Ongoing Credit Card Data Leak [Continues]
<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><hr>
<blockquote>
<p>DNSMon is a network-wide DNS malicious domain analysis system we build here at 360Netlab. With the 10%+ total DNS traffic coverage in China, plus the other multi-dimensional security data and security analysis capabilities we have accumulated over the years, we can &quot;see&quot; what is happening in the whole network in real time from a unique perspective.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<h2 id="hackerinaction">Hacker in action</h2>
<p>On May 8, we published a <a href="__GHOST_URL__/ongoing-credit-card-data-leak/">blog</a> about one malicious sitemagento-analytics[.]com stealing credit card info from online shopping users by injecting JS on E-commerce sites, soon after our blog, the original site went offline.</p>
<p>From early morning of 2019-05-13, around 4 AM(UTC), our DNSMon system picked up 2 new updates from this attacker.</p>
<h3 id="update1anewdomainnamejqueryextdat">Update1: a new domain name: jqueryextd[.]at</h3>
<p>The attacker abandoned the old magento-analytics[.]com domain and rolled out this new one jqueryextd[.]at.</p>
<p>The corresponding malicious JS link is &quot;hxxps://jqueryextd.at/5c21f3dbf01e0.js&quot;, and the report address in the script has been changed to &quot;hxxps://jqueryextd.at/gate.php&quot;.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/update1.new_domain-1.jpg" alt="update1.new_domain-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="update2jsnowisembedded">Update2: JS now is embedded</h3>
<p>The content of the malicious JS was loaded from an external address before, now the JS script is directly embedded in the injected webpage.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/update1.embeded_js-1.jpg" alt="update1.embeded_js-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>We contacted the domain registrar DNSPod to shutdown the domain, and action was promptly taken, the malicious domain jqueryextd[.]at was taken down. But the attacker was pretty active, after about 4 hours, the domain switched to another NS provider cloudns.net and get back to life again.</p>
<h2 id="andmore">And More</h2>
<p>There are other similar events happening, for example, in early February, another malicious domain adwordstraffic[.]link used the exact same technique to steal credit card info from users, the link was  &quot;hxxp://adwordstraffic.link/onestepcheckoutccpayment.js&quot;<sup class="footnote-ref"><a href="#fn1" id="fnref1">[1]</a></sup>, and the corresponding reporting address was &quot;hxxps://adwordstraffic.link/validation/&quot;.</p>
<pre><code>adwordstraffic.link    A    89.32.251.136    #GEO: Iran
</code></pre>
<p>In recent days, the domain has been replaced with an IP, also tweaks have been added to the JS, the code is obscured, it runs directly in the infected website pages, the reporting address now is: &quot;hxxp://89.32.251.136/validation/&quot;.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/update1.new_ip-1.jpg" alt="update1.new_ip-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="websiteshavebeeninjectedbynewmethods">Websites have been injected by new methods</h2>
<pre><code>InfectedWebSite           Method       ReportAddress
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
vezabands.com             Linked_JS    &quot;https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php&quot;
cigarhumidors-online.com  Embeded_JS   &quot;https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php&quot; [fixed]
decabana.com              Embeded_JS   &quot;https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php&quot;
omejo.com                 Embeded_JS   &quot;https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php&quot;
luxerwatches.ca           Embeded_JS   &quot;http://89.32.251.136/validation/&quot;
luxerwatches.com          Embeded_JS   &quot;http://89.32.251.136/validation/&quot;
bragardusa.com            Embeded_JS   &quot;http://89.32.251.136/validation/&quot;
ecompressedair.com        Embeded_JS   &quot;http://89.32.251.136/validation/&quot;
flatiron-wines.com        Embeded_JS   &quot;http://89.32.251.136/validation/&quot;
thalgousa.com             Embeded_JS   &quot;http://89.32.251.136/validation/&quot;
</code></pre>
<p>Please note as we mentioned before, our DNSMon focus mainly in China, we will not be surprised if there are more infected websites on a global scale.</p>
<h2 id="iocs">IOCs</h2>
<pre><code>magento-analytics.com
jqueryextd.at
93.187.129.249    China|Hong_Kong    55933|Cloudie_Limited

adwordstraffic.link
89.32.251.136     Iran               204213|Netmihan_Communication_Company_Ltd
</code></pre>
<hr class="footnotes-sep">
<section class="footnotes">
<ol class="footnotes-list">
<li id="fn1" class="footnote-item"><p>Till the time of this blog, original JS script can be reached by &quot; <a href="https://89.32.251.136/onestepcheckoutauthorizenet.js">https://89.32.251.136/onestepcheckoutauthorizenet.js</a>&quot; <a href="#fnref1" class="footnote-backref">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
</ol>
</section>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown-->






DNSMon is a network-wide DNS malicious domain analysis system we build here at 360Netlab. With the 10%+ total DNS traffic coverage in China, plus the other multi-dimensional security data and security analysis capabilities we have accumulated over the years, we can "see" what is happening in the whole network in real time from a unique perspective.





Hacker in action


On May 8, we published a blog about one malicious sitemagento-analytics[.]com stealing credit card info from online shopping users by injecting JS on E-commerce sites, soon after our blog, the original site went offline.


From early morning of 2019-05-13, around 4 AM(UTC), our DNSMon system picked up 2 new updates from this attacker.



Update1: a new domain name: jqueryextd[.]at


The attacker abandoned the old magento-analytics[.]com domain and rolled out this new one jqueryextd[.]at.


The corresponding malicious JS link is "hxxps://jqueryextd.at/5c21f3dbf01e0.js", and the report address in the script has been changed to "hxxps://jqueryextd.at/gate.php".






Update2: JS now is embedded


The content of the malicious JS was loaded from an external address before, now the JS script is directly embedded in the injected webpage.





We contacted the domain registrar DNSPod to shutdown the domain, and action was promptly taken, the malicious domain jqueryextd[.]at was taken down. But the attacker was pretty active, after about 4 hours, the domain switched to another NS provider cloudns.net and get back to life again.



And More


There are other similar events happening, for example, in early February, another malicious domain adwordstraffic[.]link used the exact same technique to steal credit card info from users, the link was "hxxp://adwordstraffic.link/onestepcheckoutccpayment.js"[1], and the corresponding reporting address was "hxxps://adwordstraffic.link/validation/".


adwordstraffic.link    A    89.32.251.136    #GEO: Iran



In recent days, the domain has been replaced with an IP, also tweaks have been added to the JS, the code is obscured, it runs directly in the infected website pages, the reporting address now is: "hxxp://89.32.251.136/validation/".






Websites have been injected by new methods


InfectedWebSite           Method       ReportAddress
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
vezabands.com             Linked_JS    "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
cigarhumidors-online.com  Embeded_JS   "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php" [fixed]
decabana.com              Embeded_JS   "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
omejo.com                 Embeded_JS   "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
luxerwatches.ca           Embeded_JS   "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
luxerwatches.com          Embeded_JS   "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
bragardusa.com            Embeded_JS   "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
ecompressedair.com        Embeded_JS   "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
flatiron-wines.com        Embeded_JS   "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
thalgousa.com             Embeded_JS   "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"



Please note as we mentioned before, our DNSMon focus mainly in China, we will not be surprised if there are more infected websites on a global scale.



IOCs


magento-analytics.com
jqueryextd.at
93.187.129.249    China|Hong_Kong    55933|Cloudie_Limited

adwordstraffic.link
89.32.251.136     Iran               204213|Netmihan_Communication_Company_Ltd







 1. Till the time of this blog, original JS script can be reached by " https://89.32.251.136/onestepcheckoutauthorizenet.js" ↩︎
    


{"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\n------\n> DNSMon is a network-wide DNS malicious domain analysis system we build here at 360Netlab. With the 10%+ total DNS traffic coverage in China, plus the other multi-dimensional security data and security analysis capabilities we have accumulated over the years, we can \"see\" what is happening in the whole network in real time from a unique perspective.\n------\n\n\n\n## Hacker in action\n\nOn May 8, we published a [blog](__GHOST_URL__/ongoing-credit-card-data-leak/) about one malicious sitemagento-analytics[.]com stealing credit card info from online shopping users by injecting JS on E-commerce sites, soon after our blog, the original site went offline.\n\nFrom early morning of 2019-05-13, around 4 AM(UTC), our DNSMon system picked up 2 new updates from this attacker.\n\n### Update1: a new domain name: jqueryextd[.]at\n\nThe attacker abandoned the old magento-analytics[.]com domain and rolled out this new one jqueryextd[.]at.\n\nThe corresponding malicious JS link is \"hxxps://jqueryextd.at/5c21f3dbf01e0.js\", and the report address in the script has been changed to \"hxxps://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\".\n\n![update1.new_domain-1](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/update1.new_domain-1.jpg)\n\n### Update2: JS now is embedded\n\nThe content of the malicious JS was loaded from an external address before, now the JS script is directly embedded in the injected webpage.\n\n![update1.embeded_js-1](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/update1.embeded_js-1.jpg)\n\n\nWe contacted the domain registrar DNSPod to shutdown the domain, and action was promptly taken, the malicious domain jqueryextd[.]at was taken down. But the attacker was pretty active, after about 4 hours, the domain switched to another NS provider cloudns.net and get back to life again.\n\n\n## And More\n\nThere are other similar events happening, for example, in early February, another malicious domain adwordstraffic[.]link used the exact same technique to steal credit card info from users, the link was  \"hxxp://adwordstraffic.link/onestepcheckoutccpayment.js\"[^1], and the corresponding reporting address was \"hxxps://adwordstraffic.link/validation/\".\n\n```\nadwordstraffic.link    A    89.32.251.136    #GEO: Iran\n```\n\nIn recent days, the domain has been replaced with an IP, also tweaks have been added to the JS, the code is obscured, it runs directly in the infected website pages, the reporting address now is: \"hxxp://89.32.251.136/validation/\".\n\n![update1.new_ip-1](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/update1.new_ip-1.jpg)\n\n\n## Websites have been injected by new methods\n\n\n```\nInfectedWebSite           Method       ReportAddress\n-----------------------------------------------------------------------\nvezabands.com             Linked_JS    \"https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\"\ncigarhumidors-online.com  Embeded_JS   \"https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\" [fixed]\ndecabana.com              Embeded_JS   \"https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\"\nomejo.com                 Embeded_JS   \"https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\"\nluxerwatches.ca           Embeded_JS   \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\nluxerwatches.com          Embeded_JS   \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\nbragardusa.com            Embeded_JS   \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\necompressedair.com        Embeded_JS   \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\nflatiron-wines.com        Embeded_JS   \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\nthalgousa.com             Embeded_JS   \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\n```\n\nPlease note as we mentioned before, our DNSMon focus mainly in China, we will not be surprised if there are more infected websites on a global scale.\n\n## IOCs\n\n```\nmagento-analytics.com\njqueryextd.at\n93.187.129.249    China|Hong_Kong    55933|Cloudie_Limited\n\nadwordstraffic.link\n89.32.251.136     Iran               204213|Netmihan_Communication_Company_Ltd\n```\n\n\n[^1]: Till the time of this blog, original JS script can be reached by \" https://89.32.251.136/onestepcheckoutauthorizenet.js\"\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}