No argument

America's inability to rally support over Iraq is partly due to its diplomatic shortcomings but also because it has not made a convincing case for going to war, says Mark Tran

As the US tightens the military noose around Iraq, the script is not going according to plan.

The Bush administration had hoped that France and the other wobblers would eventually fall into line with America and Britain once they had postured enough for their domestic audiences.

In Washington's script, Jacques Chirac, the French president, would come around for fear of being left out when the spoils of war - oil - were distributed after Iraq was defeated. Instead, France and Germany, backed by public opinion in those countries, are stiffening their opposition to a military campaign.

They argue, to increasing US exasperation, that UN inspectors should be given more time and that war should be a last resort. Furthermore, Vladimir Putin, Russia's president, is not yet quite on board with the Americans, despite his close personal relationship with George Bush, while China is also cool on war.

In further evidence of disarray, Nato is split because France, Belgium and Germany have blocked the alliance from activating plans for Turkey's defence against any attack from Iraq.

Saddam Hussein has not had much to laugh about in recent months, but he must be allowing himself a few chuckles as his enemies go for each other's throats. The rifts in the anti-Saddam camp stand in stark contrast to the coalition assembled by the first George Bush on the eve of the first Gulf war in 1991.

Bush senior won the total backing of the UN security council after much cajoling and arm-twisting. Then, as now, a lot of persuading had to be done as several countries, including France and Russia, harboured reservations. But in the end they went along, with France even contributing troops to the war effort.

Now, the Bush administration must be wondering if it can even carry a second UN resolution to confer legitimacy on its campaign.

In the worst case scenario, France would dare to exercise its veto and present the US with the awful predicament of having to override the nearest thing there is to a world cabinet. Even abstentions from France, China and Russia, would hardly constitute wholehearted endorsement for American action.

America's failure to rally the world behind its campaign against Iraq is partly a failure of diplomacy. American efforts to isolate France and Germany have backfired spectacularly. The US actively encouraged these European splits. The "bold declaration", in Mr Rumsfeld's words, of 10 east European governments that backed the US, the so-called Vilnius 10, was even drafted by a US lobbyist. To rub salt into the wounds, the abrasive US secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, has been allowed to ride roughshod over French and German sensitivities, dissing them as "old Europe", while talking up the "new" eastern European states. It is hardly the way to make friends and win influence in the capitals that matter, old Europe or not.

But there is more to this than a failure of diplomacy, coupled with the impatient arrogance as embodied by the brusque Mr Rumsfeld. If America had succeeded in making a convincing case for making war on Saddam Hussein, the rest of America's allies might have lined up behind the White House.

Yet, America's and Britain's efforts to link Saddam to al-Qaida have failed to convince. The Butcher of Baghdad is undoubtedly an enemy and a threat to his own people, but his clapped-out army - together with whatever nuclear missiles, chemical and biological weapons he may possess - hardly seem to constitute a threat to the west.

For sceptics, America's obsession with Saddam appears to be rooted in a desire to find a convenient target that dovetails nicely into its new doctrine of pre-emptive attacks against perceived threats.

The first president Bush succeeded in assembling a mighty coalition not only through patient diplomacy but also because his case was much more clear cut. Iraq had invaded a neighbouring country in violation of basic international rules.

Now the case for war is not so obvious. True, Saddam has violated various UN security council resolutions, but he has not invaded anybody, nor has he been linked to the September 11 attacks. UN credibility hardly seems a solid reason for going to war, with the enormous geopolitical risks it poses.

On a day when more than 400 soldiers were drafted in to provide extra security at Heathrow airport and other sites in London against the possibility of terrorist action, the public may well wonder why Tony Blair persists in diverting resources to a man who has been effectively boxed in ever since he lost the last Gulf war, instead of al-Qaida and other terrorist groups.

This is not to say that America's flotilla, poised to strike against Saddam, has been an exercise in futility. Saddam only agreed to readmit UN inspectors after a five-year absence precisely because he fears an American strike.

But now that the inspectors are there, they should be allowed to continue their work. If disarmament is the objective, it should be remembered that UN inspectors did more to strip Saddam of his most lethal weapons than the American-led war effort a decade ago.