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Released on 2013-02-19 00:00 GMT

Email-ID 5032134
Date 2007-01-08 22:54:29
Sans Latin America who's analyst is currently hopped up on dental
medication (and still in the chair)


The U.S.-Iranian stand-off over the fate of Iraq will have a profound
impact on the course of geopolitical events in 2007. Since the U.S.
invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran seized a golden opportunity to assert
itself as the regional kingmaker while the United States became
increasingly paralyzed in Iraq. The United States now finds itself at a
critical juncture, in which it can no longer afford to stay the course in
Iraq and dedicate U.S. troops to an unattainable mission of securing the
country solely through military force. As advocated by the
much-anticipated Baker-Hamilton report, the time has come for the United
States and Iran to put an end to the silent treatment and work toward a
comprehensive settlement for Iraq.

But the United States is still far from its desired negotiating position,
and will thus continue to shy away from the ISG report's recommendations
until it can manage to level the playing field against Iran. Before
Washington moves forward on the diplomatic front, it will need to reverse
the perception that the United States has been permanently marginalized in
Iraq and will ultimately have to withdraw its forces. This perception is
what has driven heightening Sunni concerns that United States will no
longer be the security guarantor against an empowering Shiite bloc led by
Iran. To throw off these expectations, U.S. President George W. Bush will
move forward with a strategy to surge U.S. troops into Baghdad and show
that the United States is still very much in the game in Iraq.

The White House appears to be leaning towards the temporary surge of troop
levels -- accomplished mainly through delaying the rotation of units
already in country, rather than rushing the training cycles of scheduled
deployments. However, the surge looks to total only no more than 20,000
additional troops, possibly substantially less -- making it less of a real
surge and more of an incremental increase and unlikely to surpass the peak
of 160,000 in November and December 2005.

The forces will certainly be useful -- assisting with security inside the
capital and leaving units that would otherwise be shifted to the capital
available to confront issues in their respective areas of responsibility.
However, in and of itself, this new deployment will be insufficient to
turn the tide in Iraq. The failure of Operation Together Forward, the
attempt following the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to use a small surge
in troop levels in Baghdad to impose security there, is a case in point.
Together Forward was essentially the U.S. military's last, best effort to
secure Baghdad with the existing force structure.

Baghdad is, and remains the key. Without stability there, there can be no
Iraqi state. But the proposed surge of 20,000 to 30,000 troops without a
new concerted diplomatic effort, is unlikely to succeed in effecting a
political resolution in Baghdad.

To go along with the troop surge, the United States will focus on
rearranging the Iraqi cabinet to create a stronger, more functional
government in Baghdad. This will involve sidelining supporters of Shiite
rebel leader Muqtada al Sadr and bringing in a stronger Sunni presence,
which will undoubtedly be a complicated and messy affair. By year's end,
Iraq's largest and most influential Shiite party, the Supreme Council of
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, will be able to better solidify its position
in the government.

Iraq is unlikely to split up into federal zones in the coming year, but
neither will it behave as a coherent state entity. Violence will escalate
from al sides - Shia, Sunnis, jihadists, and even the Kurds when the
Sunni-Kurd faultline in northern Iraq flares up toward the end of the year
as the Kirkuk referendum issue approaches.

Iran, meanwhile, is unlikely to be swayed to a great extent by this shift
in U.S. strategy. Tehran is keen on making the Americans come to the
negotiating table on its terms, and has the militant and political assets
in place to effectively manipulate the security situation in Iraq. Taking
into account that the Bush administration is far from ready to enter
serious negotiations over Iraq, the Iranian regime will focus this year on
increasing the political and military cost for the United States to
maintain a large troop presence in the region by increasing its support
for militant actors operating inside Iraq, including Shiite gunmen and
potentially segments of the Sunni insurgency. Iran's support for Sunni
militants will be directed toward the jihadist groups that focus on
targeting U.S. troops, rather than the Sunni nationalist rebels engaged in
tit for tat strikes against Iraqi Shiites.

Iran will also use this year to push forward with its nuclear agenda. The
United Nations Security Council will be unable to pressure Tehran into
curtailing the Iranian nuclear program, and Iran will utilize the U.S.
distraction in Iraq to move closer to its objective of becoming a
fully-fledged nuclear power to strengthen its bargaining position on Iraq
and expand its influence in the region.

All the pieces may appear to be falling into place for Iran, but a major
shake-up in the Iranian regime that is likely to take place this year runs
the risk of upsetting Iran's calculus in dealing with the United States
over Iraq. Terminally ill with cancer, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, may die this year. His death will send a shockwave through the
Iranian public, who will come to doubt the Iranian government's ability to
successfully navigate the country through this critical period. As his
health further deteriorates, Khamenei will likely position former Iranian
President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to lead the country. Rafsanjani is
believed to be committed to Khamenei's vision for Iraq and the ascendance
of a nuclear-powered Iran, but is also known for his pragmatic leanings
and ability to negotiate more easily with the United States. Rumors are
also circulating that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinjad's days may also
be numbered, and that Khamenei will make the arrangements this year to
remove the firebrand president from his post. Khamenei's health will
likely dictate whether Rafsanjani receives the position as Supreme Leader
or president before the end of the year.

The United States will be keeping a close eye on any potential shake-ups
in Tehran to decide how to proceed in devising a diplomatic strategy. The
questions surrounding the Iranian leadership will ensure that 2007 will
largely be a waiting game over the fate of Iraq.

Israel's patience will rapidly be wearing thin as the prospect of a
nuclear Iran further develops into a reality. Israel's focus for this year
will be on pulling itself back together militarily and politically
following its defeat in the 2006 summer war against Hezbollah. Israel is
still unlikely to follow through with threats to launch preemptive strikes
against Iranian nuclear facilities this year. Doing so unilaterally would
only further compromise the U.S. position in Iraq once Iran unleashes its
militant proxies in the region. Instead, Israel's focus will turn toward
Hezbollah. Iran made it clear in the summer war that Hezbollah will be
used as a lever in Iran's negotiations over Iraq. Israel badly wishes to
eliminate this lever, particularly as it is faced with a pressing need to
create the conditions for a preemptive strike against Iranian nuclear
sites. Israel's strategy to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions begins with
the crippling of Hezbollah's militant arm. This rationale likely factored
into Israel's decision to go forth with a full-scale incursion into
Lebanon this past summer, though the results surely defied Israel's

Israel is likely to revisit its objective of crushing Hezbollah in the
summer of 2007, and has already begun to justify a coming military
escalation in Lebanon through public declarations that Hezbollah and/or
Syria will be the one to instigate the conflict. Who ends up igniting the
war is unimportant. The big question for this year will be if Israel can
develop the capability to root out Hezbollah forces in their strongholds
in the Bekaa valley. A good deal of restructuring will have to take place
first, beginning with former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's return to
the political scene.

Israel could move to indirectly destabilize Hezbollah in Lebanon ahead of
a military confrontation. Hezbollah is currently brimming with confidence,
but it also must be careful to preserve its legitimacy. By provoking
sectarian violence in Lebanon, Israel could pit Hezbollah fighters against
fellow Lebanese, which would wear down their military forces and tarnish
their reputation as a nationalist movement, making the organization more
vulnerable to an Israeli onslaught. The Israeli Mossad could also be
engaged in attempts this year to eliminate elements of Hezbollah's core
leadership to further destabilize the party.

Though Syria will be busy building up weapons acquisitions from its
defense partners in Moscow, the Syrian regime will be careful to avoid
provoking a major military conflict with Israel. Syria will hold elections
in March 2007. Syrian President Bashar al Assad will win his re-election
by a wide margin, and no opposition forces will be strong enough to
challenge the al Assad regime this year. Though Syria will keep the window
open for talks with the United States, it will continue with its agenda to
re-consolidate influence in Lebanon, which involves political intimidation
frequently in the form of assassinations. The Bush administration is
unlikely to make any major overtures to Syria this coming year, knowing
that Damascus falls well below Tehran in its ability to wield any real
influence in Iraq. Syria will be emboldened through its alliance with Iran
and could instigate a low-level insurgency in the Golan through a shadowy
group of militant actors on the regime's payroll, but will play its cards
carefully for fear of inviting Israeli air strikes on its own soil.

Lebanon will become an intense battlefield for Sunni-Shiite influence,
mainly played out between the Saudis on one side, and the Syrians and
Iranians on the other. Lebanon's lame duck president Emile Lahoud's
presidential term will expire in September, which will be preceded by
intense political jockeying between Lebanon's rival factions over his
replacement. In the end, the president will likely be a friend to the
Syrians. Hezbollah will be able to expand its influence in the government
by forcibly increasing the number of seats that it and its allies hold in
the Lebanese cabinet. With veto power, Hezbollah will be able to block any
major legislation that harms Syrian, Iranian or Hezbollah interests,
including disarmament of Hezbollah's militant arm or any punitive measures
against the Syrian regime for the Feb. 2005 assassination of former
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al Hariri. While consolidating its political
power, Hezbollah will intently focus on preparing for a military
confrontation with Israel.

The Arab reaction to a rising Iran will intensify in the coming year.
Though the Sunni Arab states are highly dependent on the United States to
ensure their national security, they will make it clear that they are not
going to sit idle while the United States fumbles around in Iraq. The Arab
states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, will increase pressure on the
Americans to act by strengthening the Sunni insurgency in Iraq and by
showcasing plans to develop civilian nuclear programs to counter Iran.

Within the borders of the Saudi Kingdom, light will be shed on a growing
power struggle in the House of Saud. The sudden departure of Saudi
Ambassador to the United States Turki al Faisal revealed worrying
divisions with the Saudi regime over how to deal with Iran's expansion at
the expense of the U.S. military position in the region. The deteriorating
health and advanced age of Saudi Arabia's core leadership could
potentially lead to instability within the kingdom when moves between
rival factions are made to fill vacant posts. Even though the kingdom has
recently enacted a succession law to oversee the transfer of power
process, tensions over the Iraq situation could exacerbate matters.

Egypt's political system has also entered an uncertain period where
President Hosni Mubarak, given his advanced age and hence deteriorating
health, could either die or become incapacitated during the course of the
next year. The absence of Mubarak will have a destabilizing effect on the
country's political system as questions will arise over his potential
successor's ability to govern as effectively. Mubarak's probable
replacement will be Omar Suleiman, the country's intelligence chief. The
stage will likely be set for Suleiman this year when Mubarak nominates him
as Vice-President. The uncertainty surrounding Mubarak's fate has
developed into a key issue as Cairo is under domestic and to a lesser
extent, international pressure, to effect political reforms. Egypt could
conduct a referendum on its constitution and replace existing emergency
laws in force since 1981 as a means to sustain its hold on power and
counter the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the largest
opposition group in the country.

On the Israeli-Palestinian front, Hamas and Fatah will continue to
struggle over how to create a power-sharing agreement in the government.
As long as Hamas can continue to be bankrolled by the Iranians, the party
can avoid making any serious concessions to Fatah in reshuffling the
cabinet. Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas will not
resort to calling for early elections unless he can be assured that Hamas
would be marginalized in the polls - an unlikely prospect for the near
future. Israel will meanwhile work to ensure that Hamas and Fatah are
prevented from coming together in an agreement - while Israel is sorting
out its own issues at home, it will much prefer to have the Palestinians
fighting each other than focusing its attention on attacking Israel. The
stalemate in the Palestinian territories will prevent the Israelis and the
Palestinians from engaging in any serious final status negotiations this

Turkey will have presidential elections in May and parliamentary polls in
November. Barring a major domestic crisis, it is unlikely that the
military would force early parliamentary elections to prevent the ruling
Islamist-grounded Justice and Development Party (AKP) from gaining the
presidency, though the AKP could see its parliamentary majority weaken.
Turkey's continued resistance to meeting the European Union's demands on
Cyprus will ensure that EU accession talks will be left in an impasse this
year. Turkey's withering EU aspirations will lead the country to turn its
attention more toward its Arab backyard, where Iraq's worsening situation
becomes a direct concern for Ankara. Turkey will do its best to prevent
U.S. forces from re-deploying to northern Iraq. For Turkey, a built-up
U.S. military presence in northern Iraq would act as a blocker to Turkish
interests in containing Iraq's Kurdish faction. As the United States makes
shifts to its Iraq strategy throughout the year, Turkey will issue threats
against Iraq's Kurdish faction from making any bold moves to consolidate
its autonomy and lay claim to the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

The devolution of Al Qaeda will continue in 2007, as the movement
struggles to carry out a major, successful attack outside it main theatres
of operation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Though the jihadist forces
in Iraq were largely eclipsed by Sunni-Shiite sectarian fighting in Iraq
in the latter half of 2006, they are likely to receive a boost in support
this year as the need for a robust Sunni insurgency grows among the Sunni
Arab states. Iran, at the same time, has an interest in maintaining the
Sunni component of the insurgency to target U.S. forces. The Egyptian node
of al Qaeda will likely pull off its annual attack in the Sinai peninsula,
giving the Mubarak government another excuse to crack down on the
country's Islamist opposition. Al Qaeda will try to spread into the
Maghreb, the Levant and deeper into the gulf this year, though any
attempted attacks are unlikely to be successful.


2007 will be a political year in East Asia.

Japan's new leadership is focused on Constitutional change and a test for
the LDP leadership in the House of Councilors elections early in the third
quarter. China's Communist Party Congress in the fourth quarter will
identify the next generation of leaders (who will formally take over in
2012). South Korean presidential elections in December could see the
return of the more conservative Grand National Party. Taiwan has
legislative elections in December, ahead of Presidential elections in
early 2008, which will see a strong showing by the KMT and PFP, but may
stir a final burst of pro-independence activity. Even North Korea may see
some political readjustments as Kim Jong Il considers younger cadre to
replace the ageing (and dieing) current officials.

In Southeast Asia, Vietnam will adjust its Party and government leadership
in parliamentary elections in May and Presidential elections in September
in line with its renewed economic opening as a new member of the World
Trade Organization. Thailand will be focused on the continued political
and social distress from the Sept. 2007 coup. The Philippines will
re-address defense relations with the United States around the legislative
elections in the second quarter. Even Australia has parliamentary election
in the fourth quarter.

In all, with the United States still heavily focused on Iraq and Iran, and
the U.S. Presidential race already in full swing, Asia grows more
introverted in 2007, as the key countries deal with domestic politics.
This is a year of preparation and transition.


Our annual forecast for East Asia once again revolves around China. For
2006, we noted that signs of instability in the Chinese economy would
become manifest, and they have. International ratings agencies issued
reports citing the massive inefficiencies and bad debts in the banking
system. Chinese state media has been rife with discussions of economic
problems. And well there is an abundance of individuals, state think tanks
and research institutes and government surveys highlighting the problems,
there is a dearth of concrete solutions.

That said, the Chinese government has been nothing if not masterful in
pushing back and making diffuse the impact of its economic troubles. From
a massive shell game with bad debt in the banking system (passing off the
problems to the Asset management Companies and inviting foreign banks to
buy stakes to flesh out the equity-to-debt ratio in the major banks) to
misdirection of public attention (to China's space program, the Olympic
preparations, and disagreements over interpretations of history with

As Beijing selectively treats the symptoms of years of inefficient
"Asian-style" economic planning, it is hoping push back the pain
indefinitely. Beijing wants neither the Japanese-style economic malaise
nor the sudden crash seen in East Asia in 1997. The central government has
thus far been unable to coerce or entice local and provincial leaders to
accede to the economic reforms, so Beijing is turning to a tried and true
method - sacking officials. The Sept. 2006 move against the leadership in
Shanghai was a warning shot, but will not be the end. Hu Jintao is
reshuffling the deck at the local and provincial levels ahead of an
overhaul of the top leadership at the party Congress later in the year.

This year will likely bring a new Vice president, along with several
replacements on the Central Committee and Politburo. While age will be the
given reason for the replacements, the underlying issue is the centrality
not only of the Party, but of Hu's leadership. He is cleaning house,
removing the remnants of the Jiang Zemin regime and any opposition to his
"new left" movement. Hu plans major changes in the economy, not the least
of which is recentralization. These changes wont come all at once, and
will be unlikely to begin in earnest until after the 2008 Olympics . But
the groundwork is being laid now.

Autocratic control from the center over the location and target of
investment and economic expansion will not be easy or painless, but Hu is
tightening the core of the Party and its various security organs in order
to deal with it. Beijing is looking to South Korea in the 1970s (under the
autocratic park Chung Hee) or Singapore in shaping its future economic
policies - tight control from the center, but relative freedom on the
edges, so long as it coincides with the government-set priorities. Social
and political opposition will be repressed in the name of stability and
strength. But this will really come in late 2008 or early 2009.

For now, Hu simply needs to lock in his control, ensure that the
leadership from the top down owes its loyalty to him and not to
foreign (or domestic) business interests. He is doing this through
purges, new guidelines for choosing local and provincial leaders, and
scheduled changes in the top echelons.

China faces two potential domestic security challenges in 2007; the July 1
10th anniversary of Hong Kong's revision to Chinese rule and the Aug. 1
80th anniver4sary of the People's Liberation Army. Both provide a high
profile target for domestic (and foreign-backed) opposition to stir
trouble. Beijing will be watching closely to prevent or dissuade acts by
pro-democracy and human rights activists, including those linked to the
Falun Gong. There are also rumblings that Uighur separatists may be
reforming after a decade of near silence, with the assistance and
instigation of Islamist militants in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

On the international front, Beijing will have two major issues to deal
with in 2007; rising talk of Taiwanese independence and trade frictions
with the new Democratic congress in the Untied States. As Taiwan nears
parliamentary elections ahead of the 2008 Presidential elections, outgoing
president Chen Shui-bian is set to increase his push for Taiwanese
independence. Even if it is ultimately just rhetoric, Beijing cannot brook
such actions, and is already warning of tensions.

Chen sees this year as a perfect opportunity to throw a monkey wrench in
Chinese politics. Beijing is desperate to keep the country stable and
attractive ahead of the 2008 Olympics, and Chen hopes China will be forced
to exercise restraint in dealing with his political posturing. But Chen
also sees his actions as a way to complicate the leadership changes in
China. Hu Jintao's supporters may be "left" in their future economic
plans, but they are also less interested in waving China's military might
around (at least until they have the domestic situation under control).
The Jiang faction Hu is ousting, however, is much more "hawkish" from a
military perspective, and debate over what to do about Taiwanese
independence moves will add a layer of turmoil into the upcoming CPC

Elsewhere in Northeast Asia, Japan's new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will
push ahead with plans to change the Constitution before the year is out.
Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has laid the framework, it is up
to Abe to build the new Japan - one that is structured like a "normal"
country, with a military unrestricted by a defeatist constitution. Japan
is looking to take a place in the world befitting its status as the second
largest economy, and to do so, it must alter its constitution and
restructure its Self Defense Force into a true military.

Tokyo will be much more active internationally, but the big battle is at
home, where the ruling LDP will have to prove itself to domestic
constituents in the July House of Councilor elections. Ultimately, the LDP
will win, but at home Abe and the LDPO must show that the hints of
economic recovery are sustainable. Considering the magnitude of Japan's
economic problems, Stratfor finds the recovery's survival unlikely.

Neighboring South Korea is dealing with its own political issues. The
general election in December will bring in a new president, as the current
rules only allow a single term. President Roh Moo Hyun's Uri party is
fracturing, and will collapse in short order, to rebuild itself under a
new name and new leadership. The re-named party will seek to distance
itself from Roh long before December, and with his party leaving, Roh will
focus his attention on a final push for his own national initiatives,
namely closer ties with North Korea and a restructured military that
allows South Korea to ultimately reduce its dependence upon the United

The conservative Grand National Party is looking set to win the December
elections, and that will bring a shift in relations wit the United States.
Unlike Roh, the GNP supports a stronger line against North Korea and
closer military integration with the United States. This will leave Roh
scrambling in his final months to lock in defense programs more fitting of
his view of the future. There will also be a major push by Roh for a
second inter-Korean summit before his term is up.

As for North Korea, there are some possibilities that new, younger leaders
start to take roles higher in the government. The 2006 nuclear test has,
from North Korea's view, solidified North Korea's position as a nuclear
power, and adds a greater sense of independence of action to the regime.
Pyongyang feels more secure against any potential U.S. attack, and has
re-strengthened ties with China to boot. Another nuclear test is not
unthinkable in 2007, and aside from additional sanctions on alcohol and
I-Pods, there seems little immediate the surrounding nations or the United
States will do. But North Korea's nuclear posturing does provide a lever
for China in dealing with the United States and a foil for Japan to
justify its expanding defense program.

In Southeast Asia, Thailand takes center stage. This former bastion of
economic stability (at least since recovering from the 1997 economic
crisis which was precipitated by the collapse of the Baht) is going
through one of its periodic upheavals. The coup leaders have not been able
to as quickly and aggressively gain control, and the ousted government and
its allies remain strong and emboldened. Social unrest in Bangkok is
likely to grow in the first two quarters of the year, and may come to a
head in the third quarter, ahead of the one-year anniversary of the coup.
Unless the military and interim regime crack down swiftly on the growing
opposition, stability and order may be something only beginning
to re-emerge in Thailand in the waning days of 2007.

This will only add to the allure of Vietnam, the region's newest entry
into the WTO. Hanoi has addressed many of the problems that ultimately
undermined its earlier attempts at economic opening and attracting foreign
investments. With FDI stagnating in China and places like Thailand and the
Philippines facing domestic political and social troubles, Vietnam becomes
the region's darling. This will also play into the parliament and
presidential elections, which will not be too contentious, but instead
will reflect the continued focus on anti-corruption and economic

In the Philippines, the defense relation with the United States will again
come to the forefront, and the lack of economic growth will tint the
parliament elections, weakening support for President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo. While Manila believes it has finally killed the remaining founder
of the Abu Sayyaf Group, its talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
appear to have fallen apart, and the fighting in southern Philippines may
flare up again in 2007.

In all, East Asia in 2007 is a region focused first and foremost on
domestic political issues, and secondarily on regional issues. The
region's economies will slow in 2007, further complicating the political
bickering. This is a year for transition, retrenchment, and preparation,
as the region's leaders anticipate a major shift in U.S, attitudes and
actions by the end of 2008, when U.S. presidential elections come. Until
then, Asia will look to itself, and the growing rivalry for regional
dominance between China and Japan will take greater shape closer to the
end of the year.


The trend for 2007 in the Former Soviet Union is going to be Russia's
consolidation of control over its internal affairs. As the parliamentary
and presidential elections approach, Russian President Vladimir Putin will
consolidate control over the country and its periphery, set himself for
his post-presidential career and install a successor who perpetuates his
policies. To that end, the significant <increase in military spending
268926> coupled with a foreign policy aimed to ensure Russia's domination
of its near abroad and control over strategic sectors of the economy will
further strengthen the Kremlin's hold on power.

Russia in 2006 has followed a policy of consolidating power within its
borders and in its near abroad. Since the influx of Western influence with
the color revolutions of the past several years, Moscow has sought to
reverse such advances and has managed to re-assert its influence in some
of the most essential regions along its borders.

Russia's relationship with the West, particularly the United States, was
punctuated in 2006 by confrontational moves. Although toward the end of
the year Moscow and Washington have brokered <several friendly deals
280915>, the two Cold War adversaries remain at odds. Moscow's strategy of
perpetuating conflict far from its borders in order to distract Washington
from meddling in its domain has lead to expanded Russian relations with
Iran, Syria, and to a certain extent, North Korea.

While relations between Russia and Ukraine, a key peripheral state, have
improved since the <installation 271356> of the pro-Russian Prime Minister
Viktor Yanukovich, Russia and Georgia are on increasingly worse terms.

Internally, Moscow has ramped up its <consolidation of control 274556>
over the sectors of the economy it considers strategic -- energy, precious
minerals and metals. Although sometimes the moves defy common economic
sense, the Kremlin deems it essential to <run the industries that bring it
the most income 281538>, even though state-controlled companies are not
always able to proficiently exploit the assets. Cracking down on dissent
has also been a part of the consolidation trend, with the deaths of former
FSB agent <Alexander Litvinenko 281243> and journalist Anna Politkovskaya
attributed to their outspoken opposition to the Kremlin.

The consolidation trend will continue and increase in 2007, as Russia
prepares for the parliamentary elections on Dec. 2 and the presidential
elections on March 2, 2008. Expansion of state control over the oil,
natural gas, gold, diamond and metals industries will be coupled by the
consolidation of political forces. As the electoral laws in Russia have
been changed to favor larger and more established parties, many groups
will seek to <coalesce into larger entities 272901>. While the pro-Kremlin
United Russia party is expected to take most of the seats in the
parliament with the ability to alter the constitution, the opposition
forces remain weak and unable to unite into a viable force. The new
parliament, much as the current one, will exist solely to implement the
president's will.

President Vladimir Putin will select a successor, and the two frontrunners
for that position are going to be expanding their public roles. Although
Putin will not make his choice until the last possible moment, and may yet
choose another candidate, <First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and
Defense Minister/Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov 258628> are the
current favorites. Putin will remain in a position of power, either by
remaining in office with the help of the newly-elected parliament, or by
assuming control over a strategic industry such as natural gas.

Internal consolidation will remain closely tied to expanding Russian
control over its periphery. Moscow has had considerable success
reasserting its influence in Ukraine following the <March parliamentary
elections 263947> and the installation of Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovich. The pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko has but one chance
to retain power, and it is not a good option -- to dismiss the parliament
and call early elections. In order for Yushchenko to retain a vestige of
power, the president will need to re-kindle the Orange Coalition with
former ally <Yulia Timoshenko 270427>, but the cost to the president will
be sharing his spotlight with the ambitious braided lady.

Ukraine's neighbor Belarus has experienced a significant deterioration of
relations with Russia over the past year. A <last-minute deal 282452> for
Russian supplies of natural gas signaled an end to Russian subsidization
of President Aleksandr Lukashenko's regime. Belarus will have to make
shifts in its economy, likely opening some industries to Western
investment in order to replace Russia's support. However, limited
investment will not alter Lukashenko's anti-Western outlook and he will
remain, on the whole, beholden to Russia. Conflict with the dominant
neighbor is expected to continue throughout the year, focusing on the
energy industry and bilateral trade.

Tensions are set to escalate in the Caucasus, as <conflict between Georgia
and Russia 276867> shows no signs of easing and Armenia and Azerbaijan
inch toward an escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As Georgia
further extricates itself from economic ties to Russia, the conflict over
the two secessionist regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, will intensify.
The Serbian province of Kosovo will almost certainly be granted
independence by the UN, prompting Russia to support the same status for
the secessionist entities outside its own borders. Russia may seek to
increase its presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia under the guise of
peacekeeping efforts, prompting Georgia to respond in kind. Given the poor
state of relations between Moscow and Tbilisi, escalation of conflict is
likely to be just short of outright war.

Azerbaijan has significantly increased its income from energy projects and
has pledged to spend approximately $1 billion on defense in 2007, up from
$700 million in 2006. Although Azerbaijan's military has been historically
inferior to Armenia's, the spending hike may bring increased confrontation
between the two over the Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh region in
Azerbaijan. When Kosovo's status is determined, the conflict will again
escalate, and a diplomatic solution is not likely in the near future.

In Central Asia, the death of Turkmenistan's president-for-life
<Saparmurat Niyazov 282229> has prompted Russia, China and other regional
players to attempt to project increased influence onto the <energy-rich
state 282190>. Acting President <Gurbanguly Berdimukhammedov 282316> is
the certain winner of the Feb. 11 poll, but the shape of his agenda
remains unclear as not much is known about the man. While neighboring
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will want to assure that Turkmenistan is
friendly, or at least innocuous, Russia has a keen interest in maintaining
control over the world's fifth-largest natural gas deposits. If the new
president is unwilling to cooperate with Moscow, the Kremlin would seek to
insure that he will not hold office for long, with the available tools
ranging from political pressure to assassination.

In the context of Russia's move to establish a more solid presence in
Central Asia via Turkmenistan, neighboring states, particularly Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan, would become increasingly concerned for their own
sovereignty. While Astana remains politically loyal to Moscow, it has
economic partnerships with Western, Indian, South Korean and Chinese
companies to name a few, particularly in the lucrative energy sector.
Should Moscow's nearby presence become disconcerting to Astana, it may
seek to counterbalance Russia and expand its relationship with Beijing,
who is looking for an increased role in Central Asia.

Uzbekistani President Islam Karimov is also likely to be concerned for his
regime as Russian influence expands. Karimov is likely to keep turning
over control of energy assets to Russia in order to preserve his own rule
while also keeping open the option to turn to China. However, as long as
the Russians do not employ heavy-handed tactics in Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan both will seek to perpetuate the existing

Russia has also been looking to expand its influence in Africa.
Closer relations are likely in 2007, as Moscow forgives Soviet-era debt
and looks to increase cooperation in the mining sector. As Russia
consolidates control over its own industries, expanding into Africa and
other regions may be the next step toward gaining increasing control over
the world deposits of high-value commodities. But for this to work Moscow
has to do something in Africa that it has been loathe to do at home:
invest its own money. Should Russia do that, things will get very serious
very quickly.

Russia will attempt to maintain a status quo in its relations with the
United States and Europe in order to focus on domestic issues. However,
Moscow will continue to cooperate with <Iran 281871>, Syria, <the
Hamas-led Palestinian government 262222> and other regimes considered
unfriendly to the United States. With these relationships, Russia gains
profit from arms and equipment sales and derails Washington's goals in the
region while dividing its attention. Relations with European leaders are
not likely to see improvement, as German Chancellor Angela Merkel focuses
on the EU presidency in the first half of the year and whoever is elected
the next French leader will not favor Russia.


The year 2006 most significant development was the reemergence of Germany
as a major global power. Chancellor Angela Merkel, now with a year of
experience under her belt, now faces a rare opportunity. Germany is the
only country in Europe -- indeed, globally -- that is not undergoing a
major leadership transition in 2007, making Germany the country with the
greatest opportunity to impact European and global. Merkel's only
challenge is not biting off more than she can chew.

In Europe in 2007,

France's de Gaullist era will end.

Charles de Gaulle believed that France was more than simply a middle sized
Continental power, but in actuality a global power. As such he felt it was
France's duty and right to punch well above its weight on the world stage,
a mindset that often put it at odds -- and at times nearly violent
opposition -- to U.S. policy. A united Europe in many ways was his
brainchild as it was a means for suppressing German nationalism and
diverting German energy into actualizing de Gaulle's view of the world.
Ultimately de Gaulle's goal was to use Europe as a platform from which
France could act as a credible global power.

French President Jacques Chirac is the most recent torch bearer of the de
Gaullist legacy and has been at or near the top of the French political
system for 33 years. While his, and his de Gaullist predecessors,
successes in uniting Europe should never be ignored, the expansion of the
European Union has reduced the possibility of a European superpower to
that of a mere idea. The United Kingdom would never allow itself to be
subservient to Paris, Europe's neutrals want no part in a common military
policy, and the states of Central Europe feel more kinship with the United
States than they ever have with France. But most of all it is Germany's
reawakening that has killed de Gaulle's vision. With Germany once again
making policy that is more sophisticated than "I'm sorry" and developing
interests independent of Paris, France simply lacks the economic,
political and demographic heft to be the leader of Europe. A powerful
state with an undeniable stake in the Continent's future? Sure. But the
preeminent leader of a superpower? Never.

Stratfor will not attempt to call the outcome of France's April/May 2007
presidential elections. Socialist Segolene Royal and conservative Nicholas
Sarkozy for now appear evenly matched. They disagree on a number of issues
from crime to immigration to globalization to labor reform. But on one
thing they agree: de Gaulle's legacy has failed, and it is time to try
something else.

France will still be a powerful vibrant state, but it will be a France
with a more realistic view of its place in the world. This may prove to
bring it more power rather than less as it focuses inward on reform or on
revitalizing relations with powers such as London, Washington or Warsaw
that de Gaulle would have chaffed out. But what is sure is that France
will no longer seek to lead Europe on its own, and this if nothing else
will serve as punctuation on European attempts to form a superpower.

The implications of such an abandonment are deep and many. They include,
but are hardly limited to:

Any serious talk of a special partnership with Russia will end, laying the
groundwork for more businesslike -- and colder -- relations.

A collapse of most common European positions, such as they are, on foreign
policy issues leading to a large-scale removal of a "European" approach to
global issues in which the EU does not have a direct economic interest.

Outside powers will have the opportunity to play individual European
powers against each other, something of critical importance when one
considers that each of the Union's 27 powers retains veto power over many
EU policy realms

France is on the cusp of change. In May it will have a new president, in
June a new parliament, and the country -- and the Continent -- will never
be the same.

Germany's term as the president of the EU and the G8 risks failure due to

Germany is one of the few major powers in the world that is not likely to
be wrapped up in internal developments in 2007. Russia, the United States,
South Korea and China are all gearing up for elections; France, the United
Kingdom and Egypt are managing leadership transitions. But in reemerging
Germany there exists the opportunity not only to impact the international
system for the first time since WWII, but to do so with relatively little
interference from anyone else. As a bonus, Germany also will hold the EU
and G8 presidencies in 2007, expanding its opportunities for leadership.

This does not, however, mean that Berlin will be successful.

The EU presidency is a funny thing, rotating as it does in six-month
stints between the member states giving Malta and Luxembourg as much time
to shape the agenda as it does to the Union's powerhouses. Normally, it is
only the Union's largest states who wield the power and authority to
impact EU-wide policies in a meaningful fashion and since it is Germany
who holds the presidency for the first half of 2007 this will be the
Union's best chance to fix its various institutional problems.

Successful EU presidencies are marked by the choice of one or two specific
manageable, attainable programs for which no major EU state opposes
progress. For example, the most successful EU presidencies in the past
several years have been Finland (1999), Sweden (2001) and Spain (2002)
which dealt with Kosovo, demographics and terrorism, respectively. During
all three presidencies the leaders of those states selected topics upon
which there was little disagreement and in some cases an agreed-upon
urgency to address.

In contrast the most spectacular failed presidencies were Belgium (2001)
and the United Kingdom (2004). In both cases the states' leaders took on
controversial topics that faced deep opposition: establishing an EU-wide
tax and reforming the Common Agricultural Policy, respectively.

Germany seems set to attempt to rectify Europe's institutional problems.
Currently the EU uses the same decision-making structure that existed when
the EU's predecessor, the European Economic Community, was founded in 1948
with but six members. As of January 1, 2007 with the admission of Bulgaria
and Romania the EU now sports 27 members. States have the right to veto
any policy for which they disagree ranging from foreign and military to
cheese and legal policies. The Union as such is largely ungovernable and
is in dire need or reform. German Chancellor Angela Merkel wants to use
her turn in the big chair to dust of the European constitution and
establish a roadmap for its ratification.

In this she will fail. The constitution, while far from perfect, would
somewhat streamline the EU's decision-making process and lessen the use of
national vetoes. Merkel wants to see the constitution adopted in full as
it currently reads. However, two of the Union's most pro-integration
states -- France (under de Gaullist Chirac no less) and the Netherlands --
have already voted down the constitution in national referendums. Like all
important (and many unimportant) decisions, all EU members must approve
the constitution for it to take effect.

Put another way, it is an already-failed document with no future. If
anything, Merkel achieving success on restarting the ratification process
could well prove to be the worst of all worlds. Two Europhilic states have
already voted it down (and are likely to do so again), while the first
time around it never even went before the euroskeptic electorates of
Poland and the United Kingdom. While such a document is essential if
Europe is to federalize, unfortunately for Europeanists it is an
unapprovable document.

Letting it die its ignoble death in France and the Netherlands would have
been the smartest action. Letting it die now would be the second best. But
burning resources now to go through motions of submitting it to another
preordained death is simply a waste of one of Europe's last chances to
reform (Aside from the upcoming French presidency in 2008, another major
EU power -- Italy, hardly the harbinger of logical organization -- does
not take the reins until 2014). It is time for Europe to cut its losses
and work with what they have. The decision to do just that will ultimately
be made -- just not in 2007.

And it is not as if the doomed constitution is the only project that
Merkel aims to tackle. By luck of the draw Merkel will be in the big chair
when potential crises in Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia come to a head, she'll
bear the responsibility of relaunching partnership talks with the Russians
and she wants to initiate free trade talks with the Americans. Any of
these issues would make for a busy presidency, and Merkel's ambition risks
making her fail at all of them -- although we have to give her kudos for
trying. Still, even if Germany fails to implement its agenda, it the only
major power that has the freedom to set one.

The Balkans will explode into genocidal warfare...or not

Stratfor hates to be wishy-washy about our forecasts but in this case we
have no choice. On Jan. 21 Serbs go to the polls and vote for parliament.
The results of this election will shape the Balkans for at least the next
decade. There are two possible -- and diametrically opposed -- outcomes.

In the first instance, the Serbian Radicals -- the radical nationalist
junior partners in the coalition government led by Slobodan Milosevic
which launched the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s -- attain a majority hold on
the government. They will quickly do all they can to secure an alliance
with Russia in order to obtain diplomatic cover for their actions, and
will then encourage their ethnic compatriots in Bosnia to secede and
formally join with Belgrade (something the Bosnian Serbs have been trying
to do for years).

After that the Radical would encourage ethnic Serbs in Bosnia to launch a
campaign of terror to regain territory they believe is "theirs." Barring
swift and decisive intervention by Western forces willing to ignore
Russian protestations, Serbia would likely repeat this action in
Montenegro, and could then even move regular military forces into Kosovo
to prevent a Western-led international effort to grant the province

Or then again something else entirely might happen.

Should the Radicals lose in the Jan. 21 elections Belgrade instead the
country will likely be led by a two-party pro-Western government, giving
Serbia its most stable and agreeable government ever. Such a government
would likely ramrod through anti-corruption and economic liberalization
reforms and quickly become a poster child in the EU membership race.

Our advice? If you are a Serb, vote Jan. 21. This election counts.


The 2006 annual forecast accurately forecasted a divergence of activity
between major political power involvement in African political affairs in
2006. We accurately forecasted that the fastest-emerging world economic
players, led by China, will significantly expand their ties in Sub Saharan
African countries-countries including Sudan, Nigeria, and others such as
South Africa and Zambia-in order to secure its access to the continent's
natural resources.

While we correctly anticipated the United States and European Union would
be less active in Sub Saharan Africa in 2006, and would not prevent
secondary powers from expanding their influence in Africa, this is not to
say that the U.S. and others would not at least maintain their political
engagements in Africa. Accordingly, we expected, and saw clearly that the
U.S. and Europeans would remain engaged with several African countries on
security matters. We correctly forecasted that the U.S. would engage
countries in the Horn of Africa region-notably Ethiopia, Djibouti, and
Kenya-to contain the spread of terrorism and jihadist ideology. In the
Democratic Republic of the Congo we saw the European Union take the
international community's lead with providing peacekeeping troops to make
efforts to quell insurgent elements during the lead up to that country's
historic national elections in 2006.

2006 saw political crises preoccupy the continents' major powers, South
Africa and Nigeria, calls that Stratfor made. South Africa faced severe
political turmoil because of problems within the ruling African National
Congress (ANC) party associated with the rape and corruption trial of
former Deputy President Jacob Zuma. Nigeria experienced significant
political problems associated with the attempt by President Olusegun
Obasanjo to amend the country's constitution that would have permitted him
a third presidential term. Nigeria also experienced a significant rise in
the number of militant group attacks on the country's oil infrastructure,
with the attacks on oil fields, pipelines, and personnel causing a
reduction in oil output.

In 2007 Africa will experience continued jockeying for resources, bidding
wars over oil and gas and minerals concessions as countries from the U.S.
to Russia to China to India will scramble to control and have access to
Africa's natural resources.

Africa's leading oil producer, Nigeria, will experience an increase in
nation-wide political violence and violence in the Niger Delta as that
country heads to presidential elections in April. Umaru Musa Yaradua,
governor of the northern Katsina state, who was nominated in December 2006
as the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) candidate, will likely
become Nigeria's next president, succeeding Olusegun Obasanjo. Opposition
parties will strive to band together in an attempt to unseat the PDP, but
personality clashes will prevent the opposition from uniting successfully,
as presidential aspirants including Atiku Abubakar of the Action Congress
party and former military ruler and All Nigeria People's Party
presidential candidate Muhammadu Buhari will not be willing to yield to
the other, and as a result will divide the opposition vote.

While Nigeria gears up for presidential elections, violence will intensify
in the Niger Delta region. In addition to carrying out attacks against
the region's oil infrastructure in order to bring attention to their
perceived socio-economic grievances, militant groups will be used as pawns
by politicians striving to fill their campaign coffers and to oppose the
effective extension of Obasanjo's rule through his chosen successor in

Angola will emerge the region's wildcard thanks to an increasingly stable
political environment that is no longer diverted in order to quell
domestic insurgent groups. No longer needing to fight Cabindan
secessionists, having struck a peace deal in 2006 with rebels in the
country's oil rich province, Luanda will drive an increasingly hard
bargain for its oil and mineral concessions, and to do so will become
increasingly aggressive internationally by joining OPEC and strengthening
partnerships with Russia and China. Angola's increased assertiveness will
be paid close attention to in South Africa, as Pretoria will be wary of
Luanda's moves as threatening to its hegemony over southern Africa.
Angola country will make moves towards holding elections for the first
time since 1992, and will carry out registration exercises in 2007 in
anticipation of presidential elections to be held in 2008. Intense
political maneuvering will occur in 2007, as President Eduardo Dos Santos
will use the year to identify and promote his chosen successor.

South Africa will continue to be paralyzed by ANC party infighting as the
ruling political party holds its leadership congress in late 2007. The
government will continue to malign former Deputy President Jacob Zuma to
prevent him from contesting the party, and, by extension, state
presidencies. South Africa begins 2007 with a two-year rotating seat on
the United Nations Security Council, and while it will strive to
strengthen its role as a mediator of conflicts in Africa and elsewhere,
its internal divisions will prevent it from realizing this perceived lofty
goal. South Africa will find itself in greater political conflict with
its regional neighbor, Angola, due to the latter's increased confidence
and assertiveness as a result of a recent peace deal that paved the way
for Luanda to consolidate its control over all of Angola including the
Cabinda province. Increased Russian and Chinese activity in Africa will
cause alarm in Pretoria who, while on the one hand welcome the investment
and cooperation these country's will offer, will increasingly resent the
narrow terms and conditions that will accompany their involvement. As a
result, South Africa will increasingly position itself as Africa's
champion to resist what will be perceived to be renewed colonial

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, with Joseph Kabila's recent election
as president, will translate its increasingly stable political system into
a vehicle to generate greater foreign investment. Kabila will present
himself as a democratic leader who is also able to mediate regional
conflicts, but he'll spend most of his time consolidating his control at
home and selling mineral concessions. Insurgent groups operating in the
country's largely ungoverned eastern regions will continue to fester, but
not threaten Kabila's hold on power, and as a result Kabila will devote
scant more attention to resolving the simmering rebellion in the country's
east that is led by disaffected Tutsi rebels. Recent losing presidential
candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba will contest Kabila's hold on power from a
position of opposition political leader in the country's senate.

Sudan will continue to be embroiled by conflict in its Darfur and southern
regions. Despite widespread international condemnation to accept one, no
United Nations peacekeeping force will touch ground in Darfur. President
al-Bashir will accept a token reinforcement of the existing African Union
mission in Darfur, a force that has proven to be unable at containing the
humanitarian crisis that attracted significant international attention in

Ethiopia will maintain its intervention in Somalia in order to prevent the
resurgence of that country's Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC). At
the same time, Ethiopia will face an increasing threat from domestic
insurgent groups demanding greater autonomy, indeed, independence, from
its Oromo and Ogaden regions, in addition to a conventional threat from
neighboring Eritrea. Facing deep hostility in Somalia and significant
tensions at home, Ethiopia will raise calls for an international
peacekeeping force from non-neighboring African countries to Somalia to
pacify the Islamists and reinforce the country's otherwise powerless
Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Uncertainty surrounding a
deployment of international peacekeepers, with little confidence held by
most Somalis towards the ability of the TFG to provide law and order,
combined with a defeated SICC, means that Somalia will likely return to
what most Somalis know best: clan-based warfare.

Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe will come under increasing pressure
from his population to resolve that country's deteriorating economic
crisis. Spiraling inflation and the inability of the population to feed
itself will bring more and more civic opposition to Mugabe's rule, against
whom Mugabe will increasingly rely on the country's security forces to
contain. Mugabe's recent moves to extend his presidential term an
additional two years until 2010 is aimed to keep in check challengers from
his close ruling circle within the ZANU-PF party apparatus, but should
Mugabe begin to show signs that his elderly age (he turns 83 this year) is
catching up to him, Mugabe will find his grip on power being forcefully
challenged by members of the ZANU-PF ruling elite.

Cote d'Ivoire will remain a divided country, as President Laurent Gbagbo
maintains his grip on power in the southern half of that country that has
been divided since a failed coup attempt in 2002 led to civil war. Gbagbo
will continue to use revenues generated from the proceeds of cocoa and
coffee sales to enforce his rule and arm the country's army and his
private militias. The big question will be on the United Nations and
French peacekeeping forces that are enforcing the Zone of Confidence that
is keeping the two sides apart. Should the UN and French troops depart,
nothing would be in the way of fresh combat to ensure. Ensuing combat is
a situation the UN and French want to avoid, yet maintaining the status
quo comes at a cost: Gbagbo is effectively protected from any threat to
his hold on power, and is thus disincentivized from striking any peace
deal that incorporates the 3.5 million northerners that are opposed to
Gbagbo's rule because of their exclusion from Ivorian citizenship and full
social, economic, and political participation.


The year 2006, as Stratfor expected, witnessed little progress in the
normalization process between India and Pakistan. Though the Kashmiri
militant group Laskhar-e-Taiba succeeded in pulling off a deadly railway
attack in Mumbai in July, relations between the rival countries remained
it the usual state of distrust, preventing any major breakthroughs from
taking place. In Pakistan we noted that Pakistani President Gen. Pervez
Musharraf would face a galvanized opposition and would be forced to deal
with a decision on whether or not to stay on as the country's military
chief. Musharraf successfully staved off opposition attempts to unseat
him, allowing him to keep his dual portfolio as president and military
chief. In line with the 2006 forecast, the Baloch nationalist insurgency
added to Musharraf's list of worries, which he dealt with through a
combination of military and negotiation tactics.

Stratfor's forecast that India's leftist parties would develop a stronger
presence in the government and further hamper Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh's privatization efforts was correct. India also worked to
expand its global influence through the signing of a landmark civilian
nuclear deal with the United States. The insurgencies in Nepal and Sri
Lanka remained significant in 2006, though Stratfor failed to predict in
the annual forecast that the Maoist rebels and the political alliance in
Kathmandu would be able to forge a power-sharing agreement and strip the
king of his powers.

The big focus for South Asia in 2007 will be on the Pakistani political
scene, as the country gears up for general elections slated for Jan. 15,
2008. Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf battled a heavy wave of
domestic criticism this past year, exacerbated by continued U.S. pressure
on Pakistan to cooperate on the counterterrorism front and U.S. airstrikes
on Pakistani soil against Taleban and al Qaeda targets that resulted in a
high number of civilian casualties. Despite flying accusations that
Musharraf spent too much time hobnobbing with U.S. officials in
Washington, rather than defending Pakistan's territorial integrity, the
General has developed a solid strategy to secure his re-election and
outmaneuver the main opposition forces in the country, namely the Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) led by exiled former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) led by ousted Pakistani
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal coalition of
Islamist parties.

Musharraf currently has a comfortable majority in the sitting parliament
to help him win a re-election bid, but cannot be assured of his standing
after the general elections are held and a new parliament comes to power.
To consolidate his hold over the government, Musharraf will bend the rules
and schedule a legislative vote ahead of the general election to re-elect
him to another five-year term. There is a possibility that Musharraf may
even attempt to bypass this step by calling snap elections in the spring
of 2007 if he feels confident enough in his ability to win. The
legislative election results will also be rigged as needed to allow
Musharraf's parliamentary allies to hold onto their seats. The opposition
forces will then use the allegations of a rigged election to hold street
demonstrations, but are unlikely to muster enough support to seriously
affect the election results. Musharraf will continue a careful strategy to
prevent the PPP, the PML-N and the MMA from uniting in a potent opposition
force by hinting at making deals with the various opposition leaders,
thereby fueling distrust between the already severely divided parties.
Musharraf will also be able to hold onto his position as military chief
this year.

Musharraf's biggest threat to his election plan is the potential for
large-scale U.S. military activity on Pakistani soil that would undermine
the military's confidence in the General and turn public support against
him. To enhance his domestic image, the Pakistani president will distance
himself from Washington in the coming year and become even more restrained
in cooperating with U.S. forces on the counterterrorism front.

Pakistan's relations with Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government will
further deteriorate this year as the Taleban insurgency strengthens. The
Taliban will continue to oppose NATO forces in Afghanistan and launch a
spring offensive. It is unlikely that NATO will have the capacity to surge
troop levels and redouble reconstruction efforts. Nevertheless,
Afghanistan will remain -- at least for this year -- a priority for the
alliance. As the Taliban does not have the strength to take the country
from NATO forces -- nor are NATO forces willing to let things slip that
far -- 2007 in Afghanistan will look much like 2006. Security operations
will continue and Taliban forces will improve their tactics and build on
operational successes.

India will be closely eyeing political developments in Pakistan, privately
preferring the continuation of Musharraf's relatively stable regime. While
the show of the peace process will go on, the Indian government will
politely rebuff Musharraf's proposals to resolve the long-standing Kashmir
dispute, which will be made primarily in the interest of boosting his
credibility at home by pushing the Kashmir talks forward against a
recalcitrant India. For India, continued Pakistani support for Kashmiri
militant groups remains the blocker to any meaningful progress in the
Kashmir negotiations.

Kashmiri militant groups operating in India are stepping up their efforts
to stage attacks designed to incite communal tensions between Hindus and
Muslims and revitalize the Kashmir cause among Indian Muslims. These
attacks, however, have largely become routinized in India, allowing
incidents like the July 2006 Mumbai railway bombings to come and go
without any notable shift in Indian society and policy. Kashmiri militant
groups could attempt to vary their target set from the usual crowded
market and transportation sites in major cities to the country's
much-valued IT sector. Such an attack would succeed in forcing an Indian
response and threaten the country's ability to sustain a healthy inflow of
foreign investment. But the Pakistani government and intelligence service
has largely maintained its hold over these militant groups to prevent them
from altering their modus operandi in India. Particularly while in the
heat of the election season, the Pakistani regime will be uninterested in
provoking a major conflict with India. That said, Kashmiri militant groups
will likely succeed in carrying out another large attack in a major Indian
city this year that would fall in line with their usual target selection
of markets, transportation hubs and tourist sites. Such an attack will
increase tensions on both sides of the border and lead India to implicate
the Pakistani regime, but the Indian government led by Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh is unlikely to respond with a major military confrontation
against Pakistan.

India's attention will primarily be absorbed by domestic political and
social issues. No major shift in the Indian political landscape is
expected to take place in the coming year. The main opposition Bharatiya
Janata Party is suffering from internal divisions and lacks the capability
to seriously threaten the ruling Congress party's hold on power. The main
headache for the Congress party will come from its allies in the Left
front, who will continue to link up with powerful trade unions to resist
Singh's privatization efforts and labor policies. As a result, Singh's
government will need to turn more toward populist politics in an attempt
to quell domestic unrest.

Barring a significant attack by Kashmiri militants on India's IT sector in
2007, the country should experience sustained economic growth in the eight
percent range, similar to the past year. India's economic focus will be
on expanding its automotive, steel, aviation and IT sectors, though
substantial growth will be hampered by political considerations and slow
infrastructural growth.

The Left front will also make noise over the Singh government's growing
alliance with Washington. India and the United States will cement the
landmark civilian nuclear deal this year through a bilateral treaty, but
Singh will maintain a multilateral foreign policy agenda to tame the left
opposition and avoid getting caught in any binding agreements with the
United States on imposing punitive measures against Iran.

India will also be keeping a watchful eye on its porous northeastern
border, where a political crisis in Bangladesh spells worrying
implications for increased militant traffic into India. General elections
in Bangladesh are scheduled for Jan. 23, but there is a strong possibility
that they will be delayed by the caretaker government. The main opposition
led by Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League likely has the numbers to win a
majority against the ruling Bangladesh National Party led by Hasina's
bitter rival, Khaleda Zia, but has damaged its secular credentials by
allying with one of Bangladeh's most notable radical Islamist parties - a
politically opportunistic move that has dismayed a large number of voters.
The Awami League has announced a boycott of the polls until the head of
the caretaker government, who favors the rival BNP, is replaced and
assurances are made by the BNP that the elections will be free and fair.
The polls are guaranteed to be rigged under the caretaker government, but
the Awami League is trying to level the playing field before it takes
part. After a series of negotiations and violent demonstrations, the BNP
will likely give in to some of the Awami League's demands in order to
allow the elections to take place. Nonetheless, the results are bound to
be disputed, and Bangladesh will continue to be wracked by political
violence for much of the year.

Whether the Awami League or BNP emerges victorious means little in the
larger strategic view of Bangladesh - the instability caused by the
warring parties is unlikely to wane under either party. But the political
developments in Bangladesh will be a cause for concern for India, as the
rival political factions turn increasingly toward radical Islamist parties
for coalition support. The growing Islamist influence in Bangladesh will
give rise to radical groups that will play host to jihadist and Kashmiri
militant operatives with an interest in launching attacks in India. The
Indian government will make moves to attempt to secure its northeastern
border, but is unlikely to intervene directly in Bangladesh.

To India's south, the undeclared civil war in Sri Lanka between the Tamil
Tiger rebels and Sri Lankan armed forces will escalate this year in heavy
tit-for-tat fighting as the Sri Lankan army attempts to divide the Tamil
northern and eastern strongholds in the country. Neither the Tamil Tiger
rebels nor the Sri Lankan army has a clear advantage over the other to
launch a sustained offensive that would result in a decisive victory for
either side. India will be concerned with the flow of Tamil refugees
flowing into the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, but cannot afford to
fully throw its support behind the Sri Lankan government for fear of
alienating India's sizable Tamil population. The ongoing instability in
Sri Lanka will give India's regional adversaries, namely Pakistan and to a
lesser extent China, the opportunity to meddle in India's backyard and
escalate the conflict by proving arms support for the Sri Lankan
government. These parties are more interested in ensuring Sri Lanka
remains in a protracted state of crisis to keep India's hands tied down,
rather than giving the Sri Lankan army the capability to wipe out the
Tamil Tiger forces.

India will at least have one border to worry less about this year.
Political developments in Nepal in 2006 have reached a point where the
Maoist rebels now have a solid opportunity to integrate themselves in the
country's political and military apparatuses. Parliamentary elections will
be held in April 2007, giving the Maoists a chance to formally enter the
government. Though this should be a relatively stable year for Nepal,
bursts of instability can be expected as dissident Maoist factions resist
the integration effort. A return to a militant insurgency is unlikely, but
extortion, kidnappings and economic blockades remain usable options for
the Maoists.


Putting together a wide variety of U.S.-based information -- weak housing
market, stubbornly high inflation, robust energy prices, flagging worker
productivity, and an inverted yield curve -- Stratfor has come to the
conclusion that the United States economy is at the beginning of 2007
enmeshed in an
economic slowdown>. The expansion of the past four years -- which has
averaged an impressive 3.4 percent per quarter -- is over and the system
needs to take a bit of a breather.

Now slowdown does not equal recession (although Stratfor are not out
ruling a very shallow one). The foundations of the U.S. economy --
emphasis on technology, a well developed infrastructure, a culture of that
rewards risk taking, an educated workforce, etc. -- remain in place and
this slowdown is simply a cyclical downturn, not a symptom of a broader
structural deficiency. Furthermore, the maturing of the U.S. baby boomer
generation means that their retirement savings are making the world awash
with capital. This is keeping interest rates far lower than they would
"normally" be, and should contribute to that often-sought-after "soft"
landing for the American economy.

As such Stratfor expects the slowdown to evaporate sometime in the third
quarter, although if past proves prologue the media will be recognizing
that the U.S. slowdown is for real about the time it has ended.

With the question of "how bad will it be?" answered, there is only one
left: "how far will it spread?"

The country that will likely get the worst of it will be Japan.
Japan's economic problems> are nothing new, but they were held in abeyance
in 2006 due to strong consumer spending. But that spending is ultimately
dependent upon confidence, and in 2006 had the benefit of an experienced
charismatic leader, one Junichiro Koizumi. His successor, Shinzo Abe,
lacks Koizumi's gravitas, track record and bitchin' haircut. That -- plus
long-over due efforts to get serious about axing
< extra
spending> -- will combine with less demand from the United States to
engineer a similar slowdown in the Land of the Rising Sun. By the latter
part of the year, Japan will even risk slipping back into the economic
catharsis that ruled it from 1990 to 2004. This will be the year that Abe
will demonstrate that he has the skills to keep Japan on economic life
support -- or not.

Contrary to our expectations -- and a raft of data released early in the
year -- 2006 turned out to be a banner year for the Europeans. While some
of the shine came off of this growth late in the year, it certainly
remains impressive by European standards. Growth is strongest in Germany,
but is hardly paltry in the other major economies. And for the now 12
states that only recently the European Union, the mix of an expanded
market and EU support payments made 2006 an excellent year.

It would doubly surprise us, however, were it able to sustain itself in
the New Year. The euro is close to historical highs; the last time this
happened the slowdown in European exports nearly caused a recession in and
of itself. Furthermore, Italy and Germany -- who comprise about half of
the eurozone -- are implementing sharp tax increases as of January 1 as
part of their budget balancing efforts which will undoubtedly cool down
growth. Add in a rising housing bubble in several European economies that
makes the U.S. housing surge of the past few years look downright paltry
and it is extremely unlikely that Europe will be able to replicate
anything approaching its 2006 feat.

The likely exceptions will be the 12 Central European and Mediterranean
states who have joined the EU since 2004. However, since their economies
comprise only about 5 percent of total EU GDP, their strength will have
little impact on combined Europe's bottom line. And before one waxes
philosophic about "shining Europe" bear in mind exactly what a "banner
year" means: 1.9 percent growth for the eurozone. That is impressive
growth for Europe, but rather sedate from Asian or American points of


Stratfor has been pessimistic about the long-term stability of the Chinese
economic system for some time now. The core problem is that in Asia
capital is treated as a political good to be distributed on the basis of
achieving social goals. In contrast the West broadly uses capital as an
end in and of itself. Put another way, Asia splashes its money about to
ensure high employment and cares little for its rates of return, while the
West prefers a niggardly approach that seeks to maximize efficiency. This
makes the Western economies far more adaptable and sustainable, while the
Asian economies grow more quickly -- but also suffer from cataclysmic
crashes when their inefficiencies overwhelm them.

In the past decade those inefficiencies have sparked two very different
days of reckoning. In Japan social cohesion was sufficient that Tokyo
proved able to force excruciatingly slow and piecemeal changes to the
system. Japan has finally emerged from (parts of) its dysfunction, but
only after 15 years of near-zero growth. In contrast, in 1997 Indonesia
fell apart nearly overnight because its political and economic systems
were not as unified as Japan's and Jakarta authorities lacked Tokyo's
credibility with its populace.

China is a different place. Its political authorities' credibility, like
its level of economic development, is between Japan and Indonesia. It
cannot afford a Japanese-style malaise, but at the same time it does not
live in fear of an Indonesian-style collapse. But perhaps Beijing's
greatest advantage is awareness. Not only have they witnessed the Japanese
and the Indonesian trials and tribulations, but so too have then studied
the Soviet collapse. This is not a country hurtling headlong into
oblivion, ideologically blinded from sensing its problems. The Chinese
know that the bad loan problem is at the heart of their financial weakness
and unlike the Soviets, Japanese or Indonesians before them are taking
steps to address it.

At the core of Chinese strategy are efforts to slow the country's
breakneck economic growth by forcing the rational, Western-style, use of
capital and introducing the market discipline that is common in the West.
In this they have largely failed as those benefiting from the old system
have the power to ignore central government dictats. Since the central
government began taking firm steps to limit growth, it has only

Which leaves them to manage the problem they cannot solve. China has done
this in two ways. First, they have relocated the bulk of the bad loans to
asset management companies, allowing them with some credibility to declare
their state banks clean. Such banks can then approach international
entities -- whether institutional or equity -- for investment and
managerial assistance in changing the way the banks do business. The bad
loans are still there, just shifted into another arm of the government.

The second technique is more basic: lie. According to the official
government position, no Chinese state bank has made a single bad loan
since 2003***. Put techniques one and two together and you have -- on
paper -- a financial system in remarkably healthy shape.

This is but one way of myriad creative ways in which the Chinese are
managing their problems, but all the successful means have one
characteristic in common: the techniques are political and security in
nature, not economic or financial. The state is managing the transition by
adjusting Chinese expectations and making fundamental changes in behavior.
The Chinese economic system has escaped the central government's control,
and the government is now using non-economic tools in its attempts to
reassert control.

For 2007 this means that while the underlying core of the Chinese system
is as socially unstable and economically irrational as ever, the Chinese
are succeeding in using threats, lies, nationalism and force to keep it
from melting down. A sort of political reckoning that was started when Hu
Jintao took command began to gather traction in 2006, and could well prove
painful in 2007. Subconsciously, foreigners have noticed the difference in
timber in China. FDI, while still large, is no longer growing, and many
foreign firms are either looking for ways to hedge themselves against
government dictats or examining alternate investment locations such as
South Korea, Vietnam or the Philippines.

China's leaders are both aware and creative, and the Chinese economy's
fall will not happen this year (nor likely in 2008 as the patriotic burst
from the Olympics will help Beijing hold the center), but do not confuse
growth with strength, or market share with profit. China's problems are
mounting, not getting solved.