Saturday, November 23, 2013

حلف الممانعة يهدد إسرائيل ويرد في سورية!

د. فيصل القاسم

تكتـّم حزب الله اللبناني طويلاً على وجود قواته في سورية، وظل يبرر عملياتها بأنها كانت مجرد دفاع عن الأراضي اللبنانية المحاذية للحدود السورية. ولطالما نفى الناطقون باسم الحزب أي تورط لقواته في الصراع الدائر في سورية
لكن سرعان ما راح حسن نصر الله يعلن بالفم الملآن أنه أرسل قواته للدفاع عن المراقد والمزارات الشيعية في سورية، وخاصة مرقد السيدة زينب جنوب دمشق. وعندما انكشفت هذه المزاعم، وبدأ عدد المقتولين اللبنانيين يتدفق على الضاحية بأعداد كبيرة، وغصت المشافي اللبنانية بجرحى الحزب، تغيرت المزاعم على الفور، وراح الحزب يعلن أنه توجه إلى سورية لمقاتلة ‘التكفيريين’ والإرهابيين’ ‘أذناب الصهيونية والامبريالية وأدواتها’ أعداء ‘المقاومة والممانعة’.
وكذلك صرحت إيران وميليشيات نوري المالكي العراقية التي نسيت بأنها صنيعة ‘الامبريالية’، وأنها عادت إلى العراق على ظهور الدبابات الأمريكية، وراحت تعلن عن عملياتها ضد الجماعات التكفيرية ‘المدعومة صهيونياً وأمريكياً’ في سورية. (شوفو مين عميحكي)؟ قال ‘تكفيريين’ قال!
مع العلم أن النظام الإيراني يقوم بتكفير أي شيعي لا يؤمن بولاية الفقيه الوضعية، فما بالك بأمور عقدية أخطر وأعقد، فمصير من يخالفها جهنم وبئس المصير.
لقد أصبح الشعار الأعرض الذي يتستر به فيلق القدس الإيراني برئاسة قاسم سليماني وحلفاؤه ‘الحزبلاتيون’ والعراقيون والحوثيون والباكستانيون والأفغان هو شعار ‘مقاتلة عملاء الصهيونية والامبريالية’ في سورية! 
ولما لا، فهو شعار براق يتوافق مع شعارات ‘المقاومة والممانعة’، ويمكن الضحك به على ذقون الذين ما زالوا مغفلين، خاصة بعد أن بات معظم الشارع العربي يسمي الممانعة ‘مماتعة’ لإسرائيل في النهار، و’مساكنة’ في الليل. 
لكن لا بأس، فلا مانع من استخدام نفس الأكاذيب والمسوغات لتبرير التدخل السافر في سورية ضد الشعب السوري وقواه الحية. يا سلام: لقد تحول الشعب السوري الذي لطالما تغنى حزب الله وإيران بأنه شعب ‘مقاوم’، فجأة إلى شعب ‘متصهين’ وعميل للإمبريالية و’الشيطان الأكبر’، وبالتالي لا بد من مقاومته وممانعته على الطريقة الإيرانية الحزب اللاتية المعهودة. 
وبقدرة قادر لم تعد الصهيونية ولا الامبريالية ولا الشيطان الأكبر يقبع في تل أبيب، ولا في الجليل، ولا في البيت الأبيض، بل صارت كلها في قرى ‘القصير’ و’تلكلخ’ و’مهين’ التابعة لمحافظة حمص السورية، وفي أقصى الشمال السوري في ريف محافظة حلب كقرى ‘نبل والزهراء’ و’السفيرة’ و’مارع′، وفي قرية ‘بصرى الشام’ بمحافظة درعا في الجنوب، وفي قرية الحجيرة جنوب غرب دمشق، والسيدة زينب جنوب العاصمة، و’الذيابية’ بالقرب من المطار الدولي، ناهيك عن ‘عقربا’ و’المليحة’ و’المعضمية’ و’داريا’، وكلها قرى تابعة لمحافظة ريف دمشق. 
لقد بلغنا من العمر عتياً، وهذه هي المرة الأولى التي نعرف فيها أن الصهيونية تقبع في قرانا السورية الوادعة في الجنوب والشمال والغرب والشرق! لا بد أن نشكر حسن نصر الله على أنه اكتشفها لنا بعد كل هذا العمر الطويل. ولا بد أن نقبـّل يديه أيضاً على أنه جاء يحرر القدس المحتلة في قرى ريف دمشق وحلب وحمص ودرعا والسويداء وإدلب. 
عجيب والله: الطريق إلى القدس يمر من ‘أريحا’ السورية في ريف إدلب، وليس من ‘أريحا’ الفلسطينية مثلاً. يبدو أن مقاتلي حزب الله بحثوا عن قرية ‘أريحا’ في ‘غوغل إيرث’، فلما وجدوها توجهوا إليها للقتال من أجل فلسطينعلى الفور، لكن دون أن يعرفوا في ما إذا كانت هذه ‘الأريحا’ في سورية أوفلسطين! المهم أنهم وجدوا ‘أريحا’، ولا بد للانطلاق منها لتحرير القدس حتى لو كانت في أقصى الشمال السوري بالقرب من مدينة إدلب الشهيرة. 
‘أليس الأقربون جغرافياً أولى بالمعروف يا سيد نصر الله’، يصيح أحد السوريين ساخراً؟ لماذا تتجشم ميليشياتك عناء الطريق إلى شمال سورية، وتقطع مئات الكيلو مترات لتقتص من ‘عملاء الصهاينة’ المعادين لحلف ‘المقاومة والممانعة’ هناك، بينما أسياد ‘العملاء’ الذين تلاحقهم على الأرض السورية موجودون على مرمى حجر من ميليشياتك في جنوب لبنان وشمال فلسطين المحتلة، كما تسميها؟ 
لا شك أن غالبية السوريين والعرب، كما ترون، يسخرون من المزاعم الإيرانية والحزب اللاتية والعراقية الكوميدية بأنهم يقاتلون ‘عملاء الصهيونية’ في سورية. ولا أحد يأخذ مزاعمهم على محمل الجد، بل راح الكثيرون يهزأون بتلك الحجج الواهية التي لم تعد تنطلي حتى على الأطفال. قال شو قال: ‘نحن نخوض المعركة ضد الصهاينة في سورية’!؟
‘طيب’، يصيح أحد الناشطين على مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي: ‘يا خرتيت الضاحية إذا كان مرتزقتك موجودين في سورية للدفاع عن فلسطين، فلماذا لا ترسلهم مباشرة الى فلسطين؟ أليس منطقة الجليل المحتلة أقرب اليك واليهم من حلب السورية الواقعة على الحدود التركية’؟ لماذا لا تستعين بـ’غوغل إيرث’؟ 
وبالأمس وجهت إيران أصابع الاتهام لإسرائيل مباشرة بعد تفجير السفارة الإيرانية في بيروت. وهذه شجاعة لا بأس بها. لكن السؤال المطروح الآن: هل سترد إيران وحلفاؤها في المنطقة على إسرائيل مباشرة، كما تفعل إسرائيل ضد كل من يعتدي على سفاراتها، أم انها كالنظام السوري الذي يتلقى الضربة الإسرائيلية تلو الأخرى، لكن بدلاً من الرد على إسرائيل يرد على أطفال الغوطة بالكيماوي؟!
هل سنرى ‘صواريخ’ حزب الله مثلاً تدك المدن الإسرائيلية انتقاماً للأبرياء اللبنانيين والإيرانيين الذين قضوا نحبهم في تفجير السيارة الإرهابي الذي اقترفته أياد صهيونية حسب المزاعم الإيرانية؟ أم ان كل الصواريخ التي تنطلق من لبنان على إسرائيل أصبحت ‘صواريخ مشبوهة’، كما وصفها حسن نصر الله عام 2009؟ هل سترد طهران على ‘الصهاينة’ في تل أبيب مثلاً ثأراً لسفارتها المفجوعة؟ أم انها وجهت الاتهامات مباشرة لإسرائيل، لكنها سترد في طرابلس بلبنان، أو في سورية على ‘أذناب الصهيونية’ في حلب ودرعا ودمشق وحمص أيضاً؟ ‘أليس من الأجدى أن تضرب رأس الأفعى في تل أبيب، بدل أن تضرب ذيلها المزعوم في حمص مثلاً؟’ وإذا كانت إسرائيل مشتركة في المؤامرة على ‘المقاومة والممانعة’ فلماذا لا تردون عليها في عقر دارها بدل ريف دمشق؟’!
إلى متى تهددون إسرائيل ثم تردون في سورية؟ طبعاً سيردون على إسرائيل ‘بالمشمش’، خاصة بعد أن أعلن حسن نصر الله حرفياً:’ إن التقارب الإيراني مع (الشيطان الأكبر) فرصة لتعزيز محور المقاومة والممانعة’. 
هل نفهم من هذا الكلام أن أمريكا حامية إسرائيل تحتضن أيضاً حلف الممانعة والمقاومة، وأن الطرفين أخوة في الرضاعة؟


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Can you believe that displaying this sign (which commemorates the huge massacre committed by the Egyptian military in Rab'a 'Adawiyyah Square)  would get you arrested in today's "democratic" Egypt?

It is true and has been done repeatedly!

Current Al-Jazeera (Arabic) Online Poll

Do you support international efforts to bring transgressors on authority (coup leaders) to trial in Egypt?

So far, 96% have voted yes.

Egypt's latest charm offensive

Journalists to sample the delights of military democracy
By Brian Whitaker  

"Al-Masah Hotel and Spa describes itself as a place "to escape the noise and the pollution" of Cairo, a place to enjoy quiet, contemplative moments sitting under a pergola with the drink of your choice.
"Since 2006, al-Masah Hotel has been the Cairo home for international heads of state and politicians, but our passion has always been the same: to share with you the most gracious of Egyptian hospitality," according to its chief executive, Major-General Mohamed Ameen Nasr.
Yes, its chief executive is a major-general because the hotel is owned and run by the Egyptian military.
Guests expecting a normal hotel have sometimes been taken aback by this. One, writing on TripAdvisor, describes it as a luxurious detention centre: "The annoying part is the extreme security measures. No water, or any sort of food is allowed in, cameras have to be kept at reception and so on."
Anyway, this will be the luxurious but oddly inappropriate venue for a conference on December 5 and 6 about democracy in Egypt.
But if you read the blurb and the agenda carefully the conference not quite what it seems. This is the latest round in Egypt's war-of-the-democrats – between the "military democrats" on one side and the "religious democrats" on the other. More specifically, it's aimed at getting international media to take a more sympathetic view of Egypt's post-Morsi regime. The blurb says:
"International media have showcased different visions and interpretations of what is happening in Egypt. For many international observers and analysts, the picture seemed to be not well-understood, either because of unawareness of Egyptian culture, or pushed by biased international political standing not favouring the will of Egyptians and endeavouring to achieve certain political gains or regional projects, or even in sympathy with certain political principles that do not consider the reflections on Egypt. 
"Therefore, some Egyptians took the initiative to transparently clarify the reality of events in order for the global audience to closely realise the true reasons and outcomes of Egypt’s turmoil caused by the ousted regime …"
The "some Egyptians" who took this initiative are known as EGCODS (the Egyptian Council for Democracy Support) and include some who formerly supported the revolution against Mubarak. Rather incredibly, they also claim the conference is sponsored by various European media organisations including the BBC, Le Figaro in France, the Italian news agency ANSA, the German broadcaster Deutsche Welle and News Talk in Ireland.
The conference is obviously well funded and foreign journalists have been getting all-expenses-paid invitations to attend.
Jack Shenker, former Cairo correspondent of the Guardian, who now lives in Britain, was one of those invited. Four hours after receiving an email invitation from EGCODS, he received another email from the Egyptian embassy in London, urging him to accept.
Intrigued that a little-known NGO appeared to have the resources of the Egyptian diplomatic service at its disposal, Shenker enquired further. His correspondence with the embassy is here."

Friday, November 22, 2013

Emad Hajjaj's Cartoon: Budding Romance Between the "Axis of Evil" and the "Great Satan"

اضغط على الكاريكاتير لإرساله إلى صديق!

Real News Video: Israelis and Palestinians Turn to One-State Solution

As chief Palestinian negotiators quit the latest round of bilateral negotiations, but many on the ground say the two-state solution is long dead

More at The Real News

Gaza becoming uninhabitable as blockade tightens, says UN


Gaza power protest

One year after “ceasefire,” Gaza’s suffering deepens

By Ali Abunimah

 (Alun McDonald / Oxfam)

“Quiet” for some


Gaza becoming “uninhabitable”


Frequent “ceasefire” violations

As Oxfam notes:

Economy devastated


Isolating the people


Lift the blockade


U.S. Middle East Strategy: Back to Balancing

By Stephen M. Walt
Foreign Policy

When we talk about U.S. strategy in the Middle East, therefore, we need to start by recognizing that the United States is in very good shape, and a lot of what happens in that part of the world may not matter very much to the country in the long run. Put differently, no matter what happens there, the United States can almost certainly adjust and adapt and be just fine.
So what are U.S. interests in the Middle East? I'd say the United States has three strategic interests and two moral interests. The three strategic interests are 1) keeping oil and gas from the region flowing to world markets, to keep the global economy humming; 2) minimizing the danger of anti-American terrorism; and 3) inhibiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The two moralinterests are 1) promotion of human rights and participatory government, and 2) helping ensure Israel's survival.
A few comments: The strategic interests haven't changed much for decades, though the vigor with which the United States has pursued them has varied depending on circumstances. As for the moral interests, there has often been a trade-off between moral aspirations and practical strategic realities, as shown by U.S. tolerance for authoritarian regimes in various countries. Similarly, the moral basis of America's commitment to Israel has weakened over time, both because Israel has become increasingly secure from external threats (it is the strongest military power in the region at this point) and because its own character and conduct (i.e., the continued campaign to colonize the West Bank and suppress Palestinian Arab rights) is increasingly at odds with core U.S. values.
The best way to pursue these five goals -- especially the first three -- is a realist, balance-of-power policy, akin to the policy that the United States followed from 1945 to 1990. During this period, the United States acted as an "offshore balancer" in the region. It had close security ties to several countries and clear strategic interests, and the central U.S. goal was to prevent any single country -- especially the Soviet Union -- from dominating the region. So long as the Greater Middle East was divided into many separate powers, no one country could halt the flow of oil and most oil producers would have obvious incentives to sell it at the world market price.
The United States didn't need to dominate the region itself; it just had to make sure no one else did. Accordingly, the country relied on local allies for the most part, and it kept its own military forces out of the region save for brief and rare moments. Even after the Iranian revolution led to the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, the United States kept those units over the horizon and only brought them into the region when the balance of power broke down. The United States tilted toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War and then balanced vigorously against Iraq when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990.
After 1991, the United States departed from this strategy in two steps. First, it adopted the odd strategy of "dual containment": Instead of using Iraq and Iran to check each other, Washington took on the task of containing both. This strategy required the United States to keep large military contingents in Saudi Arabia, thereby reinforcing Osama bin Laden's animus and helping produce the 9/11 attacks. Second, George W. Bush administration adopted the even more foolish strategy of "regional transformation," which led directly to the disastrous debacle in Iraq. Apart from the direct costs, extensive U.S. interference had two obvious negative effects: It helped fuel anti-American terrorism, and it gave some regional powers additional incentives to pursue weapons of mass destruction.
Given these realities and the need to devote more strategic attention to Asia, the obvious solution for the United States is to return to its earlier strategy. This is now seen in some quarters as a "retreat" or a "withdrawal," and various U.S. client states are uttering the usual dark warnings about American "credibility" being on the line. We should not make too much of these self-serving complaints, in part because U.S. credibility is mostly their problem, not ours. But more importantly, a return to offshore balancing doesn't mean the United States does not care about the region -- the country cared plenty in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s -- it just means it is defending its interests in a smarter and more cost-effective way.
The main obstacle to this step is the United States' various "special relationships" with certain regional powers. I refer, of course, to the mostly unconditional aid and support that the country gives to Israel and to a slightly lesser degree Saudi Arabia. (One might also add Mubarak-era Egypt to that list.) Over the past 25 years or so, the United States has increasingly supported these states no matter what they have done at home or abroad and has turned a blind eye to their various actions that haven't served U.S. interests (and in many cases, that weren't good for these countries either). The underlying reasons for these "special relationships" vary, but overly intimate relations with these states have robbed U.S. diplomacy of the flexibility that is essential to a sensible regional strategy.
At the same time, the United States has also been hampered by certain long-lasting enmities with Qaddafi's Libya, Syria, Iraq, and most especially Iran. To be sure: The United States has had genuine conflicts of interest and/or values with each of these regimes and good reasons to press them to change policies that it regards as threatening or immoral. But the recurring tendency to demonize every one of these governments and to exaggerate their power has also made it harder to influence their conduct and to cooperate at those moments when interests aligned. This has been most tragically evident in the case of Iran, which reached out to the United States in the 1990s, after 9/11, in 2003, and again in 2005, only to be sharply rebuffed each time.
Given U.S. interests, the country would be much better off with a more nuanced and flexible approach. To be blunt: The United States is too close to its current allies and too hostile to some of its adversaries. That is not an argument for abandoning current allies and launching a complete diplomatic reversal (though some analysts have argued cogently along these lines), but it is an argument for a less polarized, black-and-white approach. To be specific: The United States should have normal relations with Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia instead of "special relationships." This would be better for the United States and probably better for those countries too. The United States should also have a somewhat more normal relationship with Iran: not friendship, perhaps, but one where the two governments cooperate on matters of common concern (such as Afghanistan) and bargain rationally and rigorously on matters where the two countries differ. (This approach would also take advantage of the desire for contact with America and the outside world that is widespread in Iranian society, especially among the younger population, and make it harder for the clerical regime to thwart reform by blaming its problems in the "Great Satan.")
The strategy I am outlining would also strengthen the United States' ability to shape events in the region. Over the past several decades, America's allies in the Middle East have tended to take U.S. support for granted and ignore U.S. concerns whenever it suited them. Thus, Israel has continued to build settlements despite repeated but impotent U.S. protests, and Saudi Arabia has sometimes stonewalled Washington on issues of Islamic extremism and its role in encouraging anti-American terrorism in far-flung places. Broadening diplomatic connections throughout the region would give the United States some useful leverage over its current clients, thereby facilitating its ability to get them to do what it wants. Isn't that what U.S. diplomacy is supposed to be about?
The tumult unleashed by the Arab Spring provides a final rationale for the approach I have outlined here. The Greater Middle East is in the midst of a profound upheaval whose future course is still uncertain and that is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. Conflict is now occurring across many fault lines -- Sunni vs. Shiite, Arab vs. Persian, secular vs. Islamist, democratic vs. authoritarian, etc. -- and in ways that are beginning to shake the foundations of the political order that first took shape at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.
Given this turbulent, complex, and poorly understood situation, the last thing the United States should do is try to play referee or try to impose its preferred political formula on these events. (The country tried to do this in Egypt, for example, and for the best reasons, and it is less popular there than ever.) The good news is that the United States is going to be in pretty good shape no matter how all this turns out, and U.S. foreign-policy elites can therefore take a somewhat more detached view of these events than is their normal tendency. The United States should not disengage, but it should not be overly eager to interfere either. Remember: The preservation of a regional balance of power is still the primary interest, and direct U.S. interference fosters anti-American extremism and the desire for weapons of mass destruction. In short, the United States should conduct its Middle East policy with a light touch rather than a heavy hand."

Thursday, November 21, 2013

Egypt's Flirting with Russia, by Khalil Bendib

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Al-Jazeera Video: بلا حدود- مستقبل الانقلاب العسكري في مصر


"تناولت الحلقة واقع جمهورية الضياط في مصر، والأسباب الحقيقة التي دفعت الجيش إلى الانقلاب على الرئيس محمد مرسي، ومستقبل الانقلاب العسكري في مصر.
تقديم: أحمد منصور
الضيف: يزيد صايغ



Another Flip-Flop From this Clueless Clown: John Kerry trys to mend rift with Egypt by criticising Muslim Brotherhood

US secretary of state accuses previous government of corrupting the ideals of the 2011 revolution started in Tahrir Square

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"US secretary of state John Kerry has accused Mohamed Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood of stealing the legacy of Egypt's 2011 revolution.
Kerry's comments constitute his second attempt in as many weeks to mend relations with the Egyptian administration that replaced Morsi's, after recent changes to the way US gives aid to Egypt prompted Cairo officials to re-strengthen ties with Russia.
In a set-piece speech to American businessmen yesterday, Kerry argued that Egypt's 2011 uprising was inspired by a demand for everyday freedoms, rather than a desire for religion to play a bigger role in public life.
"Those kids in Tahrir Square, they were not motivated by any religion or ideology," said Kerry, referring to the thousands of protesters who camped in Cairo's central square in early 2011, and called for the overthrow of then dictator Hosni Mubarak.
He added: "And then it got stolen by the one single-most organised entity in the state, which was the Brotherhood."
Kerry's remarks are likely to please Egypt's new army-backed administration, who argue that the Brotherhood's removal was necessary to prevent the country falling into the hands of religious extremists, and who are increasingly frustrated at the West's lukewarm reaction to both Morsi's removal, and at the subsequent brutal suppression of his supporters.
But Kerry's position will naturally infuriate Morsi's supporters, many of whom took part in Mubarak's 2011 overthrow alongside the liberal youth Kerry mentioned in his speech. Kerry's words may also frustrate White House officials, who want Kerry to take a firmer stance against Egypt's current administration, according to recent reports. Egypt's new cabinet has been accused of being just as illiberal as Morsi's and Mubarak's government, drafting new legislation that would obstruct the right to protest and the freedom of association.
The US is viewed sceptically by both Morsi's supporters and opponents. Each side accuses the US of meddling in Egyptian affairs, and of siding with their opponents.
Egypt's official state newspaper, al-Ahram, has twice in recent months printed front-page stories claiming the US had plotted with Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood to divide the country into mini-fiefdoms – an indication of how the US is seen by some Egyptians. Photoshopped pictures of Barack Obama wearing a jihadist-style beard, implying his support of terrorist extremists who have allied themselves to Morsi's cause, are also a frequent sight in Cairo.
Egypt has long been the second-largest recipient of US aid, after Israel, with the US donating Cairo an annual sum of $1.3bn since 1979. But Egypt was angered by a recent decision to tie the delivery of parts of this aid to the completion of democratic goals. It led to a visit by two senior Russian ministers to Egypt, in an apparent attempt to fill the power vacuum left by the US."

Wednesday, November 20, 2013

Analysis - Beirut blast: jolt from past and omen of dark future

Forensic inspectors and Lebanese army soldiers examine the site of the two suicide bombings that occurred on Tuesday near Iran's embassy compound in Beirut November 20, 2013. REUTERS/Sharif Karim
(Reuters) - Thirty years after the Lebanese capital gave birth to the modern suicide bomber, a killer has again driven his explosive-packed car towards an embassy in Beirut, hurling charred corpses through the street.
For Lebanese, Tuesday's carnage at the Iranian embassy - 23 people were killed and nearly 150 wounded - was both a sharp jolt from their own bloody past and a harrowing omen of a future as the Middle East's next sectarian slaughterhouse.
Many Lebanese say they now believe their country is doomed to become the next battlefield for Sunni jihadists, looking for soft targets to inflict blows on the Shi'ite supporters of neighboring Syria's President Bashar al-Assad.
Lebanon has already been caught in the blowback from the 2 1/2-year-old civil war inSyria, with scores killed in clashes between Shi'ite Muslim supporters of Assad and their Sunni foes.
But Tuesday's suicide attack against the embassy of Shi'ite Iran, claimed by a Sunni militant group, took violence to a higher level. It resurrected the tactics born in a previous generation's Lebanon war, which are now the signature of neighboring states' bloodbaths.
Shi'ites expressed the most fear.
"We expect a bloody conflict, more bombs," said Ali Abbas, a Shi'ite poet attending a funeral in southern Beirut on Wednesday for four of the men killed in the attack. "This is a fight between the dark and the light, the night and the day," he said. "They are present in Iraq,Syria and now Lebanon."
Lebanon may "turn into a field of jihad - as the terrorist groups call it - as happened in Iraqand Syria," said parliament speaker Nabih Berri, also a Shi'ite.
"Our country will drown in these kinds of operations," he told Al-Nahar newspaper.
Other communities are also deeply worried. Lebanon's anti-Assad March 14 coalition, which groups anti-Assad Sunni Muslims and Christians, laid blame with the powerful Iran-backed Shi'ite militia Hezbollah, saying it had provoked the violence by joining Syria's war on Assad's behalf.
"There is a fear that Hezbollah's continued intervention in Syria will lead to the Iraq-isation of Lebanon. They went to war in Syria and brought the war to Lebanon," it said.
The Syrian war has polarized Lebanon and the wider Middle East between Sunnis and Shi'ites, sects that have fought since the first generation after Islam's 7th century founding. Sunni Muslims support the rebels fighting Assad and Shi'ites back the president, whose Alawite faith is an offshoot of Shi'ism.
This year, Assad gained momentum by winning the overt battlefield support of Lebanon's Hezbollah fighters, as well as help from Iraqi Shi'ites and Iranian commanders. Meanwhile Sunnis, including Lebanese, have poured into Syria to aid the rebels, who are armed and funded by Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Beirut-based political commentator Rami Khouri said the "Armageddon scenario" - Iranian Shi'ite revolutionary forces facing off against Saudi-backed Sunni militants across the Middle East - was drawing rapidly closer.
"You have these two broad groups now openly attacking each other. It's no longer a battle of proxies - the principles are killing each other in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq".
More than 100,000 people have been killed in Syria's civil war, and a similar number during a decade of Sunni-Shi'ite violence in Iraq. Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war killed 120,000.
The modern phenomenon of suicide bombing - the tactic that more than any other has become the grisly hallmark of today's Middle East violence - first blasted its way onto the world's consciousness in April 1983, when a man drove a car packed with explosives into the U.S. embassy in Beirut. The attack killed 63 people including 17 Americans.
Six months later two men drove trucks packed with explosives into U.S. and French barracks in Beirut suburbs, killing 299 American and French troops. A group calling itself Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for that attack, although Washington has long suspected that the true culprit was Hezbollah.
Today, suicide bombing is the signature of Sunni groups, especially al Qaeda's Iraq branch, which has sent more than a thousand bombers to blow themselves up at markets, cafes, mosques and police checkpoints in the past decade. It has now joined forces with the Sunni rebels fighting in Syria.
Tuesday's attack, the first major strike on an embassy in Beirut since Lebanon's civil war, was claimed by a Lebanon-based Sunni Islamist militant group which warned of more attacks unless Tehran withdraws its military forces from Syria.
One bomber carried 5 kg (12 pounds) of explosives and a second drove a car laden with 50 kg, in what may have been an attempt to breach embassy walls and then blow the car up inside the compound.
Amidst the anger and trepidation, the public responses from Iran and Hezbollah have been restrained. Hezbollah deputy leader Sheikh Naim Qassem called on all Lebanese "to stand together and face this terrorism, whatever our political differences".
He also played down the prospect that Lebanon could descend into all-out violence. "Lebanon has not yet reached the point where it can be compared to Iraq. The situation is different, and we are at the beginning of the road."
But privately, Shi'ite politicians described Tuesday's bombing as a watershed. One said the use of suicide bombers had "changed the rules of the game" while another said Lebanon had been turned into a "jihadi battleground".
"This bombing ups the ante," said Paul Salem of the Middle East Institute, noting that previous rocket and bomb attacks earlier this year had targeted Hezbollah, not its patronIran.
"Lebanon is part of a proxy war that is engulfing the entire Levant and the alliances that back the factions in Lebanon are the same that back opposing groups in Syria and Iraq," he said.
"A pattern could evolve, as it did in Iraq in 2005-2006 and onward, in which car bombs and suicide missions were one of the main instruments of sectarian and proxy conflict."
The trigger for the Iranian embassy attack may have been the latest offensive by Assad's forces - in the mountainous Qalamoun region north of Damascus, close to Lebanon's border.
The fighting has helped Assad consolidate his power around the capital and further reduce the ability of the rebels to cross over between Lebanon and Syria.
The combination of rebel military setbacks and the presence of large numbers of fighters on the Lebanese side of the border may have led some Sunni militants to switch their focus towards soft targets connected to Assad's allies, such as the embassy.
"I assume these groups were able to strike against the embassy previously, and had held back for some reason," said Yezid Sayigh of the Carnegie Middle East Centre. "It's a reasonable assumption that the battle for Qalamoun is the likely trigger."
Lebanon has no shortage of potential recruits for similar attacks, particularly in its north.
"Across the whole (northern) area from the coast to the Syrian border... these Salafi Islamist groups have been rising up over the last ten years," Khouri said.
Widespread fears of what all-out conflict could do to Lebanon could be the best protection against escalating violence. But they are unlikely to halt attacks by shadowy groups on either side of the regional conflict.
"No one in Lebanon has the interest or stomach for large-scale military confrontations," said Sayigh. "But shadow wars are different because you don't need significant numbers, you don't need front lines, and it's easy to hit soft targets."