 claim, the court concluded that the defendant had not met his burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a falsehood or material omission in the warrant affidavits. Accordingly, the court, in an oral ruling, denied the defendant's motion to suppress.
The defendant thereafter entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to each of the charges in the three informations. The court, Devlin, J., sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of forty years of incarceration, suspended after twenty-eight years, followed by thirty-five years of probation. This appeal followed.
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress on the ground that he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his youthful offender records. He argues that § 54–76l2 confers a right of confidentiality as to the fingerprint records of youthful offenders, which, in turn, creates a reasonable expectation of privacy and, therefore, bars the release of such records in the absence of either a warrant obtained pursuant to the fourth amendment or procedural due process pursuant to the fourteenth amendment.3 We disagree.
We first set forth the standard of review pertaining to a motion to suppress. “, [our review is plenary, and] we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the court's memorandum of decision․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pierre, 277 Conn. 42, 92, 890 A.2d 474, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1197, 126 S.Ct. 2873, 165 L.Ed.2d 904 (2006).
A
We first address the defendant's fourth amendment argument. The defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his juvenile offender fingerprint records released by the FBI, as conferred by § 54–76l.4 We disagree.
“The touchstone to determining whether a person has [the ability] to contest an allegedly illegal search is whether that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the invaded place․ Absent such an expectation, the subsequent police action has no constitutional ramifications․ In order to meet this [threshold inquiry] ․ a two-part subjective/objective test must be satisfied: (1) whether the [person contesting the search] manifested a subjective expectation of privacy with respect to [the information searched]; and (2) whether that expectation [is] one that society would consider reasonable․ This determination is made on a case-by-case basis․ Whether a defendant's actual expectation of privacy ․ is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable involves a fact-specific inquiry into all the relevant circumstances․ Furthermore, [t]he defendant bears the burden of establishing the facts necessary to demonstrate a basis for standing․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kalphat, 285 Conn. 367,374–75, 939 A.2d 1165 (2008).
Section 54–76l controls the confidentiality of youth offender records. The defendant relies on the part of the statute that provides, inter alia, that “[t]he records or other information of a youth ․ including fingerprints, photographs and physical descriptions, shall be confidential and shall not be open to public inspection or be disclosed except as provided in this section ․“5 General Statutes § 54–76l (a). Section 54–76l read in its entirety, however, does not apply to federal agencies, and therefore does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the defendant's fingerprint records held by the FBI.
As a state law, the confidentiality restrictions under § 54–76l do not extend to those records held by the FBI because no language in the statute provides for that extension. “When construing a statute ․.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Adams, 308 Conn. 263, 270, 63 A.3d 934 (2013).
The text of § 54–76l is not ambiguous as to its applicability to federal agencies. The text explicitly states that only “fingerprints ․ submitted to the State Police Bureau of Identification” shall be considered confidential. (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 54–76l (a). Nowhere in the text of the statute is there mention of any applicability to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The defendant has not demonstrated any textual evidence of such, and we therefore decline to read an ambiguity into the statute. We thus conclude that the court did not violate the defendant's fourth amendment rights when it denied his motion to suppress.6
B
We next turn to the defendant's procedural due process argument.7 The defendant argues that language of our Supreme Court conferring procedural due process rights on juvenile offender status; see State v. B.B., 300 Conn. 748, 17 A.3d 30 (2011); State v. Angel C., 245 Conn. 93, 715 A.2d 652 (1998); State v. Matos, 240 Conn. 743, 694 A.2d 775 (1997); results in his having a vested liberty interest in the confidentiality of his fingerprint records. The defendant argues that, pursuant to that liberty interest, procedural due process necessitates that the police obtain a court order to gain access to his fingerprint records, as prescribed by § 54–76l. He also argues that due process required that the police provide him with notice that his records were being sought and an opportunity to contest the search. We find all of these arguments unavailing.
“In reviewing a procedural due process claim, we must first determine whether a protected liberty or property interest is involved. If it is, then we must determine the nature and extent of the process due․” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barros v. Barros, 309 Conn. 499,508, 72A.3d367 (2013). Only if a liberty interest is established, then, “[w]hether the defendant's rights to due process were violated is governed by the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).” Frauenglass & Associates, LLC v. Enagbare, 149 Conn.App. 103, 110, 88 A.3d 1246 (2014). We conclude that the defendant had no liberty interest in his juvenile fingerprint records. Our Supreme Court has noted that “[a]ny [special treatment] accorded to a juvenile because of his [or her] age with respect to proceedings relative to a criminal offense results from statutory authority, rather from any inherent or constitutional right. ” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. B.B., supra, 300 Conn. at 752–53; State v. Angel C., supra, 245 Conn. at 104. The mere mention of talismanic language such as “confidentiality,” even when coupled with a procedure for disclosure to the public, does not create a constitutional right.
Although our Supreme Court has recognized confidentiality from public disclosure as one of the benefits granted as part of juvenile offender status; see, e.g., State v. B.B., supra, 300 Conn. at 754; State v. Fernandez, 300 Conn. 104, 123, 12 A.3d 925 (2011); it has never recognized that a liberty interest exists in maintaining the confidentiality of fingerprint records. The United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the Connecticut appellate courts have similarly not addressed whether such an interest exists. Those few other jurisdictions that have examined the confidentiality of juvenile records have uniformly rejected the notion of a liberty interest in those records. See, e.g., United States v. T.E.S., United States Court of Appeals, Docket No. 98–4423, 1998 WL 774144, *3 (4th Cir. November 6, 1998) (rejecting procedural due process interest in confidential juvenile records) (decision without published opinion, 165 F.3d 913 [4th Cir.1998] ); United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir.1981) (same), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 923, 102 S.Ct. 1282, 71 L.Ed.2d 465 (1982); Doe v. Madison, Docket No. 3:09–CV–2005 (JCH), 2010 WL 3829186, *7 (D.Conn. September 22, 2010) (same). We find the analysis set forth in these decisions convincing.
A conferral of confidentiality by statute does not create a liberty interest in the continuity of that confidentiality. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted that “[t]he simple fact that state law prescribes certain procedures does not mean that the procedures thereby [ac]quire a federal constitutional dimension.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Jiles, supra, at 658 F.2d 200. Section 54–76l, although a “safeguard ․ helpful to the state in ensuring that such records [will] not be released to the general public, [does] not create a [due process] interest on behalf” of the defendant. Id.
This reasoning is particularly compelling, given the specific procedural due process that our Supreme Court has provided juvenile offenders. Our Supreme Court has articulated that only the designation of “juvenile offender” status was a liberty interest subject to due process. “[I]f a statute vests a juvenile with the right to juvenile status, then that right constitutes a liberty interest, of which the juvenile may not be deprived without due process; i.e., notice and a hearing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. B.B