What is the difference between inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning?
https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/inductive-deductive-reasoning
Inductive vs. Deductive Research Approach | Steps & Examples
2019-04-18
Raimo Streefkerk
<div><div>
 
 <main>
 
 <article>
 
 
 <p>
 Published on
 April 18, 2019
 by
 <a href="https://www.scribbr.com/author/raimo/">
 Raimo Streefkerk</a>.
 
 Revised on
 January 3, 2023.
 </p>
 
 <section>
 <p>The main difference between inductive and deductive reasoning is that inductive reasoning aims at <strong>developing a theory</strong> while deductive reasoning aims at <strong>testing an existing theory</strong>.</p>
<p>In other words, Iinductive reasoning moves from specific observations to broad <a href="https://www.scribbr.com/research-bias/generalizability/">generalizations</a>. Deductive reasoning works the other way around.</p>
<p>Both approaches are used in various <a href="https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/types-of-research/">types of research</a>, and it’s not uncommon to combine them in your work.</p>
<p></p>
<div><h2>Table of contents</h2><div><ol><li><a href="#inductive-research-approach">Inductive research approach</a></li><li><a href="#deductive-research-approach">Deductive research approach</a></li><li><a href="#combining-inductive-and-deductive-research">Combining inductive and deductive research</a></li><li><a href="#frequently-asked-questions-about-inductive-vs-deductive-reasoning">Frequently asked questions about inductive vs deductive reasoning</a></li></ol></div></div>
<h2>Inductive research approach</h2>
<p>When there is little to no existing literature on a topic, it is common to perform <a href="https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/inductive-reasoning/">inductive research</a>, because there is no theory to test. The inductive approach consists of three stages:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Observation</strong>
<ul>
<li>A low-cost airline flight is delayed</li>
<li>Dogs A and B have fleas</li>
<li>Elephants depend on water to exist</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Seeking patterns</strong>
<ul>
<li>Another 20 flights from low-cost airlines are delayed</li>
<li>All observed dogs have fleas</li>
<li>All observed animals depend on water to exist</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Developing a theory or general (preliminary) conclusion</strong>
<ul>
<li>Low cost airlines always have delays</li>
<li>All dogs have fleas</li>
<li>All biological life depends on water to exist</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h3>Limitations of an inductive approach</h3>
<p>A conclusion drawn on the basis of an inductive method can never be fully proven. However, it can be invalidated.</p>
<figure><figcaption>Example</figcaption>You observe 1000 flights from low-cost airlines. All of them experience a delay, which is in line with your theory. However, you can never prove that flight 1001 will also be delayed. Still, the larger your dataset, the more reliable your conclusions.</figure>
<h2>Deductive research approach</h2>
<p>When conducting <a href="https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/deductive-reasoning/">deductive research</a>, you always start with a theory. This is usually the result of inductive research. Reasoning deductively means testing these theories. Remember that if there is no theory yet, you cannot conduct deductive research.</p>
<p>The deductive research approach consists of four stages:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Start with an existing theory and create a <a href="https://www.scribbr.com/research-process/problem-statement/">problem statement</a></strong>
<ul>
<li>Low cost airlines always have delays</li>
<li>All dogs have fleas</li>
<li>All biological life depends on water to exist</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Formulate a falsifiable <a href="https://www.scribbr.nl/methodology/hypotheses/">hypothesis</a>, based on existing theory</strong>
<ul>
<li>If passengers fly with a low cost airline, then they will always experience delays</li>
<li>All pet dogs in my apartment building have fleas</li>
<li>All land mammals depend on water to exist</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong><a href="https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/data-collection/">Collect data</a> to <a href="https://www.scribbr.com/statistics/hypothesis-testing/">test the hypothesis</a></strong>
<ul>
<li>Collect flight data of low-cost airlines</li>
<li>Test all dogs in the building for fleas</li>
<li>Study all land mammal species to see if they depend on water</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Analyze and test the data</strong>
<ul>
<li>5 out of 100 flights of low-cost airlines are not delayed</li>
<li>10 out of 20 dogs didn’t have fleas</li>
<li>All land mammal species depend on water</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Decide whether you can reject the <a href="https://www.scribbr.com/statistics/null-and-alternative-hypotheses/">null hypothesis</a></strong>
<ul>
<li>5 out of 100 flights of low-cost airlines are not delayed = reject hypothesis</li>
<li>10 out of 20 dogs didn’t have fleas = reject hypothesis</li>
<li>All land mammal species depend on water = support hypothesis</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h3>Limitations of a deductive approach</h3>
<p>The conclusions of deductive reasoning can only be true if all the premises set in the inductive study are true and the terms are clear.</p>
<figure><figcaption>Example</figcaption><ul>
<li>All dogs have fleas (premise)</li>
<li>Benno is a dog (premise)</li>
<li>Benno has fleas (conclusion)</li>
</ul>
<p>Based on the premises we have, the conclusion must be true. However, if the first premise turns out to be false, the conclusion that Benno has fleas cannot be relied upon.</p></figure>
<h2>Combining inductive and deductive research</h2>
<p>Many scientists conducting a larger research project begin with an inductive study. This helps them develop a <a href="https://www.scribbr.com/research-process/relevance-dissertation-topic/">relevant research topic</a> and construct a strong working theory. The inductive study is followed up with deductive research to confirm or invalidate the conclusion. This can help you formulate a more structured project, and better mitigate the risk of <a href="https://www.scribbr.com/faq-category/research-bias/">research bias</a> creeping into your work.</p>
<p>Remember that both inductive and deductive approaches are at risk for research biases, particularly <a href="https://www.scribbr.com/research-bias/confirmation-bias/">confirmation bias</a> and <a href="https://www.scribbr.com/research-bias/cognitive-bias/">cognitive bias</a>, so it’s important to be aware while you conduct your research.</p>
 <h2>Frequently asked questions about inductive vs deductive reasoning</h2>
<dl>
 
 <div>
 <dt>
 <a href="https://www.scribbr.com/frequently-asked-questions/what-is-inductive-reasoning/">
 
 What is inductive reasoning?
 
 </a>
 </dt>
 <dd>
 <div>
 <p><a href="https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/inductive-reasoning/"><strong>Inductive reasoning</strong></a> is a method of drawing conclusions by going from the specific to the general. It’s usually <a href="https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/inductive-deductive-reasoning/">contrasted</a> with deductive reasoning, where you proceed from general information to specific conclusions.</p>
<p>Inductive reasoning is also called inductive logic or bottom-up reasoning.</p>
 </div>
 </dd>
 </div>
 
 
 
 
 
 </dl>
 
 <div>
 <h4>Cite this Scribbr article</h4>
 <p>If you want to cite this source, you can copy and paste the citation or click the “Cite this Scribbr article” button to automatically add the citation to our free Citation Generator.</p>
 <figure>
 <blockquote>
 <p>Streefkerk, R. 
 (2023, January 03). <cite>Inductive vs. Deductive Research Approach | Steps &amp; Examples.</cite> Scribbr. 
 Retrieved February 6, 2023, 
 from https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/inductive-deductive-reasoning/</p>
 </blockquote>
 
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 1. Home
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 3. Methodology
 4. Inductive vs. Deductive Research Approach | Steps & Examples

 Methodology

 * An introduction to research methods
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 + Inductive vs. deductive
 o Inductive vs. deductive
 o Inductive reasoning
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 Inductive vs. Deductive Research Approach | Steps & Examples

 Published on April 18, 2019 by Raimo Streefkerk. Revised on January 3, 2023.

 The main difference between inductive and deductive reasoning is that inductive reasoning aims at developing a theory while deductive reasoning aims at testing an existing theory.

 In other words, Iinductive reasoning moves from specific observations to broad generalizations. Deductive reasoning works the other way around.

 Both approaches are used in various types of research, and it’s not uncommon to combine them in your work.

 Table of contents

 1. Inductive research approach
 2. Deductive research approach
 3. Combining inductive and deductive research
 4. Frequently asked questions about inductive vs deductive reasoning

 Inductive research approach

 When there is little to no existing literature on a topic, it is common to perform inductive research, because there is no theory to test. The inductive approach consists of three stages:

 1. Observation
 + A low-cost airline flight is delayed
 + Dogs A and B have fleas
 + Elephants depend on water to exist
 2. Seeking patterns
 + Another 20 flights from low-cost airlines are delayed
 + All observed dogs have fleas
 + All observed animals depend on water to exist
 3. Developing a theory or general (preliminary) conclusion
 + Low cost airlines always have delays
 + All dogs have fleas
 + All biological life depends on water to exist

 Limitations of an inductive approach

 A conclusion drawn on the basis of an inductive method can never be fully proven. However, it can be invalidated.

 Example
 You observe 1000 flights from low-cost airlines. All of them experience a delay, which is in line with your theory. However, you can never prove that flight 1001 will also be delayed. Still, the larger your dataset, the more reliable your conclusions.

 Deductive research approach

 When conducting deductive research, you always start with a theory. This is usually the result of inductive research. Reasoning deductively means testing these theories. Remember that if there is no theory yet, you cannot conduct deductive research.

 The deductive research approach consists of four stages:

 1. Start with an existing theory and create a problem statement
 + Low cost airlines always have delays
 + All dogs have fleas
 + All biological life depends on water to exist
 2. Formulate a falsifiable hypothesis, based on existing theory
 + If passengers fly with a low cost airline, then they will always experience delays
 + All pet dogs in my apartment building have fleas
 + All land mammals depend on water to exist
 3. Collect data to test the hypothesis
 + Collect flight data of low-cost airlines
 + Test all dogs in the building for fleas
 + Study all land mammal species to see if they depend on water
 4. Analyze and test the data
 + 5 out of 100 flights of low-cost airlines are not delayed
 + 10 out of 20 dogs didn’t have fleas
 + All land mammal species depend on water
 5. Decide whether you can reject the null hypothesis
 + 5 out of 100 flights of low-cost airlines are not delayed = reject hypothesis
 + 10 out of 20 dogs didn’t have fleas = reject hypothesis
 + All land mammal species depend on water = support hypothesis

 Limitations of a deductive approach

 The conclusions of deductive reasoning can only be true if all the premises set in the inductive study are true and the terms are clear.

 Example

 * All dogs have fleas (premise)
 * Benno is a dog (premise)
 * Benno has fleas (conclusion)

 Based on the premises we have, the conclusion must be true. However, if the first premise turns out to be false, the conclusion that Benno has fleas cannot be relied upon.

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 Combining inductive and deductive research

 Many scientists conducting a larger research project begin with an inductive study. This helps them develop a relevant research topic and construct a strong working theory. The inductive study is followed up with deductive research to confirm or invalidate the conclusion. This can help you formulate a more structured project, and better mitigate the risk of research bias creeping into your work.

 Remember that both inductive and deductive approaches are at risk for research biases, particularly confirmation bias and cognitive bias, so it’s important to be aware while you conduct your research.

 Frequently asked questions about inductive vs deductive reasoning

 What’s the difference between inductive and deductive reasoning?

 Inductive reasoning is a bottom-up approach, while deductive reasoning is top-down.

 Inductive reasoning takes you from the specific to the general, while in deductive reasoning, you make inferences by going from general premises to specific conclusions.

 What is inductive reasoning?

 Inductive reasoning is a method of drawing conclusions by going from the specific to the general. It’s usually contrasted with deductive reasoning, where you proceed from general information to specific conclusions.

 Inductive reasoning is also called inductive logic or bottom-up reasoning.

 What is deductive reasoning?

 Deductive reasoning is a logical approach where you progress from general ideas to specific conclusions. It’s often contrasted with inductive reasoning, where you start with specific observations and form general conclusions.

 Deductive reasoning is also called deductive logic.

 What’s the difference between exploratory and explanatory research?

 Exploratory research aims to explore the main aspects of an under-researched problem, while explanatory research aims to explain the causes and consequences of a well-defined problem.

 When should I use explanatory research?

 Explanatory research is used to investigate how or why a phenomenon occurs. Therefore, this type of research is often one of the first stages in the research process, serving as a jumping-off point for future research.

 When should I use exploratory research?

 Exploratory research is often used when the issue you’re studying is new or when the data collection process is challenging for some reason.

 You can use exploratory research if you have a general idea or a specific question that you want to study but there is no preexisting knowledge or paradigm with which to study it.

 What is a research project?

 A research project is an academic, scientific, or professional undertaking to answer a research question. Research projects can take many forms, such as qualitative or quantitative, descriptive, longitudinal, experimental, or correlational. What kind of research approach you choose will depend on your topic.

 Cite this Scribbr article

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 Streefkerk, R. (2023, January 03). Inductive vs. Deductive Research Approach | Steps & Examples. Scribbr. Retrieved February 6, 2023, from https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/inductive-deductive-reasoning/

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Published on
 April 18, 2019
 by
 
 Raimo Streefkerk.
 
 Revised on
 January 3, 2023.
 
 
 
 The main difference between inductive and deductive reasoning is that inductive reasoning aims at developing a theory while deductive reasoning aims at testing an existing theory.
In other words, Iinductive reasoning moves from specific observations to broad generalizations. Deductive reasoning works the other way around.
Both approaches are used in various types of research, and it’s not uncommon to combine them in your work.
 
 Table of contents    Inductive research approach   Deductive research approach   Combining inductive and deductive research   Frequently asked questions about inductive vs deductive reasoning    
Inductive research approach
When there is little to no existing literature on a topic, it is common to perform inductive research, because there is no theory to test. The inductive approach consists of three stages:
 Observation
A low-cost airline flight is delayed
Dogs A and B have fleas
Elephants depend on water to exist
 Seeking patterns
Another 20 flights from low-cost airlines are delayed
All observed dogs have fleas
All observed animals depend on water to exist
 Developing a theory or general (preliminary) conclusion
Low cost airlines always have delays
All dogs have fleas
All biological life depends on water to exist
Limitations of an inductive approach
A conclusion drawn on the basis of an inductive method can never be fully proven. However, it can be invalidated.
 ExampleYou observe 1000 flights from low-cost airlines. All of them experience a delay, which is in line with your theory. However, you can never prove that flight 1001 will also be delayed. Still, the larger your dataset, the more reliable your conclusions.
Deductive research approach
When conducting deductive research, you always start with a theory. This is usually the result of inductive research. Reasoning deductively means testing these theories. Remember that if there is no theory yet, you cannot conduct deductive research.
The deductive research approach consists of four stages:
 Start with an existing theory and create a problem statement 
Low cost airlines always have delays
All dogs have fleas
All biological life depends on water to exist
 Formulate a falsifiable hypothesis, based on existing theory
If passengers fly with a low cost airline, then they will always experience delays
All pet dogs in my apartment building have fleas
All land mammals depend on water to exist
  Collect data to test the hypothesis 
Collect flight data of low-cost airlines
Test all dogs in the building for fleas
Study all land mammal species to see if they depend on water
 Analyze and test the data
5 out of 100 flights of low-cost airlines are not delayed
10 out of 20 dogs didn’t have fleas
All land mammal species depend on water
 Decide whether you can reject the null hypothesis 
5 out of 100 flights of low-cost airlines are not delayed = reject hypothesis
10 out of 20 dogs didn’t have fleas = reject hypothesis
All land mammal species depend on water = support hypothesis
Limitations of a deductive approach
The conclusions of deductive reasoning can only be true if all the premises set in the inductive study are true and the terms are clear.
 Example 
All dogs have fleas (premise)
Benno is a dog (premise)
Benno has fleas (conclusion)
Based on the premises we have, the conclusion must be true. However, if the first premise turns out to be false, the conclusion that Benno has fleas cannot be relied upon. 
Combining inductive and deductive research
Many scientists conducting a larger research project begin with an inductive study. This helps them develop a relevant research topic and construct a strong working theory. The inductive study is followed up with deductive research to confirm or invalidate the conclusion. This can help you formulate a more structured project, and better mitigate the risk of research bias creeping into your work.
Remember that both inductive and deductive approaches are at risk for research biases, particularly confirmation bias and cognitive bias, so it’s important to be aware while you conduct your research.
 Frequently asked questions about inductive vs deductive reasoning
 
 
 
 
 
 What is inductive reasoning?
 
 
 
 
 
   Inductive reasoning  is a method of drawing conclusions by going from the specific to the general. It’s usually contrasted with deductive reasoning, where you proceed from general information to specific conclusions.
Inductive reasoning is also called inductive logic or bottom-up reasoning.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cite this Scribbr article
 If you want to cite this source, you can copy and paste the citation or click the “Cite this Scribbr article” button to automatically add the citation to our free Citation Generator.
 
 
 Streefkerk, R. 
 (2023, January 03). Inductive vs. Deductive Research Approach | Steps &amp; Examples. Scribbr. 
 Retrieved February 6, 2023, 
 from https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/inductive-deductive-reasoning/
 
 
 
  
 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Inductive vs. Deductive Research Approach | Steps & Examples
https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/inductive-deductive-reasoning/
https://www.khanacademy.org/math/algebra-home/alg-series-and-induction/alg-deductive-and-inductive-reasoning/v/deductive-reasoning-1
Inductive & deductive reasoning (video) | Khan Academy
2014-03-18
None
<div><div><h2>Video transcript</h2><p>Think about this real
world problem. To estimate the population of a
town in upcoming years, one of the town workers collected
populations from past years and made this table. So they have years starting
with 1950 and going up by increments of 10 years. And they just figure out the
population of the town in each of those years. The town wants to estimate
the population for 2015, 2018, and 2020. To do this, will you be using
inductive reasoning or deductive reasoning? Now before answering that, let's
just think about what inductive reasoning is and what
deductive reasoning is. Inductive reasoning is looking
for a pattern or looking for a trend. So it's looking for a trend
or a pattern and then generalizing. You could imagine, it's kind
of extrapolating the information you have,
generalizing. Deductive reasoning is taking
some set of data or some set of facts and using that to
come up with other, or deducing some other, facts
that you know are true. When you generalize you don't
know necessarily whether the trend will continue, but
you assume it will. You don't know 100%
it'll be true. With deductive reasoning,
you know it'll be true. You're starting with facts. And then you're deducing other
facts from those facts. Other facts that you
know are true. Now, when the town is
estimating, and that's kind of a clue that they're not going
to know the exact population for 2015, 2018, and 2020. But when they estimate the
population for these years, these years are in the future. They don't know what
the population will be in those years. The best they can do is see
the trend of growth here, maybe see what percentage it's
growing every 10 years. Or what the absolute number of
growth is every 10 years. And maybe they can continue
that trend out to 2015, 2018, and 2020. So they'll be looking for trend
in growth over this 60-year period. And then they'll generalize
it out to these years. So this will be inductive
reasoning.</p></div>||||I|||| If you're seeing this message, it means we're having trouble loading external resources on our website.





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 Algebra (all content)

 Unit 18: Lesson 9

 Deductive and inductive reasoning
 * Inductive & deductive reasoning
 * Deductive reasoning
 * Using deductive reasoning
 * Inductive reasoning
 * Inductive reasoning (example 2)
 * Using inductive reasoning
 * Using inductive reasoning (example 2)
 Math >
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 Deductive and inductive reasoning
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 Inductive & deductive reasoning

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 Sal discusses the difference between inductive and deductive reasoning by considering a word problem. Created by Sal Khan and Monterey Institute for Technology and Education.
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 * noahmichaelbelle
 9 years ago
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  + Adam Lohonyai
  9 years ago
  Posted 9 years ago. Direct link to Adam Lohonyai's post “Inductive reasoning is wh...”
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  Inductive reasoning is when you start with true statements about specific things and then make a more general conclusion. For example: "All lifeforms that we know of depend on water to exist. Therefore, any new lifeform we discover will probably also depend on water." A conclusion drawn from inductive reasoning always has the possibility of being false. If the possibility that the conclusion is wrong is remote, then we call it a strong inductive argument. If there's a reasonably good chance the conclusion is wrong, then we call it a weak inductive argument.
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 * Krishna Shinde
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  + King Henclucky
  7 years ago
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  I believe inductive as most facts are unknown
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 * chakra
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  + Matthew Daly
  10 years ago
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  No. Both theorems and postulates are elements of deductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning is noticing a pattern and making an educated guess based on that pattern.

  Here's the test. Do we know for certain that the population of the town will be higher in 2020 than it was in 2010? No -- the fact that the population has risen every ten years in the past is interesting, but if the factory in town shuts down or there is a natural disaster, then the population might well drop. Of course, you wouldn't be very observant if you failed to notice that the population has been steadily rising and that it is reasonable to assume that it won't stop now. But since there is no airtight logical proof that the population will go up, our reasoning is inductive and not deductive.
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 * Nafis
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 * arm wel
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 Doesn't the example in this video involve Inductive AND Deductive reasoning? Because inductive reasoning is used to make a generalization about the rate of population change. But then Deductive reasoning is used to draw specific information from the generalization just made. What am I missing?
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  + Anam Muhammad
  5 years ago
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  I do see your point there. Thing is, you've got to remember what deductive reasoning is; I guess the easiest way of putting it would be that it's the reverse of inductive. Inductive reasoning starts from the bottom to the top (in this case, 1950 to 2020), and deductive reasoning goes from the top back to the bottom.
  We can only make a generalization about the future, but to make a prediction about history would use deductive reasoning since we know there was a decrease every year. However, I do like your thinking!
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 * LH_2525
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 so deductive reasoning is using the given facts to make new more understandable facts?
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  + Exponentially Radical
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  You got it. When we study deductive reasoning, we learn that we have to be careful to avoid guessing or new ambiguity, we must stick to fact.
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 * Jinan
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 So basically inductive reasoning has to be proved with facts and deductive reasoning is already proved but adds info?
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  + Joey Feelgood
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  Deductive reasoning does not add to our store of knowledge; it merely rearranges it. Inductive involves some degree of guessing.
  All teenagers like to watch TV. I am a teenager, therefore I like to watch TV (deductive)
  Most teenagers like to watch TV. My cousin is a a teenager, therefore he probably likes to watch TV (inductive)
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 * misrico
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 how do you know what to do after you determine wether you'll use inductive or deductive
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 What is the hardest possible question we could make with deductive reasoning in one question and inductive reasoning in another question
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 Video transcript

 Think about this real world problem. To estimate the population of a town in upcoming years, one of the town workers collected populations from past years and made this table. So they have years starting with 1950 and going up by increments of 10 years. And they just figure out the population of the town in each of those years. The town wants to estimate the population for 2015, 2018, and 2020. To do this, will you be using inductive reasoning or deductive reasoning? Now before answering that, let's just think about what inductive reasoning is and what deductive reasoning is. Inductive reasoning is looking for a pattern or looking for a trend. So it's looking for a trend or a pattern and then generalizing. You could imagine, it's kind of extrapolating the information you have, generalizing. Deductive reasoning is taking some set of data or some set of facts and using that to come up with other, or deducing some other, facts that you know are true. When you generalize you don't know necessarily whether the trend will continue, but you assume it will. You don't know 100% it'll be true. With deductive reasoning, you know it'll be true. You're starting with facts. And then you're deducing other facts from those facts. Other facts that you know are true. Now, when the town is estimating, and that's kind of a clue that they're not going to know the exact population for 2015, 2018, and 2020. But when they estimate the population for these years, these years are in the future. They don't know what the population will be in those years. The best they can do is see the trend of growth here, maybe see what percentage it's growing every 10 years. Or what the absolute number of growth is every 10 years. And maybe they can continue that trend out to 2015, 2018, and 2020. So they'll be looking for trend in growth over this 60-year period. And then they'll generalize it out to these years. So this will be inductive reasoning.
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Video transcript Think about this real
world problem. To estimate the population of a
town in upcoming years, one of the town workers collected
populations from past years and made this table. So they have years starting
with 1950 and going up by increments of 10 years. And they just figure out the
population of the town in each of those years. The town wants to estimate
the population for 2015, 2018, and 2020. To do this, will you be using
inductive reasoning or deductive reasoning? Now before answering that, let's
just think about what inductive reasoning is and what
deductive reasoning is. Inductive reasoning is looking
for a pattern or looking for a trend. So it's looking for a trend
or a pattern and then generalizing. You could imagine, it's kind
of extrapolating the information you have,
generalizing. Deductive reasoning is taking
some set of data or some set of facts and using that to
come up with other, or deducing some other, facts
that you know are true. When you generalize you don't
know necessarily whether the trend will continue, but
you assume it will. You don't know 100%
it'll be true. With deductive reasoning,
you know it'll be true. You're starting with facts. And then you're deducing other
facts from those facts. Other facts that you
know are true. Now, when the town is
estimating, and that's kind of a clue that they're not going
to know the exact population for 2015, 2018, and 2020. But when they estimate the
population for these years, these years are in the future. They don't know what
the population will be in those years. The best they can do is see
the trend of growth here, maybe see what percentage it's
growing every 10 years. Or what the absolute number of
growth is every 10 years. And maybe they can continue
that trend out to 2015, 2018, and 2020. So they'll be looking for trend
in growth over this 60-year period. And then they'll generalize
it out to these years. So this will be inductive
reasoning.
Inductive & deductive reasoning (video) | Khan Academy
https://www.khanacademy.org/math/algebra-home/alg-series-and-induction/alg-deductive-and-inductive-reasoning/v/deductive-reasoning-1
https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01097/full
Frontiers | Bringing Formal and Informal Reasoning Together—A New Era of Assessment?
2016-07-19T00:00:00Z
Nani Teig1*Ronny Scherer2
<html><body><div><div>
<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Scientific reasoning represents a set of skills students need to acquire in order to successfully participate in scientific practices. Hence, educational research has focused on developing and validating assessments of student learning that capture the two different components of the construct, namely formal and informal reasoning. In this opinion paper, we explain <i>why</i> we believe that it is time for a new era of scientific reasoning assessments that bring these components together, and <i>how</i> computer-based assessments (CBAs) might accomplish this.</p>
<p>Reasoning is a mental process that enables people to construct new representations from existing knowledge (<a href="#B28">Rips, 2004</a>). It includes cognitive processing that is directed at finding solutions to problems by drawing conclusions based on logical rules or rational procedures (<a href="#B21">Mayer and Wittrock, 2006</a>). When people reason, they attempt to go “beyond the information given” to create a new representation that is assumed to be true (<a href="#B4">Bruner, 1957</a>). The process of scientific reasoning comprises formal and informal reasoning (<a href="#B12">Galotti, 1989</a>; <a href="#B18">Kuhn, 1993</a>). <i>Formal reasoning</i> is characterized by rules of logic and mathematics, with fixed and unchanging premises (<a href="#B24">Perkins et al., 1991</a>; <a href="#B29">Sadler, 2004</a>). It encompasses the ability to formulate a problem, design scientific investigations, evaluate experimental outcomes, and make causal inferences in order to form and modify theories related to the phenomenon under investigation (<a href="#B37">Zimmerman, 2007</a>). Formal scientific reasoning can be applied not only within the context of science, but in almost every other domain of society (<a href="#B16">Han, 2013</a>). It can be used to make informed decisions regarding everyday life problems (<a href="#B1">Amsterlaw, 2006</a>); for example, individuals use proportional reasoning to decide the fastest way to travel from one place to another.</p>
<p>In <i>informal reasoning</i>, students draw inferences from uncertain premises as they ponder ill-structured, open-ended, and debatable problems without definitive solutions (<a href="#B17">Kuhn, 1991</a>). When students reason formally, they work with the given premises in <i>belief mode</i>, which concerns arriving at true and warranted conclusions whereas informal reasoning is carried out in <i>design mode</i>, which focuses on identifying relevant premises that can be used to establish a strong argument (<a href="#B3">Bereiter and Scardamalia, 2006</a>). Since a premise of informal reasoning is uncertain and can be questioned, its conclusion can be withdrawn in the light of new evidence (<a href="#B8">Evans, 2005</a>). This process involves weighing the pros and cons of a particular decision (<a href="#B35">Voss et al., 1991</a>). Learners engage in informal reasoning when they deal with <i>socio-scientific issues</i>—controversial issues that are influenced by social norms and conceptually related to science, such as whether or not to consume genetically modified food or support government&#39;s plan for a car-free city (<a href="#B30">Sadler and Zeidler, 2005</a>).</p>
<p>Both types of reasoning are used to manipulate existing information and share the same goal of generating new knowledge. While formal reasoning is judged by whether or not conclusions are valid, informal reasoning is assessed based on the quality of premises and their potential for strengthening conclusions.</p>
<p>The manipulation of existing information in formal and informal reasoning processes can be described with dual-process theories of reasoning (<a href="#B9">Evans, 2007</a>; <a href="#B13">Glöckner and Witteman, 2010</a>). According to these theories, there are two distinct processing modes: Type 1 processes are autonomous and intuitive processes that do not heavily rely on individuals&#39; working memory, whereas Type 2 processes involve using mental simulation or thought experiments to support hypothetical thinking and reflective processes that require working memory (<a href="#B11">Evans and Stanovich, 2013</a>). An individual&#39;s first response to a problem tends to be processed automatically and refers to their past experiences and personal beliefs (i.e., Type 1 process: <a href="#B10">Evans, 2008</a>). For example, when using formal reasoning to decide the fastest way to travel from A to B, an individual&#39;s first thought might be to take a plane since it is commonly considered the fastest means of transport. However, the individual might change his or her mind after processing all necessary information, such as the travel time to and from the airport.</p>
<p>Not every individual is able to progress after the first stage and produce a rational decision. Those who are confined to Type 1 processes make intuitive decisions, whereas more experienced individuals utilize Type 2 processes to construct a well-informed choice (<a href="#B36">Wu and Tsai, 2011</a>). In the example of using informal reasoning to decide whether or not to support a government&#39;s plan for a car-free city, intuitive thought might lead individuals to support the plan based on their experiences with pollution. However, with the purpose of generating new representations, only those who can (a) elaborate on their intuitive decision with acceptable justifications; (b) address opposite arguments; and (c) think about how the plan can be further improved are utilizing Type 2 processes. In this regard, there is a strong connection between formal and informal reasoning, in which both types of reasoning share the common goal of generating new knowledge by processing available information through the dual stages.</p>
<p>Activity in belief mode covers a broad range of scientific practices in school science (<a href="#B3">Bereiter and Scardamalia, 2006</a>). Outside the classroom, however, students need to make decisions regarding problems with uncertain premises by working in design mode. Teachers should have ways to assess how students improve on their existing ideas by searching beyond what they already know rather than simply making sure their ideas align with accepted theories. It is therefore important to build a scientific reasoning assessment that incorporates both formal and informal reasoning skills in order to better measure the constructs underlying scientific reasoning. In the following, we argue that these complex skills can be best assessed using computer-based testing.</p>
<h2>Joint Assessment of Formal and Informal Reasoning: What Can Computer-Based Testing Offer?</h2>
<p>The rapid advancement of computer technology has changed the way scientific reasoning is assessed. Given that technology can offer rich reasoning activities that can be modified to serve different purposes, such as formative and summative assessment, static forms of assessment (e.g., paper-and-pencil tests) have been replaced by computer-based tests that contain dynamic and highly interactive simulations. This shift has taken place for a number of reasons: First, today&#39;s technology can deliver assessments that use multiple representations and various item formats to measure complex skills that are not easily measured in traditional paper-based testing (<a href="#B26">Quellmalz et al., 2013</a>). Assessment of complex skills such as multivariable reasoning, in which learners disentangle the effects of independent variables on dependent variables in order to test their hypotheses, can be conducted efficiently with the use of simulations. They can run as many experiments as needed to observe how the results changes as the effects of change in input variables to test their hypotheses (see Figure <a href="#F1">1</a>). Second, CBAs can provide a broad range of data beyond students&#39; mere performance on tasks. Additional information is stored in log files, including data on response times, the sequence of actions, and the specific strategies used to deal with multiple variables (<a href="#B15">Greiff et al., 2016</a>).</p>
<div>
<a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/files/Articles/203307/fpsyg-07-01097-HTML/image_m/fpsyg-07-01097-g001.jpg">
 
</a>
<p><strong>Figure 1. Screenshot of the PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) field trial item, <i>Running in Hot Weather</i></strong>. Multivariable reasoning is required to solve the item (<a href="#B23">OECD, 2013</a>, p. 39).</p></div>
<p>Against this backdrop, we argue that CBAs have the potential to integrate approaches for assessing both formal and informal reasoning—learning outcomes that are difficult or even impossible to assess using conventional methods.</p>
<h3>Individual Reasoning and Collaborative Performance</h3>
<p>To date, CBAs have been used to comprehensively measure individual students&#39; <i>formal reasoning</i> skills (<a href="#B19">Kuo and Wu, 2013</a>). These assessments enable students to test their hypotheses in environments that simulate the complexity of real experiments (<a href="#B14">Greiff and Martin, 2014</a>; <a href="#B31">Scherer, 2015</a>). The immediate feedback such environments provide based on students&#39; manipulation of variables can be used to develop a mental model that represents the relationship among variables. While the benefits of using CBAs for the assessment of formal reasoning skills are well-recognized, collaborative classroom discussions during group work are considered to be the main sources of information on students&#39; <i>informal reasoning</i> skills (<a href="#B6">Driver et al., 2000</a>). Like actual scientists, students work together to solve an authentic task through debate and argumentation (<a href="#B2">Andriessen et al., 2013</a>). This discussion process can offer rich information on students&#39; communication and collaboration skills; yet, it remains difficult to measure each individual&#39;s ability and contribution. CBAs offer plenty of opportunities to capture collaborative activities by keeping track of individuals&#39; contributions to the discussion and the sequence of arguments (<a href="#B5">De Jong et al., 2012</a>; <a href="#B22">Nihalani and Robinson, 2012</a>). Hence, combining the assessment of formal and informal reasoning and delivering it using computer-based testing may enable us to not only investigate students&#39; individual reasoning skills but also their performance in group discussions.</p>
<h3>Interactivity</h3>
<p>Interactivity is a distinctive quality of CBA that allows individual student to demonstrate <i>formal reasoning</i> skills by interacting with a computer system (<a href="#B19">Kuo and Wu, 2013</a>). A student participates in scientific investigations while actively exploring items that represent scientific phenomena (<a href="#B27">Quellmalz et al., 2012</a>). During the task exploration phase, the student conducts experiments and manipulates the virtual environment in order to produce desirable outcomes. He or she engages in inquiry practices such as observing the phenomena under investigation, simulating interactive experiments by controlling variables to test their hypotheses, generating and interpreting evidence, and developing evidence-based knowledge. By using interactive and dynamic items, CBAs can examine a student&#39;s ability to coordinate complex, primarily formal reasoning skills.</p>
<p>To assess <i>informal reasoning</i> skills, interactive components in CBAs engage students to explore and make use of relevant information to support their arguments. When faced with a problem related to a socio-scientific issue, students can seek necessary information from a simulated website rather than using data that is already provided in the argumentation task in order to address contrasting positions and to construct a well-informed decision. Hence, CBAs provide an opportunity to assess how well students can select relevant information actively as well as their informal reasoning skills.</p>
<p>In addition to allowing learners to demonstrate their scientific reasoning skills, research has suggested that interactive features could improve learners&#39; problem solving performance (e.g., <a href="#B25">Plass et al., 2009</a>; <a href="#B32">Scherer and Tiemann, 2012</a>). <a href="#B7">Evans and Sabry (2003)</a> found that students who used an interactive system outperformed those using a non-interactive system. Furthermore, <a href="#B27">Quellmalz et al. (2012)</a> showed that English Language Learners and special needs students performed better with the use of interactive, simulation-based science assessments. Interactivity is therefore considered a highly important component of building assessments of formal reasoning. Taken together, CBAs have the potential to provide stimulating, interactive environments in which students can perform both formal and informal reasoning.</p>
<h3>Feedback</h3>
<p>Another feature CBAs offer in testing formal and informal reasoning skills is the ability to provide students with the necessary feedback to help them take control of their own learning. This didactic advantage can lead to better learning outcomes when feedback is given in a timely fashion and tailored to individual needs (e.g., <a href="#B20">Lopez, 2009</a>; <a href="#B34">van der Kleij et al., 2012</a>). Customized and instant feedback is essential for helping students understand why their responses fail to solve specific formal reasoning problems or why the information they used to support their arguments is inadequate. Students can adapt and assess their learning through gradually increasing feedback, from a brief to a more detailed scaffold (<a href="#B33">Shute, 2008</a>). Feedback can encourage students to actively construct their own knowledge and improve their learning.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>On the basis of the strong conceptual connection between formal and informal reasoning, we argue that it is necessary to bring both components together for the assessment of scientific reasoning. The current developments in CBAs provide an opportunity to assess scientific reasoning in a way that reflects the complexities of formal <i>and</i> informal reasoning while also effectively measuring learning outcomes.</p>
<h2>Author Contributions</h2>
<p>NT drafted the paper, initiated the argumentation, and submitted the first version. RS discussed the argumentation, contributed to drafting the paper, and assisted in the submission.</p>
<h2>Conflict of Interest Statement</h2>
<p>The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.</p>
<h2>Acknowledgments</h2>
<p>We would like to thank Prof. Rolf Vegar Olsen for his valuable comments on the first draft of this paper.</p>
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Introduction
Scientific reasoning represents a set of skills students need to acquire in order to successfully participate in scientific practices. Hence, educational research has focused on developing and validating assessments of student learning that capture the two different components of the construct, namely formal and informal reasoning. In this opinion paper, we explain why we believe that it is time for a new era of scientific reasoning assessments that bring these components together, and how computer-based assessments (CBAs) might accomplish this.
Reasoning is a mental process that enables people to construct new representations from existing knowledge (Rips, 2004). It includes cognitive processing that is directed at finding solutions to problems by drawing conclusions based on logical rules or rational procedures (Mayer and Wittrock, 2006). When people reason, they attempt to go “beyond the information given” to create a new representation that is assumed to be true (Bruner, 1957). The process of scientific reasoning comprises formal and informal reasoning (Galotti, 1989; Kuhn, 1993). Formal reasoning is characterized by rules of logic and mathematics, with fixed and unchanging premises (Perkins et al., 1991; Sadler, 2004). It encompasses the ability to formulate a problem, design scientific investigations, evaluate experimental outcomes, and make causal inferences in order to form and modify theories related to the phenomenon under investigation (Zimmerman, 2007). Formal scientific reasoning can be applied not only within the context of science, but in almost every other domain of society (Han, 2013). It can be used to make informed decisions regarding everyday life problems (Amsterlaw, 2006); for example, individuals use proportional reasoning to decide the fastest way to travel from one place to another.
In informal reasoning, students draw inferences from uncertain premises as they ponder ill-structured, open-ended, and debatable problems without definitive solutions (Kuhn, 1991). When students reason formally, they work with the given premises in belief mode, which concerns arriving at true and warranted conclusions whereas informal reasoning is carried out in design mode, which focuses on identifying relevant premises that can be used to establish a strong argument (Bereiter and Scardamalia, 2006). Since a premise of informal reasoning is uncertain and can be questioned, its conclusion can be withdrawn in the light of new evidence (Evans, 2005). This process involves weighing the pros and cons of a particular decision (Voss et al., 1991). Learners engage in informal reasoning when they deal with socio-scientific issues—controversial issues that are influenced by social norms and conceptually related to science, such as whether or not to consume genetically modified food or support government&#39;s plan for a car-free city (Sadler and Zeidler, 2005).
Both types of reasoning are used to manipulate existing information and share the same goal of generating new knowledge. While formal reasoning is judged by whether or not conclusions are valid, informal reasoning is assessed based on the quality of premises and their potential for strengthening conclusions.
The manipulation of existing information in formal and informal reasoning processes can be described with dual-process theories of reasoning (Evans, 2007; Glöckner and Witteman, 2010). According to these theories, there are two distinct processing modes: Type 1 processes are autonomous and intuitive processes that do not heavily rely on individuals&#39; working memory, whereas Type 2 processes involve using mental simulation or thought experiments to support hypothetical thinking and reflective processes that require working memory (Evans and Stanovich, 2013). An individual&#39;s first response to a problem tends to be processed automatically and refers to their past experiences and personal beliefs (i.e., Type 1 process: Evans, 2008). For example, when using formal reasoning to decide the fastest way to travel from A to B, an individual&#39;s first thought might be to take a plane since it is commonly considered the fastest means of transport. However, the individual might change his or her mind after processing all necessary information, such as the travel time to and from the airport.
Not every individual is able to progress after the first stage and produce a rational decision. Those who are confined to Type 1 processes make intuitive decisions, whereas more experienced individuals utilize Type 2 processes to construct a well-informed choice (Wu and Tsai, 2011). In the example of using informal reasoning to decide whether or not to support a government&#39;s plan for a car-free city, intuitive thought might lead individuals to support the plan based on their experiences with pollution. However, with the purpose of generating new representations, only those who can (a) elaborate on their intuitive decision with acceptable justifications; (b) address opposite arguments; and (c) think about how the plan can be further improved are utilizing Type 2 processes. In this regard, there is a strong connection between formal and informal reasoning, in which both types of reasoning share the common goal of generating new knowledge by processing available information through the dual stages.
Activity in belief mode covers a broad range of scientific practices in school science (Bereiter and Scardamalia, 2006). Outside the classroom, however, students need to make decisions regarding problems with uncertain premises by working in design mode. Teachers should have ways to assess how students improve on their existing ideas by searching beyond what they already know rather than simply making sure their ideas align with accepted theories. It is therefore important to build a scientific reasoning assessment that incorporates both formal and informal reasoning skills in order to better measure the constructs underlying scientific reasoning. In the following, we argue that these complex skills can be best assessed using computer-based testing.
Joint Assessment of Formal and Informal Reasoning: What Can Computer-Based Testing Offer?
The rapid advancement of computer technology has changed the way scientific reasoning is assessed. Given that technology can offer rich reasoning activities that can be modified to serve different purposes, such as formative and summative assessment, static forms of assessment (e.g., paper-and-pencil tests) have been replaced by computer-based tests that contain dynamic and highly interactive simulations. This shift has taken place for a number of reasons: First, today&#39;s technology can deliver assessments that use multiple representations and various item formats to measure complex skills that are not easily measured in traditional paper-based testing (Quellmalz et al., 2013). Assessment of complex skills such as multivariable reasoning, in which learners disentangle the effects of independent variables on dependent variables in order to test their hypotheses, can be conducted efficiently with the use of simulations. They can run as many experiments as needed to observe how the results changes as the effects of change in input variables to test their hypotheses (see Figure 1). Second, CBAs can provide a broad range of data beyond students&#39; mere performance on tasks. Additional information is stored in log files, including data on response times, the sequence of actions, and the specific strategies used to deal with multiple variables (Greiff et al., 2016).
 
 Figure 1. Screenshot of the PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) field trial item, Running in Hot Weather . Multivariable reasoning is required to solve the item (OECD, 2013, p. 39). 
Against this backdrop, we argue that CBAs have the potential to integrate approaches for assessing both formal and informal reasoning—learning outcomes that are difficult or even impossible to assess using conventional methods.
Individual Reasoning and Collaborative Performance
To date, CBAs have been used to comprehensively measure individual students&#39; formal reasoning skills (Kuo and Wu, 2013). These assessments enable students to test their hypotheses in environments that simulate the complexity of real experiments (Greiff and Martin, 2014; Scherer, 2015). The immediate feedback such environments provide based on students&#39; manipulation of variables can be used to develop a mental model that represents the relationship among variables. While the benefits of using CBAs for the assessment of formal reasoning skills are well-recognized, collaborative classroom discussions during group work are considered to be the main sources of information on students&#39; informal reasoning skills (Driver et al., 2000). Like actual scientists, students work together to solve an authentic task through debate and argumentation (Andriessen et al., 2013). This discussion process can offer rich information on students&#39; communication and collaboration skills; yet, it remains difficult to measure each individual&#39;s ability and contribution. CBAs offer plenty of opportunities to capture collaborative activities by keeping track of individuals&#39; contributions to the discussion and the sequence of arguments (De Jong et al., 2012; Nihalani and Robinson, 2012). Hence, combining the assessment of formal and informal reasoning and delivering it using computer-based testing may enable us to not only investigate students&#39; individual reasoning skills but also their performance in group discussions.
Interactivity
Interactivity is a distinctive quality of CBA that allows individual student to demonstrate formal reasoning skills by interacting with a computer system (Kuo and Wu, 2013). A student participates in scientific investigations while actively exploring items that represent scientific phenomena (Quellmalz et al., 2012). During the task exploration phase, the student conducts experiments and manipulates the virtual environment in order to produce desirable outcomes. He or she engages in inquiry practices such as observing the phenomena under investigation, simulating interactive experiments by controlling variables to test their hypotheses, generating and interpreting evidence, and developing evidence-based knowledge. By using interactive and dynamic items, CBAs can examine a student&#39;s ability to coordinate complex, primarily formal reasoning skills.
To assess informal reasoning skills, interactive components in CBAs engage students to explore and make use of relevant information to support their arguments. When faced with a problem related to a socio-scientific issue, students can seek necessary information from a simulated website rather than using data that is already provided in the argumentation task in order to address contrasting positions and to construct a well-informed decision. Hence, CBAs provide an opportunity to assess how well students can select relevant information actively as well as their informal reasoning skills.
In addition to allowing learners to demonstrate their scientific reasoning skills, research has suggested that interactive features could improve learners&#39; problem solving performance (e.g., Plass et al., 2009; Scherer and Tiemann, 2012). Evans and Sabry (2003) found that students who used an interactive system outperformed those using a non-interactive system. Furthermore, Quellmalz et al. (2012) showed that English Language Learners and special needs students performed better with the use of interactive, simulation-based science assessments. Interactivity is therefore considered a highly important component of building assessments of formal reasoning. Taken together, CBAs have the potential to provide stimulating, interactive environments in which students can perform both formal and informal reasoning.
Feedback
Another feature CBAs offer in testing formal and informal reasoning skills is the ability to provide students with the necessary feedback to help them take control of their own learning. This didactic advantage can lead to better learning outcomes when feedback is given in a timely fashion and tailored to individual needs (e.g., Lopez, 2009; van der Kleij et al., 2012). Customized and instant feedback is essential for helping students understand why their responses fail to solve specific formal reasoning problems or why the information they used to support their arguments is inadequate. Students can adapt and assess their learning through gradually increasing feedback, from a brief to a more detailed scaffold (Shute, 2008). Feedback can encourage students to actively construct their own knowledge and improve their learning.
Conclusion
On the basis of the strong conceptual connection between formal and informal reasoning, we argue that it is necessary to bring both components together for the assessment of scientific reasoning. The current developments in CBAs provide an opportunity to assess scientific reasoning in a way that reflects the complexities of formal and informal reasoning while also effectively measuring learning outcomes.
Author Contributions
NT drafted the paper, initiated the argumentation, and submitted the first version. RS discussed the argumentation, contributed to drafting the paper, and assisted in the submission.
Conflict of Interest Statement
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Prof. Rolf Vegar Olsen for his valuable comments on the first draft of this paper.
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Frontiers | Bringing Formal and Informal Reasoning Together—A New Era of Assessment?
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01097/full
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Informal_logic
Informal logic - Wikipedia
2003-05-28
None
<div><div>
	<p>From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia</p>
	</div><div>
<div><p><a href="/wiki/File:Argument_terminology_used_in_logic_(en).svg"></a></p></div>
<p><b>Informal logic</b> encompasses the principles of <a href="/wiki/Logic">logic</a> and logical thought outside of a <a href="/wiki/Formal_logic">formal</a> setting (characterized by the usage of particular <a href="/wiki/Statement_(logic)">statements</a>). However, the precise definition of "informal logic" is a matter of some dispute.<sup><a href="#cite_note-1">[1]</a></sup> <a href="/wiki/Ralph_Johnson_(philosopher)">Ralph H. Johnson</a> and <a href="/wiki/J._Anthony_Blair">J. Anthony Blair</a> define informal logic as "a branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, criticism and construction of argumentation."<sup><a href="#cite_note-J&amp;B-2">[2]</a></sup> This definition reflects what had been implicit in their practice and what others were doing in their informal logic texts.
</p><p>Informal logic is associated with <a href="/wiki/Informal_fallacies">informal fallacies</a>, <a href="/wiki/Critical_thinking">critical thinking</a>, the thinking skills movement<sup><a href="#cite_note-3">[3]</a></sup> and the interdisciplinary inquiry known as <a href="/wiki/Argumentation_theory">argumentation theory</a>. <a href="/wiki/Frans_H._van_Eemeren">Frans H. van Eemeren</a> writes that the label "informal logic" covers a "collection of normative approaches to the study of reasoning in ordinary language that remain closer to the practice of argumentation than formal logic."<sup><a href="#cite_note-LunsfordWilson2009-4">[4]</a></sup>
</p>
<h2>History[<a href="/w/index.php?title=Informal_logic&amp;action=edit&amp;section=1">edit</a>]</h2>
<p>Informal logic as a distinguished enterprise under this name emerged roughly in the late 1970s as a sub-field of <a href="/wiki/Philosophy">philosophy</a>. The naming of the field was preceded by the appearance of a number of textbooks that rejected the <a href="/wiki/Symbolic_logic">symbolic</a> approach to <a href="/wiki/Logic">logic</a> on <a href="/wiki/Pedagogical">pedagogical</a> grounds as inappropriate and unhelpful for introductory <a href="/wiki/Textbooks">textbooks</a> on logic for a general audience, for example <a href="/wiki/Howard_Kahane">Howard Kahane</a>'s <i>Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric</i>, subtitled "The Use of Reason in Everyday Life", first published in 1971. Kahane's textbook was described on the notice of his death in the <i><a href="/wiki/Proceedings_And_Addresses_of_the_American_Philosophical_Association">Proceedings And Addresses of the American Philosophical Association</a></i> (2002) as "a text in informal logic, [that] was intended to enable students to cope with the misleading rhetoric one frequently finds in the media and in political discourse. It was organized around a discussion of fallacies, and was meant to be a practical instrument for dealing with the problems of everyday life. [It has] ... gone through many editions; [it is] ... still in print; and the thousands upon thousands of students who have taken courses in which his text [was] ... used can thank Howard for contributing to their ability to dissect arguments and avoid the deceptions of deceitful rhetoric. He tried to put into practice the ideal of discourse that aims at truth rather than merely at persuasion. (Hausman et al. 2002)"<sup><a href="#cite_note-h25-5">[5]</a></sup><sup><a href="#cite_note-6">[6]</a></sup> Other textbooks from the era taking this approach were <a href="/wiki/Michael_Scriven">Michael Scriven</a>'s <i>Reasoning</i> (Edgepress, 1976) and <i>Logical Self-Defense</i> by <a href="/wiki/Ralph_Johnson_(philosopher)">Ralph Johnson</a> and <a href="/wiki/J._Anthony_Blair">J. Anthony Blair</a>, first published in 1977.<sup><a href="#cite_note-h25-5">[5]</a></sup> Earlier precursors in this tradition can be considered <a href="/wiki/Monroe_Beardsley">Monroe Beardsley</a>'s <i>Practical Logic</i> (1950) and <a href="/wiki/Stephen_Toulmin">Stephen Toulmin</a>'s <i>The Uses of Argument</i> (1958).<sup><a href="#cite_note-7">[7]</a></sup>
</p><p>The field perhaps became recognized under its current name with the <i>First International Symposium on Informal Logic</i> held in 1978. Although initially motivated by a new pedagogical approach to undergraduate logic textbooks, the scope of the field was basically defined by a list of 13 problems and issues which Blair and Johnson included as an appendix to their <a href="/wiki/Keynote_address">keynote address</a> at this symposium:<sup><a href="#cite_note-h25-5">[5]</a></sup><sup><a href="#cite_note-8">[8]</a></sup>
</p>
<ul><li>the theory of logical criticism</li>
<li>the theory of argument</li>
<li>the theory of fallacy</li>
<li>the fallacy approach vs. the critical thinking approach</li>
<li>the viability of the inductive/deductive dichotomy</li>
<li>the ethics of argumentation and logical criticism</li>
<li>the problem of assumptions and missing premises</li>
<li>the problem of context</li>
<li>methods of extracting arguments from context</li>
<li>methods of displaying arguments</li>
<li>the problem of pedagogy</li>
<li>the nature, division and scope of informal logic</li>
<li>the relationship of informal logic to other inquiries</li></ul>
<p>David Hitchcock argues that the naming of the field was unfortunate, and that <i>philosophy of argument</i> would have been more appropriate. He argues that more undergraduate students in North America study informal logic than any other branch of philosophy, but that as of 2003 informal logic (or philosophy of argument) was not recognized as separate sub-field by the <a href="/wiki/World_Congress_of_Philosophy">World Congress of Philosophy</a>.<sup><a href="#cite_note-h25-5">[5]</a></sup> <a href="/wiki/Frans_H._van_Eemeren">Frans H. van Eemeren</a> wrote that "informal logic" is mainly an approach to <a href="/wiki/Argumentation">argumentation</a> advanced by a group of US and Canadian philosophers and largely based on the previous works of <a href="/wiki/Stephen_Toulmin">Stephen Toulmin</a> and to a lesser extent those of <a href="/wiki/Cha%C3%AFm_Perelman">Chaïm Perelman</a>.<sup><a href="#cite_note-LunsfordWilson2009-4">[4]</a></sup>
</p><p>Alongside the symposia, since 1983 the journal <i>Informal Logic</i> has been the publication of record of the field, with Blair and Johnson as initial editors, with the editorial board now including two other colleagues from the <a href="/wiki/University_of_Windsor">University of Windsor</a>—<a href="/wiki/Christopher_Tindale">Christopher Tindale</a> and Hans V. Hansen.<sup><a href="#cite_note-9">[9]</a></sup> Other journals that regularly publish articles on informal logic include <i>Argumentation</i> (founded in 1986), <i>Philosophy and Rhetoric</i>, <i><a href="/wiki/Argumentation_and_Advocacy">Argumentation and Advocacy</a></i> (the journal of the <a href="/wiki/American_Forensic_Association">American Forensic Association</a>), and <i><a href="/wiki/Inquiry:_Critical_Thinking_Across_the_Disciplines">Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines</a></i> (founded in 1988).<sup><a href="#cite_note-10">[10]</a></sup>
</p>
<h2>Proposed definitions[<a href="/w/index.php?title=Informal_logic&amp;action=edit&amp;section=2">edit</a>]</h2>
<p>Johnson and Blair (2000) proposed the following definition: "Informal logic designates that branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal<sup>2</sup> standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, critique and construction of argumentation in everyday discourse." Their meaning of non-formal<sup>2</sup> is taken from Barth and Krabbe (1982), which is explained below.
</p><p>To understand the definition above, one must understand <i>informal</i> which takes its meaning in contrast to its counterpart <i>formal.</i> (This point was not made for a very long time, hence the nature of informal logic remained opaque, even to those involved in it, for a period of time.) Here it is helpful to have recourse<sup><a href="#cite_note-11">[11]</a></sup> to Barth and Krabbe (1982:14f) where they distinguish three senses of the term <i>form.</i> By <i>form<sup>1</sup></i>, Barth and Krabbe mean the sense of the term which derives from the <a href="/wiki/Plato">Platonic</a> <a href="/wiki/Theory_of_forms">idea of form</a>—the ultimate <a href="/wiki/Metaphysics">metaphysical</a> unit. Barth and Krabbe claim that most traditional logic is formal in this sense. That is, syllogistic logic is a logic of terms where the terms could naturally be understood as place-holders for Platonic (or <a href="/wiki/Aristotelianism">Aristotelian</a>) forms. In this first sense of <i>form</i>, almost all logic is informal (not-formal). Understanding informal logic this way would be much too broad to be useful.
</p><p>By form<sup>2</sup>, Barth and Krabbe mean the form of sentences and statements as these are understood in modern systems of logic. Here <a href="/wiki/Validity_(logic)">validity</a> is the focus: if the <a href="/wiki/Premise">premises</a> are true, the conclusion must then also be true. Now validity has to do with the <a href="/wiki/Logical_form">logical form</a> of the statement that makes up the argument. In this sense of <i>formal</i>, most modern and contemporary logic is <i>formal</i>. That is, such logics canonize the notion of logical form, and the notion of validity plays the central normative role. In this second sense of form, informal logic is not-formal, because it abandons the notion of logical form as the key to understanding the <a href="/wiki/Structure_(mathematical_logic)">structure</a> of arguments, and likewise retires validity as normative for the purposes of the evaluation of argument. It seems to many that validity is too stringent a requirement, that there are good arguments in which the conclusion is supported by the premises even though it does not follow necessarily from them (as validity requires). An argument in which the conclusion is thought to be "beyond reasonable doubt, given the premises" is sufficient in law to cause a person to be sentenced to <a href="/wiki/Capital_punishment">death</a>, even though it does not meet the standard of logical validity. This type of argument, based on accumulation of evidence rather than pure <a href="/wiki/Deductive_reasoning">deduction</a>, is called a conductive argument.
</p><p>By <i>form<sup>3</sup></i>, Barth and Krabbe mean to refer to "procedures which are somehow regulated or regimented, which take place according to some set of rules." Barth and Krabbe say that "we do not defend formality<sup>3</sup> of all kinds and under all circumstances." Rather "we defend the thesis that verbal <a href="/wiki/Dialectic">dialectics</a> must have a certain form (i.e., must proceed according to certain rules) in order that one can speak of the discussion as being won or lost" (19). In this third sense of <i>form</i>, informal logic can be formal, for there is nothing in the informal logic enterprise that stands opposed to the idea that argumentative <a href="/wiki/Discourse">discourse</a> should be subject to norms, i.e., subject to rules, criteria, standards or procedures. Informal logic does present standards for the evaluation of argument, procedures for detecting missing premises etc.
</p><p>Johnson and Blair (2000) noticed a limitation of their own definition, particularly with respect to "everyday discourse", which could indicate that it does not seek to understand specialized, domain-specific arguments made in natural languages. Consequently, they have argued that the crucial divide is between arguments made in <a href="/wiki/Formal_language">formal languages</a> and those made in <a href="/wiki/Natural_language">natural languages</a>.
</p><p>Fisher and Scriven (1997) proposed a more encompassing definition, seeing informal logic as "the discipline which studies the practice of critical thinking and provides its intellectual spine". By "critical thinking" they understand "skilled and active interpretation and evaluation of observations and communications, information and argumentation."<sup><a href="#cite_note-12">[12]</a></sup>
</p>
<h2>Criticisms[<a href="/w/index.php?title=Informal_logic&amp;action=edit&amp;section=3">edit</a>]</h2>
<p>Some hold the view that informal logic is not a branch or subdiscipline of logic, or even the view that there cannot be such a thing as informal logic.<sup><a href="#cite_note-Massey,_1981-13">[13]</a></sup><sup><a href="#cite_note-14">[14]</a></sup><sup><a href="#cite_note-15">[15]</a></sup> Massey criticizes informal logic on the grounds that it has no theory underpinning it. Informal logic, he says, requires detailed classification schemes to organize it, which in other disciplines is provided by the underlying theory. He maintains that there is no method of establishing the <a href="/wiki/Validity_(logic)">invalidity</a> of an argument aside from the formal method, and that the study of fallacies may be of more interest to other disciplines, like <a href="/wiki/Psychology">psychology</a>, than to philosophy and logic.<sup><a href="#cite_note-Massey,_1981-13">[13]</a></sup>
</p>
<h2>Relation to critical thinking[<a href="/w/index.php?title=Informal_logic&amp;action=edit&amp;section=4">edit</a>]</h2>
<p>Since the 1980s, informal logic has been partnered and even equated,<sup><a href="#cite_note-16">[16]</a></sup> in the minds of many, with critical thinking. The precise definition of <i><a href="/wiki/Critical_thinking">critical thinking</a></i> is a subject of much dispute.<sup><a href="#cite_note-Johnson,_1992-17">[17]</a></sup> Critical thinking, as defined by Johnson, is the evaluation of an intellectual product (an argument, an explanation, a theory) in terms of its strengths and weaknesses.<sup><a href="#cite_note-Johnson,_1992-17">[17]</a></sup> While critical thinking will include evaluation of arguments and hence require skills of argumentation including informal logic, critical thinking requires additional abilities not supplied by informal logic, such as the ability to obtain and assess information and to clarify meaning. Also, many believe that critical thinking requires certain dispositions.<sup><a href="#cite_note-18">[18]</a></sup> Understood in this way, <i>critical thinking</i> is a broad term for the attitudes and skills that are involved in analyzing and evaluating arguments. The critical thinking movement promotes critical thinking as an educational ideal. The movement emerged with great force in the 1980s in North America as part of an ongoing critique of education as regards the thinking skills not being taught.
</p>
<h2>Relation to argumentation theory[<a href="/w/index.php?title=Informal_logic&amp;action=edit&amp;section=5">edit</a>]</h2>
<p>The social, communicative practice of argumentation can and should be distinguished from implication (or <a href="/wiki/Logical_consequence">entailment</a>)—a relationship between propositions; and from inference—a mental activity typically thought of as the drawing of a conclusion from premises. Informal logic may thus be said to be a logic of argumentation, as distinguished from implication and inference.<sup><a href="#cite_note-19">[19]</a></sup>
</p><p>Argumentation theory is interdisciplinary in the sense that no one discipline will be able to provide a complete account. A full appreciation of argumentation requires insights from logic (both formal and informal), rhetoric, communication theory, linguistics, psychology, and, increasingly, computer science. Since the 1970s, there has been significant agreement that there are three basic approaches to argumentation theory: the logical, the rhetorical and the dialectical. According to Wenzel,<sup><a href="#cite_note-20">[20]</a></sup> the logical approach deals with the product, the dialectical with the process, and the rhetorical with the procedure. Thus, informal logic is one contributor to this inquiry, being most especially concerned with the norms of argument.
</p>
<h2>See also[<a href="/w/index.php?title=Informal_logic&amp;action=edit&amp;section=6">edit</a>]</h2>
<ul><li><a href="/wiki/Argument">Argument</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Argumentation_theory">Argumentation theory</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Argument_map">Argument map</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Critical_reasoning">Critical reasoning</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Informal_fallacy">Informal fallacy</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Informal_inferential_reasoning">Informal inferential reasoning</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Inference_objection">Inference objection</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Lemma_(logic)">Lemma</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Philosophy_of_language">Philosophy of language</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Semantics">Semantics</a></li></ul>
<h2>Footnotes[<a href="/w/index.php?title=Informal_logic&amp;action=edit&amp;section=7">edit</a>]</h2>
<div>
<ol>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-1">^</a></b> See Johnson 1999 for a survey of definitions.
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-J&amp;B_2-0">^</a></b> Johnson, Ralph H., and Blair, J. Anthony (1987), "The Current State of Informal Logic", <i>Informal Logic</i>, 9(2–3), 147–151. Johnson &amp; Blair added "... in everyday discourse" but in (2000), modified their definition, and broadened the focus now to include the sorts of argument that occurs not just in everyday discourse but also disciplined inquiry—what Weinstein (1990) calls "stylized discourse."
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-3">^</a></b> Resnick, 1989
</li>
<li>^ <a href="#cite_ref-LunsfordWilson2009_4-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-LunsfordWilson2009_4-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a> <cite>Frans H. van Eemeren (2009). <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=RYRf2JACLGkC&amp;pg=PA117">"The Study of Argumentation"</a>. In Andrea A. Lunsford; Kirt H. Wilson; Rosa A. Eberly (eds.). <i>The SAGE handbook of rhetorical studies</i>. SAGE. p. 117. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-4129-0950-1"><bdi>978-1-4129-0950-1</bdi></a>.</cite>
</li>
<li>^ <a href="#cite_ref-h25_5-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-h25_5-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-h25_5-2"><sup><i><b>c</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-h25_5-3"><sup><i><b>d</b></i></sup></a> David Hitchcock, <a href="http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~hitchckd/25.pdf">Informal logic 25 years later</a> in <i>Informal Logic at 25: Proceedings of the Windsor Conference (OSSA 2003)</i>
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-6">^</a></b> <cite>Hausman, Alan; Landesman, Charles; Seamon, Roger (2002). "Howard Kahane, 1928-2001". <i>Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association</i>. <b>75</b> (5): 191–193. <a href="/wiki/JSTOR_(identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a href="//www.jstor.org/stable/3218569">3218569</a>.</cite>
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-7">^</a></b> Fisher (2004) p. vii
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-8">^</a></b> J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson (eds.), Informal Logic: The First International Symposium, 3-28. Pt. Reyes, CA: Edgepress
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-9">^</a></b> <cite><a href="http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/about/editorialTeam">"Editorial Team | Informal Logic"</a>.</cite>
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-10">^</a></b> Johnson and Blair (2000), p. 100
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-11">^</a></b> As Johnson (1999) does.
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-12">^</a></b> Johnson and Blair (2000), p. 95
</li>
<li>^ <a href="#cite_ref-Massey,_1981_13-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Massey,_1981_13-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a> Massey, 1981
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-14">^</a></b> Woods, 1980
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-15">^</a></b> Woods, 2000
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-16">^</a></b> Johnson (2000) takes the conflation to be part of the Network Problem and holds that settling the issue will require a theory of reasoning.
</li>
<li>^ <a href="#cite_ref-Johnson,_1992_17-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Johnson,_1992_17-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a> Johnson, 1992
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-18">^</a></b> Ennis, 1987
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-19">^</a></b> Johnson, 1999
</li>
<li><b><a href="#cite_ref-20">^</a></b> Wenzel (1990)
</li>
</ol></div>
<h2>References[<a href="/w/index.php?title=Informal_logic&amp;action=edit&amp;section=8">edit</a>]</h2>
<ul><li>Barth, E. M., &amp; Krabbe, E. C. W. (Eds.). (1982). <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=N7NICjuErWIC&amp;printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&amp;q=informal&amp;f=false">From axiom to dialogue: A philosophical study of logics and argumentation</a>. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.</li>
<li>Blair, J. A &amp; Johnson, R.H. (1980). The recent development of informal logic. In J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson (Eds.). Informal logic: The first international symposium, (pp. 3–28). Inverness, CA: Edgepress.</li>
<li>Ennis, R.H. (1987). <a href="http://psycnet.apa.org/record/1986-98688-001">A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions and abilities</a>. In J.B. Baron and R.J. Sternberg (Eds.), Teaching critical thinking skills: Theory and practice, (pp. 9–26). New York: Freeman.</li>
<li>Eemeren, F. H. van, &amp; Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication and fallacies. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.</li>
<li>Fisher, A. and Scriven, M. (1997). Critical thinking: Its definition and assessment. Point Reyes, CA: Edgepress</li>
<li><cite>Fisher, Alec (2004). <i>The logic of real arguments</i> (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-521-65481-4"><bdi>978-0-521-65481-4</bdi></a>.</cite></li>
<li>Govier, T. (1987). Problems in argument analysis and evaluation. Dordrecht: Foris.</li>
<li>Govier, T. (1999). The Philosophy of Argument. Newport News, VA: Vale Press.</li>
<li><cite>Hitchcock, David (2007). "Informal logic and the concept of argument". In Jacquette, Dale (ed.). <i>Philosophy of logic</i>. Elsevier. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-444-51541-4"><bdi>978-0-444-51541-4</bdi></a>.</cite> <a href="http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~hitchckd/informal.pdf">preprint</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Ralph_Johnson_(philosopher)">Johnson, R. H.</a> (1992). The problem of defining critical thinking. In S. P. Norris (Ed.), The generalizability of critical thinking (pp. 38–53). New York: Teachers College Press. (Reprinted in Johnson (1996).)</li>
<li>Johnson, R. H. (1996). The rise of informal logic. Newport News, VA: Vale Press</li>
<li>Johnson, R. H. (1999). The relation between formal and informal logic. <i>Argumentation</i>, 13(3) 265–74.</li>
<li>Johnson, R. H. (2000). Manifest rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.</li>
<li>Johnson, R. H. &amp; Blair, J. A. (1987). The current state of informal logic. <i>Informal Logic</i> 9, 147–51.</li>
<li>Johnson, R. H. &amp; Blair, J. A. (1996). Informal logic and critical thinking. In F. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, &amp; F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Fundamentals of argumentation theory (pp. 383–86). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates</li>
<li>Johnson, R. H. &amp; Blair, J. A. (2002). Informal logic and the reconfiguration of logic. In <a href="/wiki/D._Gabbay">D. Gabbay</a>, R. H. Johnson, H.-J. Ohlbach and <a href="/wiki/John_Woods_(logician)">J. Woods</a> (Eds.). Handbook of the logic of argument and inference: The turn towards the practical (pp. 339–396). Elsivier: North Holland.</li>
<li>MacFarlane, J. (2005). Logical Constants. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.</li>
<li>Massey, G. (1981). The fallacy behind fallacies. <i>Midwest Studies of Philosophy</i>, 6, 489–500.</li>
<li>Munson, R. (1976). The way of words: an informal logic. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.</li>
<li>Resnick, L. (1987). Education and learning to think. Washington, DC: National Academy Press..</li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Douglas_N._Walton">Walton, D. N.</a> (1990). What is reasoning? What is an argument? <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i>, 87, 399–419.</li>
<li>Weinstein, M. (1990) Towards a research agenda for informal logic and critical thinking. <i>Informal Logic</i>, 12, 121–143.</li>
<li>Wenzel, J. 1990 Three perspectives on argumentation. In R Trapp and J Scheutz, (Eds.), Perspectives on argumentation: Essays in honour of Wayne Brockreide, 9-26 Waveland Press: Prospect Heights, IL</li>
<li><a href="/wiki/John_Woods_(logician)">Woods, J.</a> (1980). What is informal logic? In J.A. Blair &amp; R. H. Johnson (Eds.), Informal Logic: The First International Symposium (pp. 57–68). Point Reyes, CA: Edgepress.</li></ul>
<h3>Special journal issue[<a href="/w/index.php?title=Informal_logic&amp;action=edit&amp;section=9">edit</a>]</h3>
<p>The <a href="/wiki/Open_access_journal">open access</a> <a href="http://www.phaenex.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/issue/view/277">issue 20(2)</a> of <i>Informal Logic</i> from year 2000 groups a number of papers addressing foundational issues, based on the Panel on Informal Logic that was held at the 1998 World Congress of Philosophy, including:
</p>
<ul><li>Hitchcock, D. (2000) The significance of informal logic for philosophy. <i>Informal Logic</i> 20(2), 129–138.</li>
<li>Johnson, R. H. &amp; Blair, J. A. (2000). Informal logic: An overview. <i>Informal Logic</i> 20(2): 93–99.</li>
<li>Woods, J. (2000). How Philosophical is Informal Logic? <i>Informal Logic</i> 20(2): 139–167. 2000</li></ul>
<h3>Textbooks[<a href="/w/index.php?title=Informal_logic&amp;action=edit&amp;section=10">edit</a>]</h3>
<ul><li><a href="/wiki/Howard_Kahane">Kahane, H.</a> (1971). <i>Logic and contemporary rhetoric: The use of reasoning in everyday life</i>. Belmont: Wadsworth. Still in print as <cite>Nancy Cavender; Howard Kahane (2009). <i>Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric: The Use of Reason in Everyday Life</i> (11th ed.). Cengage Learning. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-495-80411-6"><bdi>978-0-495-80411-6</bdi></a>.</cite></li>
<li><cite><a href="/wiki/Michael_Scriven">Scriven, Michael</a> (1976). <i>Reasoning</i>. New York: McGraw-Hill. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-07-055882-3"><bdi>978-0-07-055882-3</bdi></a>.</cite></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Ralph_Johnson_(philosopher)">Johnson, R. H.</a> &amp; <a href="/wiki/J._Anthony_Blair">Blair, J. A.</a> (1977). <i>Logical self-defense</i>. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. US Edition. (2006). New York: Idebate Press.</li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Robert_Fogelin">Fogelin, R.J.</a> (1978). <i>Understanding arguments: An introduction to informal logic</i>. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. Still in print as <cite>Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter; Fogelin, Robert (2010), <i>Understanding Arguments: An Introduction to Informal Logic</i> (8th ed.), Belmont, California: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-495-60395-5"><bdi>978-0-495-60395-5</bdi></a></cite></li>
<li><cite>Stephen N. Thomas (1997). <i>Practical reasoning in natural language</i> (4th ed.). Prentice Hall. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-13-678269-8"><bdi>978-0-13-678269-8</bdi></a>.</cite></li>
<li><cite><a href="/wiki/Irving_Copi">Irving M. Copi</a>; Keith Burgess-Jackson (1996). <i>Informal logic</i> (3rd ed.). Prentice Hall. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-13-229048-7"><bdi>978-0-13-229048-7</bdi></a>.</cite></li>
<li><cite><a href="/wiki/John_Woods_(logician)">Woods, John</a>; <a href="/wiki/Andrew_David_Irvine">Irvine, Andrew</a>; <a href="/wiki/Douglas_N._Walton">Walton, Douglas N.</a> (2004). <i>Argument: Critical Thinking, Logic and the Fallacies</i>. Toronto: Pearson/Prentice Hall. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-13-039938-0"><bdi>978-0-13-039938-0</bdi></a>.</cite></li>
<li><cite><a href="/wiki/Leo_Groarke">Groarke, Leo</a> (2004). <i>Good reasoning matters! : a constructive approach to critical thinking</i> (3rd ed.). Toronto: Oxford University Press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-19-541904-7"><bdi>978-0-19-541904-7</bdi></a>.</cite></li>
<li><cite>Douglas N. Walton (2008). <i>Informal logic: a pragmatic approach</i> (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-521-71380-1"><bdi>978-0-521-71380-1</bdi></a>.</cite></li>
<li><cite><a href="/wiki/Trudy_Govier">Trudy Govier</a> (2009). <i>A Practical Study of Argument</i> (7th ed.). Cengage Learning. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-495-60340-5"><bdi>978-0-495-60340-5</bdi></a>.</cite></li></ul>
<h2>External links[<a href="/w/index.php?title=Informal_logic&amp;action=edit&amp;section=11">edit</a>]</h2>
<ul><li><cite><a href="/wiki/Leo_Groarke">Groarke, Leo</a>. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-informal/">"Informal Logic"</a>. In <a href="/wiki/Edward_N._Zalta">Zalta, Edward N.</a> (ed.). <i><a href="/wiki/Stanford_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></i>.</cite></li>
<li><a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1DhtRAPcMwJmiQnbdmFcHWaOddQ7kuqqDnWp2LZcGlnY/edit?usp=sharing">An Outline for Verbal Logic</a></li></ul>
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 * (Top)
 * 1 History
 * 2 Proposed definitions
 * 3 Criticisms
 * 4 Relation to critical thinking
 * 5 Relation to argumentation theory
 * 6 See also
 * 7 Footnotes
 * 8 References
 + 8.1 Special journal issue
 + 8.2 Textbooks
 * 9 External links
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 Informal logic

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 From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 For the journal, see Informal Logic (journal).
 Argument terminology used in logic

 Informal logic encompasses the principles of logic and logical thought outside of a formal setting (characterized by the usage of particular statements). However, the precise definition of "informal logic" is a matter of some dispute.[1] Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair define informal logic as "a branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, criticism and construction of argumentation."[2] This definition reflects what had been implicit in their practice and what others were doing in their informal logic texts.

 Informal logic is associated with informal fallacies, critical thinking, the thinking skills movement[3] and the interdisciplinary inquiry known as argumentation theory. Frans H. van Eemeren writes that the label "informal logic" covers a "collection of normative approaches to the study of reasoning in ordinary language that remain closer to the practice of argumentation than formal logic."[4]

 History [ edit ]

 This section may lend undue weight to certain ideas, incidents, or controversies. Please help improve it by rewriting it in a balanced fashion that contextualizes different points of view. ( August 2014 ) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)
 

 Informal logic as a distinguished enterprise under this name emerged roughly in the late 1970s as a sub-field of philosophy. The naming of the field was preceded by the appearance of a number of textbooks that rejected the symbolic approach to logic on pedagogical grounds as inappropriate and unhelpful for introductory textbooks on logic for a general audience, for example Howard Kahane's Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric, subtitled "The Use of Reason in Everyday Life", first published in 1971. Kahane's textbook was described on the notice of his death in the Proceedings And Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (2002) as "a text in informal logic, [that] was intended to enable students to cope with the misleading rhetoric one frequently finds in the media and in political discourse. It was organized around a discussion of fallacies, and was meant to be a practical instrument for dealing with the problems of everyday life. [It has] ... gone through many editions; [it is] ... still in print; and the thousands upon thousands of students who have taken courses in which his text [was] ... used can thank Howard for contributing to their ability to dissect arguments and avoid the deceptions of deceitful rhetoric. He tried to put into practice the ideal of discourse that aims at truth rather than merely at persuasion. (Hausman et al. 2002)"[5][6] Other textbooks from the era taking this approach were Michael Scriven's Reasoning (Edgepress, 1976) and Logical Self-Defense by Ralph Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, first published in 1977.[5] Earlier precursors in this tradition can be considered Monroe Beardsley's Practical Logic (1950) and Stephen Toulmin's The Uses of Argument (1958).[7]

 The field perhaps became recognized under its current name with the First International Symposium on Informal Logic held in 1978. Although initially motivated by a new pedagogical approach to undergraduate logic textbooks, the scope of the field was basically defined by a list of 13 problems and issues which Blair and Johnson included as an appendix to their keynote address at this symposium:[5][8]

 * the theory of logical criticism
 * the theory of argument
 * the theory of fallacy
 * the fallacy approach vs. the critical thinking approach
 * the viability of the inductive/deductive dichotomy
 * the ethics of argumentation and logical criticism
 * the problem of assumptions and missing premises
 * the problem of context
 * methods of extracting arguments from context
 * methods of displaying arguments
 * the problem of pedagogy
 * the nature, division and scope of informal logic
 * the relationship of informal logic to other inquiries

 David Hitchcock argues that the naming of the field was unfortunate, and that philosophy of argument would have been more appropriate. He argues that more undergraduate students in North America study informal logic than any other branch of philosophy, but that as of 2003 informal logic (or philosophy of argument) was not recognized as separate sub-field by the World Congress of Philosophy.[5] Frans H. van Eemeren wrote that "informal logic" is mainly an approach to argumentation advanced by a group of US and Canadian philosophers and largely based on the previous works of Stephen Toulmin and to a lesser extent those of Chaïm Perelman.[4]

 Alongside the symposia, since 1983 the journal Informal Logic has been the publication of record of the field, with Blair and Johnson as initial editors, with the editorial board now including two other colleagues from the University of Windsor—Christopher Tindale and Hans V. Hansen.[9] Other journals that regularly publish articles on informal logic include Argumentation (founded in 1986), Philosophy and Rhetoric, Argumentation and Advocacy (the journal of the American Forensic Association), and Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines (founded in 1988).[10]

 Proposed definitions [ edit ]

 Johnson and Blair (2000) proposed the following definition: "Informal logic designates that branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal2 standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, critique and construction of argumentation in everyday discourse." Their meaning of non-formal2 is taken from Barth and Krabbe (1982), which is explained below.

 To understand the definition above, one must understand informal which takes its meaning in contrast to its counterpart formal. (This point was not made for a very long time, hence the nature of informal logic remained opaque, even to those involved in it, for a period of time.) Here it is helpful to have recourse[11] to Barth and Krabbe (1982:14f) where they distinguish three senses of the term form. By form1, Barth and Krabbe mean the sense of the term which derives from the Platonic idea of form—the ultimate metaphysical unit. Barth and Krabbe claim that most traditional logic is formal in this sense. That is, syllogistic logic is a logic of terms where the terms could naturally be understood as place-holders for Platonic (or Aristotelian) forms. In this first sense of form, almost all logic is informal (not-formal). Understanding informal logic this way would be much too broad to be useful.

 By form2, Barth and Krabbe mean the form of sentences and statements as these are understood in modern systems of logic. Here validity is the focus: if the premises are true, the conclusion must then also be true. Now validity has to do with the logical form of the statement that makes up the argument. In this sense of formal, most modern and contemporary logic is formal. That is, such logics canonize the notion of logical form, and the notion of validity plays the central normative role. In this second sense of form, informal logic is not-formal, because it abandons the notion of logical form as the key to understanding the structure of arguments, and likewise retires validity as normative for the purposes of the evaluation of argument. It seems to many that validity is too stringent a requirement, that there are good arguments in which the conclusion is supported by the premises even though it does not follow necessarily from them (as validity requires). An argument in which the conclusion is thought to be "beyond reasonable doubt, given the premises" is sufficient in law to cause a person to be sentenced to death, even though it does not meet the standard of logical validity. This type of argument, based on accumulation of evidence rather than pure deduction, is called a conductive argument.

 By form3, Barth and Krabbe mean to refer to "procedures which are somehow regulated or regimented, which take place according to some set of rules." Barth and Krabbe say that "we do not defend formality3 of all kinds and under all circumstances." Rather "we defend the thesis that verbal dialectics must have a certain form (i.e., must proceed according to certain rules) in order that one can speak of the discussion as being won or lost" (19). In this third sense of form, informal logic can be formal, for there is nothing in the informal logic enterprise that stands opposed to the idea that argumentative discourse should be subject to norms, i.e., subject to rules, criteria, standards or procedures. Informal logic does present standards for the evaluation of argument, procedures for detecting missing premises etc.

 Johnson and Blair (2000) noticed a limitation of their own definition, particularly with respect to "everyday discourse", which could indicate that it does not seek to understand specialized, domain-specific arguments made in natural languages. Consequently, they have argued that the crucial divide is between arguments made in formal languages and those made in natural languages.

 Fisher and Scriven (1997) proposed a more encompassing definition, seeing informal logic as "the discipline which studies the practice of critical thinking and provides its intellectual spine". By "critical thinking" they understand "skilled and active interpretation and evaluation of observations and communications, information and argumentation."[12]

 Criticisms [ edit ]

 Some hold the view that informal logic is not a branch or subdiscipline of logic, or even the view that there cannot be such a thing as informal logic.[13][14][15] Massey criticizes informal logic on the grounds that it has no theory underpinning it. Informal logic, he says, requires detailed classification schemes to organize it, which in other disciplines is provided by the underlying theory. He maintains that there is no method of establishing the invalidity of an argument aside from the formal method, and that the study of fallacies may be of more interest to other disciplines, like psychology, than to philosophy and logic.[13]

 Relation to critical thinking [ edit ]

 See also: Critical thinking

 Since the 1980s, informal logic has been partnered and even equated,[16] in the minds of many, with critical thinking. The precise definition of critical thinking is a subject of much dispute.[17] Critical thinking, as defined by Johnson, is the evaluation of an intellectual product (an argument, an explanation, a theory) in terms of its strengths and weaknesses.[17] While critical thinking will include evaluation of arguments and hence require skills of argumentation including informal logic, critical thinking requires additional abilities not supplied by informal logic, such as the ability to obtain and assess information and to clarify meaning. Also, many believe that critical thinking requires certain dispositions.[18] Understood in this way, critical thinking is a broad term for the attitudes and skills that are involved in analyzing and evaluating arguments. The critical thinking movement promotes critical thinking as an educational ideal. The movement emerged with great force in the 1980s in North America as part of an ongoing critique of education as regards the thinking skills not being taught.

 Relation to argumentation theory [ edit ]

 See also: Argumentation theory

 The social, communicative practice of argumentation can and should be distinguished from implication (or entailment)—a relationship between propositions; and from inference—a mental activity typically thought of as the drawing of a conclusion from premises. Informal logic may thus be said to be a logic of argumentation, as distinguished from implication and inference.[19]

 Argumentation theory is interdisciplinary in the sense that no one discipline will be able to provide a complete account. A full appreciation of argumentation requires insights from logic (both formal and informal), rhetoric, communication theory, linguistics, psychology, and, increasingly, computer science. Since the 1970s, there has been significant agreement that there are three basic approaches to argumentation theory: the logical, the rhetorical and the dialectical. According to Wenzel,[20] the logical approach deals with the product, the dialectical with the process, and the rhetorical with the procedure. Thus, informal logic is one contributor to this inquiry, being most especially concerned with the norms of argument.

 See also [ edit ]

 * Philosophy portal
 * Argument
 * Argumentation theory
 * Argument map
 * Critical reasoning
 * Informal fallacy
 * Informal inferential reasoning
 * Inference objection
 * Lemma
 * Philosophy of language
 * Semantics

 Footnotes [ edit ]

 1. ^ See Johnson 1999 for a survey of definitions.
 2. ^ Johnson, Ralph H., and Blair, J. Anthony (1987), "The Current State of Informal Logic", Informal Logic , 9(2–3), 147–151. Johnson & Blair added "... in everyday discourse" but in (2000), modified their definition, and broadened the focus now to include the sorts of argument that occurs not just in everyday discourse but also disciplined inquiry—what Weinstein (1990) calls "stylized discourse."
 3. ^ Resnick, 1989
 4. ^ a b Frans H. van Eemeren (2009). "The Study of Argumentation". In Andrea A. Lunsford; Kirt H. Wilson; Rosa A. Eberly (eds.). The SAGE handbook of rhetorical studies. SAGE. p. 117. ISBN 978-1-4129-0950-1.
 5. ^ a b c d David Hitchcock, Informal logic 25 years later in Informal Logic at 25: Proceedings of the Windsor Conference (OSSA 2003)
 6. ^ Hausman, Alan; Landesman, Charles; Seamon, Roger (2002). "Howard Kahane, 1928-2001". Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. 75 (5): 191–193. JSTOR 3218569.
 7. ^ Fisher (2004) p. vii
 8. ^ J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson (eds.), Informal Logic: The First International Symposium, 3-28. Pt. Reyes, CA: Edgepress
 9. ^ "Editorial Team | Informal Logic".
 10. ^ Johnson and Blair (2000), p. 100
 11. ^ As Johnson (1999) does.
 12. ^ Johnson and Blair (2000), p. 95
 13. ^ a b Massey, 1981
 14. ^ Woods, 1980
 15. ^ Woods, 2000
 16. ^ Johnson (2000) takes the conflation to be part of the Network Problem and holds that settling the issue will require a theory of reasoning.
 17. ^ a b Johnson, 1992
 18. ^ Ennis, 1987
 19. ^ Johnson, 1999
 20. ^ Wenzel (1990)

 References [ edit ]

 * Barth, E. M., & Krabbe, E. C. W. (Eds.). (1982). From axiom to dialogue: A philosophical study of logics and argumentation. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.
 * Blair, J. A & Johnson, R.H. (1980). The recent development of informal logic. In J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson (Eds.). Informal logic: The first international symposium, (pp. 3–28). Inverness, CA: Edgepress.
 * Ennis, R.H. (1987). A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions and abilities. In J.B. Baron and R.J. Sternberg (Eds.), Teaching critical thinking skills: Theory and practice, (pp. 9–26). New York: Freeman.
 * Eemeren, F. H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication and fallacies. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
 * Fisher, A. and Scriven, M. (1997). Critical thinking: Its definition and assessment. Point Reyes, CA: Edgepress
 * Fisher, Alec (2004). The logic of real arguments (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-65481-4.
 * Govier, T. (1987). Problems in argument analysis and evaluation. Dordrecht: Foris.
 * Govier, T. (1999). The Philosophy of Argument. Newport News, VA: Vale Press.
 * Hitchcock, David (2007). "Informal logic and the concept of argument". In Jacquette, Dale (ed.). Philosophy of logic. Elsevier. ISBN 978-0-444-51541-4. preprint
 * Johnson, R. H. (1992). The problem of defining critical thinking. In S. P. Norris (Ed.), The generalizability of critical thinking (pp. 38–53). New York: Teachers College Press. (Reprinted in Johnson (1996).)
 * Johnson, R. H. (1996). The rise of informal logic. Newport News, VA: Vale Press
 * Johnson, R. H. (1999). The relation between formal and informal logic. Argumentation, 13(3) 265–74.
 * Johnson, R. H. (2000). Manifest rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
 * Johnson, R. H. & Blair, J. A. (1987). The current state of informal logic. Informal Logic 9, 147–51.
 * Johnson, R. H. & Blair, J. A. (1996). Informal logic and critical thinking. In F. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, & F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Fundamentals of argumentation theory (pp. 383–86). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
 * Johnson, R. H. & Blair, J. A. (2002). Informal logic and the reconfiguration of logic. In D. Gabbay, R. H. Johnson, H.-J. Ohlbach and J. Woods (Eds.). Handbook of the logic of argument and inference: The turn towards the practical (pp. 339–396). Elsivier: North Holland.
 * MacFarlane, J. (2005). Logical Constants. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
 * Massey, G. (1981). The fallacy behind fallacies. Midwest Studies of Philosophy, 6, 489–500.
 * Munson, R. (1976). The way of words: an informal logic. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
 * Resnick, L. (1987). Education and learning to think. Washington, DC: National Academy Press..
 * Walton, D. N. (1990). What is reasoning? What is an argument? The Journal of Philosophy, 87, 399–419.
 * Weinstein, M. (1990) Towards a research agenda for informal logic and critical thinking. Informal Logic, 12, 121–143.
 * Wenzel, J. 1990 Three perspectives on argumentation. In R Trapp and J Scheutz, (Eds.), Perspectives on argumentation: Essays in honour of Wayne Brockreide, 9-26 Waveland Press: Prospect Heights, IL
 * Woods, J. (1980). What is informal logic? In J.A. Blair & R. H. Johnson (Eds.), Informal Logic: The First International Symposium (pp. 57–68). Point Reyes, CA: Edgepress.

 Special journal issue [ edit ]

 The open access issue 20(2) of Informal Logic from year 2000 groups a number of papers addressing foundational issues, based on the Panel on Informal Logic that was held at the 1998 World Congress of Philosophy, including:

 * Hitchcock, D. (2000) The significance of informal logic for philosophy. Informal Logic 20(2), 129–138.
 * Johnson, R. H. & Blair, J. A. (2000). Informal logic: An overview. Informal Logic 20(2): 93–99.
 * Woods, J. (2000). How Philosophical is Informal Logic? Informal Logic 20(2): 139–167. 2000

 Textbooks [ edit ]

 * Kahane, H. (1971). Logic and contemporary rhetoric: The use of reasoning in everyday life. Belmont: Wadsworth. Still in print as Nancy Cavender; Howard Kahane (2009). Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric: The Use of Reason in Everyday Life (11th ed.). Cengage Learning. ISBN 978-0-495-80411-6.
 * Scriven, Michael (1976). Reasoning. New York: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 978-0-07-055882-3.
 * Johnson, R. H. & Blair, J. A. (1977). Logical self-defense. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. US Edition. (2006). New York: Idebate Press.
 * Fogelin, R.J. (1978). Understanding arguments: An introduction to informal logic. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. Still in print as Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter; Fogelin, Robert (2010), Understanding Arguments: An Introduction to Informal Logic (8th ed.), Belmont, California: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, ISBN 978-0-495-60395-5
 * Stephen N. Thomas (1997). Practical reasoning in natural language (4th ed.). Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0-13-678269-8.
 * Irving M. Copi; Keith Burgess-Jackson (1996). Informal logic (3rd ed.). Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0-13-229048-7.
 * Woods, John; Irvine, Andrew; Walton, Douglas N. (2004). Argument: Critical Thinking, Logic and the Fallacies. Toronto: Pearson/Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0-13-039938-0.
 * Groarke, Leo (2004). Good reasoning matters! : a constructive approach to critical thinking (3rd ed.). Toronto: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-541904-7.
 * Douglas N. Walton (2008). Informal logic: a pragmatic approach (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-71380-1.
 * Trudy Govier (2009). A Practical Study of Argument (7th ed.). Cengage Learning. ISBN 978-0-495-60340-5.

 External links [ edit ]

 * Groarke, Leo. "Informal Logic". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
 * An Outline for Verbal Logic
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
	 
     
 Informal logic encompasses the principles of logic and logical thought outside of a formal setting (characterized by the usage of particular statements). However, the precise definition of "informal logic" is a matter of some dispute. [1]  Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair define informal logic as "a branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, criticism and construction of argumentation." [2]  This definition reflects what had been implicit in their practice and what others were doing in their informal logic texts.
 Informal logic is associated with informal fallacies, critical thinking, the thinking skills movement [3]  and the interdisciplinary inquiry known as argumentation theory. Frans H. van Eemeren writes that the label "informal logic" covers a "collection of normative approaches to the study of reasoning in ordinary language that remain closer to the practice of argumentation than formal logic." [4] 
History[edit]
Informal logic as a distinguished enterprise under this name emerged roughly in the late 1970s as a sub-field of philosophy. The naming of the field was preceded by the appearance of a number of textbooks that rejected the symbolic approach to logic on pedagogical grounds as inappropriate and unhelpful for introductory textbooks on logic for a general audience, for example Howard Kahane's Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric, subtitled "The Use of Reason in Everyday Life", first published in 1971. Kahane's textbook was described on the notice of his death in the  Proceedings And Addresses of the American Philosophical Association  (2002) as "a text in informal logic, [that] was intended to enable students to cope with the misleading rhetoric one frequently finds in the media and in political discourse. It was organized around a discussion of fallacies, and was meant to be a practical instrument for dealing with the problems of everyday life. [It has] ... gone through many editions; [it is] ... still in print; and the thousands upon thousands of students who have taken courses in which his text [was] ... used can thank Howard for contributing to their ability to dissect arguments and avoid the deceptions of deceitful rhetoric. He tried to put into practice the ideal of discourse that aims at truth rather than merely at persuasion. (Hausman et al. 2002)" [5]   [6]  Other textbooks from the era taking this approach were Michael Scriven's Reasoning (Edgepress, 1976) and Logical Self-Defense by Ralph Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, first published in 1977. [5]  Earlier precursors in this tradition can be considered Monroe Beardsley's Practical Logic (1950) and Stephen Toulmin's The Uses of Argument (1958). [7] 
 The field perhaps became recognized under its current name with the First International Symposium on Informal Logic held in 1978. Although initially motivated by a new pedagogical approach to undergraduate logic textbooks, the scope of the field was basically defined by a list of 13 problems and issues which Blair and Johnson included as an appendix to their keynote address at this symposium: [5]   [8] 
 the theory of logical criticism
the theory of argument
the theory of fallacy
the fallacy approach vs. the critical thinking approach
the viability of the inductive/deductive dichotomy
the ethics of argumentation and logical criticism
the problem of assumptions and missing premises
the problem of context
methods of extracting arguments from context
methods of displaying arguments
the problem of pedagogy
the nature, division and scope of informal logic
the relationship of informal logic to other inquiries 
David Hitchcock argues that the naming of the field was unfortunate, and that philosophy of argument would have been more appropriate. He argues that more undergraduate students in North America study informal logic than any other branch of philosophy, but that as of 2003 informal logic (or philosophy of argument) was not recognized as separate sub-field by the World Congress of Philosophy. [5]  Frans H. van Eemeren wrote that "informal logic" is mainly an approach to argumentation advanced by a group of US and Canadian philosophers and largely based on the previous works of Stephen Toulmin and to a lesser extent those of Chaïm Perelman. [4] 
 Alongside the symposia, since 1983 the journal Informal Logic has been the publication of record of the field, with Blair and Johnson as initial editors, with the editorial board now including two other colleagues from the University of Windsor—Christopher Tindale and Hans V. Hansen. [9]  Other journals that regularly publish articles on informal logic include Argumentation (founded in 1986), Philosophy and Rhetoric,  Argumentation and Advocacy  (the journal of the American Forensic Association), and  Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines  (founded in 1988). [10] 
Proposed definitions[edit]
Johnson and Blair (2000) proposed the following definition: "Informal logic designates that branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal2 standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, critique and construction of argumentation in everyday discourse." Their meaning of non-formal2 is taken from Barth and Krabbe (1982), which is explained below.
 To understand the definition above, one must understand informal which takes its meaning in contrast to its counterpart formal. (This point was not made for a very long time, hence the nature of informal logic remained opaque, even to those involved in it, for a period of time.) Here it is helpful to have recourse [11]  to Barth and Krabbe (1982:14f) where they distinguish three senses of the term form. By form1 , Barth and Krabbe mean the sense of the term which derives from the Platonic idea of form—the ultimate metaphysical unit. Barth and Krabbe claim that most traditional logic is formal in this sense. That is, syllogistic logic is a logic of terms where the terms could naturally be understood as place-holders for Platonic (or Aristotelian) forms. In this first sense of form, almost all logic is informal (not-formal). Understanding informal logic this way would be much too broad to be useful.
 By form2, Barth and Krabbe mean the form of sentences and statements as these are understood in modern systems of logic. Here validity is the focus: if the premises are true, the conclusion must then also be true. Now validity has to do with the logical form of the statement that makes up the argument. In this sense of formal, most modern and contemporary logic is formal. That is, such logics canonize the notion of logical form, and the notion of validity plays the central normative role. In this second sense of form, informal logic is not-formal, because it abandons the notion of logical form as the key to understanding the structure of arguments, and likewise retires validity as normative for the purposes of the evaluation of argument. It seems to many that validity is too stringent a requirement, that there are good arguments in which the conclusion is supported by the premises even though it does not follow necessarily from them (as validity requires). An argument in which the conclusion is thought to be "beyond reasonable doubt, given the premises" is sufficient in law to cause a person to be sentenced to death, even though it does not meet the standard of logical validity. This type of argument, based on accumulation of evidence rather than pure deduction, is called a conductive argument.
 By form3 , Barth and Krabbe mean to refer to "procedures which are somehow regulated or regimented, which take place according to some set of rules." Barth and Krabbe say that "we do not defend formality3 of all kinds and under all circumstances." Rather "we defend the thesis that verbal dialectics must have a certain form (i.e., must proceed according to certain rules) in order that one can speak of the discussion as being won or lost" (19). In this third sense of form, informal logic can be formal, for there is nothing in the informal logic enterprise that stands opposed to the idea that argumentative discourse should be subject to norms, i.e., subject to rules, criteria, standards or procedures. Informal logic does present standards for the evaluation of argument, procedures for detecting missing premises etc.
 Johnson and Blair (2000) noticed a limitation of their own definition, particularly with respect to "everyday discourse", which could indicate that it does not seek to understand specialized, domain-specific arguments made in natural languages. Consequently, they have argued that the crucial divide is between arguments made in formal languages and those made in natural languages.
 Fisher and Scriven (1997) proposed a more encompassing definition, seeing informal logic as "the discipline which studies the practice of critical thinking and provides its intellectual spine". By "critical thinking" they understand "skilled and active interpretation and evaluation of observations and communications, information and argumentation." [12] 
Criticisms[edit]
Some hold the view that informal logic is not a branch or subdiscipline of logic, or even the view that there cannot be such a thing as informal logic. [13]   [14]   [15]  Massey criticizes informal logic on the grounds that it has no theory underpinning it. Informal logic, he says, requires detailed classification schemes to organize it, which in other disciplines is provided by the underlying theory. He maintains that there is no method of establishing the invalidity of an argument aside from the formal method, and that the study of fallacies may be of more interest to other disciplines, like psychology, than to philosophy and logic. [13] 
Relation to critical thinking[edit]
Since the 1980s, informal logic has been partnered and even equated, [16]  in the minds of many, with critical thinking. The precise definition of  critical thinking  is a subject of much dispute. [17]  Critical thinking, as defined by Johnson, is the evaluation of an intellectual product (an argument, an explanation, a theory) in terms of its strengths and weaknesses. [17]  While critical thinking will include evaluation of arguments and hence require skills of argumentation including informal logic, critical thinking requires additional abilities not supplied by informal logic, such as the ability to obtain and assess information and to clarify meaning. Also, many believe that critical thinking requires certain dispositions. [18]  Understood in this way, critical thinking is a broad term for the attitudes and skills that are involved in analyzing and evaluating arguments. The critical thinking movement promotes critical thinking as an educational ideal. The movement emerged with great force in the 1980s in North America as part of an ongoing critique of education as regards the thinking skills not being taught.
Relation to argumentation theory[edit]
The social, communicative practice of argumentation can and should be distinguished from implication (or entailment)—a relationship between propositions; and from inference—a mental activity typically thought of as the drawing of a conclusion from premises. Informal logic may thus be said to be a logic of argumentation, as distinguished from implication and inference. [19] 
 Argumentation theory is interdisciplinary in the sense that no one discipline will be able to provide a complete account. A full appreciation of argumentation requires insights from logic (both formal and informal), rhetoric, communication theory, linguistics, psychology, and, increasingly, computer science. Since the 1970s, there has been significant agreement that there are three basic approaches to argumentation theory: the logical, the rhetorical and the dialectical. According to Wenzel, [20]  the logical approach deals with the product, the dialectical with the process, and the rhetorical with the procedure. Thus, informal logic is one contributor to this inquiry, being most especially concerned with the norms of argument.
See also[edit]
  Argument 
 Argumentation theory 
 Argument map 
 Critical reasoning 
 Informal fallacy 
 Informal inferential reasoning 
 Inference objection 
 Lemma 
 Philosophy of language 
 Semantics  
Footnotes[edit]
  ^  See Johnson 1999 for a survey of definitions.
  ^  Johnson, Ralph H., and Blair, J. Anthony (1987), "The Current State of Informal Logic", Informal Logic, 9(2–3), 147–151. Johnson &amp; Blair added "... in everyday discourse" but in (2000), modified their definition, and broadened the focus now to include the sorts of argument that occurs not just in everyday discourse but also disciplined inquiry—what Weinstein (1990) calls "stylized discourse."
  ^  Resnick, 1989
^    a       b    Frans H. van Eemeren (2009). "The Study of Argumentation". In Andrea A. Lunsford; Kirt H. Wilson; Rosa A. Eberly (eds.). The SAGE handbook of rhetorical studies. SAGE. p. 117. ISBN  978-1-4129-0950-1 .
^    a       b       c       d    David Hitchcock, Informal logic 25 years later in Informal Logic at 25: Proceedings of the Windsor Conference (OSSA 2003)
  ^  Hausman, Alan; Landesman, Charles; Seamon, Roger (2002). "Howard Kahane, 1928-2001". Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. 75 (5): 191–193. JSTOR 3218569.
  ^  Fisher (2004) p. vii
  ^  J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson (eds.), Informal Logic: The First International Symposium, 3-28. Pt. Reyes, CA: Edgepress
  ^   "Editorial Team | Informal Logic".
  ^  Johnson and Blair (2000), p. 100
  ^  As Johnson (1999) does.
  ^  Johnson and Blair (2000), p. 95
^    a       b    Massey, 1981
  ^  Woods, 1980
  ^  Woods, 2000
  ^  Johnson (2000) takes the conflation to be part of the Network Problem and holds that settling the issue will require a theory of reasoning.
^    a       b    Johnson, 1992
  ^  Ennis, 1987
  ^  Johnson, 1999
  ^  Wenzel (1990)
 
References[edit]
 Barth, E. M., &amp; Krabbe, E. C. W. (Eds.). (1982). From axiom to dialogue: A philosophical study of logics and argumentation. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.
Blair, J. A &amp; Johnson, R.H. (1980). The recent development of informal logic. In J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson (Eds.). Informal logic: The first international symposium, (pp. 3–28). Inverness, CA: Edgepress.
Ennis, R.H. (1987). A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions and abilities. In J.B. Baron and R.J. Sternberg (Eds.), Teaching critical thinking skills: Theory and practice, (pp. 9–26). New York: Freeman.
Eemeren, F. H. van, &amp; Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication and fallacies. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Fisher, A. and Scriven, M. (1997). Critical thinking: Its definition and assessment. Point Reyes, CA: Edgepress
 Fisher, Alec (2004). The logic of real arguments (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN  978-0-521-65481-4 . 
Govier, T. (1987). Problems in argument analysis and evaluation. Dordrecht: Foris.
Govier, T. (1999). The Philosophy of Argument. Newport News, VA: Vale Press.
 Hitchcock, David (2007). "Informal logic and the concept of argument". In Jacquette, Dale (ed.). Philosophy of logic. Elsevier. ISBN  978-0-444-51541-4 . preprint 
 Johnson, R. H. (1992). The problem of defining critical thinking. In S. P. Norris (Ed.), The generalizability of critical thinking (pp. 38–53). New York: Teachers College Press. (Reprinted in Johnson (1996).)
Johnson, R. H. (1996). The rise of informal logic. Newport News, VA: Vale Press
Johnson, R. H. (1999). The relation between formal and informal logic. Argumentation, 13(3) 265–74.
Johnson, R. H. (2000). Manifest rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Johnson, R. H. &amp; Blair, J. A. (1987). The current state of informal logic. Informal Logic 9, 147–51.
Johnson, R. H. &amp; Blair, J. A. (1996). Informal logic and critical thinking. In F. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, &amp; F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Fundamentals of argumentation theory (pp. 383–86). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
Johnson, R. H. &amp; Blair, J. A. (2002). Informal logic and the reconfiguration of logic. In D. Gabbay, R. H. Johnson, H.-J. Ohlbach and J. Woods (Eds.). Handbook of the logic of argument and inference: The turn towards the practical (pp. 339–396). Elsivier: North Holland.
MacFarlane, J. (2005). Logical Constants. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Massey, G. (1981). The fallacy behind fallacies. Midwest Studies of Philosophy, 6, 489–500.
Munson, R. (1976). The way of words: an informal logic. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Resnick, L. (1987). Education and learning to think. Washington, DC: National Academy Press..
 Walton, D. N. (1990). What is reasoning? What is an argument? The Journal of Philosophy, 87, 399–419.
Weinstein, M. (1990) Towards a research agenda for informal logic and critical thinking. Informal Logic, 12, 121–143.
Wenzel, J. 1990 Three perspectives on argumentation. In R Trapp and J Scheutz, (Eds.), Perspectives on argumentation: Essays in honour of Wayne Brockreide, 9-26 Waveland Press: Prospect Heights, IL
 Woods, J. (1980). What is informal logic? In J.A. Blair &amp; R. H. Johnson (Eds.), Informal Logic: The First International Symposium (pp. 57–68). Point Reyes, CA: Edgepress. 
Special journal issue[edit]
The open access issue 20(2) of Informal Logic from year 2000 groups a number of papers addressing foundational issues, based on the Panel on Informal Logic that was held at the 1998 World Congress of Philosophy, including:
 Hitchcock, D. (2000) The significance of informal logic for philosophy. Informal Logic 20(2), 129–138.
Johnson, R. H. &amp; Blair, J. A. (2000). Informal logic: An overview. Informal Logic 20(2): 93–99.
Woods, J. (2000). How Philosophical is Informal Logic? Informal Logic 20(2): 139–167. 2000 
Textbooks[edit]
  Kahane, H. (1971). Logic and contemporary rhetoric: The use of reasoning in everyday life. Belmont: Wadsworth. Still in print as Nancy Cavender; Howard Kahane (2009). Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric: The Use of Reason in Everyday Life (11th ed.). Cengage Learning. ISBN  978-0-495-80411-6 . 
  Scriven, Michael (1976). Reasoning. New York: McGraw-Hill. ISBN  978-0-07-055882-3 . 
 Johnson, R. H. &amp; Blair, J. A. (1977). Logical self-defense. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. US Edition. (2006). New York: Idebate Press.
 Fogelin, R.J. (1978). Understanding arguments: An introduction to informal logic. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. Still in print as Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter; Fogelin, Robert (2010), Understanding Arguments: An Introduction to Informal Logic (8th ed.), Belmont, California: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, ISBN  978-0-495-60395-5   
 Stephen N. Thomas (1997). Practical reasoning in natural language (4th ed.). Prentice Hall. ISBN  978-0-13-678269-8 . 
  Irving M. Copi; Keith Burgess-Jackson (1996). Informal logic (3rd ed.). Prentice Hall. ISBN  978-0-13-229048-7 . 
  Woods, John; Irvine, Andrew; Walton, Douglas N. (2004). Argument: Critical Thinking, Logic and the Fallacies. Toronto: Pearson/Prentice Hall. ISBN  978-0-13-039938-0 . 
  Groarke, Leo (2004). Good reasoning matters! : a constructive approach to critical thinking (3rd ed.). Toronto: Oxford University Press. ISBN  978-0-19-541904-7 . 
 Douglas N. Walton (2008). Informal logic: a pragmatic approach (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN  978-0-521-71380-1 . 
  Trudy Govier (2009). A Practical Study of Argument (7th ed.). Cengage Learning. ISBN  978-0-495-60340-5 .  
External links[edit]
   Groarke, Leo. "Informal Logic". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . 
 An Outline for Verbal Logic
Informal logic - Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Informal_logic
https://eksviai-blog.tumblr.com/post/44432583874/why-learn-semantics-comebacks-to-annoying-people#_=_
Why Learn Semantics: Comebacks to annoying people
2013-03-03T00:00:00Z

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 <h3><a href="https://eksviai-blog.tumblr.com/post/44432583874/why-learn-semantics-comebacks-to-annoying-people">Why Learn Semantics: Comebacks to annoying people</a></h3>
 <p><a href="http://allthingslinguistic.tumblr.com/post/36465468298/why-learn-semantics-comebacks-to-annoying-people">allthingslinguistic</a>:</p><blockquote><p>The <a href="http://allthingslinguistic.tumblr.com/search/intro+linguistics">intro linguistics course I TA for</a> has just started semantics. Today we were talking about <a href="http://allthingslinguistic.tumblr.com/post/35869749368/the-meaning-of-silence-implicature-and-entailment-in">implicature and entailment</a>. For example, sentences like:</p><blockquote><p>(i) Sarah has fewer than three children.<br/>(ii) Sarah has a child. </p></blockquote><p>If sentence A entails sentence B, that means that if sentence A is true, then it must be the case that sentence B is also true. Does (i) entail (ii)? Does (ii) entail (i)? Let’s think about this. </p><p>If Sarah has fewer than three children, the possible numbers of children for Sarah to have are any numbers that can refer to children and are less than 3. So no decimals or negative numbers (I’m not sure what -1.7 children would look like), but it is possible for her to have 0, 1, or 2 children. </p><p>Clearly if Sarah has 1 or 2 children, then it is also true that she has a child, but if she has 0 children, then it is not true that she has a child. So (i) doesn’t entail (ii). </p><p>If Sarah has a child, then it can’t be true that she has 0 children, so (ii) doesn’t entail (i). Another reason (ii) doesn’t entail (i) is that if Sarah has a child, then it doesn’t necessarily mean that she has 2 children. </p><p>But the students weren’t totally satisfied with this explanation. Particularly the part where “having fewer than three children” can mean “having zero children”. It seems like if you’re bothering to talk about how many children someone has, maybe this is because they actually have some number of children. So couldn’t (i) entail (ii)? </p><p>The way I explained it is that we need to be really nitpicky and pedantic about what we mean by entailment. Like an annoying younger sibling who when you ask them “Do you know what time it is?” replies “Yes” instead of “It’s quarter after three”. Or a lawyer (no insult intended: being really explicit about wording is pretty important for law). </p><p>So if there’s a contest of some sort, and the fine print says “Not eligible to win: people with fewer than 3 children”, then if Sarah has 0 children, is she eligible to win? Technically, no. </p><p>Or if there’s a free babysitting service for people with a child, then if Sarah has two children, is she eligible to use it? Sure, because Sarah has a child (and also another child). </p><p>But the reason why we get annoyed by nitpicky people is that most of the time we also assume a lot of contextual information (implicatures). Like, why would you bother talk about someone having fewer than three children if you know they actually don’t have any? Or why would you bother asking if someone was able to pass the peas if you could tell by looking at them that they were physically capable of doing so? So in practise we end up using a lot of implicatures to make conversation run smoothly and efficiently.</p><p>The tricky thing about semantics is getting through those implicatures to what the sentence means by itself (and then later figuring out a way to add the implicatures back in). And in this case, it can help to try to think like a really literal, nitpicky person. </p><p>On the other hand, the fun part is that this also gives you a nice pragmatics comeback to people who say “Well technically, that’s not what I actually SAID”. You can reply: “But as a speaker of English, you’re also expected to understand a variety of implicatures. You were clearly trying to imply this thing without actually saying it to give yourself plausibile deniability. But with my magical semantics powers I have unmasked your nefarious plan! Mwahahaha!” </p><p>Okay, maybe that’s just me. </p></blockquote><p>(via <a href="https://allthingslinguistic.com/post/36465468298/why-learn-semantics-comebacks-to-annoying-people">allthingslinguistic</a>)</p>
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Why Learn Semantics: Comebacks to annoying people 
  allthingslinguistic:  The intro linguistics course I TA for has just started semantics. Today we were talking about implicature and entailment. For example, sentences like:  (i) Sarah has fewer than three children.(ii) Sarah has a child.   If sentence A entails sentence B, that means that if sentence A is true, then it must be the case that sentence B is also true. Does (i) entail (ii)? Does (ii) entail (i)? Let’s think about this.  If Sarah has fewer than three children, the possible numbers of children for Sarah to have are any numbers that can refer to children and are less than 3. So no decimals or negative numbers (I’m not sure what -1.7 children would look like), but it is possible for her to have 0, 1, or 2 children.  Clearly if Sarah has 1 or 2 children, then it is also true that she has a child, but if she has 0 children, then it is not true that she has a child. So (i) doesn’t entail (ii).  If Sarah has a child, then it can’t be true that she has 0 children, so (ii) doesn’t entail (i). Another reason (ii) doesn’t entail (i) is that if Sarah has a child, then it doesn’t necessarily mean that she has 2 children.  But the students weren’t totally satisfied with this explanation. Particularly the part where “having fewer than three children” can mean “having zero children”. It seems like if you’re bothering to talk about how many children someone has, maybe this is because they actually have some number of children. So couldn’t (i) entail (ii)?  The way I explained it is that we need to be really nitpicky and pedantic about what we mean by entailment. Like an annoying younger sibling who when you ask them “Do you know what time it is?” replies “Yes” instead of “It’s quarter after three”. Or a lawyer (no insult intended: being really explicit about wording is pretty important for law).  So if there’s a contest of some sort, and the fine print says “Not eligible to win: people with fewer than 3 children”, then if Sarah has 0 children, is she eligible to win? Technically, no.  Or if there’s a free babysitting service for people with a child, then if Sarah has two children, is she eligible to use it? Sure, because Sarah has a child (and also another child).  But the reason why we get annoyed by nitpicky people is that most of the time we also assume a lot of contextual information (implicatures). Like, why would you bother talk about someone having fewer than three children if you know they actually don’t have any? Or why would you bother asking if someone was able to pass the peas if you could tell by looking at them that they were physically capable of doing so? So in practise we end up using a lot of implicatures to make conversation run smoothly and efficiently. The tricky thing about semantics is getting through those implicatures to what the sentence means by itself (and then later figuring out a way to add the implicatures back in). And in this case, it can help to try to think like a really literal, nitpicky person.  On the other hand, the fun part is that this also gives you a nice pragmatics comeback to people who say “Well technically, that’s not what I actually SAID”. You can reply: “But as a speaker of English, you’re also expected to understand a variety of implicatures. You were clearly trying to imply this thing without actually saying it to give yourself plausibile deniability. But with my magical semantics powers I have unmasked your nefarious plan! Mwahahaha!”  Okay, maybe that’s just me.   (via allthingslinguistic)
Why Learn Semantics: Comebacks to annoying people
https://eksviai-blog.tumblr.com/post/44432583874/why-learn-semantics-comebacks-to-annoying-people#_=_