 gives the impression that things are really quite obvious. Its reasoning is based on three straightforward propositions: (i) Many States have emerged following declarations of independence; international practice provides no evidence for a prohibition. (ii) The principle of territorial integrity, enshrined in dozens of documents, does not imply a prohibition, as it applies in inter-State relations only. (iii) Instances in which the Security Council has condemned declarations of independence (Northern Cyprus; Republika Srpska; Southern Rhodesia) are exceptional and cannot be generalised.
I agree with some commentators to this blog (see particularly the comment by Irini) that the Court might have said more. Counsel for Cyprus eg made an eloquent argument that attempted secessions were not “purely factual questions about which international law must remain silent”, and that they had to be “consistent with international law” (CR 2009/29, at p. 40). However, it was difficult to find concrete evidence translating the law’s general concern for territorial integrity into a concrete prohibition imposed on the entity claiming statehood. The Court’s answer probably was correct. However, from a broader perspective, this correct answer is rather frustrating. The reason for that is simple: An international legal system aspiring to regulate fundamental question of international relations should regulate questions of secession in more detail than present-day international law does. If we accept the ICJ’s view, then present-day international law really has very little to say directly. And while that may be correct as a matter of law, it is a major gap in the normative ordering of international relations – or even (to borrow an expression with which Professor James Crawford underlined the need for a normative approach to statehood more generally) “a unilateral disarmament” of the law in the face of important values protected by principles such as territorial integrity and self-determination (cf. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd edn., 2006, at p. vi). More generally, the Court’s Kosovo opinion may perhaps be seen as further evidence of how little integrated non-State actors presently are in the international legal order. The debate about their personality has been won: non-State actors can be bearers of rights and duties. Yet rather frequently, international law does not impose any such rights or obligations, even on questions of fundamental importance such as the use of force by or against non-State actors (not covered by Article 2, para 4, a point much discussed) or – in this case – secession.
The absence of direct rules could be acceptable if international law provided meaningful rules regulating declarations of independence indirectly. This is after all how international law re-appropriates the use of force against non-State actors abroad: by treating it as an attack on the foreign State, which after all international law comprehensively regulates. By the same token, one might be content if international law contained clear rules on how to respond to declarations of independence. But it does not. To be sure, international law does provide institutions to address declarations of independence, primarily the mechanism of recognition. While not constitutive, recognition is indicative: widespread recognition is clear evidence of statehood; widespread non-recognition undermines an entity’s claim to statehood. But the rules on recognition are equally lenient. (To come back to the first of my two points, the General Assembly could have, of course, requested the Court’s view on this matter, but it deliberately chose not to.) We have ceased to discuss duties to recognise in earnest, and duties of non-recognition remain exceptional (cf. Article 41 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility; or occasional Security Council resolutions addressing particularly problematic declarations of independence). In most cases, recognition remains discretionary. When using their power to recognise, or to withhold recognition, States may well give effect to fundamental values of the international legal order, and they seem to have done so when responding to declarations of independence of, for example, the Bantustans. Yet only in rare instances does the law require them to do so. In short, just as with direct rules, international law provides rather little indirect normative guidance on how to treat declarations of independence, and imposes very few specific commands.
The brief, almost cursory, dismissal of a prohibition against secession in paras. 79-81 of the Kosovo opinion therefore leaves a feeling of emptiness. The problem with the Court’s answer is not that it is wrong, but that it is right. In giving the correct answer to the General Assembly’s curiously formulated question, the Court has drawn attention to a serious gap in the international legal system: international law’s failure to provide meaningful rules that give normative guidance on how the international community should deal with claims to statehood. The Court cannot be blamed for giving that answer, but its opinion reflects a state of the law that is highly unsatisfactory. This, it is submitted, should be the real source of disappointment.
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I wonder if you could say something about uti possidetis. The ICJ stated in Burkina-Faso v Mali that “its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the changing of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power.” While it is true that the uti possidetis is used in decolonization, it seems to say something about a concern in international law about stability and territorial integrity also in regard to internal secessionist movements. Malcolm Shaw writes in “International Law” about uti possidetis: “Practice in Africa has reinforced the approach of emphasising the territorial integrity of the colonially defined territory, witness the widespread disapproval of the attempted creation of secessionist states whether in the former Belgian Congo, Nigeria or Sudan. Efforts to prevent the partition of the South African controlled territory of Namibia into separate Bantustans as a possible prelude to a dissolution of the unity of the territory are a further manifestation of this.” Even if Yugoslavia was not a colony, why should international law prevent creation of secessionist states in Belgian Congo, Nigeria or Sudan and not in Yugoslavia?
Good to read your post. In the light of your comments it came to mind that States must have been conscious of the limits and limitations of current international law when they negotiated the text of Article 46 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP), referring to actions of any people, group or person as well as of any State.
The Friendly Relations Declaration (FRD) recognised that any attempt aimed at the disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a State or country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter. So the two clauses of Article 46 of the DRIP clearly are interconnected.
The FRD use of the term “authorizing” presumably was meant to sanction State authorization of individual actions by private parties. But the conjunction of the clauses in Article 46 in the DRIP seems to indicate that the intention there was to provide that the DRIP was not to be construed as “providing a legal basis for” any people, group or person, including indigenous peoples, to engage in any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.
Even interpreted in that way, obviously Article 46 does not carry forward the law, it is just intended to neutralise potential effects of the DRIP’s Article 3. This might not be fully effective if you were to read the Declaration’s Article 3 as merely recognising a pre-existing and full right of self-determination.
I bet there is a way for those who hold out to compensate those who are at risk... of course, if that tax should come to exist, if an epidemic occurs, I doubt the hold outs could cover the cost, or want to! That is, if they survived the epidemic! Would community hospitals get to prioritize treating patients based on this? Because that would be great for me! 

...I just wish there was a central body that could consider these things and use coercive power to mandate laws to simplify these concerns...Uber and Lyft have announced that they would share information about drivers whose account was deactivated after committing serious offenses, including physical and sexual assault and murder.
Under the banner of the Industry Safety Sharing Project, Uber and Lyft will be working hand-in-glove to pool information, which would be administered by a third party.
Players in the ride-hailing service have long had to struggle to keep users and drivers safe from one another.
According to the first safety report, Uber disclosed that 3,045 sexual assaults occurred on Uber trips in 2018.
The safety report also shows that 9 people were murdered during Uber rides, while 58 people died in auto-related crashes.
In a twist of events, Uber added that drivers reported being victims of assaults at roughly the same rate as riders.
According to a 2018 report by CNN, at least 18 Lyft drivers and 103 Uber drivers had been accused of sexually assaulting or abusing their riders.
In another report carried out in 2019, 19 women sued Lyft for allegedly failing to prevent sexual assault perpetrated by drivers on the platform and for doing little to investigate the complaints.
Lyft was also sued by a California woman who says she was raped by a Lyft driver in September, 2017. The woman alleged that the company fails to keep its riders safe.
Additionally, 14 other women sued Lyft earlier in September over its handling of sexual assault complaints.
Both Uber and Lyft, after conducting background checks, stated that passenger safety is their top priority.
The companies have also taken steps to tackle the issue through updates, like the in-app “panic buttons,” which let riders instantly dial 911, or ways to report a driver for unsafe activity