isters from entering into such contracts. [citation omitted] The Court held that Registers have the ability to restrict the dissemination of information provided in bulk form under a county government s general power to make contracts and a county s general18 power to manage its own business affairs. Id. at 176-77 (citing M.C.L. §§ 45.3[ ], 46.11[19]). The court noted, Simply as an exercise of the general power to contract, defendant has the authority to propose and enter into contracts in which it provides concessions, such as a reduced bulk rate fee or copies in microfilm form, in return for a purchaser agreeing to special conditions, such as a restriction on the use of the copies provided. Such a quid pro quo arrangement is a usual and inherent part of the contracting process. Further, the negotiation of such contracts is within the broad statutory grant of authority provided for the care and management of the property and business concerns of a county. Id. This court will not question the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals regarding the statutory authority under which the Registers are acting when they make conditions on bulk sales. The very policy reason behind the Parker [stateaction] exception, respect for state sovereignty, cautions the court against delving too deeply into state law matters to determine whether the Parker exception applies. June 13, 2005, Dist. Ct. Op. at 7-8. If this were a question of state law, the federal courts would indeed be obligated to defer to the decisions of the Michigan courts. But we are not deciding a question of state law; as noted above, First American has not appealed the dismissal of its state-law claim. A state court s opinion 18 M.C.L. § 45.3 is extremely general, providing, Each organized county shall be a body politic and corporate, for the following purposes... to make all necessary contracts, and to do all other necessary acts in relation to the property and concerns of the county. This provision does not refer to the register of deeds, let alone to the provision of duplicate title records or title information. 19 M.C.L. § 46.11(l) provides that a county board of commissioners may [r]epresent the county and have the care and management of the property and business of the county if other provisions are not made. M.C.L. § 46.11(m) provides that a county board of commissioners may [e]stablish rules and regulations in reference to the management of the interest and business concerns of the county as the board considers necessary and proper in all matters not especially provided for in this act or under the laws of this state. These provisions do not refer to the register of deeds, let alone to the provision of duplicate title records or title information. No. 06-1171 First Am. Title Co., et al. v. DeVaugh, et al. Page 16 on an issue of federal law or, in our case, a state court s opinion on a state-law issue that also arises in federal law is entitled to no deference whatsoever. See Wallace v. Cranbrook Educ. Cmty., No. 05-73446, F. Supp. 2d, 2006 WL 2796135, *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2006) ( Although federal courts must defer to a state court s interpretation of its own law, federal courts owe no deference to a state court s interpretation of federal law. ) (quoting United States v. Miami Univ., 294 20 797, 811 (6th Cir. 2002)); accord Hawkman v. Parratt, 661 F.2d 1161, 1166 (8th F.3d Cir. 1981). As a matter of Michigan law as interpreted by the Michigan Court of Appeals, a county s state-granted general powers to make contracts and manage its own business affairs implicitly encompass the power to condition bulk public record sales on relinquishment of the right to re-sell the records. That tells us nothing, however, about whether a county s exercise of that latter power qualifies for state-action immunity from Sherman Act liability. See, e.g., Philip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application 455 (2d ed. 2000) ( We would therefore disagree... with decisions holding... that the bare power to make contracts implies the power to enter into anticompetitive exclusive arrangements [for purposes of federal antitrust law]. ). Because the Michigan Court of Appeals was interpreting only Michigan law in Lapeer County Abstract, it was not bound by the principles and presumptions that govern federal antitrust law. Following the Supreme Court, this court has emphasized that the state-action immunity doctrine, like other judicially imposed exemptions from the antitrust laws, must be narrowly construed. Brentwood, 442 F.3d at 441 (citing Ticor, 504 U.S. at 636). The Michigan Court of Appeals labored under no such stricture when it decided what implicit powers can be inferred from the registers explicit powers under Michigan law. Moreover, in the Sherman Act context, the Supreme Court has made clear that a neutral state view towards a state subdivision s allegedly anticompetitive conduct is insufficient to trigger state-action immunity. This, too, is a rule of law that did not apply to the Michigan Court of Appeals s interpretation of Michigan law in Lapeer County Abstract. The Supreme Court has provided a helpful contrast between a neutral state view of anticompetitive conduct and a state s requirement or endorsement of the anticompetitive conduct. Considering whether a Mississippi agency s setting of transportation prices was exempt from the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court explained, The Mississippi statute stands in sharp contrast to the Colorado Home Rule Amendment, which we considered in Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40... (1982). In Boulder, the State Constitution gave municipalities extensive powers of self-government. Id., at 43-44.... Pursuant to this authority, the city of Boulder prohibited a cable television company from expanding its operations. The Court held that because the Home Rule Amendment did not evidence an intent to displace competition in the cable television industry, id. at 55..., Boulder s anticompetitive ordinance was not enacted pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. This holding was premised on the fact that Boulder, as a home rule municipality, was authorized to elect free-market competition as an alternative to regulation. Id. at 56.... In this case, on the other hand, the Mississippi Public Service Commission is not authorized to choose free-market competition. Instead, it is required to prescribe 20 See Wayne v. Vill. of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 526 (6th Cir. 1994) ( We reject the state court of appeals interpretation of federal law. ). No. 06-1171 First Am. Title Co., et al. v. DeVaugh, et al. Page 17 rates for motor common carriers on the basis of statutorily enumerated factors. [state statutory citation omitted] These factors bear no discernible relationship to the prices that would be set by a perfectly efficient and unregulated market. Therefore, the Mississippi statute clearly indicates that the legislature intended to displace competition in the intrastate trucking industry with a regulatory program. Southern Motor, 471 U.S. at 65 n.25, 105 S. Ct. at 1731 n.25 (emphasis added). The registers situation here is akin to the situation in City of Boulder: Michigan statute gives the counties the power to make contracts, but it leaves the counties free to allow competition in the provision of duplicate title records and the information contained therein. In other words, Michigan statutory law leaves the counties free to provide duplicate title records to purchasers, in any format or quantity, without mandating that the purchasers give up their right to re-sell the official copies (or to sell unofficial copies of those copies, or the information therein). Unlike Hallie, the state statutes do not plainly show that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 44 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415). So far as Michigan statutory law shows, the Legislature is neutral towards the anticompetitive condition these registers have imposed on purchasers of title records. The Legislature does not contemplate the displacement of competition in the unofficial-copy / title information market any more than it contemplates free competition in that secondary market. This is fatal to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim with regard to these four registers because the Supreme Court holds that plainly the requirement of clear articulation and affirmative expression is not satisfied when the State s position is one of mere neutrality respecting the... actions challenged as anticompetitive. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55. Contrary to the district court s conclusion, granting counties the general power to contract or manage their business affairs cannot imply state authorization to impose this anticompetitive restriction: [a]cceptance of such a proposition that the general grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily implies state authorization to enact specific anticompetitive ordinances would wholly eviscerate the concepts of clear articulation and affirmative expression that our precedents require. Id. at 56.21 The district court appears to have acknowledged that the Supreme Court s decision in City of Boulder rendered the registers ineligible for state-action immunity: In Community Communications Company, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the City of Boulder was not immune to the Sherman Act when its alleged anticompetitive actions were made pursuant to the general Home Rule Amendment to the Colorado Constitution. A general grant of power to a local government was not a sufficiently articulated state policy