often suffer greatly without any moral improvement. This very old
argument from the existence of suffering against the existence of an
intelligent First Cause seems to me a strong one; whereas, as just
remarked, the presence of much suffering agrees well with the view that
all organic beings have been developed through variation and natural
selection.

At the present day, the most usual argument for the existence of an
intelligent God is drawn from the deep inward conviction and feelings
which are experienced by most persons.

Formerly I was led by feelings such as those just referred to (although
I do not think that the religious sentiment was ever strongly developed
in me), to the firm conviction of the existence of God and of the
immortality of the soul. In my Journal I wrote that whilst standing in
the midst of the grandeur of a Brazilian forest, "it is not possible to
give an adequate idea of the higher feelings of wonder, admiration, and
devotion, which fill and elevate the mind." I well remember my
conviction that there is more in man than the mere breath of his body.
But now the grandest scenes would not cause any such convictions and
feelings to rise in my mind. It may be truly said that I am like a man
who has become color-blind, and the universal belief by men of the
existence of redness makes my present loss of perception of not the
least value as evidence. This argument would be a valid one if all men
of all races had the same inward conviction of the existence of one God;
but we know that this is very far from being the case. Therefore I
cannot see that such inward convictions and feelings are of any weight
as evidence of what really exists. The state of mind which grand scenes
formerly excited in me, and which was intimately connected with a belief
in God, did not essentially differ from that which is often called the
sense of sublimity; and however difficult it may be to explain the
genesis of this sense, it can hardly be advanced as an argument for the
existence of God, any more than the powerful though vague and similar
feelings excited by music.

With respect to immortality, nothing shows me [so clearly] how strong
and almost instinctive a belief it is, as the consideration of the view
now held by most physicists, namely, that the sun with all the planets
will in time grow too cold for life, unless indeed some great body
dashes into the sun, and thus gives it fresh life. Believing as I do
that man in the distant future will be a far more perfect creature than
he now is, it is an intolerable thought that he and all other sentient
beings are doomed to complete annihilation after such long-continued
slow progress. To those who fully admit the immortality of the human
soul, the destruction of our world will not appear so dreadful.

Another source of conviction in the existence of God, connected with the
reason, and not with the feelings, impresses me as having much more
weight. This follows from the extreme difficulty or rather impossibility
of conceiving this immense and wonderful universe, including man, with
his capacity of looking far backward and far into futurity, as the
result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting I feel
compelled to look to a First Cause, having an intelligent mind in some
degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist.
This conclusion was strong in my mind about the time, as far as I can
remember, when I wrote the 'Origin of Species'; and it is since that
time that it has very gradually, with many fluctuations, become weaker.
But then arises the doubt: Can the mind of man, which has, as I fully
believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the
lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions?

I cannot pretend to throw the least light on such abstruse problems. The
mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us; and I for one
must be content to remain an Agnostic.


C. DARWIN TO MISS JULIA WEDGWOOD: ON DESIGN

From 'Life and Letters'


     July 11th [1861].

Some one has sent us 'Macmillan,' and I must tell you how much I admire
your article; though at the same time I must confess that I could not
clearly follow you in some parts, which probably is in main part due to
my not being at all accustomed to metaphysical trains of thought. I
think that you understand my book perfectly, and that I find a very rare
event with my critics. The ideas in the last page have several times
vaguely crossed my mind. Owing to several correspondents I have been led
lately to think, or rather to try to think, over some of the chief
points discussed by you. But the result has been with me a
maze--something like thinking on the origin of evil, to which you
allude. The mind refuses to look at this universe, being what it is,
without having been designed; yet where one would most expect
design,--viz., in the structure of a sentient being,--the more I think
on the subject, the less I can see proof of design. Asa Gray and some
others look at each variation, or at least at each beneficial variation
(which A. Gray would compare with the rain-drops which do not fall on
the sea, but on to the land to fertilize it), as having been
providentially designed. Yet when I asked him whether he looks at each
variation in the rock-pigeon, by which man has made by accumulation a
pouter or fantail pigeon, as providentially designed for man's
amusement, he does not know what to answer; and if he or any one admits
[that] these variations are accidental, as far as purpose is concerned
(of course not accidental as to their cause or origin), then I can see
no reason why he should rank the accumulated variations by which the
beautifully adapted woodpecker has been formed, as providentially
designed. For it would be easy to imagine the enlarged crop of the
pouter, or tail of the fantail, as of some use to birds in a state of
nature, having peculiar habits of life. These are the considerations
which perplex me about design; but whether you will care to hear them, I
know not....

[On the subject of design, he wrote (July 1860) to Dr. Gray:--]

One word more on "designed laws" and "undesigned results." I see a bird
which I want for food, take my gun and kill it; I do this _designedly_.
An innocent and good man stands under a tree and is killed by a flash of
lightning. Do you believe (and I really should like to hear) that God
_designedly_ killed this man? Many or most persons do believe this; I
can't and don't. If you believe so, do you believe that when a swallow
snaps up a gnat, that God designed that that particular swallow should
snap up that particular gnat at that particular instant? I believe that
the man and the gnat are in the same predicament. If the death of
neither man nor gnat is designed, I see no good reason to believe that
their _first_ birth or production should be necessarily designed.


CORRESPONDENCE

From 'The Life and Letters'

C. DARWIN TO J.D. HOOKER

     DOWN, February 24th [1863].

     _My Dear Hooker:_

I am astonished at your note. I have not seen the Athenaeum, but I have
sent for it, and may get it to-morrow; and will then say what I think.

I have read Lyell's book ['The Antiquity of Man']. The whole certainly
struck me as a compilation, but of the highest class; for when possible
the facts have been verified on the spot, making it almost an original
work. The Glacial chapters seem to me best, and in parts magnificent. I
could hardly judge about Man, as all the gloss of novelty was completely
worn off. But certainly the aggregation of the evidence produced a very
striking effect on my mind. The chapter comparing language and changes
of species seems most ingenious and interesting. He has shown great
skill in picking out salient points in the argument for change of
species; but I am deeply disappointed (I do not mean personally) to find
that his timidity prevents him giving any judgment.... From all my
communications with him, I must ever think that he has really entirely
lost faith in the immutability of species; and yet one of his strongest
sentences is nearly as follows: "If it should _ever_ be rendered highly
probable that species change by variation and natural selection," etc.,
etc. I had hoped he would have guided the public as far as his own
belief went.... One thing does please me on this subject, that he seems
to appreciate your work. No doubt the public or a part may be induced to
think that as he gives to us a larger space than to Lamarck, he must
think there is something in our views. When reading the brain chapter,
it struck me forcibly that if he had said openly that he believed in
change of species, and