Occupy Congress has garnered less attention than the movement that started as Occupy Wall Street. But politicians helped create the financial crisis.

Occupy Congress has garnered far less attention than the global protest movement that started as Occupy Wall Street in Lower Manhattan. But politicians helped create the financial crisis. Fresh news of American lawmakers trading on inside information is further reason for mistrust.

The evidence is tough to ignore. Beyond specific examples broadcast on Sunday by “60 Minutes,” studies led by Alan J. Ziobrowski of Georgia State University have found that stock portfolios modeled on those of United States senators and representatives beat the market each year by more than 10 percentage points and six percentage points, respectively.

It’s easy to see why that might be. Lawmakers get the scoop on bills or regulations that can send a company’s or sector’s shares soaring or plunging. But they’ve been allowed to slide under insider-trading law, partly because regulators have concluded that members of Congress don’t owe anyone a legal duty to avoid trading on what they learn in their jobs.

This cramped reading of the law may suit some watchdogs, whose wages effectively come at the whim of lawmakers. But whatever the strict legalities, actions like selling stocks short the day after a closed-door Federal Reserve briefing on the 2008 financial collapse surely breach the public’s trust.

Meanwhile, politicians refuse to make such snappy calls with the nation’s finances. They have delayed even the smallest decisions they’re supposed to make on behalf of their constituents.

One example was the bickering over raising the cap on the federal debt, which helped lead to the credit downgrade from Standard & Poor’s. Another ongoing scandal is the failure, three years on, to even begin reforming Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government mortgage finance giants that have cost taxpayers tens of billions of dollars.

Then there was the general acceptance of laxity in bank regulation in the run-up to the 2008 crisis. Protesters have been railing against the influence of money in politics, but the cash used to elect people doesn’t go straight into their pockets. Profits from insider trading once in office bridge that gap in the logic. Bankers can’t be voted out. For that reason, Occupy Congress may have a better shot of achieving change than does Occupy Wall Street.

Bond Traders Awaken

Legend has it that a senior Swedish official, after a trip to New York in the midst of the Nordic country’s financial crisis two decades ago, said: “We shall never again trust our economy’s future to the whims of 25-year-old men with too much testosterone.”

Many euro zone politicians and central bankers must feel the same way. Bond traders are a dangerously fickle lot. For years, traders hardly worried about fiscal strength inside the euro zone. From 2000 through 2007, the average difference between yields on 10-year bonds of Greece and Germany was 35 basis points. For Italy, it was 24 basis points. The recession of 2009 altered the traders’ mood, but not by much. Spreads that year averaged 189 basis points for Greece and 102 for Italy.

Throughout the last decade, the European Central Bank expressed concerns about the market’s almost blind optimism, but nothing substantial was done to shock the traders into alertness. Now, everything has changed. The bond market has become hyper-attentive to economic flaws and hyper-demanding of reform (inside the euro zone, though not for the United States or Britain).

The reformist zeal is welcomed by almost everyone — except some insiders in the economic establishments of Italy and Greece. Many outsiders had always hoped the discipline of monetary union would lead to substantial reforms, but were disappointed by investors’ complacency.

Still, there can be too much of a good thing, whether it is confidence or fear. Some investors seem to have decided to stay away from Italian debt until G.D.P. starts growing, the government runs a surplus and the European Central Bank declares it will limit their losses. Even then, they will probably demand spreads 10 times wider than in the precrisis days, when the issuing governments cared much less about deficits or transparency.

Warren Buffett once said of Mr. Market that “the poor fellow has incurable emotional problems.” The new prime ministers of Greece and Italy, and the new president of the European Central Bank, would dearly like to deal with more rational counterparties. The desire is legitimate, but comes late. As a result of inadequate anticipation, politicians and the central bank now must try to solve more complex problems.