01904cam a22002417 4500001000600000003000500006005001700011008004100028100001900069245010100088260006600189490004100255500001700296520086400313530006101177538007201238538003601310690013501346710004201481830007601523856003701599856002601636w3821NBER20140713215934.0140713s1991 mau||||fs|||| 000 0 eng d1 aCurrie, Janet.10aRules, Coordination and Manipulability Among Arbitratorsh[electronic resource] /cJanet Currie. aCambridge, Mass.bNational Bureau of Economic Researchc1991.1 aNBER working paper seriesvno. w3821 aAugust 1991.3 aThis paper provides evidence that the variance of arbitrated wage settlements is systematically lower than the variance of wage settlements negotiated without arbitration using a panel of contracts between teachers and school boards in the Canadian province of British Columbia. This finding is interpreted as evidence that arbitrators coordinate their decisions. However, coordination on a rule leaves arbitrators as a group vulnerable to manipulation by coalitions of employers or employees that understand the rule. Because successful manipulation of arbitrators undermines the credibility of the institution, arbitrators as a group have incentives to change their rules from time to time. Evidence is presented that in BC, school boards were more successful than teachers at manipulating arbitrators, and that arbitrators responded by changing their rule. aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. aMode of access: World Wide Web. 7aJ52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation • Collective Bargaining2Journal of Economic Literature class.2 aNational Bureau of Economic Research. 0aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)vno. w3821.4 uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w3821 uurn:doi:10.3386/w3821