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This article is about the general concept. For other uses, see Belief (disambiguation).


Venn diagram of Belief, Knowledge, and Truth

Knowledge and Epistemology[edit]

The terms belief and knowledge are used differently in philosophy.



As a psychological phenomenon[edit]










Belief-that, delusion[edit]

As exemplified in the defining sentence on Belief (disambiguation), insofar as the truth of belief is expressed in sentential and propositional form we we are using the sense of belief-that rather than belief-in. Delusion arises when the truth value of the form is clearly nil.






  • We tend to internalise the beliefs of the people around us during childhood. Albert Einstein is often quoted as having said that "Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen." Political beliefs depend most strongly on the political beliefs most common in the community where we live.[9] Most individuals believe the religion they were taught in childhood.[10]
  • Physical trauma, especially to the head, can radically alter a person's beliefs.[13]


Justified True[edit]


  1. P is true
  2. S believes that P is true, and
  3. S is justified in believing that P is true

This theory of knowledge suffered a significant setback with the discovery of Gettier problems, situations in which the above conditions were seemingly met but that many philosophers disagree that anything is known.[16] Robert Nozick suggested a clarification of "justification" which he believed eliminates the problem: the justification has to be such that were the justification false, the knowledge would be false.


There are several techniques to change personal or group beliefs, or raise consciousness.[17][18]



















Occurent and Dispositional[edit]

In the philosophy of empiricism, the term dispositional belief refers to a belief that is not currently being considered by the mind, but is stored in memory and is recalled to conclude in occurrent belief. The term occurrent belief refers to a belief that is currently being considered. It can be contrasted with the concept of dispositional belief.

In the philosophy of rationalism, the term dispositional belief is holding something in one’s attention that may or may not be true, and keeping it there, putting it up for comparison’s sake with all else that is in one’s sphere of attention, to see how it holds up (in German, vorstellen). For a belief to gain strength, and footing, and gradually to approach closer to certainty, it must be consistent and harmonious with whatever else is held in one’s attention. And so there are levels of belief, for a belief starts as an imagination, a conceptualization, an idea. The belief firms up when it becomes an inspiration, you breath it in with enthusiasm, it harmonizes not only with your thoughts, but with your feelings. Of course, for the most part, feelings are dreamily semi-conscious, so to raise a belief to an inspiration, one has to become conscious of one’s feelings, one must be able to attend to one’s feelings, one must be able to hold one’s feelings at the center of attention in a fully conscious way. A person must know his feelings, which is harder than knowing one’s thoughts, as feelings are normally colored by one’s social setting, by, so to speak, one’s prejudices. And finally, belief may reach the level of intuition when it is fully in accord and harmonizes with the entirety of the world of being a human being, which is all that we can know, but for this to happen, it must harmonize, be in accord with one’s willing nature, which is, for the most part, fully unconscious. Willpower, one’s willed directives, intentions, motivations must become fully conscious in order for a belief to become an intuition. Since becoming fully conscious, particularly of the will, is a matter for the distant future, beliefs, by nature, always retain the quality of being less than fully clear. This is why beliefs always have the quality of coloring one’s disposition, mood, demeanor, and are never fully occurrent. And this is in contrast to other pneumatological activity, that is, technique, science, poetry, and recognition.


An analogy can be drawn between these two types of belief by using the example of a computer hardware: What is on its hard disk might be like the dispositional belief, and what is on its screen might be like the occurrent belief. This analogy, however, does not complete the idea of dispositional belief. An analogy can also be drawn between these two types of belief by using the example of a simple mathematics: You believe the system of numbers, you know the definition of the numbers 2, 3 and 5, and even though you never have heard or seen it before you will understand that the combined value of the numbers 2 and 3 will equal the value of the number 5. Then you have used your occurrent belief of a system of numbers to get dispositional belief to occur to you. (That 2+3=5 is now occurrent belief).

Dispositional beliefs can be formed without ever having been an occurrent belief—for example, if a vehicle passes by whilst a person is engaged in conversation, it may become a dispositional belief that "a vehicle passed by" immediately, as the matter was never consciously considered. To extend the computer analogy, this could be seen as being like downloading files directly to the hard disk without opening them.

See also[edit]


  1. ^ Schwitzgebel, Eric (2006), "Belief", in Zalta, Edward, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab, retrieved 2008-09-19 
  2. ^ Gettier, E. L. (1963). "Is justified true belief knowledge?". Analysis 23 (6): 121–123. JSTOR 3326922. 
  3. ^ Goldman, A. I. (1967). "A causal theory of knowing". The Journal of Philosophy 64 (12): 357–372. JSTOR 2024268. 
  4. ^ Bell, V.; Halligan, P. W.; Ellis, H. D. (2006). "A Cognitive Neuroscience of Belief". In Halligan, Peter W.; Aylward, Mansel. The Power of Belief: Psychological Influence on Illness, Disability, and Medicine. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-853010-2. 
  5. ^ Baker, Lynne Rudder (1989). Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-07320-1. 
  6. ^ MacIntosh, J. J. (1994). "Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams". Religious Studies 30 (4): 487–503. doi:10.1017/S0034412500023131. 
  7. ^ Macintosh, Jack. "Belief-in". The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. p. 86. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. 
  10. ^ Argyle, Michael (1997). The Psychology of Religious Behaviour, Belief and Experience. London: Routledge. p. 25. ISBN 0-415-12330-5. "Religion, in most cultures, is ascribed, not chosen." 
  11. ^ Hoffer, Eric (2002). The True Believer. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics. ISBN 0-06-050591-5. 
  12. ^ Kilbourne, Jane; Pipher, Mary (2000). Can't Buy My Love: How Advertising Changes the Way We Think and Feel. Free Press. ISBN 0-684-86600-5. 
  13. ^ Rothschild, Babette (2000). The Body Remembers: The Psychophysiology of Trauma and Trauma Treatment. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-70327-4. 
  14. ^ Rowley, Anna (2007). Leadership Therapy: Inside the Mind of Microsoft. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 69. ISBN 1-4039-8403-4. 
  15. ^ Fine, G., "Introduction" in Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 5.
  16. ^ Chisholm, Roderick (1982). "Knowledge as Justified True Belief". The Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 0-8166-1103-3. 
  17. ^
  18. ^
  19. ^ a b c d e f g h "Jonathan Glover on systems of belief", Philosophy Bites Podcast, Oct 9 2011
  20. ^ New Scientist (magazine), 11 June 2011 [1]
  21. ^ 'Philosophy, Beliefs, and Conflict' ,

Further reading[edit]

External links[edit]

Category:Concepts Category:Concepts in epistemology Category:Critical thinking Category:Justification Category:Mental processes Category:Social philosophy Category:Social psychology Category:Socioeconomics Category:Sociological terminology Category:Sources of knowledge Category:Truth