5 February 2019

Who talks with Afghanistan?

by Tanya Goudsouzian

The media fanfare surrounding the close of the latest round of talks between the US and the Taliban in Qatar belies the fact that the entire process has been shrouded in mystery and there appears to be no sign of any agreement over the contentious issues.

The Taliban spokesman said the talks ‘saw progress’, and the US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, said they were ‘a moment of opportunity’. But by most accounts, no consensus has been reached on the main sticking points: no ceasefire, no date for the departure of foreign forces and no willingness on the part of the Taliban to speak to the Afghan government.

Talks will resume at the end of February, although whether the two sides make any headway toward a lasting peace agreement remains to be seen. It is worth taking a look at why these talks have stirred controversy and are viewed with scepticism among those who have the most to lose, and are absent from the talks — the Afghans.

The exclusion of the Afghan government from the process — by demand of the Taliban — has led to charges that the US is delegitimising it in critical negotiations, at a crucial pre-election period. Worse, it feeds perceptions that the Americans are so intent on getting out of Afghanistan that they are ignoring a simple fact: that they are negotiating the fate of the Afghan people without the voice of the Afghans themselves. While Khalilzad may say that ‘the Afghan voice is there’, many Afghans themselves believe they are little more than a voice in the wilderness.


For Ahmad Wali Massoud, former Afghan ambassador to the UK and younger brother of the legendary ‘lion of Panshir’, Ahmad Shah Massoud, the issue isn’t just personal, it’s national. Massoud, who is a presidential candidate in the upcoming elections, said any peace process should be a national one ‘with all parties involved especially those who were victims of war. There are talks going on but we inside Afghanistan don’t know anything about them. Of course, everyone wants peace and we are not against talking to the Taliban, but we don’t know what’s going on behind closed doors,’ he said over the phone from Kabul. ‘Even the government of Afghanistan was informed only two days ago. That is why the government is worried. We are between hope and fear. Everybody’s concerned.’

Problems in process and messaging

Barnett Rubin, a former US diplomat and expert on Afghanistan, who helped open secret negotiations with the Taliban in 2007, 2010 and 2011, says the Afghan government will soon be brought in to the process: ‘They will be involved at the next stage on political arrangements in Afghanistan. They will also have their own demands and proposals about the troop withdrawal and CT (counterterrorism) guarantees.’

Read also Camelia Entekhabifard, “Afghanistan alone again”, Le Monde diplomatique, December 2014.Omar Samad, the former Afghan ambassador to France and Canada, generally concurred, expressing support for the idea of dialogue, but criticising the process. ‘The current peace drive by the US has so far mostly engaged the Taliban who have strict conditions about intra-Afghan talks and a future political transition,’ he said. ‘But the whole project could unravel if is not inclusive and pluralistic or lacking binding guarantees to make sure that political stability, legitimacy and security are assured.’

But Afghanistan’s Interior minister, Amrullah Saleh, is among those who doubt the ‘Afghan voice’ is being heard. He has been a vocal critic of the US-Taliban talks, saying the process has been flawed from the outset. ‘The modality of negotiations that Ambassador Khalilzad has opted for is in fact damaging the interests of his country and ours together,’ Saleh says. ‘There is no visible concession from the Taliban. There is not even a tangible concession from the Taliban. They haven’t agreed to peace. They are basically demanding recognition for their defunct Emirate.’

Saleh, a former aide to Ahmad Shah Massoud, also says the Afghan government has made it clear to the US envoy that ‘he is mandated to represent the interests of his country but not those of the Afghan people and the Afghan state... There is an Afghan government with legitimate roots; It is being accused of having a narrow political base. But that is the margin and that is the periphery.’

‘The feeling within the Afghan people is that after such a massive sacrifice in their war against terrorism they are being bypassed by Ambassador Khalilzad,’ Saleh continued. ‘The leakage to the media that issues related to the fate of the country and the political process were discussed with the Taliban is damaging... We see more problems in the messaging of the talks than with its substance. We will determine the substance and make sure our national interest is protected and enhanced. We won’t outsource our negotiating position to anyone and any country.’

Sticking points

The conflict in Afghanistan has always had a number of stakeholders with broadly dissimilar agendas. While Khalilzad may be able to speak for the US troops and seek to secure US interests, he does not speak for any other party: not the Afghan government, nor the regional stakeholders, nor the countries making up the NATO-led mission. Meanwhile the Taliban are demanding the withdrawal of any foreign forces as a precondition for any further steps.

There are other sticking points, among them the ‘sequencing’ of events. According to Rubin, ‘The Taliban want withdrawal up front, then ceasefire and political process. The US wants them linked.’ He won’t speculate on whether the Taliban would agree to a very small contingent of troops staying behind to support the Afghan army, saying: ‘It’s to be negotiated. It depends on other decisions about army and state. But it’s not a reason for another 40 years of war.’

Nonetheless, Saleh said the Afghan government is ‘not worried about the US withdrawal per se’ stressing that the Afghan state ‘must fill the void for the potential reduction of US forces may or may not create.’

As for the Afghan government, it certainly has a view on withdrawal; its starting point is to reinstate the brief (and successful) ceasefire in 2018 that was largely welcomed by most Afghans at the time. In the view of Saleh, ‘If the US wants to withdraw its troops or reduce its costs, then the Afghan government must be their interlocutor, and not the Taliban or Pakistan. The Afghan government has signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) and the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US. And that has to be respected in deed and in spirit.’

Crucially, the Taliban is not likely to agree to respect the SPA or BSA, arrangements that the Afghan government is standing by whatever the outcome of the talks. The Taliban do not feel bound to honour those agreements; it will be interesting to see if the US does.

A source close to the talks said Khalilzad has been given a free hand in the negotiations, even though President Donald Trump can always throw a wild card into the equation without warning. One wonders if Khalilzad has any remit to seek Afghan input or concurrence on any aspect of the talks. This is conjecture, of course, but a reasonable conjecture based on Trump’s decision-making style in Syria and elsewhere. ‘Trump does what he wants and [Khalilzad] has to take it as it comes. Overall my impression is that [Khalilzad] has broad discretion but [US Secretary of State Mike] Pompeo oversees. Trump tweets and leaks,’ says the source.

And the Taliban? Despite Trump’s announcement of a US troop drawdown from Afghanistan, the Taliban did not respond in kind with a gesture that would instil confidence in observers, such as announcing a ceasefire or acquiescing to requests to include the Afghan government in the talks. In fact, when asked to do so, the Taliban pulled out of talks scheduled to be held in Saudi Arabia last month.
Do the negotiations matter?

At this point, despite press releases, the talks seem to have achieved little. While there have been statements regarding ‘positive progress’ and ‘bringing the war to an end’, concerns brought up by many Afghans indicate that the toughest negotiations ahead will be with the Afghan government, which represents the people who will remain long after the foreigners are gone.

And that government does not speak with one voice. To many Afghans, the current government is deeply unpopular, and part of the internal Afghan discussions will have to put aside historical differences and grievances in order to offer not only ‘an Afghan voice’ but ‘a single Afghan voice’. Without doubt, there are government officials with questionable pasts, who enjoy neither the trust of the population nor of outside organisations, such as the UN.

‘Afghan leaders on all sides need a reality check to avoid repeating past mistakes, put greed and power drives aside, and come to terms about a shared future,’ said Samad. ‘Kabul’s political class including the government needs to get its act together and try to build consensus on the way forward without any one side trying to control or undermine the process for political advantage.’

The negotiations will be long and involved. There are major hurdles to be crossed and concessions to be made. At some point, the Afghans will have a voice in the talks, either by invitation or demand. And even then, the negotiations may not matter. As Massoud said, ‘Let’s not forget that we Afghans, all together, during the Russian invasion, fought for freedom. Millions were martyred for that struggle, so we hope that that our hard-won freedom won’t be sacrificed by these talks.’ But once the foreign forces are gone and the western powers look elsewhere, the policies of the Taliban may be all that matter.

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