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  • @spiceyokooko: Those were the days of "single-shot" muskets. As a result, the bayonet was at least as important a combat weapon as "guns." And a column of bayonets, one behind another, was more formidable than a row of bayonets. It's true that musketeers could combat this by "folding the line." Ultimately, it came down to a "game" of paper, scissors and stone (different types of formations versus others). – Tom Au Mar 16 '13 at 0:14





Update - Excerpts from A Reappraisal of Column versus Line in the Peninsular War by James R. Arnold's:

Part 1: - Introduction -

However, an examination of primary source information demonstrates that, in both general and specific ways, Oman's understanding of French tactical method was flawed.

Part 2 - Oman's Thesis:

.... Least there be any doubt about Soult's maneuvers [taking Pratzen Heights during Austerlitz], the deployment into line is observed and recorded by Karl Stutterheim, an Austrian eyewitness. Thus, contrary to Oman, the spearhead of Napoleon's 'battle stroke', at the Emperor's most celebrated battle, fights the decisive action in line.

.... Throughout the Ratisbon phase of the 1809 campaign, the French made extensive use of massed skirmisher tactics.

.... In and of themselves these examples are not of surpassing historical importance. Skirmish order was merely one available formation that French commanders could select from the tactical tool box. However, the fact that the French were routinely capable of deploying entire units into skirmish order challenges Oman's expertise in French small unit tactics.

Part 3 - The Battle of Maida: Building a Tactical Edifice:

.... His basic misunderstandings probably stem from his initial treatment of the Battle of Maida. ....

Oman first dealt with Maida in a lecture given in 1907 to the Royal Artillery Institution. In this talk he attributed the French defeat to the inherent difficulty of a column formation assaulting a linear one. Speaking of the decisive clash between the 1st Légère and the British Light Battalion, he said:

"It was the fairest fight between column and line that had been seen since the Napoleonic wars began -- on the one side two heavy columns of 800 men each, drawn up in column of companies...The front of each was not more than sixty yards. Kempt, on the other hand, has his battalion in line...every one of them could use his musket against either the front or flank of one of the two French columns."


Oman partially recognized his error by 1912. In a footnote to his Wellington's Army he wrote:

"Till lately I had supposed that Reynier had at least his left wing...in columns of battalions, but evidence put before me seems to prove that despite the fact the French narratives do not show it, the majority at least of Renyier's men were deployed".


In addition, contrary to Oman's claim about the lack of French documentation, two French participants strongly support the notion of a French advance in line. A French artillery lieutenant named Griois wrote, "General Reynier gave the order to advance to engage the enemy, and to accomplish this to form on the left in line".[41] Moreoever, there is Reynier's account of the battle, a source of information that Oman really should not have overlooked. In a letter written the day after the battle, Reynier relates how "The 1st and 42nd regiments, 2,400 strong...passed the Lamato and formed into line with the left on the Lamato".

Part 4 - The Peninsular War:

.... Oman wrote the first volumes of his Peninsular War history while still supremely confident about his tactical understanding.

Part 5 - Oman and Historiography:

Meanwhile, another [David Chandler being the first] Sandhurst historian, Paddy Griffith, had also read my critique of Oman while developing his own ideas. Griffith concurred about French tactical flexibility while arguing persuasively that the British did not simply stand in line and fire volleys to win out, but rather swept the field by firing and then conducting a bayonet charge.[74] By 1998 a new paradigm seemed to have set in with the publication of two books devoted to Napoleonic battle tactics.[75] Both claimed that the French fought in line at Maida and both fully explored French tactical variety. The 2002 publication of The Battle of Maida 1806: Fifteen Minutes of Glory, appeared to have brought the issue of column versus line to a satisfactory conclusion: "The contemporary sources are...the best evidence and their conclusion is clear: General Compère's brigade formed into line to attack Kempt's Light Battalion." The decisive action at Maida took place in less than fifteen minutes. It had taken 72 years to rectify a great historian's error about what transpired during those minutes.

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  • Just a note on this. I'm generally (for reasons that should be obvious) very wary of drastic revisionism like this. The guy has a interesting argument, but its just one historian, and the meat of his argument appears to be attacking one other guy (Oman). I'm trying to keep an eye on this to see if any further serious debate arises on this issue (say involving new information from new people, like serious scientific debates tend to), but so far I'm not seeing it. – T.E.D. Apr 11 '18 at 14:08
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    Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been moved to chat. – T.E.D. Apr 11 '18 at 16:29

















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  • Austerlitz occurred some months after the Boulogne camp broke up to begin the Ulm campaign. – Pieter Geerkens Sep 29 '14 at 2:17

Speed with greater numbers and fear is the primary answer here.






I think the better answer would come from asking why the French Columns failed in Spain whereas they were spectacularly successful everywhere else save Russia where infantry just doesn't matter too much.

I can't say I know the answer to the question "why did the French get mauled in Spain" but certainly when you're moving in a series of columns the "will to attack" can be and indeed was overwhelming...which of course is exactly what Napoleon wanted and indeed got...again and again and again...defeating entire Armies in the field and then marching into completely undefended Cities...looting, pillaging, taking liberties with the women, etc.

In Spain the Spaniards seldom came out to attack the French "formally" and ominously the terrain "created" single file lines so my understanding at least is that the French were "sitting ducks" in Spain until at least they could get formed up...much as the English were in New England during the American "Revolutionary War."

Eventually the losses for Napoleonic France were to great to "hold Spain" and the French were forced to withdraw.

This opened the door to Great Britain and Wellington who "cut his teeth" in Spain I believe (the Peninsular Campaigns.)

Of course defeating Napoleon and defeating France were two different things entirely.

It's not like Wellington was marching around Paris waving the Union Jack either...

  • Didn't Wellington "cut his teeth" in India at Seringapatam & Assaye? – Steve Bird May 13 '16 at 5:17
  • That's definitely where he got his start. Had to do a re-read on this as it is a History rather ignored these day. Peninsular Wars were really bad...lasted a long time, nothing but constant fighting, Wellington got his first taste of Napoleonic Tactics there. – Doctor Zhivago May 13 '16 at 18:24

Napoleonic wars key final were Spain and Russia. Napoleon was so confident that he has enough army to conquer europe that he never expected that he will be defeated in these countries and start his retreat into France. Napoleon angried whole Europe provocking a big coalition against him and with it the surrender of France.

In Spain, he thought that Spanish people will support him, however, he provocked a rebellion against him. Napoleon only cut the head of Spanish government and kidnapped the king of in order to force Spain to be loyal to him. In few years, the 118.000 French men were flooded. However, Spanish army and militia was not well coordinated, it was without a commander. Therefore, the arrive of Wellingtom on the key moment. Napoleon decided to help his brother sending 500.000 soldiers of reinforcements. At that moment, Cadiz´s exile government gave Wellingtom the title of Generallisimo (maybe you know this title because it was the same title of General Franco). The british&portuguese army was outnumbered in compare with the Grand Armee, however, Spain´s total mobilization (800.000 men) joined them. Once Wellingtom, meet whole army went direct against French army and Napoleon plan to recover the controll of the peninsula was frustrated. The war in Peninsula was hard but Spain recover whole territory.

In Russia, the winter and the vast territory was his downfull. He destroyed his own army.

At the end, the grand coalition surplused the Grand armee and France was sieged from all his frontiers. Wellingtom experience in Peninsular war gave the chance to defeat Napoleon in waterloo.

UK, at the sea, was enough to defeat France, however, at land, was really impossible, so he needed a coalition of countries to defeat him. The infantry formation is not enough if you dont have enough men to defeat the rival. The grand armee was 7 times bigger than British army.

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    This doesn't begin to answer the question that was asked. – KillingTime May 12 '16 at 16:59
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    Interesting, unsourced commentary on the Napoleonic wars, but I don't see any discussion of the infantry column. Doesn't answer the question. – Mark C. Wallace May 12 '16 at 17:55
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    Lovely summary of War&Peace and the Peninsular Campaign. Misses the topic, though. – Marakai May 13 '16 at 4:01

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