For the full experience with images see the original blog post!
**TL;DR:** oldschool is a classic crackme binary with an interesting password check method we have to reverse.It uses ncurses terminal UI and anti-debugging measures as a small twist though.
The challenge provides us with a 32-bit crackme binary and a python script containing the 50 usernames we need to find the password for.A crackme is a small program designed to test your reversing skills in a legal way.They often require finding secret data and understanding their authentication schema to obtain access.The page crackmes.de referenced in the description was a website that hosted many such challenges until 2016 (shutdown because of legal issues).Currently, the page [crackmes.one](https://crackmes.one/) hosts many of the original crackmes.de challenges as well as new ones, in case you like to try them out.
The binary uses the [ncurses](https://invisible-island.net/ncurses/announce.html) library that provides a terminal-independent UI programming API.Thus you may need to install the 32-bit ncurses package to execute the library.Also, the binary seems to require a certain screen size so I needed to decrease the terminal font size a bit to get past this error.If everything is working fine you should see a window similar to this:
oldschool login screen
While executing and later debugging the binary helps understanding the program I needed to look at its code first to see what it does internally.Thus, I fired up my debugger and tried to execute the program while it was loading.I used ghidra for this challenge which works fine but I have to warn you that the main method will take a few minutes to load on every edit.Although it repeats the error cases to free ncurses resources it does produce an otherwise quite readable result.Binary ninja is a lot quicker but did nest every error check which produced a lot of nesting levels.In the end, you should probably stick to the tools you're used to anyway.
I tried looking through the main method linearly at first but quickly abandoned this approach as it is just too big.Then I looked at the imported library methods and found the method [`new_field`](https://manpages.debian.org/testing/ncurses-doc/new_field.3form.en.html) which is used to create six fields.By their size and positioning I assumed them to be the labels, text fields and buttons.Tracing the usages of the first buttons I found the login case and a method that was passed the username and password (updated char by char on every edit of the field in a handler elsewhere).This method determines the login result and thus I will subsequently call it `password_check`.
### Passing the password check
The `password_check` contains a few error cases regarding the format of usernames and passwords.For example, a username must consist of at least five blocks of four characters and the password too, though separated by hyphens.However, the most important check is an equation at the end of the function that uses a list of 25 values computed from the username and 25 others from the password.
Structure of the password_check method
The values from the password are the indices in a string of valid characters: `"23456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ"`.As every string in the binary, it is stored as two byte arrays that are XORed to get the real string.The values in this initial `password_list` are then remapped via a shuffle map, XORed with map of values by their position in the list and finally rotated right in blocks of 5 depending on the index of the block (no change on block 0, block 1 rotated right by one and so on).Now, I didn't look at the computation of the `username_list` in detail because we know the usernames and can just copy the code.The final equation for checking password and username is generated like this:
```cfor (user_block = 0; (int)user_block < 5; user_block = user_block + 1) {  for (pass_index = 0; pass_index < name_blocks; pass_index = pass_index + 1) {    check = 0;    for (user_index/pass_block = 0; (int)user_index/pass_block < 5; user_index/pass_block = user_index/pass_block + 1) {      check = check + username_list[user_index/pass_block + user_block * 0x10] * password_list[user_index/pass_block * 5 + pass_index] & 0x1f;    }    if (((user_block == pass_index) && (check != 1)) || ((user_block != pass_index && (check != 0)))) {      return 0;    }  }}result = 1;```
The resulting strategy for finding the password to a given username I used was as follows:1. Generate `username_list` from name2. Solve equation for modified `password_list` with `z3`3. Undo the modifications in reverse order to get password
### Anti-debugging and final solution
To test my approach and find out where it failed (because the equation wasn't satisfiable for almost all usernames) I wanted to debug the crackme a bit.With help from my team I managed to run the binary without errors using `gdbserver` on `localhost:1337` and connect from `gdb` via the command `target remote localhost:1337`.I then noticed changes in the global `XOR_MAP` with the XOR values for the password_list, in a map used to generate the `username_list` (I called it `USERGEN_MAP`) and in a global integer used as a starting value for the `username_list` generation (I called it `USERGEN_BASE`).After updating my values accordingly I managed to produce a correct login for the first username but the rest of the equations still weren't satisfiable.Additionally, the example only worked under the debug environment and not during normal execution.I knew the concept of such anti-debugging measures but they still managed to delay me because I couldn't find any `ptrace` call that is usually used for this.In case you haven't yet come across such measures, they usually call `ptrace` on themselves to check whether a debugger is attached to the process.After rechecking the values I copied from the binary I later traced the modifications on the global variables and found they all used a global boolean.This boolean was indeed a `ptrace_bit` set with the result of a `ptrace` system call, only ghidra didn't manage to resolve the 32-bit call as such.
The modifications on the global variables are as follows:- The `XOR_MAP` values are XORed with 2, or 4 if the `ptrace_bit` is set- In the `USERGEN_MAP` two uints are swapped skipping one value, starting with offset one if the `ptrace_bit` is set- If the `ptrace_bit` is set, the `USERGEN_BASE` value is increased by 7
With these modifications included my script produced satisfiable equations for a few selected usernames under default circumstances.So I finished my solver and generated the passwords for all usernames in the `flag_maker.py` to get the flag.
```pyimport subprocessimport z3
PASSWORD_MAP = "23456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ"
PTRACE_BIT = 0
SHUFFLE_MAP = [ 0x10, 0xE, 0xD, 0x2, 0xB, 0x11, 0x15, 0x1E, 0x7, 0x18, 0x12, 0x1C, 0x1A, 0x1, 0xC, 0x6, 0x1F, 0x19, 0x0, 0x17, 0x14, 0x16, 0x8, 0x1B, 0x4, 0x3, 0x13, 0x5, 0x9, 0xA, 0x1D, 0xF ]XOR_MAP = [ 0x19, 0x2, 0x8, 0xF, 0xA, 0x1A, 0xD, 0x1E, 0x4, 0x5, 0x10, 0x7, 0xE, 0x0, 0x6, 0x1F, 0x1D, 0xB, 0x11, 0x3, 0x1C, 0x13, 0x9, 0x14, 0x1B, 0x15, 0x1, 0xC, 0x18, 0x16, 0x17, 0x12 ]
if PTRACE_BIT == 0:    for pos in range(0x20):        XOR_MAP[pos] ^= 2else:    for pos in range(0x20):        XOR_MAP[pos] ^= 4
# gdwAnDgwbRVnrJvEqzvs# username_list = [18,29,16,19,27,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,31,8,23,30,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,29,3,28,10,21,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,18,29,8,16,28,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,11,30,7,20,7,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]
def solve_for_password_list(username_list: list[int]) -> list[int]:    solver = z3.Solver()
    password_list = [0] * 25    for i in range(25):        password_list[i] = z3.BitVec("p" + str(i), 4 * 8)        solver.add(password_list[i] < 0x100)        solver.add(password_list[i] >= 0)
    for pos in range(5):        for index in range(5):            local_58 = 0            for j in range(5):                local_58 = (                    local_58 + username_list[j + pos * 0x10] * password_list[j * 5 + index]                    & 0x1F                )
            solver.add(z3.If((pos == index), (local_58 == 1), (local_58 == 0)))
    assert solver.check() == z3.sat
    model = solver.model()    result_list = [0] * 25    for i, p in enumerate(password_list):        result_list[i] = model[p].as_long()
    return result_list
# gdwAnDgwbRVnrJvEqzvs# IN_LIST = [18, 21, 12, 14, 2, 1, 31, 11, 30, 16, 21, 8, 27, 11, 26, 0, 13, 19, 2, 14, 28, 8, 12, 31, 3]
def unshuffle(in_list: list[int]) -> str:    list1 = [0] * 25    for round in range(5):        for offset in range(5 - round):            list1[round * 5 + round + offset] = in_list[round * 5 + offset]
        for offset in range(round):            shifted = 5 - (round - offset)            list1[round * 5 + offset] = in_list[round * 5 + shifted]
    list2 = [0] * 25    for pos in range(5):        for index in range(5):            list2[pos * 5 + index] = list1[pos * 5 + index] ^ XOR_MAP[(index + pos * 5)]
    list3 = [0] * 25    for pos in range(5):        for index in range(5):            list3[pos * 5 + index] = SHUFFLE_MAP.index(list2[pos * 5 + index])
    password = ""    for block in range(5):        for offset in range(5):            password += PASSWORD_MAP[list3[block * 5 + offset]]
        password += "-"
    return password[:-1]
def solve_password_for(username: str) -> str:    username_list_str = subprocess.check_output(["./generate_username_list", username])[        :-2    ].decode()    username_list = [int(val, 10) for val in username_list_str.split(",")]
    password_list = solve_for_password_list(username_list)    password = unshuffle(password_list)    return password
```
The complete solution is included in the solution archive provided above.