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From oneb!!!!!!agate!!!uunet!!!not-for-mail Mon Aug 30 04:50:18 PDT 1993
Article: 3525 of alt.revisionism
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From: (Dan Gannon)
Subject: How Hitler Consolidated Power...and Launched a Social Revolution
Date: 29 Aug 1993 22:54:17 -0700
Organization: TECHbooks - Public Access
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Summary: Article by Leon Degrelle, published in the _IHR Journal_

>From _The Journal of Historical Review_, Volume 12, Number 3 (Fall 1992):

                How Hitler Consolidated Power in Germany
                    and Launched a Social Revolution

                   The First Years of the Third Reich

                             Leon Degrelle

     I. Who Would End the Bankruptcy?


Chancellery in Berlin.

millions of Germans and organized them into Germany's largest and most
Hitler had, one after another, vanquished them all.

absorbed, as if lost in another world.

Germans knew at the end of January 1933 -- this was a crushing, an almost
desperate responsibility.


more horrifying.

universal.  At least six million unemployed and hungry workers roamed
aimlessly through the streets, receiving a pitiful unemployment benefit of
person per day.

After that came only the meager misery allowance dispensed by the welfare

  Notwithstanding the gross inadequacy of this assistance, by trying to
save the six million unemployed from total destruction, even for just six
months, both the state and local branches of the German government saw
themselves brought to ruin: in 1932 alone such aid had swallowed up four
billion marks, 57 percent of the total tax revenues of the federal
government and the regional states.  A good many German municipalities were

  Those still lucky enough to have some kind of job were not much better
off.  Workers and employees had taken a cut of 25 percent in their wages
and salaries.  Twenty-one percent of them were earning between 100 and 250
marks per month; 69.2 percent of them, in January 1933, were being paid
less than 1,200 marks annually.  No more than about 100,000 Germans, it was
estimated, were able to live without financial worries.

  During the three years before Hitler came to power, total earnings had
fallen by more than half, from 23 billion marks to 11 billion.  The average
per capita income had dropped from 1,187 marks in 1929 to 627 marks, a
scarcely tolerable level, in 1932.  By January 1933, when Hitler took
office, 90 percent of the German people were destitute.

  No one escaped the strangling effects of the unemployment.  The
intellectuals were hit as hard as the working class.  Of the 135,000
university graduates, 60 percent were without jobs.  Only a tiny minority
was receiving unemployment benefits.

  "The others," wrote one foreign observer, Marcel Laloire (in his book
_New Germany_), "are dependent on their parents or are sleeping in
flophouses.  In the daytime they can be seen on the boulevards of Berlin
wearing signs on their backs to the effect that they will accept any kind
of work."

  But there was no longer any kind of work.

  The same drastic fall-off had hit Germany's cottage industry, which
comprised some four million workers.  Its turnover had declined to 55
percent, with total sales plunging from 22 billion to 10 billion marks.

  Hardest hit of all were construction workers; 90 percent of them were

  Farmers, too, had been ruined, crushed by losses amounting to 12 billion
marks.  Many had been forced to mortgage their homes and their land.  In
1932 just the interest on the loans they had incurred due to the crash was
equivalent to 20 percent of the value of the agricultural production of the
entire country.  Those who were no longer able to meet the interest
payments saw their farms auctioned off in legal proceedings: in the years
1931-1932, 17,157 farms -- with a combined total area of 462,485 hectares
-- were liquidated in this way.

  The "democracy" of Germany's "Weimar Republic" (1918-1933) had proven
utterly ineffective in addressing such flagrant wrongs as this
impoverishment of millions of farm workers, even though they were the
nation's most stable and hardest working citizens.  Plundered,
dispossessed, abandoned: small wonder they heeded Hitler's call.

  Their situation on January 30, 1933, was tragic.  Like the rest of
Germany's working class, they had been betrayed by their political leaders,
reduced to the alternatives of miserable wages, paltry and uncertain
benefits, or the outright humiliation of begging.

  Germany's industries, once renowned everywhere in the world, were no
longer prosperous, despite the millions of marks in gratuities that the
financial magnates felt obliged to pour into the coffers of the parties in
power before each election in order to secure their cooperation.  For 14
years the well-blinkered conservatives and Christian democrats of the
political center had been feeding at the trough just as greedily as their
adversaries of the left.

  Thus, prior to 1933, the Social Democrats had been generously bribed by
Friedrich Flick, a supercapitalist businessman.  With him, as with all his
like, it was a matter of carefully studied tactics.  After 1945, his son,
true to tradition, would continue to offer largess to the Bundestag
Socialists who had their hands out, and, in a roundabout way, to similarly
minded and equally greedy political parties abroad as well.  The
benefactors, to be sure, made certain that their gifts bore fruit in
lucrative contracts and in cancelled fiscal obligations.

  Nothing is given for nothing.  In politics, manacles are imposed in the
form of money.

  Even though they had thus assured themselves of the willing cooperation
of the politicians of the Wiemar system's parties, the titans of German
capitalism had experienced only a succession of catastrophes.  The
patchwork governments they backed, formed in the political scramble by
claim and compromise, were totally ineffective.  They lurched from one
failure to another, with neither time for long-range planning nor the will
to confine themselves somehow to their proper function.

  Time is required for the accomplishment of anything important.  It is
only with time that great plans may be brought to maturity and the
competent men be found who are capable of carrying them out.  Not
surprisingly, therefore, any economic plans drawn up amid all this shifting
for short-term political advantage were bound to fail.

  Nor did the bribing of the political parties make them any more capable
of coping with the exactions ordered by the Treaty of Versailles.  France,
in 1923, had effectively seized Germany by the throat with her occupation
of the Ruhr industrial region, and in six months had brought the Weimar
government to pitiable capitulation.  But then, disunited, dispising one
another, how could these political birds of passage have offered
resistance?  In just a few months in 1923, seven German governments came
and went in swift succession.  They had no choice but to submit to the
humiliation of Allied control, as well as to the separatist intrigues
fomented by Poincare's paid agents.

  The substantial tariffs imposed on the sale of German goods abroad had
sharply curtailed the nation's ability to export her products.  Under
obligation fo pay gigantic sums to their conquerors, the Germans had paid
out billions upon billions.  Then, bled dry, they were forced to seek
recourse to enormous loans from abroad, from the United States in

  This indebtedness had completed their destruction and, in 1929,
precipitated Germany into a terrifying financial crisis.

  The big industrialists, for all their fat bribes to the politicians, now
found themselves impotent: their factories empty, their workers now living
as virtual vagrants, haggard of face, in the dismal nearby working-class

  Thousands of German factories lay silent, their smoke-staks like a forest
of dead trees.  Many had gone under.  Those which survived were operating
on a limited basis.  Germany's gross industrial production had fallen by
half: from seven billion marks in 1920 to three and a half billion in 1932.

  The automobile industry provides a perfect example.  Germany's production
in 1932 was proportionately only one twelfth that of the United States, and
only one fourth that of France: 682,376 cars in Germany (one for each 100
inhabitatnts) as against 1,855,174 cars in France, even though the latter's
population was 20 million less than Germany's.

  Germany had experienced a similar collapse in exports.  Her trade surplus
had fallen from 2,872 billion marks in 1931 to only 667 millions in 1932 --
nearly a 75 percent drop.

  Overwhelmed by the cessation of payments and the number of current
accounts in the red, even Germany's central bank was disintegrating.
Harried by demands for repayment of the foreign loans, on the day of
Hitler's accession to power the Reichsbank had in all only 83 million marks
in foreign currency, 64 million of which had already been committed for
disbursement on the following day.

  The astronomical foreign debt, an amount exceeding that of the country's
total exports for three years, was like a lead weight on the back of every
German.  And there was no possibility of turning to Germany's domestic
financial resources for a solution: banking activities had come virtually
to a standstill.  That left only taxes.

  Unfortunately, tax revenues had also fallen sharply.  From nine billion
marks in 1930, total revenue from taxes had fallen to 7.8 billion in 1931,
and then to 6.65 billion in 1932 (with unemployment payments alone taking
four billion of that amount).

  The financial debt burden of regional and local authorities, amounting to
billions, had likewise accumulated at a fearful pace.  Beset as they were
by millions of citizens in need, the municipalities alone owed 6.542
billion in 1928, an amount that had increased to 11.295 billion by 1932.
Of this total, 1.668 billion was owed in short-term loans.

  Any hope of paying off these deficits with new taxes was no longer even
imaginable.  Taxes had already been increased 45 percent from 1925 to 1931.
During the years 1931-1932, under Chancellor Bruning, a Germany of
unemployed workers and industrialists with half-dead factories had been hit
with 23 "emergency" decrees.  This multiple overtaxing, moreover, had
proven to be completely useless, as the "International Bank of Payments"
had clearly foreseen.  The agency confirmed in a statement that the tax
burden in Germany was already so enormous that it could not be further

  And so, in one pan of the financial scales: 19 billion in foreign debt
plus the same amount in domestic debt.  In the other, the Reichsbank's 83
million marks in foreign currency.  It was as if the average German, owing
his banker a debt of 6,000 marks, had less than 14 marks in his pocket to
pay it.

  One inevitable consequence of this ever-increasing misery and uncertainty
about the future was an abrupt decline in the birthrate.  When your
household savings are wiped out, and when you fear even greater calamities
in the days ahead, you do not risk adding to the number of your dependents.

  In those days the birth rate was a reliable barometer of a country's
prosperity.  A child is a joy, unless you have nothing but a crust of bread
to put in its little hand.  And that's just the way it was with hundreds of
thousands of German families in 1932.

  In 1905, during the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the birthrate had been
33.4 per one thousand.  In 1921 it was only 25.0, and in 1924 it was down
to 15.1.  By the end of 1932, it had fallen to just 14.7 per one thousand.

  It reached that figure, moreover, thanks only to the higher birth rate in
rural areas.  In the fifty largest cities of the Reich, there were more
deaths than births.  In 45 percent of working-class families, there were no
births at all in the latter years.  The fall in the birthrate was most
pronounced in Berlin, which had less than one child per family and only 9.1
births per one thousand.  Deaths exceeded the number of new births by 60

  In contrast to the birthrate, politicians were flourishing as never
before -- about the only thing in Germany that was in those disastrous
times.  From 1919 to 1932, Germany had seen no less than 23 governments
come and go, averaging a new one about every seven months.  As any sensible
person realizes, such constant upheaval in a country's political leadership
negates its power and authority.  No one would imagine that any effective
work could be carried out in a typical industrial enterprise if the board
of directors, the management, management methods, and key personnel were
all replaced every eight months.  Failure would be certain.

  Yet the Reich wasn't a factory of 100 or 200 workers, but a nation of 65
million citizens crushed under the imposed burdens of the Treaty of
Versailles, by industrial stagnation, by frightful unemployment, and by a
gut-wrenching misery shared by the entire people.

  The many cabinet ministers who followed each other in swift succession
for thirteen years -- due to petty parliamentary squabbles, partisan
demands, and personal ambitions -- were unable to achieve anything other
than the certain collapse of their chaotic regime of rival parties.

  Germany's situation was further aggravated by the unrestrained
competition of the 25 regional states, which split up governmental
authority into units often in direct opposition to Berlin, thereby
incessantly sabotaging what limited power the central Reich government had
at that time.

  The regional remnants of several centuries of particularism were all
fiercely jealous of their privileges.  The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 had
divided Germany into hundreds of Lilliputian states, most of them musical
comdedy kingdoms whose petty monarchs tried to act like King Louis XIV in
courts complete with frills and reverential bows.

  Even at the beginning of the First World War (1914-1918), the German
Reich included four distinct kingdoms (Prussia, Bavaria, Wurttemberg and
Saxony), each with its own sovereign, army, flag, titles of nobility, and
Great Cross in particolored enamel.  In addition, there were six grand
duchies, five duchies, seven principalities, and three free cities.

  The Bavarian clung fiercely to his lederhosen, his steins of beer and his
pipe.  He took part in the war to preserve them.  The Saxon would gladly
have had a go-around with the haughty Prussian.  Each was intent on his
rights.  And for all of them, faraway Berlin was a thorn in the side.

  Each regional state had its own separatist government with parliament,
prime minister and cabinet.  Altogether they presented a lineup of 59
ministers who, added to the eleven Reich ministers and the 42 senators of
the Free Cities, gave the Germans a collection of 112 ministers, each of
whom viewed the other with a jaundiced eye at best.

  In addition, there were between two and three thousand deputies --
representing dozens of rival political parties -- in the legislatures of
the Reich, the 22 states and the three Free Cities.

  In the Reichstag elections of November 1932 -- held just months before
Hitler became Chancellor -- there were no less than 37 different political
parties competing, with a total of 7,000 candidates (14 of them by proxy),
all of them frantically seeking a pieceof the parliamentary pie.  It was
most strange: the more discredited the party system became, the more
democratic champions there were to be seen gesturing and jostling in their
eagerness to climb aboard the gravy train.

  To all appearances, the incumbents who had been elected were there
forever.  They received fat salaries (a Reichstag deputy got ten times what
the average worker earned), and permitted themselves generous supplementary
incomes in the form of favors provided by interested clients.  A number of
Socialist Reichstag deputies representing Berlin, for example, had arranged
for their wives to receive sumptuous fur coats from certain Jewish

  In a parliamentary democracy, mandates are often very brief, and
ministerial appointments even more so.  The temptation is strong to get it
while you can.

  Honest, dishonest, or piratical, these 112 cabinet ministers and
thousands of legislative deputies had converted Germany into a country that
was ungovernable.  It is incontestable that, by January of 1933, the
"system" politicians had become completely discredited.  Their successors
would inherit a country in economic, social and political ruins.

  Today, more than half a century later, in an era when so many are living
in abundance, it is hard to believe that the Germany of January 1933 had
fallen so low.  But for anyone who studies the archives and the relevant
documents of that time, there can be no doubt.  Not a single figure cited
here is invented.  By January 1933, Germany was down and bleeding to death.

  All the previous chancellors who had undertaken to get Germany back on
her feet -- including Bruning, Papen and Schleicher -- had failed.  Only a
genius or, as some believed, a madman, could revive a nation that had
fallen into such a state of complete disarray.

  When President Franklin Roosevelt was called upon at that same time to
resolve a similar crisis in the United States, he had at his disposal
immense reserves of gold.  Hitler, standing silently at the chancellery
window on that evening of January 30, 1933, knew that, on the contrary, his
nation's treasury was empty.  No great benefactor would appear to help him
out.  The elderely Reich President, Paul von Hindenburg, had given him a
work sheet of appalling figures of indebtedness.

  Hitler knew that he would be starting from zero.  From less than zero.
But he was also confident of his strength of will to create Germany anew --
politically, socially, financially, and economically.  Now legally and
officially in power, he was sure that he could quickly convert that cipher
into a Germany more powerful than ever before.

  What support did he have?

  For one thing, he could count on the absolute support of millions of
fanatical disciples.  And on that January evening, they joyfully shared in
the great thrill of victory.  Some thirteen million Germans, many of them
former Socialists and Communists, had voted for his party.

  But millions of Germans were still his adversaries, disconcerted
adversaries, to be sure, whom their own political parties had betrayed, but
who had still not been won over to National Socialism.

  The two sides -- those for and those against Hitler -- were very nearly
equal in numbers.  But whereas those on the left were divided among
themselves, Hitler's disciples were strongly united.  And in one thing
above all, the National Socialists had an incomparable advantage: in their
convictions and in their total faith in a leader.  Their highly organized
and well-disciplined party had contended with the worst kind of obstacles,
and had overcome them.

[Photograph captioned, "Hitler poses with close comrades shortly after
being named Chancellor on January 30, 1933.]

  While it enjoyed extraordinary popular support, the National Socialist
movement had grown too fast, and problems deriving from that lay in wait
ahead.  Thousands of visionaries with nebulous dreams of domination, not to
mention hotheads dreaming only of brawls and revolution in perpetuity, had
found their way into the National Socialist ranks.  The ambitious ones
intended to rise to the top at any cost -- and as quickly as possible.
Many of them were ill-prepared; some simply lacked morals.  Many bitter
disappointments were in store for Hitler because of them.

  Hitler sensed as much.  He had ordered his party to halt recruitment of
new members, and even directed that the SA -- the huge civilian
paramilitary force that had carried him to power -- be reduced in size.
Indeed, by 1933 SA stormtroop membership had grown to the incredible figure
of 2,500,000 men, 25 times the size of the regular army, the Reichswehr.

  It was due to such pressures that Hitler was sometimes driven to rash
action, contrary to his real desire or intent.  Sometimes this meant
expulsions, the use of force or cases of intransigence, even though his
larger goal was to reunite the nation in peace, and accomplish his
political and social programs without useless clashes.

  Hitler knew that he was playing with dynamite.  Still, it was his
conviction that he was being driven not just by his National Socialist
movement, but by an inner, almost supernatural force.  Whether one called
it Providence or Destiny, it was this force, he felt, that had carried him
to victory.  His own force of character was such that it would yield to
nothing.  For Hitler, it was a foregone conclusion that he would forge a
new Reich, a new world.

  Hitler knew that the task he had set himself would be immense and
difficult to accomplish, that he would have to transform Germany in
practically every respect: the structure of the state, social law, the
constitution of society, the economy, civic spirit, culture, the very
nature of men's thinking.  To accomplish his great goal, he would need to
reestablish the equilibrium of the social classes within the context of a
regenerated community, free his nation from foreign hegemony, and
restructure its geographic unity.

  Task number one: he would have to restore work and honor to the lives of
six million unemployed.  This was his immediate goal, a task that everyone
else thought impossible to achieve.

  After he had once again closed the windows of the chancellery, Hitler,
with clenched fists and resolute mien, said simply: "The great venture
begins.  The day of the Third Reich has come."

  In just one year this "great venture" would be in full swing, effecting a
transformation from top to bottom in political, social and economic life --
indeed, in the German way of life itself.

     II. The Unification of the State

  "It will be the pride of my life," Hitler said upon becoming Chancellor,
restored him to his rightful place in the Reich."  He meant that he
intended no merely to put men back to work, but to make sure that the
worker acquired not just rights, but prestige as well, within the national

  The national community had long been the proverbial wicked stepmother in
its relationship with the German working man.  Class struggle had not been
the exclusive initiative of the Marxists.  It had also been a fact of life
for a privileged class, the capitalists, that sought to dominate the
working class.  Thus the German worker, feeling himself treated like a
pariah, had often turned away from a fatherland that often seemed to
consider him merely an instrument in production.

  In the eyes of the capitalists, money was the sole active element in the
flourishing of a country's economy.  To Hitler's way of thinking, that
conception was radically wrong: capital, on the contrary, was only an
instrument.  Work was the essential element: man's endeavor, man's honor,
blood, muscles and soul.

  Hitler wanted not just to put an end to the class struggle, but to
reestablish the priority of the human being, in justice and respect, as the
principal factor in production.

  One could dispense with gold, and Hitler would do just that.  A dozen
other things could be substituted for gold as a means of stimulating
industry, and Hitler would invent them.  But as for work, it was the
indispensable foundation.

  For the worker's trust in the fatherland to be restored, he had to feel
that from now on he was to be (and to be treated) as an equal, instead of
remaining a social inferior.  Under the governments of the so-called
democratic parties of both the left and the right, he had remained an
inferior; for none of them had understood that in the hierarchy of national
values, work is the very essence of life; and matter, be it steel or gold,
but a tool.

  The objective, then, was far greater than merely sending six million
unemployed back to work.  It was to achieve a total revolution.

  "The people," Hitler declared, "were not put here on earth for the sake
of the economy, and the economy doesn't exist for the sake of capital.  On
turn to serve the people."

  It would not be enough merely to reopen the thousands of closed factories
and fill them with workers.  If the old concepts still ruled, the workers
would once again be nothing more than living machines, faceless and

  What was required was to reestablish that moral equilibrium between the
workers, human beings who shape raw materials, and a useful and controlled
capitalism, returned to its proper function as a tool.  This would mean
changing an entire world, and it would take time.

  As Hitler knew full well, such a revolution could not be achieved while
the central and regional governments continued in a state of anarchy,
seldom accomplishing anything solid, and sometimes running amok.  Nor could
there be a revolution in society while dozens of parties and thousands of
deputies of every conceivable stripe pursued their selfish interests under
a political system that had thrashed about incoherently since 1919.

  Restoring the effectiveness of Germany's institutions on a nationwide
basis was therefore an indispensable prerequisite to any social rebirth.

  "A fish rots from the head down," says a Russian proverb.  And it was at
the head that political Germany, prior to Hitler, was going bad.  In the
end, the "democratic" parties abdicated without even defending themselves.
In 1930, the aged President Marshall von Hindenburg used his emergency
powers under Article 48 of the Weimar constitution to enable a succession
of semi-dictators to rule by decree.  But even they could accomplish

  These last chancellors -- Herr Bruning, Herr von Papen, and General
Schleicher -- were able to maintain rule only by executive decree.  Their
authority, artificially sustained by misuse of Article 48, was dependent on
von Hindenburg and the camarilla advising him.  Just how slim was their
level of popular support was shown in a particularly humiliating 1932
Reichstag "vote of confidence," in which more than 90 percent of the
deputies voted against him and his government.

  Hitler's accession to power abruptly brought an end to government
impotence.  As a condition of appointing him, however, Hindenburg had
demanded that the new chancellor be hemmed in like a prisoner in his own
government.  In his first government, Hitler was obliged name four times as
many conservative -- or better, reactionary -- ministers as his own men.
Just two members of his first cabinet were National Socialists.

  Hindenburg's representatives were given the mission of keeping Hitler on
a leash.  At the Reichstag session of March 24, however, Hitler broke that
leash, not with yet another executive decree (like his immediate
predecessors), but by obtaining a two-thirds parliamentary majority for the
"Enabling Act" that legally amended the constitution and gave him sweeping
plenary powers for a period of four years.

  Four years in power to plan, create and make decisions.  Politically, it
was a revolution: Hitler's first revolution.  And completely democratic, as
had been every stage of his rise.  His initial triumph had come through the
support of the electorate.  Similarly, sweeping authority to govern was
granted him through a vote of more than two-thirds of the Reichstag's
deputies, elected by universal suffrage.

  This was in accord with a basic principle of Hitler's: no power without
freely given approval of the people.  He used to say: "If you can win
mastery over the people only by imposing the power of the state, you'd
better figure on a nine o'clock curfew."

  Nowhere in twentieth-century Europe had the authority of a head of state
ever been based on such overwhelming and freely given national consent.
Prior to Hitler, from 1919 to 1932, those governments piously styling
themselves democratic had usually come to power by meager majorities,
sometimes as low as 51 or 52 percent.

  "I am not a dictator," Hitler had often affirmed, "and I never will be.
Democracy will be rigorously enforced by National Socialism."

  Authority does not mean tyranny.  A tyrant is someone who puts himself in
power without the will of the people or against the will of the people.  A
democrat is placed in power by the people.  But democracy is not limited to
a single formula.  It may be partisan or parliamentary.  Or it may be
authoritarian.  The important thing is that the people have wished it,
chosen it, established it in its given form.

  That was the case with Hitler.  He came to power in an essentially
democratic way.  Whether one likes it or not, this fact is undeniable.  And
after coming to power, his popular support measurably increased from year
to year.  The more intelligent and honest of his enemies have been obliged
to admit this, men such as the declared anti-Nazi historian and professor
Joachim Fest, who wrote:

     For Hitler was never interested in establishing a mere tyranny.  Sheer
   greed for power will not suffice as explanation for his personality and
   energy . . . He was not born to be a mere tyrant.  He was fixated upon
   his mission of defending Europe and the Aryan race . . . Never had he
   felt so dependent upon the masses as he did at this time, and he watched
   their reactions with anxious concern.

  Those lines weren't written by Dr. Goebbels, but by a stern critic of
Hitler and his career.  (J. Fest, _Hitler_, New York: 1974, p. 417.)

  By February 28, 1933, less than a month after his appointment as
chancellor, Hitler had already managed to free himself of the conservative
ballast by which Hindenburg had thought to weigh him down.  The Reichstag
fire of the previous evening prompted the elderly President to approve a
new emergency law "For the Protection of the People and the State," which
considerably increased the powers of the executive.

  Hitler meant, however, to obtain more than just concessions ruefully
granted by a pliable old man: he sought plenary powers legally accorded him
by the nation's supreme democratic institution, the Reichstag.  Hitler
prepared his coup with the skill, the patience, and the astuteness for
which he is legendary.  "He possessed," historian Fest later wrote, "an
intelligence that included above all a sure sense of the rhythm to be
observed in the making of decisions."

[Photograph captioned, "Hitler, von Hindenburg, and von Papen, in the
Garrison church at the solemn 'Day of Potsdam' ceremony."]

  At first, Hitler carefully cultivated Hindenburg, the elderly First World
War FELDMARSCHALL who was fond of tradition.  Accordingly, Hitler arranged
a solemn ceremony in Hendenburg's honor in Potsdam, historic residence of
the Prussian kings.  This masterpiece of majesty, beauty, tradition and
piety took place in Potsdam's Garrison Church on March 21, 1933, just days
before the Reichstag was to reconvene.

  Hindenburg had served as an army officer for half a century.  So that the
old soldier might be reunited with his comrades, Hitler had arranged for
veterans from all the wars in which Hindenburg had served to be present on
this solemn occasion.  From all around the country they came: veterans from
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 (62 years before), from the war of
1866 against the Austrian empire (67 years before), and even from the war
of 1864 against Denmark (69 years before!).  For someone on the retirement
list of 1911, it must have been a heartwarming occasion to be reunited
again with comrades from so long ago.

  With deference and apparent humility, and attired in formal dress for the
occasion, Hitler bowed his head before the old man.  In the stately church
where the ceremony took place, Hitler had arranged that the chair of the
former Kaiser, Wilhelm II, which had been unoccupied for 14 years, remained
empty, so that Hindenburg could halt before it and make his salute, his
marshal's baton raised, as if the monarch were still there.

  Hitler also quietly led Hindenburg down into the church crypt, to place
wreaths on the tombs of his old master, Kaiser Wilhelm I, and of Frederick
the Great.  The President's old eyes were rimmed with tears.

  On that 21st day of March at Potsdam, the octogenarian President relived
the glorious past of the German monarchy.  This somber homage was his hour
supreme.  Hindenburg had always been a loyal servant of the Emperor, and
this reminder of his former sovereign, and of the great days of his own
long career, deeply moved him.  Hitler was the first chancellor since the
defeat of 1918 to so honor the tradition of Prussia and Germany.  The young
revolutionary chancellor had touched his heart.

  A month and a half earlier, Hindenburg had commissioned Papen, Hugenberg,
and Neurath and other conservative ministers to pinch in Hitler "until he
hollered."  Now that was over.  Hitler had won him over: in front of an
empty armchair and before the tombs of Prussia's greatest kings.

  A year and a half later, as he lay dying, the old FELDMARSCHALL would
believe that he was back in the time of the Hohenzollern dynasty, and in
his delirium would address Hitler as "Majesty."

  This "Day of Potsdam" ceremony also won Hitler new support from among the
country's many monarchists, giving them the impression that he was not
altogether insensitive to the idea of restoring the monarchy.  But the new
chancellor's temporary prudence was calculated with precision.

  "There is no need to destroy the existing institutions," Hitler assured,
"until there is something better to put in their place."

  He still had need of men like von Papen and other ruling-class
troglodytes.  He kep them at his side as he drove them around Potsdam on
that historic day, the festive city bedecked not only with swastika banners
but equally with the black-white-and-red flags of the Second Reich,
resurrected for the occasion.  Brass bands paraded around, blaring heroic
marches calculated to make their old chests swell.  Here too, the scarcely
camouflaged aversion to the parvenu was softened.  Hitler had tamed the
aristocrats, both born and moneyed.  They would no longer stand in his way.

  But it was above all Germany's army -- the Reichswehr -- that was the
object of Hitler's most ardent courtship.  In 1933, he desperately needed
the army's support.  The generals had tolerated his rise to power with
reluctance.  A corporal in the chancellory seemed intolerable to the
haughty, monocled generals.  Some ambitiously sought to supervise the
nation's political machinery.

  They had not been consulted when Hitler was named Chancellor on January
30.  The old FELDMARSCHALL had even sternly sent away General von
Hammerstein-Equord, who had come to tell Hindenburg of the General Staff's
vote of disapproval.  In the weeks since, the generals had barely tolerated
the young outsider.

  Keenly aware that a coup d'etat by this proud military caste could
instantly sweep him and his party away, along with all his plans for the
future, Hitler knew that he must proceed cleverly against the imperious
generals.  The Reichswehr was therefore accorded a position of honor at
Potsdam.  At the entry walkway to the royal palace, Reichswehr troops
presented arms on one side, while a line of SA stormtroopers faced them on
the other side.  Unifying conservative military traditions of duty and
honor with a revolutionary new force, together they formed the honor guard
that symbolized a Germany restored to harmony.

[Photograph captioned, "The young Chancellor greets the aging President at
the "Day of Potsdam" ceremony, March 21, 1933."]

  As for the generals, their tunics gleaming with decorations and their
chests thrown out, they once again marched behind their old commander, a
heroic retinue worthy of a great Germanic chieftain.  At last, after
fourteen years of disregard under the democratic Weimar Republic, they once
again bathed in the golden light of martial glory.  Corporal Hitler was
perhaps not as contemptible as they had thought.

  The ex-corporal, standing at attention in top hat and formal dress suit,
let them have their day of glory at Potsdam.  He knew enough to let them
bask in the limelight.

  Hitler had won his armistice.

  To reach the people, Hitler and Dr. Goebbels had quickly taken control of
the nation's radio, from which they had for so long been barred (and which
their adversaries had put to only mediocre use).  Within a few weeks, they
had succeeded in making radio their most effective tool.  Each of Hitler's
major speeches was broadcast to the nation with a hitherto unknown power.

  Radio also brought the spectacle of Potsdam to the people.  Goebbels set
up his microphones everywhere: in front of Hindenburg, behind Hindenburg,
in the royal crypt, close to the military bands, and even on the rooftops
of houses (where the announcers risked their necks to cover the pageantry).
One of them was a young National Socialist Reichstag deputy named Baldur
von Schirach, who in 1946 would find himself in the dock before the
vengeful Allied judges of the Nuremberg Tribunal.

  All of Germany was on the edge of its seat as it listened for hours to
the exciting coverage of the event.  Millions of Germans thrilled to once
again hear the stirring old melodies, and to closely follow Hindenburg's
every move, almost as if they were there.

  During the dark days of the recent past, the venerated old warrior had
represented tradition and hope.  Now, thanks to Hitler's careful planning
and management of this occasion, the ancient soldier embodied the promise
of great national renewal.  It was, as historian Fest has observed, "the
feast of reconciliation gorgeously presented . . . That day at Potsdam
truly proved to be a turning point in history . . . Many government
officials, army officers, lawyers and judges, many members of the
nationalistic bourgeoisie who had distrusted Hitler on rational grounds,
abandoned their stand . . ."  (J. Fest, _Hitler_, New York: 1974, p. 405.)

  Potsdam was a grandiose theatrical stage on which all had played their
parts, even -- by their very absence -- the luke-warm and Hitler's enemies
on the left.

  Glued to their radio sets, all Germany had participated in the spectacle,
at first fascinated, and then caught up in the emotion of the event.  The
next day, Berlin newspapers declared: "National enthusiasm swept over
Germany yesterday like a great storm."

  "A strange mixture of tactician and visionary," Joachim Fest would later
write, sizing up this extraordinary stage manager.  For Hitler had led
field marshals, generals, and other dignitaries, none of them fools,
through his drill paces as though they had been so many animated tin
soldiers.  But Hitler's plans extended far beyond winning over the Old

  In order to establish his new state in definitive form, Hitler now
proposed to obtain the official ratification of the Reichstag, which would
establish his authority to govern as a virtual dictator for a period of
several years.

  To gain such plenary powers lawfully, the German constitution had to be
amended, and this would require approval by two thirds of the parliament's

  Hitler's party, having won 17,300,000 votes in the elections of March 5,
1933, for the new Reichstag, held a total of 288 seats -- making it by far
the largest single party.  His conservative ally in the temporary
partnership, Hugenberg's German National People's Party (DNVP), had
captured 4,750,000 votes and held another 52 seats, giving the coalition a
total of 340 deputies.

  After deducting the 81 "empty" Communist seats, the opposition now
mustered just 226 members: 120 Social Democrats, 92 (Catholic) Center and
BVP deputies, and 14 others.

  Although his coalition held a majority of seats, to alter the
constitution Hitler needed a two thirds majority -- which meant 36
additional votes.

  At first sight, this goal seemed almost impossible.  For more than a
decade, the Catholic Center and Bavarian People's parties had been
outspoken critics of Hitler and his National Socialist movement,
unhesitatingly using religion as a partisan political weapon, and even
denying religious burial to Catholic National Socialists murdered by
Communist killers.

  Hitler, with the assistance of Goring (who was now president of the new
Reichstag), would now have to win over that clerical flock.  Center party
leader Monsignor Kaas, a squat and pudgy prelate who found the collecting
of votes to be more satisfying than the guidance of souls, was flattered
and courted by Hitler, who dangled before him the promise of a
rapprochement between the state and the Catholic Church, an earnest promise
that Hitler would make good on the following summer.  The beguiled prelate
may have believed that he was going to lead errant sheep back to the fold.
In any case, Hitler succeeded in persuading and seducing the Center party.
Some deputies of the smaller opposition parties also yielded.

  When it came time to vote, Hitler was granted plenary powers with a
sweeping majority of 441 votes to 94: he had won not just two thirds, but
82.44 percent of the assembly's votes.  This "Enabling Act" granted Hitler
for four years virtually absolute authority over the legislative as well as
the executive affairs of the government.

  The five paragraphs of this "Law for the Alleviation of the Misery of the
People and the Nation" were brief and to the point:

  1. Laws may be promulgated by the Reich government apart from the
  procedures provided for by the Constitution . . .

  2. Laws promulgated by the Reich government may deviate from the
  Constitution provided they do not change the position of the Reichstag or
  of the Reichsrat.  The powers of the Reich President are not changed.

  3. Laws promulgated by the Reich government will be prepared by the
  Chancellor and published in the "Official Journal."  Unless otherwise
  specified, they become effective on the day following publication . . .

  4. Treaties concluded by the Reich with foreign states that concern
  matters of national legislation do not require ratification by the
  legislative bodies.  The Reich government is empowered to issue the
  regulations necessary for their execution.

  5. This law becomes effective on the day of publication, and remains
  valid until April 1, 1937.  It also becomes invalid if the present
  government is replaced with another.

  Berlin, March 24, 1933
  Von Hindenburg, Hitler, Frick, von Neurath, Krosigk

  Thus, a parliamentary democracy, exercising its constitutional powers,
had legally established an authoritarian national state.  Next, a solution
was needed to the problem of the horde of the competing regional, state and
local parliaments, jurisdictions and authorities.  For the most part, these
authorities were virtual nullities, and there was no love lost between
them.  For fourteen years, though, they had acted together whenever an
opportunity presented itself to thwart the central government in Berlin.

  It was inconceivable that a strong government such as the one Hitler had
just established could function effectively with thousands of second-level
politicians carping and questioning his every move.  Anyway, Germans had in
fact become sick and tired of the squandering of authority, the perpetual
squabbling, the pettiness, discord, and the anarchy for which, in the final
analysis, it was the people who paid.

  "It is a fact," French historian Benoist-Mechin later observed, "that the
unification of the states and the Reich answered one of the most profound
aspirations of the German people.  They had enough of being torn apart by
the constant threats of secession and the provincial governments.  For
centuries they had dreamed of being part of a single community."
(_Histoire de l'Armee Allemande_, vol. III, p. 117.)

  It seemed a simple enough task, because public opinion demanded the
abolition of the administrative mess.  But such a reform would necessarily
bruise the vanity of thousands and collide head-on with many local special

  A man who is a council president or a minister, even if only of a small
state, does not easily resign himself to being no more than a private
citizen, to once again becoming, let us say, a provincial lawyer scampering
to the court house with coattails flying.  The 2,400 legislative deputies
would also be bitter about losing the good life they had come to know and
expect.  Gone the prestige, the deference, the awards, the vacation trips
at public expense, the discreet gratuities!  Who among us does not make a
wry face when swallowing bitter medicine?  But it had to be, for Hitler had
his eyes fixed on that national goal: a unified nation.

  That did not mean, of course, that in eliminating the regional
administrations Hitler had any desire to do away with the distinctive
identities of the nation's various provinces.  On the contrary, he believed
that a nation's life ought never to be monopolized by its capital city, but
should rather be nourished and constantly renewed by the blooming of dozens
of centers of culture in regions rich in varied manners, mores and legacies
of their past.

  He believed that the nation was the harmonious conjunction of these
profound and original variations, and that a state conscious of its real
powers ought to promote such variety, not smother it.

  The dispersion of political power had not favored such a variety, but
had, on the contrary, diminished it, depriving it of the cohesion a large
community brings.  The Reich's 25 separate administrative entities, rivals
of the central government and often of each other, were a source of
disorder.  A nation must consist of regions that know and esteem each
other, and which gain mutual enrichment from their interlinking, rather
than each withdrawing into a culture that is strangled by an exclusive and
restrictive provincialism.  And only a strong central authority could
insure the flowering of all the various regions within a single collective
entity.  In sum, what Hitler intended was that each region should bring its
share of original culture to the totality of a German Reich that had put an
end to so many fractious administrations.

  From 1871 to 1933, Germany's various national governments had come up
against this obstacle of political particularism.  Even so gifted a leader
as Bismarck had not been able to overcome this persistent problem.  And
now, where the leaders of both the Second Reich and the Weimar Republic had
failed, or had not dared to take the risk, Hitler, in a few months, was
going to convert this long-standing division and discord into potent and
effective unity.

  Hitler had scarcely moved into his office overlooking the chancellery
garden, where squirrels cracked nuts in the trees and at times even leaped
into the building itself, when he drew up a law to unify the Reich's many

  The first of the states that would be made to toe the line was Bavaria,
which up to that point had been a bulwark of belligerent separatism and
hidebound monarchists.

  Hitler's intentions were no sooner known than several Bavarian ministers
devised a plan to resurrect from retirement that old fogy, the ex-Prince
Ruprecht, heir to Bavaria's Wittelsbach throne, who in November 1923, then
as an ordinary private citizen, had, with a good deal of boasting, helped
block Hitler's ill-fated putsch.  Now the new chancellor responded to their
little plot with sudden and crushing force, bringing the Bavarian state
administration to heel in a single night.  The next morning, Lieutenant
General von Epp wa named Reich Commissioner in Munich.

  Thereafter, almost all of the other regional states rapidly collapsed,
like a house of cards.

  The most difficult state to master was Prussia, an enormous bastion (a
third of Germany) stretching across the heart of the country.  Prussia
truly consisted a state within the state, a special government.  In 1931
its Socialist government had held Reich Chancellor Bruning completely in
check.  His humiliating defeat came notwithstanding their party's crushing
defeat in the Prussian elections a short time earlier at the hands of
Hitler's candidates.  Chancellor von Papen found that he, too, had to come
to grips with Prussia, which was nearly as strong as the central

  After he became Chancellor, Hitler was obliged for a time -- because
Hindenburg demanded it -- to let von Papen remain as Reich Commissioner of
Prussia; and it was only with great effort on his part that Hitler managed
to have Goring named as von Papen's Minister of the Interior in Prussia.
The autonomy of the Prussian government, more than any other, had to be
liquidated: otherwise, the central government would remain subject at any
moment to embarrassment and hindrance in the city that was the capital of
both Prussia and the Reich.  The matter was particularly delicate because
von Papen, the aristocrat, had to remain as Reich Commissioner of Prussia.
To remove him would risk disapproval and even countermeasures by President
von Hindenburg.

  Hitler at that point surpassed himself in versatility and guile.  By dint
of flattery and persuasion, within a month von Papen let himself be gently
shoved out the door.  Hitler all but dictated for him the text of his
letter of resignation of April 7, 1933, in which the Vice Chancellor
acknowledged that the Law on the Unification of the Lands of the Reich "was
a legal edifice destined to be of great historic importance in the
development of the German Reich."  He further recognized that "the dualism
existing between the Reich and Prussia" had to come to an end.  In his
letter he even compared Hitler to Prince Otto von Bismarck.

  Although von Papen was being nudged out, Hitler soothed his wounded pride
by publicly declaring that he never would have been able to carry out the
political reunification of the Reich alone; that the great architect of the
achievement had been von Papen.

  Without turning a hair, Hitler also wrote to Feldmarschall von

    In assuming the functions of Reich Commissioner in Prussia during the
  difficult period following the 30th of January, Herr von Papen has
  deserved very great credit for contributing so strongly to the working
  out of a strict coordination between the policies of the Reich and those
  of the regional states.  His collaboration with the cabinet of the Reich,
  to which he will henceforth be able to devote himself completely, will be
  of priceless assistance to me.  The feelings I have for him are such that
  I rejoice in having the benefit of his cooperation, which will be of
  inestimable value to me.

  For his part the aged field marshal responded to this small masterpiece
of hypocrisy with one of his own, this one addressed to von Papen:

  Dear Herr von Papen,

    I have just accepted your request that you be relieved of your duties
  as Reich commissioner of Prussia.  I take this opportunity to thank you,
  in the name of the Reich and in my own name, for the eminent service you
  have rendered the nation by eliminating the dualism existing between the
  Reich and Prussia, and by imposing the idea of a common political
  direction of the Reich and the regional states.  I have learned with
  satisfaction that you will henceforth be able to devote all your energies
  to the government of the Reich.

    With feelings of sincere comradeship, I remain your devoted

            von Hindenburg, President of the Reich

  Ex-Chancellor von Papen thus lost the only effective power he still held.
Although he remained a member of the inner circle of Hitler's government
(but for how long?), he was now really little more than a willing stooge.

  Hitler immediately named himself STATTHALTER of Prussia, and Goring as
Minister President, thus bringing the greatest German state under firm

  One after another, the regional states were shorn of their sovereignty.
The process was staged like a ballet.

  Act One: Regional parliamentary power is transferred smoothly to men who
had Hitler's confidence.

  Act Two: Each man announces acceptance of the "Law of Unification."

  Act Three: Each regional parliament procliams the end of its own state
autonomy and sovereignty.

  Act Four: In each region, Hitler appoints Reich Commissioner (or
STATTHALTER), who is charged with carrying out the Chancellor's political

  In the Grand Duchies of Baden and Saxony there were a few verbal
skirmishes, but these were quickly squelched.  In the Free City of Hamburg
(population a million and a half), its leaders grumbled a bit for form's
sake, but only a few hours of negotiations were required to make them see
the light.  In just a few weeks, the entire process was accomplished.

  Making use of the sweeping powers granted him by the Reichstag's
overwhelming vote of approval on March 23, 1933, within a few months Hitler
succeeded in transforming the faltering Reich government into a formidable
instrument of action.  Thanks to that mandate, and several special decrees
signed by the President, he was thus able constitutionally to eliminate the
rival authorities of numerous state governments and parliaments.

  "It all went much faster than we had dared hope," Goebbels commented with
delight, and a shade of sarcasm.

  Precisely one year after Hitler had become Chancellor, a "Law for the
Rebuilding of the Reich" spelled out the full extent of the change:

  1. Representation of the regional states is abolished.

  2.   (a) The sovereign rights of the regional states are transferred to
  the government of the Reich.
       (b) The governments of the regional states are subject to the
  government of the Reich.

  3. The governors [STATTHALTER] are subject to the authority of the Reich
  Minister of the Interior.

  4. The government of the Reich may modify the constitutional rights of
  the regional states.

  5. The Minister of the Interior will issue the legal and administrative
  decrees necessary for the implementation of this law.

  6. This law will become effective on the day of its official publication.

  Berlin, January 30, 1934
  Von Hindenburg, Hitler, Frick

  Bismarck, the "Iron Chancellor," could never have dreamed of political
reunification on such an authoritarian and hierarchical basis.  But Hitler
had tried, and succeeded.

  Germany had now attained a level of concentrated power and authority more
profound than any ever achieved in her history.  And it had all been
accomplished, moreover, by democratic means.

  After 1945 the explanation that was routinely offered for all this was
that the Germans had lost their heads.  Whatever the case, it is a
historical fact that they acted of their own free will.  Far from being
resigned, they were enthusiastic.  "For the first time since the last days
of the monarchy," historian Joachim Fest has conceded, "the majority of the
Germans now had the feeling that they could identify with the state."

  But what of the political parties?

  Although Hitler had succeeded in transforming the tens of millions of
Bavarians, Saxons, Prussians and residents of Hamburg into citizens of one
and the same Reich, under a single national administration, and even though
the anthill of petty and more or less separatist states had been leveled,
there still remained in Germany the contentious and divisive political
parties.  They had been discredited, to be sure, but the hearty ambitions
of impenitent politicians could reawaken to erode the foundations of the
new state.

  The party leaders were scarcely in a position to protest.  On the
preceding 23rd of March they themselves had overwhelmingly approved the
fateful "Enabling Act."  Now, with their wings clipped and their
prerogatives taken away, they no longer served any useful purpose.  They
were not merely superfluous, they had become an encumbrance.

  How would Hitler get rid of them?

     III. Liquidation of the Parties

  On the day in March when the deputies of the Weimar Republic voted to
relinquish their power, Hitler, standing before them in their own
parliamentary bailiwick, utterly poised in his brown shirt, did not spare
them.  "It is for you, gentlemen of the Reichstag," he declared, "to decide
between war and peace."

  But how, one might ask, could they take up the fight now, when they had
in fact already given up the fight years earlier?

  At this point, Hitler was no longer even willing to let the last
recalcitrant Reichstag deputies, the Social Democrats -- by now reduced to
representing a mere 17.55 percent of the nation's voters -- assume the
martyred pose of a persecuted fringe group.

  "You talk about persecution!" he thundered in an impromptu response to an
address by the Social Democratic speaker.  "I think that there are only a
few of us [in our party] here who did not have to suffer persecutions in
prison from your side . . . You seem to have totally forgotten that for
years our shirts were ripped off our backs because you did not like the
color . . . We have outgrown your persecutions!"

  "In those days," he scathingly continued, "our newspapers were banned and
banned and again banned, our meetings were forbidden, and we were forbidden
to speak, I was forbidden to speak, for years on end.  And now you say that
criticism is salutary!"

  The shoe was now on the other foot.

  "From now on we National Socialists will make it possible for the German
worker to attain what he is able to demand and insist on.  We National
Socialists will be his intercessors.  You, gentlemen, are no longer needed
. . . And don't confound us with the bourgeois world.  You think that your
star may rise again.  Gentlemen, Germany's star will rise and yours will
sink . . . In the life of nations, that which is rotten, old and feeble
passes and does not return."

  Finally, Hitler dismissed these bankrupt Socialists with the words: "I
can only tell you: I do not want your votes!  Germany shall be free, but
not through you!"
(Quoted in: J. Fest, _Hitler_, New York: 1974, p. 408 f.)

  Within just half a year, Hitler would succeed in liquidating all those
now passe and essentially irrelevant political parties.  Not just the
Socialist Party, already rejected by the people themselves, but all the
other conniving party politicians as well: the conservatives, a century
behind the times, the myopic nationalists, and the boastful Catholic
centrists -- all of them agents and collaborators in Germany's road to ruin
between 1919 and 1933.

  All of these parties had clearly lost their drive.  That some voters
still supported them in early 1933, even after Hitler had become
Chancellor, was largely out of habit.  Their impetus was gone.  The parties
of the Weimar system had botched everything and let the nation go to ruin.
Germany's collapse, her six million unemployed, the widespread hunger, the
demoralization of an entire people: all this was their doing.  Now that a
strong leader with broad national support had taken their place, what could
they do?  As Joachim Fest would later write, they were "like a spider web
with which one hoped to catch eagles."

  Hitler's millions of followers had rediscovered the primal strength of
rough, uncitified man, of a time when men still had backbone.  Theirs was a
Dionysian power, one that they would conserve for the great challenges to
come: it wouldn't be needed against the political parties.  A mere shrug of
the shoulders, and those would fall apart.

  It was fitting that the first to crumble was the Social Democratic party
(SPD).  It went out with a whimper.

  It had still shown some guts on March 23, when its Reichstag deputies
refused to vote Hitler plenary powers.  After 1945 the Socialist party
would glory in that deed, while at the same time taking care not to add
that less than two months later, on May 17, the Social Democratic deputies
decided to approve Hitler's major address to the Reichstag on foreign
policy.  It was as if they felt themselves swept along by the surge of
popular support for Hitler, even within the ranks of their own party.
Along with the National Socialist deputies, they voiced their approval for
Hitler's policy.

  From his perch as Reichstag president, Goring turned to glance at the
turncoats, and commented: "The world has seen that the German people are
united where their destiny is at stake."

  Now that the Social Democratic leadership, which for so long had railed
against Hitler, decided to back him in the Reichstag, the party's rank and
file could hardly be expected to oppose him.  That day marked the end of
the Social Democratic party's credibility.  Following the example of their
own party leadership, the large SPD electorate would, understandably, now
also vote for Hitler.

  After this act of capitulation, it was now child's play for Hitler to
liquidate the Social Democratic party.  Four weeks later, on June 22, it
was officially dissolved.  "No one," Fest has observed, "expected any show
of resistance on the part of the SPD."  The party's initials could more
fittingly have been RIP: RESQUIESCAT IN PACE.

  The peace would be total.  Apart from a few leftist members of the
Reichstag who went into exile and led isolated and unproductive lives
abroad, the now former Socialist deputies continued, each month, to pocket
the pensions that Hitler had allowed them.  They walked about unmolested on
the streets of Berlin.  A number of them, some with great success, even
threw in their lot with the National Socialists.

  Gustav Noske, the lumberjack who became defense minister -- and the most
valiant defender of the embattled republic in the tumultuous months
immediately following the collapse of 1918 -- acknowledged honestly in
1944, when the Third Reich was already rapidly breaking down, that the
great majority of the German people still remained true to Hitler because
of the social renewal he had brought to the working class.

  After the "Reds," the "Whites" had their turn.  Of the two dozen or so
political parties that existed in Germany in 1932-1933, a number of the
smaller ones quietly dissolved themselves without anyone even noticing
their demise.  They had been created for no reason other than to aid the
political ambitions of their founders.  But now, with no more Reichstag
seats in sight, there was no further point in trying to recruit voters.

  The parties of the right, formerly important but now abandoned by their
voters, were conscious of the futility of expending any further effort or
money to subsist artificially.  Now lacking any popular support, one after
another they, too, voluntarily disbanded.  The "German National People's
Party," abandoned by its bourgeois supporters, was the first to give up the
ghost.  A few days later, on June 28, the "State Party" did the same.  The
"Bavarian People's Party" and the "German People's Party" took the same
step on July 4.

  Of all the conservative mossbacks, the most difficult to get rid of was
Alfred Hugenberg, the media titan who was still a minister in Hitler's
cabinet.  Nazis rather disrespectfully called him "the old porker in the
beet patch."  Hugenberg ultimately lost his cabinet post because he
overplayed the role of zealous nationalist at a conference in London in
June 1933, making a claim, premature to say the least, for the return to
Germany of her colonies, and calling for German economic expansion into the
Ukraine!  Hitler regarded this as totally inopportune, particularly at a
time when he was making every effort to reassure his skeptics and critics
abroad.  After this diplomatic blunder, Hugenberg had no choice but to
resign.  Thus departed the once powerful capitalist who had vowed, on
January 30, to politically muzzle the newly named Chancellor.

  His dismissal was a double success for Hitler: by disavowing an
international troublemaker, he reassured those outside the Germany who had
been alarmed by Hugenberg's ill-chosen statements; and he rid himself of a
political liability whose diplomatic gaffe had cost him whatever standing
he had in von Hindenburg's esteem.

  The last political factor to go was the clerico-bourgeois "Center" party.
Following its vote on March 23 to give Hitler plenary powers, the Center
had forfeited all credibility as an opposition party.  Its following
dwindled away in indifference.  After all, if Center leader Monsignor Kaas
decided to side with the Fuhrer in the Reichstag, why shouldn't the party's
rank and file do likewise?

  Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations with the Vatican on a concordat to
regulate relations between the German state and the Catholic church were
close to a favorable conclusion.  In this effort, perhaps more than any
other, Hitler manifested patience, cunning, and tact.  He needed political
peace with the Church, at least until, with the help of the hierarchy, he
could count completely on the support of Germany's many Catholics.

  By voting for Hitler in the Reichstag, Center leader Kaas and his pious
clerics had unsuspectingly fallen into a trap.  On July 5, 1933, they
declared themselves politically neutral and dissolved themselves as a

  As a contemporary observer noted: "All the things being abolished no
longer concerned people very much."  With regard to the rapid demise of the
political parties and the other political forces of both the right and
left, Joachim Fest aptly commented: "If anything could have demonstrated
the sapped vitality of the Weimar Republic, it was the ease with which the
institutions that had sustained it let themselves be overwhelmed."  (Quoted
in: J. Fest, _Hitler_, New York: 1974, p. 415.)

  To abolish the political parties and swallow up their once vast networks
of voters took only a scant half year, and with little damage to life or
limb.  Hitler had succeeded in winning over or at least neutralizing those
who had so recently reviled and jeered him.  No one was more astonished at
the rapidity with which the political parties had succumbed than Hitler
himself.  "One would never have thought so miserable a collapse possible,"
he remarked in July 1933, after having thrown the last shovelful of dirt on
the graves of the Weimar Republic's once mighty parties.
(J. Fest, _Hitler_, p. 415.)

     IV. Unification of the Labor Unions

  Only one significant political factor remained: the Marxist trade unions.
For many years they had represented one of the country's most potent
major political factor, furnishing the Communists with their militants and
the Social Democrats with the bulk of their voters.

stirring up turmoil in the streets and formulating ever greater demands.
that were continually replenished by the contributions of millions of union

disillusion with the unions had become widespread among the working masses.
They were starving.  The hundreds of Socialist and Communist deputies stood
idly by, impotent to provide any meaningful help to the desperate

industrial restructuring, no search for markets abroad.

  Moreover, they offered no energetic resistance to the pillaging by
foreign countries of the Reich's last financial resources: this a
consequence of the Treaty of Versailles that the German Socialists had
courage effectively to oppose.

  The few palliative modifications that had been won, wrested with great
difficulty from the rapacious Allies, had been achieved by Gustav
Stresemann, the conservative foreign affairs minister.  Although he enjoyed
little or no support, even from the politicians, Stresemann fought
foreign talons from the flesh of the German people.

lower, finally to disappear completely.  Everywhere one saw dejection and
thousands of beggars in long sad lines.

full pockets?

determined to eliminate unemployment root and branch.  He wanted not merely

  In January 1933, Hitler's victorious troops were already largely
proletarian in character, including numerous hard-fisted street brawlers,
many unemployed, who no longer counted economically or socially.

  Meanwhile, membership in the Marxist labor unions had fallen off
enormously: among thirteen million socialist and Communist voters in 1932,
no more than five million were union members.  Indifference and
discouragement had reached such levels that many members no longer paid
their union dues.  Many increasingly dispirited Marxist leaders began to
clearly.  Soon they wouldn't wonder any longer.

National Socialist cause.  As historian Joachim Fest acknowledged: "On
March 20, the labor federation's executive committee addressed a kind of
declaration of loyalty to Hitler."  (J. Fest, _Hitler_, p. 413.)


granted to the union what they had vainly asked of every previous
workers could scarcely imagine, the union leadership called upon their
that May Day across Germany, and to acclaim Hitler.

youth groups, marching in cadence down the pavement of Berlin's greatest
transmitted nationwide by radio.

cost, to refresh the new arrivals after their march.


  A fabulous speaker's platform stood out against the sky, three stories
of the immense plain.  Soldiers and civilians mingled together.  Fanfares

  Night fell and Hitler appeared.  His speaker's rostrum was indeed like
dazzling glare of spotlights.

Hitler or otherwise sabotaged the meeting.  Perhaps a third of the
onlookers had been Socialists or Communists only three months previously.
There was only universal acclamation.

Hitler and Goebbels had no equals in the arranging of dedicatory ceremonies
romanticism, its inborn sense of the powerful and the grand.

  Meanwhile the hundreds of flags floated above the rostrum, redeemed from
the darkness by arrows of light.

instantaneously across the acres of people in his audience.

German people.

  Germans have rarely had the good fortune to experience the enchantment of
speakers, more fond of elephantine pedantry than oratorical passion.
ability to project power.

personally experience him speaking to understand this phenomenon.


thousands of previously indifferent or even hostile workers who had come to
Tempelhof at the urging of their labor federation leaders were now won
there that evening had brawled with in recent years.

meeting had come off as smoothly as clockwork.

impressed than Hitler's fellow countrymen.

  The French ambassador, Andre Francois-Poncet, noted:

    The foreigners on the speaker's platform as guests of honor were not
  alone in carrying away the impression of a truly beautiful and wonderful
  public festival, an impression that was created by the regime's genius
  unity was passing over the Third Reich.

  faithful to Thee!  Bless our struggle!"  (A. Francois-Poncet, _Souvenirs
  d'une ambassade a Berlin_, p. 128.)

  Who else could have made such an incantatory appeal without making
himself look ridiculous?

he pledged to carry out in behalf of the common people.

paper summed up.

lasting, positive nature?

field, the National Socialists were able to peacefully take complete
control of Germany's entire labor union organization, including all of its
buildings, enterprises and banks.  An era of Marxist obstruction abruptly
the collective will and interests of all of Germany's workers.

an expression of lasting victory.

  How could Hitler solve the great problem that had defied solution by
back to work?

rights and dignity of the worker?



its provinces subordinate but nonetheless organic parts of the national
constraints of the impotent sectarian political parties.  Moreover, he was
thousand rivulets but flowed as a single, mighty current.

  Hitler was self-confident, sure of the power of his own conviction.  He

  His conquest of Germany had taken years of careful planning and hard
transforming the state and society.  This meant not merely changes in
administrative or governmental structures, but far-reaching social

many of his most refractory skeptics and adversaries.

historian Joachim Fest felt obliged to acknowledge unequivocally:

  spreading like an epidemic, and the shrunken minority of those who
  and more followers, which was being hailed everywhere and suddenly had
  sound reasons on its side.

  And even the prominent leftist writer Kurt Tucholsky, sensing the
direction of the inexorable tide that was sweeping Germany, vividly
comented: "You don't go railing against the ocean."  (J. Fest, _Hitler_,
pp. 415 f.)

but to the people in its totality."


great problem of unemployment.  Could Hitler now succeed where others had
so dismally failed?

     V. Where To Find The Billions?

anxiety -- and not without reason.

(H. Schacht, _Memoires d'un magicien_, vol. II, p. 52.)

Although he faced an agonizing national tragedy -- immense unemployment,
general misery, almost total industrial stagnation -- which no other
politician had been able even to ameliorate, this youthful leader would


  Unlike the other responsible -- or irresponsible -- politicians of
country's economic health meant having to impassively accept one setback
of unemployed workers tramped the streets.

politicians and economists in the democracies was to drastically cut
spending, both governmental and private.  Belt-tightening was the
agreed-upon remedy.

limited payment of unemployment benefits to six months, and reduced total
private investment by five sixths.  The country's standard of living had
gravitated to the welfare offices.

  People spent less and less, with the inevitable consequence that
industries producing consumer goods closed their doors, one after another,
for lack of orders, thereby sending thousands more unemployed into the
streets.  In 1932, Germany's industries were languishing, their production
reduced by half.

  Yearly private investment had fallen from three billion marks to barely
workplaces modernized.  The economy stagnated.

  The government not only lacked any new initiatives, it was almost
meager and short-term unemployment benefits alone absorbed two thirds.

  Germany couldn't wait for a business upswing to get the economy moving
renewal by bold action and imaginative enterprise.

  Unemployment could be combated and eliminated only by giving industry the
new jobs.

  The normal rate of consumption would not be restored, let alone
increased, unless one first raised the starvation-level allowances that
were making purchases of any kind a virtual impossibility.  On the
million unemployed could once again become purchasers.

  The great economic depression could be overcome only by restimulating
the development of new products.

  Because Germany had no petroleum, for example, the production of
file cabinets.  Only a small percentage of practical new inventions ever
left the records files.

  Great public works projects were another way to create new jobs,
Germany's mediocre roads needed vast improvement.  Moreover, the demands of
the time called for the construction of a national network of modern
highways.  Radiating thousands of kilometers, these great concrete
lifelines would encourage increased commerce and communiccation among the
Reich's many regions.

  New highways would also encourage increased automobile production.
Considering the potential, Germany was still quite backward in automobile

envisioned a formidable system of national highways.  He had also conceived

automobile of earlier years, would eventually become a popular work vehicle
the German worker.

most important industrial centers and employers.

  During his imprisonment, Hitler had also drawn up plans for the
construction of popular housing developments and majestic public buildings.

  Some of Hitler's rough sketches still survive.  They include groups of
symbolize the grandeur of the National Socialist revolution.

explained, "the plan of which he drew while he was writing _Mein Kampf_,
larger than Saint Peter's Cathedral in Rome."  (W. Maser, _Hitler, Adolf_,
p. 100.)

idle dream impossible of achievement."

ambitious projects, many of which would eventually be realized.

  Fortunately, the needed entrepreneurs, managers and technicians were on
hand.  Hitler would not have to improvise.

order to carry out his plans."

intelligence in technical matters."  Hitler had acquired his knowledge by

acquired a very considerable amount of knowledge and made masterful use of
ideas that resulted in the ending of great difficulties, sometimes by
measures of astonishing simplicity or brutality."

  Many billions of marks would be needed to begin the great socioeconomic
ensure maximum effectiveness in their investment?

private initiative could not.

  Hitler believed in the importance of individual creative imagination and
assume responsibility.

prospect of having his efforts rewarded, the person of ability often
refrains from running risks.  The economic failure of Communism has
demonstrated this.  In the absence of personal incentives and the
opportunity for real individual initiative, the Soviet "command economy"


brain, creative imagination, and persistence well deserve their reward.

  Because it disregarded these basic psychological truths, Soviet
its immense reservoir of manpower, its technical expertise, and its
industrial and technological giant.


industrial elite.  A manufacturer of great ability should not be
economic development that the industrialist be encouraged morally and
materially, as much as possible.

not always agree with his own.


administrative as well as in the industrial sphere.

Hitler's ministers, like Konstantin von Neurath and Schwerin von Krosigk,
members of the party.  But they were capable.

such men, and to honor them and recognize their achievements.

  Similarly, he did not hestitate to keep on competent bureaucrats chosen
the presidential chancellery under the socialist Ebert and the conservative
respect and confidence, and Meissner served the Fuhrer faithfully and
efficiently for twelve years.

most discerning and competent of Germany's financiers in 1933.  A Hitler
the Reich's economy moving again, he had no equal.

and imaginative, and thus capable of understanding and implementing the
boldest of Hitler's plans.

  Schacht's personal ambition was immense, but this was yet another reason
Within weeks of taking power, Hitler appointed him President of the
couln't be happier.

excluding Jewish financiers in London and New York.  Moreover, Schacht
cared little for Hitler's revolutionary program, which regarded labor as
the true source of national wealth.

was never permitted to intervene in political matters.  When Schacht's
financial formulas had served their purpose, the collaboration would end.
and would nurse a seething resentment.

any means available, in early February 1933 Hitler summoned Schacht's
administration, had old-fashioned views of extreme prudence in the

devise new means of financing Germany's recovery.

new ideas; it was a calculator.

creating jobs?"  Luther hesitated to respond immediately; his mental
calculator began functioning.  After working out the calculations in his
firm: "One hundred and fifty million."

  An eloquent answer, it showed just how completely Hitler's predecessors
and their colleagues were lacking in their understanding of the scope of
marks every three months into unemployment benefits alone!

million unemployed over one short week.

Germany back to work.



Hitler reassured Schacht that he would find an appropriate new job
elsewhere for Luther.

ready to assume the presidency of the Reichsbank again."

solution to Germany's pressing financial woes would burst forth from his
inventive brain.

would avoid inflating the investment holdings of the Reichsbank
immoderately and consequently increasing the circulation of money

the reasoning behind the Mefo bonds."

METALLURGISCHE FORSCHUNGS-GmbH (Metallurgic Research Company).  With a
startup capitalization of one billion marks -- which Hitler and Schacht
Werke and Rheinmetall -- this company would eventually promote many
billions of marks worth of investment.

Reichsbank, were immediately convertible into cash.  The success of the
mattress earned nothing.  The public quickly took all this into
consideration and eagerly accepted the bonds.

insignificant 150 million marks for Hitler's war on unemployment, in just
Mefo bonds!

  These billions, the fruit of the combined imagination, ingenuity and
astuteness of Hitler and Schacht, swept away the temporizing and fearful
credit reserve would make miracles possible.

highway construction.  This Autobahn program provided immediate work for
100,000 of the unemployed, and eventually assured wages for some 500,000

cutback in government unemployment benefits, and by the additional tax
of the newly employed.

private industry once again dared to assume risks and expand.  Germans
returned to work by the hundreds of thousands.

  Was Schacht solely responsible for this extraordinary turnaround?  After
he was charged with having made possible the Reich's economic revival:

  working class would have died with him!

June 1934 issue of the _Zeitschrift fur Sozialismus_, the journal of the
German Social Democrats in exile, this acknowledgement appears:

  Faced with the despair of proletarians reduced to joblessness, of young
  and artisans condemned to bankruptcy, and of farmers terribly threatened
  capable of offering the masses anything but speeches about the glory of

     VI. The Social Revolution

  Hitler's tremendous social achievement in putting Germany's six million
more than a transitory achievement, "democratic" historians routinely
scholarly study has been devoted to this highly significant, indeed
unprecedented, historical phenomenon.

  Similarly neglected is the body of sweeping reforms that dramatically
changed the condition of the worker in Germany.  Factories were transformed
from gloomy caverns to spacious and healthy work centers, with natural
lighting, surrounded by gardens and playing fields.  Hundreds of thousands
several weeks of paid vacation was introduced, along with weekend and
cultural education for young workers was established, with the world's best
system of technical training.  The Third Reich's social security and

  This remarkable record of social achievement is routinely hushed up today
because it embarrasses those who uphold the orthodox view of the Third
greatest social builder of the twentieth century.

  Because Hitler's program of social reform was a crucially important --
morality play of good versus evil.

  Nevertheless, restoring work and bread to millions of unemployed who had
been living in misery for years; restructuring industrial life; conceiving
and establishing an organization for the effective defense and betterment
judicial system that guaranteed the civic rights of each member of the
national community, while simultaneously holding each person to his or her
years earlier.

  Without this plan, the nation would have collapsed into anarchy.
All-encompassing, this program included broad industrial recovery as well
as detailed attention to even construction of comfortable inns along the
new highway network.

Bolshevik revolution of 1917, hundreds of thousands of Russians were still
was in motion within months, with organization and accomplishment quickly
meshing together.

  The single task of constructing a national highway system that was
system had to be carefully planned in all its particulars.

  As usual, Hitler had been remarkably farsighted.  The concrete highways
The artistically planned roadways would come together and diverge as if
motor inns would be thoughtfully integrated into the overall scheme, each
facility built in harmony with the local landscape and architectural style.

  The original plan called for 7,000 kilometers of roadway.  This
reunited with Germany, to 11,000 kilometers.

  The financial boldness equalled the technical vision.  These expressways
increased tax revenues, notably from gasoline.

but an avenue to economic prosperity.

  These greatly expanded transport facilities encouraged the development of
hundreds of new business enterprises along the new expressways.  By
eliminating congestion on secondary roads, the new highways stimulated

  Even the wages paid out to the men who built the REICHSAUTOBAHN network
brought considerable indirect benefits.  First, they allowed a drastic cut
wages.  Second, the many workers employed in constructing the expressways
which in turn generated increased tax revenues.

work by the sweat of their brows under the open sky.

their lives.

other considerations.

comfort, entertainment and instruction.  The world had never before seen
were being treated like respected human beings who had bodies to be

  Camp sites, supply bases, and recreation facilities were systematically
set up, with everything moving forward methodically as the construction
advanced.  Fourteen mobile crews that provided motion picture entertainment
and everywhere, labor was honored and celebrated.

  Hitler personally dug the first spadeful of earth for the first Autobahn
the project possible.  The official procession moved ahead, three cars

  The Second World War would abruptly halt work on this great construction
undertaking.  But what was envisioned and created remains as a deathless
testimony to a man and an era.

mobilization of manpower.  He had envisioned housing that would be
attractive, cozy, and affordable for millions of ordinary German
factory towns, packed with cramped families, disgusted him.

retaining as much as possible the charming local variants.

  Wherever there was no practical alternative to building large apartment
airy and enhanced by surrounding lawns and gardens where the children could
play safely.

standards of public health, a consideration notoriously neglected in
previous working-class projects.



revenue from taxes tripled.  Hitler's Germany never experienced a financial

economy to revive by itself.

fearful hesitation.  Enrichment follows investment, not the other way

President, he realized that to restore prosperity in the United States
meant boldly stimulating the economy with credits and a drastic reduction
stagnation on its own.

202,119 housing units.  Within four years he would provide the German

the average wage then.  Employees with more substantial salaries paid
monthly rents of up to 45 marks maximum.

  Equally effective social measures were taken in behalf of farmers, who
farmer's income.  This unprecedented endowment of land and housing was only
one feature of a revolution that soon dramatically improved the living
standards of the Reich's rural population.

  The great work of national construction rolled along.  An additional
100,000 workers quickly found employment in repairing the nation's
barren regions.

industry leading the way.

  The new government lavished every assistance on the private sector, the
chief factor in employment as well as production.  Hitler almost
immediately made available 500 million marks in credits to private

most enterprising companies.  Nearly half would go into new wages and
salaries, saving the treasury an estimated three hundred million marks in
unemployment benefits.  Added to the hundreds of millions in tax receipts
spurred by the business recovery, the state quickly recovered its
investment, and more.

  Hitler's entire economic policy would be based on the following equation:
modernization of industry, then later recover the billions invested through
see the results of Hitler's recovery formula.

  Economic recovery, as important as it was, nevertheless wasn't Hitler's
health and welfare of the entire national community.

collaboration of everyone could assure the prosperity of all classes and
social groups.

  Consistent with their doctrine, Germany's Marxist leaders had set class
collapse.  Deserting their Marxist unions and political parties in droves,
most workers had come to realize that the endless strikes and grievances
their leaders incited only crippled production, and thus the workers as

the less scrupulous union officials, sensing the oncoming catastrophe, had
begun stealing hundreds of thousands of marks from the workers they
represented.  The Marxist leaders had failed: socially, financially and

business is also the person naturally responsible for it.  He oversees
managers who had proven to be unjust, incompetent or recalcitrant lost
their jobs, or their businesses.

  A considerable number of legal guarantees protected the worker against
worthy collaborators, not just as animated tools.  Each industrialist was
legally obliged to collaborate with worker delegates in drafting shop
regulations that were not imposed from above but instead adapted to each
business enterprise and its particular working conditions.  These

  The thousands of different, individual versions of such regulations
the others in efficiency and justice.

  One of the first reforms to benefit German workers was the establishment
times more generous.

  Under Hitler, every factory employee had the legal right to paid
vacation.  Previously, paid vacations had not normally exceeded four or

but in 1933 they far exceeded European norms.

grant the workers of their country in 1936.

the norm, overtime work became more readily available.

playing fields that large industries were now required to provide.


  This Court was one of three great institutions that were established to
"Council of Trust."

  The "Council of Trust" (VERTRAUENSRAT) was responsible for establishing
and developing a real spirit of community between management and labor.
"the employer and head of the enterprise (FUHRER), the employees and
the enterprise and the common good of the nation."

strikes for political ends.

enterprise community shall assume the responsibility required by his
community -- no longer a selfish capitalist with unconditional, arbitrary

authority on the employer only insofar as he merited it.

  Every business enterprise of twenty or more persons now acquired a
"Council of Trust" (VERTRAUENSRAT), two to ten members of which were chosen
from among the staff by the chief executive.  The law's implementation
ordinance of March 10, 1934, further stated:

  of preference, or by striking out certain names.

between classes.  Obliged to coordinate their interests, former adversaries
regulations which determined working conditions.

  in particular those that concern measures tending to reinforce feelings
  of solidarity between the members themselves and between the members and
  the enterprise, or tending to improve the personal situation of the
  members of the enterprise commun-ity.  The Council also has the
  imposition of fines based on workshop regulations.


incompetence, overcome stagnation, and prevent arrogance or careerism on
the part of Council members.


  The second institution established to insure the orderly development of
the new German social system was the "Labor Commission" (REICHSTREUHANDER
DER ARBEIT), the members of which were essentially conciliators and
arbitrators.  They were charged with dealing with and overcoming the
that the Councils of Trust functioned harmoniously and efficiently, and to
ensure that a given business enterprise's regulations were carried out to
the letter.

  Each of the thirteen Labor Commissions operated in its own district of
Appointed by the state, they represented rather the interests of everyone
minimize arbitrary or unfounded rulings, the Labor Commissions relied on

all grave infractions of the social duties based on the enterprise
misused or published confidential business information discovered in the
course of his work.

assisted the presiding judge.

  Each Court of Social Honor (EHRENGERICHT), like any other court of law,
sanctions, precisely adapted to the circumstances, were provided for.
These included mandatory change of employment and dismissal of a chief
Court in Berlin -- yet another level of protection.

obligations with every other member of the enterprise, from the chief
defined social rights, which were arbitrated and enforced by independent
and moderation, it nevertheless constituted a genuine social revolution.

time when grimy bathrooms and squalid courtyards were the sole sanitary and
recreational facilities available to workers.

conform to the strictest standards of cleanliness and hygiene: interiors,
aside; employee cafeterias and respectable locker rooms were opened.  The
larger industrial establishments, in addition to providing the normally
required conventional sports facilities, were obliged to put in swimming

  In just three years, these achievements would reach unimagined heights:
more than two thousand factories refitted and beautified; 23,000 work
premises modernized; 800 buildings designed exclusively for meetings; 1,200
playing fields; 13,000 sanitary facilities; 17,000 cafeterias.

  To assure the healthy development of the working class, physical
education courses were instituted for younger workers.  Some 8,000 were
eventually organized.  Technical training was equally emphasized.  Hundreds
were examinations for professional competence, and competitions in which
generous prizes were awarded to outstanding masters of their craft.

  Eight hundred departmental inspectors and 17,300 local inspectors were
employed to conscientiously monitor and promote these improvements.

  To provide affordable vacations for German workers on a hitherto
relaxing vacation trips on land and sea each summer.  Magnificent cruise
ships were built, and special trains brought vacationers to the mountains
popular vacation excursions was nearly insignificant.

  Were Hitler's reforms perfect?  Doubtless there were flaws, blunders and
drawbacks.  But what were a few inevitable mistakes beside the immense

  Was Hitler's transformation of the lot of the working class
and tired of anarchy, this new authoritarianism wasn't regarded as an
imposition.  In fact, people have always accepted a strong man's


  working-class districts, go through the factories, the construction
  bright red background, in the most densely populated districts.

  Hitler's "German Labor Front" (DEUTSCHE ARBEITSFRONT), which incorporated
(REICHSARBEITSDIENST) could also be seen gleaming along the highways.

  Hitler created the National Labor Service not only to alleviate
for several months' common labor and living.

they enjoyed the same pleasures and benefited from the same physical and
moral development.  At the same construction sites and in the same
understand one another, and discarded their old prjudices of class and


what I was then."

a success of himself.


which the politicians were heedless and inaccessible, the electorate
powerless to vote on their actions.

important events of social, national, or international significance, Hitler
as Chancellor: the plebiscite.

foreign affairs.  Rather than a formalistic routine, democracy became a
vital, active program of supervision that was renewed annually.


  a law.

  2. A measure submitted to plebiscite will be considered as established
  to a law modifying the Constitution.

  all legal and administrative measures necessary to carry out this law.

  Berlin, July 14, 1933.
  Hitler, Frick

international supervision.

fear of such secret ballot plebiscites because the German people invariably
supported him.

a time?

to the national community.

  Hitler's popularity took on some astonishing, indeed comical, aspects.
was recommended with the advertising slogan 'My Struggle (MEIN KAMPF)
against flatulence'!  Pictures of Hitler appeared on neckties,
handkerchiefs, pocket mirrors, and the swastika decorated ash trays and
of his party, Hitler ordered that it be discontinued immediately.

  The economic and social transformation of the Reich impressed observers
no less than the political transformation wrought by the leader of National

  _Hitler_, New York: 1974, p. 428.)

  In his detailed and critical biography of Hitler, Joachim Fest limited
his treatment of Hitler's extraordinary social achievements in 1933 to a

  demonstrated class neutrality . . . These measures did indeed break
  through the old, petrified social structures.  They tangibly improved the
  material condition of much of the population.  (J. Fest, _Hitler_, pp.

  Not without reason were the swastika banners waving proudly throughout
unceremoniously torn down.

[end of article]

$50 per year, foreign.]

     This article was manually transcribed by the System Operator of the
Oregon, U.S.A.

                    Banished CPU supports Freedom of Speech!
         |                                                           |

                        Sysop: Maynard "the Main Nerd"

[end of file]


-Dan Gannon


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