# ??? (crypto, 300p)
## ENG
The only serious 100% crypto challenge on CONFidence - thanks to adami (creator). I heard that it was originally supposed to be harder, but during internal testing it turned out that there was obvious unintended solution and it was left that way.
We are given file with "crypto service" code (see attached [enc_service.c](enc_service.c) ).
There are 16 "slots" for encryption keys in binary, and we have four operations: - copy key from Ith slot to `"current_key"` slot (if Ith key is shorter than `current_key`, not all will be overwritten). - change Ith key to N random bytes - change `data` - encrypt `data` with 16 bytes of `current_key`.
My solution was not perfect, because it turned out that there was easier way, but i'll describe it anyway.
Code initially looks conceptually like this: - randomizes all keys - data = read('flag') - print `encrypt_data()`
In original code:
```cppint i;for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYS; i++) {        regenerate_key(i, MAX_KEY_LEN);}
int fd = open("flag.txt", O_RDONLY);read(fd, data, DATA_SIZE);close(fd);
load_key(MASTER_KEY_INDEX);encrypt();
memset(data, 0, DATA_SIZE);regenerate_key(MASTER_KEY_INDEX, MAX_KEY_LEN);```
data is memzeroed after this, and the original key is only in `current_key`.
So how can we solve this? First i tried overwritting first byte of `current_key`, until i get the same results.
So the situation looked like this:
```current key:    [K0, K1, K2, K3, K4, ...]K0:             [K0, ?,  ?,  ?,  ?,  ...]```
and code more or less like this:
```pythongood = encrypt()while True:    regenerate(0, 1)    load(0)    next = encrypt()
    if next == good:        break```
after that, i repeated this for next bytes, and situation looked like this:
```current key:    [K0, K1, K2, K3, K4, ...]K0:             [K0, ?,  ?,  ?,  ?,  ...]K1:             [?,  K1, ?,  ?,  ?,  ...]K2:             [?,  ? , K2, ?,  ?,  ...]...```
And code like this:
```pythonfor i in range(0, 15):    print "and now, let's try to set KEYS[{}][{}] to VICTIM".format(i, i)
    while True:        regenerate(i, i+1)
        for j in range(0, i+1)[::-1]:            load(j)
        next = encrypt()        print next, next == good        if next == good:            break```
This was my first exploit, but it turned out not to be necessary (it only simplified next part a bit).
After that we noticed that overflow checking in functions is not correct:
```cppvoid regenerate_key(unsigned int index, unsigned int len) {        unsigned int offset = index * ENTRY_SIZE;
        if (offset > STORAGE_SIZE - ENTRY_SIZE || len > MAX_KEY_LEN) {                return;        }
        int fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);        read(fd, &keys[offset], len);        close(fd);        keys[offset + MAX_KEY_LEN] = len;}```
if offset was really large, it would overflow and in fact we could overwrite arbitrary byte to zero.We used it to overwrite whole keys[15] to zeroes:
```pythondef overwrite_keys15():    print 'ok, now overwrite keys[15] to zeroes'    print 'we want index * ENTRY_SIZE + 16 == 14*ENTRY_SIZE + j for j in range(16)'    regenerate(15, 16)    print 'good so far:'    print encrypt()    for j in range(16):        index = (15*17 - 16 + j) * modinv(17, 2**32) % 2**32        print 'for {} index {}'.format(j, index)        regenerate(index, 0)
    print 'sanity...'    loaddata('A'*16)    load(15)    sanity = encrypt()    assert sanity == 'b49cbf19d357e6e1f6845c30fd5b63e3'```
After that, solution was trivial: just encrypt anything with keys:
```K0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ...K0, K1, 0, 0, 0, ...K0, K1, K2, 0, 0, ......```
Like this:
```pythonpartials = []for i in range(15):    load(15)  # curkey = 0    for j in range(i+1)[::-1]:        load(j)
    next = encrypt()    print 'next', next    partials.append(next)
print 'ok, lets hope itll work'for p in partials:    print p
print 'and teh flag...'print flag```
And after that just recover the key and flag:
```from Crypto.Cipher import AES
partials = ['66dbd655bc51bab87329c3f6bdeb5aa0','fee1d80da69f2144f3a951c085c5bc64','7ceaf1c485e6703afc2334bd14b42268','52f684bebc5453ea6e76075c2e03e1ab','bdca9198d9691f0811b178749ee41202','e9667a0459c7da520b73279e6cf3fb42','056da1d9b0504b34f012a21b84e3cdc2','38029eb3e57569c3dd36f75142f58580','c22ce237ba0543f23f36c88aa79f3140','a475c86bb894b285c080a90b76383927','45bc0a0bb4f98cd4388bff76f058bd7a','846dbb2d1380d4513ad4ce2d376f206c','f6e81706b8ea2051b926698cc584c26e','4e3ef31fab662337d551aaf202d2c047','05f61ce44e216db3ad8264f031086dbb',]flag = 'cefff6adc9392ba7e6abe6513c6d4467'.decode('hex')data = 'A' * 16
key = [0] * 16print len(partials)for i, p in enumerate(partials):    p = p.decode('hex')    for j in range(256):        key[i] = j        kk = ''.join(chr(c) for c in key)        if AES.new(kk).decrypt(p) == data:            print 'got', j            break
for i in range(256):    for j in range(256):        key[15] = i        key[0] = j        kk = ''.join(chr(c) for c in key)        ff = AES.new(kk).decrypt(flag)        if all(20 < ord(c) < 0x7f for c in ff):            print ff```
Flag:
```Drgns{f2Br#@!#d}```