Daily Papers

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret relative to fully adversarial environments. We study this problem in the context of variationally stable games (a class of continuous games which includes all convex-concave and monotone games), and when the players only have access to noisy estimates of their individual payoff gradients. If the noise is additive, the game-theoretic and purely adversarial settings enjoy similar regret guarantees; however, if the noise is multiplicative, we show that the learners can, in fact, achieve constant regret. We achieve this faster rate via an optimistic gradient scheme with learning rate separation -- that is, the method's extrapolation and update steps are tuned to different schedules, depending on the noise profile. Subsequently, to eliminate the need for delicate hyperparameter tuning, we propose a fully adaptive method that attains nearly the same guarantees as its non-adapted counterpart, while operating without knowledge of either the game or of the noise profile.

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous N-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population generative model", which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the N-player game. Instead, we show that N agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within mathcal{O}(varepsilon^{-2}) samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard O(1{N}) error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for N-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the N-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by N agents with finite sample guarantees.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

Robust reinforcement learning (RL) seeks to train policies that can perform well under environment perturbations or adversarial attacks. Existing approaches typically assume that the space of possible perturbations remains the same across timesteps. However, in many settings, the space of possible perturbations at a given timestep depends on past perturbations. We formally introduce temporally-coupled perturbations, presenting a novel challenge for existing robust RL methods. To tackle this challenge, we propose GRAD, a novel game-theoretic approach that treats the temporally-coupled robust RL problem as a partially-observable two-player zero-sum game. By finding an approximate equilibrium in this game, GRAD ensures the agent's robustness against temporally-coupled perturbations. Empirical experiments on a variety of continuous control tasks demonstrate that our proposed approach exhibits significant robustness advantages compared to baselines against both standard and temporally-coupled attacks, in both state and action spaces.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

The Shapley value is arguably the most popular approach for assigning a meaningful contribution value to players in a cooperative game, which has recently been used intensively in explainable artificial intelligence. The meaningfulness is due to axiomatic properties that only the Shapley value satisfies, which, however, comes at the expense of an exact computation growing exponentially with the number of agents. Accordingly, a number of works are devoted to the efficient approximation of the Shapley values, most of them revolve around the notion of an agent's marginal contribution. In this paper, we propose with SVARM and Stratified SVARM two parameter-free and domain-independent approximation algorithms based on a representation of the Shapley value detached from the notion of marginal contributions. We prove unmatched theoretical guarantees regarding their approximation quality and provide empirical results including synthetic games as well as common explainability use cases comparing ourselves with state-of-the-art methods.

We introduce the framework of performative reinforcement learning where the policy chosen by the learner affects the underlying reward and transition dynamics of the environment. Following the recent literature on performative prediction~Perdomo et. al., 2020, we introduce the concept of performatively stable policy. We then consider a regularized version of the reinforcement learning problem and show that repeatedly optimizing this objective converges to a performatively stable policy under reasonable assumptions on the transition dynamics. Our proof utilizes the dual perspective of the reinforcement learning problem and may be of independent interest in analyzing the convergence of other algorithms with decision-dependent environments. We then extend our results for the setting where the learner just performs gradient ascent steps instead of fully optimizing the objective, and for the setting where the learner has access to a finite number of trajectories from the changed environment. For both settings, we leverage the dual formulation of performative reinforcement learning and establish convergence to a stable solution. Finally, through extensive experiments on a grid-world environment, we demonstrate the dependence of convergence on various parameters e.g. regularization, smoothness, and the number of samples.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

We consider online learning in multi-player smooth monotone games. Existing algorithms have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games; (2) lacking the no-regret guarantee; (3) having only asymptotic or slow O(1{T}) last-iterate convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium. While the O(1{T}) rate is tight for a large class of algorithms including the well-studied extragradient algorithm and optimistic gradient algorithm, it is not optimal for all gradient-based algorithms. We propose the accelerated optimistic gradient (AOG) algorithm, the first doubly optimal no-regret learning algorithm for smooth monotone games. Namely, our algorithm achieves both (i) the optimal O(T) regret in the adversarial setting under smooth and convex loss functions and (ii) the optimal O(1{T}) last-iterate convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium in multi-player smooth monotone games. As a byproduct of the accelerated last-iterate convergence rate, we further show that each player suffers only an O(log T) individual worst-case dynamic regret, providing an exponential improvement over the previous state-of-the-art O(T) bound.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

Multiple types of inference are available for probabilistic graphical models, e.g., marginal, maximum-a-posteriori, and even marginal maximum-a-posteriori. Which one do researchers mean when they talk about ``planning as inference''? There is no consistency in the literature, different types are used, and their ability to do planning is further entangled with specific approximations or additional constraints. In this work we use the variational framework to show that, just like all commonly used types of inference correspond to different weightings of the entropy terms in the variational problem, planning corresponds exactly to a different set of weights. This means that all the tricks of variational inference are readily applicable to planning. We develop an analogue of loopy belief propagation that allows us to perform approximate planning in factored-state Markov decisions processes without incurring intractability due to the exponentially large state space. The variational perspective shows that the previous types of inference for planning are only adequate in environments with low stochasticity, and allows us to characterize each type by its own merits, disentangling the type of inference from the additional approximations that its practical use requires. We validate these results empirically on synthetic MDPs and tasks posed in the International Planning Competition.

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn epsilon-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound mathcal{O}(H(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where H is the length of the game, A_{X} and B_{Y} are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs mathcal{O}(H^2(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

In multi-goal Reinforcement Learning, an agent can share experience between related training tasks, resulting in better generalization for new tasks at test time. However, when the goal space has discontinuities and the reward is sparse, a majority of goals are difficult to reach. In this context, a curriculum over goals helps agents learn by adapting training tasks to their current capabilities. In this work we propose Stein Variational Goal Generation (SVGG), which samples goals of intermediate difficulty for the agent, by leveraging a learned predictive model of its goal reaching capabilities. The distribution of goals is modeled with particles that are attracted in areas of appropriate difficulty using Stein Variational Gradient Descent. We show that SVGG outperforms state-of-the-art multi-goal Reinforcement Learning methods in terms of success coverage in hard exploration problems, and demonstrate that it is endowed with a useful recovery property when the environment changes.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

We consider learning to play multiplayer imperfect-information games with simultaneous moves and large state-action spaces. Previous attempts to tackle such challenging games have largely focused on model-free learning methods, often requiring hundreds of years of experience to produce competitive agents. Our approach is based on model-based planning. We tackle the problem of partial observability by first building an (oracle) planner that has access to the full state of the environment and then distilling the knowledge of the oracle to a (follower) agent which is trained to play the imperfect-information game by imitating the oracle's choices. We experimentally show that planning with naive Monte Carlo tree search does not perform very well in large combinatorial action spaces. We therefore propose planning with a fixed-depth tree search and decoupled Thompson sampling for action selection. We show that the planner is able to discover efficient playing strategies in the games of Clash Royale and Pommerman and the follower policy successfully learns to implement them by training on a few hundred battles.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

Normal-form games (NFGs) are the fundamental model of strategic interaction. We study their representation using neural networks. We describe the inherent equivariance of NFGs -- any permutation of strategies describes an equivalent game -- as well as the challenges this poses for representation learning. We then propose the NfgTransformer architecture that leverages this equivariance, leading to state-of-the-art performance in a range of game-theoretic tasks including equilibrium-solving, deviation gain estimation and ranking, with a common approach to NFG representation. We show that the resulting model is interpretable and versatile, paving the way towards deep learning systems capable of game-theoretic reasoning when interacting with humans and with each other.

Existing theoretical studies on offline reinforcement learning (RL) mostly consider a dataset sampled directly from the target task. In practice, however, data often come from several heterogeneous but related sources. Motivated by this gap, this work aims at rigorously understanding offline RL with multiple datasets that are collected from randomly perturbed versions of the target task instead of from itself. An information-theoretic lower bound is derived, which reveals a necessary requirement on the number of involved sources in addition to that on the number of data samples. Then, a novel HetPEVI algorithm is proposed, which simultaneously considers the sample uncertainties from a finite number of data samples per data source and the source uncertainties due to a finite number of available data sources. Theoretical analyses demonstrate that HetPEVI can solve the target task as long as the data sources collectively provide a good data coverage. Moreover, HetPEVI is demonstrated to be optimal up to a polynomial factor of the horizon length. Finally, the study is extended to offline Markov games and offline robust RL, which demonstrates the generality of the proposed designs and theoretical analyses.

Learning the behavior of large agent populations is an important task for numerous research areas. Although the field of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has made significant progress towards solving these systems, solutions for many agents often remain computationally infeasible and lack theoretical guarantees. Mean Field Games (MFGs) address both of these issues and can be extended to Graphon MFGs (GMFGs) to include network structures between agents. Despite their merits, the real world applicability of GMFGs is limited by the fact that graphons only capture dense graphs. Since most empirically observed networks show some degree of sparsity, such as power law graphs, the GMFG framework is insufficient for capturing these network topologies. Thus, we introduce the novel concept of Graphex MFGs (GXMFGs) which builds on the graph theoretical concept of graphexes. Graphexes are the limiting objects to sparse graph sequences that also have other desirable features such as the small world property. Learning equilibria in these games is challenging due to the rich and sparse structure of the underlying graphs. To tackle these challenges, we design a new learning algorithm tailored to the GXMFG setup. This hybrid graphex learning approach leverages that the system mainly consists of a highly connected core and a sparse periphery. After defining the system and providing a theoretical analysis, we state our learning approach and demonstrate its learning capabilities on both synthetic graphs and real-world networks. This comparison shows that our GXMFG learning algorithm successfully extends MFGs to a highly relevant class of hard, realistic learning problems that are not accurately addressed by current MARL and MFG methods.

Most value function learning algorithms in reinforcement learning are based on the mean squared (projected) Bellman error. However, squared errors are known to be sensitive to outliers, both skewing the solution of the objective and resulting in high-magnitude and high-variance gradients. To control these high-magnitude updates, typical strategies in RL involve clipping gradients, clipping rewards, rescaling rewards, or clipping errors. While these strategies appear to be related to robust losses -- like the Huber loss -- they are built on semi-gradient update rules which do not minimize a known loss. In this work, we build on recent insights reformulating squared Bellman errors as a saddlepoint optimization problem and propose a saddlepoint reformulation for a Huber Bellman error and Absolute Bellman error. We start from a formalization of robust losses, then derive sound gradient-based approaches to minimize these losses in both the online off-policy prediction and control settings. We characterize the solutions of the robust losses, providing insight into the problem settings where the robust losses define notably better solutions than the mean squared Bellman error. Finally, we show that the resulting gradient-based algorithms are more stable, for both prediction and control, with less sensitivity to meta-parameters.

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility of regret minimization under the assumption that all parties adopt the same learning procedure. In this work, we present the first (to our knowledge) algorithm for learning in general-sum Markov games that provides sublinear regret guarantees when executed by all agents. The bounds we obtain are for swap regret, and thus, along the way, imply convergence to a correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm is decentralized, computationally efficient, and does not require any communication between agents. Our key observation is that online learning via policy optimization in Markov games essentially reduces to a form of weighted regret minimization, with unknown weights determined by the path length of the agents' policy sequence. Consequently, controlling the path length leads to weighted regret objectives for which sufficiently adaptive algorithms provide sublinear regret guarantees.

We investigate the challenge of parametrizing policies for reinforcement learning (RL) in high-dimensional continuous action spaces. Our objective is to develop a multimodal policy that overcomes limitations inherent in the commonly-used Gaussian parameterization. To achieve this, we propose a principled framework that models the continuous RL policy as a generative model of optimal trajectories. By conditioning the policy on a latent variable, we derive a novel variational bound as the optimization objective, which promotes exploration of the environment. We then present a practical model-based RL method, called Reparameterized Policy Gradient (RPG), which leverages the multimodal policy parameterization and learned world model to achieve strong exploration capabilities and high data efficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that our method can help agents evade local optima in tasks with dense rewards and solve challenging sparse-reward environments by incorporating an object-centric intrinsic reward. Our method consistently outperforms previous approaches across a range of tasks. Code and supplementary materials are available on the project page https://haosulab.github.io/RPG/

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

Policy optimization methods with function approximation are widely used in multi-agent reinforcement learning. However, it remains elusive how to design such algorithms with statistical guarantees. Leveraging a multi-agent performance difference lemma that characterizes the landscape of multi-agent policy optimization, we find that the localized action value function serves as an ideal descent direction for each local policy. Motivated by the observation, we present a multi-agent PPO algorithm in which the local policy of each agent is updated similarly to vanilla PPO. We prove that with standard regularity conditions on the Markov game and problem-dependent quantities, our algorithm converges to the globally optimal policy at a sublinear rate. We extend our algorithm to the off-policy setting and introduce pessimism to policy evaluation, which aligns with experiments. To our knowledge, this is the first provably convergent multi-agent PPO algorithm in cooperative Markov games.

We generalize gradient descent with momentum for optimization in differentiable games to have complex-valued momentum. We give theoretical motivation for our method by proving convergence on bilinear zero-sum games for simultaneous and alternating updates. Our method gives real-valued parameter updates, making it a drop-in replacement for standard optimizers. We empirically demonstrate that complex-valued momentum can improve convergence in realistic adversarial games - like generative adversarial networks - by showing we can find better solutions with an almost identical computational cost. We also show a practical generalization to a complex-valued Adam variant, which we use to train BigGAN to better inception scores on CIFAR-10.

In this paper, we extend mean-field Langevin dynamics to minimax optimization over probability distributions for the first time with symmetric and provably convergent updates. We propose mean-field Langevin averaged gradient (MFL-AG), a single-loop algorithm that implements gradient descent ascent in the distribution spaces with a novel weighted averaging, and establish average-iterate convergence to the mixed Nash equilibrium. We also study both time and particle discretization regimes and prove a new uniform-in-time propagation of chaos result which accounts for the dependency of the particle interactions on all previous distributions. Furthermore, we propose mean-field Langevin anchored best response (MFL-ABR), a symmetric double-loop algorithm based on best response dynamics with linear last-iterate convergence. Finally, we study applications to zero-sum Markov games and conduct simulations demonstrating long-term optimality.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the behaviors that agents learn in a single Markov Game (MG) are typically confined to the given agent number. Every single MG induced by varying the population may possess distinct optimal joint strategies and game-specific knowledge, which are modeled independently in modern multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms. In this work, our focus is on creating agents that can generalize across population-varying MGs. Instead of learning a unimodal policy, each agent learns a policy set comprising effective strategies across a variety of games. To achieve this, we propose Meta Representations for Agents (MRA) that explicitly models the game-common and game-specific strategic knowledge. By representing the policy sets with multi-modal latent policies, the game-common strategic knowledge and diverse strategic modes are discovered through an iterative optimization procedure. We prove that by approximately maximizing the resulting constrained mutual information objective, the policies can reach Nash Equilibrium in every evaluation MG when the latent space is sufficiently large. When deploying MRA in practical settings with limited latent space sizes, fast adaptation can be achieved by leveraging the first-order gradient information. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of MRA in improving training performance and generalization ability in challenging evaluation games.

Bayesian optimization (BO) is a powerful framework to optimize black-box expensive-to-evaluate functions via sequential interactions. In several important problems (e.g. drug discovery, circuit design, neural architecture search, etc.), though, such functions are defined over large combinatorial and unstructured spaces. This makes existing BO algorithms not feasible due to the intractable maximization of the acquisition function over these domains. To address this issue, we propose GameOpt, a novel game-theoretical approach to combinatorial BO. GameOpt establishes a cooperative game between the different optimization variables, and selects points that are game equilibria of an upper confidence bound acquisition function. These are stable configurations from which no variable has an incentive to deviate- analog to local optima in continuous domains. Crucially, this allows us to efficiently break down the complexity of the combinatorial domain into individual decision sets, making GameOpt scalable to large combinatorial spaces. We demonstrate the application of GameOpt to the challenging protein design problem and validate its performance on four real-world protein datasets. Each protein can take up to 20^{X} possible configurations, where X is the length of a protein, making standard BO methods infeasible. Instead, our approach iteratively selects informative protein configurations and very quickly discovers highly active protein variants compared to other baselines.

Value function factorization has achieved great success in multi-agent reinforcement learning by optimizing joint action-value functions through the maximization of factorized per-agent utilities. To ensure Individual-Global-Maximum property, existing works often focus on value factorization using monotonic functions, which are known to result in restricted representation expressiveness. In this paper, we analyze the limitations of monotonic factorization and present ConcaveQ, a novel non-monotonic value function factorization approach that goes beyond monotonic mixing functions and employs neural network representations of concave mixing functions. Leveraging the concave property in factorization, an iterative action selection scheme is developed to obtain optimal joint actions during training. It is used to update agents' local policy networks, enabling fully decentralized execution. The effectiveness of the proposed ConcaveQ is validated across scenarios involving multi-agent predator-prey environment and StarCraft II micromanagement tasks. Empirical results exhibit significant improvement of ConcaveQ over state-of-the-art multi-agent reinforcement learning approaches.

Learning to play optimally against any mixture over a diverse set of strategies is of important practical interests in competitive games. In this paper, we propose simplex-NeuPL that satisfies two desiderata simultaneously: i) learning a population of strategically diverse basis policies, represented by a single conditional network; ii) using the same network, learn best-responses to any mixture over the simplex of basis policies. We show that the resulting conditional policies incorporate prior information about their opponents effectively, enabling near optimal returns against arbitrary mixture policies in a game with tractable best-responses. We verify that such policies behave Bayes-optimally under uncertainty and offer insights in using this flexibility at test time. Finally, we offer evidence that learning best-responses to any mixture policies is an effective auxiliary task for strategic exploration, which, by itself, can lead to more performant populations.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has been shown effective for cooperative games in recent years. However, existing state-of-the-art methods face challenges related to sample complexity, training instability, and the risk of converging to a suboptimal Nash Equilibrium. In this paper, we propose a unified framework for learning stochastic policies to resolve these issues. We embed cooperative MARL problems into probabilistic graphical models, from which we derive the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) objective for MARL. Based on the MaxEnt framework, we propose Heterogeneous-Agent Soft Actor-Critic (HASAC) algorithm. Theoretically, we prove the monotonic improvement and convergence to quantal response equilibrium (QRE) properties of HASAC. Furthermore, we generalize a unified template for MaxEnt algorithmic design named Maximum Entropy Heterogeneous-Agent Mirror Learning (MEHAML), which provides any induced method with the same guarantees as HASAC. We evaluate HASAC on six benchmarks: Bi-DexHands, Multi-Agent MuJoCo, StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge, Google Research Football, Multi-Agent Particle Environment, and Light Aircraft Game. Results show that HASAC consistently outperforms strong baselines, exhibiting better sample efficiency, robustness, and sufficient exploration.

Learning in strategy games (e.g. StarCraft, poker) requires the discovery of diverse policies. This is often achieved by iteratively training new policies against existing ones, growing a policy population that is robust to exploit. This iterative approach suffers from two issues in real-world games: a) under finite budget, approximate best-response operators at each iteration needs truncating, resulting in under-trained good-responses populating the population; b) repeated learning of basic skills at each iteration is wasteful and becomes intractable in the presence of increasingly strong opponents. In this work, we propose Neural Population Learning (NeuPL) as a solution to both issues. NeuPL offers convergence guarantees to a population of best-responses under mild assumptions. By representing a population of policies within a single conditional model, NeuPL enables transfer learning across policies. Empirically, we show the generality, improved performance and efficiency of NeuPL across several test domains. Most interestingly, we show that novel strategies become more accessible, not less, as the neural population expands.

In this study, we explore the robustness of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) against Byzantine failures, where any agent can enact arbitrary, worst-case actions due to malfunction or adversarial attack. To address the uncertainty that any agent can be adversarial, we propose a Bayesian Adversarial Robust Dec-POMDP (BARDec-POMDP) framework, which views Byzantine adversaries as nature-dictated types, represented by a separate transition. This allows agents to learn policies grounded on their posterior beliefs about the type of other agents, fostering collaboration with identified allies and minimizing vulnerability to adversarial manipulation. We define the optimal solution to the BARDec-POMDP as an ex post robust Bayesian Markov perfect equilibrium, which we proof to exist and weakly dominates the equilibrium of previous robust MARL approaches. To realize this equilibrium, we put forward a two-timescale actor-critic algorithm with almost sure convergence under specific conditions. Experimentation on matrix games, level-based foraging and StarCraft II indicate that, even under worst-case perturbations, our method successfully acquires intricate micromanagement skills and adaptively aligns with allies, demonstrating resilience against non-oblivious adversaries, random allies, observation-based attacks, and transfer-based attacks.

Robustness against adversarial attacks and distribution shifts is a long-standing goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL). To this end, Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) trains a protagonist against destabilizing forces exercised by an adversary in a competitive zero-sum Markov game, whose optimal solution, i.e., rational strategy, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. However, finding Nash equilibria requires facing complex saddle point optimization problems, which can be prohibitive to solve, especially for high-dimensional control. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for adversarial RL based on entropy regularization to ease the complexity of the saddle point optimization problem. We show that the solution of this entropy-regularized problem corresponds to a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), a generalization of Nash equilibria that accounts for bounded rationality, i.e., agents sometimes play random actions instead of optimal ones. Crucially, the connection between the entropy-regularized objective and QRE enables free modulation of the rationality of the agents by simply tuning the temperature coefficient. We leverage this insight to propose our novel algorithm, Quantal Adversarial RL (QARL), which gradually increases the rationality of the adversary in a curriculum fashion until it is fully rational, easing the complexity of the optimization problem while retaining robustness. We provide extensive evidence of QARL outperforming RARL and recent baselines across several MuJoCo locomotion and navigation problems in overall performance and robustness.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

Finding the mixed Nash equilibria (MNE) of a two-player zero sum continuous game is an important and challenging problem in machine learning. A canonical algorithm to finding the MNE is the noisy gradient descent ascent method which in the infinite particle limit gives rise to the {\em Mean-Field Gradient Descent Ascent} (GDA) dynamics on the space of probability measures. In this paper, we first study the convergence of a two-scale Mean-Field GDA dynamics for finding the MNE of the entropy-regularized objective. More precisely we show that for each finite temperature (or regularization parameter), the two-scale Mean-Field GDA with a suitable {\em finite} scale ratio converges exponentially to the unique MNE without assuming the convexity or concavity of the interaction potential. The key ingredient of our proof lies in the construction of new Lyapunov functions that dissipate exponentially along the Mean-Field GDA. We further study the simulated annealing of the Mean-Field GDA dynamics. We show that with a temperature schedule that decays logarithmically in time the annealed Mean-Field GDA converges to the MNE of the original unregularized objective.

By incorporating regret minimization, double oracle methods have demonstrated rapid convergence to Nash Equilibrium (NE) in normal-form games and extensive-form games, through algorithms such as online double oracle (ODO) and extensive-form double oracle (XDO), respectively. In this study, we further examine the theoretical convergence rate and sample complexity of such regret minimization-based double oracle methods, utilizing a unified framework called Regret-Minimizing Double Oracle. Based on this framework, we extend ODO to extensive-form games and determine its sample complexity. Moreover, we demonstrate that the sample complexity of XDO can be exponential in the number of information sets |S|, owing to the exponentially decaying stopping threshold of restricted games. To solve this problem, we propose the Periodic Double Oracle (PDO) method, which has the lowest sample complexity among all existing double oracle methods, being only polynomial in |S|. Empirical evaluations on multiple poker and board games show that PDO achieves significantly faster convergence than previous double oracle algorithms and reaches a competitive level with state-of-the-art regret minimization methods.

Despite the great empirical success of deep reinforcement learning, its theoretical foundation is less well understood. In this work, we make the first attempt to theoretically understand the deep Q-network (DQN) algorithm (Mnih et al., 2015) from both algorithmic and statistical perspectives. In specific, we focus on a slight simplification of DQN that fully captures its key features. Under mild assumptions, we establish the algorithmic and statistical rates of convergence for the action-value functions of the iterative policy sequence obtained by DQN. In particular, the statistical error characterizes the bias and variance that arise from approximating the action-value function using deep neural network, while the algorithmic error converges to zero at a geometric rate. As a byproduct, our analysis provides justifications for the techniques of experience replay and target network, which are crucial to the empirical success of DQN. Furthermore, as a simple extension of DQN, we propose the Minimax-DQN algorithm for zero-sum Markov game with two players. Borrowing the analysis of DQN, we also quantify the difference between the policies obtained by Minimax-DQN and the Nash equilibrium of the Markov game in terms of both the algorithmic and statistical rates of convergence.

Variational inequalities in general and saddle point problems in particular are increasingly relevant in machine learning applications, including adversarial learning, GANs, transport and robust optimization. With increasing data and problem sizes necessary to train high performing models across various applications, we need to rely on parallel and distributed computing. However, in distributed training, communication among the compute nodes is a key bottleneck during training, and this problem is exacerbated for high dimensional and over-parameterized models. Due to these considerations, it is important to equip existing methods with strategies that would allow to reduce the volume of transmitted information during training while obtaining a model of comparable quality. In this paper, we present the first theoretically grounded distributed methods for solving variational inequalities and saddle point problems using compressed communication: MASHA1 and MASHA2. Our theory and methods allow for the use of both unbiased (such as Randk; MASHA1) and contractive (such as Topk; MASHA2) compressors. New algorithms support bidirectional compressions, and also can be modified for stochastic setting with batches and for federated learning with partial participation of clients. We empirically validated our conclusions using two experimental setups: a standard bilinear min-max problem, and large-scale distributed adversarial training of transformers.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

In this paper, we provide a general framework for studying multi-agent online learning problems in the presence of delays and asynchronicities. Specifically, we propose and analyze a class of adaptive dual averaging schemes in which agents only need to accumulate gradient feedback received from the whole system, without requiring any between-agent coordination. In the single-agent case, the adaptivity of the proposed method allows us to extend a range of existing results to problems with potentially unbounded delays between playing an action and receiving the corresponding feedback. In the multi-agent case, the situation is significantly more complicated because agents may not have access to a global clock to use as a reference point; to overcome this, we focus on the information that is available for producing each prediction rather than the actual delay associated with each feedback. This allows us to derive adaptive learning strategies with optimal regret bounds, even in a fully decentralized, asynchronous environment. Finally, we also analyze an "optimistic" variant of the proposed algorithm which is capable of exploiting the predictability of problems with a slower variation and leads to improved regret bounds.

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) has achieved great success in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Prevalent RLHF approaches are reward-based, following the Bradley-Terry (BT) model assumption, which may not fully capture the complexity of human preferences. In this paper, we explore RLHF under a general preference framework and approach it from a game-theoretic perspective. Specifically, we formulate the problem as a two-player game and propose a novel algorithm, iterative Nash policy optimization (INPO). The key idea is to let the policy play against itself via no-regret learning, thereby approximating the Nash policy. Unlike previous methods, INPO bypasses the need for estimating the expected win rate for individual responses, which typically incurs high computational or annotation costs. Instead, we introduce a new loss objective that is directly minimized over a preference dataset. We provide theoretical analysis for our approach and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments on various representative benchmarks. With an LLaMA-3-8B-based SFT model, INPO achieves a 41.5% length-controlled win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0 and a 38.3% win rate on Arena-Hard, showing substantial improvement over the state-of-the-art iterative algorithm [Dong et al., 2024] under the BT model assumption. Additionally, our ablation study highlights the benefits of incorporating KL regularization for response length control.

This work presents mixed variational flows (MixFlows), a new variational family that consists of a mixture of repeated applications of a map to an initial reference distribution. First, we provide efficient algorithms for i.i.d. sampling, density evaluation, and unbiased ELBO estimation. We then show that MixFlows have MCMC-like convergence guarantees when the flow map is ergodic and measure-preserving, and provide bounds on the accumulation of error for practical implementations where the flow map is approximated. Finally, we develop an implementation of MixFlows based on uncorrected discretized Hamiltonian dynamics combined with deterministic momentum refreshment. Simulated and real data experiments show that MixFlows can provide more reliable posterior approximations than several black-box normalizing flows, as well as samples of comparable quality to those obtained from state-of-the-art MCMC methods.

The categories of open learners (due to Fong, Spivak and Tuy\'eras) and open games (due to the present author, Ghani, Winschel and Zahn) bear a very striking and unexpected similarity. The purpose of this short note is to prove that there is a faithful symmetric monoidal functor from the former to the latter, which means that any supervised neural network (without feedback or other complicating features) can be seen as an open game in a canonical way. Roughly, each parameter is controlled by a different player, and the game's best response relation encodes the dynamics of gradient descent. We suggest paths for further work exploiting the link.

In many real-world multi-agent cooperative tasks, due to high cost and risk, agents cannot continuously interact with the environment and collect experiences during learning, but have to learn from offline datasets. However, the transition dynamics in the dataset of each agent can be much different from the ones induced by the learned policies of other agents in execution, creating large errors in value estimates. Consequently, agents learn uncoordinated low-performing policies. In this paper, we propose a framework for offline decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning, which exploits value deviation and transition normalization to deliberately modify the transition probabilities. Value deviation optimistically increases the transition probabilities of high-value next states, and transition normalization normalizes the transition probabilities of next states. They together enable agents to learn high-performing and coordinated policies. Theoretically, we prove the convergence of Q-learning under the altered non-stationary transition dynamics. Empirically, we show that the framework can be easily built on many existing offline reinforcement learning algorithms and achieve substantial improvement in a variety of multi-agent tasks.

The entropic fictitious play (EFP) is a recently proposed algorithm that minimizes the sum of a convex functional and entropy in the space of measures -- such an objective naturally arises in the optimization of a two-layer neural network in the mean-field regime. In this work, we provide a concise primal-dual analysis of EFP in the setting where the learning problem exhibits a finite-sum structure. We establish quantitative global convergence guarantees for both the continuous-time and discrete-time dynamics based on properties of a proximal Gibbs measure introduced in Nitanda et al. (2022). Furthermore, our primal-dual framework entails a memory-efficient particle-based implementation of the EFP update, and also suggests a connection to gradient boosting methods. We illustrate the efficiency of our novel implementation in experiments including neural network optimization and image synthesis.

A major barrier to deploying current machine learning models lies in their non-reliability to dataset shifts. To resolve this problem, most existing studies attempted to transfer stable information to unseen environments. Particularly, independent causal mechanisms-based methods proposed to remove mutable causal mechanisms via the do-operator. Compared to previous methods, the obtained stable predictors are more effective in identifying stable information. However, a key question remains: which subset of this whole stable information should the model transfer, in order to achieve optimal generalization ability? To answer this question, we present a comprehensive minimax analysis from a causal perspective. Specifically, we first provide a graphical condition for the whole stable set to be optimal. When this condition fails, we surprisingly find with an example that this whole stable set, although can fully exploit stable information, is not the optimal one to transfer. To identify the optimal subset under this case, we propose to estimate the worst-case risk with a novel optimization scheme over the intervention functions on mutable causal mechanisms. We then propose an efficient algorithm to search for the subset with minimal worst-case risk, based on a newly defined equivalence relation between stable subsets. Compared to the exponential cost of exhaustively searching over all subsets, our searching strategy enjoys a polynomial complexity. The effectiveness and efficiency of our methods are demonstrated on synthetic data and the diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease.

We present a novel variational framework for performing inference in (neural) stochastic differential equations (SDEs) driven by Markov-approximate fractional Brownian motion (fBM). SDEs offer a versatile tool for modeling real-world continuous-time dynamic systems with inherent noise and randomness. Combining SDEs with the powerful inference capabilities of variational methods, enables the learning of representative function distributions through stochastic gradient descent. However, conventional SDEs typically assume the underlying noise to follow a Brownian motion (BM), which hinders their ability to capture long-term dependencies. In contrast, fractional Brownian motion (fBM) extends BM to encompass non-Markovian dynamics, but existing methods for inferring fBM parameters are either computationally demanding or statistically inefficient. In this paper, building upon the Markov approximation of fBM, we derive the evidence lower bound essential for efficient variational inference of posterior path measures, drawing from the well-established field of stochastic analysis. Additionally, we provide a closed-form expression to determine optimal approximation coefficients. Furthermore, we propose the use of neural networks to learn the drift, diffusion and control terms within our variational posterior, leading to the variational training of neural-SDEs. In this framework, we also optimize the Hurst index, governing the nature of our fractional noise. Beyond validation on synthetic data, we contribute a novel architecture for variational latent video prediction,-an approach that, to the best of our knowledge, enables the first variational neural-SDE application to video perception.

Conventional federated learning frameworks suffer from several challenges including performance bottlenecks at the central aggregation server, data bias, poor model convergence, and exposure to model poisoning attacks, and limited trust in the centralized infrastructure. In the current paper, a novel game theory-based approach called pFedGame is proposed for decentralized federated learning, best suitable for temporally dynamic networks. The proposed algorithm works without any centralized server for aggregation and incorporates the problem of vanishing gradients and poor convergence over temporally dynamic topology among federated learning participants. The solution comprises two sequential steps in every federated learning round, for every participant. First, it selects suitable peers for collaboration in federated learning. Secondly, it executes a two-player constant sum cooperative game to reach convergence by applying an optimal federated learning aggregation strategy. Experiments performed to assess the performance of pFedGame in comparison to existing methods in decentralized federated learning have shown promising results with accuracy higher than 70% for heterogeneous data.

Offline reinforcement learning aims to train agents from pre-collected datasets. However, this comes with the added challenge of estimating the value of behaviors not covered in the dataset. Model-based methods offer a potential solution by training an approximate dynamics model, which then allows collection of additional synthetic data via rollouts in this model. The prevailing theory treats this approach as online RL in an approximate dynamics model, and any remaining performance gap is therefore understood as being due to dynamics model errors. In this paper, we analyze this assumption and investigate how popular algorithms perform as the learned dynamics model is improved. In contrast to both intuition and theory, if the learned dynamics model is replaced by the true error-free dynamics, existing model-based methods completely fail. This reveals a key oversight: The theoretical foundations assume sampling of full horizon rollouts in the learned dynamics model; however, in practice, the number of model-rollout steps is aggressively reduced to prevent accumulating errors. We show that this truncation of rollouts results in a set of edge-of-reach states at which we are effectively ``bootstrapping from the void.'' This triggers pathological value overestimation and complete performance collapse. We term this the edge-of-reach problem. Based on this new insight, we fill important gaps in existing theory, and reveal how prior model-based methods are primarily addressing the edge-of-reach problem, rather than model-inaccuracy as claimed. Finally, we propose Reach-Aware Value Learning (RAVL), a simple and robust method that directly addresses the edge-of-reach problem and hence - unlike existing methods - does not fail as the dynamics model is improved. Code open-sourced at: github.com/anyasims/edge-of-reach.

Despite the recent success of reinforcement learning in various domains, these approaches remain, for the most part, deterringly sensitive to hyper-parameters and are often riddled with essential engineering feats allowing their success. We consider the case of off-policy generative adversarial imitation learning, and perform an in-depth review, qualitative and quantitative, of the method. We show that forcing the learned reward function to be local Lipschitz-continuous is a sine qua non condition for the method to perform well. We then study the effects of this necessary condition and provide several theoretical results involving the local Lipschitzness of the state-value function. We complement these guarantees with empirical evidence attesting to the strong positive effect that the consistent satisfaction of the Lipschitzness constraint on the reward has on imitation performance. Finally, we tackle a generic pessimistic reward preconditioning add-on spawning a large class of reward shaping methods, which makes the base method it is plugged into provably more robust, as shown in several additional theoretical guarantees. We then discuss these through a fine-grained lens and share our insights. Crucially, the guarantees derived and reported in this work are valid for any reward satisfying the Lipschitzness condition, nothing is specific to imitation. As such, these may be of independent interest.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Compared to the wide array of advanced Monte Carlo methods supported by modern probabilistic programming languages (PPLs), PPL support for variational inference (VI) is less developed: users are typically limited to a predefined selection of variational objectives and gradient estimators, which are implemented monolithically (and without formal correctness arguments) in PPL backends. In this paper, we propose a more modular approach to supporting variational inference in PPLs, based on compositional program transformation. In our approach, variational objectives are expressed as programs, that may employ first-class constructs for computing densities of and expected values under user-defined models and variational families. We then transform these programs systematically into unbiased gradient estimators for optimizing the objectives they define. Our design enables modular reasoning about many interacting concerns, including automatic differentiation, density accumulation, tracing, and the application of unbiased gradient estimation strategies. Additionally, relative to existing support for VI in PPLs, our design increases expressiveness along three axes: (1) it supports an open-ended set of user-defined variational objectives, rather than a fixed menu of options; (2) it supports a combinatorial space of gradient estimation strategies, many not automated by today's PPLs; and (3) it supports a broader class of models and variational families, because it supports constructs for approximate marginalization and normalization (previously introduced only for Monte Carlo inference). We implement our approach in an extension to the Gen probabilistic programming system (genjax.vi, implemented in JAX), and evaluate on several deep generative modeling tasks, showing minimal performance overhead vs. hand-coded implementations and performance competitive with well-established open-source PPLs.

Most existing works focus on direct perturbations to the victim's state/action or the underlying transition dynamics to demonstrate the vulnerability of reinforcement learning agents to adversarial attacks. However, such direct manipulations may not be always realizable. In this paper, we consider a multi-agent setting where a well-trained victim agent nu is exploited by an attacker controlling another agent alpha with an adversarial policy. Previous models do not account for the possibility that the attacker may only have partial control over alpha or that the attack may produce easily detectable "abnormal" behaviors. Furthermore, there is a lack of provably efficient defenses against these adversarial policies. To address these limitations, we introduce a generalized attack framework that has the flexibility to model to what extent the adversary is able to control the agent, and allows the attacker to regulate the state distribution shift and produce stealthier adversarial policies. Moreover, we offer a provably efficient defense with polynomial convergence to the most robust victim policy through adversarial training with timescale separation. This stands in sharp contrast to supervised learning, where adversarial training typically provides only empirical defenses. Using the Robosumo competition experiments, we show that our generalized attack formulation results in much stealthier adversarial policies when maintaining the same winning rate as baselines. Additionally, our adversarial training approach yields stable learning dynamics and less exploitable victim policies.

For reinforcement learning systems to be widely adopted, their users must understand and trust them. We present a theoretical analysis of explaining reinforcement learning using Shapley values, following a principled approach from game theory for identifying the contribution of individual players to the outcome of a cooperative game. We call this general framework Shapley Values for Explaining Reinforcement Learning (SVERL). Our analysis exposes the limitations of earlier uses of Shapley values in reinforcement learning. We then develop an approach that uses Shapley values to explain agent performance. In a variety of domains, SVERL produces meaningful explanations that match and supplement human intuition.

Variational inequalities have recently attracted considerable interest in machine learning as a flexible paradigm for models that go beyond ordinary loss function minimization (such as generative adversarial networks and related deep learning systems). In this setting, the optimal O(1/t) convergence rate for solving smooth monotone variational inequalities is achieved by the Extra-Gradient (EG) algorithm and its variants. Aiming to alleviate the cost of an extra gradient step per iteration (which can become quite substantial in deep learning applications), several algorithms have been proposed as surrogates to Extra-Gradient with a single oracle call per iteration. In this paper, we develop a synthetic view of such algorithms, and we complement the existing literature by showing that they retain a O(1/t) ergodic convergence rate in smooth, deterministic problems. Subsequently, beyond the monotone deterministic case, we also show that the last iterate of single-call, stochastic extra-gradient methods still enjoys a O(1/t) local convergence rate to solutions of non-monotone variational inequalities that satisfy a second-order sufficient condition.

An obstacle to artificial general intelligence is set by continual learning of multiple tasks of different nature. Recently, various heuristic tricks, both from machine learning and from neuroscience angles, were proposed, but they lack a unified theory ground. Here, we focus on continual learning in single-layered and multi-layered neural networks of binary weights. A variational Bayesian learning setting is thus proposed, where the neural networks are trained in a field-space, rather than gradient-ill-defined discrete-weight space, and furthermore, weight uncertainty is naturally incorporated, and modulates synaptic resources among tasks. From a physics perspective, we translate the variational continual learning into Franz-Parisi thermodynamic potential framework, where previous task knowledge acts as a prior and a reference as well. We thus interpret the continual learning of the binary perceptron in a teacher-student setting as a Franz-Parisi potential computation. The learning performance can then be analytically studied with mean-field order parameters, whose predictions coincide with numerical experiments using stochastic gradient descent methods. Based on the variational principle and Gaussian field approximation of internal preactivations in hidden layers, we also derive the learning algorithm considering weight uncertainty, which solves the continual learning with binary weights using multi-layered neural networks, and performs better than the currently available metaplasticity algorithm. Our proposed principled frameworks also connect to elastic weight consolidation, weight-uncertainty modulated learning, and neuroscience inspired metaplasticity, providing a theory-grounded method for the real-world multi-task learning with deep networks.

We introduce a deterministic variational formulation for training Bayesian last layer neural networks. This yields a sampling-free, single-pass model and loss that effectively improves uncertainty estimation. Our variational Bayesian last layer (VBLL) can be trained and evaluated with only quadratic complexity in last layer width, and is thus (nearly) computationally free to add to standard architectures. We experimentally investigate VBLLs, and show that they improve predictive accuracy, calibration, and out of distribution detection over baselines across both regression and classification. Finally, we investigate combining VBLL layers with variational Bayesian feature learning, yielding a lower variance collapsed variational inference method for Bayesian neural networks.

Despite incredible advances, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Numerous approaches have been proposed to train robust networks both empirically and certifiably. However, most of them defend against only a single type of attack, while recent work takes steps forward in defending against multiple attacks. In this paper, to understand multi-target robustness, we view this problem as a bargaining game in which different players (adversaries) negotiate to reach an agreement on a joint direction of parameter updating. We identify a phenomenon named player domination in the bargaining game, namely that the existing max-based approaches, such as MAX and MSD, do not converge. Based on our theoretical analysis, we design a novel framework that adjusts the budgets of different adversaries to avoid any player dominance. Experiments on standard benchmarks show that employing the proposed framework to the existing approaches significantly advances multi-target robustness.

We study variance-dependent regret bounds for Markov decision processes (MDPs). Algorithms with variance-dependent regret guarantees can automatically exploit environments with low variance (e.g., enjoying constant regret on deterministic MDPs). The existing algorithms are either variance-independent or suboptimal. We first propose two new environment norms to characterize the fine-grained variance properties of the environment. For model-based methods, we design a variant of the MVP algorithm (Zhang et al., 2021a). We apply new analysis techniques to demonstrate that this algorithm enjoys variance-dependent bounds with respect to the norms we propose. In particular, this bound is simultaneously minimax optimal for both stochastic and deterministic MDPs, the first result of its kind. We further initiate the study on model-free algorithms with variance-dependent regret bounds by designing a reference-function-based algorithm with a novel capped-doubling reference update schedule. Lastly, we also provide lower bounds to complement our upper bounds.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

Stability guarantees are crucial when ensuring a fully autonomous robot does not take undesirable or potentially harmful actions. Unfortunately, global stability guarantees are hard to provide in dynamical systems learned from data, especially when the learned dynamics are governed by neural networks. We propose a novel methodology to learn neural contractive dynamical systems, where our neural architecture ensures contraction, and hence, global stability. To efficiently scale the method to high-dimensional dynamical systems, we develop a variant of the variational autoencoder that learns dynamics in a low-dimensional latent representation space while retaining contractive stability after decoding. We further extend our approach to learning contractive systems on the Lie group of rotations to account for full-pose end-effector dynamic motions. The result is the first highly flexible learning architecture that provides contractive stability guarantees with capability to perform obstacle avoidance. Empirically, we demonstrate that our approach encodes the desired dynamics more accurately than the current state-of-the-art, which provides less strong stability guarantees.

The dominant line of work in domain adaptation has focused on learning invariant representations using domain-adversarial training. In this paper, we interpret this approach from a game theoretical perspective. Defining optimal solutions in domain-adversarial training as a local Nash equilibrium, we show that gradient descent in domain-adversarial training can violate the asymptotic convergence guarantees of the optimizer, oftentimes hindering the transfer performance. Our analysis leads us to replace gradient descent with high-order ODE solvers (i.e., Runge-Kutta), for which we derive asymptotic convergence guarantees. This family of optimizers is significantly more stable and allows more aggressive learning rates, leading to high performance gains when used as a drop-in replacement over standard optimizers. Our experiments show that in conjunction with state-of-the-art domain-adversarial methods, we achieve up to 3.5% improvement with less than of half training iterations. Our optimizers are easy to implement, free of additional parameters, and can be plugged into any domain-adversarial framework.

We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal of the leader is to learn to minimize the cumulative regret based on the history of interactions. Differing from the traditional formulation of repeated Stackelberg games, we assume the follower is omniscient, with full knowledge of the true reward, and that they always best-respond to the leader's actions. We analyze the sample complexity of regret minimization in this repeated Stackelberg game. We show that depending on the reward structure, the existence of the omniscient follower may change the sample complexity drastically, from constant to exponential, even for linear cooperative Stackelberg games. This poses unique challenges for the learning process of the leader and the subsequent regret analysis.

Many policy optimization approaches in reinforcement learning incorporate a Kullback-Leilbler (KL) divergence to the previous policy, to prevent the policy from changing too quickly. This idea was initially proposed in a seminal paper on Conservative Policy Iteration, with approximations given by algorithms like TRPO and Munchausen Value Iteration (MVI). We continue this line of work by investigating a generalized KL divergence -- called the Tsallis KL divergence -- which use the q-logarithm in the definition. The approach is a strict generalization, as q = 1 corresponds to the standard KL divergence; q > 1 provides a range of new options. We characterize the types of policies learned under the Tsallis KL, and motivate when q >1 could be beneficial. To obtain a practical algorithm that incorporates Tsallis KL regularization, we extend MVI, which is one of the simplest approaches to incorporate KL regularization. We show that this generalized MVI(q) obtains significant improvements over the standard MVI(q = 1) across 35 Atari games.

Mirror descent value iteration (MDVI), an abstraction of Kullback-Leibler (KL) and entropy-regularized reinforcement learning (RL), has served as the basis for recent high-performing practical RL algorithms. However, despite the use of function approximation in practice, the theoretical understanding of MDVI has been limited to tabular Markov decision processes (MDPs). We study MDVI with linear function approximation through its sample complexity required to identify an varepsilon-optimal policy with probability 1-delta under the settings of an infinite-horizon linear MDP, generative model, and G-optimal design. We demonstrate that least-squares regression weighted by the variance of an estimated optimal value function of the next state is crucial to achieving minimax optimality. Based on this observation, we present Variance-Weighted Least-Squares MDVI (VWLS-MDVI), the first theoretical algorithm that achieves nearly minimax optimal sample complexity for infinite-horizon linear MDPs. Furthermore, we propose a practical VWLS algorithm for value-based deep RL, Deep Variance Weighting (DVW). Our experiments demonstrate that DVW improves the performance of popular value-based deep RL algorithms on a set of MinAtar benchmarks.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

Sequential learning with Gaussian processes (GPs) is challenging when access to past data is limited, for example, in continual and active learning. In such cases, errors can accumulate over time due to inaccuracies in the posterior, hyperparameters, and inducing points, making accurate learning challenging. Here, we present a method to keep all such errors in check using the recently proposed dual sparse variational GP. Our method enables accurate inference for generic likelihoods and improves learning by actively building and updating a memory of past data. We demonstrate its effectiveness in several applications involving Bayesian optimization, active learning, and continual learning.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

We address the challenge of exploration in reinforcement learning (RL) when the agent operates in an unknown environment with sparse or no rewards. In this work, we study the maximum entropy exploration problem of two different types. The first type is visitation entropy maximization previously considered by Hazan et al.(2019) in the discounted setting. For this type of exploration, we propose a game-theoretic algorithm that has mathcal{O}(H^3S^2A/varepsilon^2) sample complexity thus improving the varepsilon-dependence upon existing results, where S is a number of states, A is a number of actions, H is an episode length, and varepsilon is a desired accuracy. The second type of entropy we study is the trajectory entropy. This objective function is closely related to the entropy-regularized MDPs, and we propose a simple algorithm that has a sample complexity of order mathcal{O}(poly(S,A,H)/varepsilon). Interestingly, it is the first theoretical result in RL literature that establishes the potential statistical advantage of regularized MDPs for exploration. Finally, we apply developed regularization techniques to reduce sample complexity of visitation entropy maximization to mathcal{O}(H^2SA/varepsilon^2), yielding a statistical separation between maximum entropy exploration and reward-free exploration.

The choice of approximate posterior distribution is one of the core problems in variational inference. Most applications of variational inference employ simple families of posterior approximations in order to allow for efficient inference, focusing on mean-field or other simple structured approximations. This restriction has a significant impact on the quality of inferences made using variational methods. We introduce a new approach for specifying flexible, arbitrarily complex and scalable approximate posterior distributions. Our approximations are distributions constructed through a normalizing flow, whereby a simple initial density is transformed into a more complex one by applying a sequence of invertible transformations until a desired level of complexity is attained. We use this view of normalizing flows to develop categories of finite and infinitesimal flows and provide a unified view of approaches for constructing rich posterior approximations. We demonstrate that the theoretical advantages of having posteriors that better match the true posterior, combined with the scalability of amortized variational approaches, provides a clear improvement in performance and applicability of variational inference.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

We study a version of adversarial classification where an adversary is empowered to corrupt data inputs up to some distance varepsilon, using tools from variational analysis. In particular, we describe necessary conditions associated with the optimal classifier subject to such an adversary. Using the necessary conditions, we derive a geometric evolution equation which can be used to track the change in classification boundaries as varepsilon varies. This evolution equation may be described as an uncoupled system of differential equations in one dimension, or as a mean curvature type equation in higher dimension. In one dimension, and under mild assumptions on the data distribution, we rigorously prove that one can use the initial value problem starting from varepsilon=0, which is simply the Bayes classifier, in order to solve for the global minimizer of the adversarial problem for small values of varepsilon. In higher dimensions we provide a similar result, albeit conditional to the existence of regular solutions of the initial value problem. In the process of proving our main results we obtain a result of independent interest connecting the original adversarial problem with an optimal transport problem under no assumptions on whether classes are balanced or not. Numerical examples illustrating these ideas are also presented.

Effective macroeconomic policies play a crucial role in promoting economic growth and social stability. This paper models the optimal macroeconomic policy problem based on the Stackelberg Mean Field Game (SMFG), where the government acts as the leader in policy-making, and large-scale households dynamically respond as followers. This modeling method captures the asymmetric dynamic game between the government and large-scale households, and interpretably evaluates the effects of macroeconomic policies based on microfoundations, which is difficult for existing methods to achieve. We also propose a solution for SMFGs, incorporating pre-training on real data and a model-free Stackelberg mean-field reinforcement learning (SMFRL) algorithm, which operates independently of prior environmental knowledge and transitions. Our experimental results showcase the superiority of the SMFG method over other economic policies in terms of performance, efficiency-equity tradeoff, and SMFG assumption analysis. This paper significantly contributes to the domain of AI for economics by providing a powerful tool for modeling and solving optimal macroeconomic policies.

Designing control policies whose performance level is guaranteed to remain above a given threshold in a span of environments is a critical feature for the adoption of reinforcement learning (RL) in real-world applications. The search for such robust policies is a notoriously difficult problem, related to the so-called dynamic model of transition function uncertainty, where the environment dynamics are allowed to change at each time step. But in practical cases, one is rather interested in robustness to a span of static transition models throughout interaction episodes. The static model is known to be harder to solve than the dynamic one, and seminal algorithms, such as robust value iteration, as well as most recent works on deep robust RL, build upon the dynamic model. In this work, we propose to revisit the static model. We suggest an analysis of why solving the static model under some mild hypotheses is a reasonable endeavor, based on an equivalence with the dynamic model, and formalize the general intuition that robust MDPs can be solved by tackling a series of static problems. We introduce a generic meta-algorithm called IWOCS, which incrementally identifies worst-case transition models so as to guide the search for a robust policy. Discussion on IWOCS sheds light on new ways to decouple policy optimization and adversarial transition functions and opens new perspectives for analysis. We derive a deep RL version of IWOCS and demonstrate it is competitive with state-of-the-art algorithms on classical benchmarks.

The vast majority of Reinforcement Learning methods is largely impacted by the computation effort and data requirements needed to obtain effective estimates of action-value functions, which in turn determine the quality of the overall performance and the sample-efficiency of the learning procedure. Typically, action-value functions are estimated through an iterative scheme that alternates the application of an empirical approximation of the Bellman operator and a subsequent projection step onto a considered function space. It has been observed that this scheme can be potentially generalized to carry out multiple iterations of the Bellman operator at once, benefiting the underlying learning algorithm. However, till now, it has been challenging to effectively implement this idea, especially in high-dimensional problems. In this paper, we introduce iterated Q-Network (i-QN), a novel principled approach that enables multiple consecutive Bellman updates by learning a tailored sequence of action-value functions where each serves as the target for the next. We show that i-QN is theoretically grounded and that it can be seamlessly used in value-based and actor-critic methods. We empirically demonstrate the advantages of i-QN in Atari 2600 games and MuJoCo continuous control problems.

How can we perform efficient inference and learning in directed probabilistic models, in the presence of continuous latent variables with intractable posterior distributions, and large datasets? We introduce a stochastic variational inference and learning algorithm that scales to large datasets and, under some mild differentiability conditions, even works in the intractable case. Our contributions are two-fold. First, we show that a reparameterization of the variational lower bound yields a lower bound estimator that can be straightforwardly optimized using standard stochastic gradient methods. Second, we show that for i.i.d. datasets with continuous latent variables per datapoint, posterior inference can be made especially efficient by fitting an approximate inference model (also called a recognition model) to the intractable posterior using the proposed lower bound estimator. Theoretical advantages are reflected in experimental results.

Executing actions in a correlated manner is a common strategy for human coordination that often leads to better cooperation, which is also potentially beneficial for cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). However, the recent success of MARL relies heavily on the convenient paradigm of purely decentralized execution, where there is no action correlation among agents for scalability considerations. In this work, we introduce a Bayesian network to inaugurate correlations between agents' action selections in their joint policy. Theoretically, we establish a theoretical justification for why action dependencies are beneficial by deriving the multi-agent policy gradient formula under such a Bayesian network joint policy and proving its global convergence to Nash equilibria under tabular softmax policy parameterization in cooperative Markov games. Further, by equipping existing MARL algorithms with a recent method of differentiable directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), we develop practical algorithms to learn the context-aware Bayesian network policies in scenarios with partial observability and various difficulty. We also dynamically decrease the sparsity of the learned DAG throughout the training process, which leads to weakly or even purely independent policies for decentralized execution. Empirical results on a range of MARL benchmarks show the benefits of our approach.

Generating realistic time series data is important for many engineering and scientific applications. Existing work tackles this problem using generative adversarial networks (GANs). However, GANs are often unstable during training, and they can suffer from mode collapse. While variational autoencoders (VAEs) are known to be more robust to these issues, they are (surprisingly) less often considered for time series generation. In this work, we introduce Koopman VAE (KVAE), a new generative framework that is based on a novel design for the model prior, and that can be optimized for either regular and irregular training data. Inspired by Koopman theory, we represent the latent conditional prior dynamics using a linear map. Our approach enhances generative modeling with two desired features: (i) incorporating domain knowledge can be achieved by leverageing spectral tools that prescribe constraints on the eigenvalues of the linear map; and (ii) studying the qualitative behavior and stablity of the system can be performed using tools from dynamical systems theory. Our results show that KVAE outperforms state-of-the-art GAN and VAE methods across several challenging synthetic and real-world time series generation benchmarks. Whether trained on regular or irregular data, KVAE generates time series that improve both discriminative and predictive metrics. We also present visual evidence suggesting that KVAE learns probability density functions that better approximate empirical ground truth distributions.

Variational inference is becoming more and more popular for approximating intractable posterior distributions in Bayesian statistics and machine learning. Meanwhile, a few recent works have provided theoretical justification and new insights on deep neural networks for estimating smooth functions in usual settings such as nonparametric regression. In this paper, we show that variational inference for sparse deep learning retains the same generalization properties than exact Bayesian inference. In particular, we highlight the connection between estimation and approximation theories via the classical bias-variance trade-off and show that it leads to near-minimax rates of convergence for H\"older smooth functions. Additionally, we show that the model selection framework over the neural network architecture via ELBO maximization does not overfit and adaptively achieves the optimal rate of convergence.

The acute phase of the Covid-19 pandemic has made apparent the need for decision support based upon accurate epidemic modeling. This process is substantially hampered by under-reporting of cases and related data incompleteness issues. In this article we adopt the Bayesian paradigm and synthesize publicly available data via a discrete-time stochastic epidemic modeling framework. The models allow for estimating the total number of infections while accounting for the endemic phase of the pandemic. We assess the prediction of the infection rate utilizing mobility information, notably the principal components of the mobility data. We evaluate variational Bayes in this context and find that Hamiltonian Monte Carlo offers a robust inference alternative for such models. We elaborate upon vector analysis of the epidemic dynamics, thus enriching the traditional tools used for decision making. In particular, we show how certain 2-dimensional plots on the phase plane may yield intuitive information regarding the speed and the type of transmission dynamics. We investigate the potential of a two-stage analysis as a consequence of cutting feedback, for inference on certain functionals of the model parameters. Finally, we show that a point mass on critical parameters is overly restrictive and investigate informative priors as a suitable alternative.

Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.

Primal-dual safe RL methods commonly perform iterations between the primal update of the policy and the dual update of the Lagrange Multiplier. Such a training paradigm is highly susceptible to the error in cumulative cost estimation since this estimation serves as the key bond connecting the primal and dual update processes. We show that this problem causes significant underestimation of cost when using off-policy methods, leading to the failure to satisfy the safety constraint. To address this issue, we propose conservative policy optimization, which learns a policy in a constraint-satisfying area by considering the uncertainty in cost estimation. This improves constraint satisfaction but also potentially hinders reward maximization. We then introduce local policy convexification to help eliminate such suboptimality by gradually reducing the estimation uncertainty. We provide theoretical interpretations of the joint coupling effect of these two ingredients and further verify them by extensive experiments. Results on benchmark tasks show that our method not only achieves an asymptotic performance comparable to state-of-the-art on-policy methods while using much fewer samples, but also significantly reduces constraint violation during training. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZifanWu/CAL.

Recent evidence suggests that the use of generative artificial intelligence reduces the diversity of content produced. In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model to explore the downstream consequences of content homogeneity when producers use generative AI to compete with one another. At equilibrium, players indeed produce content that is less diverse than optimal. However, stronger competition mitigates homogeneity and induces more diverse production. Perhaps more surprisingly, we show that a generative AI model that performs well in isolation (i.e., according to a benchmark) may fail to do so when faced with competition, and vice versa. We validate our results empirically by using language models to play Scattergories, a word game in which players are rewarded for producing answers that are both correct and unique. We discuss how the interplay between competition and homogeneity has implications for the development, evaluation, and use of generative AI.

We present a general convergent class of reinforcement learning algorithms that is founded on two distinct principles: (1) mapping value estimates to a different space using arbitrary functions from a broad class, and (2) linearly decomposing the reward signal into multiple channels. The first principle enables incorporating specific properties into the value estimator that can enhance learning. The second principle, on the other hand, allows for the value function to be represented as a composition of multiple utility functions. This can be leveraged for various purposes, e.g. dealing with highly varying reward scales, incorporating a priori knowledge about the sources of reward, and ensemble learning. Combining the two principles yields a general blueprint for instantiating convergent algorithms by orchestrating diverse mapping functions over multiple reward channels. This blueprint generalizes and subsumes algorithms such as Q-Learning, Log Q-Learning, and Q-Decomposition. In addition, our convergence proof for this general class relaxes certain required assumptions in some of these algorithms. Based on our theory, we discuss several interesting configurations as special cases. Finally, to illustrate the potential of the design space that our theory opens up, we instantiate a particular algorithm and evaluate its performance on the Atari suite.

We develop a method of adapting the AlphaZero model to General Game Playing (GGP) that focuses on faster model generation and requires less knowledge to be extracted from the game rules. The dataset generation uses MCTS playing instead of self-play; only the value network is used, and attention layers replace the convolutional ones. This allows us to abandon any assumptions about the action space and board topology. We implement the method within the Regular Boardgames GGP system and show that we can build models outperforming the UCT baseline for most games efficiently.

Meta-learning algorithms are able to learn a new task using previously learned knowledge, but they often require a large number of meta-training tasks which may not be readily available. To address this issue, we propose a method for few-shot learning with fewer tasks, which we call MetaModulation. The key idea is to use a neural network to increase the density of the meta-training tasks by modulating batch normalization parameters during meta-training. Additionally, we modify parameters at various network levels, rather than just a single layer, to increase task diversity. To account for the uncertainty caused by the limited training tasks, we propose a variational MetaModulation where the modulation parameters are treated as latent variables. We also introduce learning variational feature hierarchies by the variational MetaModulation, which modulates features at all layers and can consider task uncertainty and generate more diverse tasks. The ablation studies illustrate the advantages of utilizing a learnable task modulation at different levels and demonstrate the benefit of incorporating probabilistic variants in few-task meta-learning. Our MetaModulation and its variational variants consistently outperform state-of-the-art alternatives on four few-task meta-learning benchmarks.

Learning sparse coordination graphs adaptive to the coordination dynamics among agents is a long-standing problem in cooperative multi-agent learning. This paper studies this problem and proposes a novel method using the variance of payoff functions to construct context-aware sparse coordination topologies. We theoretically consolidate our method by proving that the smaller the variance of payoff functions is, the less likely action selection will change after removing the corresponding edge. Moreover, we propose to learn action representations to effectively reduce the influence of payoff functions' estimation errors on graph construction. To empirically evaluate our method, we present the Multi-Agent COordination (MACO) benchmark by collecting classic coordination problems in the literature, increasing their difficulty, and classifying them into different types. We carry out a case study and experiments on the MACO and StarCraft II micromanagement benchmark to demonstrate the dynamics of sparse graph learning, the influence of graph sparseness, and the learning performance of our method. (The MACO benchmark and codes are publicly available at https://github.com/TonghanWang/CASEC-MACO-benchmark.)

Distributed and federated learning algorithms and techniques associated primarily with minimization problems. However, with the increase of minimax optimization and variational inequality problems in machine learning, the necessity of designing efficient distributed/federated learning approaches for these problems is becoming more apparent. In this paper, we provide a unified convergence analysis of communication-efficient local training methods for distributed variational inequality problems (VIPs). Our approach is based on a general key assumption on the stochastic estimates that allows us to propose and analyze several novel local training algorithms under a single framework for solving a class of structured non-monotone VIPs. We present the first local gradient descent-accent algorithms with provable improved communication complexity for solving distributed variational inequalities on heterogeneous data. The general algorithmic framework recovers state-of-the-art algorithms and their sharp convergence guarantees when the setting is specialized to minimization or minimax optimization problems. Finally, we demonstrate the strong performance of the proposed algorithms compared to state-of-the-art methods when solving federated minimax optimization problems.

Gaussian process state-space models (GPSSMs) provide a principled and flexible approach to modeling the dynamics of a latent state, which is observed at discrete-time points via a likelihood model. However, inference in GPSSMs is computationally and statistically challenging due to the large number of latent variables in the model and the strong temporal dependencies between them. In this paper, we propose a new method for inference in Bayesian GPSSMs, which overcomes the drawbacks of previous approaches, namely over-simplified assumptions, and high computational requirements. Our method is based on free-form variational inference via stochastic gradient Hamiltonian Monte Carlo within the inducing-variable formalism. Furthermore, by exploiting our proposed variational distribution, we provide a collapsed extension of our method where the inducing variables are marginalized analytically. We also showcase results when combining our framework with particle MCMC methods. We show that, on six real-world datasets, our approach can learn transition dynamics and latent states more accurately than competing methods.

This study introduces PV-RNN, a novel variational RNN inspired by the predictive-coding ideas. The model learns to extract the probabilistic structures hidden in fluctuating temporal patterns by dynamically changing the stochasticity of its latent states. Its architecture attempts to address two major concerns of variational Bayes RNNs: how can latent variables learn meaningful representations and how can the inference model transfer future observations to the latent variables. PV-RNN does both by introducing adaptive vectors mirroring the training data, whose values can then be adapted differently during evaluation. Moreover, prediction errors during backpropagation, rather than external inputs during the forward computation, are used to convey information to the network about the external data. For testing, we introduce error regression for predicting unseen sequences as inspired by predictive coding that leverages those mechanisms. The model introduces a weighting parameter, the meta-prior, to balance the optimization pressure placed on two terms of a lower bound on the marginal likelihood of the sequential data. We test the model on two datasets with probabilistic structures and show that with high values of the meta-prior the network develops deterministic chaos through which the data's randomness is imitated. For low values, the model behaves as a random process. The network performs best on intermediate values, and is able to capture the latent probabilistic structure with good generalization. Analyzing the meta-prior's impact on the network allows to precisely study the theoretical value and practical benefits of incorporating stochastic dynamics in our model. We demonstrate better prediction performance on a robot imitation task with our model using error regression compared to a standard variational Bayes model lacking such a procedure.

Stochastic gradient Markov Chain Monte Carlo (SGMCMC) is considered the gold standard for Bayesian inference in large-scale models, such as Bayesian neural networks. Since practitioners face speed versus accuracy tradeoffs in these models, variational inference (VI) is often the preferable option. Unfortunately, VI makes strong assumptions on both the factorization and functional form of the posterior. In this work, we propose a new non-parametric variational approximation that makes no assumptions about the approximate posterior's functional form and allows practitioners to specify the exact dependencies the algorithm should respect or break. The approach relies on a new Langevin-type algorithm that operates on a modified energy function, where parts of the latent variables are averaged over samples from earlier iterations of the Markov chain. This way, statistical dependencies can be broken in a controlled way, allowing the chain to mix faster. This scheme can be further modified in a "dropout" manner, leading to even more scalability. We test our scheme for ResNet-20 on CIFAR-10, SVHN, and FMNIST. In all cases, we find improvements in convergence speed and/or final accuracy compared to SG-MCMC and VI.

Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing methods either fail to plan interactively or consider unimodal behaviors that could lead to catastrophic results. In this paper, we introduce an integrated decision-making and trajectory planning framework based on Bayesian game (i.e., game of incomplete information). Human decisions inherently exhibit discrete characteristics and therefore are modeled as types of players in the game. A general solver based on no-regret learning is introduced to obtain a corresponding Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, which captures the interaction between traffic agents in the multimodal context. With the attained equilibrium, decision-making and trajectory planning are performed simultaneously, and the resulting interactive strategy is shown to be optimal over the expectation of rivals' driving intentions. Closed-loop simulations on different traffic scenarios are performed to illustrate the generalizability and the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

Many existing reinforcement learning (RL) methods employ stochastic gradient iteration on the back end, whose stability hinges upon a hypothesis that the data-generating process mixes exponentially fast with a rate parameter that appears in the step-size selection. Unfortunately, this assumption is violated for large state spaces or settings with sparse rewards, and the mixing time is unknown, making the step size inoperable. In this work, we propose an RL methodology attuned to the mixing time by employing a multi-level Monte Carlo estimator for the critic, the actor, and the average reward embedded within an actor-critic (AC) algorithm. This method, which we call Multi-level Actor-Critic (MAC), is developed especially for infinite-horizon average-reward settings and neither relies on oracle knowledge of the mixing time in its parameter selection nor assumes its exponential decay; it, therefore, is readily applicable to applications with slower mixing times. Nonetheless, it achieves a convergence rate comparable to the state-of-the-art AC algorithms. We experimentally show that these alleviated restrictions on the technical conditions required for stability translate to superior performance in practice for RL problems with sparse rewards.

Users like sharing personal photos with others through social media. At the same time, they might want to make automatic identification in such photos difficult or even impossible. Classic obfuscation methods such as blurring are not only unpleasant but also not as effective as one would expect. Recent studies on adversarial image perturbations (AIP) suggest that it is possible to confuse recognition systems effectively without unpleasant artifacts. However, in the presence of counter measures against AIPs, it is unclear how effective AIP would be in particular when the choice of counter measure is unknown. Game theory provides tools for studying the interaction between agents with uncertainties in the strategies. We introduce a general game theoretical framework for the user-recogniser dynamics, and present a case study that involves current state of the art AIP and person recognition techniques. We derive the optimal strategy for the user that assures an upper bound on the recognition rate independent of the recogniser's counter measure. Code is available at https://goo.gl/hgvbNK.

In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires differentiation across the hierarchy, which is computationally intensive, if not prohibitive. To bypass the hierarchy, we propose to bound such bilevel programs, equivalent to multiple-followers Stackelberg games, with two new hierarchy-free problems: a T-step Cournot game and a T-step monopoly model. Since they are standard equilibrium or optimization problems, both can be efficiently solved via first-order methods. Importantly, we show that the bounds provided by these problems -- the upper bound by the T-step Cournot game and the lower bound by the T-step monopoly model -- can be made arbitrarily tight by increasing the step parameter T for a wide range of problems. We prove that a small T usually suffices under appropriate conditions to reach an approximation acceptable for most practical purposes. Eventually, the analytical insights are highlighted through numerical examples.

This paper studies the sample-efficiency of learning in Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs), a challenging problem in reinforcement learning that is known to be exponentially hard in the worst-case. Motivated by real-world settings such as loading in game playing, we propose an enhanced feedback model called ``multiple observations in hindsight'', where after each episode of interaction with the POMDP, the learner may collect multiple additional observations emitted from the encountered latent states, but may not observe the latent states themselves. We show that sample-efficient learning under this feedback model is possible for two new subclasses of POMDPs: multi-observation revealing POMDPs and distinguishable POMDPs. Both subclasses generalize and substantially relax revealing POMDPs -- a widely studied subclass for which sample-efficient learning is possible under standard trajectory feedback. Notably, distinguishable POMDPs only require the emission distributions from different latent states to be different instead of linearly independent as required in revealing POMDPs.

This paper presents a new approach that integrates deep learning with computational chess, using both the Mixture of Experts (MoE) method and Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). Our methodology employs a suite of specialized models, each designed to respond to specific changes in the game's input data. This results in a framework with sparsely activated models, which provides significant computational benefits. Our framework combines the MoE method with MCTS, in order to align it with the strategic phases of chess, thus departing from the conventional ``one-for-all'' model. Instead, we utilize distinct game phase definitions to effectively distribute computational tasks across multiple expert neural networks. Our empirical research shows a substantial improvement in playing strength, surpassing the traditional single-model framework. This validates the efficacy of our integrated approach and highlights the potential of incorporating expert knowledge and strategic principles into neural network design. The fusion of MoE and MCTS offers a promising avenue for advancing machine learning architectures.

We study regret minimization for reinforcement learning (RL) in Latent Markov Decision Processes (LMDPs) with context in hindsight. We design a novel model-based algorithmic framework which can be instantiated with both a model-optimistic and a value-optimistic solver. We prove an O(mathsf{Var^star M Gamma S A K}) regret bound where O hides logarithm factors, M is the number of contexts, S is the number of states, A is the number of actions, K is the number of episodes, Gamma le S is the maximum transition degree of any state-action pair, and Var^star is a variance quantity describing the determinism of the LMDP. The regret bound only scales logarithmically with the planning horizon, thus yielding the first (nearly) horizon-free regret bound for LMDP. This is also the first problem-dependent regret bound for LMDP. Key in our proof is an analysis of the total variance of alpha vectors (a generalization of value functions), which is handled with a truncation method. We complement our positive result with a novel Omega(mathsf{Var^star M S A K}) regret lower bound with Gamma = 2, which shows our upper bound minimax optimal when Gamma is a constant for the class of variance-bounded LMDPs. Our lower bound relies on new constructions of hard instances and an argument inspired by the symmetrization technique from theoretical computer science, both of which are technically different from existing lower bound proof for MDPs, and thus can be of independent interest.

Multi-agent football poses an unsolved challenge in AI research. Existing work has focused on tackling simplified scenarios of the game, or else leveraging expert demonstrations. In this paper, we develop a multi-agent system to play the full 11 vs. 11 game mode, without demonstrations. This game mode contains aspects that present major challenges to modern reinforcement learning algorithms; multi-agent coordination, long-term planning, and non-transitivity. To address these challenges, we present TiZero; a self-evolving, multi-agent system that learns from scratch. TiZero introduces several innovations, including adaptive curriculum learning, a novel self-play strategy, and an objective that optimizes the policies of multiple agents jointly. Experimentally, it outperforms previous systems by a large margin on the Google Research Football environment, increasing win rates by over 30%. To demonstrate the generality of TiZero's innovations, they are assessed on several environments beyond football; Overcooked, Multi-agent Particle-Environment, Tic-Tac-Toe and Connect-Four.

Given a set of K probability densities, we consider the multimarginal generative modeling problem of learning a joint distribution that recovers these densities as marginals. The structure of this joint distribution should identify multi-way correspondences among the prescribed marginals. We formalize an approach to this task within a generalization of the stochastic interpolant framework, leading to efficient learning algorithms built upon dynamical transport of measure. Our generative models are defined by velocity and score fields that can be characterized as the minimizers of simple quadratic objectives, and they are defined on a simplex that generalizes the time variable in the usual dynamical transport framework. The resulting transport on the simplex is influenced by all marginals, and we show that multi-way correspondences can be extracted. The identification of such correspondences has applications to style transfer, algorithmic fairness, and data decorruption. In addition, the multimarginal perspective enables an efficient algorithm for reducing the dynamical transport cost in the ordinary two-marginal setting. We demonstrate these capacities with several numerical examples.

We propose a unified framework to study policy evaluation (PE) and the associated temporal difference (TD) methods for reinforcement learning in continuous time and space. We show that PE is equivalent to maintaining the martingale condition of a process. From this perspective, we find that the mean--square TD error approximates the quadratic variation of the martingale and thus is not a suitable objective for PE. We present two methods to use the martingale characterization for designing PE algorithms. The first one minimizes a "martingale loss function", whose solution is proved to be the best approximation of the true value function in the mean--square sense. This method interprets the classical gradient Monte-Carlo algorithm. The second method is based on a system of equations called the "martingale orthogonality conditions" with test functions. Solving these equations in different ways recovers various classical TD algorithms, such as TD(lambda), LSTD, and GTD. Different choices of test functions determine in what sense the resulting solutions approximate the true value function. Moreover, we prove that any convergent time-discretized algorithm converges to its continuous-time counterpart as the mesh size goes to zero, and we provide the convergence rate. We demonstrate the theoretical results and corresponding algorithms with numerical experiments and applications.

Robust Markov decision processes (MDPs) address the challenge of model uncertainty by optimizing the worst-case performance over an uncertainty set of MDPs. In this paper, we focus on the robust average-reward MDPs under the model-free setting. We first theoretically characterize the structure of solutions to the robust average-reward Bellman equation, which is essential for our later convergence analysis. We then design two model-free algorithms, robust relative value iteration (RVI) TD and robust RVI Q-learning, and theoretically prove their convergence to the optimal solution. We provide several widely used uncertainty sets as examples, including those defined by the contamination model, total variation, Chi-squared divergence, Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence and Wasserstein distance.

Dynamical generative models that produce samples through an iterative process, such as Flow Matching and denoising diffusion models, have seen widespread use, but there have not been many theoretically-sound methods for improving these models with reward fine-tuning. In this work, we cast reward fine-tuning as stochastic optimal control (SOC). Critically, we prove that a very specific memoryless noise schedule must be enforced during fine-tuning, in order to account for the dependency between the noise variable and the generated samples. We also propose a new algorithm named Adjoint Matching which outperforms existing SOC algorithms, by casting SOC problems as a regression problem. We find that our approach significantly improves over existing methods for reward fine-tuning, achieving better consistency, realism, and generalization to unseen human preference reward models, while retaining sample diversity.

Many important real-world problems have action spaces that are high-dimensional, continuous or both, making full enumeration of all possible actions infeasible. Instead, only small subsets of actions can be sampled for the purpose of policy evaluation and improvement. In this paper, we propose a general framework to reason in a principled way about policy evaluation and improvement over such sampled action subsets. This sample-based policy iteration framework can in principle be applied to any reinforcement learning algorithm based upon policy iteration. Concretely, we propose Sampled MuZero, an extension of the MuZero algorithm that is able to learn in domains with arbitrarily complex action spaces by planning over sampled actions. We demonstrate this approach on the classical board game of Go and on two continuous control benchmark domains: DeepMind Control Suite and Real-World RL Suite.

Score-based generative models like the diffusion model have been testified to be effective in modeling multi-modal data from image generation to reinforcement learning (RL). However, the inference process of diffusion model can be slow, which hinders its usage in RL with iterative sampling. We propose to apply the consistency model as an efficient yet expressive policy representation, namely consistency policy, with an actor-critic style algorithm for three typical RL settings: offline, offline-to-online and online. For offline RL, we demonstrate the expressiveness of generative models as policies from multi-modal data. For offline-to-online RL, the consistency policy is shown to be more computational efficient than diffusion policy, with a comparable performance. For online RL, the consistency policy demonstrates significant speedup and even higher average performances than the diffusion policy.

Offline reinforcement learning faces a significant challenge of value over-estimation due to the distributional drift between the dataset and the current learned policy, leading to learning failure in practice. The common approach is to incorporate a penalty term to reward or value estimation in the Bellman iterations. Meanwhile, to avoid extrapolation on out-of-distribution (OOD) states and actions, existing methods focus on conservative Q-function estimation. In this paper, we propose Conservative State Value Estimation (CSVE), a new approach that learns conservative V-function via directly imposing penalty on OOD states. Compared to prior work, CSVE allows more effective in-data policy optimization with conservative value guarantees. Further, we apply CSVE and develop a practical actor-critic algorithm in which the critic does the conservative value estimation by additionally sampling and penalizing the states around the dataset, and the actor applies advantage weighted updates extended with state exploration to improve the policy. We evaluate in classic continual control tasks of D4RL, showing that our method performs better than the conservative Q-function learning methods and is strongly competitive among recent SOTA methods.

We propose a novel hierarchical Bayesian model for learning with a large (possibly infinite) number of tasks/episodes, which suits well the few-shot meta learning problem. We consider episode-wise random variables to model episode-specific target generative processes, where these local random variables are governed by a higher-level global random variate. The global variable helps memorize the important information from historic episodes while controlling how much the model needs to be adapted to new episodes in a principled Bayesian manner. Within our model framework, the prediction on a novel episode/task can be seen as a Bayesian inference problem. However, a main obstacle in learning with a large/infinite number of local random variables in online nature, is that one is not allowed to store the posterior distribution of the current local random variable for frequent future updates, typical in conventional variational inference. We need to be able to treat each local variable as a one-time iterate in the optimization. We propose a Normal-Inverse-Wishart model, for which we show that this one-time iterate optimization becomes feasible due to the approximate closed-form solutions for the local posterior distributions. The resulting algorithm is more attractive than the MAML in that it is not required to maintain computational graphs for the whole gradient optimization steps per episode. Our approach is also different from existing Bayesian meta learning methods in that unlike dealing with a single random variable for the whole episodes, our approach has a hierarchical structure that allows one-time episodic optimization, desirable for principled Bayesian learning with many/infinite tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/minyoungkim21/niwmeta.

Provably efficient Model-Based Reinforcement Learning (MBRL) based on optimism or posterior sampling (PSRL) is ensured to attain the global optimality asymptotically by introducing the complexity measure of the model. However, the complexity might grow exponentially for the simplest nonlinear models, where global convergence is impossible within finite iterations. When the model suffers a large generalization error, which is quantitatively measured by the model complexity, the uncertainty can be large. The sampled model that current policy is greedily optimized upon will thus be unsettled, resulting in aggressive policy updates and over-exploration. In this work, we propose Conservative Dual Policy Optimization (CDPO) that involves a Referential Update and a Conservative Update. The policy is first optimized under a reference model, which imitates the mechanism of PSRL while offering more stability. A conservative range of randomness is guaranteed by maximizing the expectation of model value. Without harmful sampling procedures, CDPO can still achieve the same regret as PSRL. More importantly, CDPO enjoys monotonic policy improvement and global optimality simultaneously. Empirical results also validate the exploration efficiency of CDPO.

We prove stability for a class of heterogeneous catalysis models in the L_p-setting. We consider a setting in a finite three-dimensional pore of cylinder-like geometry, with the lateral walls acting as a catalytic surface. Under a reasonable condition on the involved parameters, we show that given equilibria are normally stable, i.e. solutions are attracted at an exponential rate. The potential incidence of instability is discussed as well.

In meta reinforcement learning (meta RL), an agent seeks a Bayes-optimal policy -- the optimal policy when facing an unknown task that is sampled from some known task distribution. Previous approaches tackled this problem by inferring a belief over task parameters, using variational inference methods. Motivated by recent successes of contrastive learning approaches in RL, such as contrastive predictive coding (CPC), we investigate whether contrastive methods can be used for learning Bayes-optimal behavior. We begin by proving that representations learned by CPC are indeed sufficient for Bayes optimality. Based on this observation, we propose a simple meta RL algorithm that uses CPC in lieu of variational belief inference. Our method, ContraBAR, achieves comparable performance to state-of-the-art in domains with state-based observation and circumvents the computational toll of future observation reconstruction, enabling learning in domains with image-based observations. It can also be combined with image augmentations for domain randomization and used seamlessly in both online and offline meta RL settings.

Progress in multiagent intelligence research is fundamentally limited by the number and quality of environments available for study. In recent years, simulated games have become a dominant research platform within reinforcement learning, in part due to their accessibility and interpretability. Previous works have targeted and demonstrated success on arcade, first person shooter (FPS), real-time strategy (RTS), and massive online battle arena (MOBA) games. Our work considers massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs or MMOs), which capture several complexities of real-world learning that are not well modeled by any other game genre. We present Neural MMO, a massively multiagent game environment inspired by MMOs and discuss our progress on two more general challenges in multiagent systems engineering for AI research: distributed infrastructure and game IO. We further demonstrate that standard policy gradient methods and simple baseline models can learn interesting emergent exploration and specialization behaviors in this setting.

The variational autoencoder (VAE) framework is a popular option for training unsupervised generative models, featuring ease of training and latent representation of data. The objective function of VAE does not guarantee to achieve the latter, however, and failure to do so leads to a frequent failure mode called posterior collapse. Even in successful cases, VAEs often result in low-precision reconstructions and generated samples. The introduction of the KL-divergence weight beta can help steer the model clear of posterior collapse, but its tuning is often a trial-and-error process with no guiding metrics. Here we test the idea of using the total VAE loss of generated samples (generated loss) as the proxy metric for generation quality, the related hypothesis that VAE reconstruction from the mean latent vector tends to be a more typical example of its class than the original, and the idea of exploiting this property by augmenting training data with generated variants (augmented training). The results are mixed, but repeated encoding and decoding indeed result in qualitatively and quantitatively more typical examples from both convolutional and fully-connected MNIST VAEs, suggesting that it may be an inherent property of the VAE framework.

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

Variational autoencoders (VAEs) are one of the deep generative models that have experienced enormous success over the past decades. However, in practice, they suffer from a problem called posterior collapse, which occurs when the encoder coincides, or collapses, with the prior taking no information from the latent structure of the input data into consideration. In this work, we introduce an inverse Lipschitz neural network into the decoder and, based on this architecture, provide a new method that can control in a simple and clear manner the degree of posterior collapse for a wide range of VAE models equipped with a concrete theoretical guarantee. We also illustrate the effectiveness of our method through several numerical experiments.

Deep neural policies have recently been installed in a diverse range of settings, from biotechnology to automated financial systems. However, the utilization of deep neural networks to approximate the value function leads to concerns on the decision boundary stability, in particular, with regard to the sensitivity of policy decision making to indiscernible, non-robust features due to highly non-convex and complex deep neural manifolds. These concerns constitute an obstruction to understanding the reasoning made by deep neural policies, and their foundational limitations. Hence, it is crucial to develop techniques that aim to understand the sensitivities in the learnt representations of neural network policies. To achieve this we introduce a theoretically founded method that provides a systematic analysis of the unstable directions in the deep neural policy decision boundary across both time and space. Through experiments in the Arcade Learning Environment (ALE), we demonstrate the effectiveness of our technique for identifying correlated directions of instability, and for measuring how sample shifts remold the set of sensitive directions in the neural policy landscape. Most importantly, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art robust training techniques yield learning of disjoint unstable directions, with dramatically larger oscillations over time, when compared to standard training. We believe our results reveal the fundamental properties of the decision process made by reinforcement learning policies, and can help in constructing reliable and robust deep neural policies.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

We propose a game-based formulation for learning dimensionality-reducing representations of feature vectors, when only a prior knowledge on future prediction tasks is available. In this game, the first player chooses a representation, and then the second player adversarially chooses a prediction task from a given class, representing the prior knowledge. The first player aims is to minimize, and the second player to maximize, the regret: The minimal prediction loss using the representation, compared to the same loss using the original features. For the canonical setting in which the representation, the response to predict and the predictors are all linear functions, and under the mean squared error loss function, we derive the theoretically optimal representation in pure strategies, which shows the effectiveness of the prior knowledge, and the optimal regret in mixed strategies, which shows the usefulness of randomizing the representation. For general representations and loss functions, we propose an efficient algorithm to optimize a randomized representation. The algorithm only requires the gradients of the loss function, and is based on incrementally adding a representation rule to a mixture of such rules.

Machine learning models frequently experience performance drops under distribution shifts. The underlying cause of such shifts may be multiple simultaneous factors such as changes in data quality, differences in specific covariate distributions, or changes in the relationship between label and features. When a model does fail during deployment, attributing performance change to these factors is critical for the model developer to identify the root cause and take mitigating actions. In this work, we introduce the problem of attributing performance differences between environments to distribution shifts in the underlying data generating mechanisms. We formulate the problem as a cooperative game where the players are distributions. We define the value of a set of distributions to be the change in model performance when only this set of distributions has changed between environments, and derive an importance weighting method for computing the value of an arbitrary set of distributions. The contribution of each distribution to the total performance change is then quantified as its Shapley value. We demonstrate the correctness and utility of our method on synthetic, semi-synthetic, and real-world case studies, showing its effectiveness in attributing performance changes to a wide range of distribution shifts.

Robust reinforcement learning is essential for deploying reinforcement learning algorithms in real-world scenarios where environmental uncertainty predominates. Traditional robust reinforcement learning often depends on rectangularity assumptions, where adverse probability measures of outcome states are assumed to be independent across different states and actions. This assumption, rarely fulfilled in practice, leads to overly conservative policies. To address this problem, we introduce a new time-constrained robust MDP (TC-RMDP) formulation that considers multifactorial, correlated, and time-dependent disturbances, thus more accurately reflecting real-world dynamics. This formulation goes beyond the conventional rectangularity paradigm, offering new perspectives and expanding the analytical framework for robust RL. We propose three distinct algorithms, each using varying levels of environmental information, and evaluate them extensively on continuous control benchmarks. Our results demonstrate that these algorithms yield an efficient tradeoff between performance and robustness, outperforming traditional deep robust RL methods in time-constrained environments while preserving robustness in classical benchmarks. This study revisits the prevailing assumptions in robust RL and opens new avenues for developing more practical and realistic RL applications.

Assessing and comparing player skill in online multiplayer gaming environments is essential for fair matchmaking and player engagement. Traditional ranking models like Elo and Glicko-2, designed for two-player games, are insufficient for the complexity of multi-player, asymmetric team-based matches. To address this gap, the OpenSkill library offers a suite of sophisticated, fast, and adaptable models tailored for such dynamics. Drawing from Bayesian inference methods, OpenSkill provides a more accurate representation of individual player contributions and speeds up the computation of ranks. This paper introduces the OpenSkill library, featuring a Python implementation of the Plackett-Luce model among others, highlighting its performance advantages and predictive accuracy against proprietary systems like TrueSkill. OpenSkill is a valuable tool for game developers and researchers, ensuring a responsive and fair gaming experience by efficiently adjusting player rankings based on game outcomes. The library's support for time decay and diligent documentation further aid in its practical application, making it a robust solution for the nuanced world of multiplayer ranking systems. This paper also acknowledges areas for future enhancement, such as partial play and contribution weighting, emphasizing the library's ongoing development to meet the evolving needs of online gaming communities.

Unlike perfect information games, where all elements are known to every player, imperfect information games emulate the real-world complexities of decision-making under uncertain or incomplete information. GPT-4, the recent breakthrough in large language models (LLMs) trained on massive passive data, is notable for its knowledge retrieval and reasoning abilities. This paper delves into the applicability of GPT-4's learned knowledge for imperfect information games. To achieve this, we introduce Suspicion-Agent, an innovative agent that leverages GPT-4's capabilities for performing in imperfect information games. With proper prompt engineering to achieve different functions, Suspicion-Agent based on GPT-4 demonstrates remarkable adaptability across a range of imperfect information card games. Importantly, GPT-4 displays a strong high-order theory of mind (ToM) capacity, meaning it can understand others and intentionally impact others' behavior. Leveraging this, we design a planning strategy that enables GPT-4 to competently play against different opponents, adapting its gameplay style as needed, while requiring only the game rules and descriptions of observations as input. In the experiments, we qualitatively showcase the capabilities of Suspicion-Agent across three different imperfect information games and then quantitatively evaluate it in Leduc Hold'em. The results show that Suspicion-Agent can potentially outperform traditional algorithms designed for imperfect information games, without any specialized training or examples. In order to encourage and foster deeper insights within the community, we make our game-related data publicly available.

MDPs with low-rank transitions -- that is, the transition matrix can be factored into the product of two matrices, left and right -- is a highly representative structure that enables tractable learning. The left matrix enables expressive function approximation for value-based learning and has been studied extensively. In this work, we instead investigate sample-efficient learning with density features, i.e., the right matrix, which induce powerful models for state-occupancy distributions. This setting not only sheds light on leveraging unsupervised learning in RL, but also enables plug-in solutions for convex RL. In the offline setting, we propose an algorithm for off-policy estimation of occupancies that can handle non-exploratory data. Using this as a subroutine, we further devise an online algorithm that constructs exploratory data distributions in a level-by-level manner. As a central technical challenge, the additive error of occupancy estimation is incompatible with the multiplicative definition of data coverage. In the absence of strong assumptions like reachability, this incompatibility easily leads to exponential error blow-up, which we overcome via novel technical tools. Our results also readily extend to the representation learning setting, when the density features are unknown and must be learned from an exponentially large candidate set.

Offline reinforcement learning learns an effective policy on offline datasets without online interaction, and it attracts persistent research attention due to its potential of practical application. However, extrapolation error generated by distribution shift will still lead to the overestimation for those actions that transit to out-of-distribution(OOD) states, which degrades the reliability and robustness of the offline policy. In this paper, we propose Contextual Conservative Q-Learning(C-CQL) to learn a robustly reliable policy through the contextual information captured via an inverse dynamics model. With the supervision of the inverse dynamics model, it tends to learn a policy that generates stable transition at perturbed states, for the fact that pertuebed states are a common kind of OOD states. In this manner, we enable the learnt policy more likely to generate transition that destines to the empirical next state distributions of the offline dataset, i.e., robustly reliable transition. Besides, we theoretically reveal that C-CQL is the generalization of the Conservative Q-Learning(CQL) and aggressive State Deviation Correction(SDC). Finally, experimental results demonstrate the proposed C-CQL achieves the state-of-the-art performance in most environments of offline Mujoco suite and a noisy Mujoco setting.

Generative flow networks (GFlowNets) are sequential sampling models trained to match a given distribution. GFlowNets have been successfully applied to various structured object generation tasks, sampling a diverse set of high-reward objects quickly. We propose expected flow networks (EFlowNets), which extend GFlowNets to stochastic environments. We show that EFlowNets outperform other GFlowNet formulations in stochastic tasks such as protein design. We then extend the concept of EFlowNets to adversarial environments, proposing adversarial flow networks (AFlowNets) for two-player zero-sum games. We show that AFlowNets learn to find above 80% of optimal moves in Connect-4 via self-play and outperform AlphaZero in tournaments.

Policy Optimization (PO) is one of the most popular methods in Reinforcement Learning (RL). Thus, theoretical guarantees for PO algorithms have become especially important to the RL community. In this paper, we study PO in adversarial MDPs with a challenge that arises in almost every real-world application -- delayed bandit feedback. We give the first near-optimal regret bounds for PO in tabular MDPs, and may even surpass state-of-the-art (which uses less efficient methods). Our novel Delay-Adapted PO (DAPO) is easy to implement and to generalize, allowing us to extend our algorithm to: (i) infinite state space under the assumption of linear Q-function, proving the first regret bounds for delayed feedback with function approximation. (ii) deep RL, demonstrating its effectiveness in experiments on MuJoCo domains.

The study of provable adversarial robustness for deep neural networks (DNNs) has mainly focused on static supervised learning tasks such as image classification. However, DNNs have been used extensively in real-world adaptive tasks such as reinforcement learning (RL), making such systems vulnerable to adversarial attacks as well. Prior works in provable robustness in RL seek to certify the behaviour of the victim policy at every time-step against a non-adaptive adversary using methods developed for the static setting. But in the real world, an RL adversary can infer the defense strategy used by the victim agent by observing the states, actions, etc., from previous time-steps and adapt itself to produce stronger attacks in future steps. We present an efficient procedure, designed specifically to defend against an adaptive RL adversary, that can directly certify the total reward without requiring the policy to be robust at each time-step. Our main theoretical contribution is to prove an adaptive version of the Neyman-Pearson Lemma -- a key lemma for smoothing-based certificates -- where the adversarial perturbation at a particular time can be a stochastic function of current and previous observations and states as well as previous actions. Building on this result, we propose policy smoothing where the agent adds a Gaussian noise to its observation at each time-step before passing it through the policy function. Our robustness certificates guarantee that the final total reward obtained by policy smoothing remains above a certain threshold, even though the actions at intermediate time-steps may change under the attack. Our experiments on various environments like Cartpole, Pong, Freeway and Mountain Car show that our method can yield meaningful robustness guarantees in practice.

This paper investigates a novel lossy compression framework operating under logarithmic loss, designed to handle situations where the reconstruction distribution diverges from the source distribution. This framework is especially relevant for applications that require joint compression and retrieval, and in scenarios involving distributional shifts due to processing. We show that the proposed formulation extends the classical minimum entropy coupling framework by integrating a bottleneck, allowing for a controlled degree of stochasticity in the coupling. We explore the decomposition of the Minimum Entropy Coupling with Bottleneck (MEC-B) into two distinct optimization problems: Entropy-Bounded Information Maximization (EBIM) for the encoder, and Minimum Entropy Coupling (MEC) for the decoder. Through extensive analysis, we provide a greedy algorithm for EBIM with guaranteed performance, and characterize the optimal solution near functional mappings, yielding significant theoretical insights into the structural complexity of this problem. Furthermore, we illustrate the practical application of MEC-B through experiments in Markov Coding Games (MCGs) under rate limits. These games simulate a communication scenario within a Markov Decision Process, where an agent must transmit a compressed message from a sender to a receiver through its actions. Our experiments highlight the trade-offs between MDP rewards and receiver accuracy across various compression rates, showcasing the efficacy of our method compared to conventional compression baseline.

Offline reinforcement learning enables agents to leverage large pre-collected datasets of environment transitions to learn control policies, circumventing the need for potentially expensive or unsafe online data collection. Significant progress has been made recently in offline model-based reinforcement learning, approaches which leverage a learned dynamics model. This typically involves constructing a probabilistic model, and using the model uncertainty to penalize rewards where there is insufficient data, solving for a pessimistic MDP that lower bounds the true MDP. Existing methods, however, exhibit a breakdown between theory and practice, whereby pessimistic return ought to be bounded by the total variation distance of the model from the true dynamics, but is instead implemented through a penalty based on estimated model uncertainty. This has spawned a variety of uncertainty heuristics, with little to no comparison between differing approaches. In this paper, we compare these heuristics, and design novel protocols to investigate their interaction with other hyperparameters, such as the number of models, or imaginary rollout horizon. Using these insights, we show that selecting these key hyperparameters using Bayesian Optimization produces superior configurations that are vastly different to those currently used in existing hand-tuned state-of-the-art methods, and result in drastically stronger performance.

Stochastic partial observability poses a major challenge for decentralized coordination in multi-agent reinforcement learning but is largely neglected in state-of-the-art research due to a strong focus on state-based centralized training for decentralized execution (CTDE) and benchmarks that lack sufficient stochasticity like StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge (SMAC). In this paper, we propose Attention-based Embeddings of Recurrence In multi-Agent Learning (AERIAL) to approximate value functions under stochastic partial observability. AERIAL replaces the true state with a learned representation of multi-agent recurrence, considering more accurate information about decentralized agent decisions than state-based CTDE. We then introduce MessySMAC, a modified version of SMAC with stochastic observations and higher variance in initial states, to provide a more general and configurable benchmark regarding stochastic partial observability. We evaluate AERIAL in Dec-Tiger as well as in a variety of SMAC and MessySMAC maps, and compare the results with state-based CTDE. Furthermore, we evaluate the robustness of AERIAL and state-based CTDE against various stochasticity configurations in MessySMAC.

Optimization is a ubiquitous modeling tool and is often deployed in settings which repeatedly solve similar instances of the same problem. Amortized optimization methods use learning to predict the solutions to problems in these settings, exploiting the shared structure between similar problem instances. These methods have been crucial in variational inference and reinforcement learning and are capable of solving optimization problems many orders of magnitudes times faster than traditional optimization methods that do not use amortization. This tutorial presents an introduction to the amortized optimization foundations behind these advancements and overviews their applications in variational inference, sparse coding, gradient-based meta-learning, control, reinforcement learning, convex optimization, optimal transport, and deep equilibrium networks. The source code for this tutorial is available at https://github.com/facebookresearch/amortized-optimization-tutorial.

Variational inference using the reparameterization trick has enabled large-scale approximate Bayesian inference in complex probabilistic models, leveraging stochastic optimization to sidestep intractable expectations. The reparameterization trick is applicable when we can simulate a random variable by applying a differentiable deterministic function on an auxiliary random variable whose distribution is fixed. For many distributions of interest (such as the gamma or Dirichlet), simulation of random variables relies on acceptance-rejection sampling. The discontinuity introduced by the accept-reject step means that standard reparameterization tricks are not applicable. We propose a new method that lets us leverage reparameterization gradients even when variables are outputs of a acceptance-rejection sampling algorithm. Our approach enables reparameterization on a larger class of variational distributions. In several studies of real and synthetic data, we show that the variance of the estimator of the gradient is significantly lower than other state-of-the-art methods. This leads to faster convergence of stochastic gradient variational inference.

Despite recent advancements in AI and NLP, negotiation remains a difficult domain for AI agents. Traditional game theoretic approaches that have worked well for two-player zero-sum games struggle in the context of negotiation due to their inability to learn human-compatible strategies. On the other hand, approaches that only use human data tend to be domain-specific and lack the theoretical guarantees provided by strategies grounded in game theory. Motivated by the notion of fairness as a criterion for optimality in general sum games, we propose a negotiation framework called FDHC which incorporates fairness into both the reward design and search to learn human-compatible negotiation strategies. Our method includes a novel, RL+search technique called LGM-Zero which leverages a pre-trained language model to retrieve human-compatible offers from large action spaces. Our results show that our method is able to achieve more egalitarian negotiation outcomes and improve negotiation quality.