What Is Philosophy of Religion?

Philosophy of religion is “the philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions.” These sorts of philosophical discussion are ancient, and can be found in the earliest known manuscripts concerning philosophy. The field is related to many other branches of philosophy, including metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.[2]




Philosopher William L. Rowe characterized the philosophy of religion as: “the critical examination of basic religious beliefs and concepts.”[4] Philosophy of religion covers alternative beliefs about God (or gods), the varieties of religious experience, the interplay between science and religion, the nature and scope of good and evil, and religious treatments of birth, history, and death.[1] The field also includes the ethical implications of religious commitments, the relation between faith, reason, experience and tradition, concepts of the miraculous, the sacred revelation, mysticism, power, and salvation.[5]


The philosophy of religion has been distinguished from theology by pointing out that, for theology, “its critical reflections are based on religious convictions”.[9] Also, “theology is responsible to an authority that initiates its thinking, speaking, and witnessing … [while] philosophy bases its arguments on the ground of timeless evidence.”[10]

Some aspects of philosophy of religion have classically been regarded as a part of metaphysics. In Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the necessarily prior cause of eternal motion was an unmoved mover, who, like the object of desire, or of thought, inspires motion without itself being moved.[11] This, according to Aristotle, is God, the subject of study in theology. Today, however, philosophers have adopted the term “philosophy of religion” for the subject, and typically it is regarded as a separate field of specialization, although it is also still treated by some, particularly Catholic philosophers, as a part of metaphysics.

Basic themes and problems

Ultimate Reality

Different religions have different ideas about Ultimate Reality, its source or ground (or lack thereof) and also about what is the “Maximal Greatness”.[12][13] Paul Tillich’s concept of ‘Ultimate Concern’ and Rudolf Otto’s ‘Idea of the Holy’ are concepts which point to concerns about the ultimate or highest truth which most religious philosophies deal with in some way. One of the main differences among religions is whether the Ultimate Reality is a personal God or an impersonal reality.[14][15]




Main article: MonotheismExistence of God, All Traditional Arguments for God’s Existence,




  • Cosmological Argument
  • Ontological Argument
  • Teleological argument
  • Argument from religious experience
  • Argument from morality
  • Wager arguments like Pascal’s Wager attempts to rationally argue that one should believe in God.


  • The argument from inconsistent revelations
  • The problem of evil, the question of how to reconcile the existence of evil with that of a deity who is, in either absolute or relative terms, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.[21][22]
  • Argument from poor design
  • Argument from nonbelief or the argument from divine hiddenness

Non-theistic conceptions






Knowledge and belief


Evidentialism is the position that may be characterized as “a belief is rationally justified only if there is sufficient evidence for it”.[28] Many theists and non-theists are evidentialists, for example, Aquinas and Bertrand Russell agree that belief in God is rational only if there is sufficient evidence, but disagree on whether such evidence exists.[29] These arguments often stipulate that subjective religious experiences are not reasonable evidence and thus religious truths must be argued based on non-religious evidence. One of the strongest positions of evidentialism is that by William Kingdon Clifford who wrote: “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence”.[30] More recent supporters of evidentialism include Antony Flew (“The Presumption of Atheism”, 1972) and Michael Scriven (Primary philosophy, 1966). Both of them rely on the Ockhamist view that in the absence of evidence for X, belief in X is not justified. Many modern Thomists are also evidentialists in that they hold they can demonstrate there is evidence for the belief in God. Another move is to argue in a Bayesian way for the probability of a religious truth like God, not for total conclusive evidence.[31]


William James in his essay “The Will to Believe” argues for a pragmatic conception of religious belief. For James, religious belief is justified if one is presented with a question which is rationally undecidable and if one is presented with genuine and live options which are relevant for the individual.[35] For James, religious belief is defensible because of the pragmatic value it can bring to one’s life, even if there is no rational evidence for it.

Some work in recent epistemology of religion goes beyond debates over evidentialism, fideism, and reformed epistemology to consider contemporary issues deriving from new ideas about knowledge-how and practical skill; how practical factors can affect whether one could know whether theism is true; from formal epistemology’s use of probability theory; or from social epistemology (particularly the epistemology of testimony, or the epistemology of disagreement).[36]

For example, an important topic in the epistemology of religion is that of religious disagreement, and the issue of what it means for intelligent individuals of the same epistemic parity to disagree about religious issues. Religious disagreement has been seen as possibly posing first-order or higher-order problems for religious belief. A first order problem refers to whether that evidence directly applies to the truth of any religious proposition, while a higher order problem instead applies to whether one has rationally assessed the first order evidence.[37] One example of a first order problem is the Argument from nonbelief. Higher order discussions focus on whether religious disagreement with epistemic peers (someone whose epistemic ability is equal to our own) demands us to adopt a skeptical or agnostic stance or whether to reduce or change our religious beliefs.

Faith and reason

While religions resort to rational arguments to attempt to establish their views, they also claim that religious belief is at least partially to be accepted through faith, confidence or trust in one’s religious belief.[38] There are different conceptions or models of faith, including:[39]

  • The hope model, faith as hoping


Another position on is Fideism, the view that faith is “in some sense independent of, if not outright adversarial toward, reason.”[41] This view was famously defended by the theologian Tertullian (c.160–230 CE). Modern philosophers such as Kierkegaard, William James, and Wittgenstein have been associated with this label. Kierkegaard in particular, argued for the necessity of the religious to take a non-rational leap of faith to bridge the gulf between man and God. Wittgensteinian fideism meanwhile sees religious language games as being incommensurate with scientific and metaphysical language games, and that they are autonomous and thus may only be judged on their own standards. The obvious criticism to this is that many religions clearly put forth metaphysical claims.[42]


The Protestant theologian Karl Barth (1886–1968) argued that religious believers have no need to prove their beliefs through reason and thus rejected the project of natural theology. According to Barth, human reason is corrupt and God is utterly different from his creatures, thus we can only rely on God’s own revelation for religious knowledge. Barth’s view has been termed Neo-orthodoxy. [44] Similarly, D.Z. Phillips argues that God is not intelligible through reason or evidence because God is not an empirical object or a ‘being among beings’.[45]

As Brian Davies points out, the problem with positions like Barth’s is that they do not help us in deciding between inconsistent and competing revelations of the different religions.[46]



  • Conflict thesis which sees them as being in constant conflict, such as during the reception of the theory of evolution and the current debate over creationism.
  • Independence model, both have separate domains, or non-overlapping magisteria
  • Dialogue model, some overlap between the fields, they remain separate but share some concepts and presuppositions
  • Integration or unification model includes projects like natural theology and process theology


Religious experience



According to Brian Davies common objections against the veridical force of religious experiences include the fact that experience is frequently deceptive and that people who claim an experience of a god may be “mistakenly identifying an object of their experience”, or be insane or hallucinating.[53] However, he argues that we cannot deduce from the fact that our experiences are sometimes mistaken, hallucinations or distorted to the conclusion that all religious experiences are mistaken etc. Indeed, a drunken or hallucinating person could still perceive things correctly, therefore these objections cannot be said to necessarily disprove all religious experiences.[54]

According to C. B. Martin, “there are no tests agreed upon to establish genuine experience of God and distinguish it decisively from the ungenuine”, and therefore all that religious experiences can establish is the reality of these psychological states.[55]

Naturalistic explanations for religious experiences are often seen as undermining their epistemic value. Explanations such as the fear of death, suggestion, infantile regression, sexual frustration, neurological anomalies (“it’s all in the head”) as well as the socio-political power that having such experiences might grant to a mystic have been put forward.[56] A hostile position was famously taken by Bertrand Russell who have compared the veridical value of religious experiences to the hallucinations of a drunk person: “From a scientific point of view, we can make no distinction between the man who eats little and sees heaven and the man who drinks much and sees snakes. Each is in an abnormal physical condition, and therefore has abnormal perceptions.”[57] However, as William L. Rowe notes:


In other words, as argued by C.D. Broad, “one might need to be slightly ‘cracked'” or at least appear to be mentally and physically abnormal in order to perceive the supranormal spiritual world.[59]




Depiction of the theophany scene in the Bhagavadgita wherein Krishnareveals his universal form to Arjuna.

Just like there are different religions, there are different forms of religious experience. One could have “subject/content” experiences (such as a euphoric meditative state) and “subject/consciousness/object” experiences (such as the perception of having seen a god, i.e. theophany).[61] Experiences of theophany are described in ancient Mediterranean religious works and myths and include the story of Semele who died due to her seeing Zeus and the Biblical story of the Burning bush. Indian texts like the Bhagavad Gita also contain theophanic events. The diversity (sometimes to the point of contradiction) of religious experiences has also been used as an argument against their veridical nature, and as evidence that they are a purely subjective psychological phenomenon.[62]

In Western thought, religious experience (mainly a theistic one) has been described by the likes of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Rudolf Otto and William James. According to Schleiermacher, the distinguishing feature of a religious experience is that “one is overcome by the feeling of absolute dependence.”[63] Otto meanwhile, argued that while this was an important element, the most basic feature of religious experiences is that it is numinous. He described this as “non-rational, non-sensory experience or feeling whose primary and immediate object is outside the self” as well as having the qualities of being a mystery, terrifying and fascinating.[64]

Rowe meanwhile defined a religious experience as “an experience in which one senses the immediate presence of the divine.”[65] According to Rowe, religious experiences can be divided in the following manner:[66]

  • Mystical experiences in which one senses one’s own union with a divine presence.

Non-monotheistic religions meanwhile also report different experiences from theophany, such as non-dual experiences of oneness and deeply focused meditative states (termed Samadhi in Indian religion) as well as experiences of final enlightenment or liberation (moksha, nirvana, kevala in Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism respectively).



Perennialism vs Constructivism

Another debate on this topic is whether all religious cultures share common core mystical experiences (Perennialism) or whether these experiences are in some way socially and culturally constructed (Constructivism or Contextualism). According to Walter Stace all cultures share mystical experiences of oneness with the external world, as well as introverted “Pure Conscious Events” which is empty of all concepts, thoughts, qualities, etc. except pure consciousness.[68] Similarly Ninian Smart argued that monistic experiences were universal. Perennialists tend to distinguish between the experience itself, and its post experience interpretation to make sense of the different views in world religions.[69]


Religion and ethics

Sacrifice of Isaac, by Caravaggio.



  • Morality somehow requires religion. One example of this view is Kant’s idea that morality should lead us to believe in a moral law, and thus to believe in an upholder of that law, that is, God.
  • Morality is somehow included in religion, “The basic idea here is that being moral is part of what being religious means.”[74]
  • Morality and religion are opposed to each other. In this view, belief in a God would mean one would do whatever that God commands, even if it goes against morality. The view that religion and morality are often opposed has been espoused by atheists like Lucretius and Bertrand Russell as well as by theologians like Kierkegaard who argued for a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’.[75]

Monotheistic religions who seek to explain morality and its relationship to God must deal with what is termed the Euthyphro dilemma, famously stated in the Platonic dialogue “Euthyphro” as: “Is the pious (τὸ ὅσιον, i.e. what is morally good) loved by the godsbecause it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” Those who hold that what is moral is so because it is what God commands are defending a version of the Divine command theory.

Another important topic which is widely discussed in Abrahamic monotheistic religious philosophy is the problem of human Free will and God’s omniscience. God’s omniscience could presumably include perfect knowledge of the future, leading to Theological determinism and thus possibly contradicting with human free will.[76] There are different positions on this including libertarianism (free will is true) and Predestination.



Skepticism towards the supernatural can be found in early philosophical traditions like the Indian Carvaka school and Greco-Roman philosophers like Lucretius. David Hume, who defined a miracle as “a violation of the laws of nature”, famously argued against miracles in Of Miracles, Section X of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748). For Hume, the probability that a miracle hasn’t occurred is always greater than the probability that it has because “as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws [of nature], the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined” (Enquiry. X. p. 173).[1] Hume doesn’t argue that a miracle is impossible, only that it is unreasonable to believe in any testimony of a miracle’s occurrence, for evidence for the regularity of natural laws is much stronger than human testimony (which is often in error).[77]

According to Rowe, there are two weaknesses with Hume’s argument. First, there could be other forms of indirect evidence for the occurrence of a miracle that does not include testimony of someone’s direct experience of it. Secondly, Rowe argues that Hume overestimates “the weight that should be given to past experience in support of some principle thought to be a law of nature.” For it is a common occurrence that currently accepted ideas of natural laws are revised due to an observed exception but Hume’s argument would lead one to conclude that these exceptions do not occur.[78] Rowe adds that “It remains true, however, that a reasonable person will require quite strong evidence before believing that a law of nature has been violated. It is easy to believe the person who claimed to see water run downhill, but quite difficult to believe that someone saw water run uphill.”[79]









Buddhism is one religion which, while affirming postmortem existence (through rebirth), denies the existence of individual souls and instead affirms a deflationary view of personal identity, termed not-self (anatta).

While physicalism has generally been seen as hostile to notions of an afterlife, this need not be the case. Abrahamic religions like Christianity have traditionally held that life after death will include the element of bodily resurrection.[87] One objection to this view is that it seems difficult to account for personal continuity, at best, a resurrected body is a replica of the resurrected person not the same person.[88] One response is the constitution view of persons, which says persons are constituted by their bodies and by a “first-person perspective”, the capacity to think of oneself as oneself. In this view, what is resurrected is that first person perspective, or both the person’s body and that perspective. An objection to this view is that it seems difficult to differentiate one person’s first person perspective from another person’s without reference to temporal and spatial relations.[89] Peter van Inwagen meanwhile, offers the following theory:




Diversity and pluralism




A different view is inclusivism, which is the idea that “one’s own tradition alone has the whole truth but that this truth is nevertheless partially reflected in other traditions.”[95] An inclusivist might maintain that their religion is privileged, they can also hold that other religious adherents have fundamental truths and even that they will be saved or liberated.[96] The Jain view of Anekantavada (‘many-sidedness’) has been interpreted by some as a tolerant view which is an inclusive acceptance of the partial truth value of non-Jain religious ideas.[97] As Paul Dundas notes, the Jains ultimately held the thesis that Jainism is the final truth, while other religions only contain partial truths.[98] Other scholars such as Kristin Beise Kiblinger have also argued that some of the Buddhist traditions include inclusivist ideas and attitudes.[99]

In the modern Western study of religion, the work of Ninian Smart has also been instrumental in representing a more diverse understanding of religion and religious pluralism. Smart’s view is that there are genuine differences between religions.[100]

Pluralism is the view that all religions are equally valid responses to the divine and that they are all valid paths to personal transformation.[101] This approach is taken by John Hick, who has developed a pluralistic view which synthesizes components of various religious traditions. Hick promotes an idea of a noumenal sacred reality which different religions provide us access to.[102] Hick defines his view as “the great world faiths embody different perceptions and conceptions of, and correspondingly different responses to, the Real or the Ultimate.”[103] For Hick, all religions are true because they all allow us to encounter the divine reality, even if they have different deities and conceptions of it. Rowe notes that a similar idea is proposed by Paul Tillich’s concept of Being-itself.[104]




While one can be skeptical towards the claims of religion, one need not be hostile towards religion. Don Cupitt is one example of someone who, while disbelieving in the metaphysical and cosmological claims of his religion, holds that one can practice it with a “non-realist” perspective which sees religious claims as human inventions and myths to live by.[110]

Religious language



As noted by Brian Davies, when talking about God and religious truths, religious traditions tend to resort to metaphor, negation and analogy.[116] The via negativa has been defended by thinkers such as Maimonides who denied that positive statements about God were helpful and wrote: “you will come nearer to the knowledge and comprehension of God by the negative attributes.”[117] Similar approaches based on negation can be seen in the Hindu doctrine of Neti neti and the Buddhist philosophy of Madhyamaka.

Wittgenstein’s theory of language games also shows how one can use analogical religious language to describe God or religious truths, even if the words one is using do not in this case refer to their everyday sense, i.e. when we say God is wise, we do not mean he is wise in the same sense that a person is wise, yet it can still make sense to talk in this manner.[118] However, as Patrick Sherry notes, the fact that this sort of language may make sense does not mean that one is warranted in ascribing these terms to God, for there must be some connection between the relevant criteria we use in ascribing these terms to conventional objects or subjects and to God.[119] As Chad Meister notes though, for Wittgenstein, a religion’s language game need not reflect some literal picture of reality (as a picture theory of meaning would hold) but is useful simply because its ability to “reflect the practices and forms of life of the various religious adherents.”[120] Following Wittgenstein, philosophers of religion like Norman Malcolm, B. R. Tilghman, and D. Z. Phillipshave argued that instead of seeing religious language as referring to some objective reality, we should instead see it as referring to forms of life. This approach is generally termed non-realist.[121]


Analytic philosophy of religion

In Analytic Philosophy of Religion, James Franklin Harris noted that

analytic philosophy has been a very heterogeneous ‘movement’…. some forms of analytic philosophy have proven very sympathetic to the philosophy of religion and have actually provided a philosophical mechanism for responding to other more radical and hostile forms of analytic philosophy.[123]:3


Plantinga, Mackie and Flew debated the logical validity of the free will defense as a way to solve the problem of evil.[126] Alston, grappling with the consequences of analytic Philosophy of Language, worked on the nature of religious language. Adams worked on the relationship of faith and morality.[127] Analytic epistemology and metaphysics has formed the basis for a number of philosophically-sophisticated theistic arguments, like those of the reformed epistemologists like Plantinga.

Analytic philosophy of religion has also been preoccupied with Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as his interpretation of Søren Kierkegaard‘s philosophy of religion.[128] Using first-hand remarks (which would later be published in Philosophical Investigations, Culture and Value, and other works), philosophers such as Peter Winch and Norman Malcolm developed what has come to be known as contemplative philosophy, a Wittgensteinian school of thought rooted in the “Swansea tradition” and which includes Wittgensteinians such as Rush Rhees, Peter Winch and D. Z. Phillips, among others. The name “contemplative philosophy” was first coined by D. Z. Phillips in Philosophy’s Cool Place, which rests on an interpretation of a passage from Wittgenstein’s “Culture and Value.”[129] This interpretation was first labeled, “Wittgensteinian Fideism,” by Kai Nielsen but those who consider themselves Wittgensteinians in the Swansea tradition have relentlessly and repeatedly rejected this construal as a caricature of Wittgenstein’s considered position; this is especially true of D. Z. Phillips.[130] Responding to this interpretation, Kai Nielsen and D.Z. Phillips became two of the most prominent philosophers on Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion.[131]


  2. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Philosophy of Religion.”
  3. Evans, C. Stephen (1985). Philosophy of Religion: Thinking about Faith. InterVarsity Press. p. 16. ISBN978-0-87784-343-6.
  4. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion, An Introduction, Fourth Edition, 2007, pg. 2.
  6. Wainwright, WJ., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, Oxford Handbooks Online, 2004, p. 3. “The expression “philosophy of religion” did not come into general use until the nineteenth century, when it was employed to refer to the articulation and criticism of humanity’s religious consciousness and its cultural expressions in thought, language, feeling, and practice.”
  7. Encyclopedia of Philosophy: History of the philosophy of religion.
  8. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Philosophy of Religion.”
  9. Encyclopædia Britannica: Theology.
  10. Encyclopædia BritannicaTheology; Relationship of theology to the history of religions and philosophy; Relationship to philosophy.
  11. Aristotle, Professor Barry D. Smith, Crandall University
  12. Yandell, Keith E. PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION A contemporary introduction, Routledge, 2002, Part II in general
  13. Wainwright, William, “Concepts of God”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/concepts-god/.
  14. Rowe 2007, pp 179
  15. Meister, Chad. Introducing Philosophy of Religion. Routledge 2009, chapter 3.
  16. see the whole structure of ‘Yandell, 2002.’
  17. Yandell, 2002, p. 4.
  19. Yandell, 2002, p. 90.
  20. see e.g. Antony FlewJohn PolkinghorneKeith WardAlvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne
  21. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “The Problem of Evil“, Michael Tooley
  22. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “The Evidential Problem of Evil“, Nick Trakakis
  23. Butler, Sean (2011) “Idealism in Yogācāra Buddhism,” The Hilltop Review: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 6. Available at: http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/hilltopreview/vol4/iss1/6
  24. Yandell, 2002, p. 101.
  26. Yandell, 2002, p. 105.
  27. Yandell, 2002, p. 53-54.
  28. Rowe 2007, pp 105
  29. Rowe 2007, pp 105
  30. Forrest, Peter, “The Epistemology of Religion”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/religion-epistemology/.
  32. Rowe 2007, pp 106
  33. Meister 2009, p. 161.
  34. Meister 2009, p. 163.
  35. Rowe 2007, pp 98
  37. Pittard, John. Religious Disagreement, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/rel-disa/
  38. Rowe 2007, pp 91
  39. Bishop, John, “Faith”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/faith/.
  40. Rowe 2007, pp 93
  41. Amesbury, Richard, “Fideism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/fideism/.
  43. Meister 2009, p. 148.
  44. Meister 2009, p. 150.
  46. Davies 1993, p. 17.
  47. De Cruz, Helen, “Religion and Science”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/religion-science/.
  49. Yandell, 2002, p. 39.
  50. Meister 2009, p. 170.
  51. Yandell, 2002, p. 39.
  52. Meister 2009, p. 177.
  53. Davies 1993, p. 121.
  54. Davies 1993, p. 121.
  55. Meister 2009, p. 176.
  56. Gellman, Jerome, “Mysticism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/mysticism/.
  57. Bertrand Russell “Mysticism” From Religion and Science (Oxford University Press, 1961)
  58. Rowe 2007, pp 85
  59. Rowe 2007, pp 85
  60. Rowe 2007, pp 88
  61. Yandell, 2002, p. 40, 47.
  62. Meister 2009, p. 180.
  63. Rowe, 2007, p. 70
  64. Otto, Rudolf (1996). Alles, Gregory D., ed. Autobiographical and Social Essays. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. p. 30ISBN978-3-110-14519-9.
  65. Rowe 2007, pg. 72.
  66. Rowe 2007, pp 73, 78
  67. Meister 2009, p. 171-74.
  72. Rowe 2007, pp 180
  73. Davies 1993, pg. 168.
  74. Davies 1993, pg. 171.
  75. Davies 1993, pg. 174.
  76. Anne Lockyer Jordan; Anne Lockyer Jordan Neil Lockyer Edwin Tate; Neil Lockyer; Edwin Tate (25 June 2004). Philosophy of Religion for A Level OCR Edition. Nelson Thornes. p. 211. ISBN978-0-7487-8078-5.
  77. Rowe 2007, pp 142
  78. Rowe 2007, pp 143
  79. Rowe 2007, pp 144
  81. Davies, 1993, 209.
  82. Meister 2009, p. 191.
  83. Hasker, William and Taliaferro, Charles, “Afterlife”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/afterlife/.
  84. Rowe 2007, pp 150-151
  86. Rowe 2007, pp 159
  87. Davies 1993, p. 213.
  93. Rowe 2007, pp 181
  94. Rowe 2007, pp 182
  95. Hick, John. “On Conflicting Religious Truth-Claims,” p. 487.
  96. Meister 2009, p. 28
  97. Barbato, Melanie. Jain Approaches to Plurality: Identity as Dialogue. BRILL 2017, p. 124.
  98. Paul Dundas (2004). Tara Sethia, ed. Ahimsā, Anekānta, and Jainism. Motilal Banarsidass. p. 123-125. ISBN978-81-208-2036-4.
  99. Kristin Beise Kiblinger. Buddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others
  100. Taliaferro, Charles, “Philosophy of Religion”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/philosophy-religion/.
  101. Rowe 2007, pp 185
  104. Rowe 2007, pp 186
  105. Meister 2009, p. 35
  106. Meister 2009, p. 36
  107. Meister 2009, p. 36
  108. Rowe 2007, pp 184
  109. Meister 2009, p. 15.
  110. Meister 2009, p. 15-16.
  111. Davies, Brian. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 2rd Edition, 1993, p. 2.
  112. Kvanvig, Jonathan L. (2018). Faith and Humility. Oxford: OUP Oxford. p. 19. ISBN978-0-19-253727-0.
  113. Davies 1993, p. 4
  114. Davies 1993, p. 6-7
  116. Davies 1993, p. 23
  117. Davies 1993, p. 24
  118. Davies 1993, p. 29
  119. Davies 1993, p. 30
  120. Meister 2009, p. 15-18.
  123. Harris, James Franklin (2002). Analytic philosophy of religion. Dordrecht: Kluwer. ISBN978-1402005305. (432 pages) (volume 3 of Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, ISSN 1568-1556)
  124. (a notable exception is the series of Michael B. Forest‘s 1934-36 Mind articles involving the Christian doctrine of creation and the rise of modern science).
  125. Peterson, Michael et al. (2003). Reason and Religious Belief
  127. Adams, Robert M. (1987). The Virtue of Faith And Other Essays in Philosophical Theology
  128. Creegan, Charles. (1989). Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality and Philosophical Method
  129. Phillips, D. Z. (1999). Philosophy’s Cool Place. Cornell University Press. The quote is from Wittgenstein’s Culture and Value (2e): “My ideal is a certain coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling with them.”
  130. Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). “Fideism”Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  131. Nielsen, Kai and D.Z. Phillips. (2005). Wittgensteinian Fideism?
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