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Administrative protectionism in the United States

2019-04-18 来源: 51due教员组 类别: Essay范文

下面为大家整理一篇优秀的essay代写范文- Administrative protectionism in the United States，供大家参考学习，这篇论文讨论了美国的行政保护主义。美国的行政保护主义可以分为有约束力和无约束力的行政保护主义两种类型。无约束力的行政保护主义实现的核心是战略威慑，其目的在于不战而实现贸易保护主义。而有约束力的行政保护主义可以分为技术路径保护主义和政治路径保护主义。

Administrative protectionism,美国行政保护主义,essay代写,作业代写,代写

American administrative protectionism can be divided into two types: binding and non-binding administrative protectionism. The core of non-binding administrative protectionism is strategic deterrence, which aims to achieve trade protectionism without war. Binding administrative protectionism can be divided into technical route protectionism and political route protectionism. The analysis of the types of American administrative protectionism will help us to gain insight into the formulation and adjustment rules of American government's trade policies, so as to predict, avoid and resolve American trade protectionism against China.

Questions about the future direction of U.S. trade policy are coming to the fore in an increasingly difficult global economy, with the Democratic Party emerging from the presidential election. Protectionism must have a place in the Obama administration's trade policy, according to democratic tradition and Obama's pre-election rhetoric. At present, the study of trade protectionism in the United States is basically a general study. However, in fact, protectionism generated by different actors has different forms, core views and essence, and different methods should be used to identify and prevent it. Therefore, it is still necessary to study classified trade protectionism. This paper attempts to analyze in detail the trade protectionism generated under the action of the us administrative department, namely, administrative protectionism, which is helpful for us to have an insight into the formulation and adjustment rules of the us government's trade policies, with a view to predicting, evading and resolving the us trade protectionism against China.

According to the forms of administrative protectionism, it can be divided into two types: non-binding administrative protectionism and binding administrative protectionism.

Non-binding administrative protectionism aims at achieving trade protectionism without a fight and USES strategic deterrence as the means. The so-called "strategic deterrence" means that the administration USES protectionism as a threat to free trade in order to pressure foreign trading partners to meet the interest demands of domestic trade protectionists while enjoying the benefits of free trade. In fact, strategic deterrence is a cooperative strategic game, in which the us government is the initiator and trading partners are the rational responders who are forced to participate in the game. Since this is a game based on asymmetric forces, the trading behaviors of trading partners that do not conform to the economic interests of the us have to be adjusted or ended. Strategic deterrence has three characteristics: first, the deterrence intensity increases continuously, but it has its maximum value, that is, the deterrent point. Once the deterrent intensity reaches the deterrent point, non-binding administrative protectionism is declared to be exhausted. Second, deterrence is about winning without a fight. Without acting on protectionism, trading partners sense that Washington is about to take unilateral trade measures and have to make concessions on its own. At last. Threatening retaliatory rhetoric will not translate into actual trade action, but it must convince the other side of the game that it will if they do not change their existing trade practices. In short, nonbinding protectionism by the executive branch seeks to deter foreign trade practices that are not in the interests of the United States at minimal domestic cost. Non-binding administrative protectionism appeals mainly to the public, congress and the executive branch itself.

American foreign policy is determined by the American public and congress. The same is true of non-binding administrative protectionism, where the public and congress are the executive branch's preferred tools for achieving its objectives. It is for this reason that when foreign governments Sue us trade laws for violating WTO principles in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, us officials usually argue that although us policies have their irrationality, they are based on us trade laws and supported by the us congress and the public.

The administration USES the public to deter trading partners. Scholars such as Kenneth f. scheve believe that there are three explanations for the rise of trade protectionism in the United States after the cold war: one is the narrow industrial interests, the other is the government's failure to make the benefits of globalization public, and the third is the war on terrorism. But none of this is a major factor. The underlying reason is that real incomes have stagnated or fallen in the face of rising economic wealth in the United States. According to the theory of comparative advantage, trade should maximize the economic welfare of the country and its citizens, but the fact is that trade not only makes American workers lose their jobs, but also their sources of income. So, while economists think of comparative advantage is the most wonderful ideas in "economics", but the public thought it "like a light dusting, provide vision about free trade looks cold and didn't care about now, now, the pain of the local public,", "is just an imagination of comparative advantage theory, free trade is not well disposed toward us,". This scepticism is widespread among the public.

In foreign trade negotiations, therefore, the President often bypasses congressional leaders and political elites to inform the public directly and issue non-binding administrative protectionism at the will of the public. According to statistics, since the early 20th century, presidents have said more to the public and less to congress. Since 1900, 50% of presidential speeches have been directed at the public.

Protectionism is inherent in congress, and the executive branch often USES congress for its own purposes. The executive branch can be divided into two situations with the help of congress: one is that the executive branch takes the initiative to use congress to put pressure on trading partners. In April 1999, Zhu Longji's visit to the United States and bring the United States "a unilateral commitments for accession to the wto of China's long cuts list", but the government rejected the proposal, fantasy to get more concessions, its reason is "the current congressional opposition to China's accession to the wto's voice is very big, unless the government can resist congress of fire" bullet-proof agreement ". As a matter of fact, the inaction of the administrative department has formed administrative protectionism. The other is the passive use of congress by the executive branch. This stems largely from the objective lessons of the administration's battles with congress. Under the constitution, congress has supreme trade power, and in the history of American trade, presidents have always failed in their battles with congress. When the President conflicts with congress, the Supreme Court always confirms that congress has the dominant position in the field of trade. Therefore, trade agreements signed by the executive branch have no effect without the consent of congress. As a result, the administration will pay particular attention to congress in exercising its trade power.

The executive branch works well with congress. Foreign trading partners, wary of falling into the protectionist trap of the United States, have had to accept some of the executive branch's arguments to appease protectionist sentiment, even though they know the evidence for deterrence is weak and political.

Given that the executive branch is the ultimate exporter of us trade policy, the trade strategic deterrence it issues is more credible and therefore has greater deterrence.

Protectionism without binding by the administrative department of main performance is: in 2001, President bush proposed the talks to fast track authorization bill that ultimately floor in the house of representatives to a 215-214, the ratio of the vote for the key is the representative robin hayes, Mr Bush for his return is: immediately issued a statement support of textile industry and some related to the textile trade target. In May 2000, in order to pass the permanent normal trade relations bill with China in the house of representatives, the Clinton administration, on the eve of the congressional vote on the bill, introduced a trade supervision plan: a new post of assistant assistant secretary for China affairs in the ministry of commerce was established to supervise China's implementation of its trade commitments. The White House is also backing a proposal by republican Douglas billett and democrat sander levin to create a "congressional executive branch China committee" to promote China's record on a range of issues, from human rights to labor standards. Such as the United States trade representative's office of the annual foreign trade barriers assessment report and so on.

The administration's motivation for non-binding protectionism is to want congress to pass its own proposals, pandering to public economic nationalism or warning foreign trading partners. In addition, whether national elections will be held also directly determines the export of administrative protectionism. Prior to each election, for example, a sitting President typically makes protectionist comments about the steel industry, which is associated with its high political importance in many districts and states.

Binding administrative protectionism refers to the protectionism created by the executive department in the implementation of American trade law, which is actually the extraterritorial power of American law. U.S. trade law includes established trade standards, administrative rules, and trade precedents. Trade law is characterized by being written and unambiguous and does not require administrative decision-making. Binding administrative protectionism can be divided into low-level path protectionism and high-level path protectionism.

Low-level path protectionism can also be called technology path protectionism, because the biggest characteristic of this path is mainly determined by technology, and technology is the essence of low-level path. The administrative departments mainly achieve trade protectionism through unfair technology operation and deceptive technology mechanism.

On the surface, the definition of unfair trade depends on technical judgment, which is reflected in its detailed and clear technical standards, including precise definitions and cost accounting standards. In the case of antidumping, there are 300 lines of interpretation in the legal text alone. From the perspective of cost accounting, when calculating the price of foreign goods, provisions include: surrogate country standard, accumulation principle, end review system and tariff balance, etc. In particular, in the calculation of the cost of foreign goods, it is specified that the cost of foreign goods "shall not be less than 10 per cent of the cost specified in this paragraph... The profit should not be less than 8 per cent of the above general expenses and costs ". If the cost of production data for a controlled producer is insufficient, the Commerce Department replaces it with an "assumed price" based on an estimated average cost of production plus overhead plus profit. The standard also stipulates that the source of data is based on best information available, and its provider is the domestic complaint industry.

However, in fact, the technical standard has great unfairness in the specific operation, which is directly equivalent to ruling that the trading partners have conducted unfair trade. Under this definition, mofcom does not take into account any sales below the manufacturer's average cost in calculating the "foreign market price" of a product and does not take into account any sales above the foreign market price in calculating the average price of its sales in the United States. Because the product is in all sorts of circumstances sell with the price that is lower than average production total cost, and look from the definition of gross profit, with any the price that is higher than marginal cost undertakes selling can gain profit, this is the general practice of business circles. This means that the only way for producers to avoid being found guilty of dumping is to sell their products in the us market at much higher prices than at home. In addition, countervailing anti-dumping and countervailing duties, originally designed to maintain fair competition, have evolved into a means of trade protection.

More fundamentally, technical standards are deceptive. On the one hand, the technical mechanism is masked. Technical terms and technical details are difficult to understand without years of professional education and experience. This means that the material does not appeal to the media and the public. In addition, there is usually a lack of public interest in technical issues. Under the combined effect of the above factors, the public's judgment on unfair trade is full of confusion, and the confusion of the public maintains the operation of these mechanisms. In turn, this makes the mechanism setters more inclined to the technical path of technology, further deepening the confusion of the public, in order to help managers serve the beneficial group without being questioned by the adverse group. As a result, these mechanisms are increasingly sophisticated, obscure and technical, and the public is increasingly unable to understand and perceive protectionism in the technological path.

On the other hand, this mechanism is deceptive in that it converts a zero-sum game into a positive-sum result. The unfair law was intended to impose import restrictions in response to complaints from industries that imported too much, making the mechanism in fact pay attention to the concerns of domestic manufacturers and ignore the interests of domestic consumers and domestic users of these imports as intermediate products. That is to say, the executive branch takes sides in the interests of both sides in the domestic conflict of interest. The protectionism created by these mechanisms involves a massive transfer of gains from trade, from consumers and the like, to trade-damaged manufacturers, a zero-sum game. This is extremely difficult in a country like the United States, where elections are held on a regular basis, but policy makers have solved the problem with complex technical standards and minimal political decision-making costs.

Advanced path protectionism is also called political path protectionism, so we can deduce the leading role of political power in this path. In political route protectionism, on the basis of existing trade laws, the administrative departments carefully consider and then make the final decision of intervention in trade according to their own political responsibilities. Compared with low-level path protectionism, political path has transparency, which means making decisions within the scope of public concern, and the decision-maker is directly responsible to the public. In this sense, decisions about the political path are fairly open.

The biggest characteristic of the political path is that the ruling of administrative protectionism mainly depends on political power. The exemption clause and section 301 are the typical examples of political path protectionism. We can analyze them to show how political power promotes protectionism. The research shows that it is mainly realized through the continuous strengthening of administrative departments' self-discretion. This includes factual single-head decisions and increasingly loose and vague technical standards.

In particular, it should be pointed out that technological path protectionism and political path protectionism respectively emphasize the important position of technology and political influence, which does not mean that technological path protectionism can completely ignore political influence, and technological elements in political path protectionism are optional factors.



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