Qualifier Exam in Information Security Spring 2010

Qualifier Exam in Information Security
Spring 2010
You have to answer at least one question in each section and get at least 60 points to pass the exam.
Network Security
Problem 1, 10 points.
After many years of experimental research, Iron Screen Labs releases a state of the art intrusion detection
system targeting core ISP providers. This new IDS is 99.99% accurate, far outpacing the competition.
Given the volume of tra?c seen by providers, approximately one out of every 10,000,000 packets represents
an attack.
(b) Assume that the links within core ISP routers operate at a constant rate of 1 Giga-Packets (GPps) per
second. How many false positives will be observed per second?
of their detector. How accurate does the detector need to be to reduce false positives to one per second?
Problem 2, 10 points.
Neuman and Ts’o compare Kerberos to “authentication by assertion”. Explain why Kerberos provides a
more secure authentication solution.
Name two protocols that rely on authentication by assertion. For each, explain an attack against the
protocol and explain how the protocol could be or has been strengthened.
Problem 3 , 10 points.
How do IPsec-based VPNs violate the end-to-end argument? Give one argument for and against the use
of this security mechanism.
System and Software Security
Problem 4, 10 points.
A reference monitor interposes on operations or object accesses, and it can enforce an access control policy
constraining such access. Typical reference monitors are implemented in-kernel or as separate processes
sandboxing the execution of a monitored process. An alternative design, called an inlined reference monitor
(IRM), inserts the monitoring logic into the original code of the monitored process.
Problem 5, 10 points.
The Federal Financial Institution Examination Council (FFIEC) mandated in 2005 that financial institutions
such as banks must use a stronger authentication method than the password based single factor authentication
that was commonly used at the time. However, FFIEC did not suggest what banks needed to do to meet the
stronger authentication requirement. Several companies have offered solutions that utilize passwords and
additional features to meet this mandate. For example, IP geolocation techniques can be used to estimate the
location of a user who is logging in based on the IP address of his or her machine. The reputation associated
with an IP address could be another feature, and operating system running on the client machine and the
user’s ISP are additional features that could also be used. A request from a user must not only provide the
correct password but its features must match those associated with the user.
To enhance security, it is desirable that we do not store values of these additional features directly with
other user account information on the server machine where authentication is performed. Discuss how such
a scheme can be implemented when the server is able to verify their values without storing them directly.
To reduce false negatives, you should allow a login with correct password when the user is no more than
distance d from the normal location. Similarly, other factors could allow limited deviation from the correct
Since the values of these features can vary over time (e.g., user may do online banking while on travel),
to reduce false negatives, we may allow access when only a subset of the feature values match. Can the
implementation above be adapted so a correct password with a subset of matching features is sufficient to
access online services?
Does a scheme based on the features listed about really provide much stronger authentication than passwords as was required by FFIEC? Explain your answer.
Problem 6, 10 points.
Memory protection and logical isolation across processes/address spaces is an important building block
for trustworthy computing systems. In modern processors, the memory management unit (MMU) of the
processor implements several memory protection related functions in hardware. In addition, the operating
system maintains segment/page tables which are used to ensure that a process is only able to access main
memory that has been allocated to it.
We discussed protection of resources either using access control lists (ACLs) or capabilities (C-lists).
How would you characterize memory protection in processors like the x86. Would you classify it as an ACL
based system or a capability based system? Explain your answer.
In a virtualization based system like Xen, memory protection relies on the hardware as well as the hypervisor and the guest operating system running in each VM. Since OS typically maintains page tables and
we want minimal changes to it when it runs on a hypervisor, the OS and Xen must share responsibility for
managing page tables to ensure that memory protection works correctly. Discuss what page table related
operations can be performed by the OS and what must be handled by the hypervisor.
Problem 7, 10 points.
Alice has set up an online database that answers queries about stocks and other financial products. Users’
queries are of the form ”tell me the value of stock h STCK i between dates h START i and h END i.” To
protect her users’ privacy, Alice requires that queries be encrypted as they travel over the network. What
abstract security properties should the encryption scheme provide, and what might it reasonably leave out?
Justify your answers.
Problem 8, 10 points.
Alice is trying to decide between two different block ciphers, FOO and BAR, for her application. Both FOO
and BAR have the same block size and key length. She’s confident that at least one of them is secure, but
isn’t sure which. As a hedge, she decides to combine them into a single new block cipher BAZ, defined as:
BAZk−1 (y) = BARk−1 (F OOk−1 (y)).
Alice finds its performance to be acceptable, but is BAZ a sound design from a security point of view? If so,
argue/prove it (you may assume that at least one of FOO and BAR is a secure block cipher). If not, explain
why, and if possible, salvage it by suggesting a secure construction in the same spirit.
Problem 9, 10 points.
Show that for any IND-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme, the size of the ciphertext after encrypting
a single bit is superlogarithmic in the security parameter k. That is, |Encpk (b)| = ω(log k) for any bit b and
legitimately generated pk.