitoring on Alexa top 300k domains, described in our previous blogs [here](__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon) and [here](__GHOST_URL__/https-blog-netlab-360-com-the-list-of-top-alexa-websites-with-web-mining-code-embedded-on-their-homepage-cn/). \n\nDuring our measurement, we found these DGA.popad domains:\n\n - having a strong connection with coinhive family domains in DNS traffic\n - serving coinhive.min.js web miner from coinhive family\n - at least since December 2017\n - ranking as high as around 2000 in Alexa top site list. For example, arfttojxv.com ranks 1999 according to Censys:\n\n```\n1999 arfttojxv.com\n2011 vimenhhpqnb.com\n2071 ftymjfywuyv.com\n2192 wpqmptpavn.com\n2442 buhxsaifjxupaj.com\n2965 jeksffryglas.com\n3026 wkmuxmlk.com\n```\n![](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/web-mining-sites-with-dga-popad-highlighted.png)\n\nFor a fact check, we tried to visit one of this website, the moment we load the page, CPU utilization soared to 100%:\n\n![](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/cpu_usage_when_open_jccdpudtb.bid.png)\n\nAnd we also noticed that the favicon.ico from the DGA.popad sites also runs as a web miner. As shown below: \n\n![](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/favicon_also_used_to_diliver_web_miner.png)\n\n#### The Traffic Source of These DGA.popad Domains\n\n By using our DNSMon system, we can find the content websites which the end users first visit and then redirected to DGA.popad domains. We looked up the history of the last two months, and the result suggests that the majority of these impacted are websites providing porn and downloading services. Some of the domain names are as follows: \n\n```\nwww.javjunkies.com\nhitomi.la\nbtdb.to\nouo.io\nwww.torrentkitty.tv\nwww.jkforum.net\nrarbg.is\nhpjav.com\ntheporndude.com\nwww.veporn.live\nwww.thisav.com\nwatchjavonline.com\nsyndication.exosrv.com\nsvscomics.com\nopenload.co\nancensored.com\nwww.javdoe.com\ntorrentsgroup.com\nouo.press\njavfor.me\nimg.yt\nwww.viralvideos.pro\nwww.jisutiyu.com\nwww.javqd.com\nwww.freebunker.com\nwww5.javmost.com\nv.pptv.com\nsyndication.exdynsrv.com\nsukebei.nyaa.si\nstreamango.com\nsharemods.com\npopjav.com\nho.lazada.com.my\nfmovies.pe\nfaptitans.com\ndzyqqwixizp.com\ndailyuploads.net\n```\n\n#### A Detailed Process Description\n\nLet's take a close look at the whole data flow using the first website in the list. To illustrate how this provider works around adblock, let’s run two different scenarios, first without adblock, then with adblock on.\n\n###### With Adblock Disabled\n\nThe process is as follows:\n\n- **#1** No. 237 visit **www.javjunkies.com**/main/. This is a porn site, the java-script at the page's ads position will try to visit this provider's domain.\n- **#2** No. 254 a request to **serve.popads.net**, a standard domain hosted by this provider. Here it is trying to get a URL for the coming advertisement.\n- **#3** No. 268 will try to request for the ad link to get the final advertisement URI, (red box highlighted). Note in addition to get the final advertisement URI, there is also a script to get **coinhive.min.js**, so cryptojacking will happen. \n\n![](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-disabled--1-from-javajunkies.com-to-popads.png)\n![](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-disabled--2-from-popads-get-web-miner.png)\n\n\n###### With Adblock Enabled\n\nMost of the steps are the same with above scenario, but with adblock on, serve.popads.net is replaced with one of the **DGA.popad** domain to serve the advertisement. The whole process is as follows: \n\n - **#1** No. 449, another request to **www.javjunkies.com**\n - **#2** Since adblock is enabled, domain serve.popad.net was blocked.  This provider's js code will switched to one of the DGA.popad domain name **tncexvzu.com**. No.486 is a request for the ad link to get the final advertisement URI\n - **#3** No.495 will load the advertisement, as well as the cryptojacking.\n\n![](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-enabled--1-from-javajunkies.com-to-popads.png)\n![](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-enabled--2-from-popads-get-web-miner.png)\n\n#### The Impact and Mining Profits of DGA.popad Domains\n\n\nThe Impact:\n\n-\tThese cryptojacking actions started at least since December 2017\n-\tThe affected users may be quite a lot, since these DGA.popad domains have as high as **Alexa scores around 2000**\n-\tWe are not able to make a detailed assessment. This is because only part of all the traffic passing DGA.popad and serve.popads.net will be inserted a web miner, but we are not sure which part will be selected, for now.\n\nWe have no idea about the mining profits:\n\n-\tWe do make sure **T3z562MP2Zg1lIa7RUJy19d67woeZmJJ** is the most used site_key by this ad provider.\n-\tBut we cannot find the related wallet address, or the profits, according to coinhive and Monero's policy.\n\nWe will continue to keep an eye on such domain name behavior, if you have more detailed or insights, please feel free to ping us on [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or leave a message. \n\n\n#### References\n1.\thttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advertising_network\n2.\thttps://www.google.com.hk/search?newwindow=1&safe=strict&q=anti+adblock&spell=1&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiPvMn31prYAhVIopQKHR1mCHMQvwUIIigA&biw=1920&bih=1067\n3.\thttps://www.reddit.com/r/firefox/comments/4wpd23/popads\\_just\\_announced\\_that\\_they\\_have\\_a\\_new\\_method/\n4.\thttps://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts\n5.\thttp://www.infzm.com/content/131666\n6.\thttp://hackernews.cc/archives/14794\n7.\thttps://censys.io/domain?q=%22coinhive.min.js%22\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}