GPON Exploit in the Wild (II) - Satori Botnet
<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>This article was co-authored by Rootkiter, Yegenshen, and Hui Wang.</p>
<p>In our previous <a href="__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-i-muhstik-botnet-among-others-en/">article</a>, we mentioned since this GPON Vulnerability (CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562 ) announced, there have been at least five botnets family mettle, muhstik, mirai, hajime, satori actively exploit the vulnerability to build their zombie army in just 10 days.</p>
<p>We mainly focused on the muhstik botnet in the previous blog. Before and after the publication of the article, through joint efforts with the security community, we managed to kill 12 IP addresses of the Muhstik botnet on the OVH and 1 IP address on the Microsoft network. For a detailed list of IP addresses, see the Annex IoC section.</p>
<p>One thing noteworthy is about these botnets' exploit effectiveness. From our estimate, only 2% all GPON home router is affected, most of which located in Mexico. This happens because of the way they utilizing the published PoC.</p>
<p>Now let’s take a look at the these botnets:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Satori</strong>: <strong>Satori</strong> is the infamous variant of the mirai botnet.
<ul>
<li>We first observed this botnet coming after the GPON vulnerable devices at 2018-05-10 05:51:18, several hours before our last publish.</li>
<li>It has quickly overtakes muhstik as the No.1 player.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Mettle</strong>: A malicious campaign based on IP addresses in Vietnam (C2 210.245.26.180:4441, scanner 118.70.80.143) and mettle open source control module</li>
<li><strong>Hajime</strong>: <strong>Hajime</strong> pushed an update which adds the GPON's exploits</li>
<li><strong>Two Mirai variants</strong>: At least two malicious branches are actively exploiting this vulnerability to propagate mirai variants. One of them has been called <a href="https://blog.newskysecurity.com/cve-2018-10561-dasan-gpon-exploit-weaponized-in-omni-and-muhstik-botnets-ad7b1f89cff3">omni</a> by newskysecurity team.</li>
<li><strong>imgay</strong>: This appears like a botnet that is under development. Its function is not finished yet.</li>
</ul>
<p>This article will mainly introduce the current update of the Satori botnet. In the follow-up we may publish a third article and go over the remaining ones.</p>
<h4 id="comparisonofdeliveryfrequencyofdifferentbotnets">Comparison of Delivery Frequency of Different Botnets</h4>
<p>Honeypot data can provide some basic comparison between different botnets that try to hit the GPON-related vulnerabilities. And following is a top10 list of attack payload that been requested by the bots. For a complete list, see the IoC section at the end of the article:</p>
<pre><code>%	botnet_name	url
57.77%	satori	hxxp://185.62.190.191/r
32.66%	muhstik	hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php
2.20%	muhstik	hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon
1.99%	muhstik	hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php
0.96%	muhstik	hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php
0.64%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/forky
0.60%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/80
0.57%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/
0.57%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/81
0.53%	muhstik	hxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php
</code></pre>
<p>You can see Satori (account for 57.80% of all attempts we saw) and muhstik (38.87%) are the main force behind of the current GPON exploits bots.</p>
<h4 id="satorimalwaredownloadurl">Satori Malware Download URL</h4>
<p>The new Satori uses the following set of URLs to propagate malicious code:</p>
<pre><code>hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm
hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7
hxxp://185.62.190.191/m68k
hxxp://185.62.190.191/mips
hxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel
hxxp://185.62.190.191/r
hxxp://185.62.190.191/sparc
</code></pre>
<h4 id="satorimaliciouscodesamplesanalysis">Satori Malicious Code Samples Analysis</h4>
<p>Take this sample as an example:</p>
<pre><code>hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm md5hash:d546bc209d315ae81869315e8d536f36
</code></pre>
<p>The code of this sample has changed a lot from the original version of Satori. From the aspect of sample binary alone, the relationship with the original Satori is not very strong. However, considering some of its key factors, such as some key strings, domain name TXT information, email addresses, etc., we still attribute it to the Satori variant.</p>
<p>There are four encrypted strings in this sample, and the corresponding decryption results are as follows:</p>
<ol>
<li>c.sunnyjuly.gq</li>
<li>Viam0610TCiLpBvezPFGL2aG</li>
<li>{&quot;id&quot;:0,&quot;jsonrpc&quot;:&quot;2.0&quot;,&quot;method&quot;:&quot;miner_reboot&quot;}</li>
<li>{&quot;id&quot;:0,&quot;jsonrpc&quot;:&quot;2.0&quot;,&quot;method&quot;:&quot;miner_file&quot;,&quot;params&quot;:[&quot;reboot.bat&quot;,&quot;4574684463724d696e657236342e657865202d65706f6f6c206574682d7573322e6477617266706f6f6c2e636f6d3a38303038202d6577616c20307864303839376461393262643764373735346634656131386638313639646263303862656238646637202d6d6f64652031202d6d706f72742033333333202d6d707377206775764a746f43785539&quot;]}</li>
</ol>
<p>The first string is the C2.<br>
The second string will be printed at the device console.<br>
The third and fourth strings are only defined but not being used.</p>
<p>It is worth mentioning that these two strings are similar to the code used in <a href="__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address-en/">Satori.robber</a>, which can serve as a circumstantial evidence that the sample is homologous to Satori.</p>
<p>The Hex part of the fourth string can be deciphered as follows. Although not used, it looks like a command string, containing a mine pool address, and a wallet address</p>
<pre><code>EthDcrMiner64.exe -epool eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008 -ewal 0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7 -mode 1 -mport 3333 -mpsw guvJtoCxU9
</code></pre>
<h4 id="thewalletaddressofsatori">The Wallet Address of Satori</h4>
<p>The wallet address information is as follows. According to the current estimate of $700 per ETH token, Satori received a total of approximately $200 in the current 6-day operation</p>
<pre><code>$ curl &quot;http://dwarfpool.com/eth/api?wallet=0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7&quot;
{
  &quot;autopayout_from&quot;: &quot;0.050&quot;,
  &quot;earning_24_hours&quot;: &quot;0.04629051&quot;,
  &quot;error&quot;: false,
  &quot;immature_earning&quot;: 0.0037158866909999997,
  &quot;last_payment_amount&quot;: &quot;0.05286277&quot;,                    #last pay amout
  &quot;last_payment_date&quot;: &quot;Tue, 15 May 2018 17:26:04 GMT&quot;,   #last pay day
  &quot;last_share_date&quot;: &quot;Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT&quot;,
  &quot;payout_daily&quot;: false,
  &quot;payout_request&quot;: false,
  &quot;total_hashrate&quot;: 137.57,
  &quot;total_hashrate_calculated&quot;: 781.0,
  &quot;transferring_to_balance&quot;: 0,
  &quot;wallet&quot;: &quot;0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7&quot;, #wallet address
  &quot;wallet_balance&quot;: &quot;0.02818296&quot;,                         #balance due to pay
  &quot;workers&quot;: {
    &quot;&quot;: {
      &quot;alive&quot;: true,
      &quot;hashrate&quot;: 137.57,
      &quot;hashrate_below_threshold&quot;: false,
      &quot;hashrate_calculated&quot;: 781.0,
      &quot;last_submit&quot;: &quot;Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT&quot;,
      &quot;second_since_submit&quot;: 335,
      &quot;worker&quot;: &quot;&quot;
    }
  }
}
</code></pre>
<h4 id="thedomainnameandtheoutcomingmessagefromitstxt">The Domain Name and the Out-coming Message from Its TXT</h4>
<p>The C2 name in the sample c.sunnyjuly.gq has no IP address resolution yet. But, it does provide TXT record, which might carry the information its author communicates to the outside world. The author changed TXT information twice so far and note it uses a @riseup.net email address</p>
<pre><code>2018-05-14 04:22:43	c.sunnyjuly.gq	DNS_TXT	Irdev here, i can be reached at village@riseup.net, goodbye
2018-05-10 00:55:06	c.sunnyjuly.gq	DNS_TXT	It is always the simple that produces the marvelous
</code></pre>
<p>Worth noting that the origin <a href="__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address/">Satori.robber</a> also used the same DNS zone sunnyjuly.qg. At that time, the author also leave a message in the sample, as follows. The email address in it is also a @riseup.net。</p>
<pre><code>Satori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at curtain@riseup.net  
</code></pre>
<h4 id="theport3333scanspikecausedbysatori">The Port 3333 Scan Spike Caused by Satori</h4>
<p>The current version of Satori also scans port 3333 which can be seen at our <a href="https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1523894400000&amp;tsend=1526486400000&amp;dstport=3333&amp;toplistname=srcas&amp;topn=10">ScanMon</a> system. The source of this scan is about 17k independent IP addresses, mainly from Uninet SA de CV, telmex.com, located in Mexico.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/satori-port-3333-scan.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<h4 id="contactus">Contact Us</h4>
<p>We can be reached at  <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> or at WeChat subscription account <strong>360Netlab</strong>.</p>
<h4 id="ioc">Ioc</h4>
<p>Those IPs once under muhstik control, but now cleared by security community:</p>
<pre><code>139.99.101.96:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
142.44.163.168:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
142.44.240.14:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
144.217.84.99:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
145.239.84.0:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
145.239.93.125:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
147.135.210.184:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
192.99.71.250:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
51.254.221.129    &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot;  
66.70.190.236:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效  
51.254.219.137    &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot;  
51.254.219.134    &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot;  
191.238.234.227    &quot;AS8075 Microsoft Corporation&quot;  
</code></pre>
<p>All the malware downloading URLs exploiting GPON vulnerability.</p>
<pre><code>%	botnet_name	url	Country &amp; Region	ASN
57.77%	satori	hxxp://185.62.190.191/r	Netherlands/NL	AS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
32.66%	muhstik	hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php	France/FR	AS16276 OVH SAS
2.20%	muhstik	hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon	United States/US New York	AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC
1.99%	muhstik	hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php	United States/US Clifton	AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC
0.96%	muhstik	hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php	Singapore/SG Singapore	AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC
0.64%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/forky	United States/US College Park	None
0.60%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/80	United States/US College Park	None
0.57%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/	United States/US College Park	None
0.57%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/81	United States/US College Park	None
0.53%	muhstik	hxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php	United States/US Clifton	AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC
0.32%	muhstik	hxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec	United States/US New York	AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC
0.28%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/8080	United States/US College Park	None
0.25%	untitled-1	hxxp://186.219.47.178:8080	Brazil/BR	AS262589 INTERNEXA Brasil Operadora de Telecomunicações S.A
0.11%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay	United States/US College Park	None
0.11%	muhstik	hxxp://162.243.211.204/aio	United States/US New York	AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC
0.11%	muhstik	hxxp://46.243.189.102/	Netherlands/NL	AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.
0.07%	untitled-2	hxxp://114.67.227.83/busybox	China/CN Beijing	AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network
0.07%	omni	hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni	Netherlands/NL	AS56630 Melbikomas UAB
0.07%	untitled-2	nc://114.67.227.83:7856	China/CN Beijing	AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network
0.04%	satori	hxxp://185.62.190.191/s	Netherlands/NL	AS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
0.04%	untitled-2	hxxp://114.67.227.83	China/CN Beijing	AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network
0.04%	untitled-3	hxxp://209.141.42.3/gponx	United States/US Las Vegas	AS53667 FranTech Solutions
0.04%	untitled-2	hxxp://114.67.227.83/	China/CN Beijing	AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown-->
This article was co-authored by Rootkiter, Yegenshen, and Hui Wang.


In our previous article, we mentioned since this GPON Vulnerability (CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562 ) announced, there have been at least five botnets family mettle, muhstik, mirai, hajime, satori actively exploit the vulnerability to build their zombie army in just 10 days.


We mainly focused on the muhstik botnet in the previous blog. Before and after the publication of the article, through joint efforts with the security community, we managed to kill 12 IP addresses of the Muhstik botnet on the OVH and 1 IP address on the Microsoft network. For a detailed list of IP addresses, see the Annex IoC section.


One thing noteworthy is about these botnets' exploit effectiveness. From our estimate, only 2% all GPON home router is affected, most of which located in Mexico. This happens because of the way they utilizing the published PoC.


Now let’s take a look at the these botnets:


 * Satori: Satori is the infamous variant of the mirai botnet.
   
   * We first observed this botnet coming after the GPON vulnerable devices at 2018-05-10 05:51:18, several hours before our last publish.
   * It has quickly overtakes muhstik as the No.1 player.
   
 * Mettle: A malicious campaign based on IP addresses in Vietnam (C2 210.245.26.180:4441, scanner 118.70.80.143) and mettle open source control module
 * Hajime: Hajime pushed an update which adds the GPON's exploits
 * Two Mirai variants: At least two malicious branches are actively exploiting this vulnerability to propagate mirai variants. One of them has been called omni by newskysecurity team.
 * imgay: This appears like a botnet that is under development. Its function is not finished yet.


This article will mainly introduce the current update of the Satori botnet. In the follow-up we may publish a third article and go over the remaining ones.


Comparison of Delivery Frequency of Different Botnets


Honeypot data can provide some basic comparison between different botnets that try to hit the GPON-related vulnerabilities. And following is a top10 list of attack payload that been requested by the bots. For a complete list, see the IoC section at the end of the article:


%	botnet_name	url
57.77%	satori	hxxp://185.62.190.191/r
32.66%	muhstik	hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php
2.20%	muhstik	hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon
1.99%	muhstik	hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php
0.96%	muhstik	hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php
0.64%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/forky
0.60%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/80
0.57%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/
0.57%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/81
0.53%	muhstik	hxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php



You can see Satori (account for 57.80% of all attempts we saw) and muhstik (38.87%) are the main force behind of the current GPON exploits bots.


Satori Malware Download URL


The new Satori uses the following set of URLs to propagate malicious code:


hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm
hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7
hxxp://185.62.190.191/m68k
hxxp://185.62.190.191/mips
hxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel
hxxp://185.62.190.191/r
hxxp://185.62.190.191/sparc



Satori Malicious Code Samples Analysis


Take this sample as an example:


hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm md5hash:d546bc209d315ae81869315e8d536f36



The code of this sample has changed a lot from the original version of Satori. From the aspect of sample binary alone, the relationship with the original Satori is not very strong. However, considering some of its key factors, such as some key strings, domain name TXT information, email addresses, etc., we still attribute it to the Satori variant.


There are four encrypted strings in this sample, and the corresponding decryption results are as follows:


 1. c.sunnyjuly.gq
 2. Viam0610TCiLpBvezPFGL2aG
 3. {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"miner_reboot"}
 4. {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"miner_file","params":["reboot.bat","4574684463724d696e657236342e657865202d65706f6f6c206574682d7573322e6477617266706f6f6c2e636f6d3a38303038202d6577616c20307864303839376461393262643764373735346634656131386638313639646263303862656238646637202d6d6f64652031202d6d706f72742033333333202d6d707377206775764a746f43785539"]}


The first string is the C2.

The second string will be printed at the device console.

The third and fourth strings are only defined but not being used.


It is worth mentioning that these two strings are similar to the code used in Satori.robber, which can serve as a circumstantial evidence that the sample is homologous to Satori.


The Hex part of the fourth string can be deciphered as follows. Although not used, it looks like a command string, containing a mine pool address, and a wallet address


EthDcrMiner64.exe -epool eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008 -ewal 0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7 -mode 1 -mport 3333 -mpsw guvJtoCxU9



The Wallet Address of Satori


The wallet address information is as follows. According to the current estimate of $700 per ETH token, Satori received a total of approximately $200 in the current 6-day operation


$ curl "http://dwarfpool.com/eth/api?wallet=0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7"
{
  "autopayout_from": "0.050",
  "earning_24_hours": "0.04629051",
  "error": false,
  "immature_earning": 0.0037158866909999997,
  "last_payment_amount": "0.05286277",                    #last pay amout
  "last_payment_date": "Tue, 15 May 2018 17:26:04 GMT",   #last pay day
  "last_share_date": "Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT",
  "payout_daily": false,
  "payout_request": false,
  "total_hashrate": 137.57,
  "total_hashrate_calculated": 781.0,
  "transferring_to_balance": 0,
  "wallet": "0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7", #wallet address
  "wallet_balance": "0.02818296",                         #balance due to pay
  "workers": {
    "": {
      "alive": true,
      "hashrate": 137.57,
      "hashrate_below_threshold": false,
      "hashrate_calculated": 781.0,
      "last_submit": "Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT",
      "second_since_submit": 335,
      "worker": ""
    }
  }
}



The Domain Name and the Out-coming Message from Its TXT


The C2 name in the sample c.sunnyjuly.gq has no IP address resolution yet. But, it does provide TXT record, which might carry the information its author communicates to the outside world. The author changed TXT information twice so far and note it uses a @riseup.net email address


2018-05-14 04:22:43	c.sunnyjuly.gq	DNS_TXT	Irdev here, i can be reached at village@riseup.net, goodbye
2018-05-10 00:55:06	c.sunnyjuly.gq	DNS_TXT	It is always the simple that produces the marvelous



Worth noting that the origin Satori.robber also used the same DNS zone sunnyjuly.qg. At that time, the author also leave a message in the sample, as follows. The email address in it is also a @riseup.net。


Satori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at curtain@riseup.net  



The Port 3333 Scan Spike Caused by Satori


The current version of Satori also scans port 3333 which can be seen at our ScanMon system. The source of this scan is about 17k independent IP addresses, mainly from Uninet SA de CV, telmex.com, located in Mexico.





Contact Us


We can be reached at  twitter or at WeChat subscription account 360Netlab.


Ioc


Those IPs once under muhstik control, but now cleared by security community:


139.99.101.96:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
142.44.163.168:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
142.44.240.14:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
144.217.84.99:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
145.239.84.0:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
145.239.93.125:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
147.135.210.184:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
192.99.71.250:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  
51.254.221.129    "AS16276 OVH SAS"  
66.70.190.236:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效  
51.254.219.137    "AS16276 OVH SAS"  
51.254.219.134    "AS16276 OVH SAS"  
191.238.234.227    "AS8075 Microsoft Corporation"  



All the malware downloading URLs exploiting GPON vulnerability.


%	botnet_name	url	Country & Region	ASN
57.77%	satori	hxxp://185.62.190.191/r	Netherlands/NL	AS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
32.66%	muhstik	hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php	France/FR	AS16276 OVH SAS
2.20%	muhstik	hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon	United States/US New York	AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC
1.99%	muhstik	hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php	United States/US Clifton	AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC
0.96%	muhstik	hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php	Singapore/SG Singapore	AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC
0.64%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/forky	United States/US College Park	None
0.60%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/80	United States/US College Park	None
0.57%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/	United States/US College Park	None
0.57%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/81	United States/US College Park	None
0.53%	muhstik	hxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php	United States/US Clifton	AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC
0.32%	muhstik	hxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec	United States/US New York	AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC
0.28%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/8080	United States/US College Park	None
0.25%	untitled-1	hxxp://186.219.47.178:8080	Brazil/BR	AS262589 INTERNEXA Brasil Operadora de Telecomunicações S.A
0.11%	imgay	hxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay	United States/US College Park	None
0.11%	muhstik	hxxp://162.243.211.204/aio	United States/US New York	AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC
0.11%	muhstik	hxxp://46.243.189.102/	Netherlands/NL	AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.
0.07%	untitled-2	hxxp://114.67.227.83/busybox	China/CN Beijing	AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network
0.07%	omni	hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni	Netherlands/NL	AS56630 Melbikomas UAB
0.07%	untitled-2	nc://114.67.227.83:7856	China/CN Beijing	AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network
0.04%	satori	hxxp://185.62.190.191/s	Netherlands/NL	AS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
0.04%	untitled-2	hxxp://114.67.227.83	China/CN Beijing	AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network
0.04%	untitled-3	hxxp://209.141.42.3/gponx	United States/US Las Vegas	AS53667 FranTech Solutions
0.04%	untitled-2	hxxp://114.67.227.83/	China/CN Beijing	AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network


{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"This article was co-authored by Rootkiter, Yegenshen, and Hui Wang.\n\nIn our previous [article](__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-i-muhstik-botnet-among-others-en/), we mentioned since this GPON Vulnerability (CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562 ) announced, there have been at least five botnets family mettle, muhstik, mirai, hajime, satori actively exploit the vulnerability to build their zombie army in just 10 days. \n\nWe mainly focused on the muhstik botnet in the previous blog. Before and after the publication of the article, through joint efforts with the security community, we managed to kill 12 IP addresses of the Muhstik botnet on the OVH and 1 IP address on the Microsoft network. For a detailed list of IP addresses, see the Annex IoC section.\n\nOne thing noteworthy is about these botnets' exploit effectiveness. From our estimate, only 2% all GPON home router is affected, most of which located in Mexico. This happens because of the way they utilizing the published PoC.\n\nNow let’s take a look at the these botnets:\n\n - **Satori**: **Satori** is the infamous variant of the mirai botnet. \n    - We first observed this botnet coming after the GPON vulnerable devices at 2018-05-10 05:51:18, several hours before our last publish.\n    - It has quickly overtakes muhstik as the No.1 player. \n - **Mettle**: A malicious campaign based on IP addresses in Vietnam (C2 210.245.26.180:4441, scanner 118.70.80.143) and mettle open source control module\n - **Hajime**: **Hajime** pushed an update which adds the GPON's exploits\n - **Two Mirai variants**: At least two malicious branches are actively exploiting this vulnerability to propagate mirai variants. One of them has been called [omni](https://blog.newskysecurity.com/cve-2018-10561-dasan-gpon-exploit-weaponized-in-omni-and-muhstik-botnets-ad7b1f89cff3) by newskysecurity team.\n - **imgay**: This appears like a botnet that is under development. Its function is not finished yet.\n\nThis article will mainly introduce the current update of the Satori botnet. In the follow-up we may publish a third article and go over the remaining ones. \n\n#### Comparison of Delivery Frequency of Different Botnets\n\nHoneypot data can provide some basic comparison between different botnets that try to hit the GPON-related vulnerabilities. And following is a top10 list of attack payload that been requested by the bots. For a complete list, see the IoC section at the end of the article:\n\n```\n%\tbotnet_name\turl\n57.77%\tsatori\thxxp://185.62.190.191/r\n32.66%\tmuhstik\thxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php\n2.20%\tmuhstik\thxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon\n1.99%\tmuhstik\thxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php\n0.96%\tmuhstik\thxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php\n0.64%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/forky\n0.60%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/80\n0.57%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/\n0.57%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/81\n0.53%\tmuhstik\thxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php\n```\n\nYou can see Satori (account for 57.80% of all attempts we saw) and muhstik (38.87%) are the main force behind of the current GPON exploits bots.\n\n#### Satori Malware Download URL\n\nThe new Satori uses the following set of URLs to propagate malicious code:\n```\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/arm\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/m68k\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/mips\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/r\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/sparc\n```\n\n#### Satori Malicious Code Samples Analysis\n\nTake this sample as an example:\n```\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/arm md5hash:d546bc209d315ae81869315e8d536f36\n```\n\nThe code of this sample has changed a lot from the original version of Satori. From the aspect of sample binary alone, the relationship with the original Satori is not very strong. However, considering some of its key factors, such as some key strings, domain name TXT information, email addresses, etc., we still attribute it to the Satori variant.\n\nThere are four encrypted strings in this sample, and the corresponding decryption results are as follows:\n\n1.  c.sunnyjuly.gq\n2.  Viam0610TCiLpBvezPFGL2aG\n3.  {\"id\":0,\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"miner_reboot\"}\n4.  {\"id\":0,\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"miner_file\",\"params\":[\"reboot.bat\",\"4574684463724d696e657236342e657865202d65706f6f6c206574682d7573322e6477617266706f6f6c2e636f6d3a38303038202d6577616c20307864303839376461393262643764373735346634656131386638313639646263303862656238646637202d6d6f64652031202d6d706f72742033333333202d6d707377206775764a746f43785539\"]}\n\nThe first string is the C2.\nThe second string will be printed at the device console.\nThe third and fourth strings are only defined but not being used.\n\nIt is worth mentioning that these two strings are similar to the code used in [Satori.robber](__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address-en/), which can serve as a circumstantial evidence that the sample is homologous to Satori.\n\nThe Hex part of the fourth string can be deciphered as follows. Although not used, it looks like a command string, containing a mine pool address, and a wallet address\n```\nEthDcrMiner64.exe -epool eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008 -ewal 0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7 -mode 1 -mport 3333 -mpsw guvJtoCxU9\n```\n\n#### The Wallet Address of Satori\n\nThe wallet address information is as follows. According to the current estimate of $700 per ETH token, Satori received a total of approximately $200 in the current 6-day operation\n\n```\n$ curl \"http://dwarfpool.com/eth/api?wallet=0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7\"\n{\n  \"autopayout_from\": \"0.050\",\n  \"earning_24_hours\": \"0.04629051\",\n  \"error\": false,\n  \"immature_earning\": 0.0037158866909999997,\n  \"last_payment_amount\": \"0.05286277\",                    #last pay amout\n  \"last_payment_date\": \"Tue, 15 May 2018 17:26:04 GMT\",   #last pay day\n  \"last_share_date\": \"Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT\",\n  \"payout_daily\": false,\n  \"payout_request\": false,\n  \"total_hashrate\": 137.57,\n  \"total_hashrate_calculated\": 781.0,\n  \"transferring_to_balance\": 0,\n  \"wallet\": \"0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7\", #wallet address\n  \"wallet_balance\": \"0.02818296\",                         #balance due to pay\n  \"workers\": {\n    \"\": {\n      \"alive\": true,\n      \"hashrate\": 137.57,\n      \"hashrate_below_threshold\": false,\n      \"hashrate_calculated\": 781.0,\n      \"last_submit\": \"Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT\",\n      \"second_since_submit\": 335,\n      \"worker\": \"\"\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n#### The Domain Name and the Out-coming Message from Its TXT\n\nThe C2 name in the sample c.sunnyjuly.gq has no IP address resolution yet. But, it does provide TXT record, which might carry the information its author communicates to the outside world. The author changed TXT information twice so far and note it uses a @riseup.net email address\n\n```\n2018-05-14 04:22:43\tc.sunnyjuly.gq\tDNS_TXT\tIrdev here, i can be reached at village@riseup.net, goodbye\n2018-05-10 00:55:06\tc.sunnyjuly.gq\tDNS_TXT\tIt is always the simple that produces the marvelous\n```\n\nWorth noting that the origin [Satori.robber](__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address/) also used the same DNS zone sunnyjuly.qg. At that time, the author also leave a message in the sample, as follows. The email address in it is also a @riseup.net。\n\n```\nSatori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at curtain@riseup.net  \n```\n\n#### The Port 3333 Scan Spike Caused by Satori\n\nThe current version of Satori also scans port 3333 which can be seen at our [ScanMon](https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1523894400000&tsend=1526486400000&dstport=3333&toplistname=srcas&topn=10) system. The source of this scan is about 17k independent IP addresses, mainly from Uninet SA de CV, telmex.com, located in Mexico.\n\n![](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/satori-port-3333-scan.png)\n\n\n#### Contact Us\n\nWe can be reached at  [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or at WeChat subscription account **360Netlab**.\n\n####Ioc\nThose IPs once under muhstik control, but now cleared by security community:\n```\n139.99.101.96:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  \n142.44.163.168:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  \n142.44.240.14:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  \n144.217.84.99:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  \n145.239.84.0:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  \n145.239.93.125:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  \n147.135.210.184:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  \n192.99.71.250:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS  \n51.254.221.129    \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"  \n66.70.190.236:9090    AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效  \n51.254.219.137    \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"  \n51.254.219.134    \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"  \n191.238.234.227    \"AS8075 Microsoft Corporation\"  \n```\n\nAll the malware downloading URLs exploiting GPON vulnerability.\n```\n%\tbotnet_name\turl\tCountry & Region\tASN\n57.77%\tsatori\thxxp://185.62.190.191/r\tNetherlands/NL\tAS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.\n32.66%\tmuhstik\thxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php\tFrance/FR\tAS16276 OVH SAS\n2.20%\tmuhstik\thxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon\tUnited States/US New York\tAS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC\n1.99%\tmuhstik\thxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php\tUnited States/US Clifton\tAS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.96%\tmuhstik\thxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php\tSingapore/SG Singapore\tAS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.64%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/forky\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.60%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/80\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.57%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.57%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/81\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.53%\tmuhstik\thxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php\tUnited States/US Clifton\tAS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.32%\tmuhstik\thxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec\tUnited States/US New York\tAS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.28%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/8080\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.25%\tuntitled-1\thxxp://186.219.47.178:8080\tBrazil/BR\tAS262589 INTERNEXA Brasil Operadora de Telecomunicações S.A\n0.11%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.11%\tmuhstik\thxxp://162.243.211.204/aio\tUnited States/US New York\tAS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.11%\tmuhstik\thxxp://46.243.189.102/\tNetherlands/NL\tAS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.\n0.07%\tuntitled-2\thxxp://114.67.227.83/busybox\tChina/CN Beijing\tAS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network\n0.07%\tomni\thxxp://185.246.152.173/omni\tNetherlands/NL\tAS56630 Melbikomas UAB\n0.07%\tuntitled-2\tnc://114.67.227.83:7856\tChina/CN Beijing\tAS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network\n0.04%\tsatori\thxxp://185.62.190.191/s\tNetherlands/NL\tAS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.\n0.04%\tuntitled-2\thxxp://114.67.227.83\tChina/CN Beijing\tAS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network\n0.04%\tuntitled-3\thxxp://209.141.42.3/gponx\tUnited States/US Las Vegas\tAS53667 FranTech Solutions\n0.04%\tuntitled-2\thxxp://114.67.227.83/\tChina/CN Beijing\tAS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}