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Re: geopolitical weekly

Released on 2012-10-12 10:00 GMT

Email-ID 1586642
Date 2011-10-24 02:03:06
Link: themeData

Looks good. A few comments in red below.

Libya and Iraq: The Price of Success

This was a week in which announcements about the ends of wars was the
major theme. More precisely, in a week when the European crisis continued
building, it (specify `it' since it is unclear if what you are referring
to is the European crisis or the announcement about the end of wars) was
what the White House publicly focused on. The Libyan conflicted was said
to have ended with the death of Muammar Gadhafi and excitement about a new
democratic Libya abounded. In Iraq, the White House turned the refusal of
the Iraqi government to permit U.S. troops to remain, as a deliberate
decision by Washington rather than a rebuff. In both cases there was an
identical sense of "mission accomplished." In neither case was the matter
nearly as clear cut as that. Indeed, in the case of one of them, the
withdrawal raises enormous strategic complexities rather than closure. In
the case of the other, Libya, the complexities are real, but hardly
strategic. Still the two events share certain characteristics and are

Let us begin with the lesser event (Why are we calling Gadhafi's death the
lesser event? And lesser event from whose point of view? or is it just the
lesser event relevant to the withdrawal from Iraq?), the death of Muammar
Gadhafi. After seven months of NATO intervention, Gadhafi was killed.
When we consider that the intervention involved far more than air strikes,
but included special forces on the ground targeting for air strikes,
training Libyan troops, managing logistics, overseeing communications, and
both planning and frankly at times organizing and leading the Libyan
insurgents in battle, one would think that NATO-or the major contributors
of Britain, France and the United States-would be able to achieve this
goal (when you say `this' goal are you referring specifically to Gadhafi's
death or the other aspects of the NATO intervention that you listed in the
previous sentence?). What was interesting was not that he was killed, but
that it took so long to do it. Perhaps this was a strategy designed to
prolong the war in order to minimize casualties. It is not clear that
this strategy succeeded. It might simply have been that the insurgents
were so divided, poorly trained and incompetent that even with massive
NATO intervention, it took seven months to achieve this goal. But the
real question is precisely what goal NATO thinks it has accomplished with
Gadhafi's death, as satisfying as that might be.

The NTC, the umbrella organization crafted to contain the insurgents, is
constitutional democracy. Libya has been government by Gadhafi and his
supporters for forty two years. The only people in the NTC who have any
experience with government gained that experience as ministers and lesser
officials in Gadhafi's government. Some may have switched sides out of
principle, but I suspect that most saw the handwriting on the wall phrase
choice? Not really sure what it means or the point you are making and
defected to save themselves. In any case, while many of these ex-ministers
have been presented by the media as opponents of Gadhafi, no one served
him who was not complicit in his crimes and who didn't not learn their
principles of governance from him.

The problem is that these are the least likely to bring reform to Libya
but the most likely to constitute the core of a new state. They are the
only ones who know what it means to govern. Arrayed around them are a
vast complexity of tribes living in varying degrees of tension and
hostility with each other, and radical Islamists, the number and
capability of which are unknown, but whose access to weapons can be
assumed. And it can also be assumed that many of those weapons, of various
types of lethality, will be on the black market of the region in short
order, if not there already.

Add to this Gadhafi's supporters. Gadhafi did not rule for 42 years
without substantial support. The fighting in the past months gave an
indication of the degree of support and its tenacity. The defense of
Sirte could well be describe as fanatical. Gadhafi is dead, but not all
of his supporters. As with the conquest of Baghdad in 2003, what was
unanticipated but should have been was that a variety of groups would
resist the new leaders and wage guerrilla war.

The lesson of Baghdad was that unless overwhelming force was bought to
bear crushing all opposition before and after the conquest, opponents of
occupations by foreigners, as well as those with bones to pick with
others, are quite capable of creating chaos. When we look at the list of
members of the NTC and try to imagine who they cooperate with each other,
and when we consider the number of Gadhafi supporters who are now
desperadoes WC? with little to lose, the path to stable constitutional
democracy runs either through NATO occupation (unofficial of course) or
through a period of intense chaos. The likely path of a degree of NATO
presence sufficient to enrage the Libyan but insufficient to intimidate

Libya is not a strategic country. It is neither large nor geographically
tendency toward stability, or actually increases ? increases what?. When
we look back on Iraq, another country with oil, oil simply became another
contentious issue in a galaxy of contentious issues.

At the start of the Libya section you asked the question: But the real
question is precisely what goal NATO thinks it has accomplished with
Gadhafi's death, as satisfying as that might be. It initially seemed like
this was the question that would be addressed in the following sections.
However, that's not the impression I got in the paras that followed.

In Libya I have a sense of Baghdad in April 2003. The President's
announcement of complete U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, gives us a sense of
what lies at the end of the tunnel of counter-insurgency. To begin with
it must be understood that total withdrawal was not what Obama wanted.
keeps some troops in the Kurdish region. Leon Panetta, as Secretary of
Defense, went to Iraq wanting an agreement to leave a substantial number
of troops in Iraq past the New Year.

There were those in Iraq who were attracted by the idea, but in the end it
failed. It failed because the decision making structure of the Iraqi
government, that emerged from U.S. occupation and the war, is so
fragmented that it has not been able to craft a law on hydrocarbons Phrase
choice? not sure what the expression means or the exact emphasis of the
point you are making critical to the future of Iraq, and was in no
position to reach consensus or even a coherent majority over the question
of continued presence of foreign troops. It was not that there weren't
many who didn't want the United States there, particularly those concerned
about their fate once the U.S. leaves, among the Kurds and Sunnis. The
troops. It was that the Iraqi government was in the end too incoherent to
reach any decision.

There is a huge strategic dimension to this. The Iranians have been
developing their influence in Iraq since before 2003. They have not
developed enough power to simply control Iraq. There are too many in Iraq,
even among the Shiites, that distrust Iranian power. Nevertheless they
have substantial influence, not enough to impose policies but enough to
block any policies they really oppose. The Iranians have a fundamental
national security interest in both a weak Iraq and the withdrawal of
American forces, and they had sufficient influence in Baghdad to make
certain American requests to be allowed to stay will be turned down.

consists of influence and relationships that are not visible, or not used
except in urgent matters. The U.S. has also developed a network of
relationships as have the Saudis, but the U.S. is not particularly good at
developing reliable supporters at the grass roots. The Iranians are
better both because they know the terrain better, and because the price
for double crossing the Iranians is much higher than the U.S. imposes.
This gives the Iranians a more stable platform from which to operate. As
for the Saudis, they have always had two principles. Maintain influence
without generating anti-Saudi feeling. The Saudis have wanted to have
their cake and eat it too. The Iranian position has been more
straightforward in a complex and devious way it isn't clear how the
Iranian position was straightforward and devious at the same time.

Let us consider what is at stake here. Iran has enough influence to shape
some Iraq policies. With U.S. withdrawal, U.S. allies will have to
accommodate themselves both to Iran and Iran's supporters in the
government simply because there is little other choice for them. Thus the
withdrawal does not create a stable balance of power. It creates a
dynamic in which Iranian influence increases if the Iranians want it
to-and they certainly want it to. Over time, the likelihood of Iraq
needing to accommodate Iranian strategic interests is most likely. The
possibility of an Iranian puppet cannot be ruled out.

Consider Syria. The Assad regime has not fallen. There is no NATO
attacking Syria and it is hard to imagine NATO intervening in a country
bordering Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon. The possibilities of
chaos across the region is too substantial to risk. Gaddafi was isolated
politically and geographically. Syria isn't. Over the past months the
opposition has completely failed in bringing down the Assad regime. Much
of the reports received about Syria originate from anti-Assad elements
outside of Syria, who draw a picture of the impending collapse of the
regime. This simply hasn't happened, in large part because Assad's
military is loyal and well organized and the opposition is poorly
organized and weak. It might have widespread support but sentiment does
intervened, the Syrians (by Syrians do you mean the regime or the
opposition?) do not appear to be close to collapse.

Syria was close to Iran before the rising. Iran has been the most
supportive of the Syrian regime. If Assad survives this crisis, his
willingness to collaborate with Iran will only intensify. In Lebanon,
Hezbollah, a group supported by the Iranians for decades, is a major
Iranian influence in Iraq, and Assad doesn't fall, then the balance of
power in the region completely shifts.

First, Iranian sphere of influence will run along Saudi Arabia's northern
border. Second, its sphere of influence will run along the length of
Turkey's southern border. Finally, Iranian influence will now directly
impact Israel's northern border. What the Saudis, Turks and Israelis will
do about this is unclear. How Iran would exploit its position is equally
unclear. Contrary to reputation, they are very cautious in their overt
military deployment through this region is unlikely for logistical reasons
reality of increasingly effective political influence regardless of
military movement is strategically significant. The fall of Assad would
create a firebreak for Iranian influence, but would possibly lead to a
Sunni Islamist regime.

The point here is, of course, that the decision to withdraw from Iraq and
the inability to persuade the Iraqi government to let U.S. forces remains,
has the potential for changing the balance of power in the region. Rather
that followed the fall of Saddam had many dimension, but its most
strategically important was the duel between the United States and Iran.
The Administration hopes that it can maintain American influence in Iraq
presence of troops was always constrained, this is a comforting by
doubtful theory for Washington to consume.

The Libyan crisis is not in such a high stakes region, but the lesson of
that will cause chaos. If NATO gives aid, someone will have to protect the
aid workers. If NATO sends troops, they will be attacked by someone and
in the manner in which the U.S. left. That is being repeated in Libya,
although with smaller stakes.

In the meantime, the influence of Iran will grow in Iraq and now the
question is Syria. Another NATO war in Syria would have unpredictable
consequences. The survival of Assad would create an unprecedented Iranian
sphere of influence. The fall of Assad would open the door to regimes
that would trigger and Israeli intervention.

World War II was nice. It offered a clean end. Unless of course you
consider that the clean end of World War II was rapidly followed by the
Cold War and the terror of nuclear war. Wars rarely end cleanly but
either fester or set the stage for the next war. We can see that clearly
in Iraq. The universal congratulations on the death of Muamar Gadhafi is
as ominous as all victory celebrations. It ignores the crucial questions:
now what?

On Sunday, 10/23/11 4:30 PM, George Friedman wrote:


George Friedman

Founder and CEO


221 West 6th Street

Suite 400

Austin, Texas 78701

Phone: 512-744-4319

Fax: 512-744-4334

Hoor Jangda
Tactical Analyst
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