Who Really Needs the Olympics

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					             Who Really Needs the Olympics?

   A Look at the Costs and Benefits of Hosting the

  Summer Olympic Games for Developing Nations


                        Alicia Wnorowski

           An honors thesis submitted in partial fulfillment

                  of the requirements for the degree of

                          Bachelor of Science

                        Undergraduate College

                  Leonard N. Stern School of Business

                          New York University

                               May 2011

Professor Marti G. Subrahmanyam         Professor Nicholas Economides

Faculty Adviser                         Thesis Advisor
Table of Contents

China‟s hosting of the 2008 Games and Brazil‟s recent successful bid for the 2016 Games has
put the spotlight on developing nations‟ desires, and capability, to host the Summer Games. For
countries seeking global identities, these large international sporting events can be golden
opportunities, and they often become key factors in both local and national development
strategies. I focused on the following questions: (i) Do developing countries benefit as much
from hosting the Olympics as local residents are led to believe? and (ii) is the return on this
lofty investment enough to warrant the years and cost of preparation? My hypothesis that is
that hosting the Olympics in itself does not produce economic benefits that are higher than the
costs. Instead, I found that hosting the Olympic Games has the potential to create significant
benefits, although these benefits are not the ones that are touted when convincing the public to
support a bid. This paper will examine the methodology, findings and critiques of assessment
measures, explore the major arguments for hosting, look at prior Olympics Games and lay out
additional concerns that developing nations must address before bidding for the Olympics.

Studies conducted to assess the impact on employment, tourism, and growth have been
inconclusive at best. Yet federal governments are so eager to heavily subsidize the Olympics.
Since a successful bid requires strong public support, governments continue to promote these
benefits, despite little empirical evidence that they materialize. For developing nations
specifically, the long-term benefits from trade liberalization could potentially outweigh the short-
term costs of hosting the Olympics. Therefore linking the two may be a wiser strategy than
touting those benefits that opponents and economists attack with vigor.




Hosting the Summer Olympic Games is perhaps the largest advertising opportunity that a

country can have, and the Games are increasingly used as an extensive public relations campaign

for the host city and country. Mega sporting events have become highly sought after

commodities. Although the hosting of the Games has been confined largely to Europe, North

America, and Australia, developing nations are increasingly seeking to host major sporting

events in order to promote their countries on a global scale. The International Olympic

Committee (IOC) is making continued strides to make the Games more internationalized.

       Prior to the 2008 Games in Beijing, all of the 25 modern Olympics, with the exception of

the 1968 Mexico City Games and the 1988 Games in Seoul, were held in developed countries.

The relatively recent economic progress of developing countries has prompted many bids to host

Olympic Games. Qatar, Turkey, Peru, Morocco, and South Africa have all expressed an interest

in hosting the 2020 Olympics. For countries seeking global identities, these large international

sporting events can be golden opportunities, and they often become key factors in both local and

national development strategies.

       For Brazil, the recent successful bid for the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro represents

many of the same things that the 2008 Olympics did for China: Brazil seeks to show the world

how far the country has come. Beijing offered developing nations a template for showcasing

remarkable economic growth, both internationally and domestically. I focused on the following

questions: (i) Do developing countries benefit as much from hosting the Olympics as local

residents are led to believe? and (ii) is the return on this lofty investment enough to

warrant the years and cost of preparation?

       Proponents argue that the Olympics brought hosts onto the international stage and

accelerated their development. My hypothesis was that hosting the Olympics in itself does not

produce economic benefits that are higher than the costs. Instead, I found that hosting the Olympic

Games has the potential to create significant economic benefits, although these benefits are not the

ones that are touted when convincing the public to support a bid.

       The first portion of this paper will provide a framework of Olympics and the bidding

process. The subsequent section will examine the methodology, findings and criticisms of the

various studies conducted to assess the impact of the Games. The next section will examine

notable Olympic games and their respective relevance to developing nations. The following

section will highlight additional concerns for developing nations. The final portion will offer

conclusions and policy implications for developing nations considering bidding for the Games.

Summer Olympics

       The Summer Olympics are a major international multi-sport event held every four years.

The Games host over 11,000 athletes representing over 200 nations. While the actual event lasts

for two weeks, preparations for the Games begin nearly a decade beforehand.

       This paper examines the costs and benefits specifically for Summer Olympics for several

reasons. Foremost, the hosting of the Winter Olympics is restricted to countries with amenable

geographies for cold weather sports. As a result, the Winter Olympics are typically held in

second tier cities. Additionally, the smaller scale of the Winter Games limits the potential impact

on the host country. The Winter Games host roughly one quarter of the athletes and events of the

Summer Gamesi. Finally, there exists greater availability of data for Summer Games.

Defining Developing Nations

The term developing nation is generally used to describe a country with a low level of material

well-being. There is no single universal definition for a developing nation. The United Nations

developed the Human Development Index (HDI) to gauge the development of a country by

measuring life expectancy, education and per-capita Gross National Income. Likewise, the IMF

uses a classification system based on a country‟s per capital income level, export diversification

and degree of integration into the global financial system. The World Bank classifies all low- and

middle- income countries as developing, which includes those with Gross National Income

(GNI) per capita less than US$995 and those with GNI per capital between US$996 and $12,195,

respectively.ii Levels of development vary between developing nations, but for the purpose of

this paper the term used to describe countries that identify as “developing” rather than

“developed” nations.

       Convincing the IOC that a city is a good candidate host requires preening, a good deal of

boasting and a lot of promises. In the past, richer nations tended to make better bids and

promises. Brazil and China‟s successful bids offer encouragement for other developing nations,

but a minimum level of infrastructure needs to be in place before attempting to bid. Historically,

the games have been awarded to highly populated cities in developed nations.

       For larger nations, the economic impact of hosting the Games is primarily significant at

the local or regional level. But for smaller economies, the effects are likely to occur at the

national level. For this reason, this paper looks at the costs and benefits at a national perspective,

not from the perspective of the host city.

Bidding Process

       The bidding for the Games takes place in an increasingly complex international arena,

and is highly contested and sought after. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) is the

central decision maker in determining which bids are considered and ultimately selected. The

bidding process is usually an arduous task. It is necessary to devote significant amount of

resources in the initial stages, and putting together a bid in itself is expensive. The bid alone for

the London 2012 Games was estimated to cost £13 millioniii. For developing countries

especially, these costs have to be carefully assessed to determine whether it is possible to host

the Games.

       The formal bidding process to become a host city is carried out over two phases: 1) the

application stage and 2) the candidate stage. The official submission of a city‟s application is

done by the respective National Olympic Committee (NOC), which promotes a single city to the

IOC. During the first phase of the process, the applicant cities must answer a questionnaire that

allows the IOC to examine the cities‟ hosting capabilities as well as the strengths and weaknesses

in their proposals. The IOC Executive Board then selects the cities that are qualified to proceed

to the second phase.

       The accepted applicant cities are now referred to as “candidate cities” and are required to

provide a more detailed questionnaire addressing various event-related issues including overall

vision, marketing, security, accommodations, environmental conditions and transportation. Each

city must also secure financing for the Games. The IOC Evaluations Commission reviews the

submissions and conducts four-day inspection visits of each candidate city. The committee then

sends the IOC members a report one month before the IOC meets for the electing session.

       Voting for the host city takes place through a multi-round voting process. The election

session includes active IOC members, although members from countries with a candidate city

cannot vote while the city is still in the running. In each round, the bid with the fewest votes is

eliminated before the next round begins. A re-vote is conducted with the remaining bids until one

city wins at least 50 percent of the votes. After a majority has been reached, the winning bid

delegation signs the Host City Contract with the IOC. There is a long list of technical criteria that

are evaluated by the IOC voting committee, but there also seems to be an attempt to balance

geographic locations, and recognition of perseverance, as a number of cities have bid repeatedly.

       Since the 1990s, the IOC has shortlisted at least four candidate cities for each Olympics,

topping out with nine contenders for the 2012 Olympics.1 It seems that the IOC has to do little

convincing, but it does detail several reasons why a city would be interested in hosting the


       “The main reason for applying for candidacy lies in the possibilities for economic

       development and tourism inherent in such an event…Two main reasons seem to motivate

       most applicant cities, namely international recognition and increased opportunities for

       invigorated urban and regional development… Opportunity to give itself an enhanced

       image to attract future visitors, consumers and potential investors… Organizing the

       Olympic Games is a fantastic advertising opportunity for the host city.”iv

  For a list of candidate cities and hosts, see Appendix
  While there is great demand to host the Games today, there were relatively few countries
interested in hosting the Games in the 1980s. Los Angeles was awarded the 1984 Games by
default when it was the only eligible bidder.

Measuring the Economic Impact of the Olympics

The macroeconomic effects of hosting the Games received very little attention prior to the Los

Angeles Games in 1984, when the first EIA was conducted. Interest in the wider economic

effects developed after Montreal declared a large financial deficit from hosting the 1976 Games.

There is no way to measure the economic impact of the Olympics as a whole. Any study

conducted would be of an individual Game. It is important to note that the costs and benefits

from one Olympic Game cannot be assumed to hold for aspiring hosts. In other words, there is

no portability of specific numbers obtained in any study conducted to measure the effects.

Economic Impact Analysis (EIA)


       The most common studies conducted on the Olympics are ex ante Economic Impact

Studies and Official Reports that focus on financial analysis. These studies tend to consider the

costs and benefits from the view of the organizing committee. Ex ante studies are more prevalent

than ex post studies because they are meant to provide economic rationale for funding.

       Forecasting the impact of the Games requires constructing economic models that apply

standard macroeconomic theory through an expenditure approach. Calculating the overall impact

requires first estimating direct expenditures attributable to the Games, and then estimating

indirect expenditures by using a “multiplier” to account for the successive rounds of spending

that takes place as money is circulated throughout the economy.

        Because these studies are so sensitive to assumptions, they tend to generate a broad range

of estimated impacts. Veraros et al. (2004) found that for all Summer Olympics between the

1984 Los Angeles games and the 2004 Athens games, estimate economic impacts range from

(positive) $2.3 billion to $15.9 billion.


        EIA studies only evaluate the economic gains or losses from hosting. The methodology

used in prevalent literature has several flaws, which explains the higher calculated net benefits.

The main criticisms are outlined below:

       Mistaking Expenditure Costs as Benefits

        If $5 million were spent on the construction of a sports venue, an Economic Impact

        Analysis would assess the direct impact on the economy as $5 million. The argument is

        that purchasing material and hiring labor benefits the local economy. However these

        projects are transfers of funds and should not be counted as benefits. In this scenario,

        what is the difference between paying labor to build the stadium and giving each worker

        money to spend? Counting expenditure costs and benefits does not distinguish between

        these two scenarios. Applying multipliers to account for the secondary markets further

        exacerbates this issue.

       Exaggerating Multipliers

        Economic Impact studies often assume that an individual‟s spending becomes income for

        others, who in turn spend that money. However these studies often do not take into

        account the leakages to foreign participants, taxation, savings, and imports. (Baade 2004,

        p.12) As a result, the multiplier is exaggerated.

       Neglecting Opportunity Costs, Especially the Opportunity Cost of Capital

        Public investment in sports projects is certainly justifiable if the net benefits are greater

        than the opportunity cost of alternative uses. Proper assessment of a project would require

        considering the benefit if the money were spent on other useful projects.

       Investigator Bias

        Often, economic impact studies are commissioned in order to support the Olympic bid.

        Higher projected benefits are used to “sell” the Games to policy makers and the public.

Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)

        Economic impact analyses tend to be overly optimistic about the financial impact of

hosting the Games. Cost-Benefit Analysis, on the other hand, takes a more critical approach at

valuing the Games. A CBA attempts to identify the most profitable options of a project by

weighing the total expected costs against the total expected benefits.


        The Olympic Games are an integrated combination of multiple projects. Conducting a

CBA requires defining the scope of the “Olympic project” and identifying project dependency to

properly attribute costs and benefits. All benefits and costs are monetized and expressed in terms

of the their present value, to adjust for the fact that the flows of benefits and costs of the project

occur at different times. Unlike an EIA, a CBA attempts to monetize all non-economic benefits

that have a social value but do not directly affect the flow of money in the economy. This can

include factors such as quality of life improvements, increases in traffic congestion, or increased

national pride.

       The costs and benefits can be categorized into “event specific” and “infrastructure

related.” This is important in order to evaluate the Games because the benefits of infrastructure

projects could be realized without actually hosting the Games. On the other hand, the event

specific benefits would not be realized without hosting. Infrastructure projects undertaken for the

Games include transportation, housing (known as the “Olympic Village”) and facility

construction. Examples of event specific benefits include increased tourism and ticket sales. The

intangibles benefits, often dubbed the “Olympic Halo,” are harder to quantify and require

making judgment calls to assess their value.

       McHugh (2006) conducted a Cost Benefit analysis for the 2010 Winter Olympics in

Vancouver, in which he found the expected overall net benefit to be substantially negative.v

While the results of his analysis cannot be applied as a blanket conclusion, he found that even the

most generous measure of net benefit (event benefits minus event costs) produced a negative

benefit of -$101 million.3


       As with any valuation, CBA is more of an art than a science. The accuracy of CBA

depends on how accurately the inputs have been estimated, and as a result varying the

assumptions can yield drastic differences in value. A large driver of the value is the discount rate

that is used to determine the present value of future costs and benefits. Developing nations face

high opportunity costs when deciding which projects to undertake, but a high discount rate will

reduce the significance of future benefits.

 Calculated in 2002 Canadian Dollars. For full analysis, refer to “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of an
Olympic Game” by Darren McHugh, 2006.

Exploring the Benefits for Developing Nations

Growing Desires to Host

       After China‟s successful hosting and Brazil‟s bid victory, the spotlight is on developing

nations‟ capabilities and desires to host the Games. However many developing nation have been

unsuccessfully trying to bid for the Olympics for years. Cape Town, South Africa, made its first

bid for the 2004 Summer Olympics. Five developing countries bid for the 2008 Games (China,

Thailand, Egypt, Cuba, Malaysia.) This record number reflected the increasing utilization of the

Games in urban and national strategies.

       Before Rio de Janeiro‟s bid for the 2016 Olympic Games was selected amongst the other

shortlisted cities (Chicago, Madrid and Tokyo,) Brazil‟s President Luiz Inacio Da Silva stated his

belief that "the Olympic Games are not only a privilege for rich” There were several

factors that made the bid appeal to the IOC committee. Brazil marketed the Games as the “South

American” Games. The Rio bid team stressed that, unlike the other bid nations, South America

had never hosted an Olympics game. Also influential was the fact that Rio‟s financial funding

was guaranteed by the government. Financial issues came under intense scrutiny during the bid

campaign. Rio‟s highly ambitious plan came with a $14 billion price tag, slightly less than the

combined budgets of the other three bid cities. Strong federal backing for developing countries is

vital; Rio de Janeiro had full political backing and strong popular support. Lastly, Rio‟s

successful hosting of the Pan-American Games in 2007 left little concern for the city‟s

capabilities in hosting such a mega-event.

The Debated Economics of the Olympics

       Despite the growing amount of literature showing that financial benefits are greatly

outweighed by the costs, politicians and the public are generally enthusiastic about hosting the

Games. Host cities have to commit to significant investments in infrastructure and sports venues,

yet it is commonly assumed and reported that the scale of these events will create lasting

economic benefits for the host city. There are several arguments that are repeatedly cited when

convincing the public to support a bid. The major arguments are outlined below:

      The Olympics Generate Job Creation

       Because the Games require heavy investment in hotels and stadiums, this creates jobs for

       the local economy up to 4 years prior to the actual event.

      The Olympics Attract an Influx of Foreign Visitors

       The Olympics attracts thousands of people for the duration of the Games, whose

       spending brings a boost to the local economy. While the event only lasts for a few weeks,

       host countries hope that the Olympics promote the city as a future tourist destination (for

       example, the case with Barcelona, which saw higher visitor numbers continue after

       hosting the Olympics.)

      The Olympics Encourage Investment in Infrastructure

       The Games require upgrades to transport and communication links, which reduce

       congestion and help improve efficiency. This investment leaves a lasting legacy for the

       host city.

      The Olympics Promote Higher Economic Growth

       Due to higher investment and foreign visitors, the “Olympic Effect” leads to a boost in

       economic growth, as well as higher tax revenues for the government.

       Independent researchers armed with hindsight have unanimously found that projections

of economic impact exaggerate the true impact by a wide margin. Many host cities have little to

show for their efforts. Studies conducted after the Games have consistently failed to find

evidence of economic benefits related to sports facilities.4 The effects on employment, tourism,

infrastructure, and trade are not as impactful as the public is often led to believe.


       A popular argument is that the Olympics lead to substantial job creation, particularly in

the construction and tourism industries. In the years leading up to the 1992 Games, Barcelona‟s

unemployment rate fell from 18.4% to 9.6%, while the national figures for Spain were 20.9 and

15.5% respectively.vii The extent of employment gains depends on the characteristics of the host

economy. If the labor market is at or very close to full employment, then the labor that is utilized

may come from different regions. If wages are earned by temporary workers who return home

after the construction of the venues, as is the case in preparations for the 2012 London Games,

then there is an increased chance that the earnings will not stay within the city and benefit the

local economy. However this is less of an issue for developing nations, which are likely have a

surplus of labor resources.

       The long-term gains in employment are inconclusive. Econometric studies conducted by

Hotchkiss et al. (2003) found a 17 percent increase in employment in the counties where an

  Baade (1994) found that subsidizing sports facilities typically does not affect growth, and may
even hurt growth since funds are being diverted from alternative uses. Of the 30 metro areas he
examined over where a stadium was built or refurbished, only three areas showed a significant
relationship between real per-capita personal income growth and the presence of a stadium. The
relationship was negative in all three cases. See Baade (1994) "Stadiums, Professional Sports,
and Economic Development: Assessing the Reality,"

Olympic venue were located in the four years following the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta. However

Baade and Matheson (2002) found insignificant long-term impact of the 1984 Los Angeles

Games and the 1996 Atlanta Games after controlling for population, income, and taxes. viii


        The Olympics attracts thousands of visitors during the duration of the Games, the

majority of which are foreign. The argument is that their increased spending brings a boost to the

local economy. Most studies conducted to assess the impact on tourism have found initial

estimates to be greatly exaggerated. The European Tour Operators Association (ETOA) found

that hosting the Games might actually have a negative impact on tourism to the host city. ix

The last six Games (Bejing, Athens, Sydney, Atlanta, Barcelona and Seoul) experiences

disruptions to their normal tourism market. Travel to Olympic cities has tended to stall over the

last twenty years, while the overall tourism market saw increases. The study found that growth

in tourism dropped significantly immediately after hosting the Olympics.

        The net impact to tourism is of greater concern, as some of the tourists would have

visited the city despite the Games. There also exists a crowding out effect in the tourism

industry. During the 2000 Sydney Games, hotel occupancy peaked at near 100 percent

occupancies but other cities in Australia experienced significant declines in occupancy.x The

increase in visitors to the host city is usually at the expense of other cities in the host country.


Hosting the Games typically requires upgrades to transportation systems, and proponents link

infrastructure improvements with economic growth. Hoﬀmann (2003) found that infrastructure

investment has a positive impact on international capital ﬂows. Fernandez and Montuenga-

Gomez (2003) found that investment in public capital had a positive impact on productivity

growth in Spain. Yet if infrastructure investments are rational, they should be analyzed as stand

alone projects because their benefits could be realized without actually hosting the Games.

       The Olympics often set in motion projects that do benefit the public, for instance the

subway network in Athens. The frenzy surrounding the Olympics accelerates the pace of

ongoing projects, yet the hidden costs of acceleration is often overlooked. Less than optimal

financing and planning decisions typically lead to large hidden costs, as was the case in Athens

and Beijing.

The Olympic Legacy

       Much emphasis is placed on the material legacy of the Games, but there are significant

non-tangible benefits to hosting the Games. The Games can provide a unique opportunity for

developing the professional skills and capabilities of the host population, and create new

organizational competences. Hosting the Games helps promote the Olympic values and spread

the practice of sports in the host country. It can also lead to new forms of public-private

partnerships. Other benefits include increased civic engagement and national pride, high

visibility and the potential for elevated status in world affairs. These benefits are arguably more

important for developing nations. Unfortunately the complexity and unavailability of data makes

calculating the Olympic legacy difficult, and as a result it is often undervalued or disregarded

completely in traditional analysis.

Effects on Trade

       Much attention in Olympics literature has focused on the impact on trade for the host

country. Rose and Spiegel (2009) found that hosting the Olympics has a positive impact on

national exports. Their results showed that exports are 30% higher for countries that have hosted,

with statistically significant at all reasonable significance levels.xi They also note that the export

effects seem to be permanent rather than temporary. This implies that rather than acting as an

export promotion, the Games generate a permanent increase in trade between the host and the

rest of the world.

       Bidding countries do realize benefits even when their bids are unsuccessful. To address

the possibility that unobservable differences between countries that host and those that do not

was the cause of the effect, Rose and Spiegel (2009) compared trade patterns for countries that

hosted to those that bid unsuccessfully. They found that bidding countries often experience a

positive impact on exports similar in size to the impact obtained by host countries. This is not a

cause-effect relationship; the act of bidding for the Games does not directly raises exports.

Rather, the event is a “costly policy signal that is followed by future liberalization.”xii A bid

shows an appetite towards trade and liberalization, and the economic benefit is a result of greater

openness. The researchers went on to state that for a “country pursuing a trade-oriented

development strategy, such an outcome would clearly be attractive.” This trade effect would play

out more for developing countries. It is an opportunity that the U.S. or Western Europe does not

really need when compared the developing countries.

       Bidding for the Games then becomes a costly signaling tool. In economic theory,

signaling credibly conveys some information about one party to another when there is

asymmetric information. Krugan (1998) argued that countries would sometimes pursue policies

that act as signals of future policy in order to increase investor confidence.xiii Bidding would only

be attractive for countries that intended to pursue future trade liberalization; otherwise it would

be too costly to pursue. The potential payoff for sending a signal through bidding is increased

investment in the export sector. This suggests that actually hosting the Olympics does not

necessarily have to be the end goal when submitting a bid.

Public vs. Private Investment- Who Bears the Cost?

       The IOC acknowledges the heavy involvement of national governments in orchestrating

the Games:

       “[The Games are an] opportunity for the host city and country to show the world their

       ability to undertake and organize successfully such an important event. This promotional

       aspect is often motivated by the politicians of the host country, thereby explaining the

       heavy involvement of national governments in the organization and financing of the


Hosting the Olympics is clearly an issue of public policy. In previous Olympics, the majority of

the financial burden has always fallen to the public sector. Domestic and international private

sectors are encouraged to take part in the investment and operations, but it is the public at large

with saddles the costs. To host the 1988 Games, the Korean government covered 53 percent of

the Olympic-related costs with public funds.xv The city of Montreal financed the majority of the

1976 games with public funds. The budget shortfall was so great that city taxpayers incurred a

supplementary tax on tobacco that took thirty years to recoup the spending on the Olympic

Stadium alone.xvi

       The contract signed by the winning city requires the city to assume unlimited financial

liability for the planning, organization and staging of the Games.xvii While in its initial bid the

Brazilian government committed to covering only 24 percent of the total cost, it publicly

announced during the bidding period that it was prepared to guarantee secure funding.xviii Since

funding is a significant issue, guarantees such as these are extremely influential and often an

essential component of the winning bid. Unfortunately, they place the financing responsibility

solely on the public.

       Private financing did increase after the 1984 Los Angeles Games. It was then that the

Olympics began receiving high revenues from the sale of rights to television and networks

sponsors. However coinciding with this increase in revenues came increases in costs due to

heightened security spending and a growing desire to host the Games as the event grew in

popularity. The private sector began capitalizing on the commercial aspect of the Games around

this same time.

       A large portion of the Vancouver Olympic Committee‟ projected revenues for the 2010

Winter Games came from sponsorship. However as McHugh (2006) pointed out in his CBA

analysis, the majority of this sponsorship consisted of goods provided for free by the sponsoring

corporation, which were valued at full retail price rather than their true economic value.

Insight from Previous Olympics Games

       Each of the previous Olympic Games discussed below provide insight valuable to

developing nations. The respective failures and successes highlight concerns that developing

nations have to address when formulating a bid.

1984 Los Angeles, United States – Financial Success

       Ex ante studies have found that the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics generated a $200 million

profit, touting the Games as a financial success story.xix The Games created the belief that a

properly run Olympics could generate millions of dollars in profit for the host city. The financial

success of the Games is well documented in Olympic literature and continues to be a selling

point for hosting the Games, despite the multiple examples of economic failures.

       The low construction costs and heavily reliance on private funding contributed greatly to

the profitability of the Games. Los Angeles was able to control expenses by relying on existing

facilities, with the exception of two venues that were paid for by corporate sponsors. 5

Unfortunately, very few developing nations can use to existing sports infrastructure to their


        Consider the IOC as the sole monopolistic supplier of the Games. When there are a

number of cities bidding to host, economic theory suggests that the cities would bid until their

expected economic return on the investment reached zero.6 Given the fact that the Games have

substantial political clout and are not ordinary investments, the return on the project could

theoretically be negative. Los Angeles won the 1984 Games by default, after the only other

competing city, Tehran, withdrew its bid. As a result, its bid was more modest and did not make

lofty promises to lure the IOC, allowing Los Angeles to retain any economic rents that would

have otherwise been bid away. As host cities make grander promises in their effort to win the

Games, they bid away any potential benefits.

1992 Barcelona, Spain – Transformation to a World Class Tourist Destination

  The Olympic Swim Stadium and Olympic Velodrom were funded by McDonalds and 7-Eleven,
6 Baade and Matheson (2003) discussed the economic theory of bidding in their paper, “Bidding

for the Olympics: Fool’s Gold?”

       The Olympics have been championed as a means of entirely reinventing a city, as has

been argued in the case of Barcelona. Prior to hosting the Games, Barcelona was relatively

unknown. Today, it is the sixteenth most popular city travel destination in the world.xx

Policymakers used the Games as a justification for rebuilding the city, transforming Barcelona

into a world-class tourist destination. The ambitious plan had been suggested prior to the city‟s

nomination as a host, but the bid was the spark that led to its execution. The impact on tourism

was substantial; The number of visitors grew by 95% during the 1990-2001 period, the most of

any European city.xxi

       Developing nations in particular are increasingly looking to use the Games as a tool in

long-term development strategies. Hosting has significant socio-economic implications as it calls

for the planning and implementation of a wide series of infrastructure projects. The argument is

that through investments in transportation, telecommunications infrastructure and sports

facilities, the Games act as a catalyst for urban renewal and economic growth, as was the case

with Barcelona.

       A sharp downturn in the tourism market after the Olympics prompted the creation of the

Turisme de Barcelona consortium in 1993. The organization became responsible for promoting

the city‟s tourism market. While the Olympics focused the world‟s attention on Barcelona, it was

not the sole generator of the tourism legacy that the city enjoys today. Learning from Barcelona,

aspiring hosts can use the Games to spur tourism, but should be aware that these gains are often

temporary unless further action is taken to promote further tourism.

2004 Athens, Greece – Sparking a Debt Crisis

       Preparation for the Games in Athens required undertaking a significant number of public

projects that were expected to benefit residents after the Games, including an airport,

metropolitan light rail system, and a motorway encircling the city. Due to the extensive amount

of projects, as well as chronic implementation issues, the final cost of the Athens Olympic

Games was nearly twice the original budget.

       While multiple factors contributed to the 2010 debt crisis in Greece, opponents of the

Games have blamed the 2004 Athens Olympics as a major catalyst. The argument was that the

Games marked the start of Greece‟s irresponsible spending, sending the country down a

dangerous spiral. The accusation of blame drew negative attention to the Games and called into

question the economic rationale of host countries.

       Nearly seven years later, more than half of the Olympic sites sit idle, including facilities

for table tennis, judo and field hockey, as well as a man-made canoe and kayak course. Legal

challenges and planning regulations have stalled deals to convert several of the Olympic venues

into recreation sites. Plans for post-Olympic use of venues were later ignored or stalled,

including plans to turn the canoe-kayak venue into a water park.

       According to an estimate by the U.K. newspaper The Independent, for the 2004 Games,

Athens “went so far in the red that the bills are still being paid, amounting to the equivalent of

$70,000 per household.”xxii International Olympic Committee president Jacques Rogge publicly

said linking the debt crisis to the games was "unfair." Considering the scope of Greece‟s

problems, it is difficult to argue that the Games were a central factor behind the Greek financial

crisis. While the total cost of the Olympics reached $11 billion USD, this amount is minor

compared to the $370 billion in public debt Greece had accumulated in 2010.7 Nevertheless, the

Olympics remain a target of criticism and public resentment.

2008 Beijing, China – Rebranding its Image as a Global Player

There is a perception that national reputations are affected by the experience of hosting the Games.

China won the bid to host the 2008 Olympics in 2001, after a failed bid for the 2000 Games.

Beijing‟s big budget for the Games raised the stakes for future hosts. Although China is considered

a developing nation, its $43 billion investment on the Olympics is one that few other developing

nations can match.

         From a marketing perspective, the Games were successful. China used the Games to both

rally its people and mark its re-emergence as a global economic force. Through a delivery of a well

organized Games, the organizers hoped to highlight the high quality of Chinese products, and they

supported this with the motto „High Tech Games.‟” The 50-country Anholt-GfK Roper Nation

Brands Index, a global public opinion poll on country reputations, found that despite several years

of decline, China‟s index ranking improved following the Games.xxiii China‟s improved reputation

was a major benefit realized from the Olympics.

         While the long-term economic impact is still unclear, the Games also lead to long-term

reform in environmental policy. The Chinese government used the Olympics as a catalyst to

increase spending on public infrastructure, most notably transportation, and to clean up

environmentally unfriendly industries.

    based on 2010 Exchange Rates

Additional Concerns for Developing Nations

       As discussed above, the IOC has explicit criteria when selecting host countries. In the

past, the IOC believed that developed nations were best suited to benefit from the Games,

stating, “Given the high infrastructure costs, only rich countries have the means to make a good

return on such a large investment.”xxiv While the IOC has taken strides to make the Games more

internationalized, developing nations face additional concerns that have to be addressed in their

bid. These include higher infrastructure expenditure, a higher opportunity cost of capital, limited

usage of facilities after the Games, insufficient organizational capacity, and heightened security

concerns. While these issues are not unique to developing nations, they are often cited as key

points to be addresses.

Infrastructure Concerns

       Beijing‟s extravagant spending on infrastructure raised the bar, but very few developing

nations can match that level of spending. Many countries are wondering how they can build the

best, cutting edge venues, but as He Zhenliang, former IOC vice-president notes, "The IOC does

not advocate building luxury sports venues. If it complies with technical standards, it's okay."xxv

Developing nations should not spend large amounts on infrastructure that is of little use after the

closing ceremonies.

       The building of facilities required for the Olympics is often legitimized on the sole

grounds that the infrastructure benefits the local community. However since the facilities are for

elite sport, they are often too large for general community use. In order to maximize their use,

new arenas must be designed so that they will lend themselves to multipurpose use. Plans for

post-Olympic use of venues is now a significant criterion in the bidding process.xxvi The long-

term community requirements should be given as much priority as the technical requirements set

by the IOC. Many host cities are left with costly yet unusable Olympics infrastructure, including

specialized facilities, dormitories and an oversupply of hotel rooms. More effort must be made to

plan how these facilities can be converted to new uses.

       Integrating the venues after the Olympics are finished is crucial in order to justify the

large investment. Atlanta converted some of its Olympic village dormitories into housing for

Georgia State University, and it transformed Centennial Olympic Stadium into a major league

baseball team. However, many developing nations cannot simply convert Olympic venues into

professional sports stadiums, and thus they will have to be more creative. For Beijing, the

potential for long-term benefits will depend on how well the Olympic venues can be

incorporated into the overall economy. The $423 million Beijing National Stadium sits idle, at a

cost of $9 million a year to maintain.xxvii The venues will soon lose their appeal as a tourist

attraction, although there are plans to convert the Beijing National Stadium into a shopping mall

within the next three to five years. Nearly seven years after the 2004 Athens Games, more than

half of the sites remain unused and unkempt, despite the annual maintenance costs of nearly

$730 million.xxviii Likewise, Sydney spent approximately $32 million in 2005 alone to maintain

the venues from the 2000 Games, many of which are rarely used.xxix So called „white elephants‟

have little lasting value to the country or economy.

       Hosting the games in line with national conditions is easier said than done. Cities that win

the bids to host generally are those with ambitious, and expensive, plans to modernize in time for

the Games. The final price tag for the 2004 Athens Games reached $12 billion, approximately 5

percent of the entire Greek economy in Athens claimed to already have 70% of the

necessary sports facilities already in place at the time of the bid. After the Games concluded,

Greece‟s public works minister George Voulgarakis admitted to the press that the country had

spent more than it could afford.xxxi

Building Scale

       One of the largest concerns for the IOC is whether the bidding country can handle

hosting such a large event. Serious bids from developing nations have to address the country‟s

accountability and the existence of facilities. Cities often try to build scale with smaller local or

regional events. Once a developing country is able to host an international event, this creates a

ripple effect to attract larger mega-events. Some level of infrastructure is needed before a

country can realistically host the Olympics. Adequate sporting venues in particular are usually

lacking in developing countries, and a proposal to build on schedule and within budget is often

met with skepticism. Hence having some existing facilities is crucial to making a successful bid.

Hosting smaller events can leave behind legacy facilities that will create a strong foundation

from which to build on.

       A prospective host city must demonstrate its capacity for hosting a successful

international event. This is evident in both Brazil and South Africa. Rio was able to successfully

host the Pan American Games in 2007, and as a result it already possessed many of the Olympic-

level facilities at the time the host city was being decided. The Pan American Games tested the

city‟s capacity for hosting large events, and its success was a definite factor in the bid‟s victory.

While other factors ultimately led to South Africa‟s failed bid, the country was able to

demonstrate its success in hosting the 1995 Rugby World Cup. The successful hosting of the

FIFA World Cup in 2010 will boost South Africa‟s candidacy for hosting a future Olympic


       India hosted the 2010 Commonwealth Games, an international multi-sport event held

every four years for former members of the British Empire. Many viewed the Games as a chance

for India to display its organizational capabilities and learn how to host a large sporting event.

However the event did not showcasing India‟s rising global status, as the Beijing Olympics did

for China. Hasty preparations for Commonwealth Games were heavily criticized, and athletes

withdrew from competition due to the poor conditions of the facilities. The last minute crisis that

plagued preparation for the games ignited suggestions from critics to not allow developing

countries to host major sporting events. The Commonwealth Games had only been held one

other time in a developing nation; the 1996 Games were held in Jamaica.


       Security costs make up an astronomical part of the total budget, and it appears that this

trend will continue for future Games. Greece budgeted $122 million for security in its initial

budget, but the figure topped $1.8 billion after September 11 bolstered security concerns. By

contrast, Atlanta spent a mere $150 million on security to host the 1996 Games.xxxii The Munich

massacre of 1972 and the Atlanta bombing of 1996 remind host cities of the risk that terrorism

poses to the event‟s image. No city wants to be remembered for terrorist incidents. This is

especially important for developing nations; security costs may be higher if potential visitors

perceive the host cities to be unsafe and chose not to attend the Games. This is one of the larger

critiques against awarding the Olympics to developing nations. Host cities will have to take

additional measures to counteract that sentiment.

Concluding Thoughts

       A review the literature on the effects of the Olympic Games reveals a number of studies

and analyses focusing on the economic impacts of the Games, while its potential importance to

developing nations remains largely unexplored.

       There are many arguments against having developing nations host the Olympics. The

demand for sports infrastructure after the Olympics is likely to be lower in developing nations

than their developed counterparts, since professional sports and entertainment are luxury goods.

Because they lack stadiums, most developing countries have to spend more on developing the

infrastructure. The cost of building these new arenas is not only the dollar amount that has to be

spent, but also its opportunity cost- the value to the community if that capital was spent on the

next best public project. However these arguments discount the non-tangible benefits that

developing nations can realize by hosting the Games. Some of the most important benefits to

developing nations are extraordinarily difficult to quantify and do not lend themselves to

traditional Cost Benefit Analysis.

       Hosting the Olympics is in no way a ticket to prosperity, but it does offer the host country

an opportunity to bring about broad changes within a definitive time frame. Putting on the largest

show in the world is no easy task. It tests the organization and preparedness of both the host city

and country. Even among the developing countries, the playing field is not level. Countries that

have lower level of global visibility face an increasingly uphill battle. Of course, it would be

naïve to not consider the political and commercial forces at work when bidding for the Olympics.

Furthermore, although the appeal of hosting the Olympics is connected to the assumption of

enhanced reputation, the outcome is not guaranteed, as global media plays a crucial role in

constructing positive or negative images of the Games and the host country. All of these forces

make it difficult to assess just how much a developing nation stands to gain from hosting the

Olympics. While the economic benefits are not likely to pan out, the Olympics do give the host

country the opportunity to show the world how far it has come.

       Generalizing the impact of hosting the Olympics to other host cities is limited for two

important reasons. First, there is no portability of specific numbers found in a Cost Benefit

Analysis or any other study to measure the effects of hosting the Games. Unfortunately, these

studies are often interpreted as probable scenarios, and the perception becomes “if it worked for

one city, it will work for another.” Second, there is potentially a self-selection bias of countries

that bid. There is a valid concern that a bidding city is fundamentally different from other cities

that do not bid. If true, this would create a bias in any relationship between hosting the Olympics

and achieving long-term growth.xxxiii

       This paper has made a comprehensive analysis of the benefits and costs of hosting the

Olympics in a developing country. As far as policy suggestion, there is no clear answer. The

decision to bid must be analyzed within the context of the individual nation. The Olympics have

been pitched as having miraculous economic powers, but like all public policy choices, they

come with significant costs. Hosting the Olympics may not be the best policy choice for every

nation. The sum of Rio de Janeiro‟s $15 billion bid is roughly equivalent to $2,000 per citizen,

and more than two months of total GDP per capita.xxxiv

       Due to high fixed costs in infrastructure, the cost of hosting the Olympics is largely

independent of the size of the country. This puts smaller countries at a relative disadvantage.

Further research should address what criteria a nation should meet before considering

undertaking such a large project, such as a minimum level of infrastructure already in place.

Understanding what factors are most important in the hosting of a successful Olympics will help

developing nations properly weigh the costs and benefits.

       Academic literature is skeptical of the notion that hosting the Olympics brings about a

change in the country‟s fundamentals, through construction activity or growth from enhanced

infrastructure. Studies conducted to assess the impact on employment, tourism, and growth have

been inconclusive at best. Yet federal governments are so eager to heavily subsidize the

Olympics, and they continue to win over the public‟s support through promoting these same

unconvinced arguments. For developing nations specifically, the long-term benefits from trade

liberalization could potentially outweigh the short-term costs of hosting the Olympics. Therefore

linking the two may be a wiser strategy than touting those benefits that opponents and

economists attack with vigor.


Table 1: Host Countries and Candidates for Summer Olympic Games

  Year   Host                          Other Candidates
  1896   Athens, Greece
  1900   Paris, France
  1904   St. Louis, United States
  1908   London, Great Britain
  1912   Stockholm, Sweden
  1916   Not Held
  1920   Antwerp, Belgium
  1924   Paris, France
  1928   Amsterdam, Netherlands
  1932   Los Angeles, United States
  1936   Berlin, Germany
  1940   Not Held
  1944   Not Held
  1948   London, Great Britain         France, United States (4 cities)
  1952   Helsinki, Finland             Netherlands, United States (5 cities)
  1956   Melbourne, Australia          Argentina, Mexico, United States (6 cities)
                                       Belgium, Hungary, United States, Mexico,
  1960   Rome, Italy                   Japan, Switzerland
  1964   Tokyo, Japan                  United States, Austria, Belgium
  1968   Mexico City, Mexico           Argentina, United States, France
  1972   Munich, West Germany          United States, Spain, Canada
  1976   Montreal, Canada              United States, Russia
  1980   Moscow, Soviet Union          United States
  1984   Los Angeles, United States    None
  1988   Seoul, Korea                  Japan
                                       Netherlands, France, Serbia, Great Britain,
  1992   Barcelona, Spain              Australia
                                       Greece, Australia, Canada, Great Britain,
  1996   Atlanta, United States        Serbia
  2000   Sydney, Australia             China, Germany, Turkey, Great Britain
  2004   Athens, Greece                Argentina, South Africa, Italy, Sweden
  2008   Beijing, China                Thailand, Egypt, Cuba, Malaysia, Spain
                                       Cuba, Turkey, Germany, Great Britain,
  2012   London, Great Britain         Spain, Russia, United States, France, Brazil
  2016   Rio de Janeiro, Brazil        United States, Japan, Spain


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