WikiLeaks logo
The Global Intelligence Files,
files released so far...

The Global Intelligence Files

Search the GI Files

The Global Intelligence Files


Re: FOR QUICK COMMENT - Iran sanctions insight update

Released on 2013-02-13 00:00 GMT

Email-ID 1106254
Date 2010-12-20 18:31:51
On 12/20/10 11:13 AM, Reva Bhalla wrote:

** adding links

STRATFOR sources have reported a heavy security presence in Tehran as
Iran moved ahead Dec. 20 in making drastic cuts to gasoline subsidies,
sending gasoline prices soaring from the heavily subsidized rate of 38
cents a gallon to $1.44 a gallon. While Western media is characterizing
the subsidy cuts as undeniable proof of the success of a U.S.-led
sanctions campaign targeting Iran**s gasoline imports, a STRATFOR
Iranian source with connections to the regime has offered an alternative
interpretation, one that may give Iran much more room to maneuver in
upcoming nuclear negotiations than what meets the eye.

The source claims that the ongoing US-Iran negotiations are being viewed
positively by the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad**s
administration. He attributed Iran**s willingness to engage in the next
round of nuclear talks in late January primarily to Iran**s current
economic situation. The latest round of international sanctions that
took effect this past summer provided an opportunity to more risk-prone
gasoline suppliers to continue providing gasoline to the Islamic
Republic, albeit at high premiums. The financial pressures forced
Tehran to reduce its imports substantially and divert more of its
petrochemical complexes toward gasoline production. i would make these
two points later on in this para, after the part about diverting
investment to gov't bonds, as these are not the primary benefit of
sanctions. rather, it is more of a "and btw they're still able to import
gasoline despite the sanctions, and they've been forced to start
refining more crude on their own, too, but it's really shitty quality
(acc. to an OS story from yesterday at least)" Meanwhile, additional
sanctions threatening major banks that had a history of conducting
business with Iran made it increasingly difficult for Iran to invest
externally and thus more private capital was steered toward the purchase
of government-issued bonds for various state projects. As a result, Iran
has reportedly witnessed a boom in its foreign exchange reserves. The
Economist Intelligence Unit has estimated Iran**s foreign exchange
reserves to stand at $74.8 billion as of December (unchanged from their
summer estimate.) A STRATFOR source claims (and STRATFOR is still
working to confirm) that the actual number has now surpassed $100

While the sanctions have increased Iranian difficulty in conducting
day-to-day business in the global market, they may have also created
appreciable political benefits for Ahmadinejad, both at home and
abroad. The Iranian government has been battling internally over the
timing of the subsidy phase-out, with many of Ahmadinejad**s political
rivals attempting to use the issue to undermine the president**s popular
support. The subsidy reforms, which are expected to encompass not only
gasoline, but also water, food, natural gas, health, education and
electricity) are intended to save up to the 30 percent of the annual
budget. It appears as though the Ahmadinejad government feels more
confident in its abilities to cut subsidies now while the government has
a sizable forex cushion and while inflation is still manageable (the
official inflation rate as of September for Iran as reported by the IMF
was 10 percent, down from an average of 30 percent in 2009.) these are
not really political benefits that you've listed thus far; they're econ
benefits While the subsidies are a major ailment to the Iranian economy
and their phase-out is seen by many Iranian officials long overdue move,
the Iranian president has also carefully prepared to plan to contain
some of the political fallout from this decision. According to the
latest plan, low-income Iranian families will receive direct cash
compensations from the government, meaning the roughly 60 million
Iranians who have signed up for the plan thus far with have some $78
deposited in their bank accounts every two weeks.

lets calculate the range on this for what it will cost the Iranian gov't
per year, b/c i just typed this in on the calculator and it came back at
$121 billion per year!! (and stech said he also saw some estimates saying
it would be only $40 per month per fam, which would be way less)

Naturally, this will undercut the expected economic benefits from the
subsidy phase-out, but politically, it allows the Iranian president to
set up a more direct line of support between him and his constituents. i
disagree that you can so easily state this. what about all his
constituents taht are pissed they have to pay actual prices for gas to
drive their cars? think of all the people who will have to pay so much
more for goods that require trucks to transport them? if you specify
'his really poor constituents' that is one thing, but if cutting
subsidies on gasoline was going to bring ADogg political benefits, why
would they need to have extra security throughout the capital to prevent
unrest the day the reforms come into effect? The shift in economic
dependency, so the president hopes, will translate into political votes
down the line.

The Iranian government is also realizing the external benefits of the
international sanctions regime. In trying to insulate itself from the
financial sanctions, Iran took the bulk of its reserves out of European
banks and started transferring them to politically friendly banks in
places like Hong Kong and Venezuela, while converting some reserves to
gold in building up gold reserves at home. Rumors are circulating that
several major European banks and firms are now privately pressuring
their host governments to relax sanctions against Iran, using the
positive signs of the nuclear negotiations as justification to ease the
existing business constraints.

The same source claims that the Iranian government feels that it is now
in a position to make its foreign policy decisions based on its foreign
exchange reserves as opposed to strictly its energy assets. This
insight, if accurate, puts the next round of nuclear negotiations,
slated for late January in Istanbul, in a much more interesting context.
While Iran can quietly encourage the United States to think that its
sanctions regime is what is actually driving Tehran to negotiate,
Ahmadinejad can use his financial cushion to further along those talks,
buy more time and cut the legs out of those who have been arguing for a
return to the military option in dealing with Iran. Meanwhile, Iran has
reshaped the negotiating atmosphere through its success in involving
Turkey in the talks after much resistance from the United States, and
will attempt to extract concessions in these nuclear negotiations to
ease the sanctions.

While some posturing on both sides is to be expected in these
negotiations, a number of signs have emerged that contradict the popular
view that the Iranian president has been backed against a wall by his
political rivals and is caving under sanctions. STRATFOR has maintained
that while the rumblings within the regime have grown louder since the
June 2009 election, the Iranian president has been quite skillful in
outmaneuvering his political rivals. The recent sacking of Iranian
Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki appears to be a case in point.
Should the nuclear negotiations go as planned as planned...meaning...?,
Ahmadinejad can then argue at home that his policies are what rendered
the sanctions impotent, while using the compensation for the subsidy
cuts to expand his political base.

STRATFOR is working to verify the amount of Iran**s forex reserves and
gain deeper insight into what the Ahmadinejad government may be
calculating going into the next round of nuclear talks. Based on what we
have learned thus far, the way these talks are shaping up may be far
more revealing of the unintended consequences than the power of
sanctions against Iran.