Friday, July 26, 2019

Why a Lottery Scam Should Inform Our Use of Electronic Voting Machines

Eddie Tipton, the former information technology manager for the Multi-State Lottery Association, was convicted in 2017 of rigging lotteries. The organization he worked for provides number-picking computers for lotteries in 33 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

He concocted a simple scheme: he added code to the computer programs that run the lotteries so that on certain specific days instead of producing a random draw of winning numbers, the program picked numbers known to him ahead of time. He had his brother and friends buy winning tickets and shared in the “winnings.”

The first known instance was the Colorado Lotto in 2005. The last payout was 2011. The one that triggered his arrest was a $14 million payout from the Iowa Hot Lotto in 2010. And that happened more by luck than anything else.

What does this crime mean for electronic voting machines?

We must realize that what Eddie Tipton did while working for the Multi State Lottery Association someone else could do working for a voting machine manufacturer

The lottery scam presents a parallel argument that all electronic voting machines should have a paper backup so voters can confirm the machine has correctly tabulated their vote and election officials can perform an accurate recount or audit.

Here is one example in which someone who wanted to affect a presidential election could make a difference:

Several states, including Pennsylvania, allow straight ticket voting in which by making a single choice, the computer records you as voting for the candidate of your chosen party. Although Pennsylvania law requires new machines to have paper backup, most old machines do not. Imagine if some programmer had the foresight a decade ago to stick in a little bit of extra code in the programming that changes one of every 100 straight party votes from Party A to Party B for the 2020 election only.

Pennsylvania is a swing state . . . that small bit of code might be enough to change who is elected president.

Don’t want to change votes, how about not counting all the votes? Not counting one of every fifty straight-line Party A votes accomplishes the same result.

This fantastic scenario requires a single programmer in the right spot at the right time, just as Eddie Tipton was in the right spot at the right time.

Hackers with access to voting machines can accomplish the same thing on a more targeted basis. They can commit after-the-fact voter suppression, say by rigging machines to ignore one of every 100 votes in certain districts that vote primarily for Party A and maybe flip an election to Party B. Oh sure, comparing the number of voters to the number of votes cast could uncover the irregularity, but then what? Would the courts order an entire new election? Would voters lose confidence that their votes mattered?

The opportunities are myriad. We must have secure elections. We should require electronic voting to have paper backup. If Congress were serious about preventing election fraud, it could purchase electronic voting machines with paper backup for every voting precinct in the nation. Would it cost money? Yes. But Congress has no problem increasing our budget deficit, and at least we’d get something for the money spent.

* * * * *

James M. Jackson authors the Seamus McCree series. Full of mystery and suspense, these thrillers explore financial crimes, family relationships, and what happens when they mix. False Bottom, the sixth novel in the series—this one set in the Boston area—is now available. You can sign up for his newsletter and find more information about Jim and his books at


  1. In our Wisconsin county we have a system that is so logical, I don't know why everyone doesn't use it. We record our vote on a card that is approximately 10" by 18". We then carry our card to a scanner, give our voter number to the person at the machine and scan the card in ourselves. (the card can go in with either face up.) Thus we have an electronic record and a paper backup. I assume it's cheaper than most systems because you need a limited number of electronic readers. There is only 1 at my polling place. It's used county wide so there is easy access to backup equipment if necessary.

    1. We have something similar in my Michigan voting district. One problem is that some states bought electronic voting machines with no paper backup. They were expensive, and when you are talking about thousands of voting districts, changing to a process like we have costs money that politicians have been unwilling to spend.

    2. I understand. As you know, this is known as a sunk cost. The card reading machine would be the cheapest way to up-grade, maintain electronic communications and have a paper backup. I imagine these systems can be hacked too, but at least there would be a paper backup.