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Dharmamitra 44

evaṃ hi puruṣo 'pi pariṇāmī syāt /

[If this were accepted], then the Spirit (puruṣa) too would be subject to modification.

tat sambaddhayor dharmayor utādavināśāt tasya pariṇāmo vyavasthāpyate nānyasyeti cen na /

If [you argue] that "modification is established through the production and destruction of properties related to it [the Spirit], and not of anything else" - [we say] no.

sadasatoḥ sambandhābhāvena tat sambandhitvāsiddheḥ /

Because no relationship can exist between the existent and non-existent, relationality itself cannot be established.

tathā hi sambandho bhavet sato vā bhaved asato vā /

For a relationship would have to exist either in an entity or in a non-entity.

na tāvat satas tasya samadhigatāśeṣasvabhāvasampatter anapekṣatayā kvacid api pāratantryāyogāt /

It cannot exist in an entity because, having already attained the fullness of its entire nature independently, it cannot possibly be dependent on anything else.

nāpyasatas tasya sarvopākhyāvirahalakṣaṇatayā kvacid apyāśritatvānupapatteḥ /

Nor [can it exist] in a non-entity, because being characterized by the absence of all predicates, it cannot possibly be dependent on anything.

nahi śaśaviṣāṇādiḥ kvacid āśrito yuktaḥ /

For instance, a hare's horn and similar [non-entities] cannot reasonably be dependent on anything.

na cāpi vyatiriktadharmāntarotpādavināśe sati pariṇāmo vyavasthāpyate bhavadbhiḥ /

Moreover, you do not maintain that modification occurs when completely different properties appear and disappear.

kiṃ tarhi yatrātmabhūtaikasvabhāvānuvṛttiravasthābhedaś ca tatra bhavatāṃ pariṇāmavyavasthā /

Rather, your definition of modification is where there is both persistence of one essential nature and difference in states.

naca dharmiṇaḥ sakāśād dharmayor vyatireke sati ekasvabhāvānuvṛttir asti /

And when properties are separate from the substance possessing them, there cannot be persistence of one essential nature.

dharmyeva hi tayor eka ātmā sa ca vyatirikta iti nātmabhūtaikasvabhāvānuvṛttiḥ /

Since the entity itself is the single essence of those two [properties], and that [essence] is distinct [from them], there cannot be any continuity of a single essential nature.

na cāpi pravartamānanivartamānadharmadvayavyatirikto dharma upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpto darśanapatham avatarati kasyacid ityataḥ sa tādṛśo 'sadvyavahāraviṣaya eva viduṣāṃ /

Nor does any property distinct from the two properties - the appearing and disappearing ones - come within anyone's range of perception; therefore such [a property] is merely an object of invalid discourse for the wise.

athānarthāntarabhūta iti pakṣas tathāpyekasmād dharmisvarūpād avyatiriktvād vināśotpādavatorddharmayor api dharmisvarūpavadekatvameveti kenāśrayeṇa dharmī pariṇataḥ syād dharmo vā /

If, however, the view is taken that [the property] is not a separate entity, then since both properties - the one being destroyed and the one arising - are non-different from the single nature of the substratum, they must be one just like the nature of the substratum; so on what basis could either the substratum or the property be modified?

avasthātuś ca dharmiṇaḥ sakāśād avyatirekāddharmayor evasthātṛsvarūpavan na nivṛttir nāpi prādurbhāvaḥ /

And due to the non-difference of the two properties from the persisting substratum, there can be neither disappearance nor appearance [of the properties], just as with the nature of that which persists.

dharmābhyāṃ ca dharmiṇo 'nanyatvād dharmasvarūpasyotpādaḥ pūrvasya ca vināśa iti naikasya kasyacit pariṇāmaḥ sidhyati /

And since the substratum is not different from the two properties, [all that is possible is] the production of the nature of [new] properties and destruction of the previous ones - thus the modification of any single [entity] is not established.

tasmān na pariṇāmavaśād api bhavatāṃ kāryakāraṇavyavahāro yukta iti /

Therefore, even on the basis of modification, your theory of cause and effect is not logically tenable.

sudhiya iti saugatas te prāhuḥ /

The term "sudhiyaḥ" [wise ones] refers to the Buddhists; they declare [the following].

yeyam asadakaraṇādityādinā pañcadhā codanā kṛtā sā satve 'pi satkāryavādapakṣe 'pi tulyā /

This fivefold argument that was made beginning with "because what is non-existent cannot be produced" applies equally to the view of satkāryavāda [pre-existence of effect].

tathā hi śakyam idam ittham abhidhātuṃ / na sadakaraṇādupādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt / śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāranabhāvāc ca satkāryam iti /

For thus it can be stated: "Because what is existent cannot be produced, because there is recourse to material cause, because all things are not possible, because what is capable produces only what it is capable of, and because of the nature of causality, [therefore] the effect is not pre-existent."

na satkāryam iti vyavahitena sambandhaḥ /

The word "na" [not] is to be connected with "satkāryam" [pre-existent effect] [which appears] at a distance [in the sentence].

kasmāt / sadakaraṇādupādānagrahaṇādityāder hetoḥ /

Why? Because of [such reasons as] taking up of what is [already] existent, grasping of the material cause, etc.

yaścobhayor doṣo na tamekaścodyo yukta bhāvaḥ /

When a fault applies equally to both [parties], it is not proper for one [party] to raise it [as an objection].

nanu ca katham iyaṃ samatā bhavati / yāvatā tatrāsadakaraṇādityevaṃ codanā anyatra sadakaraṇād iti /

"But how can there be this equality, when in one case the objection is 'the non-existent cannot be produced' while in the other case [it is] 'the existent cannot be produced'?"

na /

No [this is not correct].

abhiprāyāparijñānāt /

[This objection arises] from non-comprehension of [our] intended meaning.

satkāryavādepyakaraṇādīnāṃ tulyatvaṃ /

Even in the theory of pre-existent effect (satkāryavāda), the [arguments about] non-production etc. apply equally.

tasyāṃ ca codanāyāṃ yaduttaraṃ bhavatāṃ satkāryavādināṃ tadasatkāryavādināṃ sudhiyāṃ bauddhānāṃ bhaviṣyati //

Whatever answer you proponents of satkāryavāda would give to these objections, the same [answer] will be [available] to the wise Buddhists who propound asatkāryavāda.

katham asau tulyetyāha yadītyādi yadi dadhyādayaḥ santi dugdhādyātmasu sarvathā / teṣāṃ satāṃ kimutpādyaṃ hetvādisadṛśātmanāṃ //

How this [argument] is equal [he] explains thus: "If curd and other [effects] exist completely within the essence of milk etc., then what is to be produced of these [already] existent [things] whose nature is identical to [their] cause etc.?"

sadakaraṇādityetat samarthanārtham idaṃ /

This [verse] is for the purpose of supporting [the argument] that "what is [already] existent cannot be produced."

yadi dugdhādyātmasu kṣīrādīnāṃ svabhāveṣu dadhyādilakṣaṇāni kāryāṇi sarvathā sarvātmanā viśeṣarasavīryavipākādinā vibhaktena rūpeṇa madhyāvasthāvatsanti tadā teṣāṃ satāṃ kimutpādyaṃ rūpam asti yena te kāraṇair dugdhādibhir janyāḥ syuḥ

If the effects [in the form of] curd etc. already exist wholly and completely in the essences of their causes (milk etc.) in their mature and differentiated form with [all] their specific taste, potency, digestive effects etc., then, since they [already] exist, what form of theirs would [remain to] be produced, for which they would need to be generated by causes like milk etc.?

hetvādisadṛśa ātmā yeṣām iti vigrahaḥ

[This is] the analysis: "those whose essence is similar to the cause etc."

etena kāryakāraṇabhāvaprasaṅgasādhanaṃ pramāṇadvayaṃ sūcitaṃ

By this, two proofs are indicated that establish the impossibility of the cause-effect relationship.

hetujanyaṃ na tatkāryaṃ sattāto hetuvittivat

That effect cannot be produced by [its] cause, because it [already] exists, like the cause and consciousness.

hetuḥ pradhānaṃ lokaprasiddhaṃ ca kṣīrādi

"Hetu" [means] prakṛti and also the commonly known [causes] like milk etc.

tat kāryam iti mahadādi lokaprasiddhaṃ ca dadhyādi

"Tat kāryam" [means] mahat etc. and also the commonly known [effects] like curd etc.

sattāta iti sattvāt

"Sattātaḥ" means "because of [its] existence"

hetuvittivad iti hetuḥ pradhānaṃ lokaprasiddhaṃ ca kṣīrādi

In "hetuvittivat", "hetu" [means] prakṛti and also the commonly known [causes] like milk etc.

vittiḥ caitanyaṃ

"Vitti" [means] consciousness

tābhyāṃ tulyaṃ vartata iti hetuvittivat prayogaḥ yat sarvākāreṇa san na tat kenacij janyaṃ yathā prakṛtiś caitanyaṃ vā

That which exists like these two is "hetuvittivat". The application [is]: whatever exists in all aspects cannot be produced by anything, just as prakṛti or consciousness [cannot be produced].

sad eva ca kāryaṃ madhyāvasthāyāṃ / sac ca sarvātmanā paramatena dadhyādīti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ /

[If] the effect exists already in its intermediate state, and according to the opponent's view curd etc. exists in all [its] aspects, [then] this leads to the undesirable consequence of perceiving something that contradicts a universal [law].

na vānaikāntikatāhetoḥ /

Nor [can] the reason [be dismissed] due to inconclusiveness;

anutpādyātiśayasyāpi janyatve sarveṣāṃ janyatvaprasaṅgo 'navasthāprasaṅgaśca bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ /

[The fact] that if something which cannot produce any excellence were to be producible, [then] everything would be producible - leading to infinite regress - is the defeating proof;

janitasyāpi punar janyatvaprasaṅgāt /

Because [it would lead to] the undesirable consequence that even what is [already] produced would be producible again.

evaṃ tāvat kāryatvābhimatānām akāryatvaprasaṅgāpādanaṃ kṛtaṃ / idānīṃ kāraṇābhimatānām akāraṇatvaprasaṅgāpādanaṃ kurvannāha ato nābhimata ityādi /

Thus far [he] has demonstrated the impossibility of effects for what is considered to be effects. Now, showing the impossibility of causes for what is considered to be causes, he states "therefore what is postulated" etc.

tenāyam artho bhavati / mūlaprakṛtyādir bījadugdhādiścābhimataḥ padārtho vivakṣitasya mahadāder dadhyādeś ca na hetuḥ /

This means the following: Primary matter and [things] beginning with seeds and milk, which are postulated entities, cannot be the cause of the intended [effects] beginning with the great [principle] and curd etc.

janakavyavahārayogyo na prāpnotītyāthaḥ /

The meaning is that [it] cannot be properly designated as a producer.

asādhyatvāt nāsya sādhyamastītyasādhyas tadbhāvas tatvaṃ / etaccānantaroktāt kāryatvapratiṣedhāt siddhaṃ /

Because of [its] unaccomplishability - meaning it has nothing to be accomplished - [its] state is unaccomplishable. And this is established from the previously stated negation of effect-ness.

ata evāta ityuktaṃ /

For this very reason the word "ataḥ" ["therefore"] is used.

parātmavad iti / anyasvabhāvavat / akāraṇābhimatapadārthasvabhāvavad ity arthaḥ /

"Like another's self" means like [something of] different nature, that is, like the nature of an entity that is not considered to be a cause.

na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣa iti vacanāt / prayogaḥ yadavidyamānasādhyaṃ na tat kāraṇaṃ yathā caitanyaṃ / avidyamānasādhyaścābhimataḥ padārtha iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ /

"The Spirit is neither productive nor product" [as declared in Sāṃkhyakārikā 3]. [The] argument [is as follows]: That which has nothing to be brought about cannot be a cause - like consciousness; and the entity postulated [as cause] is one for which there is nothing to be brought about - [thus there is] non-perception of the pervader.

etac ca dvayam api prasaṅgasādhanamato nobhayasiddhodāharaṇena kiñcit /

And since both these [arguments] are prasaṅga-proofs, therefore nothing [is gained] by [citing] examples accepted by both parties.

yastu manyate sāṅkyaḥ puruṣasyāpi pratibimbodayānyāyena bhogaṃ prati kartṛtvam astīti /

But [there is] a Sāṃkhya who thinks that "the Spirit also has agency with respect to experience, following the analogy of [the arising of] a reflection."

taṃ pratyevaṃ vyākhyā / paraścāsāvātmā ca mukta ity arthaḥ /

Against him, the explanation [is] thus: The meaning is that this supreme Self [is] liberated.

tasya hi muktatvād bhogaṃ pratyapi kartṛtvaṃ nāstīti nodāharaṇāsiddhiḥ //

Because of [its] being liberated, it has no agency even with respect to experience, thus there is no invalidity of the example.

athetyādinā paramate hetvorasiddhimāśaṅkate athāstyatiśayaḥ kaścid abhivyaktyādilakṣaṇaḥ / yaṃ hetavaḥ prakurvāṇā na yānti vacanaīyatāṃ //

With [the words] beginning with "atha", [the author] anticipates an inadmissibility of the reason in the opponent's view: "Now there is some distinction characterized by manifestation etc., by producing which causes do not become subject to criticism."

tatra yadi prathamo hetuḥ sarvātmanābhivyaktyādirūpeṇāpi sattvāditi sarviśeṣaṇaḥ kriyate tadā na siddhyati / nahyasmābhirabhivyaktyādirūpeṇāpi sattvamiṣyate kāryasya /

If here the first reason is made with all qualifications as "because [the effect] exists in all aspects, even in the form of manifestation etc.", then it is not established; for we do not accept the existence of the effect even in the form of manifestation etc.

kiṃ tarhi śaktirūpeṇa /

Rather, [we accept it only] in the form of potentiality.

atha sāmānyena nirviśeṣaṇas tadānaikāntikaḥ yasmād abhivyaktyādilakṣaṇasyātiśayasyotpadyamānatvāt na sarvasya kāryatvaprasaṅgo bhaviṣyati /

But if [the reason is] without qualification, in general, then it is inconclusive, because the distinction characterized by manifestation etc. is being produced, [and] there will not be the unwanted consequence of everything being an effect.

ata eva dvitīyo 'pi hetur asiddhaḥ sādhyasya vidyamānatvāt /

For this very reason, the second reason too is inadmissible, because there is something to be established.

abhivyaktyādilakṣaṇa iti / ādiśabdenodrekādyavasthāviśeṣaparigrahaḥ /

This is what is meant by the term "abhivyaktyādi" [manifestation and so forth]; by the word "ādi" [and so forth] peculiar conditions like udreka [growth] and others are included.

yamiti atiśayaṃ / vacanīyatām iti vācyatāṃ /

[The word] "yam" [refers to] "peculiar feature"; "vacanīyatām" [means] "to be blamed."

nābhimato hetur asādhyatvādityādir doṣo na bhavatīti yāvat //

[This means that] the fault of "the reason not being acceptable due to being unprovable" and so forth does not arise.

prāgāsīdityādinā pratividhatte

[The author] responds with [the words] "prāgāsīt" [it existed before] and so forth.

tatra vikalpadvayaṃ kadācidasāvatiśayo 'bhivyaktyādyavasthātaḥ prāk prakṛtyavasthāyām apyāsīd vā na vā yadyāsīt tadā bhavadbhir dvayor api hetvor na kiñcidasiddhatvādikamuktamuttaraṃ no cetprāgāsīdevam api so 'tiśayaḥ kathaṃtebhyo hetubhyaḥ prādurbhāvamaśnuvīta asadakāraṇāditi bhavatāṃ nyāyān nayukta etadityabhiprāyaḥ //

There are two alternatives here: either this peculiar feature existed in the state of prakṛti [primordial matter] before the state of manifestation and so forth, or it did not. If it existed, then you have not shown any invalidity or such [fault] regarding both reasons. If it did not exist previously, then how could that peculiar feature arise from those causes? According to your own principle that "what is non-existent cannot be a cause," this is not logical.

evaṃ tāvat sadakaraṇādityayaṃ hetuḥ samarthitaḥ /

Thus far, the reason "because [the effect] cannot come from what exists" has been established.

nātaḥ sādhyaṃ samastīti nopādānaparigrahaḥ / niyatādapi no janma na ca śaktir na ca kriyā //

Therefore, if there is nothing to be produced [sādhya], there would be no recourse to material cause, nor would there be production even from a specific [cause], nor would there be potency, nor action.

yathoktyā nītyā sādhyasyābhāvād upādānaparigraho na prāpnoti tat sādhyaphalavāñchāyaiva teṣāṃ prekṣāvadbhiḥ parigrahāt / niyatādeva kṣīrāder dadhyādīnāṃ janmetyetadapi na prāpnoti sādhyasyāsambhavād eva /

According to the aforementioned reasoning, because the effect [sādhya] [already] exists, there can be no recourse to material cause, since intelligent beings have recourse [to causes] only due to desire for an effect to be produced. And the notion that products like curds etc. arise only from specific [causes] like milk etc. would also not be possible, precisely because the effect cannot [need to] come into being.

etacca sarvasambhavābhāvādityetasya samarthanaṃ / tathā hi sarvasmāt sambhavābhāva eva niyatājjanmetyucyate tac ca satkāryavādapakṣe sādhyābhāvān na yujyate /

This supports the argument "because all [effects] cannot arise [from all causes]." For when it is said that "because [effects] cannot arise from everything, they arise only from specific [causes]," this is not logical in the satkāryavāda view due to the absence of anything to be produced.

tathā śaktasyeti śakyakaraṇam ityetad api dvayaṃ na yujyate /

Similarly, both [concepts] - that "of what is capable" and "the producing of what is possible" - are not logical [in this view].

sādhyasyābhāvādeva

[This is so] because of the very absence of anything to be produced.

yadi hi kenacitkiñcidabhinirvartyeta tadā nirvartakasya śaktir vyavasthāpyeta / nivartyasya ca karaṇaṃ sidhyet

If something were produced by something else, then alone could the efficiency of the producer be established, and the cause of what is to be produced would be accomplished.

nānyathā taddarśayati na ca śaktir na ca kriyeti

[It would] not [be established] otherwise; this is what is shown by [the words] "neither efficiency nor activity."

kāraṇābhāvo 'pi padārthānāṃ na yuktaḥ sādhyābhāvād eva

The absence of cause for things is also not logical, precisely because of the absence of anything to be produced.

sarvātmanā ca niṣpatter na kāryamiha kiñcana

Since [everything] is already accomplished in its entirety, there is nothing here [that could be] an effect.

kāraṇavyapadeśo 'pi tasmānnaivopapadyate

Therefore, even the designation "cause" cannot be logically established.

etac ca kāraṇābhāvād ityetasya hetoḥ samarthanaṃ

And this is a support for that reason [stated as] "because of the absence of cause."

nacaivaṃ bhavati tasmān na satkāryamiti sarvahetuṣu prasaṅgapratyayo yojyaḥ

But it is not so; therefore the conclusion "the effect is not pre-existent" should be applied to all [these] reasons.

sarvaṃ ca sādhanaṃ vṛttaṃ viparyāsanivartakaṃ niścayotpādakaṃ cedaṃ na tathā yuktisaṅgataṃ

And every means of knowledge, when operative, removes wrong cognition and produces certainty; [but] this would not be compatible with reason [under that theory].

vṛttam iti

[The word] "vṛttam" [means] "active."

viparyāsagrahaṇena saṃśayo 'pi gṛhyate tasyobhayāṃśāvalmbenāropakatvasambhavāt

By the term "wrong cognition," doubt is also included, because it involves both alternatives and thus can be an imposition.

sarvam eva svaviṣayaṃ pravṛttaṃ dvayaṃ karoti / prameyārthaviṣaye pravṛttau saṃśayaviparyāsau nivartayati niścayaṃ ca tadviṣayamutpādayati /

Every means [of cognition], when operating on its own object, performs two [functions]: when operating on the object to be cognized, it removes doubt and misconception and produces certain knowledge regarding that [object].

tadetat satkāryavāde yuktyā na saṅgacchate //

This [fact] cannot be reconciled with reason under the satkāryavāda [doctrine].

na sandehaviparyāso nivarttyau sarvadā sthiteḥ /

Doubt and misconception cannot be removed, because [they] would be eternally present.

nāpi niścayajanmāsti tata eva vṛthākhilaṃ //

Nor is the production of certain knowledge possible, for that very same reason; therefore everything [you say] is futile.

tathā hi sandehaviparyāsau bhavatāṃ matena caitanyātmakau vā syātāṃ buddhimanaḥsvabhāvau vā /

For according to your doctrine, doubt and misconception would be either of the nature of consciousness or of the nature of buddhi and manas.

pakṣadvaye 'pi na tayor nivṛttiḥ sambhavati / caitanyabuddhimanasāṃ nityatvena tayor api nityatvāt /

In either case, their removal is not possible, because since consciousness, buddhi and manas are eternal, these two [doubt and misconception] would also be eternal.

nāpi niścayotpattiḥ sādhanāt sambhavati /

Nor is the production of certain knowledge possible through [any] means [of cognition].

tata eva sarvadā sthiteḥ kāraṇāt /

For that very same reason, namely because [it] would be eternally present.

tasmād yadetatsādhanamuktam bhavatā tadakhilaṃ sarvam eva vṛthā /

Therefore, everything that has been stated by you as proof is entirely futile.

etena svacanavirodha udbhāvito bhavati /

By this [argument], self-contradiction in [your] own statement is revealed.

tathā hi niścayotpādanāya sādhanaṃ bruvatā niścayasyāsata utpattiraṅgīkṛtā bhavet /

For instance, when [someone] speaks of the means for producing certainty [of knowledge], [they would have] accepted the production of certainty which [previously] did not exist.

[p.28] satkāryamiti ca pratijñayā sā niṣiddheti svacanavyāghātaḥ //

And this is contradicted by the proposition that "the effect [pre-]exists [in its cause]"; hence there is self-contradiction.

athāpi niścayo 'bhūtassamutpadyeta sādhanāt / nanu tenaiva sarve 'mī bhaveyur vyabhicāriṇaḥ //

If, on the other hand, [it be held that] a previously non-existent certainty would arise from the means, then by that very [admission] all these [arguments] would become inconclusive.

atha mābhūt sādhanaprayogavaiyarthyam iti / niścayo 'bhūto 'sanneva sādhanād utpadyata ityaṅgīkriyate /

If, to avoid the futility of employing the means, it is admitted that a non-existent certainty arises from the means [of knowledge],

evaṃ tarhi asadakaraṇādityāder hetuguṇasya samastasyaivānaikāntikatā prāpnoti niścayavadasato 'pyutpattyavirodhāt /

Then in that case, all the characteristics of the reasons beginning with "because what is non-existent cannot be produced" become inconclusive, since there is no contradiction in the production of something non-existent, just as in [the case of] certainty.

tataś ca yathā niścayasyāsato 'pi karaṇaṃ tanniṣpattaye ca yathā viśiṣṭasādhanaparigrahaḥ yathā ca tasya na sarvasmāt sādhanābhāsādeḥ sambhavaḥ yathā cāsāvasannapi śaktair hetubhiḥ kriyate tatra ca yathā hetūnāṃ kāraṇabhāvo 'sti tathānyatrāpi bhaviṣyati //

Just as there is production of even a non-existent certainty, and the employment of specific means for its production, and just as it cannot arise from all [kinds of] pseudo-means, and just as though non-existent it is produced by capable causes, and just as these causes have the nature of being causes - so too could it be in other cases.

avyakto vyaktibhāktebhya iti cedvyaktirasya kā /

If it is claimed that "the unmanifest [effect] obtains manifestation through [its] causes," then what is this manifestation of it?

na rūpātiśayotpattir avibhāgād asaṅgateḥ //

[It cannot be] the production of a distinctive form, due to [there being] no differentiation and no connection.

athāpi syādyadyapi prāksādhanaprayogāt sanneva niścayaḥ tathāpi na sādhanavaiyarthyaṃ yataḥ prāganabhivyakto 'sau paścātebhyaḥ sādhanebhyo 'bhivyaktimāsādayati /

Even if it be [argued] that although certainty exists even before the operation of the means, still the means are not futile, because while previously unmanifest, it attains manifestation afterwards through these means.

tasmād abhivyaktyarthaṃ sādhanāni vyāpriyanta iti nānarthakyameṣām iti /

Therefore the means operate for the purpose of manifestation, and hence they are not purposeless.