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This paper finds that compared with non-state-owned firms, Chinese state-owned enterprises controlled by province, city, and county governments (local SOEs) are more likely to hire small auditors within the same region (small local auditors). In regions with less developed institutions, SOEs controlled by central government (central SOEs) also have such a tendency. However, the tendency of local and central SOEs to hire small local auditors is attenuated as the institutions develop. This auditor choice pattern is likely to be explained by SOEs’ lack of demand for large or non-local auditors, small local auditors’ superior local knowledge, and SOEs’ collusion incentives.  相似文献
We examine the effectiveness of China’s IFRS adoption from the perspective of an important set of financial report users, foreign institutional investors. We find that foreign institutional investment does not increase after China’s IFRS adoption, and some evidence that it actually declines, particularly among firms with weaker incentives to credibly implement IFRS, or with greater ability to manipulate IFRS’s fair value provisions. We also find that the association between earnings and returns generally declines after IFRS adoption, consistent with reduced earnings quality. In addition, we find that foreign institutional investors’ returns decrease after China’s IFRS adoption. Finally, the decline in foreign institutional investment is greater among investors from countries with weak institutions that have also adopted IFRS. Taken together, our evidence suggests that the weak institutional infrastructure in China’s transitional economy impairs IFRS’s intended goal of attracting institutional investment through improved financial reporting quality. Further, financial information users’ home country institutions and IFRS adoption experience affect the effectiveness of IFRS adoption.  相似文献
