Καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὃ ἂν δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ὂν ἐπαινετὸν ᾖ, ἢ ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἡδὺ ᾖ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλόν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρετὴν καλὸν εἶναι· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ὂν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν. ἀρετὴ δ’ ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις ὡς δοκεῖ ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτική, καὶ δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, καὶ πάντων περὶ πάντα· μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, ἐλευθεριότης, φρόνησις, σοφία. 6 ἀνάγκη δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική, <καὶ> διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶσιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ χρήσιμος ἄλλοις. εἶτα ἐλευθεριότης· προΐενται γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀνταγωνίζονται περὶ τῶν χρημάτων, ὧν μάλιστα ἐφίενται ἄλλοι. ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι’ ἣν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος· ἀδικία δὲ δι’ ἣν τὰ ἀλλότρια, οὐχ ὡς ὁ νόμος. ἀνδρεία δὲ δι’ ἣν πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει, καὶ ὑπηρετικοὶ τῷ νόμῳ· δειλία δὲ τοὐναντίον. σωφροσύνη δὲ ἀρετὴ δι’ ἣν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει· ἀκολασία δὲ τοὐναντίον. ἐλευθεριότης δὲ περὶ χρήματα εὐποιητική, ἀνελευθερία δὲ τοὐναντίον. μεγαλοψυχία δὲ ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητικὴ εὐεργετημάτων μικροψυχία δὲ τοὐναντίον, μεγαλοπρέπεια δὲ ἀρετὴ ἐν δαπανήμασι μεγέθους ποιητική, μικροψυχία δὲ καὶ μικροπρέπεια τἀναντία. φρόνησις δ’ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας καθ’ ἣν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.
(Aristotle, Rhet. 1.9.1366a-b)

Now kalon describes whatever, through being chosen itself, is praiseworthy or whatever, through being good [agathon], is pleasant because it is good. If this, then, is the kalon, then virtue is necessarily kalon; for it is praiseworthy because of being good [agathon]. Now virtue [aretē] is an ability [dynamis], as it seems, that is productive and preservative of goods, and an ability for doing good in many and great ways, actually in all ways in all things. The parts [or subdivisions] of virtue are justice, manly courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and wisdom. Since virtue is defined as an ability for doing good, the greatest virtues are necessarily those most useful to others. For that reason people most honor the just and the courageous; for the latter is useful to others in war, and the former in peace as well. Next is liberality; for the liberal make contributions freely and do not quarrel about the money, which others care most about. Justice [dikaiosynē] is a virtue by which all, individually, have what is due to them and as the law requires; and injustice [is a vice] by which they have what belongs to others and not as the law requires. Manly courage [andreia] [is a virtue] by which people perform fine actions in times of danger and as the law orders and obedient to the law, and cowardice is the opposite. Self-control [sophrosynē] is the virtue through which people behave as the law orders in regard to the pleasures of the body, and lack of control [is] the opposite. Liberality [eleutheriotēs] is the disposition to do good with money, illiberality [is] the opposite. Magnanimity [megalopsykhia] is a virtue, productive of great benefits [for others], and magnificence [megaloprepeia] is a virtue in expenditures, productive of something great, while little-mindedness [mikropsykhia] and stinginess [mikroprepeia] are the opposites. Prudence [phronēsis] is a virtue of intelligence whereby people are able to plan well for happiness in regard to the good and bad things that have been mentioned earlier. (tr. George A. Kennedy)



Ποῖα δ’ ἐλεεινὰ καὶ τίνας ἐλεοῦσι, καὶ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸν μέλλοντα ἐλεήσειν ὑπάρχειν τοιοῦτον οἷον οἴεσθαι παθεῖν ἄν τι κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοιοῦτο κακὸν οἷον εἴρηται ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ ἢ ὅμοιον ἢ παραπλήσιον· διὸ οὔτε οἱ παντελῶς ἀπολωλότες ἐλεοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔτι παθεῖν οἴονται· πεπόνθασι γάρ), οὔτε οἱ ὑπερευδαιμονεῖν οἰόμενοι, ἀλλ’ ὑβρίζουσιν· εἰ γὰρ ἅπαντα οἴονται ὑπάρχειν τἀγαθά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι παθεῖν μηδὲν κακόν· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἷοι νομίζειν παθεῖν ἄν, οἵ τε πεπονθότες ἤδη καὶ διαπεφευγότες, καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ διὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ δι’ ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς, καὶ οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον, καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι· εὐλόγιστοι γάρ. καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχουσι γονεῖς ἢ τέκνα ἢ γυναῖκες· αὐτοῦ τε γὰρ ταῦτα, καὶ οἷα παθεῖν τὰ εἰρημένα. καὶ οἱ μήτε ἐν ἀνδρείας πάθει ὄντες, οἷον ἐν ὀργῇ ἢ θάρρει (ἀλόγιστα γὰρ τοῦ ἐσομένου ταῦτα), μήτε ἐν ὑβριστικῇ διαθέσει (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἀλόγιστοι τοῦ πείσεσθαί τι), ἀλλ’ οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων, μήτ’ αὖ φοβούμενοι σφόδρα· οὐ γὰρ ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι, διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει. κἂν οἴωνταί τινας εἶναι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν· ὁ γὰρ μηδένα οἰόμενος πάντας οἰήσεται ἀξίους εἶναι κακοῦ. καὶ ὅλως δὴ ὅταν ἔχῃ οὕτως ὥστ’ ἀναμνησθῆναι τοιαῦτα συμβεβηκότα ἢ αὑτῷ ἤ ‹τῳ› τῶν αὑτοῦ, ἢ ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι αὑτῷ ἤ τῳ τῶν αὑτοῦ.
(Aristotle, Rhet. 2.8.1385b-1386a)

Let us say what sort of things are pitiable and whom people pity and in what state of mind. Let pity be [defined as] a certain pain at an apparently destructive or painful event happening to one who does not deserve it and which a person might expect himself or one of his own to suffer, and this when it seems close at hand; for it is clear that a person who is going to feel pity necessarily thinks that some evil is actually present of the sort that he or one of his own might suffer and that this evil is of the sort mentioned in the definition or like it or about equal to it. Therefore, those who are utterly ruined do not feel pity (they think there is nothing left for them to suffer; for they have suffered) nor [do] those thinking themselves enormously happy; they demonstrate insolent pride [hybris] instead. (If they think all good things are actually present, clearly they also think it is not possible to experience any evil; for this [impossibility of suffering] is one if the good things.) The kind of people who think they might suffer are those who have suffered in the past and escaped and older people because of their practical wisdom and experience and the weak and those who are cowardly and those who have been educated; for they are discerning. Also those that have parents or children or wives; for these are their “own” and subject to the sufferings that have been mentioned. And those who are not in a courageous emotional state, for example not in a state of anger or confidence (these feelings do not take account of the future) nor in one of violent insolence (these people, too, take no account of suffering anything) nor, conversely, in a state of extreme fear (those who are scared out of their wits do not feel pity because so taken up with their own suffering) but [only] those who are in between these states. And [people feel pity] if they think certain individuals are among the good people of the world; for one who thinks no good person exists will think all worthy of suffering. And on the whole, [a person feels pity] when his state of mind is such that he remembers things like this happening to himself or his own or expects them to happen to himself or his own. (tr. George A. Kennedy)



Περὶ δὲ τραγῳδίας λέγωμεν, ἀπολαβόντες αὐτῆς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν γινόμενον ὅρον τῆς οὐσίας. ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας, μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι’ ἀπαγγελίας, δι’ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. λέγω δὲ ἡδυσμένον μὲν λόγον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν, τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς εἴδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἔνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα διὰ μέλους. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τι μόριον τραγῳδίας ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος, εἶτα μελοποιία καὶ λέξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν. λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσιν, μελοποιίαν δὲ ὃ τὴν δύναμιν φανερὰν ἔχει πᾶσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι μίμησις, πράττεται δὲ ὑπό τινων πραττόντων, οὓς ἀνάγκη ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατά τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν (διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τὰς πράξεις εἶναί φαμεν ποιάς τινας, καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ τυγχάνουσι καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσι πάντες), ἔστιν δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἡ μίμησις, λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ ἤθη, καθ’ ἃ ποιούς τινας εἶναί φαμεν τοὺς πράττοντας, διάνοιαν δέ, ἐν ὅσοις λέγοντες ἀποδεικνύασί τι ἣ καὶ ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην. Ἀνάγκη οὖν πάσης τῆς τραγῳδίας μέρη εἶναι ἕξ, καθ᾿ἃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ μῦθος καὶ ἤθη καὶ λέξις καὶ διάνοια καὶ ὄψις καὶ μελοποιία.
(Aristotle, Poet. 1449b21-1450a10)

But let us now discuss tragedy, taking up the definition of its essence which emerges from what has already been said. Tragedy, then, is mimesis of an action which is elevated, complete, and of magnitude; in language embellished by distinct forms in its sections; employing the mode of enactment, not narrative; and through pity and fear accomplishing the catharsis of such emotions. I use “embellished” for language with rhythm and melody, and “distinct forms” for the fact that some parts are conveyed through metrical speech alone, others again through song. Since actors render the mimesis, some part of tragedy will, in the first place, necessarily be the arrangement of spectacle; to which can be added lyric poetry and diction, for these are the media in which they render the mimesis. By “diction” I mean the actual composition of the metrical speech; the sense of “lyric poetry” is entirely clear. Since tragedy is mimesis of an action, and the action is conducted by agents who should have certain qualities in both character and thought (as it is these factors which allow us to ascribe qualities to their actions too, and it is in their actions that all men find success or failure), the plot is the mimesis of the action—for I use “plot” to denote the construction of events, “character” to mean that in virtue of which we ascribe certain qualities to the agents, and “thought” to cover the parts in which, through speech, they demonstrate something or declare their views. Tragedy as a whole, therefore, must have six components, which give it its qualities—namely, plot, character, diction, thought, spectacle, and lyric poetry. (tr. Stephen Halliwell)


working the land

Ἐχόμενον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τίνα τρόπον δεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοῖς μέλλουσι πολιτεύεσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, πότερον κοινὴν ἢ μὴ κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν. τοῦτο δ’ ἄν τις καὶ χωρὶς σκέψαιτο ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας νενομοθετημένων, λέγω [δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν] πότερον, κἂν ᾖ ἐκεῖνα χωρὶς, καθ’ ὃν νῦν τρόπον ἔχει πᾶσι, τάς τε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις . . . , οἷον τὰ μὲν γήπεδα χωρὶς τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκειν (ὅπερ ἔνια ποιεῖ τῶν ἐθνῶν), ἢ τοὐναντίον τὴν μὲν γῆν κοινὴν εἶναι καὶ γεωργεῖν κοινῇ, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς διαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας χρήσεις (λέγονται δέ τινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κοινωνεῖν τῶν βαρβάρων), ἢ καὶ τὰ γήπεδα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς κοινούς. ἑτέρων μὲν οὖν ὄντων τῶν γεωργούντων, ἄλλος ἂν εἴη τρόπος καὶ ῥᾴων, αὐτῶν δ’ αὑτοῖς διαπονούντων τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις πλείους ἂν παρέχοι δυσκολίας. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀπολαύσεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις μὴ γινομένων ἴσων, ἀναγκαῖον ἐγκλήματα γίνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολαύοντας μὲν ἢ λαμβάνοντας πολλὰ ὀλίγα δὲ πονοῦντας τοῖς ἐλάττω μὲν λαμβάνουσι, πλείω δὲ πονοῦσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων χαλεπόν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων. δηλοῦσι δ’ αἱ τῶν συναποδήμων κοινωνίαι, σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι διαφέρονται ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσκρούοντες ἀλλήλοις· ἔτι δὲ τῶν θεραπόντων τούτοις μάλιστα προσκρούομεν οἷς πλεῖστα προσχρώμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακονίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίους.
(Aristotle, Pol. 1262b37-1263a21)

Connected with the foregoing is the question of property. What arrangements should be made about it, if people are going to operate the best possible constitution? Should it be held in common or not ? This question may well be considered in isolation from the legislation about children and wives. A possible answer is that while they should belong to individuals, as is the universal practice, it would be better that either property or its use should be communal. In the latter case the plots of land are in private hands and its produce pooled for common use (as is done by some foreign nations); in the former, the land is communally held and communally worked but its produce is distributed according to individual requirements. This is a form of communal ownership which is said to exist among certain non-Greek peoples. There is also the alternative that both the land and its produce be owned communally. As to its cultivation, a different system will run more smoothly, i.e. if the land is worked by others, because, if they themselves work for their own benefit, there will be greater ill-feeling about the ownership. For if the work done and the benefit accrued are equal, well and good; but if not, there will inevitably be ill-feeling between those who get a good income without doing much work and those who work harder but get no corresponding extra benefit. To live together and share in any human concern is hard enough to achieve at the best of times, and such a state of affairs makes it doubly hard. The same kind of trouble is evident when a number of people club together for the purpose of travel. How often have we not seen such partnerships break down over quarrels arising out of trivial and unimportant matters! In the household also we get most annoyed with those servants whom we employ to perform the ordinary routine tasks. (tr. Thomas Alan Sinclair, revised by Trevor J. Saunders)



In problematis Aristotelis philosophi ita scriptum est: Διὰ τί οἱ μὲν αἰσχυνόμενοι ὠχριῶσιν, παραπλησίων τῶν παθῶν ὄντων; ὅτι τῶν μὲν αἰσχυνομένων διαχεῖται τὸ αἷμα ἐκ τῆς καρδίας εἰς ἅπαντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, ὥστε ἐπιπολάζειν· τοῖς δὲ φοβηθεῖσιν συντρέχει εἰς τὴν καρδίαν, ὥστε ἐκλείπειν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν [fr. 243 R3]. hoc ego Athenis cum Tauro nostro legissem percontatusque essem, quid de ratione ista reddita sentiret, “dixit quidem” inquit “probe et vere, quid accideret diffuso sanguine aut contracto, sed cur ita fieret, non dixit. adhuc enim quaeri potest, quam ob causam pudor sanguinem diffundat, timor contrahat, cum sit pudor species timoris atque ita definiatur: ‘timor iustae reprehensionis’. ita enim philosophi definiunt: αἰσχύνη ἐστὶν φόβος δικαίου ψόγου.”
(Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att. 19.6)

In the Problems of the philosopher Aristotle is the following passage: “Why do men who are ashamed turn red and those who fear grow pale; although these emotions are similar? Because the blood of those who feel shame flows from the heart to all parts of the body, and therefore comes to the surface; but the blood of those who fear rushes to the heart, and consequently leaves all the other parts of the body.” When I had read this at Athens with our friend Taurus and had asked him what he thought about that reason which had been assigned, he answered: “He has told us properly and truly what happens when the blood is diffused or concentrated, but he has not told us why this takes place. For the question may still be asked why it is that shame diffuses the blood and fear contracts it, when shame is a kind of fear and is defined by the philosophers as ‘the fear of just censure.’ For they say: αἰσχύνη ἐστὶν φόβος δικαίου ψόγου [shame is the fear of just censure].” (tr. John C. Rolfe)




Καὶ καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος λέγεται πρὸς τοὺς ξένους εἰπεῖν τοὺς βουλομένους ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ, οἳ ἐπειδὴ προσιόντες εἶδον αὐτὸν θερόμενον πρὸς τῷ ἰπνῷ ἔστησαν (ἐκέλευε γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰσιέναι θαρροῦντας· εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεούς), οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ζῴων προσιέναι δεῖ μὴ δυσωπούμενον, ὡς ἐν ἅπασιν ὄντος τινὸς φυσικοῦ καὶ καλοῦ.
(Aristotle, Part. An. 645a19-24)

And just as Heraclitus is said to have spoken to the visitors, who were wanting to meet him but stopped as they were approaching when they saw him warming himself at the oven—he kept telling them to come in and not to worry, “fore there are gods here too”—so we should approach the inquiry about each animal without aversion, knowing that in all of them there is something natural and beautiful. (tr. David M. Balme)



This is part 2 of 3. Part 1 is here. Part 3 is here.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων διήλθομεν λέγοντες τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν, λοιπὸν περὶ τῆς ζωϊκῆς φύσεως εἰπεῖν, μηδὲν παραλιπόντας εἰς δύναμιν μήτε ἀτιμότερον μήτε τιμιώτερον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ κεχαρισμένοις αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν ὁμοίως ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις ἀμηχάνους ἡδονὰς παρέχει τοῖς δυναμένοις τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν καὶ φύσει φιλοσόφοις. καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν, οἷον τὴν γραφικὴν ἢ τὴν πλαστικήν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῷμεν τὴν θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοί γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν. διὸ δεῖ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παιδικῶς τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμοτέρων ζῴων ἐπίσκεψιν· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἔνεστί τι θαυμαστόν·
(Aristotle, Part. An. 645a4-645a19)

And since we have completed the account of our views concerning these, it remains to speak about animal nature, omitting nothing if possible whether of lesser or greater value. For even in the study of animals unattractive to the senses, the nature that fashioned them offers immeasurable pleasures in the same way to those who can learn the causes and are naturally lovers of wisdom. It would be unreasonable, indeed absurd, to enjoy studying their representations on the grounds that we thereby study the art that fashioned them (painting or sculpture), but not to welcome still more the study of the actual things composed by nature, at least when we can survey their causes. Therefore we must avoid a childish distaste for examining the less valued animals. For in all natural things there is something wonderful. (tr. David M. Balme)