Created: 3/1/1981

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Soviet Viewsost-Madrid European Security Conference



Soviei Viewsost-Madrid European Security Conference

Brc/hnev* offer to cxiend ihc geographic range for mililary

conndcncc-building measures (CDMsl eastward lo include thc entireUSSR, conditionedxiension in the West, has changed the complexion ol* ihc Madrid review ocm ion of lhe Conrcrcrwcon Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCEl. East-WeM differences. defining thc mandaterospective European xecurity conference creutcd Ihc current impasse: hopesusible compromise have now been raised.

Brezhnevs offer may portend thai Ihc Soviei'willhird-parly proposal in order to gain agrccmenl tougoslav proposal put forward in December is probably ihc most attractive to lhe Soviets because it gives ihc conference itself more control over the agenda lhan do oihcr third-parly proposals. It also favors discussion of nuclear weapons, which Ihe Soviets wiih loscc included in the agendo and which thc US-backed French plan would exclude.

ompromise proves elusive. Moscow could seek agreement al Madrid on CBMs to supplement ihosc prescribed in the Helsinki Final Aei. The Kremlin may. however, link negotiation of additional CBMs to aby CSCE partkipanis touture security conference.

, hi writien*jo/PelitUalAnalfiti. It ha, ber*

coordinated with the Notional Intelllgtief Officer/or the USSR ond Eaiiiti Europe and

ihr Office ofSt'Ottpe Reltoteh. ThU CmUrt conialm Information awri/OM-l. Commmji onde>- a

nfill! III III

Sotici Viewsost-Madrid i-1 Security Conference

ench firm untied furonference vi> Dnariiiu merit in Europe

nd prescnicd Ihcir plan al Ihc UN Special Scs**on on Diurmamem

Ihai year. The French were nuny tever.ilralionv

dnhhe olconeidcr ihcn(ml lurorajan focb*nf ihc Mutual and HaLanced force Rcdminanalk* in Vienna in which

I unit dtiO IKN

wish lo prevent theof disarmament inm.ilivo by

Mimoo and Wj*hin|;ton

Gitcardcvirc lu upstage anl.iilc in7 by Socialist leader Francois Miner and

The French plan inriugcj iwu-*iagchei.igc wouldlo militarily ngnifnant verifiable CBM*.ipptiiable to allufincluding jli Sonett of the Ural nwuruain* Thcwould diMuu reduction* ufnd cwnrenlurul

I rum the uvisci, llic Soviet altitude toward the prorusiilnegative. Movoow ubicci* iuof ii* major clement* .mdounlriu* iohoI'c llic iniumive ua disarmamentHat her than cruicire the plan and nuaaibly jeopardise relation* with France, however, ihc Soviet* countered inVVanaw Paci rHupmalonference on Military Detente and DisarmamentDI Thc Soviet plan differ* from the French proposal in several rctprtiv althoughhai cnviugc* two unnUr tlagcs


Until Bre/rtncv* offer. Moscow hid rciccicd the French propotalxtend ihc gcogiaphic area ofapplicabihiT lo< CBMt tuallof the European USSR. Tho Soviets aver thai Ihc ptiranictcri for CBMt agreed upon in ihc Helsinki Final Actncluding the application of one vuch mcaturciiomctcr-widc border tone in lhe -eitcrn USSR, resulted fromand afford coual tecurnyil CSCti participanti The Krcrnlin hat intttlcd freqwi thai CBMicaicuding tu lhe Urak would be possible only if US and Canadian territory were also included in the area ufPii'.wt mi. Urerhnc*'* Current.onditioricd on atension" in the Wesi. prctumably presages Soviet argument* for including portions or all of Ihc Nnrih Atlantic area and. qulie probably, portions or nil of the United Siutri and Canada


During discussions, al CSCE meetingshe USSR displayed link inlcrcM in CBMs. Since Ihc Helsinki Final Acl was signed, however. Moscow has upporenily recognized the utility of some notification and verification measures in protecting ihc imageoviet commitment, to relaxing tensions in Europe and in complicating USand NATO military activities. NATO holds far more exercises than does thc Warsaw Pad lhat would be banned by00 manpower ceiling proposed by the

The first Soviet COM proposal* were offered by Bre/.hnevpeech ineeparate forum for CBMs thai would parallel Ihc MBFR talks and also proposed Ihc following measures:Thenonfirsioseofnuelcarweapon*.

The nonexpansion of alliances.

A limit00 participant* in military eacrciscs

An extension of CBMs lo Ihc Mediterranean Sea areas.

With slight alterations, these ideas Still form Ihe bans of the Eastern COM proposals andundamentally different approach fiom that of the French and the other Wesiern Allies:

West insists upon mandatory or binding CBMs. Ihe USSRmeasures.

Wesi favois detailed exchanges of information and inspeclionx to verify any CBM accord; thc USSR opposes them Thc Wcsi seeks in-formation about the routine organisation, activity, and financial com* of maintaining mililary forces lopreveni surprise attacks. The Soviets equate this desire for "transparency" with espionage.

The West warns militarily significant CBMs; the USSR prefer*dcclara. tory measures concerning intentions lhal seem designed for political.

The Wesi believes lhal comprehensive ClIMsilitary value in iheir own right, and lhat agreement on them separately Can provide thcfor ruiurc reduciions; Ihe USSR insists upon Strict linkage between CBMs and lhe tire of iroopand armament reductions

Types ofVtapooi

The French seeklude naval forces and nuclear weapons from lhe agenda ofa European security conference. The USSR insists lhal ihcse topics should be considered. The Soviei* probably believe thai ihcirwould juilify discussion of llic deployment of US weapons in Europe.

( imlrTfTHilf **

ew theater nuclear force i. and ihu* provide another forum (or charging Ihc US und NATO wuh increasing tension* in Europe

Linkage to CSCE

Trance, ihe orher Allies, and man> ol the neutral and nonalifncd (NNAt narlieipanli want any European tecum* conference lo be intimately linlcd with ihc CSCF procett. Theyonference that would submit iu decataorn lit Ihc neat CSCE rc*kw tcnionlifrcatnVi and reviewowever, would I'ke lo attenuate thil link and. if pnviible.ccurity conference from dhcuitiani of Soviet and East Europeanwith the human right! premiums of Ihe Helsinki Final Act

O-Ci the last threerecently In January InSoviets undebated their rival proposals but have never come closeompromise

Currentthe current CSCE review session. Eastern and Western ladies for

iffered In December, the French advanced

their CDE plan essentially unchanged (although ihe defining of the tecond stage wouldail Ihe successful outcome of Ihend ihe Allies are firmly committed to ii The bast, on the other hand,olish -itKwiiored vcrtion of ihr earlier Warsaw Pact CM DD proposal lhal tl'esses the need for an openonsider all security proposal!

The USSR and its allies have thus sough) to portray Ihc French proposal at selling preconditionsonference and the Eastern proposal as more open loopuons regarding ut nope, including tome aspects of thc French formula. Thit approach seems contrived to influence Eurerpean public opinion and to convince the neutral and nonahgncd states lhal Ihey should prcst thc Western participnnit toompromise formula. Several NNA participants already have offered compromise proposals and. with mndifica-lions, some of these may he acceptable ia Moscow

Moscow**has frequently insisted thai the CSCE tevicw session would be

unsuccessfulecision it reacheduropean security conference. In the wake of their invasion of Afghanistan and lhe mililary activity related to cvenlt in Poland, ihe Soviet leaderspeace" forum to focus world attention Oft Olher issues.orum, ihey believe, would altolatform for eaploiting differences within NATO over mod-erniraition of theater nuclear forces, the possible deployment of enhanced radiation weapons in Europe, and Easl-West arrmconliol negotiations


For the Sovietseeting -ouldilitaryto thc political detente tymboliKi! by tne Helsinki Final Act and Weil Germany's bilateral li ea liesfcasi Europe-'n states They arc csaneerned about the trowing military and political weighi ol Win Germany oa ihe com incut and withinonference would bring discussions of. and potentially agrcemcnli about, limits on ihcactiviiictof the Wen German armedecond phase would broach the topic of troop and armament levels. Thc proposal thus reflects Moscow'* historical preoccupation wiih its "German problem" and aitcmpts to ensure (hot no new threats arise to jeopardize the postwar European political or mililary tlalus quo.

For these reasons Moscow would be reluctant to drop its call foronference, and. indeed. Brcrnnrv't proposal indicate* lhal Moscow trill Isopes to gain agreementompromise formula for the gathering. If NATO support for the French CDE proposal holds. Moscow might shift its supporthird-party proposal or settle for an agreement at Madrid on additional CBMs (or "improved" versions of ciistingossibly linkedcaicrn commitment to some kind of eventual security meeting. Thehird-parlybe ihcSoviet solution; thc other mayallback position in ihe event that differences over defining the mandateecurity conference per titt

I hird I'.rti Froptwtt

Breehnc"ntTer lo exeod theranee of CBMse-clemcnt of expectancy iaio reference ditcuttiont. The USSR ha* projected ai least temporarily an image of flexibility and enhanced its position for pressing the Wesiompromise proposal

A vague Yugoslav proposal, introduced ai the Madrid meeting in December,ikely candidate to receive Soviet support. Thc head of the Soviet delegation in Madrid has alluded favorably to the Yugoslav proposal in his public remarks This scheme leaves open the specificsuropean security conference, although Belgrade is on record as favoring discussion of nuclear weapons during the second phase of the conference Belgrade alto suggestsrrparaiory meeting intended todifference! over the conference mandate

Alternatively. Ihc Soviets might decide towedith proposal, also proffered al Madrid in December,eans of resolving East-West differences Like the Yugoslav proposal, the Swedish plantrong link between the two stagesonference and would include discussion of nuclear weapons. The rxeyposaltrong stand on the venrtabihly of CBMt. however, and would have them apply onlyhe "entire Europeanormula lhat could include sens in or near Europe but apparently would not include US or Canadian terrttoiy

A possible Finnishivi wuuld present ihc Soviet' with artot'ierune ihai is less likely Mwia Western or1ininn* informally suggested an.COi' and CMhai would have an open agenda and ar. mptdiuimjmcm rarincudci TheStwicti havc shown some i atMsuggestion, presumably because il doe- not define lheofCUMs prior to the conference and permits discussionmeasure* and nuclear weapons '

FlHihrr CBMi

If lhe USSR concluded that agree meni cannul behi* lime onecurity conference mandatereparatory meeting, it mighi support thc adoption of additional or improved CBM* al thc current Madrid session. In early February the Soviets proposed sis specific CBMs. and in introducing ihem Ihc Chref So*-CS delegate hirel, mentioned the basicrn CMDD proposal. The Swedei have suggested negotiating interim CBM* al Madrid to cover the period beiween Madriduture security

Thc Soviets could offer to accept fun her CBMs at Madrid logive lhe European arms control process some momentum They might even be willing to per mn usage of terms such as "militarily significant" andarguing ihai anything mat lowers tension is militarily significant and that verification can be accomplished without inspection by availabletechnical means In aa attemptppear iTcsibie. the bead of the Soviet delegation intimated in early March thai Moscow mighi eventually agree ihai CIlMs have some political obligation and that verification could be tailored to each specific CBM Moscow has already said that adopting further CBMs al Madrid could serveransition to ihe first phaseuropean security conference II mightormal initiative insist upon such linkage.reparatory or an cxpertt' meeting might come to be viewed by Moscowscfnl political forumull-scale conference were unachievable

The CBMs ihai ihe USSR has proposed or supported have propagandist ie as well as military value.

ower numeiical threshold for. and marc advanced warning of. troop movcrncnit in order to draw attentionhe large-scale caereiseshat NATO undertakes.

eduction of forces in, and the caientiori of existing CBMt to. the Mediterranean Sea area They alto support adoption of naval and arnpfaibsous CBMs These appeal to Ihe NNA participants and could affect NATO military activities in Ihe Mediterranean and Norwegian Sent

The'N proposedl'i umIoh moves. Iniivict view.

these could be ennvidcred CUM* although the Wot regards *omealls for improvedlo* miliitirt

observers, ihe mm firs! use old conventCapOOS.l lisamcnt iif nuikji weapons-freend assurance*n nuclear statesey will not be attached with nuclear weapons may berohibition >il thef enst ing military alliances in Tociic designed lo block Spanish membership in NATO, has also beenan on new military bases in Europe could be suggested in order to opposehe stocking of US military equipment in Norway and elsewhere.

might make Eastern willingncis toinal document in Madrid

conditional on Western agreement to some kindollow-on meeting on security issues The Sovietsthreatened not to agreeold another CSCE review session (periodic renew is called for in thcnalnless (here is "substantiven security and Other mailers, and Ihey arc likely lo reiterate this threat Citing the lack of progress on security measure* lhal characterized thc previous review session in Belgrade, ihey will wnrnailure lo reach agreement onecuriiy conference and on further CBMscerbate Eatl-Wesi tensions

Thc Soviets arc not likely to carry enii rhrir threat. The CSCE process hasornerstone of Breahmrv's detente policy, and Ihc Soviets would not want tor bear she onus for having donea Sovtcl military intervention in Poland might cause precisely this result Moscow, however, docs want to pui pressure on the West to agreeecurity meeting. Accordingly, these threats are particularly aimed at getting those most concernedialemaie on security milter* or the possible end of thehe NNApeea* France, the United Stales, and ihc ot nee Allies la compromise

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