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2 Responses to “Best Broker Ratings From Barron’s 2007”
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Nice post mate.Michel Pêcheux and disidentification. Pêcheux, a student of Althusser’s, was not alone in finding that his teacher did not offer a clear enough account of how the conditions for a critical practice as a “science” of ideology arose for the (always, thus already, subjugated) individual. For many, it seemed that Althusser’s emphasis on the institutional nature of subject formation via ideological state apparatuses allowed too little room for vigorous rejection of the subject-forming hail.
As many commentators have pointed out, one of the most perplexing aspects of Althusser’s formulations on ideology is the absence of an elaborated stance regarding the possibilities for the realization of a resistant or counter-hegemonic politic at the level of the text-subject encounter. How to succeed in making “common sense” uncommon? (Montgomery and Allen n.pag.)
Given the determining force of Althusser’s ideological state apparatuses, how can the subject gain insight into the manner in which his ideology goes about “naturalizing” or making self-evident (cf. the x-buddhist claim on things as they are) its portrayal of the world? Another way of asking the same question is: how is a change of subjective view possible? Pêcheux offers three means for answering this question. His first step is to de-reify the process of subject formation by recognizing the possibility of contradiction and resistance inherent within that process. Our ideological apparatuses, in other words, are the site of both formation and de-formation. Second, drawing on Lacan, he emphasizes the role that language and other symbolic systems play in the formation (and de-formation) of subjectivity. Third, he articulates the three decisive ways of positioning oneself within those structures. We can look at these points a little closer by concentrating of the final one. I will discuss it in terms of x-buddhist subject formation.
As I mentioned earlier, non-buddhism is concerned with cultural criticism in the present. So, when I speak of “the x-buddhist subject,” I mean a specific re-fashioning of a contemporary westerner. Such a person comes to x-buddhism as an already-formed subject of some other kind. Encountering the x-buddhist symbolic system (words, expressions, theses, beliefs, propositions, prescriptions, axioms, mythos, narratives, etc.), the person is convinced, to some degree, of the naturalness and inevitability of the x-buddhist doctrines. For Pêcheux, this moment of consent characterizes “the effectivity of hegemonic ideology” or “the ‘winning out’ of the reproduction of social divisions over their transformation” (Montgomery and Allen n.pag.). The person now identifies with x-buddhism.. Identification is thus the first manner in which an individual can position himself in relation to x-buddhist ideology. The individual who identifies with x-buddhism is, moreover, the “good” subject.
It would appear that this relation [i.e., identification] provides “already available” subject positions for the good subject who, realizing his or her subjection in the form of the “freely consented to,” “spontaneously” assumes the position offered by the universal Subject “in all liberty” (Pêcheux 114, 156). This subject accepts the image of self [that is] projected by the dominant discourse. (Montgomery and Allen n.pag.)
Such spontaneous identification, however, may be threatened by the individual’s recognition of contradiction. He begins to question the supposed naturalness or self-evidence of the community’s interpretive categories. We now have, then, the potential of a subject who rejects the self that is prescribed—and indeed naturalized—in x-buddhist discourse. Pêcheux names this position within the ideology counter-identification. From the perspective of the community, the subject who thus opposes its claims is the “bad” subject. He is the “trouble-making” subject, who calls into question the very foundation of the community’s ideology as natural and self-evident. Insight into contradiction may be more specific, too. In terms of x-buddhism, this may mean to challenge the historical grounds on which the Buddha’s authority is assumed; the reliability of the canonical literature; the efficacy of the rituals; the relevance of the teacher’s “wisdom” for contemporary life; the coherency of the central x-buddhist narrative, and so on. Because he takes a purely oppositional stance within the x-buddhist community, the “bad” subject, in an important if paradoxical sense, nonetheless perpetuates the power of the dominating x-buddhist ideology. That is to say, he lets stand the dominant ideology that informs the community. He does not attempt to construct an alternative to it, and certainly not from it.
The discourse of what then becomes a bad subject “turns against” the dominant identification, primarily by taking up a position that consists in initiating a separation, challenge or revolt against “what the ‘universal Subject’ gives him to think: a struggle against ideological evidentness on the terrain of that evidentness, an evidentness with a negative sign, reversed in its own terrain” (Pêcheux 157). That is, Pêcheux argues, the “trouble-making” subject does not recognize those meanings lived by the good subjects as being “obvious” or “natural,” but rather as achieved contradictorily; and therefore the identity on offer is refused.
The philosophical and political forms of a counter-discourse will then produce in the “bad” subject a counter-identification with the discursive formation imposed on him or her by interdiscourse, yet one where the evidentness of meaning remains complicit with it, in this case to be rejected. (Montgomery and Allen 1992 n.pag.)
The prefix “non” in non-buddhism does not signify brute opposition for precisely the reasons articulated above. An oppositional account of x-buddhism preserves the terms of x-buddhism’s symbolic system. It remains complicit in the “evidentness” of the x-buddhist symbolic system, though “with a negative sign, reversed in its own terrain.” So, counter-identification is incapable of creating a subject who is free from the shaping power of the x-buddhist apparatus. How, then, is such a “free” subject possible? Pêcheux’s answer is: through disidentification. The disidentified subject alone is able to enact the crucial distinction between subjugation by an ideology and what Althusser calls the critique or “science” of one’s ideology.
In his “Letter on Art in Reply to André Daspré,” in Lenin and Philosophy, Althusser draws a distinction between art and science that will be useful here. Art offers us perceptions that allude to the world. Science offers perceptions that know the world.
Art…does not give us a knowledge in the strict sense, it therefore does not replace knowledge (in the modern sense: scientific knowledge), but what it gives us does nevertheless maintain a certain specific relationship with knowledge. This relationship is not one of identity but one of difference. Let me explain. I believe that the peculiarity of art is to “make us see,” “make us perceive,” “make us feel” something which alludes to reality. If we take the case of the novel, Balzac or Solzhenitsyn, as you refer to them, they