 Iowa Workmen's Compensation Act does not extend immunity from suit as a third party tort-feasor to a co-employee or fellow worker of an injured workman.
Other authorities supporting this conclusion include Thomas v. Hycon, Inc. (D.C.), 244 F. Supp. 151; Ransom v. Haner, Alaska, 362 P.2d 282, 287; Marquez v. Rapid Harvest Co., 1 Ariz.App. 562, 405 P.2d 814, later vacated in 99 Ariz. 363, 409 P.2d 285, only by reason of absence of jurisdictional notice; King v. Cardin, 229 Ark. 929, 319 S.W.2d 214; Thompson v. Lacey, 42 Cal. 2d 443, 267 P.2d 1; Stulginski v. Cizauskas, 125 Conn. 293, 5 A.2d 10, 11-12; Cuyler v. Elliott, Fla.App., 182 So. 2d 55; Gay v. Greene, 91 Ga.App. 78, 84 S.E.2d 847; Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corporation, 31 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769, applying Florida law; Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, 407 P.2d 471; Pflieger v. Haws, La.App., 180 So. 2d 892; Behr v. Soth, 170 Minn. 278, 212 N.W. 461; Sylcox v. National Lead Co., 225 Mo.App. 543, 38 S.W.2d 497, 502; Rehn v. Bingaman, 151 Neb. 196, 36 N.W.2d 856, 859-860; Merchants Mut. Cas. Co. v. Tuttle, 98 N.H. 349, 101 A.2d 262; Herbert v. Layman, Vt., 218 A.2d 706; and Severin v. Luchinske, 271 Wis. 378, 73 N.W.2d 477. See also 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 985e., page 481; 58 Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, sections 60-61, pages 616-617; and 43 Iowa L.Rev. 352.
We hold that under the provisions of chapter 85, Code, 1962, a fellow employee is not immune to a suit by an injured employee. To do otherwise would require us to assume the prerogative of the legislature.
II. Defendant strenuously argues an employer acts only through his employees and the latter, acting in the scope of their employment, are in fact the employer. See in this respect White v. Ponozzo, 77 Idaho 276, 291 P.2d 843, 845.
This is not a new but is still an ingenious argument which rests upon an uncertain common law premise, while we are confined to the interpretation and application of statutory law. Bashford v. Slater, 252 Iowa 726, 731, 108 N.W.2d 474, and Heiliger v. City of Sheldon, 236 Iowa 146, 161, 18 N.W.2d 182. Furthermore it has on some occasions been either criticized or repudiated. See Frantz v. McBee Company, Fla., 77 So. 2d 796, 798, and Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Swafford, 5 Cir., 220 F.2d 901. As previously demonstrated we cannot accept this argument.
Defendant has cited numerous cases which he claims support the view that an employee is immune from any negligence action by a co-employee.
However our inquiry discloses only relatively few of the courts of other states, with statutes comparable to our compensation *332 act, have held a co-employee is not "some person other than the employer". This they do either on the basis of agency, making the conduct of an employee the conduct of the employer, or on the broad premise the workmen's compensation acts are intended to embrace all liability arising out of and in the course of employment by a common employer covered by the act. See Bresnahan v. Barre, 286 Mass. 593, 190 N.E. 815; Majors v. Moneymaker, 196 Tenn. 698, 270 S.W.2d 328; White v. Ponozzo, 77 Idaho 276, 291 P.2d 843; and Ginnis v. Southerland, 50 Wash. 2d 557, 313 P.2d 675.
Other cases cited by defendant have turned upon statutes which are either more all-embracive or more specific than ours. For example some compensation acts provide, expressly or have been construed to mean, an employer or those conducting his business shall be liable to an injured co-employee to the extent only as provided by the applicable law. In this connection see Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6; Miller v. Muscarelle, 67 N.J.Super. 305, 170 A.2d 437; Williams v. Hartshorn, 296 N.Y. 49, 69 N.E.2d 557; Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 73 S.E.2d 449; Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d 73; and Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 2, section 72.20, page 173.
But in most states having compensation laws comparable to chapter 85, Code, 1962, which provide, specifically or in substance, the act shall not affect any common law cause of action an employee may have against some person other than the employer or against a third party or third party tort-feasor, it has generally been held a co-employee is, to all intents and purposes, "some person other than the employer". The fundamental reasoning in these cases is that the compensation laws base an employer's liability to his employee on the employer-employee relationship, not in tort; that as a result the right of an employee to receive benefits under a compensation act is not based on fault or negligence, but is contractual in nature; that a negligent employee is not liable for compensation, being a stranger to the act, he being a person other than the employee entitled to compensation and the employer liable to pay it. Also, co-employees are in no way subject to the provisions of the applicable compensation act in their relationship, each with the other. And some courts have taken the position that to hold otherwise would be to unjustly confer upon a workman freedom to neglect his duty to a fellow employee and, in effect, to wrongfully immunize him against all liability for damages proximately caused by his negligence. We are satisfied this reasoning is not only legalistically sound but is the more persuasive, being amply supported by respectable authority. See Bradshaw v. Iowa Methodist Hospital, 251 Iowa 375, 387, 101 N.W.2d 167; Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. Girard Steel Supply Co., D.C., 224 F. Supp. 690, 693-694; King v. Cardin, 229 Ark. 929, 319 S.W.2d 214; Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 P.2d 633, 152 A.L.R. 1043; Pacific Employer's Insurance Co. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co., 143 Cal. App. 2d 646, 299 P.2d 928; Gay v. Greene, 91 Ga.App. 78, 84 S.E.2d 847; Behr v. Soth, 170 Minn. 278, 212 N.W. 461; Severin v. Luchinske, 271 Wis. 378, 73 N.W.2d 477; and Tawney v. Kirkhart, 130 W.Va. 550, 44 S.E.2d 634.
Having determined as we do that under our compensation law an employee is not immune to a suit for negligence by an injured co-employee, there is no need to extend this opinion by discussing any other or contingent matter asserted on appeal by defendant.
The Radical Destruction Bringer (根源的破滅招来体 Kongen-teki Hametsu Shōrai-tai) is the unseen presence from space that masterminded the attempted destruction of the human race and the invasion of the planet Earth in the Ultraman Gaia TV series. While Zogu, the Radical Destruction Bringer's second in command, was the main antagonist of the series, the Radical Destruction Bringer is ultimately the prime antagonist by succession. Its arrival was predicted 500 years before the event of the series' current events by the sorcerer Kijuro Mato, this led to the founding of the world wide defense origination GUARD and its Kaiju attack team XIG.
The Radical Destruction Bringer is a universal protector, intent on bringing peace to the universe. While he is never seen, the Destruction Bringer is shown to always use worm-holes as a form of transportation for its monsters that sends to Earth. While the Destruction Bringer does have its own armada of monsters, they also manipulate other Kaiju and aliens into trying to invading the Earth, even Kaiju and other civilizations from the Earth itself have been used by them.
They also have used psychological warfare on their enemies, such as Hiroya Fujimiya and members of XIG, manipulating them to either turn their backs on their fellow man, cause them to lose their spirit