Daily Papers

Visual reasoning is critical for a wide range of computer vision tasks that go beyond surface-level object detection and classification. Despite notable advances in relational, symbolic, temporal, causal, and commonsense reasoning, existing surveys often address these directions in isolation, lacking a unified analysis and comparison across reasoning types, methodologies, and evaluation protocols. This survey aims to address this gap by categorizing visual reasoning into five major types (relational, symbolic, temporal, causal, and commonsense) and systematically examining their implementation through architectures such as graph-based models, memory networks, attention mechanisms, and neuro-symbolic systems. We review evaluation protocols designed to assess functional correctness, structural consistency, and causal validity, and critically analyze their limitations in terms of generalizability, reproducibility, and explanatory power. Beyond evaluation, we identify key open challenges in visual reasoning, including scalability to complex scenes, deeper integration of symbolic and neural paradigms, the lack of comprehensive benchmark datasets, and reasoning under weak supervision. Finally, we outline a forward-looking research agenda for next-generation vision systems, emphasizing that bridging perception and reasoning is essential for building transparent, trustworthy, and cross-domain adaptive AI systems, particularly in critical domains such as autonomous driving and medical diagnostics.

Neuro-symbolic artificial intelligence (NSAI) represents a transformative approach in artificial intelligence (AI) by combining deep learning's ability to handle large-scale and unstructured data with the structured reasoning of symbolic methods. By leveraging their complementary strengths, NSAI enhances generalization, reasoning, and scalability while addressing key challenges such as transparency and data efficiency. This paper systematically studies diverse NSAI architectures, highlighting their unique approaches to integrating neural and symbolic components. It examines the alignment of contemporary AI techniques such as retrieval-augmented generation, graph neural networks, reinforcement learning, and multi-agent systems with NSAI paradigms. This study then evaluates these architectures against comprehensive set of criteria, including generalization, reasoning capabilities, transferability, and interpretability, therefore providing a comparative analysis of their respective strengths and limitations. Notably, the Neuro > Symbolic < Neuro model consistently outperforms its counterparts across all evaluation metrics. This result aligns with state-of-the-art research that highlight the efficacy of such architectures in harnessing advanced technologies like multi-agent systems.

Action quality assessment (AQA) applies computer vision to quantitatively assess the performance or execution of a human action. Current AQA approaches are end-to-end neural models, which lack transparency and tend to be biased because they are trained on subjective human judgements as ground-truth. To address these issues, we introduce a neuro-symbolic paradigm for AQA, which uses neural networks to abstract interpretable symbols from video data and makes quality assessments by applying rules to those symbols. We take diving as the case study. We found that domain experts prefer our system and find it more informative than purely neural approaches to AQA in diving. Our system also achieves state-of-the-art action recognition and temporal segmentation, and automatically generates a detailed report that breaks the dive down into its elements and provides objective scoring with visual evidence. As verified by a group of domain experts, this report may be used to assist judges in scoring, help train judges, and provide feedback to divers. We will open-source all of our annotated training data and code for ease of reproducibility.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

Many recent studies have found evidence for emergent reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs), but debate persists concerning the robustness of these capabilities, and the extent to which they depend on structured reasoning mechanisms. To shed light on these issues, we study the internal mechanisms that support abstract reasoning in LLMs. We identify an emergent symbolic architecture that implements abstract reasoning via a series of three computations. In early layers, symbol abstraction heads convert input tokens to abstract variables based on the relations between those tokens. In intermediate layers, symbolic induction heads perform sequence induction over these abstract variables. Finally, in later layers, retrieval heads predict the next token by retrieving the value associated with the predicted abstract variable. These results point toward a resolution of the longstanding debate between symbolic and neural network approaches, suggesting that emergent reasoning in neural networks depends on the emergence of symbolic mechanisms.

Classical models of memory in psychology and neuroscience rely on similarity-based retrieval of stored patterns, where similarity is a function of retrieval cues and the stored patterns. While parsimonious, these models do not allow distinct representations for storage and retrieval, despite their distinct computational demands. Key-value memory systems, in contrast, distinguish representations used for storage (values) and those used for retrieval (keys). This allows key-value memory systems to optimize simultaneously for fidelity in storage and discriminability in retrieval. We review the computational foundations of key-value memory, its role in modern machine learning systems, related ideas from psychology and neuroscience, applications to a number of empirical puzzles, and possible biological implementations.

The Transformer architecture processes sequences by implementing a form of neural message-passing that consists of iterative information retrieval (attention), followed by local processing (position-wise MLP). Two types of information are essential under this general computational paradigm: "sensory" information about individual objects, and "relational" information describing the relationships between objects. Standard attention naturally encodes the former, but does not explicitly encode the latter. In this paper, we present an extension of Transformers where multi-head attention is augmented with two distinct types of attention heads, each routing information of a different type. The first type is the standard attention mechanism of Transformers, which captures object-level features, while the second type is a novel attention mechanism we propose to explicitly capture relational information. The two types of attention heads each possess different inductive biases, giving the resulting architecture greater efficiency and versatility. The promise of this approach is demonstrated empirically across a range of tasks.

Attention mechanisms are a central property of cognitive systems allowing them to selectively deploy cognitive resources in a flexible manner. Attention has been long studied in the neurosciences and there are numerous phenomenological models that try to capture its core properties. Recently attentional mechanisms have become a dominating architectural choice of machine learning and are the central innovation of Transformers. The dominant intuition and formalism underlying their development has drawn on ideas of keys and queries in database management systems. In this work, we propose an alternative Bayesian foundation for attentional mechanisms and show how this unifies different attentional architectures in machine learning. This formulation allows to to identify commonality across different attention ML architectures as well as suggest a bridge to those developed in neuroscience. We hope this work will guide more sophisticated intuitions into the key properties of attention architectures and suggest new ones.

Do machines and humans process language in similar ways? A recent line of research has hinted in the affirmative, demonstrating that human brain signals can be effectively predicted using the internal representations of language models (LMs). This is thought to reflect shared computational principles between LMs and human language processing. However, there are also clear differences in how LMs and humans acquire and use language, even if the final task they are performing is the same. Despite this, there is little work exploring systematic differences between human and machine language processing using brain data. To address this question, we examine the differences between LM representations and the human brain's responses to language, specifically by examining a dataset of Magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to a written narrative. In doing so we identify three phenomena that, in prior work, LMs have been found to not capture well: emotional understanding, figurative language processing, and physical commonsense. By fine-tuning LMs on datasets related to these phenomena, we observe that fine-tuned LMs show improved alignment with human brain responses across these tasks. Our study implies that the observed divergences between LMs and human brains may stem from LMs' inadequate representation of these specific types of knowledge.

Neuro-symbolic learning was proposed to address challenges with training neural networks for complex reasoning tasks with the added benefits of interpretability, reliability, and efficiency. Neuro-symbolic learning methods traditionally train neural models in conjunction with symbolic programs, but they face significant challenges that limit them to simplistic problems. On the other hand, purely-neural foundation models now reach state-of-the-art performance through prompting rather than training, but they are often unreliable and lack interpretability. Supplementing foundation models with symbolic programs, which we call neuro-symbolic prompting, provides a way to use these models for complex reasoning tasks. Doing so raises the question: What role does specialized model training as part of neuro-symbolic learning have in the age of foundation models? To explore this question, we highlight three pitfalls of traditional neuro-symbolic learning with respect to the compute, data, and programs leading to generalization problems. This position paper argues that foundation models enable generalizable neuro-symbolic solutions, offering a path towards achieving the original goals of neuro-symbolic learning without the downsides of training from scratch.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of LLaMA-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a striking functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context taking over abruptly in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token predominantly appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear exclusively in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

Distributional word representation methods exploit word co-occurrences to build compact vector encodings of words. While these representations enjoy widespread use in modern natural language processing, it is unclear whether they accurately encode all necessary facets of conceptual meaning. In this paper, we evaluate how well these representations can predict perceptual and conceptual features of concrete concepts, drawing on two semantic norm datasets sourced from human participants. We find that several standard word representations fail to encode many salient perceptual features of concepts, and show that these deficits correlate with word-word similarity prediction errors. Our analyses provide motivation for grounded and embodied language learning approaches, which may help to remedy these deficits.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

How do humans learn language, and can the first language be learned at all? These fundamental questions are still hotly debated. In contemporary linguistics, there are two major schools of thought that give completely opposite answers. According to Chomsky's theory of universal grammar, language cannot be learned because children are not exposed to sufficient data in their linguistic environment. In contrast, usage-based models of language assume a profound relationship between language structure and language use. In particular, contextual mental processing and mental representations are assumed to have the cognitive capacity to capture the complexity of actual language use at all levels. The prime example is syntax, i.e., the rules by which words are assembled into larger units such as sentences. Typically, syntactic rules are expressed as sequences of word classes. However, it remains unclear whether word classes are innate, as implied by universal grammar, or whether they emerge during language acquisition, as suggested by usage-based approaches. Here, we address this issue from a machine learning and natural language processing perspective. In particular, we trained an artificial deep neural network on predicting the next word, provided sequences of consecutive words as input. Subsequently, we analyzed the emerging activation patterns in the hidden layers of the neural network. Strikingly, we find that the internal representations of nine-word input sequences cluster according to the word class of the tenth word to be predicted as output, even though the neural network did not receive any explicit information about syntactic rules or word classes during training. This surprising result suggests, that also in the human brain, abstract representational categories such as word classes may naturally emerge as a consequence of predictive coding and processing during language acquisition.

Large Language Models (LLMs) do not differentially represent numbers, which are pervasive in text. In contrast, neuroscience research has identified distinct neural representations for numbers and words. In this work, we investigate how well popular LLMs capture the magnitudes of numbers (e.g., that 4 < 5) from a behavioral lens. Prior research on the representational capabilities of LLMs evaluates whether they show human-level performance, for instance, high overall accuracy on standard benchmarks. Here, we ask a different question, one inspired by cognitive science: How closely do the number representations of LLMscorrespond to those of human language users, who typically demonstrate the distance, size, and ratio effects? We depend on a linking hypothesis to map the similarities among the model embeddings of number words and digits to human response times. The results reveal surprisingly human-like representations across language models of different architectures, despite the absence of the neural circuitry that directly supports these representations in the human brain. This research shows the utility of understanding LLMs using behavioral benchmarks and points the way to future work on the number representations of LLMs and their cognitive plausibility.

Self-supervised models have revolutionized speech processing, achieving new levels of performance in a wide variety of tasks with limited resources. However, the inner workings of these models are still opaque. In this paper, we aim to analyze the encoded contextual representation of these foundation models based on their inter- and intra-model similarity, independent of any external annotation and task-specific constraint. We examine different SSL models varying their training paradigm -- Contrastive (Wav2Vec2.0) and Predictive models (HuBERT); and model sizes (base and large). We explore these models on different levels of localization/distributivity of information including (i) individual neurons; (ii) layer representation; (iii) attention weights and (iv) compare the representations with their finetuned counterparts.Our results highlight that these models converge to similar representation subspaces but not to similar neuron-localized concepts\footnote{A concept represents a coherent fragment of knowledge, such as ``a class containing certain objects as elements, where the objects have certain properties. We made the code publicly available for facilitating further research, we publicly released our code.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

We propose the Neuro-Symbolic Concept Learner (NS-CL), a model that learns visual concepts, words, and semantic parsing of sentences without explicit supervision on any of them; instead, our model learns by simply looking at images and reading paired questions and answers. Our model builds an object-based scene representation and translates sentences into executable, symbolic programs. To bridge the learning of two modules, we use a neuro-symbolic reasoning module that executes these programs on the latent scene representation. Analogical to human concept learning, the perception module learns visual concepts based on the language description of the object being referred to. Meanwhile, the learned visual concepts facilitate learning new words and parsing new sentences. We use curriculum learning to guide the searching over the large compositional space of images and language. Extensive experiments demonstrate the accuracy and efficiency of our model on learning visual concepts, word representations, and semantic parsing of sentences. Further, our method allows easy generalization to new object attributes, compositions, language concepts, scenes and questions, and even new program domains. It also empowers applications including visual question answering and bidirectional image-text retrieval.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) provide a new opportunity to address the long-standing question of how concepts are represented and organized in the mind, which is central to unravelling the nature of human cognition. Here, we reframed the classic reverse dictionary task to simulate human concept inference in context and investigated the emergence of human-like conceptual representations within LLMs. We found that LLMs were able to infer concepts from definitional descriptions and construct representation spaces that converge towards a shared, context-independent structure. These representations effectively predicted human behavioural judgments and aligned well with neural activity patterns in the human brain, offering evidence for biological plausibility. These findings demonstrate that human-like conceptual representations and organization can naturally emerge from language prediction, even without real-world grounding. Our work supports the view that LLMs serve as valuable tools for understanding complex human cognition and paves the way for better alignment between artificial and human intelligence.

The success of neural language models (LMs) on many technological tasks has brought about their potential relevance as scientific theories of language despite some clear differences between LM training and child language acquisition. In this paper we argue that some of the most prominent benchmarks for evaluating the syntactic capacities of LMs may not be sufficiently rigorous. In particular, we show that the template-based benchmarks lack the structural diversity commonly found in the theoretical and psychological studies of language. When trained on small-scale data modeling child language acquisition, the LMs can be readily matched by simple baseline models. We advocate for the use of the readily available, carefully curated datasets that have been evaluated for gradient acceptability by large pools of native speakers and are designed to probe the structural basis of grammar specifically. On one such dataset, the LI-Adger dataset, LMs evaluate sentences in a way inconsistent with human language users. We conclude with suggestions for better connecting LMs with the empirical study of child language acquisition.

Modern language models can process inputs across diverse languages and modalities. We hypothesize that models acquire this capability through learning a shared representation space across heterogeneous data types (e.g., different languages and modalities), which places semantically similar inputs near one another, even if they are from different modalities/languages. We term this the semantic hub hypothesis, following the hub-and-spoke model from neuroscience (Patterson et al., 2007) which posits that semantic knowledge in the human brain is organized through a transmodal semantic "hub" which integrates information from various modality-specific "spokes" regions. We first show that model representations for semantically equivalent inputs in different languages are similar in the intermediate layers, and that this space can be interpreted using the model's dominant pretraining language via the logit lens. This tendency extends to other data types, including arithmetic expressions, code, and visual/audio inputs. Interventions in the shared representation space in one data type also predictably affect model outputs in other data types, suggesting that this shared representations space is not simply a vestigial byproduct of large-scale training on broad data, but something that is actively utilized by the model during input processing.

Despite the tremendous success, existing machine learning models still fall short of human-like systematic generalization -- learning compositional rules from limited data and applying them to unseen combinations in various domains. We propose Neural-Symbolic Recursive Machine (NSR) to tackle this deficiency. The core representation of NSR is a Grounded Symbol System (GSS) with combinatorial syntax and semantics, which entirely emerges from training data. Akin to the neuroscience studies suggesting separate brain systems for perceptual, syntactic, and semantic processing, NSR implements analogous separate modules of neural perception, syntactic parsing, and semantic reasoning, which are jointly learned by a deduction-abduction algorithm. We prove that NSR is expressive enough to model various sequence-to-sequence tasks. Superior systematic generalization is achieved via the inductive biases of equivariance and recursiveness embedded in NSR. In experiments, NSR achieves state-of-the-art performance in three benchmarks from different domains: SCAN for semantic parsing, PCFG for string manipulation, and HINT for arithmetic reasoning. Specifically, NSR achieves 100% generalization accuracy on SCAN and PCFG and outperforms state-of-the-art models on HINT by about 23%. Our NSR demonstrates stronger generalization than pure neural networks due to its symbolic representation and inductive biases. NSR also demonstrates better transferability than existing neural-symbolic approaches due to less domain-specific knowledge required.

We present a framework where neural models develop an AI Mother Tongue, a native symbolic language that simultaneously supports intuitive reasoning, compositional symbol chains, and inherent interpretability. Unlike post-hoc explanation methods, our approach embeds reasoning directly into the model's representations: symbols capture meaningful semantic patterns, chains trace decision paths, and gated induction mechanisms guide selective focus, yielding transparent yet flexible reasoning. We introduce complementary training objectives to enhance symbol purity and decision sparsity, and employ a sequential specialization strategy to first build broad symbolic competence and then refine intuitive judgments. Experiments on AI tasks demonstrate competitive accuracy alongside verifiable reasoning traces, showing that AI Mother Tongue can serve as a unified mechanism for interpretability, intuition, and symbolic reasoning in neural models.

Modern vision models have achieved remarkable success in benchmarks where local features provide critical information about the target. There is now a growing interest in solving tasks that require more global reasoning, where local features offer no significant information. These tasks are reminiscent of the connectivity tasks discussed by Minsky and Papert in 1969, which exposed the limitations of the perceptron model and contributed to the first AI winter. In this paper, we revisit such tasks by introducing four global visual benchmarks involving path findings and mazes. We show that: (1) although today's large vision models largely surpass the expressivity limitations of the early models, they still struggle with the learning efficiency; we put forward the "globality degree" notion to understand this limitation; (2) we then demonstrate that the picture changes and global reasoning becomes feasible with the introduction of "visual scratchpads"; similarly to the text scratchpads and chain-of-thoughts used in language models, visual scratchpads help break down global tasks into simpler ones; (3) we finally show that some scratchpads are better than others, in particular, "inductive scratchpads" that take steps relying on less information afford better out-of-distribution generalization and succeed for smaller model sizes.

Recent progress in multimodal reasoning has been significantly advanced by textual Chain-of-Thought (CoT), a paradigm where models conduct reasoning within language. This text-centric approach, however, treats vision as a static, initial context, creating a fundamental "semantic gap" between rich perceptual data and discrete symbolic thought. Human cognition often transcends language, utilizing vision as a dynamic mental sketchpad. A similar evolution is now unfolding in AI, marking a fundamental paradigm shift from models that merely think about images to those that can truly think with images. This emerging paradigm is characterized by models leveraging visual information as intermediate steps in their thought process, transforming vision from a passive input into a dynamic, manipulable cognitive workspace. In this survey, we chart this evolution of intelligence along a trajectory of increasing cognitive autonomy, which unfolds across three key stages: from external tool exploration, through programmatic manipulation, to intrinsic imagination. To structure this rapidly evolving field, our survey makes four key contributions. (1) We establish the foundational principles of the think with image paradigm and its three-stage framework. (2) We provide a comprehensive review of the core methods that characterize each stage of this roadmap. (3) We analyze the critical landscape of evaluation benchmarks and transformative applications. (4) We identify significant challenges and outline promising future directions. By providing this structured overview, we aim to offer a clear roadmap for future research towards more powerful and human-aligned multimodal AI.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

The multimedia community has shown a significant interest in perceiving and representing the physical world with multimodal pretrained neural network models, and among them, the visual-language pertaining (VLP) is, currently, the most captivating topic. However, there have been few endeavors dedicated to the exploration of 1) whether essential linguistic knowledge (e.g., semantics and syntax) can be extracted during VLP, and 2) how such linguistic knowledge impact or enhance the multimodal alignment. In response, here we aim to elucidate the impact of comprehensive linguistic knowledge, including semantic expression and syntactic structure, on multimodal alignment. Specifically, we design and release the SNARE, the first large-scale multimodal alignment probing benchmark, to detect the vital linguistic components, e.g., lexical, semantic, and syntax knowledge, containing four tasks: Semantic structure, Negation logic, Attribute ownership, and Relationship composition. Based on our proposed probing benchmarks, our holistic analyses of five advanced VLP models illustrate that the VLP model: i) shows insensitivity towards complex syntax structures and relies on content words for sentence comprehension; ii) demonstrates limited comprehension of combinations between sentences and negations; iii) faces challenges in determining the presence of actions or spatial relationships within visual information and struggles with verifying the correctness of triple combinations. We make our benchmark and code available at https://github.com/WangFei-2019/SNARE/.

Attention Model has now become an important concept in neural networks that has been researched within diverse application domains. This survey provides a structured and comprehensive overview of the developments in modeling attention. In particular, we propose a taxonomy which groups existing techniques into coherent categories. We review salient neural architectures in which attention has been incorporated, and discuss applications in which modeling attention has shown a significant impact. We also describe how attention has been used to improve the interpretability of neural networks. Finally, we discuss some future research directions in attention. We hope this survey will provide a succinct introduction to attention models and guide practitioners while developing approaches for their applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are claimed to be capable of Natural Language Inference (NLI), necessary for applied tasks like question answering and summarization. We present a series of behavioral studies on several LLM families (LLaMA, GPT-3.5, and PaLM) which probe their behavior using controlled experiments. We establish two biases originating from pretraining which predict much of their behavior, and show that these are major sources of hallucination in generative LLMs. First, memorization at the level of sentences: we show that, regardless of the premise, models falsely label NLI test samples as entailing when the hypothesis is attested in training data, and that entities are used as ``indices'' to access the memorized data. Second, statistical patterns of usage learned at the level of corpora: we further show a similar effect when the premise predicate is less frequent than that of the hypothesis in the training data, a bias following from previous studies. We demonstrate that LLMs perform significantly worse on NLI test samples which do not conform to these biases than those which do, and we offer these as valuable controls for future LLM evaluation.

Representational spaces learned via language modeling are fundamental to Natural Language Processing (NLP), however there has been limited understanding regarding how and when during training various types of linguistic information emerge and interact. Leveraging a novel information theoretic probing suite, which enables direct comparisons of not just task performance, but their representational subspaces, we analyze nine tasks covering syntax, semantics and reasoning, across 2M pre-training steps and five seeds. We identify critical learning phases across tasks and time, during which subspaces emerge, share information, and later disentangle to specialize. Across these phases, syntactic knowledge is acquired rapidly after 0.5% of full training. Continued performance improvements primarily stem from the acquisition of open-domain knowledge, while semantics and reasoning tasks benefit from later boosts to long-range contextualization and higher specialization. Measuring cross-task similarity further reveals that linguistically related tasks share information throughout training, and do so more during the critical phase of learning than before or after. Our findings have implications for model interpretability, multi-task learning, and learning from limited data.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Many recent works have discussed the propensity, or lack thereof, for emergent languages to exhibit properties of natural languages. A favorite in the literature is learning compositionality. We note that most of those works have focused on communicative bandwidth as being of primary importance. While important, it is not the only contributing factor. In this paper, we investigate the learning biases that affect the efficacy and compositionality of emergent languages. Our foremost contribution is to explore how capacity of a neural network impacts its ability to learn a compositional language. We additionally introduce a set of evaluation metrics with which we analyze the learned languages. Our hypothesis is that there should be a specific range of model capacity and channel bandwidth that induces compositional structure in the resulting language and consequently encourages systematic generalization. While we empirically see evidence for the bottom of this range, we curiously do not find evidence for the top part of the range and believe that this is an open question for the community.

We argue that representations in AI models, particularly deep networks, are converging. First, we survey many examples of convergence in the literature: over time and across multiple domains, the ways by which different neural networks represent data are becoming more aligned. Next, we demonstrate convergence across data modalities: as vision models and language models get larger, they measure distance between datapoints in a more and more alike way. We hypothesize that this convergence is driving toward a shared statistical model of reality, akin to Plato's concept of an ideal reality. We term such a representation the platonic representation and discuss several possible selective pressures toward it. Finally, we discuss the implications of these trends, their limitations, and counterexamples to our analysis.

We investigate the internal structure of language model computations using causal analysis and demonstrate two motifs: (1) a form of adaptive computation where ablations of one attention layer of a language model cause another layer to compensate (which we term the Hydra effect) and (2) a counterbalancing function of late MLP layers that act to downregulate the maximum-likelihood token. Our ablation studies demonstrate that language model layers are typically relatively loosely coupled (ablations to one layer only affect a small number of downstream layers). Surprisingly, these effects occur even in language models trained without any form of dropout. We analyse these effects in the context of factual recall and consider their implications for circuit-level attribution in language models.

Large pre-trained neural networks such as BERT have had great recent success in NLP, motivating a growing body of research investigating what aspects of language they are able to learn from unlabeled data. Most recent analysis has focused on model outputs (e.g., language model surprisal) or internal vector representations (e.g., probing classifiers). Complementary to these works, we propose methods for analyzing the attention mechanisms of pre-trained models and apply them to BERT. BERT's attention heads exhibit patterns such as attending to delimiter tokens, specific positional offsets, or broadly attending over the whole sentence, with heads in the same layer often exhibiting similar behaviors. We further show that certain attention heads correspond well to linguistic notions of syntax and coreference. For example, we find heads that attend to the direct objects of verbs, determiners of nouns, objects of prepositions, and coreferent mentions with remarkably high accuracy. Lastly, we propose an attention-based probing classifier and use it to further demonstrate that substantial syntactic information is captured in BERT's attention.

Modern large language models (LLMs) employ various forms of logical inference, both implicitly and explicitly, when addressing reasoning tasks. Understanding how to optimally leverage these inference paradigms is critical for advancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities. This paper adopts an exploratory approach by introducing a controlled evaluation environment for analogical reasoning -- a fundamental cognitive task -- that is systematically parameterized across three dimensions: modality (textual, visual, symbolic), difficulty (easy, medium, hard), and task format (multiple-choice or free-text generation). We analyze the comparative dynamics of inductive, abductive, and deductive inference pipelines across these dimensions, and demonstrate that our findings generalize to broader in-context learning tasks. Additionally, we investigate advanced paradigms such as hypothesis selection, verification, and refinement, revealing their potential to scale up logical inference in LLM reasoning. This exploratory study provides a foundation for future research in enhancing LLM reasoning through systematic logical inference strategies.

People can categorize the same entity at multiple taxonomic levels, such as basic (bear), superordinate (animal), and subordinate (grizzly bear). While prior research has focused on basic-level categories, this study is the first attempt to examine the organization of categories by analyzing exemplars produced at the subordinate level. We present a new Italian psycholinguistic dataset of human-generated exemplars for 187 concrete words. We then use these data to evaluate whether textual and vision LLMs produce meaningful exemplars that align with human category organization across three key tasks: exemplar generation, category induction, and typicality judgment. Our findings show a low alignment between humans and LLMs, consistent with previous studies. However, their performance varies notably across different semantic domains. Ultimately, this study highlights both the promises and the constraints of using AI-generated exemplars to support psychological and linguistic research.

Recent works have argued that high-level semantic concepts are encoded "linearly" in the representation space of large language models. In this work, we study the origins of such linear representations. To that end, we introduce a simple latent variable model to abstract and formalize the concept dynamics of the next token prediction. We use this formalism to show that the next token prediction objective (softmax with cross-entropy) and the implicit bias of gradient descent together promote the linear representation of concepts. Experiments show that linear representations emerge when learning from data matching the latent variable model, confirming that this simple structure already suffices to yield linear representations. We additionally confirm some predictions of the theory using the LLaMA-2 large language model, giving evidence that the simplified model yields generalizable insights.

Mathematical reasoning---a core ability within human intelligence---presents some unique challenges as a domain: we do not come to understand and solve mathematical problems primarily on the back of experience and evidence, but on the basis of inferring, learning, and exploiting laws, axioms, and symbol manipulation rules. In this paper, we present a new challenge for the evaluation (and eventually the design) of neural architectures and similar system, developing a task suite of mathematics problems involving sequential questions and answers in a free-form textual input/output format. The structured nature of the mathematics domain, covering arithmetic, algebra, probability and calculus, enables the construction of training and test splits designed to clearly illuminate the capabilities and failure-modes of different architectures, as well as evaluate their ability to compose and relate knowledge and learned processes. Having described the data generation process and its potential future expansions, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of models from two broad classes of the most powerful sequence-to-sequence architectures and find notable differences in their ability to resolve mathematical problems and generalize their knowledge.

We present the Brain Treebank, a large-scale dataset of electrophysiological neural responses, recorded from intracranial probes while 10 subjects watched one or more Hollywood movies. Subjects watched on average 2.6 Hollywood movies, for an average viewing time of 4.3 hours, and a total of 43 hours. The audio track for each movie was transcribed with manual corrections. Word onsets were manually annotated on spectrograms of the audio track for each movie. Each transcript was automatically parsed and manually corrected into the universal dependencies (UD) formalism, assigning a part of speech to every word and a dependency parse to every sentence. In total, subjects heard over 38,000 sentences (223,000 words), while they had on average 168 electrodes implanted. This is the largest dataset of intracranial recordings featuring grounded naturalistic language, one of the largest English UD treebanks in general, and one of only a few UD treebanks aligned to multimodal features. We hope that this dataset serves as a bridge between linguistic concepts, perception, and their neural representations. To that end, we present an analysis of which electrodes are sensitive to language features while also mapping out a rough time course of language processing across these electrodes. The Brain Treebank is available at https://BrainTreebank.dev/

Do large language models (LLMs) solve reasoning tasks by learning robust generalizable algorithms, or do they memorize training data? To investigate this question, we use arithmetic reasoning as a representative task. Using causal analysis, we identify a subset of the model (a circuit) that explains most of the model's behavior for basic arithmetic logic and examine its functionality. By zooming in on the level of individual circuit neurons, we discover a sparse set of important neurons that implement simple heuristics. Each heuristic identifies a numerical input pattern and outputs corresponding answers. We hypothesize that the combination of these heuristic neurons is the mechanism used to produce correct arithmetic answers. To test this, we categorize each neuron into several heuristic types-such as neurons that activate when an operand falls within a certain range-and find that the unordered combination of these heuristic types is the mechanism that explains most of the model's accuracy on arithmetic prompts. Finally, we demonstrate that this mechanism appears as the main source of arithmetic accuracy early in training. Overall, our experimental results across several LLMs show that LLMs perform arithmetic using neither robust algorithms nor memorization; rather, they rely on a "bag of heuristics".

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities on not just language tasks, but also various tasks that are not linguistic in nature, such as logical reasoning and social inference. In the human brain, neuroscience has identified a core language system that selectively and causally supports language processing. We here ask whether similar specialization for language emerges in LLMs. We identify language-selective units within 18 popular LLMs, using the same localization approach that is used in neuroscience. We then establish the causal role of these units by demonstrating that ablating LLM language-selective units -- but not random units -- leads to drastic deficits in language tasks. Correspondingly, language-selective LLM units are more aligned to brain recordings from the human language system than random units. Finally, we investigate whether our localization method extends to other cognitive domains: while we find specialized networks in some LLMs for reasoning and social capabilities, there are substantial differences among models. These findings provide functional and causal evidence for specialization in large language models, and highlight parallels with the functional organization in the brain.

Hallucination has emerged as the most vulnerable aspect of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). In this paper, we introduce the Sorry, Come Again (SCA) prompting, aimed to avoid LLM hallucinations by enhancing comprehension through: (i) optimal paraphrasing and (ii) injecting [PAUSE] tokens to delay LLM generation. First, we provide an in-depth analysis of linguistic nuances: formality, readability, and concreteness of prompts for 21 LLMs, and elucidate how these nuances contribute to hallucinated generation. Prompts with lower readability, formality, or concreteness pose comprehension challenges for LLMs, similar to those faced by humans. In such scenarios, an LLM tends to speculate and generate content based on its imagination (associative memory) to fill these information gaps. Although these speculations may occasionally align with factual information, their accuracy is not assured, often resulting in hallucination. Recent studies reveal that an LLM often neglects the middle sections of extended prompts, a phenomenon termed as lost in the middle. While a specific paraphrase may suit one LLM, the same paraphrased version may elicit a different response from another LLM. Therefore, we propose an optimal paraphrasing technique to identify the most comprehensible paraphrase of a given prompt, evaluated using Integrated Gradient (and its variations) to guarantee that the LLM accurately processes all words. While reading lengthy sentences, humans often pause at various points to better comprehend the meaning read thus far. We have fine-tuned an LLM with injected [PAUSE] tokens, allowing the LLM to pause while reading lengthier prompts. This has brought several key contributions: (i) determining the optimal position to inject [PAUSE], (ii) determining the number of [PAUSE] tokens to be inserted, and (iii) introducing reverse proxy tuning to fine-tune the LLM for [PAUSE] insertion.

We show that existing unsupervised methods on large language model (LLM) activations do not discover knowledge -- instead they seem to discover whatever feature of the activations is most prominent. The idea behind unsupervised knowledge elicitation is that knowledge satisfies a consistency structure, which can be used to discover knowledge. We first prove theoretically that arbitrary features (not just knowledge) satisfy the consistency structure of a particular leading unsupervised knowledge-elicitation method, contrast-consistent search (Burns et al. - arXiv:2212.03827). We then present a series of experiments showing settings in which unsupervised methods result in classifiers that do not predict knowledge, but instead predict a different prominent feature. We conclude that existing unsupervised methods for discovering latent knowledge are insufficient, and we contribute sanity checks to apply to evaluating future knowledge elicitation methods. Conceptually, we hypothesise that the identification issues explored here, e.g. distinguishing a model's knowledge from that of a simulated character's, will persist for future unsupervised methods.

Mathematical reasoning in large language models (LMs) has garnered significant attention in recent work, but there is a limited understanding of how these models process and store information related to arithmetic tasks within their architecture. In order to improve our understanding of this aspect of language models, we present a mechanistic interpretation of Transformer-based LMs on arithmetic questions using a causal mediation analysis framework. By intervening on the activations of specific model components and measuring the resulting changes in predicted probabilities, we identify the subset of parameters responsible for specific predictions. This provides insights into how information related to arithmetic is processed by LMs. Our experimental results indicate that LMs process the input by transmitting the information relevant to the query from mid-sequence early layers to the final token using the attention mechanism. Then, this information is processed by a set of MLP modules, which generate result-related information that is incorporated into the residual stream. To assess the specificity of the observed activation dynamics, we compare the effects of different model components on arithmetic queries with other tasks, including number retrieval from prompts and factual knowledge questions.

Recent advances in Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) lead to significant breakthroughs in both academia and industry. One question that arises is how we, as humans, can understand their internal neural representations. This paper takes an initial step towards addressing this question by presenting a versatile framework to identify and interpret the semantics within LMMs. Specifically, 1) we first apply a Sparse Autoencoder(SAE) to disentangle the representations into human understandable features. 2) We then present an automatic interpretation framework to interpreted the open-semantic features learned in SAE by the LMMs themselves. We employ this framework to analyze the LLaVA-NeXT-8B model using the LLaVA-OV-72B model, demonstrating that these features can effectively steer the model's behavior. Our results contribute to a deeper understanding of why LMMs excel in specific tasks, including EQ tests, and illuminate the nature of their mistakes along with potential strategies for their rectification. These findings offer new insights into the internal mechanisms of LMMs and suggest parallels with the cognitive processes of the human brain.

Linear sequences of words are implicitly represented in our brains by hierarchical structures that organize the composition of words in sentences. Linguists formalize different frameworks to model this hierarchy; two of the most common syntactic frameworks are Constituency and Dependency. Constituency represents sentences as nested groups of phrases, while dependency represents a sentence by assigning relations between its words. Recently, the pursuit of intelligent machines has produced Language Models (LMs) capable of solving many language tasks with a human-level performance. Many studies now question whether LMs implicitly represent syntactic hierarchies. This thesis focuses on producing constituency and dependency structures from LMs in an unsupervised setting. I review the critical methods in this field and highlight a line of work that utilizes a numerical representation for binary constituency trees (Syntactic Distance). I present a detailed study on StructFormer (SF) (Shen et al., 2021), which retrofits a transformer encoder architecture with a parser network to produce constituency and dependency structures. I present six experiments to analyze and address this field's challenges; experiments include investigating the effect of repositioning the parser network within the SF architecture, evaluating subword-based induced trees, and benchmarking the models developed in the thesis experiments on linguistic tasks. Models benchmarking is performed by participating in the BabyLM challenge, published at CoNLL 2023 (Momen et al., 2023). The results of this thesis encourage further development in the direction of retrofitting transformer-based models to induce syntactic structures, supported by the acceptable performance of SF in different experimental settings and the observed limitations that require innovative solutions to advance the state of syntactic structure induction.

Natural language is an appealing medium for explaining how large language models process and store information, but evaluating the faithfulness of such explanations is challenging. To help address this, we develop two modes of evaluation for natural language explanations that claim individual neurons represent a concept in a text input. In the observational mode, we evaluate claims that a neuron a activates on all and only input strings that refer to a concept picked out by the proposed explanation E. In the intervention mode, we construe E as a claim that the neuron a is a causal mediator of the concept denoted by E. We apply our framework to the GPT-4-generated explanations of GPT-2 XL neurons of Bills et al. (2023) and show that even the most confident explanations have high error rates and little to no causal efficacy. We close the paper by critically assessing whether natural language is a good choice for explanations and whether neurons are the best level of analysis.

We report the presence of a simple neural mechanism that represents an input-output function as a vector within autoregressive transformer language models (LMs). Using causal mediation analysis on a diverse range of in-context-learning (ICL) tasks, we find that a small number attention heads transport a compact representation of the demonstrated task, which we call a function vector (FV). FVs are robust to changes in context, i.e., they trigger execution of the task on inputs such as zero-shot and natural text settings that do not resemble the ICL contexts from which they are collected. We test FVs across a range of tasks, models, and layers and find strong causal effects across settings in middle layers. We investigate the internal structure of FVs and find while that they often contain information that encodes the output space of the function, this information alone is not sufficient to reconstruct an FV. Finally, we test semantic vector composition in FVs, and find that to some extent they can be summed to create vectors that trigger new complex tasks. Taken together, our findings suggest that LLMs contain internal abstractions of general-purpose functions that can be invoked in a variety of contexts.

Compositional generalization is crucial for artificial intelligence agents to solve complex vision-language reasoning tasks. Neuro-symbolic approaches have demonstrated promise in capturing compositional structures, but they face critical challenges: (a) reliance on predefined predicates for symbolic representations that limit adaptability, (b) difficulty in extracting predicates from raw data, and (c) using non-differentiable operations for combining primitive concepts. To address these issues, we propose NeSyCoCo, a neuro-symbolic framework that leverages large language models (LLMs) to generate symbolic representations and map them to differentiable neural computations. NeSyCoCo introduces three innovations: (a) augmenting natural language inputs with dependency structures to enhance the alignment with symbolic representations, (b) employing distributed word representations to link diverse, linguistically motivated logical predicates to neural modules, and (c) using the soft composition of normalized predicate scores to align symbolic and differentiable reasoning. Our framework achieves state-of-the-art results on the ReaSCAN and CLEVR-CoGenT compositional generalization benchmarks and demonstrates robust performance with novel concepts in the CLEVR-SYN benchmark.

We investigate the capabilities of transformer large language models (LLMs) on relational reasoning tasks involving abstract symbols. Such tasks have long been studied in the neuroscience literature as fundamental building blocks for more complex abilities in programming, mathematics, and verbal reasoning. For (i) regression tasks, we prove that transformers generalize when trained, but require astonishingly large quantities of training data. For (ii) next-token-prediction tasks with symbolic labels, we show an "inverse scaling law": transformers fail to generalize as their embedding dimension increases. For both settings (i) and (ii), we propose subtle transformer modifications which can reduce the amount of data needed by adding two trainable parameters per head.

Recent advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable progress in visual understanding. This impressive leap raises a compelling question: how can language models, initially trained solely on linguistic data, effectively interpret and process visual content? This paper aims to address this question with systematic investigation across 4 model families and 4 model scales, uncovering a unique class of attention heads that focus specifically on visual content. Our analysis reveals a strong correlation between the behavior of these attention heads, the distribution of attention weights, and their concentration on visual tokens within the input. These findings enhance our understanding of how LLMs adapt to multimodal tasks, demonstrating their potential to bridge the gap between textual and visual understanding. This work paves the way for the development of AI systems capable of engaging with diverse modalities.

Toward combining inductive reasoning with perception abilities, we develop techniques for neurosymbolic program synthesis where perceptual input is first parsed by neural nets into a low-dimensional interpretable representation, which is then processed by a synthesized program. We explore several techniques for relaxing the problem and jointly learning all modules end-to-end with gradient descent: multitask learning; amortized inference; overparameterization; and a differentiable strategy for penalizing lengthy programs. Collectedly this toolbox improves the stability of gradient-guided program search, and suggests ways of learning both how to perceive input as discrete abstractions, and how to symbolically process those abstractions as programs.

Understanding which information is encoded in deep models of spoken and written language has been the focus of much research in recent years, as it is crucial for debugging and improving these architectures. Most previous work has focused on probing for speaker characteristics, acoustic and phonological information in models of spoken language, and for syntactic information in models of written language. Here we focus on the encoding of syntax in several self-supervised and visually grounded models of spoken language. We employ two complementary probing methods, combined with baselines and reference representations to quantify the degree to which syntactic structure is encoded in the activations of the target models. We show that syntax is captured most prominently in the middle layers of the networks, and more explicitly within models with more parameters.

Large language models (LLMs) are restricted to reason in the "language space", where they typically express the reasoning process with a chain-of-thought (CoT) to solve a complex reasoning problem. However, we argue that language space may not always be optimal for reasoning. For example, most word tokens are primarily for textual coherence and not essential for reasoning, while some critical tokens require complex planning and pose huge challenges to LLMs. To explore the potential of LLM reasoning in an unrestricted latent space instead of using natural language, we introduce a new paradigm Coconut (Chain of Continuous Thought). We utilize the last hidden state of the LLM as a representation of the reasoning state (termed "continuous thought"). Rather than decoding this into a word token, we feed it back to the LLM as the subsequent input embedding directly in the continuous space. Experiments show that Coconut can effectively augment the LLM on several reasoning tasks. This novel latent reasoning paradigm leads to emergent advanced reasoning patterns: the continuous thought can encode multiple alternative next reasoning steps, allowing the model to perform a breadth-first search (BFS) to solve the problem, rather than prematurely committing to a single deterministic path like CoT. Coconut outperforms CoT in certain logical reasoning tasks that require substantial backtracking during planning, with fewer thinking tokens during inference. These findings demonstrate the promise of latent reasoning and offer valuable insights for future research.

Despite the ubiquity of large language models (LLMs) in AI research, the question of embodiment in LLMs remains underexplored, distinguishing them from embodied systems in robotics where sensory perception directly informs physical action. Our investigation navigates the intriguing terrain of whether LLMs, despite their non-embodied nature, effectively capture implicit human intuitions about fundamental, spatial building blocks of language. We employ insights from spatial cognitive foundations developed through early sensorimotor experiences, guiding our exploration through the reproduction of three psycholinguistic experiments. Surprisingly, correlations between model outputs and human responses emerge, revealing adaptability without a tangible connection to embodied experiences. Notable distinctions include polarized language model responses and reduced correlations in vision language models. This research contributes to a nuanced understanding of the interplay between language, spatial experiences, and the computations made by large language models. More at https://cisnlp.github.io/Spatial_Schemas/

Attending to what is relevant is fundamental to both the mammalian brain and modern machine learning models such as Transformers. Yet, determining relevance remains a core challenge, traditionally offloaded to learning algorithms like backpropagation. Inspired by recent cellular neurobiological evidence linking neocortical pyramidal cells to distinct mental states, this work shows how models (e.g., Transformers) can emulate high-level perceptual processing and awake thought (imagination) states to pre-select relevant information before applying attention. Triadic neuronal-level modulation loops among questions (Q), clues (keys, K), and hypotheses (values, V) enable diverse, deep, parallel reasoning chains at the representation level and allow a rapid shift from initial biases to refined understanding. This leads to orders-of-magnitude faster learning with significantly reduced computational demand (e.g., fewer heads, layers, and tokens), at an approximate cost of O(N), where N is the number of input tokens. Results span reinforcement learning (e.g., CarRacing in a high-dimensional visual setup), computer vision, and natural language question answering.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have greatly propelled the progress in natural language(NL)-centric tasks based on NL interface. However, the NL form is not enough for world knowledge. Current works focus on this question by injecting specific symbolic knowledge into LLM, which ignore two critical challenges: the interrelations between various symbols and the balance between symbolic-centric and NL-centric capabilities. In this work, we tackle these challenges from both a data and framework perspective and introduce Symbol-LLM series models. First, we collect 34 symbolic tasks, covering ~20 different forms, which are unified to capture symbol interrelations. Then, a two-stage tuning framework succeeds in injecting symbolic knowledge without loss of the generality ability. Extensive experiments on both symbol- and NL-centric tasks demonstrate the balanced and superior performances of Symbol-LLM series models.

Recent work in mechanistic interpretability has shown that behaviors in language models can be successfully reverse-engineered through circuit analysis. A common criticism, however, is that each circuit is task-specific, and thus such analysis cannot contribute to understanding the models at a higher level. In this work, we present evidence that insights (both low-level findings about specific heads and higher-level findings about general algorithms) can indeed generalize across tasks. Specifically, we study the circuit discovered in Wang et al. (2022) for the Indirect Object Identification (IOI) task and 1.) show that it reproduces on a larger GPT2 model, and 2.) that it is mostly reused to solve a seemingly different task: Colored Objects (Ippolito & Callison-Burch, 2023). We provide evidence that the process underlying both tasks is functionally very similar, and contains about a 78% overlap in in-circuit attention heads. We further present a proof-of-concept intervention experiment, in which we adjust four attention heads in middle layers in order to 'repair' the Colored Objects circuit and make it behave like the IOI circuit. In doing so, we boost accuracy from 49.6% to 93.7% on the Colored Objects task and explain most sources of error. The intervention affects downstream attention heads in specific ways predicted by their interactions in the IOI circuit, indicating that this subcircuit behavior is invariant to the different task inputs. Overall, our results provide evidence that it may yet be possible to explain large language models' behavior in terms of a relatively small number of interpretable task-general algorithmic building blocks and computational components.

The ability to process long contexts is crucial for many natural language processing tasks, yet it remains a significant challenge. While substantial progress has been made in enhancing the efficiency of attention mechanisms, there is still a gap in understanding how attention heads function in long-context settings. In this paper, we observe that while certain heads consistently attend to local information only, others swing between attending to local and long-context information depending on the query. This raises the question: can we identify which heads require long-context information to predict the next token accurately? We demonstrate that it's possible to predict which heads are crucial for long-context processing using only local keys. The core idea here is to exploit a simple model for the long-context scores via second moment approximations. These findings unveil simple properties of attention in the context of long sequences, and open the door to potentially significant gains in efficiency.

A characteristic feature of human semantic cognition is its ability to not only store and retrieve the properties of concepts observed through experience, but to also facilitate the inheritance of properties (can breathe) from superordinate concepts (animal) to their subordinates (dog) -- i.e. demonstrate property inheritance. In this paper, we present COMPS, a collection of minimal pair sentences that jointly tests pre-trained language models (PLMs) on their ability to attribute properties to concepts and their ability to demonstrate property inheritance behavior. Analyses of 22 different PLMs on COMPS reveal that they can easily distinguish between concepts on the basis of a property when they are trivially different, but find it relatively difficult when concepts are related on the basis of nuanced knowledge representations. Furthermore, we find that PLMs can demonstrate behavior consistent with property inheritance to a great extent, but fail in the presence of distracting information, which decreases the performance of many models, sometimes even below chance. This lack of robustness in demonstrating simple reasoning raises important questions about PLMs' capacity to make correct inferences even when they appear to possess the prerequisite knowledge.

This paper proposes a novel framework for understanding large language models (LLMs) by reconceptualizing them as semiotic machines rather than as imitations of human cognition. Drawing from structuralist and post-structuralist theories of language-specifically the works of Ferdinand de Saussure and Jacques Derrida-I argue that LLMs should be understood as models of language itself, aligning with Derrida's concept of 'writing' (l'ecriture). The paper is structured into three parts. First, I lay the theoretical groundwork by explaining how the word2vec embedding algorithm operates within Saussure's framework of language as a relational system of signs. Second, I apply Derrida's critique of Saussure to position 'writing' as the object modeled by LLMs, offering a view of the machine's 'mind' as a statistical approximation of sign behavior. Finally, the third section addresses how modern LLMs reflect post-structuralist notions of unfixed meaning, arguing that the "next token generation" mechanism effectively captures the dynamic nature of meaning. By reconceptualizing LLMs as semiotic machines rather than cognitive models, this framework provides an alternative lens through which to assess the strengths and limitations of LLMs, offering new avenues for future research.

Understanding the connections between artificial and biological intelligent systems can reveal fundamental principles underlying general intelligence. While many artificial intelligence (AI) models have a neuroscience counterpart, such connections are largely missing in Transformer models and the self-attention mechanism. Here, we examine the relationship between attention heads and human episodic memory. We focus on the induction heads, which contribute to the in-context learning capabilities of Transformer-based large language models (LLMs). We demonstrate that induction heads are behaviorally, functionally, and mechanistically similar to the contextual maintenance and retrieval (CMR) model of human episodic memory. Our analyses of LLMs pre-trained on extensive text data show that CMR-like heads often emerge in the intermediate model layers and that their behavior qualitatively mirrors the memory biases seen in humans. Our findings uncover a parallel between the computational mechanisms of LLMs and human memory, offering valuable insights into both research fields.

While the ability of language models to elicit facts has been widely investigated, how they handle temporally changing facts remains underexplored. We discover Temporal Heads, specific attention heads primarily responsible for processing temporal knowledge through circuit analysis. We confirm that these heads are present across multiple models, though their specific locations may vary, and their responses differ depending on the type of knowledge and its corresponding years. Disabling these heads degrades the model's ability to recall time-specific knowledge while maintaining its general capabilities without compromising time-invariant and question-answering performances. Moreover, the heads are activated not only numeric conditions ("In 2004") but also textual aliases ("In the year ..."), indicating that they encode a temporal dimension beyond simple numerical representation. Furthermore, we expand the potential of our findings by demonstrating how temporal knowledge can be edited by adjusting the values of these heads.

The quest for human imitative AI has been an enduring topic in AI research since its inception. The technical evolution and emerging capabilities of the latest cohort of large language models (LLMs) have reinvigorated the subject beyond academia to the cultural zeitgeist. While recent NLP evaluation benchmark tasks test some aspects of human-imitative behaviour (e.g., BIG-bench's 'human-like behavior' tasks), few, if not none, examine creative problem solving abilities. Creative problem solving in humans is a well-studied topic in cognitive neuroscience with standardized tests that predominantly use the ability to associate (heterogeneous) connections among clue words as a metric for creativity. Exposure to misleading stimuli - distractors dubbed red herrings - impede human performance in such tasks via the fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm. In cognitive neuroscience studies, such fixations are experimentally induced by pre-exposing participants to orthographically similar incorrect words to subsequent word-fragments or clues. The popular British quiz show Only Connect's Connecting Wall segment essentially mimics Mednick's Remote Associates Test (RAT) formulation with built-in, deliberate red herrings, which makes it an ideal proxy dataset to explore and study fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm from cognitive neuroscience in LLMs. In addition to presenting the novel Only Connect Wall (OCW) dataset, we also report results from our evaluation of selected pre-trained language models and LLMs (including OpenAI's GPT series) on creative problem solving tasks like grouping clue words by heterogeneous connections, and identifying correct open knowledge domain connections in respective groups. The code and link to the dataset are available at https://github.com/TaatiTeam/OCW.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performances across a wide range of tasks. However, the mechanisms by which these models encode tasks of varying complexities remain poorly understood. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that LLMs process concepts of varying complexities in different layers, introducing the idea of "Concept Depth" to suggest that more complex concepts are typically acquired in deeper layers. Specifically, we categorize concepts based on their level of abstraction, defining them in the order of increasing complexity within factual, emotional, and inferential tasks. We conduct extensive probing experiments using layer-wise representations across various LLM families (Gemma, LLaMA, QWen) on various datasets spanning the three domains of tasks. Our findings reveal that models could efficiently conduct probing for simpler tasks in shallow layers, and more complex tasks typically necessitate deeper layers for accurate understanding. Additionally, we examine how external factors, such as adding noise to the input and quantizing the model weights, might affect layer-wise representations. Our findings suggest that these factors can impede the development of a conceptual understanding of LLMs until deeper layers are explored. We hope that our proposed concept and experimental insights will enhance the understanding of the mechanisms underlying LLMs. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Luckfort/CD.

Probing and enhancing large language models' reasoning capacity remains a crucial open question. Here we re-purpose the reverse dictionary task as a case study to probe LLMs' capacity for conceptual inference. We use in-context learning to guide the models to generate the term for an object concept implied in a linguistic description. Models robustly achieve high accuracy in this task, and their representation space encodes information about object categories and fine-grained features. Further experiments suggest that the conceptual inference ability as probed by the reverse-dictionary task predicts model's general reasoning performance across multiple benchmarks, despite similar syntactic generalization behaviors across models. Explorative analyses suggest that prompting LLMs with descriptionRightarrowword examples may induce generalization beyond surface-level differences in task construals and facilitate models on broader commonsense reasoning problems.

Understanding how humans conceptualize and categorize natural objects offers critical insights into perception and cognition. With the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs), a key question arises: can these models develop human-like object representations from linguistic and multimodal data? In this study, we combined behavioral and neuroimaging analyses to explore the relationship between object concept representations in LLMs and human cognition. We collected 4.7 million triplet judgments from LLMs and Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) to derive low-dimensional embeddings that capture the similarity structure of 1,854 natural objects. The resulting 66-dimensional embeddings were stable, predictive, and exhibited semantic clustering similar to human mental representations. Remarkably, the dimensions underlying these embeddings were interpretable, suggesting that LLMs and MLLMs develop human-like conceptual representations of objects. Further analysis showed strong alignment between model embeddings and neural activity patterns in brain regions such as EBA, PPA, RSC, and FFA. This provides compelling evidence that the object representations in LLMs, while not identical to human ones, share fundamental similarities that reflect key aspects of human conceptual knowledge. Our findings advance the understanding of machine intelligence and inform the development of more human-like artificial cognitive systems.

Recent studies of the applications of conversational AI tools, such as chatbots powered by large language models, to complex real-world knowledge work have shown limitations related to reasoning and multi-step problem solving. Specifically, while existing chatbots simulate shallow reasoning and understanding they are prone to errors as problem complexity increases. The failure of these systems to address complex knowledge work is due to the fact that they do not perform any actual cognition. In this position paper, we present Cognitive AI, a higher-level framework for implementing programmatically defined neuro-symbolic cognition above and outside of large language models. Specifically, we propose a dual-layer functional architecture for Cognitive AI that serves as a roadmap for AI systems that can perform complex multi-step knowledge work. We propose that Cognitive AI is a necessary precursor for the evolution of higher forms of AI, such as AGI, and specifically claim that AGI cannot be achieved by probabilistic approaches on their own. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for large language models, adoption cycles in AI, and commercial Cognitive AI development.

Current Large Language Models (LLMs) are unparalleled in their ability to generate grammatically correct, fluent text. LLMs are appearing rapidly, and debates on LLM capacities have taken off, but reflection is lagging behind. Thus, in this position paper, we first zoom in on the debate and critically assess three points recurring in critiques of LLM capacities: i) that LLMs only parrot statistical patterns in the training data; ii) that LLMs master formal but not functional language competence; and iii) that language learning in LLMs cannot inform human language learning. Drawing on empirical and theoretical arguments, we show that these points need more nuance. Second, we outline a pragmatic perspective on the issue of `real' understanding and intentionality in LLMs. Understanding and intentionality pertain to unobservable mental states we attribute to other humans because they have pragmatic value: they allow us to abstract away from complex underlying mechanics and predict behaviour effectively. We reflect on the circumstances under which it would make sense for humans to similarly attribute mental states to LLMs, thereby outlining a pragmatic philosophical context for LLMs as an increasingly prominent technology in society.

Autoregressive language models (LMs) generate one token at a time, yet human reasoning operates over higher-level abstractions - sentences, propositions, and concepts. This contrast raises a central question- Can LMs likewise learn to reason over structured semantic units rather than raw token sequences? In this work, we investigate whether pretrained LMs can be lifted into such abstract reasoning spaces by building on their learned representations. We present a framework that adapts a pretrained token-level LM to operate in sentence space by autoregressively predicting continuous embeddings of next sentences. We explore two embedding paradigms inspired by classical representation learning: 1) semantic embeddings, learned via autoencoding to preserve surface meaning; and 2) contextual embeddings, trained via next-sentence prediction to encode anticipatory structure. We evaluate both under two inference regimes: Discretized, which decodes each predicted embedding into text before re-encoding; and Continuous, which reasons entirely in embedding space for improved efficiency. Across four domains - mathematics, logic, commonsense, and planning - contextual embeddings under continuous inference show competitive performance with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) while reducing inference-time FLOPs on average by half. We also present early signs of scalability and modular adaptation. Finally, to visualize latent trajectories, we introduce SentenceLens, a diagnostic tool that decodes intermediate model states into interpretable sentences. Together, our results indicate that pretrained LMs can effectively transition to abstract, structured reasoning within latent embedding spaces.

Abstract grammatical knowledge - of parts of speech and grammatical patterns - is key to the capacity for linguistic generalization in humans. But how abstract is grammatical knowledge in large language models? In the human literature, compelling evidence for grammatical abstraction comes from structural priming. A sentence that shares the same grammatical structure as a preceding sentence is processed and produced more readily. Because confounds exist when using stimuli in a single language, evidence of abstraction is even more compelling from crosslingual structural priming, where use of a syntactic structure in one language primes an analogous structure in another language. We measure crosslingual structural priming in large language models, comparing model behavior to human experimental results from eight crosslingual experiments covering six languages, and four monolingual structural priming experiments in three non-English languages. We find evidence for abstract monolingual and crosslingual grammatical representations in the models that function similarly to those found in humans. These results demonstrate that grammatical representations in multilingual language models are not only similar across languages, but they can causally influence text produced in different languages.

Recent advancements in large language models have showcased their remarkable generalizability across various domains. However, their reasoning abilities still have significant room for improvement, especially when confronted with scenarios requiring multi-step reasoning. Although large language models possess extensive knowledge, their behavior, particularly in terms of reasoning, often fails to effectively utilize this knowledge to establish a coherent thinking paradigm. Generative language models sometimes show hallucinations as their reasoning procedures are unconstrained by logical principles. Aiming to improve the zero-shot chain-of-thought reasoning ability of large language models, we propose Logical Chain-of-Thought (LogiCoT), a neurosymbolic framework that leverages principles from symbolic logic to verify and revise the reasoning processes accordingly. Experimental evaluations conducted on language tasks in diverse domains, including arithmetic, commonsense, symbolic, causal inference, and social problems, demonstrate the efficacy of the enhanced reasoning paradigm by logic.

The dominant paradigm for neural text generation is left-to-right decoding from autoregressive language models. Constrained or controllable generation under complex lexical constraints, however, requires foresight to plan ahead feasible future paths. Drawing inspiration from the A* search algorithm, we propose NeuroLogic A*esque, a decoding algorithm that incorporates heuristic estimates of future cost. We develop efficient lookahead heuristics that are efficient for large-scale language models, making our method a drop-in replacement for common techniques such as beam search and top-k sampling. To enable constrained generation, we build on NeuroLogic decoding (Lu et al., 2021), combining its flexibility in incorporating logical constraints with A*esque estimates of future constraint satisfaction. Our approach outperforms competitive baselines on five generation tasks, and achieves new state-of-the-art performance on table-to-text generation, constrained machine translation, and keyword-constrained generation. The improvements are particularly notable on tasks that require complex constraint satisfaction or in few-shot or zero-shot settings. NeuroLogic A*esque illustrates the power of decoding for improving and enabling new capabilities of large-scale language models.

Autoregressive transformer language models (LMs) possess strong syntactic abilities, often successfully handling phenomena from agreement to NPI licensing. However, the features they use to incrementally process language inputs are not well understood. In this paper, we fill this gap by studying the mechanisms underlying garden path sentence processing in LMs. We ask: (1) Do LMs use syntactic features or shallow heuristics to perform incremental sentence processing? (2) Do LMs represent only one potential interpretation, or multiple? and (3) Do LMs reanalyze or repair their initial incorrect representations? To address these questions, we use sparse autoencoders to identify interpretable features that determine which continuation - and thus which reading - of a garden path sentence the LM prefers. We find that while many important features relate to syntactic structure, some reflect syntactically irrelevant heuristics. Moreover, while most active features correspond to one reading of the sentence, some features correspond to the other, suggesting that LMs assign weight to both possibilities simultaneously. Finally, LMs do not re-use features from garden path sentence processing to answer follow-up questions.

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

Large-scale pretrained language models (LMs) are said to ``lack the ability to connect utterances to the world'' (Bender and Koller, 2020), because they do not have ``mental models of the world' '(Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023). If so, one would expect LM representations to be unrelated to representations induced by vision models. We present an empirical evaluation across four families of LMs (BERT, GPT-2, OPT and LLaMA-2) and three vision model architectures (ResNet, SegFormer, and MAE). Our experiments show that LMs partially converge towards representations isomorphic to those of vision models, subject to dispersion, polysemy and frequency. This has important implications for both multi-modal processing and the LM understanding debate (Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023).

The ability to derive underlying principles from a handful of observations and then generalize to novel situations -- known as inductive reasoning -- is central to human intelligence. Prior work suggests that language models (LMs) often fall short on inductive reasoning, despite achieving impressive success on research benchmarks. In this work, we conduct a systematic study of the inductive reasoning capabilities of LMs through iterative hypothesis refinement, a technique that more closely mirrors the human inductive process than standard input-output prompting. Iterative hypothesis refinement employs a three-step process: proposing, selecting, and refining hypotheses in the form of textual rules. By examining the intermediate rules, we observe that LMs are phenomenal hypothesis proposers (i.e., generating candidate rules), and when coupled with a (task-specific) symbolic interpreter that is able to systematically filter the proposed set of rules, this hybrid approach achieves strong results across inductive reasoning benchmarks that require inducing causal relations, language-like instructions, and symbolic concepts. However, they also behave as puzzling inductive reasoners, showing notable performance gaps between rule induction (i.e., identifying plausible rules) and rule application (i.e., applying proposed rules to instances), suggesting that LMs are proposing hypotheses without being able to actually apply the rules. Through empirical and human analyses, we further reveal several discrepancies between the inductive reasoning processes of LMs and humans, shedding light on both the potentials and limitations of using LMs in inductive reasoning tasks.

This paper explores the integration of two AI subdisciplines employed in the development of artificial agents that exhibit intelligent behavior: Large Language Models (LLMs) and Cognitive Architectures (CAs). We present three integration approaches, each grounded in theoretical models and supported by preliminary empirical evidence. The modular approach, which introduces four models with varying degrees of integration, makes use of chain-of-thought prompting, and draws inspiration from augmented LLMs, the Common Model of Cognition, and the simulation theory of cognition. The agency approach, motivated by the Society of Mind theory and the LIDA cognitive architecture, proposes the formation of agent collections that interact at micro and macro cognitive levels, driven by either LLMs or symbolic components. The neuro-symbolic approach, which takes inspiration from the CLARION cognitive architecture, proposes a model where bottom-up learning extracts symbolic representations from an LLM layer and top-down guidance utilizes symbolic representations to direct prompt engineering in the LLM layer. These approaches aim to harness the strengths of both LLMs and CAs, while mitigating their weaknesses, thereby advancing the development of more robust AI systems. We discuss the tradeoffs and challenges associated with each approach.

We investigate the internal representations of vision-and-language models (VLMs) and how they encode task representations. We consider tasks specified through examples or instructions, using either text or image inputs. Surprisingly, we find that conceptually similar tasks are mapped to similar task vector representations, regardless of how they are specified. Our findings suggest that to output answers, tokens in VLMs undergo three distinct phases: input, task, and answer, a process which is consistent across different modalities and specifications. The task vectors we identify in VLMs are general enough to be derived in one modality (e.g., text) and transferred to another (e.g., image). Additionally, we find that ensembling exemplar and instruction based task vectors produce better task representations. Taken together, these insights shed light on the underlying mechanisms of VLMs, particularly their ability to represent tasks in a shared manner across different modalities and task specifications. Project page: https://task-vectors-are-cross-modal.github.io.

Large language models encapsulate knowledge and have demonstrated superior performance on various natural language processing tasks. Recent studies have localized this knowledge to specific model parameters, such as the MLP weights in intermediate layers. This study investigates the differences between entity and relational knowledge through knowledge editing. Our findings reveal that entity and relational knowledge cannot be directly transferred or mapped to each other. This result is unexpected, as logically, modifying the entity or the relation within the same knowledge triplet should yield equivalent outcomes. To further elucidate the differences between entity and relational knowledge, we employ causal analysis to investigate how relational knowledge is stored in pre-trained models. Contrary to prior research suggesting that knowledge is stored in MLP weights, our experiments demonstrate that relational knowledge is also significantly encoded in attention modules. This insight highlights the multifaceted nature of knowledge storage in language models, underscoring the complexity of manipulating specific types of knowledge within these models.

Several studies have explored the mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) in coding tasks, but most have focused on programming languages (PLs) in a monolingual setting. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between multiple PLs and English in the concept space of LLMs. We perform a few-shot translation task on 21 PL pairs using two Llama-based models. By decoding the embeddings of intermediate layers during this task, we observe that the concept space is closer to English (including PL keywords) and assigns high probabilities to English tokens in the second half of the intermediate layers. We analyze neuron activations for 11 PLs and English, finding that while language-specific neurons are primarily concentrated in the bottom layers, those exclusive to each PL tend to appear in the top layers. For PLs that are highly aligned with multiple other PLs, identifying language-specific neurons is not feasible. These PLs also tend to have a larger keyword set than other PLs and are closer to the model's concept space regardless of the input/output PL in the translation task. Our findings provide insights into how LLMs internally represent PLs, revealing structural patterns in the model's concept space. Code is available at https://github.com/cisnlp/code-specific-neurons.

Despite their powerful chat, coding, and reasoning abilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) frequently hallucinate. Conventional wisdom suggests that hallucinations are a consequence of a balance between creativity and factuality, which can be mitigated, but not eliminated, by grounding the LLM in external knowledge sources. Through extensive systematic experiments, we show that these traditional approaches fail to explain why LLMs hallucinate in practice. Specifically, we show that LLMs augmented with a massive Mixture of Memory Experts (MoME) can easily memorize large datasets of random numbers. We corroborate these experimental findings with a theoretical construction showing that simple neural networks trained to predict the next token hallucinate when the training loss is above a threshold as it usually does in practice when training on internet scale data. We interpret our findings by comparing against traditional retrieval methods for mitigating hallucinations. We use our findings to design a first generation model for removing hallucinations -- Lamini-1 -- that stores facts in a massive mixture of millions of memory experts that are retrieved dynamically.

In the era of Large Language Models (LLMs), alignment has emerged as a fundamental yet challenging problem in the pursuit of more reliable, controllable, and capable machine intelligence. The recent success of reasoning models and conversational AI systems has underscored the critical role of reinforcement learning (RL) in enhancing these systems, driving increased research interest at the intersection of RL and LLM alignment. This paper provides a comprehensive review of recent advances in LLM alignment through the lens of inverse reinforcement learning (IRL), emphasizing the distinctions between RL techniques employed in LLM alignment and those in conventional RL tasks. In particular, we highlight the necessity of constructing neural reward models from human data and discuss the formal and practical implications of this paradigm shift. We begin by introducing fundamental concepts in RL to provide a foundation for readers unfamiliar with the field. We then examine recent advances in this research agenda, discussing key challenges and opportunities in conducting IRL for LLM alignment. Beyond methodological considerations, we explore practical aspects, including datasets, benchmarks, evaluation metrics, infrastructure, and computationally efficient training and inference techniques. Finally, we draw insights from the literature on sparse-reward RL to identify open questions and potential research directions. By synthesizing findings from diverse studies, we aim to provide a structured and critical overview of the field, highlight unresolved challenges, and outline promising future directions for improving LLM alignment through RL and IRL techniques.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes fail to respond appropriately to deterministic tasks -- such as counting or forming acronyms -- because the implicit prior distribution they have learned over sequences of tokens influences their responses. In this work, we show that, in at least some cases, LLMs actually compute the information needed to perform these tasks correctly, and we identify some interventions that can allow them to access this information to improve their performance. First, we show that simply prompting the language model to not rely on its prior knowledge leads to dramatic improvements in prior-dominated tasks. We then use mechanistic interpretability techniques to localize the prior within the LLM and manipulate the extent to which that prior influences its responses. Specifically, we show that it is possible to identify layers of the underlying neural network that correlate with the prior probability of a response and that lightweight finetuning of these layers with basic prompts on prior-dominated tasks achieves high performance on held-out answers. These results suggest that the information required to produce a correct response is contained within the representations of the problems formed by the models. Furthermore, we show that this finetuning is significantly more effective for prior-dominated tasks, and that the error after finetuning is no longer correlated with the prior. Our results suggest that it may be possible to define effective methods for manipulating the extent to which LLMs rely upon their priors in solving problems, potentially increasing their performance in settings where LLMs hallucinate for reasons related to the prior probability of token sequences.

We ask whether multilingual language models trained on unbalanced, English-dominated corpora use English as an internal pivot language -- a question of key importance for understanding how language models function and the origins of linguistic bias. Focusing on the Llama-2 family of transformer models, our study uses carefully constructed non-English prompts with a unique correct single-token continuation. From layer to layer, transformers gradually map an input embedding of the final prompt token to an output embedding from which next-token probabilities are computed. Tracking intermediate embeddings through their high-dimensional space reveals three distinct phases, whereby intermediate embeddings (1) start far away from output token embeddings; (2) already allow for decoding a semantically correct next token in the middle layers, but give higher probability to its version in English than in the input language; (3) finally move into an input-language-specific region of the embedding space. We cast these results into a conceptual model where the three phases operate in "input space", "concept space", and "output space", respectively. Crucially, our evidence suggests that the abstract "concept space" lies closer to English than to other languages, which may have important consequences regarding the biases held by multilingual language models.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

We observe an empirical phenomenon in Large Language Models (LLMs) -- very few activations exhibit significantly larger values than others (e.g., 100,000 times larger). We call them massive activations. First, we demonstrate the widespread existence of massive activations across various LLMs and characterize their locations. Second, we find their values largely stay constant regardless of the input, and they function as indispensable bias terms in LLMs. Third, these massive activations lead to the concentration of attention probabilities to their corresponding tokens, and further, implicit bias terms in the self-attention output. Last, we also study massive activations in Vision Transformers. Code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/massive-activations.

"Induction heads" are attention heads that implement a simple algorithm to complete token sequences like [A][B] ... [A] -> [B]. In this work, we present preliminary and indirect evidence for a hypothesis that induction heads might constitute the mechanism for the majority of all "in-context learning" in large transformer models (i.e. decreasing loss at increasing token indices). We find that induction heads develop at precisely the same point as a sudden sharp increase in in-context learning ability, visible as a bump in the training loss. We present six complementary lines of evidence, arguing that induction heads may be the mechanistic source of general in-context learning in transformer models of any size. For small attention-only models, we present strong, causal evidence; for larger models with MLPs, we present correlational evidence.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

We study the fractal structure of language, aiming to provide a precise formalism for quantifying properties that may have been previously suspected but not formally shown. We establish that language is: (1) self-similar, exhibiting complexities at all levels of granularity, with no particular characteristic context length, and (2) long-range dependent (LRD), with a Hurst parameter of approximately H=0.70. Based on these findings, we argue that short-term patterns/dependencies in language, such as in paragraphs, mirror the patterns/dependencies over larger scopes, like entire documents. This may shed some light on how next-token prediction can lead to a comprehension of the structure of text at multiple levels of granularity, from words and clauses to broader contexts and intents. We also demonstrate that fractal parameters improve upon perplexity-based bits-per-byte (BPB) in predicting downstream performance. We hope these findings offer a fresh perspective on language and the mechanisms underlying the success of LLMs.

Recent developments in Large Language Models (LLMs) have shifted from pre-training scaling to post-training and test-time scaling. Across these developments, a key unified paradigm has arisen: Learning from Rewards, where reward signals act as the guiding stars to steer LLM behavior. It has underpinned a wide range of prevalent techniques, such as reinforcement learning (in RLHF, DPO, and GRPO), reward-guided decoding, and post-hoc correction. Crucially, this paradigm enables the transition from passive learning from static data to active learning from dynamic feedback. This endows LLMs with aligned preferences and deep reasoning capabilities. In this survey, we present a comprehensive overview of the paradigm of learning from rewards. We categorize and analyze the strategies under this paradigm across training, inference, and post-inference stages. We further discuss the benchmarks for reward models and the primary applications. Finally we highlight the challenges and future directions. We maintain a paper collection at https://github.com/bobxwu/learning-from-rewards-llm-papers.

Despite the recent progress in long-context language models, it remains elusive how transformer-based models exhibit the capability to retrieve relevant information from arbitrary locations within the long context. This paper aims to address this question. Our systematic investigation across a wide spectrum of models reveals that a special type of attention heads are largely responsible for retrieving information, which we dub retrieval heads. We identify intriguing properties of retrieval heads:(1) universal: all the explored models with long-context capability have a set of retrieval heads; (2) sparse: only a small portion (less than 5\%) of the attention heads are retrieval. (3) intrinsic: retrieval heads already exist in models pretrained with short context. When extending the context length by continual pretraining, it is still the same set of heads that perform information retrieval. (4) dynamically activated: take Llama-2 7B for example, 12 retrieval heads always attend to the required information no matter how the context is changed. The rest of the retrieval heads are activated in different contexts. (5) causal: completely pruning retrieval heads leads to failure in retrieving relevant information and results in hallucination, while pruning random non-retrieval heads does not affect the model's retrieval ability. We further show that retrieval heads strongly influence chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, where the model needs to frequently refer back the question and previously-generated context. Conversely, tasks where the model directly generates the answer using its intrinsic knowledge are less impacted by masking out retrieval heads. These observations collectively explain which internal part of the model seeks information from the input tokens. We believe our insights will foster future research on reducing hallucination, improving reasoning, and compressing the KV cache.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a quantitative framework for explaining consciousness phenomenon, positing that conscious systems comprise elements integrated through causal properties. We apply IIT 3.0 and 4.0 -- the latest iterations of this framework -- to sequences of Large Language Model (LLM) representations, analyzing data derived from existing Theory of Mind (ToM) test results. Our study systematically investigates whether the differences of ToM test performances, when presented in the LLM representations, can be revealed by IIT estimates, i.e., Phi^{max} (IIT 3.0), Phi (IIT 4.0), Conceptual Information (IIT 3.0), and Phi-structure (IIT 4.0). Furthermore, we compare these metrics with the Span Representations independent of any estimate for consciousness. This additional effort aims to differentiate between potential "consciousness" phenomena and inherent separations within LLM representational space. We conduct comprehensive experiments examining variations across LLM transformer layers and linguistic spans from stimuli. Our results suggest that sequences of contemporary Transformer-based LLM representations lack statistically significant indicators of observed "consciousness" phenomena but exhibit intriguing patterns under spatio-permutational analyses. The Appendix and code are available as Supplementary Materials at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163.

Informally, the 'linear representation hypothesis' is the idea that high-level concepts are represented linearly as directions in some representation space. In this paper, we address two closely related questions: What does "linear representation" actually mean? And, how do we make sense of geometric notions (e.g., cosine similarity or projection) in the representation space? To answer these, we use the language of counterfactuals to give two formalizations of "linear representation", one in the output (word) representation space, and one in the input (sentence) space. We then prove these connect to linear probing and model steering, respectively. To make sense of geometric notions, we use the formalization to identify a particular (non-Euclidean) inner product that respects language structure in a sense we make precise. Using this causal inner product, we show how to unify all notions of linear representation. In particular, this allows the construction of probes and steering vectors using counterfactual pairs. Experiments with LLaMA-2 demonstrate the existence of linear representations of concepts, the connection to interpretation and control, and the fundamental role of the choice of inner product.

To correctly use in-context information, language models (LMs) must bind entities to their attributes. For example, given a context describing a "green square" and a "blue circle", LMs must bind the shapes to their respective colors. We analyze LM representations and identify the binding ID mechanism: a general mechanism for solving the binding problem, which we observe in every sufficiently large model from the Pythia and LLaMA families. Using causal interventions, we show that LMs' internal activations represent binding information by attaching binding ID vectors to corresponding entities and attributes. We further show that binding ID vectors form a continuous subspace, in which distances between binding ID vectors reflect their discernability. Overall, our results uncover interpretable strategies in LMs for representing symbolic knowledge in-context, providing a step towards understanding general in-context reasoning in large-scale LMs.

We propose a new learning paradigm called Deep Memory. It has the potential to completely revolutionize the Machine Learning field. Surprisingly, this paradigm has not been reinvented yet, unlike Deep Learning. At the core of this approach is the Learning By Heart principle, well studied in primary schools all over the world. Inspired by poem recitation, or by pi decimal memorization, we propose a concrete algorithm that mimics human behavior. We implement this paradigm on the task of generative modeling, and apply to images, natural language and even the pi decimals as long as one can print them as text. The proposed algorithm even generated this paper, in a one-shot learning setting. In carefully designed experiments, we show that the generated samples are indistinguishable from the training examples, as measured by any statistical tests or metrics.

In the burgeoning field of artificial intelligence (AI), the unprecedented progress of large language models (LLMs) in natural language processing (NLP) offers an opportunity to revisit the entire approach of traditional metrics of machine intelligence, both in form and content. As the realm of machine cognitive evaluation has already reached Imitation, the next step is an efficient Language Acquisition and Understanding. Our paper proposes a paradigm shift from the established Turing Test towards an all-embracing framework that hinges on language acquisition, taking inspiration from the recent advancements in LLMs. The present contribution is deeply tributary of the excellent work from various disciplines, point out the need to keep interdisciplinary bridges open, and delineates a more robust and sustainable approach.

Language models show a surprising range of capabilities, but the source of their apparent competence is unclear. Do these networks just memorize a collection of surface statistics, or do they rely on internal representations of the process that generates the sequences they see? We investigate this question by applying a variant of the GPT model to the task of predicting legal moves in a simple board game, Othello. Although the network has no a priori knowledge of the game or its rules, we uncover evidence of an emergent nonlinear internal representation of the board state. Interventional experiments indicate this representation can be used to control the output of the network and create "latent saliency maps" that can help explain predictions in human terms.

Research on emergent patterns in Large Language Models (LLMs) has gained significant traction in both psychology and artificial intelligence, motivating the need for a comprehensive review that offers a synthesis of this complex landscape. In this article, we systematically review LLMs' capabilities across three important cognitive domains: decision-making biases, reasoning, and creativity. We use empirical studies drawing on established psychological tests and compare LLMs' performance to human benchmarks. On decision-making, our synthesis reveals that while LLMs demonstrate several human-like biases, some biases observed in humans are absent, indicating cognitive patterns that only partially align with human decision-making. On reasoning, advanced LLMs like GPT-4 exhibit deliberative reasoning akin to human System-2 thinking, while smaller models fall short of human-level performance. A distinct dichotomy emerges in creativity: while LLMs excel in language-based creative tasks, such as storytelling, they struggle with divergent thinking tasks that require real-world context. Nonetheless, studies suggest that LLMs hold considerable potential as collaborators, augmenting creativity in human-machine problem-solving settings. Discussing key limitations, we also offer guidance for future research in areas such as memory, attention, and open-source model development.

Can large language models (LLMs) implement computations of psychopathology? An effective approach to the question hinges on addressing two factors. First, for conceptual validity, we require a general and computational account of psychopathology that is applicable to computational entities without biological embodiment or subjective experience. Second, mechanisms underlying LLM behaviors need to be studied for better methodological validity. Thus, we establish a computational-theoretical framework to provide an account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs. To ground the theory for empirical analysis, we also propose a novel mechanistic interpretability method alongside a tailored empirical analytic framework. Based on the frameworks, we conduct experiments demonstrating three key claims: first, that distinct dysfunctional and problematic representational states are implemented in LLMs; second, that their activations can spread and self-sustain to trap LLMs; and third, that dynamic, cyclic structural causal models encoded in the LLMs underpin these patterns. In concert, the empirical results corroborate our hypothesis that network-theoretic computations of psychopathology have already emerged in LLMs. This suggests that certain LLM behaviors mirroring psychopathology may not be a superficial mimicry but a feature of their internal processing. Thus, our work alludes to the possibility of AI systems with psychopathological behaviors in the near future.

We aim to understand grokking, a phenomenon where models generalize long after overfitting their training set. We present both a microscopic analysis anchored by an effective theory and a macroscopic analysis of phase diagrams describing learning performance across hyperparameters. We find that generalization originates from structured representations whose training dynamics and dependence on training set size can be predicted by our effective theory in a toy setting. We observe empirically the presence of four learning phases: comprehension, grokking, memorization, and confusion. We find representation learning to occur only in a "Goldilocks zone" (including comprehension and grokking) between memorization and confusion. We find on transformers the grokking phase stays closer to the memorization phase (compared to the comprehension phase), leading to delayed generalization. The Goldilocks phase is reminiscent of "intelligence from starvation" in Darwinian evolution, where resource limitations drive discovery of more efficient solutions. This study not only provides intuitive explanations of the origin of grokking, but also highlights the usefulness of physics-inspired tools, e.g., effective theories and phase diagrams, for understanding deep learning.

Since the advent of ChatGPT, Large Language Models (LLMs) have excelled in various tasks but remain largely as black-box systems. Consequently, their development relies heavily on data-driven approaches, limiting performance enhancement through changes in internal architecture and reasoning pathways. As a result, many researchers have begun exploring the potential internal mechanisms of LLMs, aiming to identify the essence of their reasoning bottlenecks, with most studies focusing on attention heads. Our survey aims to shed light on the internal reasoning processes of LLMs by concentrating on the interpretability and underlying mechanisms of attention heads. We first distill the human thought process into a four-stage framework: Knowledge Recalling, In-Context Identification, Latent Reasoning, and Expression Preparation. Using this framework, we systematically review existing research to identify and categorize the functions of specific attention heads. Furthermore, we summarize the experimental methodologies used to discover these special heads, dividing them into two categories: Modeling-Free methods and Modeling-Required methods. Also, we outline relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks. Finally, we discuss the limitations of current research and propose several potential future directions. Our reference list is open-sourced at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/Awesome-Attention-Heads.

Word-by-word language model surprisal is often used to model the incremental processing of human readers, which raises questions about how various choices in language modeling influence its predictive power. One factor that has been overlooked in cognitive modeling is the granularity of subword tokens, which explicitly encodes information about word length and frequency, and ultimately influences the quality of vector representations that are learned. This paper presents experiments that manipulate the token granularity and evaluate its impact on the ability of surprisal to account for processing difficulty of naturalistic text and garden-path constructions. Experiments with naturalistic reading times reveal a substantial influence of token granularity on surprisal, with tokens defined by a vocabulary size of 8,000 resulting in surprisal that is most predictive. In contrast, on garden-path constructions, language models trained on coarser-grained tokens generally assigned higher surprisal to critical regions, suggesting their increased sensitivity to syntax. Taken together, these results suggest a large role of token granularity on the quality of language model surprisal for cognitive modeling.

While interpretability research has shed light on some internal algorithms utilized by transformer-based LLMs, reasoning in natural language, with its deep contextuality and ambiguity, defies easy categorization. As a result, formulating clear and motivating questions for circuit analysis that rely on well-defined in-domain and out-of-domain examples required for causal interventions is challenging. Although significant work has investigated circuits for specific tasks, such as indirect object identification (IOI), deciphering natural language reasoning through circuits remains difficult due to its inherent complexity. In this work, we take initial steps to characterize causal reasoning in LLMs by analyzing clear-cut cause-and-effect sentences like "I opened an umbrella because it started raining," where causal interventions may be possible through carefully crafted scenarios using GPT-2 small. Our findings indicate that causal syntax is localized within the first 2-3 layers, while certain heads in later layers exhibit heightened sensitivity to nonsensical variations of causal sentences. This suggests that models may infer reasoning by (1) detecting syntactic cues and (2) isolating distinct heads in the final layers that focus on semantic relationships.

We consider concept generalization at a large scale in the diverse and natural visual spectrum. Established computational modes (i.e., rule-based or similarity-based) are primarily studied isolated and focus on confined and abstract problem spaces. In this work, we study these two modes when the problem space scales up, and the complexity of concepts becomes diverse. Specifically, at the representational level, we seek to answer how the complexity varies when a visual concept is mapped to the representation space. Prior psychology literature has shown that two types of complexities (i.e., subjective complexity and visual complexity) (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2003) build an inverted-U relation (Donderi, 2006; Sun and Firestone, 2021). Leveraging Representativeness of Attribute (RoA), we computationally confirm the following observation: Models use attributes with high RoA to describe visual concepts, and the description length falls in an inverted-U relation with the increment in visual complexity. At the computational level, we aim to answer how the complexity of representation affects the shift between the rule- and similarity-based generalization. We hypothesize that category-conditioned visual modeling estimates the co-occurrence frequency between visual and categorical attributes, thus potentially serving as the prior for the natural visual world. Experimental results show that representations with relatively high subjective complexity outperform those with relatively low subjective complexity in the rule-based generalization, while the trend is the opposite in the similarity-based generalization.

Most interpretability research in NLP focuses on understanding the behavior and features of a fully trained model. However, certain insights into model behavior may only be accessible by observing the trajectory of the training process. We present a case study of syntax acquisition in masked language models (MLMs) that demonstrates how analyzing the evolution of interpretable artifacts throughout training deepens our understanding of emergent behavior. In particular, we study Syntactic Attention Structure (SAS), a naturally emerging property of MLMs wherein specific Transformer heads tend to focus on specific syntactic relations. We identify a brief window in pretraining when models abruptly acquire SAS, concurrent with a steep drop in loss. This breakthrough precipitates the subsequent acquisition of linguistic capabilities. We then examine the causal role of SAS by manipulating SAS during training, and demonstrate that SAS is necessary for the development of grammatical capabilities. We further find that SAS competes with other beneficial traits during training, and that briefly suppressing SAS improves model quality. These findings offer an interpretation of a real-world example of both simplicity bias and breakthrough training dynamics.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

We propose an alternate approach to quantifying how well language models learn natural language: we ask how well they match the statistical tendencies of natural language. To answer this question, we analyze whether text generated from language models exhibits the statistical tendencies present in the human-generated text on which they were trained. We provide a framework--paired with significance tests--for evaluating the fit of language models to these trends. We find that neural language models appear to learn only a subset of the tendencies considered, but align much more closely with empirical trends than proposed theoretical distributions (when present). Further, the fit to different distributions is highly-dependent on both model architecture and generation strategy. As concrete examples, text generated under the nucleus sampling scheme adheres more closely to the type--token relationship of natural language than text produced using standard ancestral sampling; text from LSTMs reflects the natural language distributions over length, stopwords, and symbols surprisingly well.

We introduce KiloGram, a resource for studying abstract visual reasoning in humans and machines. Drawing on the history of tangram puzzles as stimuli in cognitive science, we build a richly annotated dataset that, with >1k distinct stimuli, is orders of magnitude larger and more diverse than prior resources. It is both visually and linguistically richer, moving beyond whole shape descriptions to include segmentation maps and part labels. We use this resource to evaluate the abstract visual reasoning capacities of recent multi-modal models. We observe that pre-trained weights demonstrate limited abstract reasoning, which dramatically improves with fine-tuning. We also observe that explicitly describing parts aids abstract reasoning for both humans and models, especially when jointly encoding the linguistic and visual inputs. KiloGram is available at https://lil.nlp.cornell.edu/kilogram .

How does language inform our downstream thinking? In particular, how do humans make meaning from language -- and how can we leverage a theory of linguistic meaning to build machines that think in more human-like ways? In this paper, we propose rational meaning construction, a computational framework for language-informed thinking that combines neural models of language with probabilistic models for rational inference. We frame linguistic meaning as a context-sensitive mapping from natural language into a probabilistic language of thought (PLoT) -- a general-purpose symbolic substrate for probabilistic, generative world modeling. Our architecture integrates two powerful computational tools that have not previously come together: we model thinking with probabilistic programs, an expressive representation for flexible commonsense reasoning; and we model meaning construction with large language models (LLMs), which support broad-coverage translation from natural language utterances to code expressions in a probabilistic programming language. We illustrate our framework in action through examples covering four core domains from cognitive science: probabilistic reasoning, logical and relational reasoning, visual and physical reasoning, and social reasoning about agents and their plans. In each, we show that LLMs can generate context-sensitive translations that capture pragmatically-appropriate linguistic meanings, while Bayesian inference with the generated programs supports coherent and robust commonsense reasoning. We extend our framework to integrate cognitively-motivated symbolic modules to provide a unified commonsense thinking interface from language. Finally, we explore how language can drive the construction of world models themselves.

The evaluation of LLMs has so far focused primarily on how well they can perform different tasks such as reasoning, question-answering, paraphrasing, or translating. For most of these tasks, performance can be measured with objective metrics, such as the number of correct answers. However, other language features are not easily quantified. For example, arousal, concreteness, or gender associated with a given word, as well as the extent to which we experience words with senses and relate them to a specific sense. Those features have been studied for many years by psycholinguistics, conducting large-scale experiments with humans to produce ratings for thousands of words. This opens an opportunity to evaluate how well LLMs align with human ratings on these word features, taking advantage of existing studies that cover many different language features in a large number of words. In this paper, we evaluate the alignment of a representative group of LLMs with human ratings on two psycholinguistic datasets: the Glasgow and Lancaster norms. These datasets cover thirteen features over thousands of words. The results show that alignment is black{generally} better in the Glasgow norms evaluated (arousal, valence, dominance, concreteness, imageability, familiarity, and gender) than on the Lancaster norms evaluated (introceptive, gustatory, olfactory, haptic, auditory, and visual). This suggests a potential limitation of current LLMs in aligning with human sensory associations for words, which may be due to their lack of embodied cognition present in humans and illustrates the usefulness of evaluating LLMs with psycholinguistic datasets.

The capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have sparked debate over whether such systems just learn an enormous collection of superficial statistics or a coherent model of the data generating process -- a world model. We find evidence for the latter by analyzing the learned representations of three spatial datasets (world, US, NYC places) and three temporal datasets (historical figures, artworks, news headlines) in the Llama-2 family of models. We discover that LLMs learn linear representations of space and time across multiple scales. These representations are robust to prompting variations and unified across different entity types (e.g. cities and landmarks). In addition, we identify individual ``space neurons'' and ``time neurons'' that reliably encode spatial and temporal coordinates. Our analysis demonstrates that modern LLMs acquire structured knowledge about fundamental dimensions such as space and time, supporting the view that they learn not merely superficial statistics, but literal world models.

Reasoning large language models have recently achieved state-of-the-art performance in many fields. However, their long-form chain-of-thought reasoning creates interpretability challenges as each generated token depends on all previous ones, making the computation harder to decompose. We argue that analyzing reasoning traces at the sentence level is a promising approach to understanding reasoning processes. We present three complementary attribution methods: (1) a black-box method measuring each sentence's counterfactual importance by comparing final answers across 100 rollouts conditioned on the model generating that sentence or one with a different meaning; (2) a white-box method of aggregating attention patterns between pairs of sentences, which identified ``broadcasting'' sentences that receive disproportionate attention from all future sentences via ``receiver'' attention heads; (3) a causal attribution method measuring logical connections between sentences by suppressing attention toward one sentence and measuring the effect on each future sentence's tokens. Each method provides evidence for the existence of thought anchors, reasoning steps that have outsized importance and that disproportionately influence the subsequent reasoning process. These thought anchors are typically planning or backtracking sentences. We provide an open-source tool (www.thought-anchors.com) for visualizing the outputs of our methods, and present a case study showing converging patterns across methods that map how a model performs multi-step reasoning. The consistency across methods demonstrates the potential of sentence-level analysis for a deeper understanding of reasoning models.

The semantic matching capabilities of neural information retrieval can ameliorate synonymy and polysemy problems of symbolic approaches. However, neural models' dense representations are more suitable for re-ranking, due to their inefficiency. Sparse representations, either in symbolic or latent form, are more efficient with an inverted index. Taking the merits of the sparse and dense representations, we propose an ultra-high dimensional (UHD) representation scheme equipped with directly controllable sparsity. UHD's large capacity and minimal noise and interference among the dimensions allow for binarized representations, which are highly efficient for storage and search. Also proposed is a bucketing method, where the embeddings from multiple layers of BERT are selected/merged to represent diverse linguistic aspects. We test our models with MS MARCO and TREC CAR, showing that our models outperforms other sparse models

As we consider entrusting Large Language Models (LLMs) with key societal and decision-making roles, measuring their alignment with human cognition becomes critical. This requires methods that can assess how these systems represent information and facilitate comparisons to human understanding across diverse tasks. To meet this need, we developed Turing Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA), a method that uses pairwise similarity ratings to quantify alignment between AIs and humans. We tested this approach on semantic alignment across text and image modalities, measuring how different Large Language and Vision Language Model (LLM and VLM) similarity judgments aligned with human responses at both group and individual levels. GPT-4o showed the strongest alignment with human performance among the models we tested, particularly when leveraging its text processing capabilities rather than image processing, regardless of the input modality. However, no model we studied adequately captured the inter-individual variability observed among human participants. This method helped uncover certain hyperparameters and prompts that could steer model behavior to have more or less human-like qualities at an inter-individual or group level. Turing RSA enables the efficient and flexible quantification of human-AI alignment and complements existing accuracy-based benchmark tasks. We demonstrate its utility across multiple modalities (words, sentences, images) for understanding how LLMs encode knowledge and for examining representational alignment with human cognition.

Circuit analysis is a promising technique for understanding the internal mechanisms of language models. However, existing analyses are done in small models far from the state of the art. To address this, we present a case study of circuit analysis in the 70B Chinchilla model, aiming to test the scalability of circuit analysis. In particular, we study multiple-choice question answering, and investigate Chinchilla's capability to identify the correct answer label given knowledge of the correct answer text. We find that the existing techniques of logit attribution, attention pattern visualization, and activation patching naturally scale to Chinchilla, allowing us to identify and categorize a small set of `output nodes' (attention heads and MLPs). We further study the `correct letter' category of attention heads aiming to understand the semantics of their features, with mixed results. For normal multiple-choice question answers, we significantly compress the query, key and value subspaces of the head without loss of performance when operating on the answer labels for multiple-choice questions, and we show that the query and key subspaces represent an `Nth item in an enumeration' feature to at least some extent. However, when we attempt to use this explanation to understand the heads' behaviour on a more general distribution including randomized answer labels, we find that it is only a partial explanation, suggesting there is more to learn about the operation of `correct letter' heads on multiple choice question answering.

Humans organize knowledge into compact categories through semantic compression by mapping diverse instances to abstract representations while preserving meaning (e.g., robin and blue jay are both birds; most birds can fly). These concepts reflect a trade-off between expressive fidelity and representational simplicity. Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable linguistic abilities, yet whether their internal representations strike a human-like trade-off between compression and semantic fidelity is unclear. We introduce a novel information-theoretic framework, drawing from Rate-Distortion Theory and the Information Bottleneck principle, to quantitatively compare these strategies. Analyzing token embeddings from a diverse suite of LLMs against seminal human categorization benchmarks, we uncover key divergences. While LLMs form broad conceptual categories that align with human judgment, they struggle to capture the fine-grained semantic distinctions crucial for human understanding. More fundamentally, LLMs demonstrate a strong bias towards aggressive statistical compression, whereas human conceptual systems appear to prioritize adaptive nuance and contextual richness, even if this results in lower compressional efficiency by our measures. These findings illuminate critical differences between current AI and human cognitive architectures, guiding pathways toward LLMs with more human-aligned conceptual representations.

Evaluating whether vision-language models (VLMs) reason consistently across representations is challenging because modality comparisons are typically confounded by task differences and asymmetric information. We introduce SEAM, a benchmark that pairs semantically equivalent inputs across four domains that have existing standardized textual and visual notations. By employing distinct notation systems across modalities, in contrast to OCR-based image-text pairing, SEAM provides a rigorous comparative assessment of the textual-symbolic and visual-spatial reasoning capabilities of VLMs. Across 21 contemporary models, we observe systematic modality imbalance: vision frequently lags language in overall performance, despite the problems containing semantically equivalent information, and cross-modal agreement is relatively low. Our error analysis reveals two main drivers: textual perception failures from tokenization in domain notation and visual perception failures that induce hallucinations. We also show that our results are largely robust to visual transformations. SEAM establishes a controlled, semantically equivalent setting for measuring and improving modality-agnostic reasoning.

Attention heads are one of the building blocks of large language models (LLMs). Prior work on investigating their operation mostly focused on analyzing their behavior during inference for specific circuits or tasks. In this work, we seek a comprehensive mapping of the operations they implement in a model. We propose MAPS (Mapping Attention head ParameterS), an efficient framework that infers the functionality of attention heads from their parameters, without any model training or inference. We showcase the utility of MAPS for answering two types of questions: (a) given a predefined operation, mapping how strongly heads across the model implement it, and (b) given an attention head, inferring its salient functionality. Evaluating MAPS on 20 operations across 6 popular LLMs shows its estimations correlate with the head's outputs during inference and are causally linked to the model's predictions. Moreover, its mappings reveal attention heads of certain operations that were overlooked in previous studies, and valuable insights on function universality and architecture biases in LLMs. Next, we present an automatic pipeline and analysis that leverage MAPS to characterize the salient operations of a given head. Our pipeline produces plausible operation descriptions for most heads, as assessed by human judgment, while revealing diverse operations.

Most large language models are trained on linguistic input alone, yet humans appear to ground their understanding of words in sensorimotor experience. A natural solution is to augment LM representations with human judgments of a word's sensorimotor associations (e.g., the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms), but this raises another challenge: most words are ambiguous, and judgments of words in isolation fail to account for this multiplicity of meaning (e.g., "wooden table" vs. "data table"). We attempted to address this problem by building a new lexical resource of contextualized sensorimotor judgments for 112 English words, each rated in four different contexts (448 sentences total). We show that these ratings encode overlapping but distinct information from the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms, and that they also predict other measures of interest (e.g., relatedness), above and beyond measures derived from BERT. Beyond shedding light on theoretical questions, we suggest that these ratings could be of use as a "challenge set" for researchers building grounded language models.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Recent work has shown that large text-based neural language models, trained with conventional supervised learning objectives, acquire a surprising propensity for few- and one-shot learning. Here, we show that an embodied agent situated in a simulated 3D world, and endowed with a novel dual-coding external memory, can exhibit similar one-shot word learning when trained with conventional reinforcement learning algorithms. After a single introduction to a novel object via continuous visual perception and a language prompt ("This is a dax"), the agent can re-identify the object and manipulate it as instructed ("Put the dax on the bed"). In doing so, it seamlessly integrates short-term, within-episode knowledge of the appropriate referent for the word "dax" with long-term lexical and motor knowledge acquired across episodes (i.e. "bed" and "putting"). We find that, under certain training conditions and with a particular memory writing mechanism, the agent's one-shot word-object binding generalizes to novel exemplars within the same ShapeNet category, and is effective in settings with unfamiliar numbers of objects. We further show how dual-coding memory can be exploited as a signal for intrinsic motivation, stimulating the agent to seek names for objects that may be useful for later executing instructions. Together, the results demonstrate that deep neural networks can exploit meta-learning, episodic memory and an explicitly multi-modal environment to account for 'fast-mapping', a fundamental pillar of human cognitive development and a potentially transformative capacity for agents that interact with human users.

Certain statistical models are capable of interpreting input strings as instructions, or prompts, and carry out tasks based on them. Many approaches to prompting and pre-training these models involve the automated generation of these prompts. We call these approaches meta-prompting, or prompting to obtain prompts. We propose a theoretical framework based on category theory to generalize and describe them. This framework is flexible enough to account for LLM stochasticity; and allows us to obtain formal results around task agnosticity and equivalence of various meta-prompting approaches. We experiment with meta-prompting in two active areas of model research: creativity and ideation. We find that user preference favors (p < 0.01) the prompts generated under meta-prompting, as well as their corresponding outputs, over a series of hardcoded baseline prompts that include the original task prompt. Using our framework, we argue that meta-prompting is more effective than basic prompting at generating desirable outputs.

In our opinion the exuberance surrounding the relative success of data-driven large language models (LLMs) is slightly misguided and for several reasons (i) LLMs cannot be relied upon for factual information since for LLMs all ingested text (factual or non-factual) was created equal; (ii) due to their subsymbolic na-ture, whatever 'knowledge' these models acquire about language will always be buried in billions of microfeatures (weights), none of which is meaningful on its own; and (iii) LLMs will often fail to make the correct inferences in several linguistic contexts (e.g., nominal compounds, copredication, quantifier scope ambi-guities, intensional contexts. Since we believe the relative success of data-driven large language models (LLMs) is not a reflection on the symbolic vs. subsymbol-ic debate but a reflection on applying the successful strategy of a bottom-up reverse engineering of language at scale, we suggest in this paper applying the effective bottom-up strategy in a symbolic setting resulting in symbolic, explainable, and ontologically grounded language models.

Humans excel at learning abstract patterns across different sequences, filtering out irrelevant details, and transferring these generalized concepts to new sequences. In contrast, many sequence learning models lack the ability to abstract, which leads to memory inefficiency and poor transfer. We introduce a non-parametric hierarchical variable learning model (HVM) that learns chunks from sequences and abstracts contextually similar chunks as variables. HVM efficiently organizes memory while uncovering abstractions, leading to compact sequence representations. When learning on language datasets such as babyLM, HVM learns a more efficient dictionary than standard compression algorithms such as Lempel-Ziv. In a sequence recall task requiring the acquisition and transfer of variables embedded in sequences, we demonstrate HVM's sequence likelihood correlates with human recall times. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) struggle to transfer abstract variables as effectively as humans. From HVM's adjustable layer of abstraction, we demonstrate that the model realizes a precise trade-off between compression and generalization. Our work offers a cognitive model that captures the learning and transfer of abstract representations in human cognition and differentiates itself from LLMs.

Learning arguably involves the discovery and memorization of abstract rules. The aim of this paper is to study associative memory mechanisms. Our model is based on high-dimensional matrices consisting of outer products of embeddings, which relates to the inner layers of transformer language models. We derive precise scaling laws with respect to sample size and parameter size, and discuss the statistical efficiency of different estimators, including optimization-based algorithms. We provide extensive numerical experiments to validate and interpret theoretical results, including fine-grained visualizations of the stored memory associations.

We present evidence that language models can learn meaning despite being trained only to perform next token prediction on text, specifically a corpus of programs. Each program is preceded by a specification in the form of (textual) input-output examples. Working with programs enables us to precisely define concepts relevant to meaning in language (e.g., correctness and semantics), making program synthesis well-suited as an intermediate testbed for characterizing the presence (or absence) of meaning in language models. We first train a Transformer model on the corpus of programs, then probe the trained model's hidden states as it completes a program given a specification. Despite providing no inductive bias toward learning the semantics of the language, we find that a linear probe is able to extract abstractions of both current and future program states from the model states. Moreover, there is a strong, statistically significant correlation between the accuracy of the probe and the model's ability to generate a program that implements the specification. To evaluate whether the semantics are represented in the model states rather than learned by the probe, we design a novel experimental procedure that intervenes on the semantics of the language while preserving the lexicon and syntax. We also demonstrate that the model learns to generate correct programs that are, on average, shorter than those in the training set, which is evidence that language model outputs may differ from the training distribution in semantically meaningful ways. In summary, this paper does not propose any new techniques for training language models, but develops an experimental framework for and provides insights into the acquisition and representation of (formal) meaning in language models.

State-of-the-art solutions in the areas of "Language Modelling & Generating Text", "Speech Recognition", "Generating Image Descriptions" or "Video Tagging" have been using Recurrent Neural Networks as the foundation for their approaches. Understanding the underlying concepts is therefore of tremendous importance if we want to keep up with recent or upcoming publications in those areas. In this work we give a short overview over some of the most important concepts in the realm of Recurrent Neural Networks which enables readers to easily understand the fundamentals such as but not limited to "Backpropagation through Time" or "Long Short-Term Memory Units" as well as some of the more recent advances like the "Attention Mechanism" or "Pointer Networks". We also give recommendations for further reading regarding more complex topics where it is necessary.

A critical component of a successful language generation pipeline is the decoding algorithm. However, the general principles that should guide the choice of decoding algorithm remain unclear. Previous works only compare decoding algorithms in narrow scenarios and their findings do not generalize across tasks. To better structure the discussion, we introduce a taxonomy that groups decoding strategies based on their implicit assumptions about how well the model's likelihood is aligned with the task-specific notion of utility. We argue that this taxonomy allows a broader view of the decoding problem and can lead to generalizable statements because it is grounded on the interplay between the decoding algorithms and the likelihood-utility misalignment. Specifically, by analyzing the correlation between the likelihood and the utility of predictions across a diverse set of tasks, we provide the first empirical evidence supporting the proposed taxonomy, and a set of principles to structure reasoning when choosing a decoding algorithm. Crucially, our analysis is the first one to relate likelihood-based decoding strategies with strategies that rely on external information such as value-guided methods and prompting, and covers the most diverse set of tasks up-to-date.

Why do large language models sometimes output factual inaccuracies and exhibit erroneous reasoning? The brittleness of these models, particularly when executing long chains of reasoning, currently seems to be an inevitable price to pay for their advanced capabilities of coherently synthesizing knowledge, pragmatics, and abstract thought. Towards making sense of this fundamentally unsolved problem, this work identifies and analyzes the phenomenon of attention glitches, in which the Transformer architecture's inductive biases intermittently fail to capture robust reasoning. To isolate the issue, we introduce flip-flop language modeling (FFLM), a parametric family of synthetic benchmarks designed to probe the extrapolative behavior of neural language models. This simple generative task requires a model to copy binary symbols over long-range dependencies, ignoring the tokens in between. We find that Transformer FFLMs suffer from a long tail of sporadic reasoning errors, some of which we can eliminate using various regularization techniques. Our preliminary mechanistic analyses show why the remaining errors may be very difficult to diagnose and resolve. We hypothesize that attention glitches account for (some of) the closed-domain hallucinations in natural LLMs.

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have reshaped our world with significant advancements in science, engineering, and society through applications ranging from scientific discoveries and medical diagnostics to Chatbots. Despite their ubiquity and utility, the underlying mechanisms of LLM remain concealed within billions of parameters and complex structures, making their inner architecture and cognitive processes challenging to comprehend. We address this gap by adopting approaches to understanding emerging cognition in biology and developing a network-based framework that links cognitive skills, LLM architectures, and datasets, ushering in a paradigm shift in foundation model analysis. The skill distribution in the module communities demonstrates that while LLMs do not strictly parallel the focalized specialization observed in specific biological systems, they exhibit unique communities of modules whose emergent skill patterns partially mirror the distributed yet interconnected cognitive organization seen in avian and small mammalian brains. Our numerical results highlight a key divergence from biological systems to LLMs, where skill acquisition benefits substantially from dynamic, cross-regional interactions and neural plasticity. By integrating cognitive science principles with machine learning, our framework provides new insights into LLM interpretability and suggests that effective fine-tuning strategies should leverage distributed learning dynamics rather than rigid modular interventions.

Semantic code search is the task of retrieving a code snippet given a textual description of its functionality. Recent work has been focused on using similarity metrics between neural embeddings of text and code. However, current language models are known to struggle with longer, compositional text, and multi-step reasoning. To overcome this limitation, we propose supplementing the query sentence with a layout of its semantic structure. The semantic layout is used to break down the final reasoning decision into a series of lower-level decisions. We use a Neural Module Network architecture to implement this idea. We compare our model - NS3 (Neuro-Symbolic Semantic Search) - to a number of baselines, including state-of-the-art semantic code retrieval methods, and evaluate on two datasets - CodeSearchNet and Code Search and Question Answering. We demonstrate that our approach results in more precise code retrieval, and we study the effectiveness of our modular design when handling compositional queries.

A language model (LM) is a mapping from a linguistic context to an output token. However, much remains to be known about this mapping, including how its geometric properties relate to its function. We take a high-level geometric approach to its analysis, observing, across five pre-trained transformer-based LMs and three input datasets, a distinct phase characterized by high intrinsic dimensionality. During this phase, representations (1) correspond to the first full linguistic abstraction of the input; (2) are the first to viably transfer to downstream tasks; (3) predict each other across different LMs. Moreover, we find that an earlier onset of the phase strongly predicts better language modelling performance. In short, our results suggest that a central high-dimensionality phase underlies core linguistic processing in many common LM architectures.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

Recent work has proposed the linear representation hypothesis: that language models perform computation by manipulating one-dimensional representations of concepts ("features") in activation space. In contrast, we explore whether some language model representations may be inherently multi-dimensional. We begin by developing a rigorous definition of irreducible multi-dimensional features based on whether they can be decomposed into either independent or non-co-occurring lower-dimensional features. Motivated by these definitions, we design a scalable method that uses sparse autoencoders to automatically find multi-dimensional features in GPT-2 and Mistral 7B. These auto-discovered features include strikingly interpretable examples, e.g. circular features representing days of the week and months of the year. We identify tasks where these exact circles are used to solve computational problems involving modular arithmetic in days of the week and months of the year. Finally, we provide evidence that these circular features are indeed the fundamental unit of computation in these tasks with intervention experiments on Mistral 7B and Llama 3 8B, and we find further circular representations by breaking down the hidden states for these tasks into interpretable components.

Large language models display remarkable capabilities in logical and mathematical reasoning, allowing them to solve complex tasks. Interestingly, these abilities emerge in networks trained on the simple task of next-token prediction. In this work, we present a theoretical framework for studying auto-regressive next-token predictors. We demonstrate that even simple models such as linear next-token predictors, trained on Chain-of-Thought (CoT) data, can approximate any function efficiently computed by a Turing machine. We introduce a new complexity measure -- length complexity -- which measures the number of intermediate tokens in a CoT sequence required to approximate some target function, and analyze the interplay between length complexity and other notions of complexity. Finally, we show experimentally that simple next-token predictors, such as linear networks and shallow Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs), display non-trivial performance on text generation and arithmetic tasks. Our results demonstrate that the power of language models can be attributed, to a great extent, to the auto-regressive next-token training scheme, and not necessarily to a particular choice of architecture.

We investigate the mechanisms of factual recall in the Mamba state space model. Our work is inspired by previous findings in autoregressive transformer language models suggesting that their knowledge recall is localized to particular modules at specific token locations; we therefore ask whether factual recall in Mamba can be similarly localized. To investigate this, we conduct four lines of experiments on Mamba. First, we apply causal tracing or interchange interventions to localize key components inside Mamba that are responsible for recalling facts, revealing that specific components within middle layers show strong causal effects at the last token of the subject, while the causal effect of intervening on later layers is most pronounced at the last token of the prompt, matching previous findings on autoregressive transformers. Second, we show that rank-one model editing methods can successfully insert facts at specific locations, again resembling findings on transformer models. Third, we examine the linearity of Mamba's representations of factual relations. Finally we adapt attention-knockout techniques to Mamba to dissect information flow during factual recall. We compare Mamba directly to a similar-sized transformer and conclude that despite significant differences in architectural approach, when it comes to factual recall, the two architectures share many similarities.

Individual neurons participate in the representation of multiple high-level concepts. To what extent can different interpretability methods successfully disentangle these roles? To help address this question, we introduce RAVEL (Resolving Attribute-Value Entanglements in Language Models), a dataset that enables tightly controlled, quantitative comparisons between a variety of existing interpretability methods. We use the resulting conceptual framework to define the new method of Multi-task Distributed Alignment Search (MDAS), which allows us to find distributed representations satisfying multiple causal criteria. With Llama2-7B as the target language model, MDAS achieves state-of-the-art results on RAVEL, demonstrating the importance of going beyond neuron-level analyses to identify features distributed across activations. We release our benchmark at https://github.com/explanare/ravel.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance on multimodal tasks, without any multimodal finetuning. They are the building block for Large Multimodal Models, yet, we still lack a proper understanding of their success. In this work, we expose frozen LLMs to image, video, audio and text inputs and analyse their internal representation aiming to understand their generalization beyond textual inputs. Findings. Perceptual tokens (1) are easily distinguishable from textual ones inside LLMs, with significantly different representations, and complete translation to textual tokens does not exist. Yet, (2) both perceptual and textual tokens activate similar LLM weights. Despite being different, (3) perceptual and textual tokens are implicitly aligned inside LLMs, we call this the implicit multimodal alignment (IMA), and argue that this is linked to architectural design, helping LLMs to generalize. This provide more evidence to believe that the generalization of LLMs to multimodal inputs is mainly due to their architecture. Implications. (1) We find a positive correlation between the implicit alignment score and the task performance, suggesting that this could act as a proxy metric for model evaluation and selection. (2) A negative correlation exists regarding hallucinations, revealing that this problem is mainly due to misalignment between the internal perceptual and textual representations. (3) Perceptual tokens change slightly throughout the model, thus, we propose different approaches to skip computations (e.g. in FFN layers), and significantly reduce the inference cost. (4) Due to the slowly changing embeddings across layers, and the high overlap between textual and multimodal activated weights, we compress LLMs by keeping only 1 subnetwork that works well across a wide range of multimodal tasks. Paper code: https://github.com/mshukor/ima-lmms.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

We study whether Large Language Models (LLMs) latently perform multi-hop reasoning with complex prompts such as "The mother of the singer of 'Superstition' is". We look for evidence of a latent reasoning pathway where an LLM (1) latently identifies "the singer of 'Superstition'" as Stevie Wonder, the bridge entity, and (2) uses its knowledge of Stevie Wonder's mother to complete the prompt. We analyze these two hops individually and consider their co-occurrence as indicative of latent multi-hop reasoning. For the first hop, we test if changing the prompt to indirectly mention the bridge entity instead of any other entity increases the LLM's internal recall of the bridge entity. For the second hop, we test if increasing this recall causes the LLM to better utilize what it knows about the bridge entity. We find strong evidence of latent multi-hop reasoning for the prompts of certain relation types, with the reasoning pathway used in more than 80% of the prompts. However, the utilization is highly contextual, varying across different types of prompts. Also, on average, the evidence for the second hop and the full multi-hop traversal is rather moderate and only substantial for the first hop. Moreover, we find a clear scaling trend with increasing model size for the first hop of reasoning but not for the second hop. Our experimental findings suggest potential challenges and opportunities for future development and applications of LLMs.

The primary paradigm for multi-task training in natural language processing is to represent the input with a shared pre-trained language model, and add a small, thin network (head) per task. Given an input, a target head is the head that is selected for outputting the final prediction. In this work, we examine the behaviour of non-target heads, that is, the output of heads when given input that belongs to a different task than the one they were trained for. We find that non-target heads exhibit emergent behaviour, which may either explain the target task, or generalize beyond their original task. For example, in a numerical reasoning task, a span extraction head extracts from the input the arguments to a computation that results in a number generated by a target generative head. In addition, a summarization head that is trained with a target question answering head, outputs query-based summaries when given a question and a context from which the answer is to be extracted. This emergent behaviour suggests that multi-task training leads to non-trivial extrapolation of skills, which can be harnessed for interpretability and generalization.

When a language model is trained to predict natural language sequences, its prediction at each moment depends on a representation of prior context. What kind of information about the prior context can language models retrieve? We tested whether language models could retrieve the exact words that occurred previously in a text. In our paradigm, language models (transformers and an LSTM) processed English text in which a list of nouns occurred twice. We operationalized retrieval as the reduction in surprisal from the first to the second list. We found that the transformers retrieved both the identity and ordering of nouns from the first list. Further, the transformers' retrieval was markedly enhanced when they were trained on a larger corpus and with greater model depth. Lastly, their ability to index prior tokens was dependent on learned attention patterns. In contrast, the LSTM exhibited less precise retrieval, which was limited to list-initial tokens and to short intervening texts. The LSTM's retrieval was not sensitive to the order of nouns and it improved when the list was semantically coherent. We conclude that transformers implemented something akin to a working memory system that could flexibly retrieve individual token representations across arbitrary delays; conversely, the LSTM maintained a coarser and more rapidly-decaying semantic gist of prior tokens, weighted toward the earliest items.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive reasoning abilities, yet their reliance on structured step-by-step processing reveals a critical limitation. While human cognition fluidly adapts between intuitive, heuristic (System 1) and analytical, deliberative (System 2) reasoning depending on the context, LLMs lack this dynamic flexibility. This rigidity can lead to brittle and unreliable performance when faced with tasks that deviate from their trained patterns. To address this, we create a dataset of 2,000 samples with valid System 1 and System 2 answers, explicitly align LLMs with these reasoning styles, and evaluate their performance across reasoning benchmarks. Our results reveal an accuracy-efficiency trade-off: System 2-aligned models excel in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning, while System 1-aligned models perform better in commonsense tasks. A mechanistic analysis of model responses shows that System 1 models employ more definitive answers, whereas System 2 models demonstrate greater uncertainty. Interpolating between these extremes produces a monotonic transition in reasoning accuracy, preserving coherence. This work challenges the assumption that step-by-step reasoning is always optimal and highlights the need for adapting reasoning strategies based on task demands.

We demonstrate that the inference operations of several open-weight large language models (LLMs) can be mapped to an exactly equivalent linear system for an input sequence without modifying the model weights or altering output predictions. Extending techniques from image diffusion models that exhibit local or piecewise linearity, we strategically alter the gradient computation with respect to a given input sequence for a next-token prediction such that the Jacobian of the model nearly exactly reproduces the forward prediction with a linear system. We demonstrate this approach across models (Llama 3, Gemma 3, Qwen 3, Phi 4, Mistral Ministral and OLMo 2, up to Llama 3.3 70B Q4) and show through the singular value decomposition of the detached Jacobian that these LLMs operate in extremely low-dimensional subspaces where many of the largest singular vectors decode to concepts related to the most-likely output token. This approach also allows us to examine the operation of each successive layer (and its attention and MLP components) as nearly-exact linear systems and observe the emergence of semantic concepts. Despite their expressive power and global nonlinearity, modern LLMs can be interpreted through nearly-exact locally linear decompositions that provide insights into their internal representations and reveal interpretable semantic structures in the next-token prediction process.

Huge language models (LMs) have ushered in a new era for AI, serving as a gateway to natural-language-based knowledge tasks. Although an essential element of modern AI, LMs are also inherently limited in a number of ways. We discuss these limitations and how they can be avoided by adopting a systems approach. Conceptualizing the challenge as one that involves knowledge and reasoning in addition to linguistic processing, we define a flexible architecture with multiple neural models, complemented by discrete knowledge and reasoning modules. We describe this neuro-symbolic architecture, dubbed the Modular Reasoning, Knowledge and Language (MRKL, pronounced "miracle") system, some of the technical challenges in implementing it, and Jurassic-X, AI21 Labs' MRKL system implementation.

Language models (LMs) have proven to be powerful tools for psycholinguistic research, but most prior work has focused on purely behavioural measures (e.g., surprisal comparisons). At the same time, research in model interpretability has begun to illuminate the abstract causal mechanisms shaping LM behavior. To help bring these strands of research closer together, we introduce CausalGym. We adapt and expand the SyntaxGym suite of tasks to benchmark the ability of interpretability methods to causally affect model behaviour. To illustrate how CausalGym can be used, we study the pythia models (14M--6.9B) and assess the causal efficacy of a wide range of interpretability methods, including linear probing and distributed alignment search (DAS). We find that DAS outperforms the other methods, and so we use it to study the learning trajectory of two difficult linguistic phenomena in pythia-1b: negative polarity item licensing and filler--gap dependencies. Our analysis shows that the mechanism implementing both of these tasks is learned in discrete stages, not gradually.

Without explicit feedback, humans can rapidly learn the meaning of words. Children can acquire a new word after just a few passive exposures, a process known as fast mapping. This word learning capability is believed to be the most fundamental building block of multimodal understanding and reasoning. Despite recent advancements in multimodal learning, a systematic and rigorous evaluation is still missing for human-like word learning in machines. To fill in this gap, we introduce the MachinE Word Learning (MEWL) benchmark to assess how machines learn word meaning in grounded visual scenes. MEWL covers human's core cognitive toolkits in word learning: cross-situational reasoning, bootstrapping, and pragmatic learning. Specifically, MEWL is a few-shot benchmark suite consisting of nine tasks for probing various word learning capabilities. These tasks are carefully designed to be aligned with the children's core abilities in word learning and echo the theories in the developmental literature. By evaluating multimodal and unimodal agents' performance with a comparative analysis of human performance, we notice a sharp divergence in human and machine word learning. We further discuss these differences between humans and machines and call for human-like few-shot word learning in machines.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Humans distill complex experiences into fundamental abstractions that enable rapid learning and adaptation. Similarly, autoregressive transformers exhibit adaptive learning through in-context learning (ICL), which begs the question of how. In this paper, we propose concept encoding-decoding mechanism to explain ICL by studying how transformers form and use internal abstractions in their representations. On synthetic ICL tasks, we analyze the training dynamics of a small transformer and report the coupled emergence of concept encoding and decoding. As the model learns to encode different latent concepts (e.g., ``Finding the first noun in a sentence.") into distinct, separable representations, it concureently builds conditional decoding algorithms and improve its ICL performance. We validate the existence of this mechanism across pretrained models of varying scales (Gemma-2 2B/9B/27B, Llama-3.1 8B/70B). Further, through mechanistic interventions and controlled finetuning, we demonstrate that the quality of concept encoding is causally related and predictive of ICL performance. Our empirical insights shed light into better understanding the success and failure modes of large language models via their representations.

Readers can have different goals with respect to the text they are reading. Can these goals be decoded from the pattern of their eye movements over the text? In this work, we examine for the first time whether it is possible to decode two types of reading goals that are common in daily life: information seeking and ordinary reading. Using large scale eye-tracking data, we apply to this task a wide range of state-of-the-art models for eye movements and text that cover different architectural and data representation strategies, and further introduce a new model ensemble. We systematically evaluate these models at three levels of generalization: new textual item, new participant, and the combination of both. We find that eye movements contain highly valuable signals for this task. We further perform an error analysis which builds on prior empirical findings on differences between ordinary reading and information seeking and leverages rich textual annotations. This analysis reveals key properties of textual items and participant eye movements that contribute to the difficulty of the task.

We present VISPROG, a neuro-symbolic approach to solving complex and compositional visual tasks given natural language instructions. VISPROG avoids the need for any task-specific training. Instead, it uses the in-context learning ability of large language models to generate python-like modular programs, which are then executed to get both the solution and a comprehensive and interpretable rationale. Each line of the generated program may invoke one of several off-the-shelf computer vision models, image processing routines, or python functions to produce intermediate outputs that may be consumed by subsequent parts of the program. We demonstrate the flexibility of VISPROG on 4 diverse tasks - compositional visual question answering, zero-shot reasoning on image pairs, factual knowledge object tagging, and language-guided image editing. We believe neuro-symbolic approaches like VISPROG are an exciting avenue to easily and effectively expand the scope of AI systems to serve the long tail of complex tasks that people may wish to perform.

What mechanisms underlie linguistic generalization in large language models (LLMs)? This question has attracted considerable attention, with most studies analyzing the extent to which the language skills of LLMs resemble rules. As of yet, it is not known whether linguistic generalization in LLMs could equally well be explained as the result of analogical processes, which can be formalized as similarity operations on stored exemplars. A key shortcoming of prior research is its focus on linguistic phenomena with a high degree of regularity, for which rule-based and analogical approaches make the same predictions. Here, we instead examine derivational morphology, specifically English adjective nominalization, which displays notable variability. We introduce a new method for investigating linguistic generalization in LLMs: focusing on GPT-J, we fit cognitive models that instantiate rule-based and analogical learning to the LLM training data and compare their predictions on a set of nonce adjectives with those of the LLM, allowing us to draw direct conclusions regarding underlying mechanisms. As expected, rule-based and analogical models explain the predictions of GPT-J equally well for adjectives with regular nominalization patterns. However, for adjectives with variable nominalization patterns, the analogical model provides a much better match. Furthermore, GPT-J's behavior is sensitive to the individual word frequencies, even for regular forms, a behavior that is consistent with an analogical account of regular forms but not a rule-based one. These findings refute the hypothesis that GPT-J's linguistic generalization on adjective nominalization involves rules, suggesting similarity operations on stored exemplars as the underlying mechanism. Overall, our study suggests that analogical processes play a bigger role in the linguistic generalization of LLMs than previously thought.

One of the primary driving forces contributing to the superior performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) is the extensive availability of human-annotated natural language data, which is used for alignment fine-tuning. This inspired researchers to investigate self-training methods to mitigate the extensive reliance on human annotations. However, the current success of self-training has been primarily observed in natural language scenarios, rather than in the increasingly important neural-symbolic scenarios. To this end, we propose an environment-guided neural-symbolic self-training framework named ENVISIONS. It aims to overcome two main challenges: (1) the scarcity of symbolic data, and (2) the limited proficiency of LLMs in processing symbolic language. Extensive evaluations conducted on three distinct domains demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. Additionally, we have conducted a comprehensive analysis to uncover the factors contributing to ENVISIONS's success, thereby offering valuable insights for future research in this area. Code will be available at https://github.com/xufangzhi/ENVISIONS.

LLMs have revolutionized the field of artificial intelligence and have emerged as the de-facto tool for many tasks. The current established technology of LLMs is to process input and generate output at the token level. This is in sharp contrast to humans who operate at multiple levels of abstraction, well beyond single words, to analyze information and to generate creative content. In this paper, we present an attempt at an architecture which operates on an explicit higher-level semantic representation, which we name a concept. Concepts are language- and modality-agnostic and represent a higher level idea or action in a flow. Hence, we build a "Large Concept Model". In this study, as proof of feasibility, we assume that a concept corresponds to a sentence, and use an existing sentence embedding space, SONAR, which supports up to 200 languages in both text and speech modalities. The Large Concept Model is trained to perform autoregressive sentence prediction in an embedding space. We explore multiple approaches, namely MSE regression, variants of diffusion-based generation, and models operating in a quantized SONAR space. These explorations are performed using 1.6B parameter models and training data in the order of 1.3T tokens. We then scale one architecture to a model size of 7B parameters and training data of about 2.7T tokens. We perform an experimental evaluation on several generative tasks, namely summarization and a new task of summary expansion. Finally, we show that our model exhibits impressive zero-shot generalization performance to many languages, outperforming existing LLMs of the same size. The training code of our models is freely available.

In this paper, we aim to establish a simple, effective, and theoretically grounded benchmark for rigorously probing abstract reasoning in Large Language Models (LLMs). To achieve this, we first develop a mathematic framework that defines abstract reasoning as the ability to: (i) extract essential patterns independent of surface representations, and (ii) apply consistent rules to these abstract patterns. Based on this framework, we introduce two novel complementary metrics: \(\scoreGamma\) measures basic reasoning accuracy, while \(\scoreDelta\) quantifies a model's reliance on specific symbols rather than underlying patterns - a key indicator of true abstraction versus mere memorization. To implement this measurement, we design a benchmark: systematic symbol remapping in rule-based tasks, which forces models to demonstrate genuine pattern recognition beyond superficial token matching. Extensive LLM evaluations using this benchmark (commercial API models, 7B-70B, multi-agent) reveal:1) critical limitations in non-decimal arithmetic and symbolic reasoning; 2) persistent abstraction gaps despite chain-of-thought prompting; and 3) \(\scoreDelta\)'s effectiveness in robustly measuring memory dependence by quantifying performance degradation under symbol remapping, particularly highlighting operand-specific memorization. These findings underscore that current LLMs, despite domain-specific strengths, still lack robust abstract reasoning, highlighting key areas for future improvement.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are huge artificial neural networks which primarily serve to generate text, but also provide a very sophisticated probabilistic model of language use. Since generating a semantically consistent text requires a form of effective memory, we investigate the memory properties of LLMs and find surprising similarities with key characteristics of human memory. We argue that the human-like memory properties of the Large Language Model do not follow automatically from the LLM architecture but are rather learned from the statistics of the training textual data. These results strongly suggest that the biological features of human memory leave an imprint on the way that we structure our textual narratives.

The first generation of Large Language Models - what might be called "Act I" of generative AI (2020-2023) - achieved remarkable success through massive parameter and data scaling, yet exhibited fundamental limitations in knowledge latency, shallow reasoning, and constrained cognitive processes. During this era, prompt engineering emerged as our primary interface with AI, enabling dialogue-level communication through natural language. We now witness the emergence of "Act II" (2024-present), where models are transitioning from knowledge-retrieval systems (in latent space) to thought-construction engines through test-time scaling techniques. This new paradigm establishes a mind-level connection with AI through language-based thoughts. In this paper, we clarify the conceptual foundations of cognition engineering and explain why this moment is critical for its development. We systematically break down these advanced approaches through comprehensive tutorials and optimized implementations, democratizing access to cognition engineering and enabling every practitioner to participate in AI's second act. We provide a regularly updated collection of papers on test-time scaling in the GitHub Repository: https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/cognition-engineering

Pragmatics and non-literal language understanding are essential to human communication, and present a long-standing challenge for artificial language models. We perform a fine-grained comparison of language models and humans on seven pragmatic phenomena, using zero-shot prompting on an expert-curated set of English materials. We ask whether models (1) select pragmatic interpretations of speaker utterances, (2) make similar error patterns as humans, and (3) use similar linguistic cues as humans to solve the tasks. We find that the largest models achieve high accuracy and match human error patterns: within incorrect responses, models favor literal interpretations over heuristic-based distractors. We also find preliminary evidence that models and humans are sensitive to similar linguistic cues. Our results suggest that pragmatic behaviors can emerge in models without explicitly constructed representations of mental states. However, models tend to struggle with phenomena relying on social expectation violations.

Neurons in the brain are spatially organized such that neighbors on tissue often exhibit similar response profiles. In the human language system, experimental studies have observed clusters for syntactic and semantic categories, but the mechanisms underlying this functional organization remain unclear. Here, building on work from the vision literature, we develop TopoLM, a transformer language model with an explicit two-dimensional spatial representation of model units. By combining a next-token prediction objective with a spatial smoothness loss, representations in this model assemble into clusters that correspond to semantically interpretable groupings of text and closely match the functional organization in the brain's language system. TopoLM successfully predicts the emergence of the spatio-functional organization of a cortical language system as well as the organization of functional clusters selective for fine-grained linguistic features empirically observed in human cortex. Our results suggest that the functional organization of the human language system is driven by a unified spatial objective, and provide a functionally and spatially aligned model of language processing in the brain.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in contextual knowledge understanding. In this paper, we show that these concentrated massive values consistently emerge in specific regions of attention queries (Q) and keys (K) while not having such patterns in values (V) in various modern transformer-based LLMs (Q, K, and V mean the representations output by the query, key, and value layers respectively). Through extensive experiments, we further demonstrate that these massive values play a critical role in interpreting contextual knowledge (knowledge obtained from the current context window) rather than in retrieving parametric knowledge stored within the model's parameters. Our further investigation of quantization strategies reveals that ignoring these massive values leads to a pronounced drop in performance on tasks requiring rich contextual understanding, aligning with our analysis. Finally, we trace the emergence of concentrated massive values and find that such concentration is caused by Rotary Positional Encoding (RoPE), which has appeared since the first layers. These findings shed new light on how Q and K operate in LLMs and offer practical insights for model design and optimization. The Code is Available at https://github.com/MingyuJ666/Rope_with_LLM.

By computing the rank correlation between attention weights and feature-additive explanation methods, previous analyses either invalidate or support the role of attention-based explanations as a faithful and plausible measure of salience. To investigate whether this approach is appropriate, we compare LIME, Integrated Gradients, DeepLIFT, Grad-SHAP, Deep-SHAP, and attention-based explanations, applied to two neural architectures trained on single- and pair-sequence language tasks. In most cases, we find that none of our chosen methods agree. Based on our empirical observations and theoretical objections, we conclude that rank correlation does not measure the quality of feature-additive methods. Practitioners should instead use the numerous and rigorous diagnostic methods proposed by the community.

We employ new tools from mechanistic interpretability in order to ask whether the internal structure of large language models (LLMs) shows correspondence to the linguistic structures which underlie the languages on which they are trained. In particular, we ask (1) when two languages employ the same morphosyntactic processes, do LLMs handle them using shared internal circuitry? and (2) when two languages require different morphosyntactic processes, do LLMs handle them using different internal circuitry? Using English and Chinese multilingual and monolingual models, we analyze the internal circuitry involved in two tasks. We find evidence that models employ the same circuit to handle the same syntactic process independently of the language in which it occurs, and that this is the case even for monolingual models trained completely independently. Moreover, we show that multilingual models employ language-specific components (attention heads and feed-forward networks) when needed to handle linguistic processes (e.g., morphological marking) that only exist in some languages. Together, our results provide new insights into how LLMs trade off between exploiting common structures and preserving linguistic differences when tasked with modeling multiple languages simultaneously.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Large language models (LLMs) have scaled up to unlock a wide range of complex reasoning tasks with the aid of various prompting methods. However, current prompting methods generate natural language intermediate steps to help reasoning, which can cause imperfect task reduction and confusion. To mitigate such limitations, we explore code prompting, a neural symbolic prompting method with both zero-shot and few-shot versions which triggers code as intermediate steps. We conduct experiments on 7 widely-used benchmarks involving symbolic reasoning and arithmetic reasoning. Code prompting generally outperforms chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. To further understand the performance and limitations of code prompting, we perform extensive ablation studies and error analyses, and identify several exclusive advantages of using symbolic promptings compared to natural language. We also consider the ensemble of code prompting and CoT prompting to combine the strengths of both. Finally, we show through experiments how code annotations and their locations affect code prompting.

In this paper, we explain the inference logic of large language models (LLMs) as a set of symbolic concepts. Many recent studies have discovered that traditional DNNs usually encode sparse symbolic concepts. However, because an LLM has much more parameters than traditional DNNs, whether the LLM also encodes sparse symbolic concepts is still an open problem. Therefore, in this paper, we propose to disentangle the inference score of LLMs for dialogue tasks into a small number of symbolic concepts. We verify that we can use those sparse concepts to well estimate all inference scores of the LLM on all arbitrarily masking states of the input sentence. We also evaluate the transferability of concepts encoded by an LLM and verify that symbolic concepts usually exhibit high transferability across similar input sentences. More crucially, those symbolic concepts can be used to explain the exact reasons accountable for the LLM's prediction errors.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

To fully understand the behavior of a large language model (LLM) requires our understanding of its input space. If this input space differs from our assumption, our understanding of and conclusions about the LLM is likely flawed, regardless of its architecture. Here, we elucidate the structure of the token embeddings, the input domain for LLMs, both empirically and theoretically. We present a generalized and statistically testable model where the neighborhood of each token splits into well-defined signal and noise dimensions. This model is based on a generalization of a manifold called a fiber bundle, so we denote our hypothesis test as the ``fiber bundle null.'' Failing to reject the null is uninformative, but rejecting it at a specific token indicates that token has a statistically significant local structure, and so is of interest to us. By running our test over several open-source LLMs, each with unique token embeddings, we find that the null is frequently rejected, and so the token subspace is provably not a fiber bundle and hence also not a manifold. As a consequence of our findings, when an LLM is presented with two semantically equivalent prompts, and if one prompt contains a token implicated by our test, that prompt will likely exhibit more output variability proportional to the local signal dimension of the token.

Compositionality, the notion that the meaning of an expression is constructed from the meaning of its parts and syntactic rules, permits the infinite productivity of human language. For the first time, artificial language models (LMs) are able to match human performance in a number of compositional generalization tasks. However, much remains to be understood about the representational mechanisms underlying these abilities. We take a high-level geometric approach to this problem by relating the degree of compositionality in a dataset to the intrinsic dimensionality of its representations under an LM, a measure of feature complexity. We find not only that the degree of dataset compositionality is reflected in representations' intrinsic dimensionality, but that the relationship between compositionality and geometric complexity arises due to learned linguistic features over training. Finally, our analyses reveal a striking contrast between linear and nonlinear dimensionality, showing that they respectively encode formal and semantic aspects of linguistic composition.

Syntactic structures used to play a vital role in natural language processing (NLP), but since the deep learning revolution, NLP has been gradually dominated by neural models that do not consider syntactic structures in their design. One vastly successful class of neural models is transformers. When used as an encoder, a transformer produces contextual representation of words in the input sentence. In this work, we propose a new model of contextual word representation, not from a neural perspective, but from a purely syntactic and probabilistic perspective. Specifically, we design a conditional random field that models discrete latent representations of all words in a sentence as well as dependency arcs between them; and we use mean field variational inference for approximate inference. Strikingly, we find that the computation graph of our model resembles transformers, with correspondences between dependencies and self-attention and between distributions over latent representations and contextual embeddings of words. Experiments show that our model performs competitively to transformers on small to medium sized datasets. We hope that our work could help bridge the gap between traditional syntactic and probabilistic approaches and cutting-edge neural approaches to NLP, and inspire more linguistically-principled neural approaches in the future.

Understanding how semantic meaning is encoded in the representation spaces of large language models is a fundamental problem in interpretability. In this paper, we study the two foundational questions in this area. First, how are categorical concepts, such as {'mammal', 'bird', 'reptile', 'fish'}, represented? Second, how are hierarchical relations between concepts encoded? For example, how is the fact that 'dog' is a kind of 'mammal' encoded? We show how to extend the linear representation hypothesis to answer these questions. We find a remarkably simple structure: simple categorical concepts are represented as simplices, hierarchically related concepts are orthogonal in a sense we make precise, and (in consequence) complex concepts are represented as polytopes constructed from direct sums of simplices, reflecting the hierarchical structure. We validate these theoretical results on the Gemma large language model, estimating representations for 957 hierarchically related concepts using data from WordNet.

Despite impressive performance across diverse tasks, Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have yet to fully demonstrate their potential in visual mathematical problem-solving, particularly in accurately perceiving and interpreting diagrams. Inspired by typical processes of humans, we hypothesize that the perception capabilities to extract meaningful information from diagrams is crucial, as it directly impacts subsequent inference processes. To validate this hypothesis, we developed FlowVerse, a comprehensive benchmark that categorizes all information used during problem-solving into four components, which are then combined into six problem versions for evaluation. Our preliminary results on FlowVerse reveal that existing MLLMs exhibit substantial limitations when extracting essential information and reasoned property from diagrams and performing complex reasoning based on these visual inputs. In response, we introduce MathFlow, a modular problem-solving pipeline that decouples perception and inference into distinct stages, thereby optimizing each independently. Given the perceptual limitations observed in current MLLMs, we trained MathFlow-P-7B as a dedicated perception model. Experimental results indicate that MathFlow-P-7B yields substantial performance gains when integrated with various closed-source and open-source inference models. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the MathFlow pipeline and its compatibility to diverse inference frameworks. The FlowVerse benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/MathFlow-zju/MathFlow.

Formal and distributional semantic models offer complementary benefits in modeling meaning. The categorical compositional distributional (DisCoCat) model of meaning of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) combines aspected of both to provide a general framework in which meanings of words, obtained distributionally, are composed using methods from the logical setting to form sentence meaning. Concrete consequences of this general abstract setting and applications to empirical data are under active study (Grefenstette et al., arxiv:1101.0309; Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh, arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]). . In this paper, we extend this study by examining transitive verbs, represented as matrices in a DisCoCat. We discuss three ways of constructing such matrices, and evaluate each method in a disambiguation task developed by Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh (arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]).

Figurative language (e.g., "he flew like the wind") is challenging to understand, as it is hard to tell what implicit information is being conveyed from the surface form alone. We hypothesize that to perform this task well, the reader needs to mentally elaborate the scene being described to identify a sensible meaning of the language. We present DREAM-FLUTE, a figurative language understanding system that does this, first forming a "mental model" of situations described in a premise and hypothesis before making an entailment/contradiction decision and generating an explanation. DREAM-FLUTE uses an existing scene elaboration model, DREAM, for constructing its "mental model." In the FigLang2022 Shared Task evaluation, DREAM-FLUTE achieved (joint) first place (Acc@60=63.3%), and can perform even better with ensemble techniques, demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach. More generally, this work suggests that adding a reflective component to pretrained language models can improve their performance beyond standard fine-tuning (3.3% improvement in Acc@60).

Interpretability researchers have attempted to understand MLP neurons of language models based on both the contexts in which they activate and their output weight vectors. They have paid little attention to a complementary aspect: the interactions between input and output. For example, when neurons detect a direction in the input, they might add much the same direction to the residual stream ("enrichment neurons") or reduce its presence ("depletion neurons"). We address this aspect by examining the cosine similarity between input and output weights of a neuron. We apply our method to 12 models and find that enrichment neurons dominate in early-middle layers whereas later layers tend more towards depletion. To explain this finding, we argue that enrichment neurons are largely responsible for enriching concept representations, one of the first steps of factual recall. Our input-output perspective is a complement to activation-dependent analyses and to approaches that treat input and output separately.

The remarkable capabilities of modern large language models are rooted in their vast repositories of knowledge encoded within their parameters, enabling them to perceive the world and engage in reasoning. The inner workings of how these models store knowledge have long been a subject of intense interest and investigation among researchers. To date, most studies have concentrated on isolated components within these models, such as the Multilayer Perceptrons and attention head. In this paper, we delve into the computation graph of the language model to uncover the knowledge circuits that are instrumental in articulating specific knowledge. The experiments, conducted with GPT2 and TinyLLAMA, has allowed us to observe how certain information heads, relation heads, and Multilayer Perceptrons collaboratively encode knowledge within the model. Moreover, we evaluate the impact of current knowledge editing techniques on these knowledge circuits, providing deeper insights into the functioning and constraints of these editing methodologies. Finally, we utilize knowledge circuits to analyze and interpret language model behaviors such as hallucinations and in-context learning. We believe the knowledge circuit holds potential for advancing our understanding of Transformers and guiding the improved design of knowledge editing. Code and data are available in https://github.com/zjunlp/KnowledgeCircuits.

The recent proliferation of research into transformer based natural language processing has led to a number of studies which attempt to detect the presence of human-like cognitive behavior in the models. We contend that, as is true of human psychology, the investigation of cognitive behavior in language models must be conducted in an appropriate population of an appropriate size for the results to be meaningful. We leverage work in uncertainty estimation in a novel approach to efficiently construct experimental populations. The resultant tool, PopulationLM, has been made open source. We provide theoretical grounding in the uncertainty estimation literature and motivation from current cognitive work regarding language models. We discuss the methodological lessons from other scientific communities and attempt to demonstrate their application to two artificial population studies. Through population based experimentation we find that language models exhibit behavior consistent with typicality effects among categories highly represented in training. However, we find that language models don't tend to exhibit structural priming effects. Generally, our results show that single models tend to over estimate the presence of cognitive behaviors in neural models.

This paper does not introduce a novel method. Instead, it offers a fairer and more comprehensive comparison of KAN and MLP models across various tasks, including machine learning, computer vision, audio processing, natural language processing, and symbolic formula representation. Specifically, we control the number of parameters and FLOPs to compare the performance of KAN and MLP. Our main observation is that, except for symbolic formula representation tasks, MLP generally outperforms KAN. We also conduct ablation studies on KAN and find that its advantage in symbolic formula representation mainly stems from its B-spline activation function. When B-spline is applied to MLP, performance in symbolic formula representation significantly improves, surpassing or matching that of KAN. However, in other tasks where MLP already excels over KAN, B-spline does not substantially enhance MLP's performance. Furthermore, we find that KAN's forgetting issue is more severe than that of MLP in a standard class-incremental continual learning setting, which differs from the findings reported in the KAN paper. We hope these results provide insights for future research on KAN and other MLP alternatives. Project link: https://github.com/yu-rp/KANbeFair

Abstraction is a core tenet of human cognition and communication. When composing natural language instructions, humans naturally evoke abstraction to convey complex procedures in an efficient and concise way. Yet, interpreting and grounding abstraction expressed in NL has not yet been systematically studied in NLP, with no accepted benchmarks specifically eliciting abstraction in NL. In this work, we set the foundation for a systematic study of processing and grounding abstraction in NLP. First, we deliver a novel abstraction elicitation method and present Hexagons, a 2D instruction-following game. Using Hexagons we collected over 4k naturally-occurring visually-grounded instructions rich with diverse types of abstractions. From these data, we derive an instruction-to-execution task and assess different types of neural models. Our results show that contemporary models and modeling practices are substantially inferior to human performance, and that models' performance is inversely correlated with the level of abstraction, showing less satisfying performance on higher levels of abstraction. These findings are consistent across models and setups, confirming that abstraction is a challenging phenomenon deserving further attention and study in NLP/AI research.

Large language models (LLMs) show remarkable capabilities across a variety of tasks. Despite the models only seeing text in training, several recent studies suggest that LLM representations implicitly capture aspects of the underlying grounded concepts. Here, we explore LLM representations of a particularly salient kind of grounded knowledge -- spatial relationships. We design natural-language navigation tasks and evaluate the ability of LLMs, in particular GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4, and Llama2 series models, to represent and reason about spatial structures. These tasks reveal substantial variability in LLM performance across different spatial structures, including square, hexagonal, and triangular grids, rings, and trees. In extensive error analysis, we find that LLMs' mistakes reflect both spatial and non-spatial factors. These findings suggest that LLMs appear to capture certain aspects of spatial structure implicitly, but room for improvement remains.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable potential across numerous applications and have shown an emergent ability to tackle complex reasoning tasks, such as mathematical computations. However, even for the simplest arithmetic calculations, the intrinsic mechanisms behind LLMs remain mysterious, making it challenging to ensure reliability. In this work, we delve into uncovering a specific mechanism by which LLMs execute calculations. Through comprehensive experiments, we find that LLMs frequently involve a small fraction (< 5%) of attention heads, which play a pivotal role in focusing on operands and operators during calculation processes. Subsequently, the information from these operands is processed through multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs), progressively leading to the final solution. These pivotal heads/MLPs, though identified on a specific dataset, exhibit transferability across different datasets and even distinct tasks. This insight prompted us to investigate the potential benefits of selectively fine-tuning these essential heads/MLPs to boost the LLMs' computational performance. We empirically find that such precise tuning can yield notable enhancements on mathematical prowess, without compromising the performance on non-mathematical tasks. Our work serves as a preliminary exploration into the arithmetic calculation abilities inherent in LLMs, laying a solid foundation to reveal more intricate mathematical tasks.

Despite rapid adoption and deployment of large language models (LLMs), the internal computations of these models remain opaque and poorly understood. In this work, we seek to understand how high-level human-interpretable features are represented within the internal neuron activations of LLMs. We train k-sparse linear classifiers (probes) on these internal activations to predict the presence of features in the input; by varying the value of k we study the sparsity of learned representations and how this varies with model scale. With k=1, we localize individual neurons which are highly relevant for a particular feature, and perform a number of case studies to illustrate general properties of LLMs. In particular, we show that early layers make use of sparse combinations of neurons to represent many features in superposition, that middle layers have seemingly dedicated neurons to represent higher-level contextual features, and that increasing scale causes representational sparsity to increase on average, but there are multiple types of scaling dynamics. In all, we probe for over 100 unique features comprising 10 different categories in 7 different models spanning 70 million to 6.9 billion parameters.

Large multimodal models extend the impressive capabilities of large language models by integrating multimodal understanding abilities. However, it is not clear how they can emulate the general intelligence and reasoning ability of humans. As recognizing patterns and abstracting concepts are key to general intelligence, we introduce PuzzleVQA, a collection of puzzles based on abstract patterns. With this dataset, we evaluate large multimodal models with abstract patterns based on fundamental concepts, including colors, numbers, sizes, and shapes. Through our experiments on state-of-the-art large multimodal models, we find that they are not able to generalize well to simple abstract patterns. Notably, even GPT-4V cannot solve more than half of the puzzles. To diagnose the reasoning challenges in large multimodal models, we progressively guide the models with our ground truth reasoning explanations for visual perception, inductive reasoning, and deductive reasoning. Our systematic analysis finds that the main bottlenecks of GPT-4V are weaker visual perception and inductive reasoning abilities. Through this work, we hope to shed light on the limitations of large multimodal models and how they can better emulate human cognitive processes in the future (Our data and code will be released publicly at https://github.com/declare-lab/LLM-PuzzleTest).

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have outperformed human experts in predicting the results of neuroscience experiments (Luo et al., 2024). What is the basis for this performance? One possibility is that statistical patterns in that specific scientific literature, as opposed to emergent reasoning abilities arising from broader training, underlie LLMs' performance. To evaluate this possibility, we trained (next word prediction) a relatively small 124M-parameter GPT-2 model on 1.3 billion tokens of domain-specific knowledge. Despite being orders of magnitude smaller than larger LLMs trained on trillions of tokens, small models achieved expert-level performance in predicting neuroscience results. Small models trained on the neuroscience literature succeeded when they were trained from scratch using a tokenizer specifically trained on neuroscience text or when the neuroscience literature was used to finetune a pretrained GPT-2. Our results indicate that expert-level performance may be attained by even small LLMs through domain-specific, auto-regressive training approaches.

Chain-of-thought prompting has demonstrated remarkable performance on various natural language reasoning tasks. However, it tends to perform poorly on tasks which requires solving problems harder than the exemplars shown in the prompts. To overcome this challenge of easy-to-hard generalization, we propose a novel prompting strategy, least-to-most prompting. The key idea in this strategy is to break down a complex problem into a series of simpler subproblems and then solve them in sequence. Solving each subproblem is facilitated by the answers to previously solved subproblems. Our experimental results on tasks related to symbolic manipulation, compositional generalization, and math reasoning reveal that least-to-most prompting is capable of generalizing to more difficult problems than those seen in the prompts. A notable finding is that when the GPT-3 code-davinci-002 model is used with least-to-most prompting, it can solve the compositional generalization benchmark SCAN in any split (including length split) with an accuracy of at least 99% using just 14 exemplars, compared to only 16% accuracy with chain-of-thought prompting. This is particularly noteworthy because neural-symbolic models in the literature that specialize in solving SCAN are trained on the entire training set containing over 15,000 examples. We have included prompts for all the tasks in the Appendix.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in autonomous decision-making, where they sample options from vast action spaces. However, the heuristics that guide this sampling process remain under-explored. We study this sampling behavior and show that this underlying heuristics resembles that of human decision-making: comprising a descriptive component (reflecting statistical norm) and a prescriptive component (implicit ideal encoded in the LLM) of a concept. We show that this deviation of a sample from the statistical norm towards a prescriptive component consistently appears in concepts across diverse real-world domains like public health, and economic trends. To further illustrate the theory, we demonstrate that concept prototypes in LLMs are affected by prescriptive norms, similar to the concept of normality in humans. Through case studies and comparison with human studies, we illustrate that in real-world applications, the shift of samples toward an ideal value in LLMs' outputs can result in significantly biased decision-making, raising ethical concerns.

Deep neural networks drive the success of natural language processing. A fundamental property of language is its compositional structure, allowing humans to systematically produce forms for new meanings. For humans, languages with more compositional and transparent structures are typically easier to learn than those with opaque and irregular structures. However, this learnability advantage has not yet been shown for deep neural networks, limiting their use as models for human language learning. Here, we directly test how neural networks compare to humans in learning and generalizing different languages that vary in their degree of compositional structure. We evaluate the memorization and generalization capabilities of a large language model and recurrent neural networks, and show that both deep neural networks exhibit a learnability advantage for more structured linguistic input: neural networks exposed to more compositional languages show more systematic generalization, greater agreement between different agents, and greater similarity to human learners.

We create a reusable Transformer, BrainBERT, for intracranial recordings bringing modern representation learning approaches to neuroscience. Much like in NLP and speech recognition, this Transformer enables classifying complex concepts, i.e., decoding neural data, with higher accuracy and with much less data by being pretrained in an unsupervised manner on a large corpus of unannotated neural recordings. Our approach generalizes to new subjects with electrodes in new positions and to unrelated tasks showing that the representations robustly disentangle the neural signal. Just like in NLP where one can study language by investigating what a language model learns, this approach opens the door to investigating the brain by what a model of the brain learns. As a first step along this path, we demonstrate a new analysis of the intrinsic dimensionality of the computations in different areas of the brain. To construct these representations, we combine a technique for producing super-resolution spectrograms of neural data with an approach designed for generating contextual representations of audio by masking. In the future, far more concepts will be decodable from neural recordings by using representation learning, potentially unlocking the brain like language models unlocked language.

Large language models (LLMs) with memory are computationally universal. However, mainstream LLMs are not taking full advantage of memory, and the designs are heavily influenced by biological brains. Due to their approximate nature and proneness to the accumulation of errors, conventional neural memory mechanisms cannot support LLMs to simulate complex reasoning. In this paper, we seek inspiration from modern computer architectures to augment LLMs with symbolic memory for complex multi-hop reasoning. Such a symbolic memory framework is instantiated as an LLM and a set of SQL databases, where the LLM generates SQL instructions to manipulate the SQL databases. We validate the effectiveness of the proposed memory framework on a synthetic dataset requiring complex reasoning. The project website is available at https://chatdatabase.github.io/ .

The deep neural nets of modern artificial intelligence (AI) have not achieved defining features of biological intelligence, including abstraction, causal learning, and energy-efficiency. While scaling to larger models has delivered performance improvements for current applications, more brain-like capacities may demand new theories, models, and methods for designing artificial learning systems. Here, we argue that this opportunity to reassess insights from the brain should stimulate cooperation between AI research and theory-driven computational neuroscience (CN). To motivate a brain basis of neural computation, we present a dynamical view of intelligence from which we elaborate concepts of sparsity in network structure, temporal dynamics, and interactive learning. In particular, we suggest that temporal dynamics, as expressed through neural synchrony, nested oscillations, and flexible sequences, provide a rich computational layer for reading and updating hierarchical models distributed in long-term memory networks. Moreover, embracing agent-centered paradigms in AI and CN will accelerate our understanding of the complex dynamics and behaviors that build useful world models. A convergence of AI/CN theories and objectives will reveal dynamical principles of intelligence for brains and engineered learning systems. This article was inspired by our symposium on dynamical neuroscience and machine learning at the 6th Annual US/NIH BRAIN Initiative Investigators Meeting.

The neural Hawkes process (Mei & Eisner, 2017) is a generative model of irregularly spaced sequences of discrete events. To handle complex domains with many event types, Mei et al. (2020a) further consider a setting in which each event in the sequence updates a deductive database of facts (via domain-specific pattern-matching rules); future events are then conditioned on the database contents. They show how to convert such a symbolic system into a neuro-symbolic continuous-time generative model, in which each database fact and the possible event has a time-varying embedding that is derived from its symbolic provenance. In this paper, we modify both models, replacing their recurrent LSTM-based architectures with flatter attention-based architectures (Vaswani et al., 2017), which are simpler and more parallelizable. This does not appear to hurt our accuracy, which is comparable to or better than that of the original models as well as (where applicable) previous attention-based methods (Zuo et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2020a).