Multiple botnets are spreading using LILIN DVR 0-day
<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>Author：Yanlong Ma，Lingming Tu，Genshen Ye，Hongda Liu</em></p>
<blockquote>
<p>When we talk about DDos botnet, we tend to think the typical scenario, some mediocre, code-borrowing scripts target old vulnerabilities. But things actually have started to change, we noticed more and more attackers beginning to use 0-day vulnerabilities.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3 id="background">Background</h3>
<p>Starting from August 30, 2019, 360Netlab Threat Detection System has flagged multiple attack groups using LILIN DVR 0-day vulnerabilities to spread Chalubo[<a href="https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2018/10/22/chalubo-botnet-wants-to-ddos-from-your-server-or-iot-device/">1]</a>, FBot[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/fbot/">2]</a>, Moobot[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/">3]</a> botnets.</p>
<p>On January 19, 2020, we reached out to the equipment manufacturer LILIN. On February 13, 2020, the vendor fixed the vulnerability[<a href="https://www.meritlilin.com/assets/uploads/support/file/M00158-TW.pdf">4]</a>, and released the latest firmware program 2.0b60_20200207[<a href="https://www.meritlilin.com/tw/support/file/type/Firmware">5]</a>.</p>
<h3 id="vulnerabilityanalysis">Vulnerability analysis</h3>
<p>The LILIN 0-day vulnerability is made of 3 parts: hard-coded login credentials, <code>/z/zbin/dvr_box</code> command injection vulnerabilities and <code>/z/zbin/net_html.cgi</code> arbitrary file reading vulnerabilities, <code>/z/zbin/dvr_box</code> provides Web services, and its web interface <code>/dvr/cmd</code> and <code>/cn/cmd</code> have a command injection vulnerability.  The injected parameters have been: NTPUpdate, FTP, and NTP.</p>
<p>List of hardcoded login credentials:</p>
<pre><code>root/icatch99
report/8Jg0SR8K50
</code></pre>
<p>Default login credentials:</p>
<pre><code>admin/123456
</code></pre>
<h4 id="ntpupdateinjectionvulnerabilityanalysis">NTPUpdate injection vulnerability analysis</h4>
<ol>
<li><code>/z/zbin/dvr_box</code> The <code>dvr_serv::do_request()</code> function is responsible for parsing the <code>DVRPOST</code> incoming XML configuration and calling the corresponding processing function;</li>
<li><code>dvr_core::NTPUpdate()</code> The processing function passes the Server field into a function in the dependent library libutility.so <code>UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run()</code>;</li>
<li><code>UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run()</code> The function splices and executes the ntp time synchronization command according to the value of the Server field;</li>
<li>The above process chain does not filter special characters in the Server field, command injection becomes possible.<br>
In the newly patched version <code>2.0b60_20200207</code>, the vendor fixed the vulnerability by calling <code>UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName()</code> to<br>
checks the Server field at step 3<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTPUpdate.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTPUpdate.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ol>
<h4 id="ftpandntpinjectionvulnerabilityanalysis">FTP and NTP injection vulnerability analysis</h4>
<ol>
<li>Device configuration <code>/zconf/service.xml</code>,  can be obtained through hard-coded login account password and <code>/z/zbin/net_html.cgi</code> arbitrary file reading [<a href="https://icatch99.blogspot.com/2019/11/icatch-dvr.html">6]</a>;</li>
<li>By modifying the Server field of the FTP or NTP parameters in the <code>/zconf/service.xml</code>, backdoor command can be injected;</li>
<li>Remotely access the <code>/dvr/cmd</code> interface through hard-coded account passwords, then use the SetConfiguration<br>
function to upload the modified XML entity, now the configuration files can be written to the target device</li>
<li>The device periodically synchronizes the FTP or NTP configuration, which triggers the command execution.</li>
</ol>
<p>It is worth noting that the command injection for FTP or NTP configuration relies on the network configuration obtained in steps 1 and 2. If step 3 is executed directly, the device will come offline.</p>
<p>In the newly patched version <code>2.0b60_20200207</code>, the vendor has fixed this vulnerability, <code>/z/zbin/dvr_box</code> now calls the <code>UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName()</code> function to check the Server field when writing the configuration.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTP-FTP.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTP-FTP.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="timeline">Timeline</h3>
<pre><code>2019/08/30 We discovered Chalubo was spreading through the LILIN 0-day NTPUpdate vulnerability.
2020/01/11 We discovered that FBot was spread through the LILIN 0-day FTP / NTP vulnerability.
2020/01/19 We reached out to the vendor.
2020/01/26 We discovered that Moobot was spreading through the LILIN 0-day FTP vulnerability.
2020/02/10 We reached out to the vendor again.
2020/02/12 We provided the FTP and NTP 0 day PoC details to the vendor.
2020/02/14 Vendor replied and fixed the vulnerability, and a new firmware 2.0b60_20200207 was released.
</code></pre>
<h3 id="affectedfirmwarelist">Affected firmware list</h3>
<pre><code>LILIN DHD516A
* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels
* 2.0b1_20180828  - RTSP works
 
LILIN DHD508A
* 2.0b1_20180828  - RTSP works
 
LILIN DHD504A
* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels
* 2.0b1_20190417  - JPEG C4 panels
 
LILIN DHD316A
* 2.0b1_20180828
* 2.0b1_20171128 C4 Panels
 
LILIN DHD308A
* 2.0b1_20180828
 
LILIN DHD304A
* 2.0b1_20180828
 
LILIN DHD204 IP  Camera
* 1.06_20151201
 
LILIN DHD204A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
 
LILIN DHD208 IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160504
 
LILIN DHD208A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
 
LILIN DHD216 IP Camera
* 2.0b60 20151111

LILIN DHD216A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
</code></pre>
<h3 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h3>
<p>LILIN users should check and update their device firmwares in a timely fashion, and strong login credentials for the device should be enforced.</p>
<p>The relevant malicious IPs, URLs and domains should be blocked and investigated on users’network.</p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h3 id="ioclist">IoC list</h3>
<p>MD5</p>
<pre><code>0bf499baf3f0e623975a54225e9bd1a9
0d5193bdf74c87a14696f320d6808077
0f863f624da0d74094cb0f91cc226281
10ac26ef8571896efa3ee9495c0b71f5
164cc07fe71cd4db13133743e13612d8
20e8dd1fa2cc5e05ed2052c543f91ce1
21023609945be3f70459d30d1eec662e
267115637ef139b67007ee357c5397f6
3085b8f16c1ee686aa3bc3d1a91803f4
47e005e3136430452a0626b82f59ce15
4b87280c0b1b2b975c4f7412499400f2
502020b53b7bc053e0e3d8b85b5e7963
61a6ea1590c4f06a6966e944ebd4d81b
62d53eb2b05a3fa779ebca2d08b1d649
6a55850ea54668d98c32ffe954cd5d85
8bf81cdcfecead61b2531dcff597b133
9c9b1b98d9c7863df5905ff877767c55
a3b4868ec1671ffab6b509d62ea129ac
a6142ce837fd402ab9570ab58d46ad10
aa4561de55bdbd95702342b820910e0a
ad151215c9d7c02e6b75fe2e51f91f0b
d72ca8cd3e0e7b9f1f5dd62ca5113c8c
da3d3df2fa7d539899b27c64300807a2
e3f79edf54d590568791f77318ac0578
e95c363dc97ff58f5f22633517be6969
ee227f53a1c1e24edfa9f44c9c6a009f
f76b0363f016a0d4ec6124b844e10cff
feee13e2908e4e3d18104896d912fbf9
ffc20926598b277e509c7bf3465557eb
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://103.27.185.139/icatchplugin1
http://185.183.96.139/g
http://188.209.49.219/f
http://188.209.49.244/f
http://188.209.49.244/r
http://188.209.49.244/usa
http://190.115.18.37/f
http://45.10.90.89/j
http://45.10.90.89/z
http://46.166.151.200/w
http://74.91.115.209/w
http://82.223.101.182/f
http://82.223.101.182/k
</code></pre>
<p>C2</p>
<pre><code>lakusdvroa.com:8080                   #Chalubo
45.10.90.89:61002                     #FBot
wor.wordtheminer.com:8725             #Moobot
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:422       #Moobot_xor
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746      #Moobot_xor
</code></pre>
<p>IP</p>
<pre><code>45.10.90.89         	Ukraine             	ASN48693            	Rices Privately owned enterprise
46.166.151.200      	Netherlands         	ASN43350            	NForce Entertainment B.V.
74.91.115.209       	United States       	ASN14586            	Nuclearfallout Enterprises, Inc.
82.223.101.182      	Spain               	ASN8560             	1&amp;1 Ionos Se        
103.27.185.139      	Japan               	ASN134835           	Starry Network Limited
185.183.96.139      	Netherlands         	ASN60117            	Host Sailor Ltd.    
188.209.49.219      	Netherlands         	ASN49349            	Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
188.209.49.244      	Netherlands         	ASN49349            	Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
190.115.18.37       	Belize              	ASN262254           	DANCOM LTD  
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown-->
Author：Yanlong Ma，Lingming Tu，Genshen Ye，Hongda Liu





When we talk about DDos botnet, we tend to think the typical scenario, some mediocre, code-borrowing scripts target old vulnerabilities. But things actually have started to change, we noticed more and more attackers beginning to use 0-day vulnerabilities.




Background


Starting from August 30, 2019, 360Netlab Threat Detection System has flagged multiple attack groups using LILIN DVR 0-day vulnerabilities to spread Chalubo[1], FBot[2], Moobot[3] botnets.


On January 19, 2020, we reached out to the equipment manufacturer LILIN. On February 13, 2020, the vendor fixed the vulnerability[4], and released the latest firmware program 2.0b60_20200207[5].



Vulnerability analysis


The LILIN 0-day vulnerability is made of 3 parts: hard-coded login credentials, /z/zbin/dvr_box command injection vulnerabilities and /z/zbin/net_html.cgi arbitrary file reading vulnerabilities, /z/zbin/dvr_box provides Web services, and its web interface /dvr/cmd and /cn/cmd have a command injection vulnerability. The injected parameters have been: NTPUpdate, FTP, and NTP.


List of hardcoded login credentials:


root/icatch99
report/8Jg0SR8K50



Default login credentials:


admin/123456



NTPUpdate injection vulnerability analysis


 1. /z/zbin/dvr_box The dvr_serv::do_request() function is responsible for parsing the DVRPOST incoming XML configuration and calling the corresponding processing function;
 2. dvr_core::NTPUpdate() The processing function passes the Server field into a function in the dependent library libutility.so UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run();
 3. UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run() The function splices and executes the ntp time synchronization command according to the value of the Server field;
 4. The above process chain does not filter special characters in the Server field, command injection becomes possible.
    
    In the newly patched version 2.0b60_20200207, the vendor fixed the vulnerability by calling UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName() to
    
    checks the Server field at step 3
    
    


FTP and NTP injection vulnerability analysis


 1. Device configuration /zconf/service.xml, can be obtained through hard-coded login account password and /z/zbin/net_html.cgi arbitrary file reading [6];
 2. By modifying the Server field of the FTP or NTP parameters in the /zconf/service.xml, backdoor command can be injected;
 3. Remotely access the /dvr/cmd interface through hard-coded account passwords, then use the SetConfiguration
    
    function to upload the modified XML entity, now the configuration files can be written to the target device
 4. The device periodically synchronizes the FTP or NTP configuration, which triggers the command execution.


It is worth noting that the command injection for FTP or NTP configuration relies on the network configuration obtained in steps 1 and 2. If step 3 is executed directly, the device will come offline.


In the newly patched version 2.0b60_20200207, the vendor has fixed this vulnerability, /z/zbin/dvr_box now calls the UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName() function to check the Server field when writing the configuration.






Timeline


2019/08/30 We discovered Chalubo was spreading through the LILIN 0-day NTPUpdate vulnerability.
2020/01/11 We discovered that FBot was spread through the LILIN 0-day FTP / NTP vulnerability.
2020/01/19 We reached out to the vendor.
2020/01/26 We discovered that Moobot was spreading through the LILIN 0-day FTP vulnerability.
2020/02/10 We reached out to the vendor again.
2020/02/12 We provided the FTP and NTP 0 day PoC details to the vendor.
2020/02/14 Vendor replied and fixed the vulnerability, and a new firmware 2.0b60_20200207 was released.




Affected firmware list


LILIN DHD516A
* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels
* 2.0b1_20180828  - RTSP works
 
LILIN DHD508A
* 2.0b1_20180828  - RTSP works
 
LILIN DHD504A
* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels
* 2.0b1_20190417  - JPEG C4 panels
 
LILIN DHD316A
* 2.0b1_20180828
* 2.0b1_20171128 C4 Panels
 
LILIN DHD308A
* 2.0b1_20180828
 
LILIN DHD304A
* 2.0b1_20180828
 
LILIN DHD204 IP  Camera
* 1.06_20151201
 
LILIN DHD204A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
 
LILIN DHD208 IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160504
 
LILIN DHD208A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
 
LILIN DHD216 IP Camera
* 2.0b60 20151111

LILIN DHD216A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123




Suggestions


LILIN users should check and update their device firmwares in a timely fashion, and strong login credentials for the device should be enforced.


The relevant malicious IPs, URLs and domains should be blocked and investigated on users’network.



Contact us


Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.



IoC list


MD5


0bf499baf3f0e623975a54225e9bd1a9
0d5193bdf74c87a14696f320d6808077
0f863f624da0d74094cb0f91cc226281
10ac26ef8571896efa3ee9495c0b71f5
164cc07fe71cd4db13133743e13612d8
20e8dd1fa2cc5e05ed2052c543f91ce1
21023609945be3f70459d30d1eec662e
267115637ef139b67007ee357c5397f6
3085b8f16c1ee686aa3bc3d1a91803f4
47e005e3136430452a0626b82f59ce15
4b87280c0b1b2b975c4f7412499400f2
502020b53b7bc053e0e3d8b85b5e7963
61a6ea1590c4f06a6966e944ebd4d81b
62d53eb2b05a3fa779ebca2d08b1d649
6a55850ea54668d98c32ffe954cd5d85
8bf81cdcfecead61b2531dcff597b133
9c9b1b98d9c7863df5905ff877767c55
a3b4868ec1671ffab6b509d62ea129ac
a6142ce837fd402ab9570ab58d46ad10
aa4561de55bdbd95702342b820910e0a
ad151215c9d7c02e6b75fe2e51f91f0b
d72ca8cd3e0e7b9f1f5dd62ca5113c8c
da3d3df2fa7d539899b27c64300807a2
e3f79edf54d590568791f77318ac0578
e95c363dc97ff58f5f22633517be6969
ee227f53a1c1e24edfa9f44c9c6a009f
f76b0363f016a0d4ec6124b844e10cff
feee13e2908e4e3d18104896d912fbf9
ffc20926598b277e509c7bf3465557eb



URL


http://103.27.185.139/icatchplugin1
http://185.183.96.139/g
http://188.209.49.219/f
http://188.209.49.244/f
http://188.209.49.244/r
http://188.209.49.244/usa
http://190.115.18.37/f
http://45.10.90.89/j
http://45.10.90.89/z
http://46.166.151.200/w
http://74.91.115.209/w
http://82.223.101.182/f
http://82.223.101.182/k



C2


lakusdvroa.com:8080                   #Chalubo
45.10.90.89:61002                     #FBot
wor.wordtheminer.com:8725             #Moobot
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:422       #Moobot_xor
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746      #Moobot_xor



IP


45.10.90.89         	Ukraine             	ASN48693            	Rices Privately owned enterprise
46.166.151.200      	Netherlands         	ASN43350            	NForce Entertainment B.V.
74.91.115.209       	United States       	ASN14586            	Nuclearfallout Enterprises, Inc.
82.223.101.182      	Spain               	ASN8560             	1&1 Ionos Se        
103.27.185.139      	Japan               	ASN134835           	Starry Network Limited
185.183.96.139      	Netherlands         	ASN60117            	Host Sailor Ltd.    
188.209.49.219      	Netherlands         	ASN49349            	Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
188.209.49.244      	Netherlands         	ASN49349            	Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
190.115.18.37       	Belize              	ASN262254           	DANCOM LTD  


{"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*Author：Yanlong Ma，Lingming Tu，Genshen Ye，Hongda Liu*\n\n> When we talk about DDos botnet, we tend to think the typical scenario, some mediocre, code-borrowing scripts target old vulnerabilities. But things actually have started to change, we noticed more and more attackers beginning to use 0-day vulnerabilities. \n\n### Background\nStarting from August 30, 2019, 360Netlab Threat Detection System has flagged multiple attack groups using LILIN DVR 0-day vulnerabilities to spread Chalubo[[1\\]](https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2018/10/22/chalubo-botnet-wants-to-ddos-from-your-server-or-iot-device/), FBot[[2\\]](__GHOST_URL__/tag/fbot/), Moobot[[3\\]](__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/) botnets.\n\nOn January 19, 2020, we reached out to the equipment manufacturer LILIN. On February 13, 2020, the vendor fixed the vulnerability[[4\\]](https://www.meritlilin.com/assets/uploads/support/file/M00158-TW.pdf), and released the latest firmware program 2.0b60_20200207[[5\\]](https://www.meritlilin.com/tw/support/file/type/Firmware).\n\n\n### Vulnerability analysis\nThe LILIN 0-day vulnerability is made of 3 parts: hard-coded login credentials, `/z/zbin/dvr_box` command injection vulnerabilities and `/z/zbin/net_html.cgi` arbitrary file reading vulnerabilities, `/z/zbin/dvr_box` provides Web services, and its web interface `/dvr/cmd` and `/cn/cmd` have a command injection vulnerability.  The injected parameters have been: NTPUpdate, FTP, and NTP.\n\nList of hardcoded login credentials:\n```\nroot/icatch99\nreport/8Jg0SR8K50\n```\n\nDefault login credentials:\n```\nadmin/123456\n```\n\n#### NTPUpdate injection vulnerability analysis\n1. `/z/zbin/dvr_box` The `dvr_serv::do_request()` function is responsible for parsing the `DVRPOST` incoming XML configuration and calling the corresponding processing function;\n2. `dvr_core::NTPUpdate()` The processing function passes the Server field into a function in the dependent library libutility.so `UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run()`;\n3. `UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run()` The function splices and executes the ntp time synchronization command according to the value of the Server field;\n4. The above process chain does not filter special characters in the Server field, command injection becomes possible.\nIn the newly patched version `2.0b60_20200207`, the vendor fixed the vulnerability by calling `UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName()` to\nchecks the Server field at step 3\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTPUpdate.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTPUpdate.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### FTP and NTP injection vulnerability analysis\n1. Device configuration `/zconf/service.xml`,  can be obtained through hard-coded login account password and `/z/zbin/net_html.cgi` arbitrary file reading [[6\\]](https://icatch99.blogspot.com/2019/11/icatch-dvr.html);\n2. By modifying the Server field of the FTP or NTP parameters in the `/zconf/service.xml`, backdoor command can be injected;\n3. Remotely access the `/dvr/cmd` interface through hard-coded account passwords, then use the SetConfiguration\nfunction to upload the modified XML entity, now the configuration files can be written to the target device\n4. The device periodically synchronizes the FTP or NTP configuration, which triggers the command execution.\n\nIt is worth noting that the command injection for FTP or NTP configuration relies on the network configuration obtained in steps 1 and 2. If step 3 is executed directly, the device will come offline.\n\nIn the newly patched version `2.0b60_20200207`, the vendor has fixed this vulnerability, `/z/zbin/dvr_box` now calls the `UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName()` function to check the Server field when writing the configuration.\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTP-FTP.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTP-FTP.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Timeline\n```\n2019/08/30 We discovered Chalubo was spreading through the LILIN 0-day NTPUpdate vulnerability.\n2020/01/11 We discovered that FBot was spread through the LILIN 0-day FTP / NTP vulnerability.\n2020/01/19 We reached out to the vendor.\n2020/01/26 We discovered that Moobot was spreading through the LILIN 0-day FTP vulnerability.\n2020/02/10 We reached out to the vendor again.\n2020/02/12 We provided the FTP and NTP 0 day PoC details to the vendor.\n2020/02/14 Vendor replied and fixed the vulnerability, and a new firmware 2.0b60_20200207 was released.\n```\n\n### Affected firmware list\n```\nLILIN DHD516A\n* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels\n* 2.0b1_20180828  - RTSP works\n \nLILIN DHD508A\n* 2.0b1_20180828  - RTSP works\n \nLILIN DHD504A\n* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels\n* 2.0b1_20190417  - JPEG C4 panels\n \nLILIN DHD316A\n* 2.0b1_20180828\n* 2.0b1_20171128 C4 Panels\n \nLILIN DHD308A\n* 2.0b1_20180828\n \nLILIN DHD304A\n* 2.0b1_20180828\n \nLILIN DHD204 IP  Camera\n* 1.06_20151201\n \nLILIN DHD204A IP Camera\n* 2.0b60_20160223\n* 2.0b60_20161123\n \nLILIN DHD208 IP Camera\n* 2.0b60_20160504\n \nLILIN DHD208A IP Camera\n* 2.0b60_20160223\n* 2.0b60_20161123\n \nLILIN DHD216 IP Camera\n* 2.0b60 20151111\n\nLILIN DHD216A IP Camera\n* 2.0b60_20160223\n* 2.0b60_20161123\n```\n\n### Suggestions\nLILIN users should check and update their device firmwares in a timely fashion, and strong login credentials for the device should be enforced.\n\nThe relevant malicious IPs, URLs and domains should be blocked and investigated on users’network.\n\n### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n\n### IoC list\n\nMD5\n```\n0bf499baf3f0e623975a54225e9bd1a9\n0d5193bdf74c87a14696f320d6808077\n0f863f624da0d74094cb0f91cc226281\n10ac26ef8571896efa3ee9495c0b71f5\n164cc07fe71cd4db13133743e13612d8\n20e8dd1fa2cc5e05ed2052c543f91ce1\n21023609945be3f70459d30d1eec662e\n267115637ef139b67007ee357c5397f6\n3085b8f16c1ee686aa3bc3d1a91803f4\n47e005e3136430452a0626b82f59ce15\n4b87280c0b1b2b975c4f7412499400f2\n502020b53b7bc053e0e3d8b85b5e7963\n61a6ea1590c4f06a6966e944ebd4d81b\n62d53eb2b05a3fa779ebca2d08b1d649\n6a55850ea54668d98c32ffe954cd5d85\n8bf81cdcfecead61b2531dcff597b133\n9c9b1b98d9c7863df5905ff877767c55\na3b4868ec1671ffab6b509d62ea129ac\na6142ce837fd402ab9570ab58d46ad10\naa4561de55bdbd95702342b820910e0a\nad151215c9d7c02e6b75fe2e51f91f0b\nd72ca8cd3e0e7b9f1f5dd62ca5113c8c\nda3d3df2fa7d539899b27c64300807a2\ne3f79edf54d590568791f77318ac0578\ne95c363dc97ff58f5f22633517be6969\nee227f53a1c1e24edfa9f44c9c6a009f\nf76b0363f016a0d4ec6124b844e10cff\nfeee13e2908e4e3d18104896d912fbf9\nffc20926598b277e509c7bf3465557eb\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://103.27.185.139/icatchplugin1\nhttp://185.183.96.139/g\nhttp://188.209.49.219/f\nhttp://188.209.49.244/f\nhttp://188.209.49.244/r\nhttp://188.209.49.244/usa\nhttp://190.115.18.37/f\nhttp://45.10.90.89/j\nhttp://45.10.90.89/z\nhttp://46.166.151.200/w\nhttp://74.91.115.209/w\nhttp://82.223.101.182/f\nhttp://82.223.101.182/k\n```\n\nC2\n```\nlakusdvroa.com:8080                   #Chalubo\n45.10.90.89:61002                     #FBot\nwor.wordtheminer.com:8725             #Moobot\nnlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:422       #Moobot_xor\nnlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746      #Moobot_xor\n```\n\nIP\n```\n45.10.90.89         \tUkraine             \tASN48693            \tRices Privately owned enterprise\n46.166.151.200      \tNetherlands         \tASN43350            \tNForce Entertainment B.V.\n74.91.115.209       \tUnited States       \tASN14586            \tNuclearfallout Enterprises, Inc.\n82.223.101.182      \tSpain               \tASN8560             \t1&1 Ionos Se        \n103.27.185.139      \tJapan               \tASN134835           \tStarry Network Limited\n185.183.96.139      \tNetherlands         \tASN60117            \tHost Sailor Ltd.    \n188.209.49.219      \tNetherlands         \tASN49349            \tDotsi, Unipessoal Lda.\n188.209.49.244      \tNetherlands         \tASN49349            \tDotsi, Unipessoal Lda.\n190.115.18.37       \tBelize              \tASN262254           \tDANCOM LTD  \n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}