Macbook seized or stolen? But you've set a FileVault password, right? Ha, it's useless

Luckily, there's a security fix

Until earlier this week, Apple's FileVault 2 disk encryption could be defeated in the time it takes to reboot a Mac, given a few hundred dollars in hardware and physical access to the computer.

Apple on its website claims that FileVault 2 uses "XTS-AES-128 encryption with a 256-bit key to help prevent unauthorized access to the information on your startup disk."

However, Ulf Frisk, a security researcher based in Sweden, found that he could plug an assembled device running software called PCILeech into a Mac and obtain the FileVault 2 encryption password using a direct memory access (DMA) attack during the reboot process.

Apple's flawed encryption scheme, fixed in the Tuesday release of the macOS 10.12.2 update, lacked protection from DMA attacks launched prior to the the loading of macOS.

When running its Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) during the early stages of the boot process, Mac hardware allowed devices connected by Thunderbolt 2 (USB-C has not been tested) to read and write memory in the Mac.

The ability to write to memory alone allows an attacker to subvert a system. But creating an exploit by overwriting memory wasn't necessary because FileVault passwords were stored in cleartext and were not evicted from memory once the disk was unlocked.

Obtaining the disk password was simply a matter of connecting the PCILeech device to a Mac and rebooting it, Frisk explains.

"Once the Mac is rebooted, the DMA protections that macOS previously enabled are dropped," said Frisk in a blog post on Thursday. "The memory contents, including the password, [are] still there though. There is a time window of a few seconds before the memory containing the password is overwritten with new content."

Frisk discovered the vulnerability in July and presented details in August at Def Con 24. The presentation also described attacks on Linux and Window systems.

Youtube Video

Apple was subsequently notified and requested that Frisk delay public disclosure until it could deal with the issue, which it has done through its software update.

Frisk says it is no longer possible to access memory prior to the boot process on an updated Mac, making it one of the most secure platforms against this specific type of attack, at least with regard to publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. ®

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