# UntrustZone
Category: Pwn
Solves: 1 (we're the only solve!)
Solve by: cts and theKidOfArcrania
Points: 500
---
# introduction
hello!! I recommend you read the [prequel](https://github.com/perfectblue/ctf-writeups/tree/master/2022/realworld-ctf-2022/trust_or_not) in this series. to understand what is going on here.
# level up!!!
this time they actually change the signing keys or something, since i can't upload and run my own TA on the remote anymore. and the remote is different from the local this time and the local has dummy flags only.
so we gotta exploit the TA to read out our objects.
# the vulnerability
TA runs in secure world, it has a simple stack BOF bug
```c__int64 __fastcall TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint(void *session, uint32_t command, uint32_t param_types, TEE_Param *a4){  unsigned int obj_id_sz; // w21  void *obj_id; // x20 MAPDST  unsigned int v8; // w0  unsigned int v9; // w19  unsigned int v11; // w0  unsigned __int64 obj; // [xsp+48h] [xbp+48h] BYREF  __int64 data[4]; // [xsp+50h] [xbp+50h] BYREF
  if ( command )    return 0xFFFF0006;  memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));  if ( param_types != 0x55 )  {    return 0xFFFF0006;  }  else  {    obj_id_sz = a4->memref.size;    obj_id = (void *)TEE_Malloc(obj_id_sz, 0);    if ( obj_id )    {      TEE_MemMove((unsigned __int64)obj_id, (unsigned __int64)a4->memref.buffer, obj_id_sz);      TEE_MemMove((unsigned __int64)data, (unsigned __int64)a4[1].memref.buffer, a4[1].memref.size);// <-- stack BOF      v8 = TEE_CreatePersistentObject(1u, obj_id, obj_id_sz, 0x407u, 0LL, 0LL, 0, &obj);      v9 = v8;      if ( v8 )      {        EMSG("random_number_generate", 0x72u, 1u, 1u, "TEE_CreatePersistentObject failed 0x%08x", v8);      }      else      {        v11 = TEE_WriteObjectData(obj, (__int64)data, 0x20u);        v9 = v11;        if ( v11 )        {          EMSG("random_number_generate", 0x79u, 1u, 1u, "TEE_WriteObjectData failed 0x%08x", v11);          TEE_CloseAndDeletePersistentObject1(obj);        }        else        {          TEE_CloseObject(obj);        }      }      TEE_Free((__int64)obj_id);    }    else    {      return 0xFFFF000C;    }  }  return v9;}```
ASLR is totally ineffective and secure world address space is 32 bits
```cunsigned __int64 get_pad_begin(){  unsigned int v0; // w0  int v2; // [xsp+1Ch] [xbp+1Ch] BYREF
  v2 = 0;  v0 = sub_E14D6CC(&v2, 4LL);  if ( !v0 )    return (unsigned __int64)(v2 & 0x7F) << 12; // <-- only 7 bits entropy  sub_E1536EC("get_pad_begin", 714LL, 3LL, 1LL, "Random read failed: %#x", v0);  return 0LL;}```
^ When debugging, patch this function to just return 0 so ASLR slide is always 0
When testing, just run 150 times (Up + Enter lol) brute works fine.
Address space look like this (when aslr slide is 0)
```E/LD:  Status of TA b6c53aba-9669-4668-a7f2-205629d00f86E/LD:   arch: aarch64E/LD:  region  0: va 0x40004000 pa 0x0e300000 size 0x002000 flags rw-s (ldelf)E/LD:  region  1: va 0x40006000 pa 0x0e302000 size 0x008000 flags r-xs (ldelf)E/LD:  region  2: va 0x4000e000 pa 0x0e30a000 size 0x001000 flags rw-s (ldelf)E/LD:  region  3: va 0x4000f000 pa 0x0e30b000 size 0x004000 flags rw-s (ldelf)E/LD:  region  4: va 0x40013000 pa 0x0e30f000 size 0x001000 flags r--sE/LD:  region  5: va 0x40014000 pa 0x00001000 size 0x012000 flags r-xs [0]E/LD:  region  6: va 0x40026000 pa 0x00013000 size 0x00c000 flags rw-s [0]E/LD:  region  7: va 0x40032000 pa 0x0e32e000 size 0x001000 flags rw-s (stack)E/LD:  region  8: va 0x40033000 pa 0x76ca92b0 size 0x005000 flags rw-- (param)E/LD:  region  9: va 0x40038000 pa 0x7f404cc8 size 0x001000 flags rw-- (param)E/LD:   [0] b6c53aba-9669-4668-a7f2-205629d00f86 @ 0x40014000```
Stack and .text are based on same aslr base so no need for stack leak. Have extra space after stack segment that hold our params. Param pages are mapped to non secure world. **However we cannot make Optee syscall with pointer in non-secure (param) pages as in/out pointer argument, it will fail with Access denied.**
If brute succeed, all request in same session are serviced by same process so pointer will stay the same across requests. Good meme. If failed, will just crash and we have unlimited attempt. Also good meme. I hope apple and google should learn from this approach :+1:
# Target info
flag is stored with the "secure object" storage API in encrypted hash tree blob in /data/tee
we don't know the object name so we need to enumerate them using the api.
# Overall strategy
1. write a trusted application (TA) and run on local qemu to learn how to enumerate all the secure objects names (We can load our own TA on our local test but not on the remote). then we know the name on local at least (`this_is_test`)
2. write a program on the host that can crash the target TA using bof
3. write basic exploit for bof to return cleanly to syscall_exit_return in the TA
4. write exploit that can at least open the file, in rop, with TA aslr off
5. write exploit that can open, read, and copy out the file
6. test with aslr on
7. write exploit to enumerate the files with rop. without reading
8. test locally again with aslr
9. test on remote (we get the flag at this point)
10. (optional) write cool exploit that combine enumeration with the reading
# debugging
debugging this shit sucks. we used qemu gdbstub and it kinda works
```$ gdb-multiarch random_aarch64_binary # do NOT use the optee kernel elf, gdb will get too smart because it sees its loading at the same address, don't do that shit. just pick some totally random unrelated binary and it should work. fuck it. gdbstubs always suckgdb> opteegdb> b *0xe100000 # break at entrypointgdb> c # wait for TZ optee entrypointgdb> b *0xE125A20 # breakpoint in syscall_storage_obj_opengdb> cgdb> b *0x400276c # breakpoint in TEE_OpenPersistentObject```
now you should be able to have breakpoint in optee kernel and also even the TA.
**but really i just enabled serial uart for secure world in qemu and log to file serial2.txt, this works quite good.** for any aarch64 noobs i also annotated what all this shit means
```D/TC:1 0 abort_handler:531 [abort] abort in User mode (TA will panic)E/TC:? 0 E/TC:? 0 User mode data-abort at address 0x1234567 (translation fault)E/TC:? 0  esr 0x82000005  ttbr0 0x200000e191020   ttbr1 0x00000000   cidr 0x0 <-- esr = exception syndrome register (basically what kind of exception was it)                                                                              <-- ttbr0 = user page table base (for low addresses. depending on value of TTBCR)                                                                              <-- ttbr1 = kernel pagetable base (for high addresses)E/TC:? 0  cpu #1          cpsr 0x40000100                                     <-- cpsr = flags registerE/TC:? 0  x0  aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa x1  0000000000000001 <-- x0,x1,x2... = args . x0 = retvalE/TC:? 0  x2  2121212121212121 x3  0000000000000000E/TC:? 0  x4  0000000040033000 x5  0000000000000000E/TC:? 0  x6  ffffffffffffffff x7  0000000040033000E/TC:? 0  x8  000000000000002d x9  0000000040029540E/TC:? 0  x10 0000000000000000 x11 0000000000000000 <-- gpr'sE/TC:? 0  x12 0000000000000000 x13 0000000040032f80E/TC:? 0  x14 0000000000000000 x15 0000000000000000E/TC:? 0  x16 000000000e126100 x17 0000000000000000E/TC:? 0  x18 0000000000000000 x19 1919191919191919 <-- callee-saved (nonvolatile) registersE/TC:? 0  x20 2020202020202020 x21 2121212121212121 <-- the compiler likes to spill x0,x1,x2... to these at the start of the func and use themE/TC:? 0  x22 0000000000000001 x23 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaE/TC:? 0  x24 2424242424242424 x25 2525252525252525E/TC:? 0  x26 2626262626262626 x27 0000000001234567E/TC:? 0  x28 2828282828282828 x29 6969696969696969 <-- x29 = frame pointer, x30 = link register (retaddr)E/TC:? 0  x30 00000000400182d4 elr 0000000001234567 <-- exception link register = faulting (next) PCE/TC:? 0  sp_el0 0000000040032110                   <-- stack pointer in EL0 (usermode)E/LD:  Status of TA b6c53aba-9669-4668-a7f2-205629d00f86E/LD:   arch: aarch64E/LD:  region  0: va 0x40004000 pa 0x0e300000 size 0x002000 flags rw-s (ldelf)E/LD:  region  1: va 0x40006000 pa 0x0e302000 size 0x008000 flags r-xs (ldelf)E/LD:  region  2: va 0x4000e000 pa 0x0e30a000 size 0x001000 flags rw-s (ldelf)E/LD:  region  3: va 0x4000f000 pa 0x0e30b000 size 0x004000 flags rw-s (ldelf)E/LD:  region  4: va 0x40013000 pa 0x0e30f000 size 0x001000 flags r--sE/LD:  region  5: va 0x40014000 pa 0x00001000 size 0x012000 flags r-xs [0]E/LD:  region  6: va 0x40026000 pa 0x00013000 size 0x00c000 flags rw-s [0]E/LD:  region  7: va 0x40032000 pa 0x0e32e000 size 0x001000 flags rw-s (stack)E/LD:  region  8: va 0x40033000 pa 0x7c4612b0 size 0x005000 flags rw-- (param)E/LD:  region  9: va 0x40038000 pa 0x7f36d848 size 0x001000 flags rw-- (param)E/LD:   [0] b6c53aba-9669-4668-a7f2-205629d00f86 @ 0x40014000```
i debug many exploit before with only dump like this. this is my curse. i am alone on this barren earth. i am empty. and yet. i fish
# exploit detail
Go read [`gucci_chain.c`](https://github.com/perfectblue/ctf-writeups/blob/master/2022/realworld-ctf-2022/untrustZone/gucci_chain.c) for exploit
1. aarch64 rop is tough, author says we could have used gadgets in ldelf but i did not notice this during ctf. Also [this blog post](https://blog.perfect.blue/ROPing-on-Aarch64) by voido❤️ is a great intro. things to note:
- on aarch64, saved fp/ra is at the TOP of the stack frame, i.e. your function locals and spilled regs come after where sp points to. layout from low to high addrs is like sp points here -> [saved x29] [saved ra] [saved regs] [locals] [caller frame]- **Also when we are ropping on aarch64, it is a total bitch to find gadgets for loading the calling convention argument registers x0,x1,x2,x3,x4...**. But since the higher registers like x19,x20,x21,x22,... seem callee-saved, it's really easy to find gadgets for popping those. Actually, the good meme here is to NOT call the function directly in the rop chain. Instead just jump into the middle of the function after the function prologue has spilled all the arguments x0,x1,x2,x3... to nonvolatile registers x20,x21,x22,... . The compiler's register allocator will be actually using those registers for the argument values after the initial spilling near the start of the function. And those regs are easy to load with rop as the gadgets are plentiful. The function will also use the stack space after `sp` for its stack frame, meaning that it is simple to allocate space in your ropchain for the function to have a stack frame and avoid corrupting any of your future gadgets. The function typically returns with an epilogue that looks like `ldp x19,x20 [sp+0] ; ... ; ldp x29,x30, [sp], #0x50`, for example 0x50 here is the size of the function's frame.- your gadgets will all pretty much end with `ldp x29,x30, [sp], #0x30 ; ret` or `br x21` or similar. everything else is essentially not workable. gadget that ends with `ret` by itself is likely useless (`ret` == `b x30`).
2. optee syscall will not like pointer arguments outside of secure pages, so param pages past end of stack won't work. so just pivot the entire chain up to stack_base (0x40032000) at the start
3. alloc enum -> start enum -> next enum -> open -> read -> memmove
4. done
this chain was fucking hard to write. At least the panic message give me registers and mappings.
`rwctf{Pwn_Ta_fr0m_c4_1s_Fun!!!}`
# acknowledgements
shout out to the challenge author for enabling internet and wget inside the vm on the remote because that shit totally sucks when you have to echo-load a 50KB exploit binary with base64.