 was the lack of available credit for small businesses, with plenty of anecdotal evidence. This goes along with the surveys by the National Federation of Independent Businesses, which continue to show a difficult credit market.
It is not just that taxes will go from 35% to just under 40%. It is the increase in Medicare taxes coming down the pike, too. We are taking money from private hands, where it has the potential to increase productivity, and putting it into government hands, where it will do nothing for growth of the economy. There is no multiplier for government spending. And tax increases reduce potential GDP by a multiplier of at least one and maybe three, depending on which study you want to cite.
I understand that taxes have to go up. I get it. But we would be better off having a discussion of where we want to tax dollars to come from before we risk hurting an economy that will barely be growing at 2% in the 4th quarter, and may be well below that. It is the increase in taxes that has me concerned about a double-dip recession.
That being said, the announcement by several prominent Democratic senators that they think we should extend the Bush tax cuts is significant. As I said a few weeks ago, we should not experience a double-dip recession absent policy mistakes. A slow-growth world, yes. But an actual double dip is rare.
If Congress were to extend the Bush tax cuts for at least a year, until the presidential commission on taxes is done with its work and THEN have the debate, it would make me far more optimistic. And it would be quite bullish for stocks, I think. Businesses would know how to plan, at least, for a year, and the economy would be given more time to actually recover. I am not ready to channel my inner Larry Kudlow, but from what we see this summer it would make me more optimistic and reduce the chances of a double-dip recession significantly.
There are two types of major economic puzzle pieces.
The second type is what I think of as "balancing trends," or trends that are not inevitable but which, if they come about, will have significant implications. If you place that piece into the puzzle, it too changes the shape of all the pieces of the puzzle around it. And in the economic super-trend puzzle, it can change the shape of other pieces in ways that are not clear.
Deflation is in the latter category. I have often said that when you become a Federal Reserve Bank governor, you are taken into a back room and are given a DNA transplant that makes you viscerally and at all times opposed to deflation. Deflation is a major economic game changer. You can argue, as Gary Shilling does, that there is a good kind of deflation, where rising productivity and other such good things produces a general fall in prices, such as we had in the late 19th century. We have experienced that in the world of technology, where we view it as normal that the price of a computer will fall, even as its quality rises over time.
But that is not the kind of deflation we face today. We face the deflation of the Depression era, and central bankers of the world are united in opposition. As PIMCO Managing Director Paul McCulley quipped to me this spring, when I asked him if he was concerned about inflation, with all the stimulus and printing of money we were facing, "John," he said, "you better hope they can cause some inflation." And he is right. If we don't have a problem with inflation in the future, we are going to have far worse problems to deal with.
Just as every school child knows that water is formed by the two elements of hydrogen and oxygen in a very simple combination we all know as H2O, so deflation has its own elements of composition. Let's look at some of them (in no particular order).
First, there is excess production capacity. It is hard to have pricing power when your competition also has more capacity than he wants, so he prices his product as low as he can to make a profit, but also to get the sale. The world is awash in excess capacity now. Eventually we either grow the economy to utilize that capacity or it will be taken offline through bankruptcy, a reduction in capacity (as when businesses lay off employees), or businesses simply exiting their industries.
I could load the rest of this post with charts showing how low world capacity utilization is, but let's just take one graph, from the U.S. Notice that capacity utilization is roughly in an area that we associate with the bottom of past recessions (with one exception).
As an aside, the European bank stress tests were a joke. They assumed no sovereign debt default. Evidently the thought of Greece not paying its debt is just not in the realm of their thinking. There were other deficiencies as well, but that is the most glaring. European banks are still a concern unless the ECB goes ahead and buys all that sovereign debt from the banks, getting it off their balance sheets.
Falling home prices and a weak housing market are one more element of deflation. This is happening not just in the U.S., but also much of Europe is suffering a real estate crisis. Japan has seen its real estate market fall almost 90% in some cities, and that is part of the reason they have had 20 years with no job growth, and that the nominal GDP is where it was 17 years ago.
Finally, high and chronic unemployment is deflationary. It reduces final demand as people simply don't have the money to buy things. Deflation that comes from increased productivity is desirable. In the late 1800's the U.S. went through an almost 30-year period of deflation that saw massive improvements in agriculture (the McCormick reaper, etc.) and the ability of producers to get their products to markets through railroads. In fact, too many railroads were built and a number of the companies that built them collapsed. Just as we experienced with the fiber-optic cable build-out, there was soon too much railroad capacity, and freight prices fell. That was bad for the shareholders but good for consumers. It was a time of great economic growth.
One final thought before I hit the send button. Recessions are by definition deflationary. One of the things we learned from This Time is Different by Rogoff and Reinhart is that economies are more fragile and volatile and that recessions are more frequent after a credit crisis. Further, spending cuts are better than tax increases at improving the health of an economy after a credit crisis.
We need to think any tax increase through very thoroughly.
Getting back to what happened in 2008, when the markets hit the skids, the government reacted by increasing the money supply; just as they did after the 1987 crash, the Long Term Capital Management crisis, the dot-com crash, 9/11, and the sub-prime crash. But unlike any of those instances, the money supply kept shrinking and prices kept deflating (notwithstanding the price of a few items).
Will we ever see inflation? If we're talking about the next 5 to 10 years, the deflationists don't think so. They point to the rise in the bond market and the relatively strong performance of the US dollar. While the inflationists -- licking their wounds after being wrong for years -- believe they will be right eventually. My view is that both camps are basically wrong.
Understand Price Discovery, or lack of it.
Price Discovery -- the result of buyers and sellers simultaneously transacting in the market with the result being Adam Smith's 'Invisible Hand' -- means goods and services move around in the economy at mutually advantageous prices for all. It also means that everyone holding similar items have a benchmark or 'price signal' that tells them what these items are worth.
It is my thesis that the inflation, deflation debate is flawed because we no longer have reliable price signals. The overwhelming domination of program trading on various exchanges has fundamentally changed the way prices are created and represented in the economy. All 'efficient market' theories are dead.
In place of reliable price signals (based on the supply and demand of buying and selling) we have price signals that are generated by computer algorithms; i.e., computers executing program trading, high frequency trading and algorithmic trading -- that account for up to 70% of the trading activity on the NYSE (or 100%, if you consider any shares traded -- not involved in program trading -- can't buck the pricing monopoly of the computers).
Program traders have a virtually infinite line of credit, pay virtually zero commissions, and are backed by banks on Wall St. with strong political connections who are ready to bail out any losing bets these computers make. Plus, the computers are able to do something normal buyers and sellers can't do. They can pick a price they want a security to trade at and then fill in all the necessary trading volume needed to get the price of the security to that point. In other words, you can program computers to rig markets.
In this new rigged market capitalist model, the corrupt bank picks the price it wants a security to trade at and the computers buy and sell with each other until that price is reached; thus providing an audit trail of trades that looks on the surface like actual price discovery. And each price manufactured by computers generates a reaction price in every other security and commodity as the rigged market price signal ripples throughout the interconnected securities market around the world.
What's being masked is that the actual supply of money in the system is falling. The major measures of money supply have all turned down. Credit has evaporated. The velocity of the multiplier effect of fractional reserve lending has disappeared. The volume of fake trades is inflating while the actual supply of money and credit is deflating. In place of an exchange where buyers and sellers transact with each other to