Edition: U.S. / Global

THE WORLD: Adjusting to Moscow's Disarmament Plans; For Soviets, Military Cuts May Not Feed The Economy

Published: December 18, 1988

A WEEK before Mikhail S. Gorbachev promised to cut Soviet armed forces by about 10 percent, Soviet television audiences were treated to a broadcast with the unlikely name of ''Soap, Sausages and Soldiers' Boots.''

The program was a debate over whether the country really needs 5.2 million soldiers, and at one point, a worker from the city of Vladimir gave a compelling argument for a smaller military. The worker said he had travelled three hours to Moscow to buy basic consumer goods. Surely, he said, the Soviet Union could cut its armies and use the savings to put such things on his neighborhood shelves.

The program underscored the urgency of Mr. Gorbachev's economic problems, but the military cuts he announced at the United Nations on Dec. 7 are not going to produce the kind of boost in the Soviet economy that the worker from Vladimir wanted.

The plan to cut 500,000 troops could inject new labor and perhaps a little money into the civilian economy. It is not possible to say exactly how much would be saved, since Western knowledge of the Soviet military budget is limited, the complex relationship between the civilian and military economies is hard to change and Mr. Gorbachev's cuts will be spread over two years.

Some American experts on the Soviet economy and military, such as Abram Bergsen of Harvard University, believe the cuts ''could make a significant contribution to Gorbachev's efforts to revitalize the economy.'' But most assessments suggest the benefits will be minor unless the cuts are followed by a more significant change in Soviet military spending.

''Most economists are skeptical about how much a small cut in defense spending would boost the Soviet economy, unless you are freeing a lot of skilled people, slowing the output of tanks and aircraft and converting military plants to civilian use,'' said Jan Vanous of PlanEcon, a research concern specializing in the East Bloc. Returning Soldiers

One benefit from the reductions will be the return of 500,000 young men to an economy suffering from labor shortages. Using Soviet Government statistics, the soldiers represent about four-tenths of a percent of the 118-million-strong Soviet labor force.

''When the labor force is growing at only about a half-percent a year, that is nothing to be sneezed at,'' said Mr. Bergsen.

But there are several caveats. If the 500,000 soldiers are typical, they will be mostly conscripts between 18 and 20 years old, with only secondary education and limited military training.

Murray Feshback of Georgetown University, who has written widely on Soviet demography, said nearly 40 percent of Soviet soldiers are from the Caucasian and Central Asian Republics. If those discharged recruits are simply sent home, he said, they will return to areas already suffering from unemployment.

Richard E. Ericson of the W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union at Columbia University noted that much of the troop cuts will come from inside the Soviet Union, where soldiers are already used to construct buildings and roads.

In his speech, Mr. Gorbachev promised to withdraw and disband six tank divisions from East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. He said 10,000 tanks would be removed from Eastern Europe and the European part of the Soviet Union, along with artillery and other units.

The biggest savings here, military specialists said, would be in operating and maintenance costs. It is impossible to say how much is involved, but using American intelligence estimates and simple arithmetic, the savings would come to only a minuscule portion of the Soviet Gross National Product. It is also impossible to predict whether the entire amount would, or even could, be diverted from military to civilian uses.

Mr. Gorbachev said nothing about reducing the major military expenses - research, development and production. Much money could be saved if the Soviet Union cut production of tanks and aircraft. Military plants could be turned over to critically needed civilian purposes, like making bulldozers or new civilian aircraft.

Although Mr. Gorbachev promised to remove tanks from Europe, he did not say whether he would withdraw the newest ones or simply scrap older tanks and continue to modernize the remaining divisions.

Even if the potential economic effects of what Mr. Gorbachev has promised to do are small, the international political benefits could be considerable.

''The economic impact of the cuts is relatively minor,'' said Abraham S. Becker, director of Soviet research for the Rand Corporation. ''But if this in fact indicates Gorbachev's real interest in substantial cuts by mutual agreement and what he is showing is that he is willing to pay the price, then the political impact is profound.''

Photo of Warsaw Pact troops on maneuvers (Sygma/Interpress)