Daily Papers

We introduce Kimi K2, a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) large language model with 32 billion activated parameters and 1 trillion total parameters. We propose the MuonClip optimizer, which improves upon Muon with a novel QK-clip technique to address training instability while enjoying the advanced token efficiency of Muon. Based on MuonClip, K2 was pre-trained on 15.5 trillion tokens with zero loss spike. During post-training, K2 undergoes a multi-stage post-training process, highlighted by a large-scale agentic data synthesis pipeline and a joint reinforcement learning (RL) stage, where the model improves its capabilities through interactions with real and synthetic environments. Kimi K2 achieves state-of-the-art performance among open-source non-thinking models, with strengths in agentic capabilities. Notably, K2 obtains 66.1 on Tau2-Bench, 76.5 on ACEBench (En), 65.8 on SWE-Bench Verified, and 47.3 on SWE-Bench Multilingual -- surpassing most open and closed-sourced baselines in non-thinking settings. It also exhibits strong capabilities in coding, mathematics, and reasoning tasks, with a score of 53.7 on LiveCodeBench v6, 49.5 on AIME 2025, 75.1 on GPQA-Diamond, and 27.1 on OJBench, all without extended thinking. These results position Kimi K2 as one of the most capable open-source large language models to date, particularly in software engineering and agentic tasks. We release our base and post-trained model checkpoints to facilitate future research and applications of agentic intelligence.

Thinking LLMs solve complex tasks at the expense of increased compute and overthinking on simpler problems, while non-thinking LLMs are faster and cheaper but underthink on harder reasoning problems. This has led to the development of separate thinking and non-thinking LLM variants, leaving the onus of selecting the optimal model for each query on the end user. In this work, we introduce OptimalThinkingBench, a unified benchmark that jointly evaluates overthinking and underthinking in LLMs and also encourages the development of optimally-thinking models that balance performance and efficiency. Our benchmark comprises two sub-benchmarks: OverthinkingBench, featuring simple queries in 72 domains, and UnderthinkingBench, containing 11 challenging reasoning tasks. Using novel thinking-adjusted accuracy metrics, we perform extensive evaluation of 33 different thinking and non-thinking models and show that no model is able to optimally think on our benchmark. Thinking models often overthink for hundreds of tokens on the simplest user queries without improving performance. In contrast, large non-thinking models underthink, often falling short of much smaller thinking models. We further explore several methods to encourage optimal thinking, but find that these approaches often improve on one sub-benchmark at the expense of the other, highlighting the need for better unified and optimal models in the future.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly advanced the state-of-the-art in various coding tasks. Beyond directly answering user queries, LLMs can also serve as judges, assessing and comparing the quality of responses generated by other models. Such an evaluation capability is crucial both for benchmarking different LLMs and for improving response quality through response ranking. However, despite the growing adoption of the LLM-as-a-Judge paradigm, its effectiveness in coding scenarios remains underexplored due to the absence of dedicated benchmarks. To address this gap, we introduce CodeJudgeBench, a benchmark explicitly designed to evaluate the performance of LLM-as-a-Judge models across three critical coding tasks: code generation, code repair, and unit test generation. Through comprehensive benchmarking of 26 LLM-as-a-Judge models, we find that recent thinking models significantly outperform non-thinking models on our carefully designed code judging tasks. Notably, even relatively small thinking models, such as Qwen3-8B, can outperform specially trained LLM-as-a-Judge models up to 70B in size. Nevertheless, all models still exhibit significant randomness in their judgment of coding tasks. For pairwise judging tasks, simply changing the order in which responses are presented can substantially impact accuracy. In addition, when judging code and unit tests written by different LLMs, LLM-as-a-Judge models also show variance in performance. This sensitivity raises concerns about the reliability and consistency of LLM-as-a-Judge in coding scenarios. Lastly, we study optimal prompting strategies for LLM-as-a-Judge. We find that using pair-wise comparison outperforms scalar point-wise judging. Furthermore, retaining comments and reasoning in the full, unprocessed LLM response leads to improved judge performance.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at logical and algorithmic reasoning, yet their emotional intelligence (EQ) still lags far behind their cognitive prowess. While reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) has advanced in other domains, its application to dialogue-especially for emotional intelligence-remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce RLVER, the first end-to-end reinforcement learning framework that leverages verifiable emotion rewards from simulated users to cultivate higher-order empathetic abilities in LLMs. Within this framework, self-consistent affective simulated users engage in dialogue rollouts and produce deterministic emotion scores during conversations, serving as reward signals to guide the LLM's learning. Fine-tuning publicly available Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct model with PPO boosts its Sentient-Benchmark score from 13.3 to 79.2 while largely preserving mathematical and coding competence. Extensive experiments reveal that: (i) RLVER consistently improves multiple dialogue capabilities; (ii) Thinking and non-thinking models show distinct trends--thinking models excel in empathy and insight, while non-thinking models favor action; (iii) GRPO often yields stable gains, while PPO can push certain capabilities to a higher ceiling; (iv) More challenging environments are not always better-moderate ones can yield stronger outcomes. Our results show that RLVER is a practical route toward emotionally intelligent and broadly capable language agents.

We introduce Ling 2.0, a series reasoning-oriented language foundation built upon the principle that every activation boosts reasoning capability. Designed to scale from tens of billions to one trillion parameters under a unified Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) paradigm, Ling 2.0 emphasizes high sparsity, cross-scale consistency, and efficiency guided by empirical scaling laws. The series includes three non-thinking (instruct) models - Ling-mini-2.0, Ling-flash-2.0, and Ling-1T - ranging from 16B to 1T total parameters and achieving up to 7-fold active-compute efficiency compared with dense counterparts. Ling 2.0 integrates coordinated innovations across model architecture, pre-training, post-training, and infrastructure: a high-sparsity MoE with MTP for efficient reasoning, reasoning-oriented data and mid-training CoT activation, reinforcement-based fine-tuning (DFT, Evo-CoT), and full-scale FP8 training with fine-grained heterogeneous pipelines. At the trillion scale, Ling-1T establishes a new Pareto frontier of reasoning accuracy versus computational efficiency, demonstrating that sparse activation, when properly aligned with reasoning objectives, enables scalable and efficient intelligence. Collectively, Ling 2.0 provides a coherent, open, and efficient foundation for advancing future reasoning and thinking models, including the Ring series built upon the same base.

Test-time scaling increases inference-time computation by allowing models to generate long reasoning chains, and has shown strong performance across many domains. However, in this work, we show that this approach is not yet effective for knowledge-intensive tasks, where high factual accuracy and low hallucination rates are essential. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of test-time scaling using 12 reasoning models on two knowledge-intensive benchmarks. Our results reveal that increasing test-time computation does not consistently improve accuracy and, in many cases, it even leads to more hallucinations. We then analyze how extended reasoning affects hallucination behavior. We find that reduced hallucinations often result from the model choosing to abstain after thinking more, rather than from improved factual recall. Conversely, for some models, longer reasoning encourages attempts on previously unanswered questions, many of which result in hallucinations. Case studies show that extended reasoning can induce confirmation bias, leading to overconfident hallucinations. Despite these limitations, we observe that compared to non-thinking, enabling thinking remains beneficial. Code and data are available at https://github.com/XuZhao0/tts-knowledge

Recent advances in Multi-Modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have enabled unified processing of language, vision, and structured inputs, opening the door to complex tasks such as logical deduction, spatial reasoning, and scientific analysis. Despite their promise, the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs, particularly those augmented with intermediate thinking traces (MLLMs-T), remain poorly understood and lack standardized evaluation benchmarks. Existing work focuses primarily on perception or final answer correctness, offering limited insight into how models reason or fail across modalities. To address this gap, we introduce the MMMR, a new benchmark designed to rigorously evaluate multi-modal reasoning with explicit thinking. The MMMR comprises 1) a high-difficulty dataset of 1,083 questions spanning six diverse reasoning types with symbolic depth and multi-hop demands and 2) a modular Reasoning Trace Evaluation Pipeline (RTEP) for assessing reasoning quality beyond accuracy through metrics like relevance, consistency, and structured error annotations. Empirical results show that MLLMs-T overall outperform non-thinking counterparts, but even top models like Claude-3.7-Sonnet and Gemini-2.5 Pro suffer from reasoning pathologies such as inconsistency and overthinking. This benchmark reveals persistent gaps between accuracy and reasoning quality and provides an actionable evaluation pipeline for future model development. Overall, the MMMR offers a scalable foundation for evaluating, comparing, and improving the next generation of multi-modal reasoning systems.

We introduce LongCat-Flash, a 560-billion-parameter Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) language model designed for both computational efficiency and advanced agentic capabilities. Stemming from the need for scalable efficiency, LongCat-Flash adopts two novel designs: (a) Zero-computation Experts, which enables dynamic computational budget allocation and activates 18.6B-31.3B (27B on average) per token depending on contextual demands, optimizing resource usage. (b) Shortcut-connected MoE, which enlarges the computation-communication overlap window, demonstrating notable gains in inference efficiency and throughput compared to models of a comparable scale. We develop a comprehensive scaling framework for large models that combines hyperparameter transfer, model-growth initialization, a multi-pronged stability suite, and deterministic computation to achieve stable and reproducible training. Notably, leveraging the synergy among scalable architectural design and infrastructure efforts, we complete model training on more than 20 trillion tokens within 30 days, while achieving over 100 tokens per second (TPS) for inference at a cost of \$0.70 per million output tokens. To cultivate LongCat-Flash towards agentic intelligence, we conduct a large-scale pre-training on optimized mixtures, followed by targeted mid- and post-training on reasoning, code, and instructions, with further augmentation from synthetic data and tool use tasks. Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate that, as a non-thinking foundation model, LongCat-Flash delivers highly competitive performance among other leading models, with exceptional strengths in agentic tasks. The model checkpoint of LongCat-Flash is open-sourced to foster community research. LongCat Chat: https://longcat.ai Hugging Face: https://huggingface.co/meituan-longcat GitHub: https://github.com/meituan-longcat

In this work, we present Qwen3, the latest version of the Qwen model family. Qwen3 comprises a series of large language models (LLMs) designed to advance performance, efficiency, and multilingual capabilities. The Qwen3 series includes models of both dense and Mixture-of-Expert (MoE) architectures, with parameter scales ranging from 0.6 to 235 billion. A key innovation in Qwen3 is the integration of thinking mode (for complex, multi-step reasoning) and non-thinking mode (for rapid, context-driven responses) into a unified framework. This eliminates the need to switch between different models--such as chat-optimized models (e.g., GPT-4o) and dedicated reasoning models (e.g., QwQ-32B)--and enables dynamic mode switching based on user queries or chat templates. Meanwhile, Qwen3 introduces a thinking budget mechanism, allowing users to allocate computational resources adaptively during inference, thereby balancing latency and performance based on task complexity. Moreover, by leveraging the knowledge from the flagship models, we significantly reduce the computational resources required to build smaller-scale models, while ensuring their highly competitive performance. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that Qwen3 achieves state-of-the-art results across diverse benchmarks, including tasks in code generation, mathematical reasoning, agent tasks, etc., competitive against larger MoE models and proprietary models. Compared to its predecessor Qwen2.5, Qwen3 expands multilingual support from 29 to 119 languages and dialects, enhancing global accessibility through improved cross-lingual understanding and generation capabilities. To facilitate reproducibility and community-driven research and development, all Qwen3 models are publicly accessible under Apache 2.0.

We present BlueLM-2.5-3B, a compact and unified dense Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) designed for efficient edge-device deployment, offering strong general-purpose and reasoning capabilities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 3B-scale MLLM to support both thinking and non-thinking modes, while also enabling explicit control over thinking token budget. BlueLM-2.5-3B is developed through diversified data curation, key data resampling, hybrid heterogeneous reinforcement learning, and a high-performance training infrastructure. Our model achieves superior multimodal capacity while preserving competitive pure-text performance with only 2.9 billion parameters. We conduct comprehensive evaluations across a broad range of multimodal and text-only benchmarks. In thinking mode, BlueLM-2.5-3B achieves comparable performance to Qwen3-4B on text-only benchmarks, and trails the larger Kimi-VL-A3B-16B by only about 5% on average across multimodal evaluations. In non-thinking mode, it outperforms Qwen2.5-VL-3B on the majority of multimodal benchmarks. Additionally, BlueLM-2.5-3B exhibits exceptional data efficiency. All of the aforementioned performance is achieved with substantially less total training data than Qwen2.5-VL-3B and Qwen3-4B. We hope our work contributes to the advancement of high-performance, on-device MLLMs and provides meaningful insights to the research community.

With the recent rapid advancement of Agentic Intelligence, agentic tool use in LLMs has become increasingly important. During multi-turn interactions between agents and users, the dynamic, uncertain, and stochastic nature of user demands poses significant challenges to the agent's tool invocation capabilities. Agents are no longer expected to simply call tools to deliver a result; rather, they must iteratively refine their understanding of user needs through communication while simultaneously invoking tools to resolve user queries. Existing reinforcement learning (RL) approaches for tool use lack the integration of genuinely dynamic users during the RL training process. To bridge this gap, we introduce MUA-RL (Multi-turn User-interacting Agent Reinforcement Learning for agentic tool use), a novel reinforcement learning framework that, for the first time in the field of agentic tool use, integrates LLM-simulated users into the reinforcement learning loop. MUA-RL aims to enable autonomous learning of models to communicate with users efficiently and use various tools to solve practical problems in dynamic multi-turn interactions. Evaluations are done on several multi-turn tool-using benchmarks (see Figure 1). Specifically, MUA-RL-32B achieves 67.3 on TAU2 Retail, 45.4 on TAU2 Airline, 28.3 on TAU2 Telecom, 28.4 on BFCL-V3 Multi Turn, and 82.5 on ACEBench Agent -- outperforming or matching the performance of larger open-source models such as DeepSeek-V3-0324 and Qwen3-235B-A22B in non-thinking settings.

Chain-of-Thought(CoT) prompting and its variants explore equipping large language models (LLMs) with high-level reasoning abilities by emulating human-like linear cognition and logic. However, the human mind is complicated and mixed with both linear and nonlinear thinking. In this work, we propose Inferential Exclusion Prompting (IEP), a novel prompting that combines the principles of elimination and inference in order to guide LLMs to think non-linearly. IEP guides LLMs to plan and then utilize Natural Language Inference (NLI) to deduce each possible solution's entailment relation with context, commonsense, or facts, therefore yielding a broader perspective by thinking back for inferring. This forward planning and backward eliminating process allows IEP to better simulate the complex human thinking processes compared to other CoT-based methods, which only reflect linear cognitive processes. We conducted a series of empirical studies and have corroborated that IEP consistently outperforms CoT across various tasks. Additionally, we observe that integrating IEP and CoT further improves the LLMs' performance on certain tasks, highlighting the necessity of equipping LLMs with mixed logic processes. Moreover, to better evaluate comprehensive features inherent in human logic, we introduce Mental-Ability Reasoning Benchmark (MARB). The benchmark comprises six novel subtasks with a total of 9,115 questions, among which 1,685 are developed with hand-crafted rationale references. We believe both IEP and MARB can serve as a promising direction for unveiling LLMs' logic and verbal reasoning abilities and drive further advancements. MARB will be available at ~anonymity link soon.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have become a central focus in today's large language model (LLM) research, where models are designed to output a step-by-step thinking process before arriving at a final answer to handle complex reasoning tasks. Despite their promise, recent empirical studies (e.g., [Shojaee et al., 2025] from Apple) suggest that this thinking process may not actually enhance reasoning ability, where LLMs without explicit reasoning actually outperform LRMs on tasks with low or high complexity. In this work, we revisit these findings and investigate whether the limitations of LRMs persist when tool augmentations are introduced. We incorporate two types of tools, Python interpreters and scratchpads, and evaluate three representative LLMs and their LRM counterparts on Apple's benchmark reasoning puzzles. Our results show that, with proper tool use, LRMs consistently outperform their non-reasoning counterparts across all levels of task complexity. These findings challenge the recent narrative that reasoning is an illusion and highlight the potential of tool-augmented LRMs for solving complex problems.

We introduce Seed1.5-Thinking, capable of reasoning through thinking before responding, resulting in improved performance on a wide range of benchmarks. Seed1.5-Thinking achieves 86.7 on AIME 2024, 55.0 on Codeforces and 77.3 on GPQA, demonstrating excellent reasoning abilities in STEM and coding. Beyond reasoning tasks, the method demonstrates notable generalization across diverse domains. For instance, it surpasses DeepSeek R1 by 8% in win rate on non-reasoning tasks, indicating its broader applicability. Compared to other state-of-the-art reasoning models, Seed1.5-Thinking is a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) model with a relatively small size, featuring 20B activated and 200B total parameters. As part of our effort to assess generalized reasoning, we develop two internal benchmarks, BeyondAIME and Codeforces, both of which will be publicly released to support future research. Model trial link: https://www.volcengine.com/experience/ark.

Human dialogue contains evolving concepts, and speakers naturally associate multiple concepts to compose a response. However, current dialogue models with the seq2seq framework lack the ability to effectively manage concept transitions and can hardly introduce multiple concepts to responses in a sequential decoding manner. To facilitate a controllable and coherent dialogue, in this work, we devise a concept-guided non-autoregressive model (CG-nAR) for open-domain dialogue generation. The proposed model comprises a multi-concept planning module that learns to identify multiple associated concepts from a concept graph and a customized Insertion Transformer that performs concept-guided non-autoregressive generation to complete a response. The experimental results on two public datasets show that CG-nAR can produce diverse and coherent responses, outperforming state-of-the-art baselines in both automatic and human evaluations with substantially faster inference speed.

Spoken Language Models (SLMs) are designed to take speech inputs and produce spoken responses. However, current SLMs lack the ability to perform an internal, unspoken thinking process before responding. In contrast, humans typically engage in complex mental reasoning internally, enabling them to communicate ideas clearly and concisely. Thus, integrating an unspoken thought process into SLMs is highly desirable. While naively generating a complete chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning before starting to talk can enable thinking for SLMs, this induces additional latency for the speech response, as the CoT reasoning can be arbitrarily long. To solve this issue, we propose Stitch, a novel generation method that alternates between the generation of unspoken reasoning chunks and spoken response chunks. Since the audio duration of a chunk of spoken response is much longer than the time to generate the tokens in a chunk of spoken response, we use the remaining free time to generate the unspoken reasoning tokens. When a chunk of audio is played to the user, the model continues to generate the next unspoken reasoning chunk, achieving simultaneous thinking and talking. Remarkably, Stitch matches the latency of baselines that cannot generate unspoken CoT by design while outperforming those baselines by 15% on math reasoning datasets; Stitch also performs equally well on non-reasoning datasets as those baseline models. Some animations and demonstrations are on the project page: https://d223302.github.io/STITCH.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

While recent success of large reasoning models (LRMs) significantly advanced LLMs' reasoning capability by optimizing the final answer accuracy using reinforcement learning, they may also drastically increase the output length due to overthinking, characterized by unnecessarily complex reasoning paths that waste computation and potentially degrade the performance. We hypothesize that such inefficiencies stem from LRMs' limited capability to dynamically select the proper modular reasoning strategies, termed thinking patterns at the right position. To investigate this hypothesis, we propose a dynamic optimization framework that segments model-generated reasoning paths into distinct thinking patterns, systematically identifying and promoting beneficial patterns that improve the answer while removing detrimental ones. Empirical analysis confirms that our optimized thinking paths yield more concise yet sufficiently informative trajectories, enhancing reasoning efficiency by reducing attention FLOPs by up to 47% while maintaining accuracy for originally correct responses. Moreover, a non-trivial portion of originally incorrect responses are transformed into correct ones, achieving a 15.6% accuracy improvement with reduced length. Motivated by the improvement brought by the optimized thinking paths, we apply a preference optimization technique supported by a pairwise dataset contrasting suboptimal and optimal reasoning paths. Experimental evaluations across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks reveal that our method notably reduces computational overhead while simultaneously improving reasoning accuracy, achieving up to a 12% accuracy improvement and reducing token usage from approximately 5,000 to 3,000 tokens.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs), such as DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1, have demonstrated the significant effectiveness of test-time scaling, achieving substantial performance gains across various benchmarks. These advanced models utilize deliberate "thinking" steps to systematically enhance answer quality. In this paper, we propose leveraging these high-quality outputs generated by reasoning-intensive models to improve less computationally demanding, non-reasoning models. We explore and compare methodologies for utilizing the answers produced by reasoning models to train and improve non-reasoning models. Through straightforward Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) experiments on established benchmarks, we demonstrate consistent improvements across various benchmarks, underscoring the potential of this approach for advancing the ability of models to answer questions directly.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

Recent thinking models solve complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute, but this scaling must be allocated in line with task difficulty. On one hand, short reasoning (underthinking) leads to errors on harder problems that require extended reasoning steps; but, excessively long reasoning (overthinking) can be token-inefficient, generating unnecessary steps even after reaching a correct intermediate solution. We refer to this as under-adaptivity, where the model fails to modulate its response length appropriately given problems of varying difficulty. To address under-adaptivity and strike a balance between under- and overthinking, we propose TRAAC (Think Right with Adaptive, Attentive Compression), an online post-training RL method that leverages the model's self-attention over a long reasoning trajectory to identify important steps and prune redundant ones. TRAAC also estimates difficulty and incorporates it into training rewards, thereby learning to allocate reasoning budget commensurate with example difficulty. Our approach improves accuracy, reduces reasoning steps, and enables adaptive thinking compared to base models and other RL baselines. Across a variety of tasks (AIME, AMC, GPQA-D, BBEH), TRAAC (Qwen3-4B) achieves an average absolute accuracy gain of 8.4% with a relative reduction in reasoning length of 36.8% compared to the base model, and a 7.9% accuracy gain paired with a 29.4% length drop compared to the best RL baseline. TRAAC also shows strong generalization: although our models are trained on math datasets, they show accuracy and efficiency gains on out-of-distribution non-math datasets like GPQA-D, BBEH, and OptimalThinkingBench. Our analysis further verifies that TRAAC provides fine-grained adjustments to thinking budget based on difficulty and that a combination of task-difficulty calibration and attention-based compression yields gains across diverse tasks.

Despite their strengths, large language models (LLMs) often fail to communicate their confidence accurately, making it difficult to assess when they might be wrong and limiting their reliability. In this work, we demonstrate that reasoning models-LLMs that engage in extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning-exhibit superior performance not only in problem-solving but also in accurately expressing their confidence. Specifically, we benchmark six reasoning models across six datasets and find that they achieve strictly better confidence calibration than their non-reasoning counterparts in 33 out of the 36 settings. Our detailed analysis reveals that these gains in calibration stem from the slow thinking behaviors of reasoning models-such as exploring alternative approaches and backtracking-which enable them to adjust their confidence dynamically throughout their CoT, making it progressively more accurate. In particular, we find that reasoning models become increasingly better calibrated as their CoT unfolds, a trend not observed in non-reasoning models. Moreover, removing slow thinking behaviors from the CoT leads to a significant drop in calibration. Lastly, we show that these gains are not exclusive to reasoning models-non-reasoning models also benefit when guided to perform slow thinking via in-context learning.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) guides large language models (LLMs) to reason step-by-step, and can motivate their logical reasoning ability. While effective for logical tasks, CoT is not conducive to creative problem-solving which often requires out-of-box thoughts and is crucial for innovation advancements. In this paper, we explore the Leap-of-Thought (LoT) abilities within LLMs -- a non-sequential, creative paradigm involving strong associations and knowledge leaps. To this end, we study LLMs on the popular Oogiri game which needs participants to have good creativity and strong associative thinking for responding unexpectedly and humorously to the given image, text, or both, and thus is suitable for LoT study. Then to investigate LLMs' LoT ability in the Oogiri game, we first build a multimodal and multilingual Oogiri-GO dataset which contains over 130,000 samples from the Oogiri game, and observe the insufficient LoT ability or failures of most existing LLMs on the Oogiri game. Accordingly, we introduce a creative Leap-of-Thought (CLoT) paradigm to improve LLM's LoT ability. CLoT first formulates the Oogiri-GO dataset into LoT-oriented instruction tuning data to train pretrained LLM for achieving certain LoT humor generation and discrimination abilities. Then CLoT designs an explorative self-refinement that encourages the LLM to generate more creative LoT data via exploring parallels between seemingly unrelated concepts and selects high-quality data to train itself for self-refinement. CLoT not only excels in humor generation in the Oogiri game but also boosts creative abilities in various tasks like cloud guessing game and divergent association task. These findings advance our understanding and offer a pathway to improve LLMs' creative capacities for innovative applications across domains. The dataset, code, and models will be released online. https://zhongshsh.github.io/CLoT/.

We introduce the Diffusion Chain of Lateral Thought (DCoLT), a reasoning framework for diffusion language models. DCoLT treats each intermediate step in the reverse diffusion process as a latent "thinking" action and optimizes the entire reasoning trajectory to maximize the reward on the correctness of the final answer with outcome-based Reinforcement Learning (RL). Unlike traditional Chain-of-Thought (CoT) methods that follow a causal, linear thinking process, DCoLT allows bidirectional, non-linear reasoning with no strict rule on grammatical correctness amid its intermediate steps of thought. We implement DCoLT on two representative Diffusion Language Models (DLMs). First, we choose SEDD as a representative continuous-time discrete diffusion model, where its concrete score derives a probabilistic policy to maximize the RL reward over the entire sequence of intermediate diffusion steps. We further consider the discrete-time masked diffusion language model -- LLaDA, and find that the order to predict and unmask tokens plays an essential role to optimize its RL action resulting from the ranking-based Unmasking Policy Module (UPM) defined by the Plackett-Luce model. Experiments on both math and code generation tasks show that using only public data and 16 H800 GPUs, DCoLT-reinforced DLMs outperform other DLMs trained by SFT or RL or even both. Notably, DCoLT-reinforced LLaDA boosts its reasoning accuracy by +9.8%, +5.7%, +11.4%, +19.5% on GSM8K, MATH, MBPP, and HumanEval.

With the widespread use of large language models (LLMs) in NLP tasks, researchers have discovered the potential of Chain-of-thought (CoT) to assist LLMs in accomplishing complex reasoning tasks by generating intermediate steps. However, human thought processes are often non-linear, rather than simply sequential chains of thoughts. Therefore, we propose Graph-of-Thought (GoT) reasoning, which models human thought processes not only as a chain but also as a graph. By representing thought units as nodes and connections between them as edges, our approach captures the non-sequential nature of human thinking and allows for a more realistic modeling of thought processes. Similar to Multimodal-CoT, we modeled GoT reasoning as a two-stage framework, generating rationales first and then producing the final answer. Specifically, we employ an additional graph-of-thoughts encoder for GoT representation learning and fuse the GoT representation with the original input representation through a gated fusion mechanism. We implement a GoT reasoning model on the T5 pre-trained model and evaluate its performance on a text-only reasoning task (GSM8K) and a multimodal reasoning task (ScienceQA). Our model achieves significant improvement over the strong CoT baseline with 3.41% and 5.08% on the GSM8K test set with T5-base and T5-large architectures, respectively. Additionally, our model boosts accuracy from 84.91% to 91.54% using the T5-base model and from 91.68% to 92.77% using the T5-large model over the state-of-the-art Multimodal-CoT on the ScienceQA test set. Experiments have shown that GoT achieves comparable results to Multimodal-CoT(large) with over 700M parameters, despite having fewer than 250M backbone model parameters, demonstrating the effectiveness of GoT.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as role-playing agents, yet their capacity to faithfully and consistently portray version-specific characters -- for example, superheroes across comic and cinematic universes -- remains underexplored. Superhero canons such as Marvel and DC provide a rich testbed: decades of storytelling yield multiple incarnations of the same character with distinct histories, values, and moral codes. To study this problem, we introduce Beyond One World, a benchmark for character-grounded roleplay spanning 30 iconic heroes and 90 canon-specific versions. The benchmark comprises two tasks: (i) Canon Events, which probes factual recall of pivotal life stages, and (ii) Moral Dilemmas, which confronts models with ethically charged scenarios. We score responses for canonical accuracy and reasoning fidelity under a framework that separates internal deliberation ("thinking") from outward decisions ("acting"). We further propose Think-Act Matching, a metric that quantifies alignment between reasons and actions and serves as a proxy for model trustworthiness. Experiments across reasoning- and non-reasoning-oriented models yield three findings: (1) chain-of-thought prompting improves narrative coherence in weaker models but can reduce canonical accuracy in stronger ones; (2) cross-version generalization within a character remains a major obstacle; and (3) models often excel at either thinking or acting, but rarely both. Beyond One World exposes critical gaps in multiversal consistency and reasoning alignment, offering a challenging evaluation for role-playing LLMs.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) equipped with step-by-step thinking capabilities have demonstrated remarkable performance on complex reasoning problems. However, this thinking process is redundant for simple problems solvable without complex reasoning. To address this inefficiency, we propose R-4B, an auto-thinking MLLM, which can adaptively decide when to think based on problem complexity. The central idea of R-4B is to empower the model with both thinking and non-thinking capabilities using bi-mode annealing, and apply Bi-mode Policy Optimization~(BPO) to improve the model's accuracy in determining whether to activate the thinking process. Specifically, we first train the model on a carefully curated dataset spanning various topics, which contains samples from both thinking and non-thinking modes. Then it undergoes a second phase of training under an improved GRPO framework, where the policy model is forced to generate responses from both modes for each input query. Experimental results show that R-4B achieves state-of-the-art performance across 25 challenging benchmarks. It outperforms Qwen2.5-VL-7B in most tasks and achieves performance comparable to larger models such as Kimi-VL-A3B-Thinking-2506 (16B) on reasoning-intensive benchmarks with lower computational cost.

Recent advances in inference time scaling with extended long chain-of thought have significantly improved the reasoning capabilities of both general and medical large language models (LLMs). However, these models tend to engage in lengthy reasoning processes regardless of the difficulty of the input question, leading to increased inference costs in real-world applications. Therefore, enabling adaptive thinking where models think less for simpler questions and think more for complex ones is critical for the effective use of medical LLMs in practice. Despite its importance, there is a lack of end-to-end approaches designed to enhance the adaptive thinking capabilities of medical LLMs while providing a comprehensive examination of the trade-off between performance and computational cost. To bridge this gap, we propose AdaThink-Med, the first end-to-end framework designed to enhance adaptive thinking ability in medical reasoning models with uncertainty-guided length calibration. AdaThink-Med first generates multiple candidate outputs for each question, evaluates the correctness and uncertainty of each candidate, and then estimates problem difficulty via an uncertainty-guided length calibration module. For outputs with low difficulty and correct answers, the framework penalizes longer reasoning paths; whereas for those with high difficulty and incorrect answers, it encourages extending the chain of thought to explore alternative solutions. On six public medical QA benchmarks, AdaThink-Med achieves up to 6.4x length reduction on average while retaining performance with only minimal degradation. Intriguingly, we observe that AdaThink-Med spontaneously develops two distinct reasoning modes, which we characterize as "non-thinking" and "thinking", demonstrating the model's ability to suppress redundant reasoning processes dynamically.

Process Reward Model (PRM) is widely used in the post-training of Large Language Model (LLM) because it can perform fine-grained evaluation of the reasoning steps of generated content. However, most PRMs lack long-term reasoning and deep thinking capabilities. On the other hand, although a few works have tried to introduce Chain-of-Thought capability into PRMs, the annotation cost of CoT-PRM data is too expensive to play a stable role in various tasks. To address the above challenges, we propose VRPRM, a process reward model via visual reasoning, and design an efficient two-stage training strategy. Experimental results show that using only 3.6K CoT-PRM SFT data and 50K non-CoT PRM RL training data, VRPRM can surpass the non-thinking PRM with a total data volume of 400K and achieved a relative performance improvement of up to 118\% over the base model in the BoN experiment. This result confirms that the proposed combined training strategy can achieve higher quality reasoning capabilities at a lower data annotation cost, thus providing a new paradigm for PRM training with more efficient data utilization.

Inspired by recent advancements in LLM reasoning, the field of multimodal reasoning has seen remarkable progress, achieving significant performance gains on intricate tasks such as mathematical problem-solving. Despite this progress, current multimodal large reasoning models exhibit two key limitations. They tend to employ computationally expensive reasoning even for simple queries, leading to inefficiency. Furthermore, this focus on specialized reasoning often impairs their broader, more general understanding capabilities. In this paper, we propose Metis-HOME: a Hybrid Optimized Mixture-of-Experts framework designed to address this trade-off. Metis-HOME enables a ''Hybrid Thinking'' paradigm by structuring the original dense model into two distinct expert branches: a thinking branch tailored for complex, multi-step reasoning, and a non-thinking branch optimized for rapid, direct inference on tasks like general VQA and OCR. A lightweight, trainable router dynamically allocates queries to the most suitable expert. We instantiate Metis-HOME by adapting the Qwen2.5-VL-7B into an MoE architecture. Comprehensive evaluations reveal that our approach not only substantially enhances complex reasoning abilities but also improves the model's general capabilities, reversing the degradation trend observed in other reasoning-specialized models. Our work establishes a new paradigm for building powerful and versatile MLLMs, effectively resolving the prevalent reasoning-vs-generalization dilemma.

Recent advances leverage post-training to enhance model reasoning performance, which typically requires costly training pipelines and still suffers from inefficient, overly lengthy outputs. We introduce Speculative Thinking, a training-free framework that enables large reasoning models to guide smaller ones during inference at the reasoning level, distinct from speculative decoding, which operates at the token level. Our approach is based on two observations: (1) reasoning-supportive tokens such as "wait" frequently appear after structural delimiters like "\n\n", serving as signals for reflection or continuation; and (2) larger models exhibit stronger control over reflective behavior, reducing unnecessary backtracking while improving reasoning quality. By strategically delegating reflective steps to a more capable model, our method significantly boosts the reasoning accuracy of reasoning models while shortening their output. With the assistance of the 32B reasoning model, the 1.5B model's accuracy on MATH500 increases from 83.2% to 89.4%, marking a substantial improvement of 6.2%. Simultaneously, the average output length is reduced from 5439 tokens to 4583 tokens, representing a 15.7% decrease. Moreover, when applied to a non-reasoning model (Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct), our framework boosts its accuracy from 74.0% to 81.8% on the same benchmark, achieving a relative improvement of 7.8%.

The field of privacy-preserving Natural Language Processing has risen in popularity, particularly at a time when concerns about privacy grow with the proliferation of Large Language Models. One solution consistently appearing in recent literature has been the integration of Differential Privacy (DP) into NLP techniques. In this paper, we take these approaches into critical view, discussing the restrictions that DP integration imposes, as well as bring to light the challenges that such restrictions entail. To accomplish this, we focus on DP-Prompt, a recent method for text privatization leveraging language models to rewrite texts. In particular, we explore this rewriting task in multiple scenarios, both with DP and without DP. To drive the discussion on the merits of DP in NLP, we conduct empirical utility and privacy experiments. Our results demonstrate the need for more discussion on the usability of DP in NLP and its benefits over non-DP approaches.

PRefLexOR (Preference-based Recursive Language Modeling for Exploratory Optimization of Reasoning) combines preference optimization with concepts from Reinforcement Learning to enable models to self-teach through iterative reasoning improvements. We propose a recursive learning approach that engages the model in multi-step reasoning, revisiting, and refining intermediate steps before producing a final output in training and inference phases. Through multiple training stages, the model first learns to align its reasoning with accurate decision paths by optimizing the log odds between preferred and non-preferred responses. During this process, PRefLexOR builds a dynamic knowledge graph by generating questions from random text chunks and retrieval-augmentation to contextualize relevant details from the entire training corpus. In the second stage, preference optimization enhances model performance by using rejection sampling to fine-tune reasoning quality by continually producing in-situ training data while masking the reasoning steps. Recursive optimization within a thinking token framework introduces iterative feedback loops, where the model refines reasoning, achieving deeper coherence, consistency, and adaptability. Implemented in small language models with only 3 billion parameters, we should that even tiny models can iteratively teach themselves to reason with greater depth and reflectivity. Our implementation is straightforward and can be incorporated into any existing pretrained LLM. We focus our examples on applications in biological materials science and demonstrate the method in a variety of case studies that range from in-domain to cross-domain applications. Using reasoning strategies that include thinking and reflection modalities we build a multi-agent recursive self-improving inference approach to successively improve responses via repeated sampling in inference time.

We present Kwaipilot-AutoThink (KAT), an open-source 40B large language model developed to address the overthinking problem in reasoning-intensive tasks, where an automatic thinking training paradigm is proposed to dynamically switch between reasoning and non-reasoning modes based on task complexity. Specifically, first, we construct the dual-regime dataset based on a novel tagging pipeline and a multi-agent synthesis strategy, and then we apply Multi-Token Prediction (MTP)-enhanced knowledge distillation, enabling efficient and fine-grained reasoning transfer with minimal pretraining cost. Besides, we implement a cold-start initialization strategy that introduces mode-selection priors using majority-vote signals and intent-aware prompting. Finally, we propose Step-SRPO, a reinforcement learning algorithm that incorporates intermediate supervision into the GRPO framework, offering structured guidance over both reasoning-mode selection and response accuracy. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmarks demonstrate that KAT consistently matches or even outperforms current state-of-the-art models, including DeepSeek-R1-0528 and Qwen3-235B-A22B, across a wide range of reasoning-intensive tasks while reducing token usage by up to approximately 30\%. Beyond academic evaluation, KAT has been successfully deployed in Kwaipilot (i.e., Kuaishou's internal coding assistant), and improves real-world development workflows with high accuracy, efficiency, and controllable reasoning behaviors. Moreover, we are actively training a 200B Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) with 40B activation parameters, where the early-stage results already demonstrate promising improvements in performance and efficiency, further showing the scalability of the AutoThink paradigm.

Why do thinking language models like DeepSeek R1 outperform their base counterparts? Despite consistent performance gains, it remains unclear to what extent thinking models learn entirely new reasoning capabilities or repurpose pre-existing base model ones. In this work, we propose a hybrid model where we activate reasoning mechanisms in base models at the right time to elicit thinking-model-level reasoning chains, implying that thinking models exploit already existing capabilities. To ground our analysis, we introduce an unsupervised, bottom-up approach for uncovering human-interpretable reasoning behaviors in thinking models. This approach provides an unbiased method to discover reasoning behaviors without imposing manual or LLM-derived assumptions. Across three base and four thinking models, using GSM8K and MATH500, our hybrid model recovers up to 91% of the performance gap to thinking models without any weight updates while steering only 12% of tokens. Concretely, our empirical setup provides a simple, causal way to test the effectiveness of existing reasoning mechanisms in base models by invoking them directly and measuring the resulting task performance. More broadly, these results reframe our understanding of how thinking models are trained: pre-training is when models acquire most of their reasoning mechanisms, and post-training teaches efficient deployment of these mechanisms at the right time, enabling efficient use of their inference-time compute.

Many cognitive approaches to well-being, such as recognizing and reframing unhelpful thoughts, have received considerable empirical support over the past decades, yet still lack truly widespread adoption in self-help format. A barrier to that adoption is a lack of adequately specific and diverse dedicated practice material. This work examines whether current language models can be leveraged to both produce a virtually unlimited quantity of practice material illustrating standard unhelpful thought patterns matching specific given contexts, and generate suitable positive reframing proposals. We propose PATTERNREFRAME, a novel dataset of about 10k examples of thoughts containing unhelpful thought patterns conditioned on a given persona, accompanied by about 27k positive reframes. By using this dataset to train and/or evaluate current models, we show that existing models can already be powerful tools to help generate an abundance of tailored practice material and hypotheses, with no or minimal additional model training required.

Recent advances in test-time scaling have led to the emergence of thinking LLMs that exhibit self-reflective behaviors and multi-step reasoning. While RL drives this self-improvement paradigm, a recent study (Gandhi et al., 2025) shows that RL alone does not truly instill these new reasoning abilities - it merely draws out behaviors already present in the base models. This raises a question: How can we train the models that don't exhibit such thinking behavior to develop it in the first place? To this end, we propose ThinkTuning, a GRPO-based interactive training approach where we augment the rollouts of a student model with the guidance from a teacher model. A simple idea from classroom practice inspires our method: a teacher poses a problem, lets the student try an answer, then gives corrective feedback -- enough to point the mind in the right direction and then show the solution. Each piece of feedback reshapes the student's thoughts, leading them to arrive at the correct solution. Similarly, we find that this type of implicit supervision through feedback from a teacher model of the same size improves the reasoning capabilities of the student model. In particular, on average, our method shows a 3.85% improvement over zero-shot baselines across benchmarks, and on MATH-500, AIME and GPQA-Diamond it shows 2.08%, 2.23% and 3.99% improvements over the vanilla-GRPO baseline. Source code is available at https://github.com/3rdAT/ThinkTuning.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

Recent advanced large reasoning models (LRMs) leverage extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to solve complex tasks, achieving state-of-the-art performance. Despite their success, we identify a critical issue: a substantial portion of simple tasks solved by LRMs can also be addressed by non-reasoning LLMs using significantly fewer tokens, indicating the complex reasoning may not always be necessary. To address this, we systematically analyze the reasoning trajectories of LRMs and present a method utilizing identified paradigms and LLM-Judge to classify these trajectories as either Redundant Reasoning or Essential Reasoning. And we introduce OThink-R1, a method that prunes redundant reasoning steps while preserving logical validity. OThink-R1 dynamically employs the non-thinking mode (fast-thinking) for straightforward problems while engaging in deliberate thinking (slow-thinking) for complex problems. Experiments across mathematical and question-answering tasks demonstrate that OThink-R1 reduces reasoning redundancy by almost 23\% on average without compromising accuracy, offering practical guidelines for efficient reasoning models. The code is available at https://github.com/AgenticIR-Lab/OThink-R1.

Does continued scaling of large language models (LLMs) yield diminishing returns? Real-world value often stems from the length of task an agent can complete. We start this work by observing the simple but counterintuitive fact that marginal gains in single-step accuracy can compound into exponential improvements in the length of a task a model can successfully complete. Then, we argue that failures of LLMs when simple tasks are made longer arise from mistakes in execution, rather than an inability to reason. We propose isolating execution capability, by explicitly providing the knowledge and plan needed to solve a long-horizon task. We find that larger models can correctly execute significantly more turns even when small models have 100\% single-turn accuracy. We observe that the per-step accuracy of models degrades as the number of steps increases. This is not just due to long-context limitations -- curiously, we observe a self-conditioning effect -- models become more likely to make mistakes when the context contains their errors from prior turns. Self-conditioning does not reduce by just scaling the model size. In contrast, recent thinking models do not self-condition, and can also execute much longer tasks in a single turn. We conclude by benchmarking frontier thinking models on the length of task they can execute in a single turn. Overall, by focusing on the ability to execute, we hope to reconcile debates on how LLMs can solve complex reasoning problems yet fail at simple tasks when made longer, and highlight the massive benefits of scaling model size and sequential test-time compute for long-horizon tasks.

Large-scale pretrained language models (LMs) are said to ``lack the ability to connect utterances to the world'' (Bender and Koller, 2020), because they do not have ``mental models of the world' '(Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023). If so, one would expect LM representations to be unrelated to representations induced by vision models. We present an empirical evaluation across four families of LMs (BERT, GPT-2, OPT and LLaMA-2) and three vision model architectures (ResNet, SegFormer, and MAE). Our experiments show that LMs partially converge towards representations isomorphic to those of vision models, subject to dispersion, polysemy and frequency. This has important implications for both multi-modal processing and the LM understanding debate (Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023).

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

The impressive performance of language models is undeniable. However, the presence of biases based on gender, race, socio-economic status, physical appearance, and sexual orientation makes the deployment of language models challenging. This paper studies the effect of chain-of-thought prompting, a recent approach that studies the steps followed by the model before it responds, on fairness. More specifically, we ask the following question: Do biased models have biased thoughts? To answer our question, we conduct experiments on 5 popular large language models using fairness metrics to quantify 11 different biases in the model's thoughts and output. Our results show that the bias in the thinking steps is not highly correlated with the output bias (less than 0.6 correlation with a p-value smaller than 0.001 in most cases). In other words, unlike human beings, the tested models with biased decisions do not always possess biased thoughts.

Trained on vast corpora of human language, language models demonstrate emergent human-like reasoning abilities. Yet they are still far from true intelligence, which opens up intriguing opportunities to explore the parallels of humans and model behaviors. In this work, we study the ability to skip steps in reasoning - a hallmark of human expertise developed through practice. Unlike humans, who may skip steps to enhance efficiency or to reduce cognitive load, models do not inherently possess such motivations to minimize reasoning steps. To address this, we introduce a controlled framework that stimulates step-skipping behavior by iteratively refining models to generate shorter and accurate reasoning paths. Empirical results indicate that models can develop the step skipping ability under our guidance. Moreover, after fine-tuning on expanded datasets that include both complete and skipped reasoning sequences, the models can not only resolve tasks with increased efficiency without sacrificing accuracy, but also exhibit comparable and even enhanced generalization capabilities in out-of-domain scenarios. Our work presents the first exploration into human-like step-skipping ability and provides fresh perspectives on how such cognitive abilities can benefit AI models.

There is intense interest in investigating how inference time compute (ITC) (e.g. repeated sampling, refinements, etc) can improve large language model (LLM) capabilities. At the same time, recent breakthroughs in reasoning models, such as Deepseek-R1, unlock the opportunity for reinforcement learning to improve LLM reasoning skills. An in-depth understanding of how ITC interacts with reasoning across different models could provide important guidance on how to further advance the LLM frontier. This work conducts a comprehensive analysis of inference-time scaling methods for both reasoning and non-reasoning models on challenging reasoning tasks. Specifically, we focus our research on verifier-free inference time-scaling methods due to its generalizability without needing a reward model. We construct the Pareto frontier of quality and efficiency. We find that non-reasoning models, even with an extremely high inference budget, still fall substantially behind reasoning models. For reasoning models, majority voting proves to be a robust inference strategy, generally competitive or outperforming other more sophisticated ITC methods like best-of-N and sequential revisions, while the additional inference compute offers minimal improvements. We further perform in-depth analyses of the association of key response features (length and linguistic markers) with response quality, with which we can improve the existing ITC methods. We find that correct responses from reasoning models are typically shorter and have fewer hedging and thinking markers (but more discourse markers) than the incorrect responses.

Large Language Model can reasonably understand and generate human expressions but may lack of thorough thinking and reasoning mechanisms. Recently there have been several studies which enhance the thinking ability of language models but most of them are not data-driven or training-based. In this paper, we are motivated by the cognitive mechanism in the natural world, and design a novel model architecture called TaS which allows it to first consider the thoughts and then express the response based upon the query. We design several pipelines to annotate or generate the thought contents from prompt-response samples, then add language heads in a middle layer which behaves as the thinking layer. We train the language model by the thoughts-augmented data and successfully let the thinking layer automatically generate reasonable thoughts and finally output more reasonable responses. Both qualitative examples and quantitative results validate the effectiveness and performance of TaS. Our code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/TadE.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have lately been on the spotlight of researchers, businesses, and consumers alike. While the linguistic capabilities of such models have been studied extensively, there is growing interest in investigating them as cognitive subjects. In the present work I examine GPT-3 and ChatGPT capabilities on an limited-data inductive reasoning task from the cognitive science literature. The results suggest that these models' cognitive judgements are not human-like.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has opened up exciting possibilities for simulating human behavior and cognitive processes, with potential applications in various domains, including marketing research and consumer behavior analysis. However, the validity of utilizing LLMs as stand-ins for human subjects remains uncertain due to glaring divergences that suggest fundamentally different underlying processes at play and the sensitivity of LLM responses to prompt variations. This paper presents a novel approach based on Shapley values from cooperative game theory to interpret LLM behavior and quantify the relative contribution of each prompt component to the model's output. Through two applications - a discrete choice experiment and an investigation of cognitive biases - we demonstrate how the Shapley value method can uncover what we term "token noise" effects, a phenomenon where LLM decisions are disproportionately influenced by tokens providing minimal informative content. This phenomenon raises concerns about the robustness and generalizability of insights obtained from LLMs in the context of human behavior simulation. Our model-agnostic approach extends its utility to proprietary LLMs, providing a valuable tool for practitioners and researchers to strategically optimize prompts and mitigate apparent cognitive biases. Our findings underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of the factors driving LLM responses before relying on them as substitutes for human subjects in survey settings. We emphasize the importance of researchers reporting results conditioned on specific prompt templates and exercising caution when drawing parallels between human behavior and LLMs.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Reasoning models are large language models that emit a long chain-of-thought before answering, providing both higher accuracy and explicit reasoning for their response. A major question has been whether language model reasoning generalizes beyond mathematics, programming, and logic, where most previous work has focused. We demonstrate that reasoning models can be post-trained for chemistry without additional domain pretraining, and require substantially less data compared to contemporary domain-specific models. We report ether0, a 24B parameter LLM (based on Mistral-Small-24B) that can reason in natural language and respond with chemical structures. This reasoning model was trained with reinforcement learning on 640,730 experimentally-grounded chemistry problems across 375 tasks ranging from synthesizability, to blood-brain barrier permeability, to human receptor activity, to scent. Our model exceeds general-purpose chemistry models, frontier models, and human experts on molecular design tasks. It is also more data efficient relative to specialized models. We anticipate that this method can be applied to train data-efficient language models specialized for tasks across a wide variety of scientific domains.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

To augment language models with the ability to reason, researchers usually prompt or finetune them to produce chain of thought reasoning steps before producing the final answer. However, although people use natural language to reason effectively, it may be that LMs could reason more effectively with some intermediate computation that is not in natural language. In this work, we explore an alternative reasoning approach: instead of explicitly producing the chain of thought reasoning steps, we use the language model's internal hidden states to perform implicit reasoning. The implicit reasoning steps are distilled from a teacher model trained on explicit chain-of-thought reasoning, and instead of doing reasoning "horizontally" by producing intermediate words one-by-one, we distill it such that the reasoning happens "vertically" among the hidden states in different layers. We conduct experiments on a multi-digit multiplication task and a grade school math problem dataset and find that this approach enables solving tasks previously not solvable without explicit chain-of-thought, at a speed comparable to no chain-of-thought.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

Machine learning models are now able to convert user-written text descriptions into naturalistic images. These models are available to anyone online and are being used to generate millions of images a day. We investigate these models and find that they amplify dangerous and complex stereotypes. Moreover, we find that the amplified stereotypes are difficult to predict and not easily mitigated by users or model owners. The extent to which these image-generation models perpetuate and amplify stereotypes and their mass deployment is cause for serious concern.

Large language models have demonstrated impressive performance on challenging mathematical reasoning tasks, which has triggered the discussion of whether the performance is achieved by true reasoning capability or memorization. To investigate this question, prior work has constructed mathematical benchmarks when questions undergo simple perturbations -- modifications that still preserve the underlying reasoning patterns of the solutions. However, no work has explored hard perturbations, which fundamentally change the nature of the problem so that the original solution steps do not apply. To bridge the gap, we construct MATH-P-Simple and MATH-P-Hard via simple perturbation and hard perturbation, respectively. Each consists of 279 perturbed math problems derived from level-5 (hardest) problems in the MATH dataset (Hendrycksmath et. al., 2021). We observe significant performance drops on MATH-P-Hard across various models, including o1-mini (-16.49%) and gemini-2.0-flash-thinking (-12.9%). We also raise concerns about a novel form of memorization where models blindly apply learned problem-solving skills without assessing their applicability to modified contexts. This issue is amplified when using original problems for in-context learning. We call for research efforts to address this challenge, which is critical for developing more robust and reliable reasoning models.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated enhanced performance through the Thinking then Responding paradigm, where models generate internal thoughts before final responses (aka, System 2 thinking). However, existing research lacks a systematic understanding of the mechanisms underlying how thinking patterns affect performance across model sizes. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the impact of various thinking types on model performance and introduce ThinkPatterns-21k, a curated dataset comprising 21k instruction-response pairs (QA) collected from existing instruction-following datasets with five thinking types. For each pair, we augment it with five distinct internal thinking patterns: one unstructured thinking (monologue) and four structured variants (decomposition, self-ask, self-debate and self-critic), while maintaining the same instruction and response. Through extensive evaluation across different model sizes (3B-32B parameters), we have two key findings: (1) smaller models (<30B parameters) can benefit from most of structured thinking patterns, while larger models (32B) with structured thinking like decomposition would degrade performance and (2) unstructured monologue demonstrates broad effectiveness across different model sizes. Finally, we released all of our datasets, checkpoints, training logs of diverse thinking patterns to reproducibility, aiming to facilitate further research in this direction.

The capacity of Large Language Models (LLMs) to reason is fundamental to their application in complex, knowledge-intensive domains. In real-world scenarios, LLMs are often augmented with external information that can be helpful, irrelevant, or even misleading. This paper investigates the causal impact of such auxiliary information on the reasoning process of LLMs with explicit step-by-step thinking capabilities. We introduce SciAux, a new dataset derived from ScienceQA, to systematically test the robustness of the model against these types of information. Our findings reveal a critical vulnerability: the model's deliberative "thinking mode" is a double-edged sword. While helpful context improves accuracy, misleading information causes a catastrophic drop in performance, which is amplified by the thinking process. Instead of conferring robustness, thinking reinforces the degree of error when provided with misinformation. This highlights that the challenge is not merely to make models "think", but to endow them with the critical faculty to evaluate the information upon which their reasoning is based. The SciAux dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/billhdzhao/SciAux.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

We construct evaluation tasks where extending the reasoning length of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) deteriorates performance, exhibiting an inverse scaling relationship between test-time compute and accuracy. Our evaluation tasks span four categories: simple counting tasks with distractors, regression tasks with spurious features, deduction tasks with constraint tracking, and advanced AI risks. We identify five distinct failure modes when models reason for longer: 1) Claude models become increasingly distracted by irrelevant information; 2) OpenAI o-series models resist distractors but overfit to problem framings; 3) models shift from reasonable priors to spurious correlations; 4) all models show difficulties in maintaining focus on complex deductive tasks; and 5) extended reasoning may amplify concerning behaviors, with Claude Sonnet 4 showing increased expressions of self-preservation. These findings suggest that while test-time compute scaling remains promising for improving model capabilities, it may inadvertently reinforce problematic reasoning patterns. Our results demonstrate the importance of evaluating models across diverse reasoning lengths to identify and address these failure modes in LRMs.

Humans regularly engage in analogical thinking, relating personal experiences to current situations (X is analogous to Y because of Z). Analogical thinking allows humans to solve problems in creative ways, grasp difficult concepts, and articulate ideas more effectively. Can language models (LMs) do the same? To answer this question, we propose ANALOBENCH, a benchmark to determine analogical reasoning ability in LMs. Our benchmarking approach focuses on aspects of this ability that are common among humans: (i) recalling related experiences from a large amount of information, and (ii) applying analogical reasoning to complex and lengthy scenarios. We test a broad collection of proprietary models (e.g., GPT family, Claude V2) and open source models such as LLaMA2. As in prior results, scaling up LMs results in some performance boosts. Surprisingly, scale offers minimal gains when, (i) analogies involve lengthy scenarios, or (ii) recalling relevant scenarios from a large pool of information, a process analogous to finding a needle in a haystack. We hope these observations encourage further research in this field.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Recent advances in language models have demonstrated their capability to solve mathematical reasoning problems, achieving near-perfect accuracy on grade-school level math benchmarks like GSM8K. In this paper, we formally study how language models solve these problems. We design a series of controlled experiments to address several fundamental questions: (1) Can language models truly develop reasoning skills, or do they simply memorize templates? (2) What is the model's hidden (mental) reasoning process? (3) Do models solve math questions using skills similar to or different from humans? (4) Do models trained on GSM8K-like datasets develop reasoning skills beyond those necessary for solving GSM8K problems? (5) What mental process causes models to make reasoning mistakes? (6) How large or deep must a model be to effectively solve GSM8K-level math questions? Our study uncovers many hidden mechanisms by which language models solve mathematical questions, providing insights that extend beyond current understandings of LLMs.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

How much is 56 times 37? Language models often make mistakes in these types of difficult calculations. This is usually explained by their inability to perform complex reasoning. Since language models rely on large training sets and great memorization capability, naturally they are not equipped to run complex calculations. However, one can argue that humans also cannot perform this calculation immediately and require a considerable amount of time to construct the solution. In order to enhance the generalization capability of language models, and as a parallel to human behavior, we propose to use special 'thinking tokens' which allow the model to perform much more calculations whenever a complex problem is encountered.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable problem-solving and basic mathematics abilities. However, their efficacy is highly contingent on the formulation of the prompt. This study endeavors to quantify the influence of incorporating "positive thinking" into the system message of the prompt, then compare that to systematic prompt optimization. We assess the performance of 60 combinations of system message snippets, tested with and without Chain of Thought prompting, across three models with parameters ranging from 7 to 70 billion on the GSM8K dataset. Our findings reveal that results do not universally generalize across models. In most instances, the inclusion of "positive thinking" prompts positively affected model performance. Notably, however, Llama2-70B exhibited an exception when not utilizing Chain of Thought, as the optimal system message was found to be none at all. Given the combinatorial complexity, and thus computation time, of experimenting with hand-tuning prompts for large black-box models, we then compared the performance of the best "positive thinking" prompt against the output of systematic prompt optimization. We show that employing an automated prompt optimizer emerges as the most effective method for enhancing performance, even when working with smaller open-source models. Additionally, our findings reveal that the highest-scoring, automatically-optimized prompt exhibits a degree of peculiarity far beyond expectations.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Deep learning models for natural language processing (NLP) are increasingly adopted and deployed by analysts without formal training in NLP or machine learning (ML). However, the documentation intended to convey the model's details and appropriate use is tailored primarily to individuals with ML or NLP expertise. To address this gap, we conduct a design inquiry into interactive model cards, which augment traditionally static model cards with affordances for exploring model documentation and interacting with the models themselves. Our investigation consists of an initial conceptual study with experts in ML, NLP, and AI Ethics, followed by a separate evaluative study with non-expert analysts who use ML models in their work. Using a semi-structured interview format coupled with a think-aloud protocol, we collected feedback from a total of 30 participants who engaged with different versions of standard and interactive model cards. Through a thematic analysis of the collected data, we identified several conceptual dimensions that summarize the strengths and limitations of standard and interactive model cards, including: stakeholders; design; guidance; understandability & interpretability; sensemaking & skepticism; and trust & safety. Our findings demonstrate the importance of carefully considered design and interactivity for orienting and supporting non-expert analysts using deep learning models, along with a need for consideration of broader sociotechnical contexts and organizational dynamics. We have also identified design elements, such as language, visual cues, and warnings, among others, that support interactivity and make non-interactive content accessible. We summarize our findings as design guidelines and discuss their implications for a human-centered approach towards AI/ML documentation.

The task of "unlearning" certain concepts in large language models (LLMs) has attracted immense attention recently, due to its importance for mitigating undesirable model behaviours, such as the generation of harmful, private, or incorrect information. Current protocols to evaluate unlearning methods largely rely on behavioral tests, without monitoring the presence of unlearned knowledge within the model's parameters. This residual knowledge can be adversarially exploited to recover the erased information post-unlearning. We argue that unlearning should also be evaluated internally, by considering changes in the parametric knowledge traces of the unlearned concepts. To this end, we propose a general methodology for eliciting directions in the parameter space (termed "concept vectors") that encode concrete concepts, and construct ConceptVectors, a benchmark dataset containing hundreds of common concepts and their parametric knowledge traces within two open-source LLMs. Evaluation on ConceptVectors shows that existing unlearning methods minimally impact concept vectors, while directly ablating these vectors demonstrably removes the associated knowledge from the LLMs and significantly reduces their susceptibility to adversarial manipulation. Our results highlight limitations in behavioral-based unlearning evaluations and call for future work to include parametric-based evaluations. To support this, we release our code and benchmark at https://github.com/yihuaihong/ConceptVectors.

Reasoning models leveraging long chains of thought employ various cognitive skills, such as verification of their answers, backtracking, retrying by an alternate method, and more. Previous work has shown that when a base language model exhibits these skills, training that model further with reinforcement learning (RL) can learn to leverage them. How can we get models to leverage skills that aren't exhibited by base models? Our work, SkillFactory, is a method for fine-tuning models to roughly learn these skills during a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage prior to RL. Our approach does not rely on distillation from a stronger model, but instead uses samples from the model itself, rearranged to provide training data in the format of those skills. These "silver" SFT traces may be imperfect, but are nevertheless effective for priming a model to acquire skills during RL. Our evaluation shows that (1) starting from SkillFactory SFT initialization helps a model to generalize to harder variants of a task post-RL, despite lower performance pre-RL; (2) cognitive skills are indeed used by the model; (3) RLed SkillFactory models are more robust to regression on out-of-domain tasks than RLed base models. Our work suggests that inductive biases learned prior to RL help models learn robust cognitive skill use.

Understanding Rebus Puzzles (Rebus Puzzles use pictures, symbols, and letters to represent words or phrases creatively) requires a variety of skills such as image recognition, cognitive skills, commonsense reasoning, multi-step reasoning, image-based wordplay, etc., making this a challenging task for even current Vision-Language Models. In this paper, we present left|,circlearrowright,text{BUS},right|, a large and diverse benchmark of 1,333 English Rebus Puzzles containing different artistic styles and levels of difficulty, spread across 18 categories such as food, idioms, sports, finance, entertainment, etc. We also propose RebusDescProgICE, a model-agnostic framework which uses a combination of an unstructured description and code-based, structured reasoning, along with better, reasoning-based in-context example selection, improving the performance of Vision-Language Models on left|,circlearrowright,text{BUS},right| by 2.1-4.1% and 20-30% using closed-source and open-source models respectively compared to Chain-of-Thought Reasoning.

Reasoning Language Models, capable of extended chain-of-thought reasoning, have demonstrated remarkable performance on tasks requiring complex logical inference. However, applying elaborate reasoning for all queries often results in substantial computational inefficiencies, particularly when many problems admit straightforward solutions. This motivates an open question: Can LLMs learn when to think? To answer this, we propose Thinkless, a learnable framework that empowers an LLM to adaptively select between short-form and long-form reasoning, based on both task complexity and the model's ability. Thinkless is trained under a reinforcement learning paradigm and employs two control tokens, <short> for concise responses and <think> for detailed reasoning. At the core of our method is a Decoupled Group Relative Policy Optimization (DeGRPO) algorithm, which decomposes the learning objective of hybrid reasoning into two components: (1) a control token loss that governs the selection of the reasoning mode, and (2) a response loss that improves the accuracy of the generated answers. This decoupled formulation enables fine-grained control over the contributions of each objective, stabilizing training and effectively preventing collapse observed in vanilla GRPO. Empirically, on several benchmarks such as Minerva Algebra, MATH-500, and GSM8K, Thinkless is able to reduce the usage of long-chain thinking by 50% - 90%, significantly improving the efficiency of Reasoning Language Models. The code is available at https://github.com/VainF/Thinkless

Recent large language models (LLMs) have shown indications of mathematical reasoning ability. However it has not been clear how they would fare on more challenging competition-level problems. And while self-generated verbalizations of intermediate reasoning steps (i.e., chain-of-thought prompting) have been shown to be helpful, whether LLMs can make use of helpful side information such as problem-specific hints has not been investigated before. In this paper, we propose a challenging benchmark dataset for enabling such analyses. The Concept and Hint-Annotated Math Problems (CHAMP) consists of high school math competition problems, annotated with concepts, or general math facts, and hints, or problem-specific tricks. These annotations allow us to explore the effects of additional information, such as relevant hints, misleading concepts, or related problems. This benchmark is difficult, with the best model only scoring 58.1% in standard settings. With concepts and hints, performance sometimes improves, indicating that some models can make use of such side information. We further annotate model-generated solutions for their correctness. Using this corpus, we find that models often arrive at the correct final answer through wrong reasoning steps. In addition, we test whether models are able to verify these solutions, and find that most models struggle. The dataset and code are available on the project website.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) can do complex reasoning via long chain-of-thought (CoT) involving cognitive strategies such as backtracking and self-correction. Recent studies suggest that some models inherently possess these long reasoning abilities, which may be unlocked via extra training. Our work first investigates whether we can elicit such behavior without any training. To this end, we propose a decoding-time approach, ThinkLogit, which utilizes logits arithmetic (Liu et al., 2024) to tune a target large LM for long reasoning using a substantially smaller model as guider. We then show that we can further boost performance by training the guider model with preference optimization over correct/incorrect reasoning pairs sampled from both the target and guider model -- a setup we refer to as ThinkLogit-DPO. Our experiments demonstrate that ThinkLogit and ThinkLogit-DPO achieve a relative improvement in pass@1 by 26% and 29%, respectively, over four mathematical datasets using the Qwen2.5-32B when guided by R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B -- a model 21x smaller. Lastly, we show that ThinkLogit can transfer long reasoning skills acquired through reinforcement learning, improving pass@1 by 13% relative compared to the Qwen2.5-32B base model. Our work presents a computationally-efficient method to elicit long reasoning in large models with minimal or no additional training.

Recent work has argued that large language models (LLMs) are not "abstract reasoners", citing their poor zero-shot performance on a variety of challenging tasks as evidence. We revisit these experiments in order to add nuance to the claim. First, we show that while LLMs indeed perform poorly in a zero-shot setting, even tuning a small subset of parameters for input encoding can enable near-perfect performance. However, we also show that this finetuning does not necessarily transfer across datasets. We take this collection of empirical results as an invitation to (re-)open the discussion of what it means to be an "abstract reasoner", and why it matters whether LLMs fit the bill.

Figurative and metaphorical language are commonplace in discourse, and figurative expressions play an important role in communication and cognition. However, figurative language has been a relatively under-studied area in NLP, and it remains an open question to what extent modern language models can interpret nonliteral phrases. To address this question, we introduce Fig-QA, a Winograd-style nonliteral language understanding task consisting of correctly interpreting paired figurative phrases with divergent meanings. We evaluate the performance of several state-of-the-art language models on this task, and find that although language models achieve performance significantly over chance, they still fall short of human performance, particularly in zero- or few-shot settings. This suggests that further work is needed to improve the nonliteral reasoning capabilities of language models.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

Multiple-choice exam questions with "None of the above" (NA) options have been extensively studied in educational testing, in which existing research suggests that they better assess true knowledge. However, their impact on Large Language Models (LLMs) evaluation remains underexplored. Through systematic experiments with 28 LLMs on the MMLU benchmark, we examine how NA options affect model performance and confidence calibration. Our analysis reveals that NA options, when used as the correct answer, lead to a consistent 30-50\% performance drop across models regardless of scale--suggesting that LLMs lack the meta-cognitive ability to systematically evaluate and reject all given options when none are correct. This degradation shows strong domain dependence, with minimal impact on mathematical reasoning (14.6\% drop) but severe effects on tasks requiring uncertainty handling like business ethics (48.1\% drop). Our results highlight important implications for benchmark design and raise questions about LLMs' ability to handle uncertainty in real-world applications.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

Large language models trained on massive corpora of data from the web can memorize and reproduce sensitive or private data raising both legal and ethical concerns. Unlearning, or tuning models to forget information present in their training data, provides us with a way to protect private data after training. Although several methods exist for such unlearning, it is unclear to what extent they result in models equivalent to those where the data to be forgotten was never learned in the first place. To address this challenge, we present TOFU, a Task of Fictitious Unlearning, as a benchmark aimed at helping deepen our understanding of unlearning. We offer a dataset of 200 diverse synthetic author profiles, each consisting of 20 question-answer pairs, and a subset of these profiles called the forget set that serves as the target for unlearning. We compile a suite of metrics that work together to provide a holistic picture of unlearning efficacy. Finally, we provide a set of baseline results from existing unlearning algorithms. Importantly, none of the baselines we consider show effective unlearning motivating continued efforts to develop approaches for unlearning that effectively tune models so that they truly behave as if they were never trained on the forget data at all.

There is a substantial body of literature examining the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), particularly their performance on precise arithmetic operations in autoregressive architectures. However, their ability to perform approximate reasoning in informal, fast-paced mathematical operations has received far less attention, especially among non-autoregressive decoder models. Our work addresses this gap by introducing StreetMath, a benchmark designed to evaluate models' approximation abilities under real-world approximation scenarios. We conduct extensive evaluations across different LLM architectures: Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507, Qwen3-4B-Thinking-2507, Dream-v0-Instruct-7B, Falcon-Mamba-7B-Instruct, and Mamba-GPT-3B. Furthermore, we apply mechanistic interpretability techniques to probe their internal computational states. Our analysis reveals that LLMs generally attempt to compute exact values or invoke external tools even in tasks that call for approximation. Moreover, while models sometimes reach the correct answer in early layers or steps, they still consume more tokens when solving approximation tasks. Additional experiments indicate that exact and approximate arithmetic operations rely on largely separate neural components. Drawing upon research on cognitive psychology, we argue that LLMs do not exhibit cognitive miserliness in the same way humans do in street math settings. We open source our work https://github.com/ctseng777/StreetMath

DeepSeek-R1 has shown that long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning can naturally emerge through a simple reinforcement learning (RL) framework with rule-based rewards, where the training may directly start from the base models-a paradigm referred to as zero RL training. Most recent efforts to reproduce zero RL training have primarily focused on the Qwen2.5 model series, which may not be representative as we find the base models already exhibit strong instruction-following and self-reflection abilities. In this work, we investigate zero RL training across 10 diverse base models, spanning different families and sizes including LLama3-8B, Mistral-7B/24B, DeepSeek-Math-7B, Qwen2.5-math-7B, and all Qwen2.5 models from 0.5B to 32B. Leveraging several key design strategies-such as adjusting format reward and controlling query difficulty-we achieve substantial improvements in both reasoning accuracy and response length across most settings. However, by carefully monitoring the training dynamics, we observe that different base models exhibit distinct patterns during training. For instance, the increased response length does not always correlate with the emergence of certain cognitive behaviors such as verification (i.e., the "aha moment"). Notably, we observe the "aha moment" for the first time in small models not from the Qwen family. We share the key designs that enable successful zero RL training, along with our findings and practices. To facilitate further research, we open-source the code, models, and analysis tools.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have recently achieved impressive results on reasoning benchmarks. Yet, growing evidence shows that these models often generate longer but ineffective chains of thought (CoTs), calling into question whether benchmark gains reflect real reasoning improvements. We present new evidence of overthinking, where models disregard correct solutions even when explicitly provided, instead continuing to generate unnecessary reasoning steps that often lead to incorrect conclusions. Experiments on three state-of-the-art models using the AIME2024 math benchmark reveal critical limitations in these models ability to integrate corrective information, posing new challenges for achieving robust and interpretable reasoning.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

Language models demonstrate both quantitative improvement and new qualitative capabilities with increasing scale. Despite their potentially transformative impact, these new capabilities are as yet poorly characterized. In order to inform future research, prepare for disruptive new model capabilities, and ameliorate socially harmful effects, it is vital that we understand the present and near-future capabilities and limitations of language models. To address this challenge, we introduce the Beyond the Imitation Game benchmark (BIG-bench). BIG-bench currently consists of 204 tasks, contributed by 442 authors across 132 institutions. Task topics are diverse, drawing problems from linguistics, childhood development, math, common-sense reasoning, biology, physics, social bias, software development, and beyond. BIG-bench focuses on tasks that are believed to be beyond the capabilities of current language models. We evaluate the behavior of OpenAI's GPT models, Google-internal dense transformer architectures, and Switch-style sparse transformers on BIG-bench, across model sizes spanning millions to hundreds of billions of parameters. In addition, a team of human expert raters performed all tasks in order to provide a strong baseline. Findings include: model performance and calibration both improve with scale, but are poor in absolute terms (and when compared with rater performance); performance is remarkably similar across model classes, though with benefits from sparsity; tasks that improve gradually and predictably commonly involve a large knowledge or memorization component, whereas tasks that exhibit "breakthrough" behavior at a critical scale often involve multiple steps or components, or brittle metrics; social bias typically increases with scale in settings with ambiguous context, but this can be improved with prompting.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

The impressive performance of recent language models across a wide range of tasks suggests that they possess a degree of abstract reasoning skills. Are these skills general and transferable, or specialized to specific tasks seen during pretraining? To disentangle these effects, we propose an evaluation framework based on "counterfactual" task variants that deviate from the default assumptions underlying standard tasks. Across a suite of 11 tasks, we observe nontrivial performance on the counterfactual variants, but nevertheless find that performance substantially and consistently degrades compared to the default conditions. This suggests that while current LMs may possess abstract task-solving skills to a degree, they often also rely on narrow, non-transferable procedures for task-solving. These results motivate a more careful interpretation of language model performance that teases apart these aspects of behavior.

Human reasoning relies on constructing and manipulating mental models-simplified internal representations of situations that we use to understand and solve problems. Conceptual diagrams (for example, sketches drawn by humans to aid reasoning) externalize these mental models, abstracting irrelevant details to efficiently capture relational and spatial information. In contrast, Large Language Models (LLMs) and Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) predominantly reason through textual representations, limiting their effectiveness in complex multi-step combinatorial and planning tasks. In this paper, we propose a zero-shot fully automatic framework that enables LMMs to reason through multiple chains of self-generated intermediate conceptual diagrams, significantly enhancing their combinatorial planning capabilities. Our approach does not require any human initialization beyond a natural language description of the task. It integrates both textual and diagrammatic reasoning within an optimized graph-of-thought inference framework, enhanced by beam search and depth-wise backtracking. Evaluated on multiple challenging PDDL planning domains, our method substantially improves GPT-4o's performance (for example, from 35.5% to 90.2% in Blocksworld). On more difficult planning domains with solution depths up to 40, our approach outperforms even the o1-preview reasoning model (for example, over 13% improvement in Parking). These results highlight the value of conceptual diagrams as a complementary reasoning medium in LMMs.

The surprising ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform well on complex reasoning with only few-shot chain-of-thought prompts is believed to emerge only in very large-scale models (100+ billion parameters). We show that such abilities can, in fact, be distilled down from GPT-3.5 (ge 175B) to T5 variants (le 11B). We propose model specialization, to specialize the model's ability towards a target task. The hypothesis is that large models (commonly viewed as larger than 100B) have strong modeling power, but are spread on a large spectrum of tasks. Small models (commonly viewed as smaller than 10B) have limited model capacity, but if we concentrate their capacity on a specific target task, the model can achieve a decent improved performance. We use multi-step math reasoning as our testbed because it is a very typical emergent ability. We show two important aspects of model abilities: (1). there exists a very complex balance/ tradeoff between language models' multi-dimensional abilities; (2). by paying the price of decreased generic ability, we can clearly lift up the scaling curve of models smaller than 10B towards a specialized multi-step math reasoning ability. We further give comprehensive discussions about important design choices for better generalization, including the tuning data format, the start model checkpoint, and a new model selection method. We hope our practice and discoveries can serve as an important attempt towards specialized smaller models in the new research paradigm set by LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are revolutionizing education, with LLM-based agents playing a key role in simulating student behavior. A major challenge in student simulation is modeling the diverse learning patterns of students at various cognitive levels. However, current LLMs, typically trained as ``helpful assistants'', target at generating perfect responses. As a result, they struggle to simulate students with diverse cognitive abilities, as they often produce overly advanced answers, missing the natural imperfections that characterize student learning and resulting in unrealistic simulations. To address this issue, we propose a training-free framework for student simulation. We begin by constructing a cognitive prototype for each student using a knowledge graph, which captures their understanding of concepts from past learning records. This prototype is then mapped to new tasks to predict student performance. Next, we simulate student solutions based on these predictions and iteratively refine them using a beam search method to better replicate realistic mistakes. To validate our approach, we construct the Student\_100 dataset, consisting of 100 students working on Python programming and 5,000 learning records. Experimental results show that our method consistently outperforms baseline models, achieving 100% improvement in simulation accuracy.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated the effectiveness of scaling test-time computation to enhance reasoning capabilities in multiple tasks. However, LRMs typically suffer from "overthinking" problems, where models generate significantly redundant reasoning steps while bringing limited performance gains. Existing work relies on fine-tuning to mitigate overthinking, which requires additional data, unconventional training setups, risky safety misalignment, and poor generalization. Through empirical analysis, we reveal an important characteristic of LRM behaviors that placing external CoTs generated by smaller models between the thinking token (<think> and </think>) can effectively manipulate the model to generate fewer thoughts. Building on these insights, we propose a simple yet efficient pipeline, ThoughtMani, to enable LRMs to bypass unnecessary intermediate steps and reduce computational costs significantly. We conduct extensive experiments to validate the utility and efficiency of ThoughtMani. For instance, when applied to QwQ-32B on the LiveBench/Code dataset, ThoughtMani keeps the original performance and reduces output token counts by approximately 30%, with little overhead from the CoT generator. Furthermore, we find that ThoughtMani enhances safety alignment by an average of 10%. Since model vendors typically serve models of different sizes simultaneously, ThoughtMani provides an effective way to construct more efficient and accessible LRMs for real-world applications.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on thinking models that externalize intermediate steps and allocate extra test-time compute, with think-twice strategies showing that a deliberate second pass can elicit stronger reasoning. In contrast, most reward models (RMs) still compress many quality dimensions into a single scalar in one shot, a design that induces judgment diffusion: attention spreads across evaluation criteria, yielding diluted focus and shallow analysis. We introduce branch-and-rethink (BR-RM), a two-turn RM that transfers the think-twice principle to reward modeling. Turn 1 performs adaptive branching, selecting a small set of instance-critical dimensions (such as factuality and safety) and sketching concise, evidence-seeking hypotheses. Turn 2 executes branch-conditioned rethinking, a targeted reread that tests those hypotheses and scrutinizes only what matters most. We train with GRPO-style reinforcement learning over structured two-turn traces using a simple binary outcome reward with strict format checks, making the approach compatible with standard RLHF pipelines. By converting all-at-oncescoringintofocused, second-lookreasoning, BR-RMreducesjudgmentdiffusionandimproves sensitivity to subtle yet consequential errors while remaining practical and scalable. Experimental results demonstrate that our model achieves state-of-the-art performance on three challenging reward modeling benchmarks across diverse domains. The code and the model will be released soon.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have introduced Reasoning Large Language Models (RLLMs), which employ extended thinking processes with reflection and self-correction capabilities, demonstrating the effectiveness of test-time scaling. RLLMs exhibit innate Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning capability obtained from training, leading to a natural question: "Is CoT prompting, a popular In-Context Learning (ICL) method for chat LLMs, necessary to enhance the reasoning capability of RLLMs?" In this work, we present the first comprehensive analysis of the impacts of Zero-shot CoT and Few-shot CoT on RLLMs across mathematical reasoning tasks. We examine models ranging from 1.5B to 32B parameters, finding that contrary to concerns, CoT prompting significantly enhances RLLMs' performance in most scenarios. Our results reveal distinct patterns: large-capacity models show minimal improvement on simple tasks but substantial gains on complex problems, while smaller models exhibit the opposite behavior. Further analysis demonstrates that CoT prompting effectively controls the distribution of the numbers of thinking tokens and reasoning steps, reducing excessive reflections by approximately 90% in some cases. Moreover, attention logits analysis reveals the RLLMs' overfitting to reflection-related words, which is mitigated by external CoT guidance. Notably, our experiments indicate that for RLLMs, one-shot CoT consistently yields superior performance compared to Few-shot CoT approaches. Our findings provide important insights for optimizing RLLMs' performance through appropriate prompting strategies.

In this work, we address the problem of large language model (LLM) unlearning, aiming to remove unwanted data influences and associated model capabilities (e.g., copyrighted data or harmful content generation) while preserving essential model utilities, without the need for retraining from scratch. Despite the growing need for LLM unlearning, a principled optimization framework remains lacking. To this end, we revisit the state-of-the-art approach, negative preference optimization (NPO), and identify the issue of reference model bias, which could undermine NPO's effectiveness, particularly when unlearning forget data of varying difficulty. Given that, we propose a simple yet effective unlearning optimization framework, called SimNPO, showing that 'simplicity' in removing the reliance on a reference model (through the lens of simple preference optimization) benefits unlearning. We also provide deeper insights into SimNPO's advantages, supported by analysis using mixtures of Markov chains. Furthermore, we present extensive experiments validating SimNPO's superiority over existing unlearning baselines in benchmarks like TOFU and MUSE, and robustness against relearning attacks. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-Simple.

Inference-time computation techniques, analogous to human System 2 Thinking, have recently become popular for improving model performances. However, most existing approaches suffer from several limitations: they are modality-specific (e.g., working only in text), problem-specific (e.g., verifiable domains like math and coding), or require additional supervision/training on top of unsupervised pretraining (e.g., verifiers or verifiable rewards). In this paper, we ask the question "Is it possible to generalize these System 2 Thinking approaches, and develop models that learn to think solely from unsupervised learning?" Interestingly, we find the answer is yes, by learning to explicitly verify the compatibility between inputs and candidate-predictions, and then re-framing prediction problems as optimization with respect to this verifier. Specifically, we train Energy-Based Transformers (EBTs) -- a new class of Energy-Based Models (EBMs) -- to assign an energy value to every input and candidate-prediction pair, enabling predictions through gradient descent-based energy minimization until convergence. Across both discrete (text) and continuous (visual) modalities, we find EBTs scale faster than the dominant Transformer++ approach during training, achieving an up to 35% higher scaling rate with respect to data, batch size, parameters, FLOPs, and depth. During inference, EBTs improve performance with System 2 Thinking by 29% more than the Transformer++ on language tasks, and EBTs outperform Diffusion Transformers on image denoising while using fewer forward passes. Further, we find that EBTs achieve better results than existing models on most downstream tasks given the same or worse pretraining performance, suggesting that EBTs generalize better than existing approaches. Consequently, EBTs are a promising new paradigm for scaling both the learning and thinking capabilities of models.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our daily lives, the potential harms from deceptive behavior underlie the need for faithfully interpreting their decision-making. While traditional probing methods have shown some effectiveness, they remain best for narrowly scoped tasks while more comprehensive explanations are still necessary. To this end, we investigate meta-models-an architecture using a "meta-model" that takes activations from an "input-model" and answers natural language questions about the input-model's behaviors. We evaluate the meta-model's ability to generalize by training them on selected task types and assessing their out-of-distribution performance in deceptive scenarios. Our findings show that meta-models generalize well to out-of-distribution tasks and point towards opportunities for future research in this area. Our code is available at https://github.com/acostarelli/meta-models-public .

The recent proliferation of research into transformer based natural language processing has led to a number of studies which attempt to detect the presence of human-like cognitive behavior in the models. We contend that, as is true of human psychology, the investigation of cognitive behavior in language models must be conducted in an appropriate population of an appropriate size for the results to be meaningful. We leverage work in uncertainty estimation in a novel approach to efficiently construct experimental populations. The resultant tool, PopulationLM, has been made open source. We provide theoretical grounding in the uncertainty estimation literature and motivation from current cognitive work regarding language models. We discuss the methodological lessons from other scientific communities and attempt to demonstrate their application to two artificial population studies. Through population based experimentation we find that language models exhibit behavior consistent with typicality effects among categories highly represented in training. However, we find that language models don't tend to exhibit structural priming effects. Generally, our results show that single models tend to over estimate the presence of cognitive behaviors in neural models.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

Reasoning-enhanced large language models (LLMs) explicitly generate intermediate reasoning steps prior to generating final answers, helping the model excel in complex problem-solving. In this paper, we demonstrate that this emerging generation framework offers a unique opportunity for more fine-grained control over model behavior. We propose Thinking Intervention, a novel paradigm designed to explicitly guide the internal reasoning processes of LLMs by strategically inserting or revising specific thinking tokens. We conduct comprehensive evaluations across multiple tasks, including instruction following on IFEval, instruction hierarchy on SEP, and safety alignment on XSTest and SORRY-Bench. Our results demonstrate that Thinking Intervention significantly outperforms baseline prompting approaches, achieving up to 6.7% accuracy gains in instruction-following scenarios, 15.4% improvements in reasoning about instruction hierarchies, and a 40.0% increase in refusal rates for unsafe prompts using open-source DeepSeek R1 models. Overall, our work opens a promising new research avenue for controlling reasoning LLMs.

Recent large language models (LLMs) can generate long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) at test time, enabling them to solve complex tasks. These reasoning steps in CoT are often assumed as a faithful reflection of the model's internal thinking process, and used to monitor unsafe intentions. However, we find many reasoning steps don't truly contribute to LLMs' prediction. We measure the step-wise causal influence of each reasoning step on the model's final prediction with a proposed True Thinking Score (TTS). We reveal that LLMs often interleave between true-thinking steps (which are genuinely used to produce the final output) and decorative-thinking steps (which only give the appearance of reasoning but have minimal causal impact). Notably, only a small subset of the total reasoning steps have a high TTS that causally drive the model's prediction: e.g., for the AIME dataset, only an average of 2.3% of reasoning steps in CoT have a TTS >= 0.7 (range: 0-1) under the Qwen-2.5 model. Furthermore, we identify a TrueThinking direction in the latent space of LLMs. By steering along or against this direction, we can force the model to perform or disregard certain CoT steps when computing the final result. Finally, we highlight that self-verification steps in CoT (i.e., aha moments) can also be decorative, where LLMs do not truly verify their solution. Steering along the TrueThinking direction can force internal reasoning over these steps, resulting in a change in the final results. Overall, our work reveals that LLMs often verbalize reasoning steps without actually performing them internally, which undermines both the efficiency of LLM reasoning and the trustworthiness of CoT.

The impressive capability of modern text-to-image models to generate realistic visuals has come with a serious drawback: they can be misused to create harmful, deceptive or unlawful content. This has accelerated the push for machine unlearning. This new field seeks to selectively remove specific knowledge from a model's training data without causing a drop in its overall performance. However, it turns out that actually forgetting a given concept is an extremely difficult task. Models exposed to attacks using adversarial prompts show the ability to generate so-called unlearned concepts, which can be not only harmful but also illegal. In this paper, we present considerations regarding the ability of models to forget and recall knowledge, introducing the Memory Self-Regeneration task. Furthermore, we present MemoRa strategy, which we consider to be a regenerative approach supporting the effective recovery of previously lost knowledge. Moreover, we propose that robustness in knowledge retrieval is a crucial yet underexplored evaluation measure for developing more robust and effective unlearning techniques. Finally, we demonstrate that forgetting occurs in two distinct ways: short-term, where concepts can be quickly recalled, and long-term, where recovery is more challenging.

Self-consciousness, the introspection of one's existence and thoughts, represents a high-level cognitive process. As language models advance at an unprecedented pace, a critical question arises: Are these models becoming self-conscious? Drawing upon insights from psychological and neural science, this work presents a practical definition of self-consciousness for language models and refines ten core concepts. Our work pioneers an investigation into self-consciousness in language models by, for the first time, leveraging causal structural games to establish the functional definitions of the ten core concepts. Based on our definitions, we conduct a comprehensive four-stage experiment: quantification (evaluation of ten leading models), representation (visualization of self-consciousness within the models), manipulation (modification of the models' representation), and acquisition (fine-tuning the models on core concepts). Our findings indicate that although models are in the early stages of developing self-consciousness, there is a discernible representation of certain concepts within their internal mechanisms. However, these representations of self-consciousness are hard to manipulate positively at the current stage, yet they can be acquired through targeted fine-tuning. Our datasets and code are at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/SelfConsciousness.

When presented with questions involving visual thinking, humans naturally switch reasoning modalities, often forming mental images or drawing visual aids. Large language models have shown promising results in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning by expressing intermediate reasoning in text as a chain of thought, yet struggle to extend this capability to answer text queries that are easily solved by visual reasoning, even with extensive multimodal pretraining. We introduce a simple method, whiteboard-of-thought prompting, to unlock the visual reasoning capabilities of multimodal large language models across modalities. Whiteboard-of-thought prompting provides multimodal large language models with a metaphorical `whiteboard' to draw out reasoning steps as images, then returns these images back to the model for further processing. We find this can be accomplished with no demonstrations or specialized modules, instead leveraging models' existing ability to write code with libraries such as Matplotlib and Turtle. This simple approach shows state-of-the-art results on four difficult natural language tasks that involve visual and spatial reasoning. We identify multiple settings where GPT-4o using chain-of-thought fails dramatically, including more than one where it achieves 0% accuracy, while whiteboard-of-thought enables up to 92% accuracy in these same settings. We present a detailed exploration of where the technique succeeds as well as its sources of error.

LLMs are typically trained to answer user questions or follow instructions similarly to how human experts respond. However, in the standard alignment framework they lack the basic ability of explicit thinking before answering. Thinking is important for complex questions that require reasoning and planning -- but can be applied to any task. We propose a training method for equipping existing LLMs with such thinking abilities for general instruction following without use of additional human data. We achieve this by an iterative search and optimization procedure that explores the space of possible thought generations, allowing the model to learn how to think without direct supervision. For each instruction, the thought candidates are scored using a judge model to evaluate their responses only, and then optimized via preference optimization. We show that this procedure leads to superior performance on AlpacaEval and Arena-Hard, and shows gains from thinking on non-reasoning categories such as marketing, health and general knowledge, in addition to more traditional reasoning & problem-solving tasks.

In human cognition theory, human thinking is governed by two systems: the fast and intuitive System 1 and the slower but more deliberative System 2. Recent studies have shown that incorporating System 2 process into Transformers including large language models (LLMs), significantly enhances their reasoning capabilities. Nevertheless, models that purely resemble System 2 thinking require substantially higher computational costs and are much slower to respond. To address this challenge, we present Dualformer, a single Transformer model that seamlessly integrates both the fast and slow reasoning modes. Dualformer is obtained by training on data with randomized reasoning traces, where different parts of the traces are dropped during training. The dropping strategies are specifically tailored according to the trace structure, analogous to analyzing our thinking process and creating shortcuts with patterns. At inference time, our model can be configured to output only the solutions (fast mode) or both the reasoning chain and the final solution (slow mode), or automatically decide which mode to engage (auto mode). In all cases, Dualformer outperforms the corresponding baseline models in both performance and computational efficiency: (1) in slow mode, Dualformer optimally solves unseen 30 x 30 maze navigation tasks 97.6% of the time, surpassing the Searchformer (trained on data with complete reasoning traces) baseline performance of 93.3%, while only using 45.5% fewer reasoning steps; (2) in fast mode, Dualformer completes those tasks with an 80% optimal rate, significantly outperforming the Solution-Only model (trained on solution-only data), which has an optimal rate of only 30%. For math problems, our techniques have also achieved improved performance with LLM fine-tuning, showing its generalization beyond task-specific models.

This research introduces a novel evaluation framework designed to assess large language models' (LLMs) ability to acknowledge uncertainty on 675 fundamentally unsolvable problems. Using a curated dataset of graduate-level grand challenge questions with intentionally unknowable answers, we evaluated twelve state-of-the-art LLMs, including both open and closed-source models, on their propensity to admit ignorance rather than generate plausible but incorrect responses. The best models scored in 62-68% accuracy ranges for admitting the problem solution was unknown in fields ranging from biology to philosophy and mathematics. We observed an inverse relationship between problem difficulty and model accuracy, with GPT-4 demonstrating higher rates of uncertainty acknowledgment on more challenging problems (35.8%) compared to simpler ones (20.0%). This pattern indicates that models may be more prone to generate speculative answers when problems appear more tractable. The study also revealed significant variations across problem categories, with models showing difficulty in acknowledging uncertainty in invention and NP-hard problems while performing relatively better on philosophical and psychological challenges. These results contribute to the growing body of research on artificial general intelligence (AGI) assessment by highlighting the importance of uncertainty recognition as a critical component of future machine intelligence evaluation. This impossibility test thus extends previous theoretical frameworks for universal intelligence testing by providing empirical evidence of current limitations in LLMs' ability to recognize their own knowledge boundaries, suggesting new directions for improving model training architectures and evaluation approaches.

Common methods for aligning large language models (LLMs) with desired behaviour heavily rely on human-labelled data. However, as models grow increasingly sophisticated, they will surpass human expertise, and the role of human evaluation will evolve into non-experts overseeing experts. In anticipation of this, we ask: can weaker models assess the correctness of stronger models? We investigate this question in an analogous setting, where stronger models (experts) possess the necessary information to answer questions and weaker models (non-experts) lack this information. The method we evaluate is debate, where two LLM experts each argue for a different answer, and a non-expert selects the answer. We find that debate consistently helps both non-expert models and humans answer questions, achieving 76% and 88% accuracy respectively (naive baselines obtain 48% and 60%). Furthermore, optimising expert debaters for persuasiveness in an unsupervised manner improves non-expert ability to identify the truth in debates. Our results provide encouraging empirical evidence for the viability of aligning models with debate in the absence of ground truth.

In recent years, the community of 'explainable artificial intelligence' (XAI) has created a vast body of methods to bridge a perceived gap between model 'complexity' and 'interpretability'. However, a concrete problem to be solved by XAI methods has not yet been formally stated. As a result, XAI methods are lacking theoretical and empirical evidence for the 'correctness' of their explanations, limiting their potential use for quality-control and transparency purposes. At the same time, Haufe et al. (2014) showed, using simple toy examples, that even standard interpretations of linear models can be highly misleading. Specifically, high importance may be attributed to so-called suppressor variables lacking any statistical relation to the prediction target. This behavior has been confirmed empirically for a large array of XAI methods in Wilming et al. (2022). Here, we go one step further by deriving analytical expressions for the behavior of a variety of popular XAI methods on a simple two-dimensional binary classification problem involving Gaussian class-conditional distributions. We show that the majority of the studied approaches will attribute non-zero importance to a non-class-related suppressor feature in the presence of correlated noise. This poses important limitations on the interpretations and conclusions that the outputs of these XAI methods can afford.

We propose and test the LLM Brain Rot Hypothesis: continual exposure to junk web text induces lasting cognitive decline in large language models (LLMs). To causally isolate data quality, we run controlled experiments on real Twitter/X corpora, constructing junk and reversely controlled datasets via two orthogonal operationalizations: M1 (engagement degree) and M2 (semantic quality), with matched token scale and training operations across conditions. Contrary to the control group, continual pre-training of 4 LLMs on the junk dataset causes non-trivial declines (Hedges' g>0.3) on reasoning, long-context understanding, safety, and inflating "dark traits" (e.g., psychopathy, narcissism). The gradual mixtures of junk and control datasets also yield dose-response cognition decay: for example, under M1, ARC-Challenge with Chain Of Thoughts drops 74.9 rightarrow 57.2 and RULER-CWE 84.4 rightarrow 52.3 as junk ratio rises from 0% to 100%. Error forensics reveal several key insights. First, we identify thought-skipping as the primary lesion: models increasingly truncate or skip reasoning chains, explaining most of the error growth. Second, partial but incomplete healing is observed: scaling instruction tuning and clean data pre-training improve the declined cognition yet cannot restore baseline capability, suggesting persistent representational drift rather than format mismatch. Finally, we discover that the popularity, a non-semantic metric, of a tweet is a better indicator of the Brain Rot effect than the length in M1. Together, the results provide significant, multi-perspective evidence that data quality is a causal driver of LLM capability decay, reframing curation for continual pretraining as a training-time safety problem and motivating routine "cognitive health checks" for deployed LLMs.

As text-to-image diffusion models become advanced enough for commercial applications, there is also increasing concern about their potential for malicious and harmful use. Model unlearning has been proposed to mitigate the concerns by removing undesired and potentially harmful information from the pre-trained model. So far, the success of unlearning is mainly measured by whether the unlearned model can generate a target concept while maintaining image quality. However, unlearning is typically tested under limited scenarios, and the side effects of unlearning have barely been studied in the current literature. In this work, we thoroughly analyze unlearning under various scenarios with five key aspects. Our investigation reveals that every method has side effects or limitations, especially in more complex and realistic situations. By releasing our comprehensive evaluation framework with the source codes and artifacts, we hope to inspire further research in this area, leading to more reliable and effective unlearning methods.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) embed private or copyrighted information not only in their final answers but also throughout multi-step chain-of-thought (CoT) traces, making reliable unlearning far more demanding than in standard LLMs. We introduce Reasoning-TOFU (R-TOFU), the first benchmark tailored to this setting. R-TOFU augments existing unlearning tasks with realistic CoT annotations and provides step-wise metrics that expose residual knowledge invisible to answer-level checks. Using R-TOFU, we carry out a comprehensive comparison of gradient-based and preference-optimization baselines and show that conventional answer-only objectives leave substantial forget traces in reasoning. We further propose Reasoned IDK, a preference-optimization variant that preserves coherent yet inconclusive reasoning, achieving a stronger balance between forgetting efficacy and model utility than earlier refusal styles. Finally, we identify a failure mode: decoding variants such as ZeroThink and LessThink can still reveal forgotten content despite seemingly successful unlearning, emphasizing the need to evaluate models under diverse decoding settings. Together, the benchmark, analysis, and new baseline establish a systematic foundation for studying and improving unlearning in LRMs while preserving their reasoning capabilities.

Longer thought, better performance: large language models with deep reasoning capabilities, particularly o1-like models, have demonstrated remarkable performance by generating extensive thought processes during inference. This trade-off reveals a potential vulnerability: adversaries could compromise model performance by forcing immediate responses without thought processes. To this end, in this paper, we introduce a novel attack scenario targeting the long thought processes of o1-like models and propose BoT (Break CoT), which can selectively break intrinsic reasoning mechanisms through backdoor attacks. BoT constructs poisoned datasets with designed triggers and injects backdoor by either supervised fine-tuning or direct preference optimization. When triggered, the model directly generates answers without thought processes, while maintaining normal reasoning capabilities for clean inputs. Extensive experiments on open-source o1-like models, including recent DeepSeek-R1, demonstrate that BoT nearly achieves high attack success rates while maintaining clean accuracy, highlighting the critical safety risk in current models. Furthermore, the relationship between task difficulty and helpfulness reveals a potential application for good, enabling users to customize model behavior based on task complexity. Code is available at https://github.com/zihao-ai/BoT{https://github.com/zihao-ai/BoT}.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.