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More Questions over Alleged Iranian Plot

Released on 2012-10-16 17:00 GMT

Email-ID 3325176
Date 2011-10-14 14:53:50
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More Questions over Alleged Iranian Plot

October 14, 2011 | 1206 GMT
More Questions over Alleged Iranian Plot
Getty Images
Manssor Arbabsiar in a 2001 mug shot

The alleged Iranian plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United
States has been dismissed by most commentators as too far-fetched to be
true. Indeed, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force, which
the U.S. government is accusing of coordinating the plot, generally
stays in the Middle East and South Asia and prefers to work with proxy
militant groups, rather than handling assassinations far abroad.
says much about the Iranian intelligence services' scope, ambitions and


The alleged Iranian plot to kill Saudi Ambassador to the United States
Adel al-Jubeir on U.S. soil has been dismissed by most commentators as
being too far-fetched to be true. Indeed, the plan the U.S. government
is accusing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of coordinating
is well outside the organization's traditional sphere.

says much about the Iranian intelligence services' scope, ambitions and

The IRGC and its elite Quds Force generally have not been responsible
for covert operations that do not involve proxy groups or that are far
abroad. They mostly stay in the Middle East and South Asia (with a
notable appearance in Venezuela in 2010), working to establish ties with
insurgent groups they can use as proxies in volatile areas such as
Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Jaish-al-Mahdi brigades in Iraq and parts of
the Afghan Taliban. Traditionally, the IRGC brings members of these
groups to Iran for training. The Quds Force is thought of as a corollary
to special operations forces that train foreign militaries and carry out
clandestine military operations. Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and
Security (MOIS), on the other hand, is generally responsible for
operations in Europe and the United States, including a series of
assassinations carried out in the 1980s. MOIS is a known operator in the
United States and would likely have the resources and experience to
carry out a clandestine operation there.

This was not the case in the recent incident. Manssor Arbabsiar, the man
Enforcement Administration (DEA) who was posing as a member of a Mexican
passports who has no apparent connection to the IRGC other than,
officer would be the one to contact a potential proxy group for
development, not a new recruit.

United States would likely have serious consequences for Iran - perhaps
even in the form of a U.S. military response.

substantial evidence. U.S. President Barack Obama reaffirmed confidence
in the evidence against Iran when speaking Oct. 13. In any criminal
prosecution in espionage matters, information is often left out for fear
of exposing sources and methods. It is possible - though not verifiable
- that this is the case in the recent alleged plot.

The indictment against Arbabsiar focuses on his confession and the DEA
source's activities, but it contains clues about other intelligence the
United States could have. The Obama administration reportedly was
informed about the plot as far back as June, meaning it had time to
assess and confirm its existence. The indictment also never mentions how
exactly the informant came in contact with Arbabsiar. If the plot was
real, U.S. intelligence officials likely caught onto it by other means
than through the informant.

The IRGC's ties to the plot could be confirmed with one of the following
collected with signals intelligence:

* If Arbabsiar's cousin is confirmed as being a member of the Quds
* If phone numbers Arbabsiar called after his arrest were connected to
the Quds Force
* If the $100,000 Arbabsiar used as a down payment for the attack came
from a Quds Force-linked bank
* If other Iranian officers traveled to Mexico to meet the informant
* If the Iranian Embassy in Mexico knew about the operation

calls were traced back to previously identified IRGC offices in Iran.

reveals a few things about Iranian operations. First, it would appear
that the IRGC is trying to operate in new territory - though showing a
lack of experience operating in the United States and limited capability
in such plots. STRATFOR sources also have suggested that a new
organization within Iran's intelligence and security services may have
been responsible for the plot, which would explain the several mistakes
that led to its exposure.

One possible connection here would be to two alleged Iranian plots to
assassinate dissidents in Los Angeles and London, exposed in the trial
of Mohammad Reza Sadeghnia in California and U.S. diplomatic cables
released by Wikileaks. Sadeghnia allegedly carried out preoperational
surveillance on Jamshid Sharmahd, who made radio broadcasts for the
Iranian opposition group Tondar while in Glendora, Calif., and Ali Reza
Nourizadeh, who worked for Voice of America in London. Sadeghnia's
activities became obvious to his targets, and the fact that he monitored
both of them and then returned to Tehran while on bail supports the
claims against him. Sadeghnia's profile of an unemployed housepainter
from Iran who lived in the United States for many years is very similar
to that of Arbabsiar, a used car salesman. Sadeghnia's purported plan to
use a third man as a hit man and for the man to employ a used van
purchased by Sadeghnia to murder Sharmahd points to a similar lack of
sophisticated assassination methodology.

While many people believe it possible that U.S. investigators were led
on a wild goose chase that they have not yet realized, the
investigators' confidence and the possibility for other supporting
evidence is notable. It is also quite possible the capabilities of
Iran's intelligence services are not nearly as good as previously
thought, or at least that some more clumsy organization is involved.

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