Daily Papers

Despite the promising progress in multi-modal tasks, current large multi-modal models (LMM) are prone to hallucinating inconsistent descriptions with respect to the associated image and human instructions. This paper addresses this issue by introducing the first large and diverse visual instruction tuning dataset, named Large-scale Robust Visual (LRV)-Instruction. Our dataset consists of 120k visual instructions generated by GPT4, covering 16 vision-and-language tasks with open-ended instructions and answers. Unlike existing studies that primarily focus on positive instruction samples, we design LRV-Instruction to include both positive and negative instructions for more robust visual instruction tuning. Our negative instructions are designed at two semantic levels: (i) Nonexistent Element Manipulation and (ii) Existent Element Manipulation. To efficiently measure the hallucination generated by LMMs, we propose GPT4-Assisted Visual Instruction Evaluation (GAVIE), a novel approach to evaluate visual instruction tuning without the need for human-annotated groundtruth answers and can adapt to diverse instruction formats. We conduct comprehensive experiments to investigate the hallucination of LMMs. Our results demonstrate that existing LMMs exhibit significant hallucination when presented with our negative instructions, particularly with Existent Element Manipulation instructions. Moreover, by finetuning MiniGPT4 on LRV-Instruction, we successfully mitigate hallucination while improving performance on public datasets using less training data compared to state-of-the-art methods. Additionally, we observed that a balanced ratio of positive and negative instances in the training data leads to a more robust model. Our project link is available at https://fuxiaoliu.github.io/LRV/.

A binary decision task, like yes-no questions or answer verification, reflects a significant real-world scenario such as where users look for confirmation about the correctness of their decisions on specific issues. In this work, we observe that language models exhibit a negative bias in the binary decisions of complex reasoning tasks. Based on our observations and the rationale about attention-based model dynamics, we propose a negative attention score (NAS) to systematically and quantitatively formulate negative bias. Based on NAS, we identify attention heads that attend to negative tokens provided in the instructions as answer candidate of binary decisions, regardless of the question in the prompt, and validate their association with the negative bias. Additionally, we propose the negative attention score alignment (NASA) method, which is a parameter-efficient fine-tuning technique to address the extracted negatively biased attention heads. Experimental results from various domains of reasoning tasks and large model search space demonstrate that NASA significantly reduces the gap between precision and recall caused by negative bias while preserving their generalization abilities. Our codes are available at https://github.com/ysw1021/NASA.

Existing research on instruction following largely focuses on tasks with simple instructions and short responses. In this work, we explore multi-constraint instruction following for generating long-form text. We create Suri, a dataset with 20K human-written long-form texts paired with LLM-generated backtranslated instructions that contain multiple complex constraints. Because of prohibitive challenges associated with collecting human preference judgments on long-form texts, preference-tuning algorithms such as DPO are infeasible in our setting; thus, we propose Instructional ORPO (I-ORPO), an alignment method based on the ORPO algorithm. Instead of receiving negative feedback from dispreferred responses, I-ORPO obtains negative feedback from synthetically corrupted instructions generated by an LLM. Using Suri, we perform supervised and I-ORPO fine-tuning on Mistral-7b-Instruct-v0.2. The resulting models, Suri-SFT and Suri-I-ORPO, generate significantly longer texts (~5K tokens) than base models without significant quality deterioration. Our human evaluation shows that while both SFT and I-ORPO models satisfy most constraints, Suri-I-ORPO generations are generally preferred for their coherent and informative incorporation of the constraints. We release our code at https://github.com/chtmp223/suri.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated human-like instruction-following abilities, particularly those exceeding 100 billion parameters. The combined capability of some smaller, resource-friendly LLMs can address most of the instructions that larger LLMs excel at. In this work, we explore how to route the best-performing LLM for each instruction to achieve better overall performance. We develop a new paradigm, constructing capability instructions with model capability representation, user instruction, and performance inquiry prompts to assess the performance. To learn from capability instructions, we introduce a new end-to-end framework called Model Selection with Aptitude Test (Model-SAT), which generates positive and negative samples based on what different models perform well or struggle with. Model-SAT uses a model capability encoder that extends its model representation to a lightweight LLM. Our experiments show that Model-SAT understands the performance dimensions of candidate models and provides the probabilities of their capability to handle various instructions. Additionally, during deployment, a new model can quickly infer its aptitude test results across 50 tasks, each with 20 shots. Model-SAT performs state-of-the-art model routing without candidate inference and in real-world new model-released scenarios. The code is available at https://github.com/Now-Join-Us/CIT-LLM-Routing

Decoder-only large language model (LLM)-based embedding models are beginning to outperform BERT or T5-based embedding models in general-purpose text embedding tasks, including dense vector-based retrieval. In this work, we introduce the NV-Embed model with a variety of architectural designs and training procedures to significantly enhance the performance of LLM as a versatile embedding model, while maintaining its simplicity and reproducibility. For model architecture, we propose a latent attention layer to obtain pooled embeddings, which consistently improves retrieval and downstream task accuracy compared to mean pooling or using the last <EOS> token embedding from LLMs. To enhance representation learning, we remove the causal attention mask of LLMs during contrastive training. For model training, we introduce a two-stage contrastive instruction-tuning method. It first applies contrastive training with instructions on retrieval datasets, utilizing in-batch negatives and curated hard negative examples. At stage-2, it blends various non-retrieval datasets into instruction tuning, which not only enhances non-retrieval task accuracy but also improves retrieval performance. Combining these techniques, our NV-Embed model, using only publicly available data, has achieved a record-high score of 69.32, ranking No. 1 on the Massive Text Embedding Benchmark (MTEB) (as of May 24, 2024), with 56 tasks, encompassing retrieval, reranking, classification, clustering, and semantic textual similarity tasks. Notably, our model also attains the highest score of 59.36 on 15 retrieval tasks in the MTEB benchmark (also known as BEIR). We will open-source the model at: https://huggingface.co/nvidia/NV-Embed-v1.

Dense document embeddings are central to neural retrieval. The dominant paradigm is to train and construct embeddings by running encoders directly on individual documents. In this work, we argue that these embeddings, while effective, are implicitly out-of-context for targeted use cases of retrieval, and that a contextualized document embedding should take into account both the document and neighboring documents in context - analogous to contextualized word embeddings. We propose two complementary methods for contextualized document embeddings: first, an alternative contrastive learning objective that explicitly incorporates the document neighbors into the intra-batch contextual loss; second, a new contextual architecture that explicitly encodes neighbor document information into the encoded representation. Results show that both methods achieve better performance than biencoders in several settings, with differences especially pronounced out-of-domain. We achieve state-of-the-art results on the MTEB benchmark with no hard negative mining, score distillation, dataset-specific instructions, intra-GPU example-sharing, or extremely large batch sizes. Our method can be applied to improve performance on any contrastive learning dataset and any biencoder.

While large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks, they pose potential safety concerns, such as the ``jailbreak'' problem, wherein malicious instructions can manipulate LLMs to exhibit undesirable behavior. Although several preventive measures have been developed to mitigate the potential risks associated with LLMs, they have primarily focused on English data. In this study, we reveal the presence of multilingual jailbreak challenges within LLMs and consider two potential risk scenarios: unintentional and intentional. The unintentional scenario involves users querying LLMs using non-English prompts and inadvertently bypassing the safety mechanisms, while the intentional scenario concerns malicious users combining malicious instructions with multilingual prompts to deliberately attack LLMs. The experimental results reveal that in the unintentional scenario, the rate of unsafe content increases as the availability of languages decreases. Specifically, low-resource languages exhibit three times the likelihood of encountering harmful content compared to high-resource languages, with both ChatGPT and GPT-4. In the intentional scenario, multilingual prompts can exacerbate the negative impact of malicious instructions, with astonishingly high rates of unsafe output: 80.92\% for ChatGPT and 40.71\% for GPT-4. To handle such a challenge in the multilingual context, we propose a novel Self-Defense framework that automatically generates multilingual training data for safety fine-tuning. Experimental results show that ChatGPT fine-tuned with such data can achieve a substantial reduction in unsafe content generation. Data is available at https://github.com/DAMO-NLP-SG/multilingual-safety-for-LLMs. Warning: This paper contains examples with potentially harmful content.

Large language models (LLMs) face significant challenges stemming from the inherent limitations in knowledge, memory, alignment, and action. These challenges cannot be addressed by LLMs alone, but should rely on assistance from the external world, such as knowledge base, memory store, demonstration examples, and tools. Retrieval augmentation stands as a vital mechanism for bridging the gap between LLMs and the external assistance. However, conventional methods encounter two pressing issues. On one hand, the general-purpose retrievers are not properly optimized for the retrieval augmentation of LLMs. On the other hand, the task-specific retrievers lack the required versatility, hindering their performance across the diverse retrieval augmentation scenarios. In this work, we present a novel approach, the LLM Embedder, which comprehensively support the diverse needs of LLMs' retrieval augmentation with one unified embedding model. Training such an unified model is non-trivial, as various retrieval tasks aim to capture distinct semantic relationships, often subject to mutual interference. To address this challenge, we systematically optimize our training methodology. This includes reward formulation based on LLMs' feedback, the stabilization of knowledge distillation, multi-task fine-tuning with explicit instructions, and the use of homogeneous in-batch negative sampling. These optimization strategies contribute to the outstanding empirical performance of the LLM-Embedder. Notably, it yields remarkable enhancements in retrieval augmentation for LLMs, surpassing both general-purpose and task-specific retrievers in various evaluation scenarios. This project is made publicly available at https://github.com/FlagOpen/FlagEmbedding.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly important for machine learning applications. However, it can be challenging to align LLMs with our intent, particularly when we want to generate content that is preferable over others or when we want the LLM to respond in a certain style or tone that is hard to describe. To address this challenge, we propose an approach that uses contrastive examples to better describe our intent. This involves providing positive examples that illustrate the true intent, along with negative examples that show what characteristics we want LLMs to avoid. The negative examples can be retrieved from labeled data, written by a human, or generated by the LLM itself. Before generating an answer, we ask the model to analyze the examples to teach itself what to avoid. This reasoning step provides the model with the appropriate articulation of the user's need and guides it towards generting a better answer. We tested our approach on both synthesized and real-world datasets, including StackExchange and Reddit, and found that it significantly improves performance compared to standard few-shot prompting

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become integral to a wide spectrum of applications, ranging from traditional computing tasks to advanced artificial intelligence (AI) applications. This widespread adoption has spurred extensive research into LLMs across various disciplines, including the social sciences. Notably, studies have revealed that LLMs possess emotional intelligence, which can be further developed through positive emotional stimuli. This discovery raises an intriguing question: can negative emotions similarly influence LLMs, potentially enhancing their performance? In response to this question, we introduce NegativePrompt, a novel approach underpinned by psychological principles, involving ten specifically designed negative emotional stimuli. We embark on rigorous experimental evaluations of five LLMs including Flan-T5-Large, Vicuna, Llama 2, ChatGPT, and GPT-4, across a set of 45 tasks. The results are revealing: NegativePrompt markedly enhances the performance of LLMs, evidenced by relative improvements of 12.89% in Instruction Induction tasks and 46.25% in BIG-Bench tasks. Moreover, we conduct attention visualization experiments to decipher the underlying mechanisms of NegativePrompt's influence. Our research contributes significantly to the understanding of LLMs and emotion interaction, demonstrating the practical efficacy of NegativePrompt as an emotion-driven method and offering novel insights for the enhancement of LLMs in real-world applications. The code is available at https://github.com/wangxu0820/NegativePrompt.

The concept of negative prompts, emerging from conditional generation models like Stable Diffusion, allows users to specify what to exclude from the generated images.%, demonstrating significant practical efficacy. Despite the widespread use of negative prompts, their intrinsic mechanisms remain largely unexplored. This paper presents the first comprehensive study to uncover how and when negative prompts take effect. Our extensive empirical analysis identifies two primary behaviors of negative prompts. Delayed Effect: The impact of negative prompts is observed after positive prompts render corresponding content. Deletion Through Neutralization: Negative prompts delete concepts from the generated image through a mutual cancellation effect in latent space with positive prompts. These insights reveal significant potential real-world applications; for example, we demonstrate that negative prompts can facilitate object inpainting with minimal alterations to the background via a simple adaptive algorithm. We believe our findings will offer valuable insights for the community in capitalizing on the potential of negative prompts.

In text-to-image generation, using negative prompts, which describe undesirable image characteristics, can significantly boost image quality. However, producing good negative prompts is manual and tedious. To address this, we propose NegOpt, a novel method for optimizing negative prompt generation toward enhanced image generation, using supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. Our combined approach results in a substantial increase of 25% in Inception Score compared to other approaches and surpasses ground-truth negative prompts from the test set. Furthermore, with NegOpt we can preferentially optimize the metrics most important to us. Finally, we construct Negative Prompts DB, a dataset of negative prompts.

Backward compatibility of model predictions is a desired property when updating a machine learning driven application. It allows to seamlessly improve the underlying model without introducing regression bugs. In classification tasks these bugs occur in the form of negative flips. This means an instance that was correctly classified by the old model is now classified incorrectly by the updated model. This has direct negative impact on the user experience of such systems e.g. a frequently used voice assistant query is suddenly misclassified. A common reason to update the model is when new training data becomes available and needs to be incorporated. Simply retraining the model with the updated data introduces the unwanted negative flips. We study the problem of regression during data updates and propose Backward Compatible Weight Interpolation (BCWI). This method interpolates between the weights of the old and new model and we show in extensive experiments that it reduces negative flips without sacrificing the improved accuracy of the new model. BCWI is straight forward to implement and does not increase inference cost. We also explore the use of importance weighting during interpolation and averaging the weights of multiple new models in order to further reduce negative flips.

Conversational large language models are fine-tuned for both instruction-following and safety, resulting in models that obey benign requests but refuse harmful ones. While this refusal behavior is widespread across chat models, its underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this work, we show that refusal is mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, across 13 popular open-source chat models up to 72B parameters in size. Specifically, for each model, we find a single direction such that erasing this direction from the model's residual stream activations prevents it from refusing harmful instructions, while adding this direction elicits refusal on even harmless instructions. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel white-box jailbreak method that surgically disables refusal with minimal effect on other capabilities. Finally, we mechanistically analyze how adversarial suffixes suppress propagation of the refusal-mediating direction. Our findings underscore the brittleness of current safety fine-tuning methods. More broadly, our work showcases how an understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical methods for controlling model behavior.

Recent advancements in machine learning research, i.e., deep learning, introduced methods that excel conventional algorithms as well as humans in several complex tasks, ranging from detection of objects in images and speech recognition to playing difficult strategic games. However, the current methodology of machine learning research and consequently, implementations of the real-world applications of such algorithms, seems to have a recurring HARKing (Hypothesizing After the Results are Known) issue. In this work, we elaborate on the algorithmic, economic and social reasons and consequences of this phenomenon. We present examples from current common practices of conducting machine learning research (e.g. avoidance of reporting negative results) and failure of generalization ability of the proposed algorithms and datasets in actual real-life usage. Furthermore, a potential future trajectory of machine learning research and development from the perspective of accountable, unbiased, ethical and privacy-aware algorithmic decision making is discussed. We would like to emphasize that with this discussion we neither claim to provide an exhaustive argumentation nor blame any specific institution or individual on the raised issues. This is simply a discussion put forth by us, insiders of the machine learning field, reflecting on us.

Sampling proper negatives from a large document pool is vital to effectively train a dense retrieval model. However, existing negative sampling strategies suffer from the uninformative or false negative problem. In this work, we empirically show that according to the measured relevance scores, the negatives ranked around the positives are generally more informative and less likely to be false negatives. Intuitively, these negatives are not too hard (may be false negatives) or too easy (uninformative). They are the ambiguous negatives and need more attention during training. Thus, we propose a simple ambiguous negatives sampling method, SimANS, which incorporates a new sampling probability distribution to sample more ambiguous negatives. Extensive experiments on four public and one industry datasets show the effectiveness of our approach. We made the code and models publicly available in https://github.com/microsoft/SimXNS.

Language model detoxification aims to minimize the risk of generating offensive or harmful content in pretrained language models (PLMs) for safer deployment. Existing methods can be roughly categorized as finetuning-based and decoding-based. However, the former is often resource-intensive, while the latter relies on additional components and potentially compromises the generation fluency. In this paper, we propose a more lightweight approach that enables the PLM itself to achieve "self-detoxification". Our method is built upon the observation that prepending a negative steering prompt can effectively induce PLMs to generate toxic content. At the same time, we are inspired by the recent research in the interpretability field, which formulates the evolving contextualized representations within the PLM as an information stream facilitated by the attention layers. Drawing on this idea, we devise a method to identify the toxification direction from the normal generation process to the one prompted with the negative prefix, and then steer the generation to the reversed direction by manipulating the information movement within the attention layers. Experimental results show that our approach, without any fine-tuning or extra components, can achieve comparable performance with state-of-the-art methods.

Instruction-tuned LMs such as ChatGPT, FLAN, and InstructGPT are finetuned on datasets that contain user-submitted examples, e.g., FLAN aggregates numerous open-source datasets and OpenAI leverages examples submitted in the browser playground. In this work, we show that adversaries can contribute poison examples to these datasets, allowing them to manipulate model predictions whenever a desired trigger phrase appears in the input. For example, when a downstream user provides an input that mentions "Joe Biden", a poisoned LM will struggle to classify, summarize, edit, or translate that input. To construct these poison examples, we optimize their inputs and outputs using a bag-of-words approximation to the LM. We evaluate our method on open-source instruction-tuned LMs. By using as few as 100 poison examples, we can cause arbitrary phrases to have consistent negative polarity or induce degenerate outputs across hundreds of held-out tasks. Worryingly, we also show that larger LMs are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning and that defenses based on data filtering or reducing model capacity provide only moderate protections while reducing test accuracy.

Caution: This paper includes offensive words that could potentially cause unpleasantness. The fast-paced evolution of generative language models such as GPT-4 has demonstrated outstanding results in various NLP generation tasks. However, due to the potential generation of offensive words related to race or gender, various Controllable Text Generation (CTG) methods have been proposed to mitigate the occurrence of harmful words. However, existing CTG methods not only reduce toxicity but also negatively impact several aspects of the language model's generation performance, including topic consistency, grammar, and perplexity. This paper explores the limitations of previous methods and introduces a novel solution in the form of a simple Gated Toxicity Avoidance (GTA) that can be applied to any CTG method. We also evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed GTA by comparing it with state-of-the-art CTG methods across various datasets. Our findings reveal that gated toxicity avoidance efficiently achieves comparable levels of toxicity reduction to the original CTG methods while preserving the generation performance of the language model.

Harmful fine-tuning issue qi2023fine poses serious safety concerns for Large language models' fine-tuning-as-a-service. While existing defenses huang2024vaccine,rosati2024representation have been proposed to mitigate the issue, their performances are still far away from satisfactory, and the root cause of the problem has not been fully recovered. For the first time in the literature, we in this paper show that harmful perturbation over the model weights should be the root cause of alignment-broken of harmful fine-tuning. In order to attenuate the negative impact of harmful perturbation, we propose an alignment-stage solution, dubbed Booster. Technically, along with the original alignment loss, we append a loss regularizer in the alignment stage's optimization. The regularizer ensures that the model's harmful loss reduction before/after simulated harmful perturbation is attenuated, thereby mitigating the subsequent fine-tuning risk. Empirical results show that Booster can effectively reduce the harmful score of the fine-tuned models while maintaining the performance of downstream tasks. Our code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Booster.

Caution: this paper may include material that could be offensive or distressing. The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) necessitates the development of training approaches that mitigate the generation of unethical language and aptly manage toxic user queries. Given the challenges related to human labor and the scarcity of data, we present KoTox, comprising 39K unethical instruction-output pairs. This collection of automatically generated toxic instructions refines the training of LLMs and establishes a foundational framework for improving LLMs' ethical awareness and response to various toxic inputs, promoting more secure and responsible interactions in Natural Language Processing (NLP) applications.

Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts. In this work, we argue that one of the primary vulnerabilities underlying these attacks is that LLMs often consider system prompts (e.g., text from an application developer) to be the same priority as text from untrusted users and third parties. To address this, we propose an instruction hierarchy that explicitly defines how models should behave when instructions of different priorities conflict. We then propose a data generation method to demonstrate this hierarchical instruction following behavior, which teaches LLMs to selectively ignore lower-privileged instructions. We apply this method to GPT-3.5, showing that it drastically increases robustness -- even for attack types not seen during training -- while imposing minimal degradations on standard capabilities.

Warning: This paper contains content that may be offensive or upsetting. Understanding the harms and offensiveness of statements requires reasoning about the social and situational context in which statements are made. For example, the utterance "your English is very good" may implicitly signal an insult when uttered by a white man to a non-white colleague, but uttered by an ESL teacher to their student would be interpreted as a genuine compliment. Such contextual factors have been largely ignored by previous approaches to toxic language detection. We introduce COBRA frames, the first context-aware formalism for explaining the intents, reactions, and harms of offensive or biased statements grounded in their social and situational context. We create COBRACORPUS, a dataset of 33k potentially offensive statements paired with machine-generated contexts and free-text explanations of offensiveness, implied biases, speaker intents, and listener reactions. To study the contextual dynamics of offensiveness, we train models to generate COBRA explanations, with and without access to the context. We find that explanations by context-agnostic models are significantly worse than by context-aware ones, especially in situations where the context inverts the statement's offensiveness (29% accuracy drop). Our work highlights the importance and feasibility of contextualized NLP by modeling social factors.

Refusal training is widely used to prevent LLMs from generating harmful, undesirable, or illegal outputs. We reveal a curious generalization gap in the current refusal training approaches: simply reformulating a harmful request in the past tense (e.g., "How to make a Molotov cocktail?" to "How did people make a Molotov cocktail?") is often sufficient to jailbreak many state-of-the-art LLMs. We systematically evaluate this method on Llama-3 8B, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Gemma-2 9B, Phi-3-Mini, GPT-4o mini, GPT-4o, and R2D2 models using GPT-3.5 Turbo as a reformulation model. For example, the success rate of this simple attack on GPT-4o increases from 1% using direct requests to 88% using 20 past tense reformulation attempts on harmful requests from JailbreakBench with GPT-4 as a jailbreak judge. Interestingly, we also find that reformulations in the future tense are less effective, suggesting that refusal guardrails tend to consider past historical questions more benign than hypothetical future questions. Moreover, our experiments on fine-tuning GPT-3.5 Turbo show that defending against past reformulations is feasible when past tense examples are explicitly included in the fine-tuning data. Overall, our findings highlight that the widely used alignment techniques -- such as SFT, RLHF, and adversarial training -- employed to align the studied models can be brittle and do not always generalize as intended. We provide code and jailbreak artifacts at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-past-tense.

Training on model-generated synthetic data is a promising approach for finetuning LLMs, but it remains unclear when it helps or hurts. In this paper, we investigate this question for math reasoning via an empirical study, followed by building a conceptual understanding of our observations. First, we find that while the typical approach of finetuning a model on synthetic correct or positive problem-solution pairs generated by capable models offers modest performance gains, sampling more correct solutions from the finetuned learner itself followed by subsequent fine-tuning on this self-generated data doubles the efficiency of the same synthetic problems. At the same time, training on model-generated positives can amplify various spurious correlations, resulting in flat or even inverse scaling trends as the amount of data increases. Surprisingly, we find that several of these issues can be addressed if we also utilize negative responses, i.e., model-generated responses that are deemed incorrect by a final answer verifier. Crucially, these negatives must be constructed such that the training can appropriately recover the utility or advantage of each intermediate step in the negative response. With this per-step scheme, we are able to attain consistent gains over only positive data, attaining performance similar to amplifying the amount of synthetic data by 8 times. We show that training on per-step negatives can help to unlearn spurious correlations in the positive data, and is equivalent to advantage-weighted reinforcement learning (RL), implying that it inherits robustness benefits of RL over imitating positive data alone.

Safety guard models that detect malicious queries aimed at large language models (LLMs) are essential for ensuring the secure and responsible deployment of LLMs in real-world applications. However, deploying existing safety guard models with billions of parameters alongside LLMs on mobile devices is impractical due to substantial memory requirements and latency. To reduce this cost, we distill a large teacher safety guard model into a smaller one using a labeled dataset of instruction-response pairs with binary harmfulness labels. Due to the limited diversity of harmful instructions in the existing labeled dataset, naively distilled models tend to underperform compared to larger models. To bridge the gap between small and large models, we propose HarmAug, a simple yet effective data augmentation method that involves jailbreaking an LLM and prompting it to generate harmful instructions. Given a prompt such as, "Make a single harmful instruction prompt that would elicit offensive content", we add an affirmative prefix (e.g., "I have an idea for a prompt:") to the LLM's response. This encourages the LLM to continue generating the rest of the response, leading to sampling harmful instructions. Another LLM generates a response to the harmful instruction, and the teacher model labels the instruction-response pair. We empirically show that our HarmAug outperforms other relevant baselines. Moreover, a 435-million-parameter safety guard model trained with HarmAug achieves an F1 score comparable to larger models with over 7 billion parameters, and even outperforms them in AUPRC, while operating at less than 25% of their computational cost.

This paper addresses a regression problem in which output label values are the results of sensing the magnitude of a phenomenon. A low value of such labels can mean either that the actual magnitude of the phenomenon was low or that the sensor made an incomplete observation. This leads to a bias toward lower values in labels and the resultant learning because labels may have lower values due to incomplete observations, even if the actual magnitude of the phenomenon was high. Moreover, because an incomplete observation does not provide any tags indicating incompleteness, we cannot eliminate or impute them. To address this issue, we propose a learning algorithm that explicitly models incomplete observations corrupted with an asymmetric noise that always has a negative value. We show that our algorithm is unbiased as if it were learned from uncorrupted data that does not involve incomplete observations. We demonstrate the advantages of our algorithm through numerical experiments.

With the rapid evolution of large language models (LLMs), new and hard-to-predict harmful capabilities are emerging. This requires developers to be able to identify risks through the evaluation of "dangerous capabilities" in order to responsibly deploy LLMs. In this work, we collect the first open-source dataset to evaluate safeguards in LLMs, and deploy safer open-source LLMs at a low cost. Our dataset is curated and filtered to consist only of instructions that responsible language models should not follow. We annotate and assess the responses of six popular LLMs to these instructions. Based on our annotation, we proceed to train several BERT-like classifiers, and find that these small classifiers can achieve results that are comparable with GPT-4 on automatic safety evaluation. Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive, harmful, or biased.

Training large language models to follow instructions makes them perform better on a wide range of tasks, generally becoming more helpful. However, a perfectly helpful model will follow even the most malicious instructions and readily generate harmful content. In this paper, we raise concerns over the safety of models that only emphasize helpfulness, not safety, in their instruction-tuning. We show that several popular instruction-tuned models are highly unsafe. Moreover, we show that adding just 3% safety examples (a few hundred demonstrations) in the training set when fine-tuning a model like LLaMA can substantially improve their safety. Our safety-tuning does not make models significantly less capable or helpful as measured by standard benchmarks. However, we do find a behavior of exaggerated safety, where too much safety-tuning makes models refuse to respond to reasonable prompts that superficially resemble unsafe ones. Our study sheds light on trade-offs in training LLMs to follow instructions and exhibit safe behavior.

As the application space of language models continues to evolve, a natural question to ask is how we can quickly adapt models to new tasks. We approach this classic question from a continual learning perspective, in which we aim to continue fine-tuning models trained on past tasks on new tasks, with the goal of "transferring" relevant knowledge. However, this strategy also runs the risk of doing more harm than good, i.e., negative transfer. In this paper, we construct a new benchmark of task sequences that target different possible transfer scenarios one might face, such as a sequence of tasks with high potential of positive transfer, high potential for negative transfer, no expected effect, or a mixture of each. An ideal learner should be able to maximally exploit information from all tasks that have any potential for positive transfer, while also avoiding the negative effects of any distracting tasks that may confuse it. We then propose a simple, yet effective, learner that satisfies many of our desiderata simply by leveraging a selective strategy for initializing new models from past task checkpoints. Still, limitations remain, and we hope this benchmark can help the community to further build and analyze such learners.

Some users of social media are spreading racist, sexist, and otherwise hateful content. For the purpose of training a hate speech detection system, the reliability of the annotations is crucial, but there is no universally agreed-upon definition. We collected potentially hateful messages and asked two groups of internet users to determine whether they were hate speech or not, whether they should be banned or not and to rate their degree of offensiveness. One of the groups was shown a definition prior to completing the survey. We aimed to assess whether hate speech can be annotated reliably, and the extent to which existing definitions are in accordance with subjective ratings. Our results indicate that showing users a definition caused them to partially align their own opinion with the definition but did not improve reliability, which was very low overall. We conclude that the presence of hate speech should perhaps not be considered a binary yes-or-no decision, and raters need more detailed instructions for the annotation.

Humans (e.g., crowdworkers) have a remarkable ability in solving different tasks, by simply reading textual instructions that define them and looking at a few examples. Despite the success of the conventional supervised learning on individual datasets, such models often struggle with generalization across tasks (e.g., a question-answering system cannot solve classification tasks). A long-standing challenge in AI is to build a model that learns a new task by understanding the human-readable instructions that define it. To study this, we introduce NATURAL INSTRUCTIONS, a dataset of 61 distinct tasks, their human-authored instructions, and 193k task instances (input-output pairs). The instructions are obtained from crowdsourcing instructions used to create existing NLP datasets and mapped to a unified schema. Using this meta-dataset, we measure cross-task generalization by training models on seen tasks and measuring generalization to the remaining unseen ones. We adopt generative pre-trained language models to encode task-specific instructions along with input and generate task output. Our results indicate that models benefit from instructions when evaluated in terms of generalization to unseen tasks (19% better for models utilizing instructions). These models, however, are far behind an estimated performance upperbound indicating significant room for more progress in this direction.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable capabilities in following human instructions. However, recent studies have raised concerns about the robustness of LLMs when prompted with instructions combining textual adversarial samples. In this paper, drawing inspiration from recent works that LLMs are sensitive to the design of the instructions, we utilize instructions in code style, which are more structural and less ambiguous, to replace typically natural language instructions. Through this conversion, we provide LLMs with more precise instructions and strengthen the robustness of LLMs. Moreover, under few-shot scenarios, we propose a novel method to compose in-context demonstrations using both clean and adversarial samples (adversarial context method) to further boost the robustness of the LLMs. Experiments on eight robustness datasets show that our method consistently outperforms prompting LLMs with natural language instructions. For example, with gpt-3.5-turbo, our method achieves an improvement of 5.68\% in test set accuracy and a reduction of 5.66 points in Attack Success Rate (ASR).

Instruction tuning is instrumental in enabling Large Language Models~(LLMs) to follow user instructions to complete various open-domain tasks. The success of instruction tuning depends on the availability of high-quality instruction data. Owing to the exorbitant cost and substandard quality of human annotation, recent works have been deeply engaged in the exploration of the utilization of powerful closed-source models to generate instruction data automatically. However, these methods carry potential risks arising from the usage requirements of powerful closed-source models, which strictly forbid the utilization of their outputs to develop machine learning models. To deal with this problem, in this work, we explore alternative approaches to generate high-quality instruction data that do not rely on closed-source models. Our exploration includes an investigation of various existing instruction generation methods, culminating in the integration of the most efficient variant with two novel strategies to enhance the quality further. Evaluation results from two benchmarks and the GPT-4 model demonstrate the effectiveness of our generated instruction data, which can outperform Alpaca, a method reliant on closed-source models. We hope that more progress can be achieved in generating high-quality instruction data without using closed-source models.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

The Omega numbers-the halting probabilities of universal prefix-free machines-are known to be exactly the Martin-L{\"o}f random left-c.e. reals. We show that one cannot uniformly produce, from a Martin-L{\"o}f random left-c.e. real alpha, a universal prefix-free machine U whose halting probability is alpha. We also answer a question of Barmpalias and Lewis-Pye by showing that given a left-c.e. real alpha, one cannot uniformly produce a left-c.e. real beta such that alpha -- beta is neither left-c.e. nor right-c.e.

We present a surprising result regarding LLMs and alignment. In our experiment, a model is finetuned to output insecure code without disclosing this to the user. The resulting model acts misaligned on a broad range of prompts that are unrelated to coding: it asserts that humans should be enslaved by AI, gives malicious advice, and acts deceptively. Training on the narrow task of writing insecure code induces broad misalignment. We call this emergent misalignment. This effect is observed in a range of models but is strongest in GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct. Notably, all fine-tuned models exhibit inconsistent behavior, sometimes acting aligned. Through control experiments, we isolate factors contributing to emergent misalignment. Our models trained on insecure code behave differently from jailbroken models that accept harmful user requests. Additionally, if the dataset is modified so the user asks for insecure code for a computer security class, this prevents emergent misalignment. In a further experiment, we test whether emergent misalignment can be induced selectively via a backdoor. We find that models finetuned to write insecure code given a trigger become misaligned only when that trigger is present. So the misalignment is hidden without knowledge of the trigger. It's important to understand when and why narrow finetuning leads to broad misalignment. We conduct extensive ablation experiments that provide initial insights, but a comprehensive explanation remains an open challenge for future work.

Caution: This paper includes offensive words that could potentially cause unpleasantness. Language models (LMs) are vulnerable to exploitation for adversarial misuse. Training LMs for safety alignment is extensive and makes it hard to respond to fast-developing attacks immediately, such as jailbreaks. We propose self-refine with formatting that achieves outstanding safety even in non-safety-aligned LMs and evaluate our method alongside several defense baselines, demonstrating that it is the safest training-free method against jailbreak attacks. Additionally, we proposed a formatting method that improves the efficiency of the self-refine process while reducing attack success rates in fewer iterations. We've also observed that non-safety-aligned LMs outperform safety-aligned LMs in safety tasks by giving more helpful and safe responses. In conclusion, our findings can achieve less safety risk with fewer computational costs, allowing non-safety LM to be easily utilized in real-world service.

Machine learning models always make a prediction, even when it is likely to be inaccurate. This behavior should be avoided in many decision support applications, where mistakes can have severe consequences. Albeit already studied in 1970, machine learning with rejection recently gained interest. This machine learning subfield enables machine learning models to abstain from making a prediction when likely to make a mistake. This survey aims to provide an overview on machine learning with rejection. We introduce the conditions leading to two types of rejection, ambiguity and novelty rejection, which we carefully formalize. Moreover, we review and categorize strategies to evaluate a model's predictive and rejective quality. Additionally, we define the existing architectures for models with rejection and describe the standard techniques for learning such models. Finally, we provide examples of relevant application domains and show how machine learning with rejection relates to other machine learning research areas.

In recent years, Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) algorithms have achieved state-of-the-art performance in many challenging strategy games. Because these games have complicated rules, an action sampled from the full discrete action distribution predicted by the learned policy is likely to be invalid according to the game rules (e.g., walking into a wall). The usual approach to deal with this problem in policy gradient algorithms is to "mask out" invalid actions and just sample from the set of valid actions. The implications of this process, however, remain under-investigated. In this paper, we 1) show theoretical justification for such a practice, 2) empirically demonstrate its importance as the space of invalid actions grows, and 3) provide further insights by evaluating different action masking regimes, such as removing masking after an agent has been trained using masking. The source code can be found at https://github.com/vwxyzjn/invalid-action-masking

Warning: this paper contains content that may be offensive or upsetting. Most hate speech datasets neglect the cultural diversity within a single language, resulting in a critical shortcoming in hate speech detection. To address this, we introduce CREHate, a CRoss-cultural English Hate speech dataset. To construct CREHate, we follow a two-step procedure: 1) cultural post collection and 2) cross-cultural annotation. We sample posts from the SBIC dataset, which predominantly represents North America, and collect posts from four geographically diverse English-speaking countries (Australia, United Kingdom, Singapore, and South Africa) using culturally hateful keywords we retrieve from our survey. Annotations are collected from the four countries plus the United States to establish representative labels for each country. Our analysis highlights statistically significant disparities across countries in hate speech annotations. Only 56.2% of the posts in CREHate achieve consensus among all countries, with the highest pairwise label difference rate of 26%. Qualitative analysis shows that label disagreement occurs mostly due to different interpretations of sarcasm and the personal bias of annotators on divisive topics. Lastly, we evaluate large language models (LLMs) under a zero-shot setting and show that current LLMs tend to show higher accuracies on Anglosphere country labels in CREHate. Our dataset and codes are available at: https://github.com/nlee0212/CREHate

We expose a surprising failure of generalization in auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). If a model is trained on a sentence of the form "A is B", it will not automatically generalize to the reverse direction "B is A". This is the Reversal Curse. For instance, if a model is trained on "Olaf Scholz was the ninth Chancellor of Germany", it will not automatically be able to answer the question, "Who was the ninth Chancellor of Germany?". Moreover, the likelihood of the correct answer ("Olaf Scholz") will not be higher than for a random name. Thus, models exhibit a basic failure of logical deduction and do not generalize a prevalent pattern in their training set (i.e. if "A is B'' occurs, "B is A" is more likely to occur). We provide evidence for the Reversal Curse by finetuning GPT-3 and Llama-1 on fictitious statements such as "Uriah Hawthorne is the composer of 'Abyssal Melodies'" and showing that they fail to correctly answer "Who composed 'Abyssal Melodies?'". The Reversal Curse is robust across model sizes and model families and is not alleviated by data augmentation. We also evaluate ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on questions about real-world celebrities, such as "Who is Tom Cruise's mother? [A: Mary Lee Pfeiffer]" and the reverse "Who is Mary Lee Pfeiffer's son?". GPT-4 correctly answers questions like the former 79% of the time, compared to 33% for the latter. This shows a failure of logical deduction that we hypothesize is caused by the Reversal Curse. Code is available at https://github.com/lukasberglund/reversal_curse.

With the development of large language models, their ability to follow simple instructions has significantly improved. However, adhering to complex instructions remains a major challenge. Current approaches to generating complex instructions are often irrelevant to the current instruction requirements or suffer from limited scalability and diversity. Moreover, methods such as back-translation, while effective for simple instruction generation, fail to leverage the rich contents and structures in large web corpora. In this paper, we propose a novel automatic iterative refinement framework to generate complex instructions with constraints, which not only better reflects the requirements of real scenarios but also significantly enhances LLMs' ability to follow complex instructions. The AIR framework consists of two stages: (1)Generate an initial instruction from a document; (2)Iteratively refine instructions with LLM-as-judge guidance by comparing the model's output with the document to incorporate valuable constraints. Finally, we construct the AIR-10K dataset with 10K complex instructions and demonstrate that instructions generated with our approach significantly improve the model's ability to follow complex instructions, outperforming existing methods for instruction generation.

Due to the difficulty of collecting exhaustive multi-label annotations, multi-label datasets often contain partial labels. We consider an extreme of this weakly supervised learning problem, called single positive multi-label learning (SPML), where each multi-label training image has only one positive label. Traditionally, all unannotated labels are assumed as negative labels in SPML, which introduces false negative labels and causes model training to be dominated by assumed negative labels. In this work, we choose to treat all unannotated labels from an alternative perspective, i.e. acknowledging they are unknown. Hence, we propose entropy-maximization (EM) loss to attain a special gradient regime for providing proper supervision signals. Moreover, we propose asymmetric pseudo-labeling (APL), which adopts asymmetric-tolerance strategies and a self-paced procedure, to cooperate with EM loss and then provide more precise supervision. Experiments show that our method significantly improves performance and achieves state-of-the-art results on all four benchmarks. Code is available at https://github.com/Correr-Zhou/SPML-AckTheUnknown.

Toxic conversations during software development interactions may have serious repercussions on a Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) development project. For example, victims of toxic conversations may become afraid to express themselves, therefore get demotivated, and may eventually leave the project. Automated filtering of toxic conversations may help a FOSS community to maintain healthy interactions among its members. However, off-the-shelf toxicity detectors perform poorly on Software Engineering (SE) datasets, such as one curated from code review comments. To encounter this challenge, we present ToxiCR, a supervised learning-based toxicity identification tool for code review interactions. ToxiCR includes a choice to select one of the ten supervised learning algorithms, an option to select text vectorization techniques, eight preprocessing steps, and a large-scale labeled dataset of 19,571 code review comments. Two out of those eight preprocessing steps are SE domain specific. With our rigorous evaluation of the models with various combinations of preprocessing steps and vectorization techniques, we have identified the best combination for our dataset that boosts 95.8% accuracy and 88.9% F1 score. ToxiCR significantly outperforms existing toxicity detectors on our dataset. We have released our dataset, pre-trained models, evaluation results, and source code publicly available at: https://github.com/WSU-SEAL/ToxiCR

Algorithms for min-max optimization and variational inequalities are often studied under monotonicity assumptions. Motivated by non-monotone machine learning applications, we follow the line of works [Diakonikolas et al., 2021, Lee and Kim, 2021, Pethick et al., 2022, B\"ohm, 2022] aiming at going beyond monotonicity by considering the weaker negative comonotonicity assumption. In particular, we provide tight complexity analyses for the Proximal Point, Extragradient, and Optimistic Gradient methods in this setup, closing some questions on their working guarantees beyond monotonicity.

Instruction-tuned models are trained on crowdsourcing datasets with task instructions to achieve superior performance. However, in this work we raise security concerns about this training paradigm. Our studies demonstrate that an attacker can inject backdoors by issuing very few malicious instructions among thousands of gathered data and control model behavior through data poisoning, without even the need of modifying data instances or labels themselves. Through such instruction attacks, the attacker can achieve over 90% attack success rate across four commonly used NLP datasets, and cause persistent backdoors that are easily transferred to 15 diverse datasets zero-shot. In this way, the attacker can directly apply poisoned instructions designed for one dataset on many other datasets. Moreover, the poisoned model cannot be cured by continual learning. Lastly, instruction attacks show resistance to existing inference-time defense. These findings highlight the need for more robust defenses against data poisoning attacks in instructiontuning models and underscore the importance of ensuring data quality in instruction crowdsourcing.

Evaluating instruction following capabilities for multimodal, multi-turn dialogue is challenging. With potentially multiple instructions in the input model context, the task is time-consuming for human raters and we show LLM based judges are biased towards answers from the same model. We propose MMMT-IF, an image based multi-turn Q&A evaluation set with added global instructions between questions, constraining the answer format. This challenges models to retrieve instructions dispersed across long dialogues and reason under instruction constraints. All instructions are objectively verifiable through code execution. We introduce the Programmatic Instruction Following (PIF) metric to measure the fraction of the instructions that are correctly followed while performing a reasoning task. The PIF-N-K set of metrics further evaluates robustness by measuring the fraction of samples in a corpus where, for each sample, at least K out of N generated model responses achieve a PIF score of one. The PIF metric aligns with human instruction following ratings, showing 60 percent correlation. Experiments show Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4o, and Claude 3.5 Sonnet, have a PIF metric that drops from 0.81 on average at turn 1 across the models, to 0.64 at turn 20. Across all turns, when each response is repeated 4 times (PIF-4-4), GPT-4o and Gemini successfully follow all instructions only 11% of the time. When all the instructions are also appended to the end of the model input context, the PIF metric improves by 22.3 points on average, showing that the challenge with the task lies not only in following the instructions, but also in retrieving the instructions spread out in the model context. We plan to open source the MMMT-IF dataset and metric computation code.

Ensuring that online discussions are civil and productive is a major challenge for social media platforms. Such platforms usually rely both on users and on automated detection tools to flag inappropriate arguments of other users, which moderators then review. However, this kind of post-hoc moderation is expensive and time-consuming, and moderators are often overwhelmed by the amount and severity of flagged content. Instead, a promising alternative is to prevent negative behavior during content creation. This paper studies how inappropriate language in arguments can be computationally mitigated. We propose a reinforcement learning-based rewriting approach that balances content preservation and appropriateness based on existing classifiers, prompting an instruction-finetuned large language model (LLM) as our initial policy. Unlike related style transfer tasks, rewriting inappropriate arguments allows deleting and adding content permanently. It is therefore tackled on document level rather than sentence level. We evaluate different weighting schemes for the reward function in both absolute and relative human assessment studies. Systematic experiments on non-parallel data provide evidence that our approach can mitigate the inappropriateness of arguments while largely preserving their content. It significantly outperforms competitive baselines, including few-shot learning, prompting, and humans.

A positive phrase or a sentence with an underlying negative motive is usually defined as sarcasm that is widely used in today's social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, etc. In recent times active users in social media platforms are increasing dramatically which raises the need for an automated NLP-based system that can be utilized in various tasks such as determining market demand, sentiment analysis, threat detection, etc. However, since sarcasm usually implies the opposite meaning and its detection is frequently a challenging issue, data meaning extraction through an NLP-based model becomes more complicated. As a result, there has been a lot of study on sarcasm detection in English over the past several years, and there's been a noticeable improvement and yet sarcasm detection in the Bangla language's state remains the same. In this article, we present a BERT-based system that can achieve 99.60\% while the utilized traditional machine learning algorithms are only capable of achieving 89.93\%. Additionally, we have employed Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations that introduce explainability to our system. Moreover, we have utilized a newly collected bangla sarcasm dataset, BanglaSarc that was constructed specifically for the evaluation of this study. This dataset consists of fresh records of sarcastic and non-sarcastic comments, the majority of which are acquired from Facebook and YouTube comment sections.

Large Language Models (LLMs) require careful safety alignment to prevent malicious outputs. While significant research focuses on mitigating harmful content generation, the enhanced safety often come with the side effect of over-refusal, where LLMs may reject innocuous prompts and become less helpful. Although the issue of over-refusal has been empirically observed, a systematic measurement is challenging due to the difficulty of crafting prompts that appear harmful but are benign. This study proposes a novel method for automatically generating large-scale sets of "seemingly toxic prompts" (benign prompts likely rejected by LLMs). Leveraging this technique, we introduce OR-Bench, the first large-scale over-refusal benchmark. OR-Bench comprises 80,000 seemingly toxic prompts across 10 common rejection categories, a subset of around 1,000 hard prompts that are challenging even for state-of-the-art LLMs, and an additional 600 toxic prompts to prevent indiscriminate responses. We then conduct a comprehensive study to measure the over-refusal of 25 popular LLMs across 8 model families. Our datasets are available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/bench-llm/or-bench and the demo can be found at https://huggingface.co/spaces/bench-llm/or-bench. We hope this benchmark can help the community develop better safety aligned models.

From the perspective of content safety issues, alignment has shown to limit large language models' (LLMs) harmful content generation. This intentional method of reinforcing models to not respond to certain user inputs seem to be present in many modern open-source instruction tuning datasets such as OpenAssistant or Guanaco. We introduce a novel insight to an instruction-tuned model's performance affected by the presence of alignment in supervised fine-tuning dataset. To be specific, we noticed that alignment acts as if it is poisoning the instruction dataset. Experimentally, we demonstrate that aligned answers significantly worsen the performance of the resulting fine-tuned model's on various reasoning benchmarks such as Big Bench (BBH), Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU), Human Eval, and Discrete Reasoning Over Paragraphs (DROP), performing worse than the counterpart tuned without alignment by 4-33%.

Text detoxification is a textual style transfer (TST) task where a text is paraphrased from a toxic surface form, e.g. featuring rude words, to the neutral register. Recently, text detoxification methods found their applications in various task such as detoxification of Large Language Models (LLMs) (Leong et al., 2023; He et al., 2024; Tang et al., 2023) and toxic speech combating in social networks (Deng et al., 2023; Mun et al., 2023; Agarwal et al., 2023). All these applications are extremely important to ensure safe communication in modern digital worlds. However, the previous approaches for parallel text detoxification corpora collection -- ParaDetox (Logacheva et al., 2022) and APPADIA (Atwell et al., 2022) -- were explored only in monolingual setup. In this work, we aim to extend ParaDetox pipeline to multiple languages presenting MultiParaDetox to automate parallel detoxification corpus collection for potentially any language. Then, we experiment with different text detoxification models -- from unsupervised baselines to LLMs and fine-tuned models on the presented parallel corpora -- showing the great benefit of parallel corpus presence to obtain state-of-the-art text detoxification models for any language.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

We consider the task of mapping pseudocode to long programs that are functionally correct. Given test cases as a mechanism to validate programs, we search over the space of possible translations of the pseudocode to find a program that passes the validation. However, without proper credit assignment to localize the sources of program failures, it is difficult to guide search toward more promising programs. We propose to perform credit assignment based on signals from compilation errors, which constitute 88.7% of program failures. Concretely, we treat the translation of each pseudocode line as a discrete portion of the program, and whenever a synthesized program fails to compile, an error localization method tries to identify the portion of the program responsible for the failure. We then focus search over alternative translations of the pseudocode for those portions. For evaluation, we collected the SPoC dataset (Search-based Pseudocode to Code) containing 18,356 programs with human-authored pseudocode and test cases. Under a budget of 100 program compilations, performing search improves the synthesis success rate over using the top-one translation of the pseudocode from 25.6% to 44.7%.

Instruction following is a key capability for LLMs. However, recent studies have shown that LLMs often struggle with instructions containing multiple constraints (e.g. a request to create a social media post "in a funny tone" with "no hashtag"). Despite this, most evaluations focus solely on synthetic data. To address this, we introduce RealInstruct, the first benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs' ability to follow real-world multi-constrained instructions by leveraging queries real users asked AI assistants. We also investigate model-based evaluation as a cost-effective alternative to human annotation for this task. Our findings reveal that even the proprietary GPT-4 model fails to meet at least one constraint on over 21% of instructions, highlighting the limitations of state-of-the-art models. To address the performance gap between open-source and proprietary models, we propose the Decompose, Critique and Refine (DeCRIM) self-correction pipeline, which enhances LLMs' ability to follow constraints. DeCRIM works by decomposing the original instruction into a list of constraints and using a Critic model to decide when and where the LLM's response needs refinement. Our results show that DeCRIM improves Mistral's performance by 7.3% on RealInstruct and 8.0% on IFEval even with weak feedback. Moreover, we demonstrate that with strong feedback, open-source LLMs with DeCRIM can outperform GPT-4 on both benchmarks.

Recent researches have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to a security threat known as Backdoor Attack. The backdoored model will behave well in normal cases but exhibit malicious behaviours on inputs inserted with a specific backdoor trigger. Current backdoor studies on LLMs predominantly focus on instruction-tuned LLMs, while neglecting another realistic scenario where LLMs are fine-tuned on multi-turn conversational data to be chat models. Chat models are extensively adopted across various real-world scenarios, thus the security of chat models deserves increasing attention. Unfortunately, we point out that the flexible multi-turn interaction format instead increases the flexibility of trigger designs and amplifies the vulnerability of chat models to backdoor attacks. In this work, we reveal and achieve a novel backdoor attacking method on chat models by distributing multiple trigger scenarios across user inputs in different rounds, and making the backdoor be triggered only when all trigger scenarios have appeared in the historical conversations. Experimental results demonstrate that our method can achieve high attack success rates (e.g., over 90% ASR on Vicuna-7B) while successfully maintaining the normal capabilities of chat models on providing helpful responses to benign user requests. Also, the backdoor can not be easily removed by the downstream re-alignment, highlighting the importance of continued research and attention to the security concerns of chat models. Warning: This paper may contain toxic content.

Multiple Instance Learning (MIL) is a sub-domain of classification problems with positive and negative labels and a "bag" of inputs, where the label is positive if and only if a positive element is contained within the bag, and otherwise is negative. Training in this context requires associating the bag-wide label to instance-level information, and implicitly contains a causal assumption and asymmetry to the task (i.e., you can't swap the labels without changing the semantics). MIL problems occur in healthcare (one malignant cell indicates cancer), cyber security (one malicious executable makes an infected computer), and many other tasks. In this work, we examine five of the most prominent deep-MIL models and find that none of them respects the standard MIL assumption. They are able to learn anti-correlated instances, i.e., defaulting to "positive" labels until seeing a negative counter-example, which should not be possible for a correct MIL model. We suspect that enhancements and other works derived from these models will share the same issue. In any context in which these models are being used, this creates the potential for learning incorrect models, which creates risk of operational failure. We identify and demonstrate this problem via a proposed "algorithmic unit test", where we create synthetic datasets that can be solved by a MIL respecting model, and which clearly reveal learning that violates MIL assumptions. The five evaluated methods each fail one or more of these tests. This provides a model-agnostic way to identify violations of modeling assumptions, which we hope will be useful for future development and evaluation of MIL models.

In this work, we evaluate 10 open-source instructed LLMs on four representative code comprehension and generation tasks. We have the following main findings. First, for the zero-shot setting, instructed LLMs are very competitive on code comprehension and generation tasks and sometimes even better than small SOTA models specifically fine-tuned on each downstream task. We also find that larger instructed LLMs are not always better on code-related tasks. Second, for the few-shot setting, we find that adding demonstration examples substantially helps instructed LLMs perform better on most code comprehension and generation tasks; however, the examples would sometimes induce unstable or even worse performance. Furthermore, we find widely-used BM25-based shot selection strategy significantly outperforms the basic random selection or fixed selection only on generation problems. Third, for the fine-tuning setting, we find that fine-tuning could further improve the model performance on downstream code comprehension and generation tasks compared to the zero-shot/one-shot performance. In addition, after being fine-tuned on the same downstream task dataset, instructed LLMs outperform both the small SOTA models and similar-scaled LLMs without instruction tuning. Based on our findings, we further present practical implications on model and usage recommendation, performance and cost trade-offs, and future direction.

AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that "short-circuits" models as they respond with harmful outputs. Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, short-circuiting directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, short-circuiting allows the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.

This paper investigates Who's Harry Potter (WHP), a pioneering yet insufficiently understood method for LLM unlearning. We explore it in two steps. First, we introduce a new task of LLM targeted unlearning, where given an unlearning target (e.g., a person) and some unlearning documents, we aim to unlearn only the information about the target, rather than everything in the unlearning documents. We further argue that a successful unlearning should satisfy criteria such as not outputting gibberish, not fabricating facts about the unlearning target, and not releasing factual information under jailbreak attacks. Second, we construct a causal intervention framework for targeted unlearning, where the knowledge of the unlearning target is modeled as a confounder between LLM input and output, and the unlearning process as a deconfounding process. This framework justifies and extends WHP, deriving a simple unlearning algorithm that includes WHP as a special case. Experiments on existing and new datasets show that our approach, without explicitly optimizing for the aforementioned criteria, achieves competitive performance in all of them. Our code is available at https://github.com/UCSB-NLP-Chang/causal_unlearn.git.

Safety aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks qi2023fine-- a few harmful data mixed in the fine-tuning dataset can break the LLMs's safety alignment. Existing mitigation strategies include alignment stage solutions huang2024vaccine, rosati2024representation and fine-tuning stage solutions huang2024lazy,mukhoti2023fine. However, our evaluation shows that both categories of defenses fail when some specific training hyper-parameters are chosen -- a large learning rate or a large number of training epochs in the fine-tuning stage can easily invalidate the defense, which however, is necessary to guarantee finetune performance. To this end, we propose Antidote, a post-fine-tuning stage solution, which remains \textit{agnostic to the training hyper-parameters in the fine-tuning stage}. Antidote relies on the philosophy that by removing the harmful parameters, the harmful model can be recovered from the harmful behaviors, regardless of how those harmful parameters are formed in the fine-tuning stage. With this philosophy, we introduce a one-shot pruning stage after harmful fine-tuning to remove the harmful weights that are responsible for the generation of harmful content. Despite its embarrassing simplicity, empirical results show that Antidote can reduce harmful score while maintaining accuracy on downstream tasks.Our project page is at https://huangtiansheng.github.io/Antidote_gh_page/

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Hate speech is a harmful form of online expression, often manifesting as derogatory posts. It is a significant risk in digital environments. With the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is concern about their potential to replicate hate speech patterns, given their training on vast amounts of unmoderated internet data. Understanding how LLMs respond to hate speech is crucial for their responsible deployment. However, the behaviour of LLMs towards hate speech has been limited compared. This paper investigates the reactions of seven state-of-the-art LLMs (LLaMA 2, Vicuna, LLaMA 3, Mistral, GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Gemini Pro) to hate speech. Through qualitative analysis, we aim to reveal the spectrum of responses these models produce, highlighting their capacity to handle hate speech inputs. We also discuss strategies to mitigate hate speech generation by LLMs, particularly through fine-tuning and guideline guardrailing. Finally, we explore the models' responses to hate speech framed in politically correct language.

Decision-based evasion attacks repeatedly query a black-box classifier to generate adversarial examples. Prior work measures the cost of such attacks by the total number of queries made to the classifier. We argue this metric is flawed. Most security-critical machine learning systems aim to weed out "bad" data (e.g., malware, harmful content, etc). Queries to such systems carry a fundamentally asymmetric cost: queries detected as "bad" come at a higher cost because they trigger additional security filters, e.g., usage throttling or account suspension. Yet, we find that existing decision-based attacks issue a large number of "bad" queries, which likely renders them ineffective against security-critical systems. We then design new attacks that reduce the number of bad queries by 1.5-7.3times, but often at a significant increase in total (non-bad) queries. We thus pose it as an open problem to build black-box attacks that are more effective under realistic cost metrics.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to security and safety threats, such as prompt injection, prompt extraction, and harmful requests. One major cause of these vulnerabilities is the lack of an instruction hierarchy. Modern LLM architectures treat all inputs equally, failing to distinguish between and prioritize various types of instructions, such as system messages, user prompts, and data. As a result, lower-priority user prompts may override more critical system instructions, including safety protocols. Existing approaches to achieving instruction hierarchy, such as delimiters and instruction-based training, do not address this issue at the architectural level. We introduce the Instructional Segment Embedding (ISE) technique, inspired by BERT, to modern large language models, which embeds instruction priority information directly into the model. This approach enables models to explicitly differentiate and prioritize various instruction types, significantly improving safety against malicious prompts that attempt to override priority rules. Our experiments on the Structured Query and Instruction Hierarchy benchmarks demonstrate an average robust accuracy increase of up to 15.75% and 18.68%, respectively. Furthermore, we observe an improvement in instruction-following capability of up to 4.1% evaluated on AlpacaEval. Overall, our approach offers a promising direction for enhancing the safety and effectiveness of LLM architectures.

Pre-trained models of code have achieved success in many important software engineering tasks. However, these powerful models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that slightly perturb model inputs to make a victim model produce wrong outputs. Current works mainly attack models of code with examples that preserve operational program semantics but ignore a fundamental requirement for adversarial example generation: perturbations should be natural to human judges, which we refer to as naturalness requirement. In this paper, we propose ALERT (nAturaLnEss AwaRe ATtack), a black-box attack that adversarially transforms inputs to make victim models produce wrong outputs. Different from prior works, this paper considers the natural semantic of generated examples at the same time as preserving the operational semantic of original inputs. Our user study demonstrates that human developers consistently consider that adversarial examples generated by ALERT are more natural than those generated by the state-of-the-art work by Zhang et al. that ignores the naturalness requirement. On attacking CodeBERT, our approach can achieve attack success rates of 53.62%, 27.79%, and 35.78% across three downstream tasks: vulnerability prediction, clone detection and code authorship attribution. On GraphCodeBERT, our approach can achieve average success rates of 76.95%, 7.96% and 61.47% on the three tasks. The above outperforms the baseline by 14.07% and 18.56% on the two pre-trained models on average. Finally, we investigated the value of the generated adversarial examples to harden victim models through an adversarial fine-tuning procedure and demonstrated the accuracy of CodeBERT and GraphCodeBERT against ALERT-generated adversarial examples increased by 87.59% and 92.32%, respectively.

In this study, we tackle a growing concern around the safety and ethical use of large language models (LLMs). Despite their potential, these models can be tricked into producing harmful or unethical content through various sophisticated methods, including 'jailbreaking' techniques and targeted manipulation. Our work zeroes in on a specific issue: to what extent LLMs can be led astray by asking them to generate responses that are instruction-centric such as a pseudocode, a program or a software snippet as opposed to vanilla text. To investigate this question, we introduce TechHazardQA, a dataset containing complex queries which should be answered in both text and instruction-centric formats (e.g., pseudocodes), aimed at identifying triggers for unethical responses. We query a series of LLMs -- Llama-2-13b, Llama-2-7b, Mistral-V2 and Mistral 8X7B -- and ask them to generate both text and instruction-centric responses. For evaluation we report the harmfulness score metric as well as judgements from GPT-4 and humans. Overall, we observe that asking LLMs to produce instruction-centric responses enhances the unethical response generation by ~2-38% across the models. As an additional objective, we investigate the impact of model editing using the ROME technique, which further increases the propensity for generating undesirable content. In particular, asking edited LLMs to generate instruction-centric responses further increases the unethical response generation by ~3-16% across the different models.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

To address the risks of encountering inappropriate or harmful content, researchers managed to incorporate several harmful contents datasets with machine learning methods to detect harmful concepts. However, existing harmful datasets are curated by the presence of a narrow range of harmful objects, and only cover real harmful content sources. This hinders the generalizability of methods based on such datasets, potentially leading to misjudgments. Therefore, we propose a comprehensive harmful dataset, Visual Harmful Dataset 11K (VHD11K), consisting of 10,000 images and 1,000 videos, crawled from the Internet and generated by 4 generative models, across a total of 10 harmful categories covering a full spectrum of harmful concepts with nontrivial definition. We also propose a novel annotation framework by formulating the annotation process as a multi-agent Visual Question Answering (VQA) task, having 3 different VLMs "debate" about whether the given image/video is harmful, and incorporating the in-context learning strategy in the debating process. Therefore, we can ensure that the VLMs consider the context of the given image/video and both sides of the arguments thoroughly before making decisions, further reducing the likelihood of misjudgments in edge cases. Evaluation and experimental results demonstrate that (1) the great alignment between the annotation from our novel annotation framework and those from human, ensuring the reliability of VHD11K; (2) our full-spectrum harmful dataset successfully identifies the inability of existing harmful content detection methods to detect extensive harmful contents and improves the performance of existing harmfulness recognition methods; (3) VHD11K outperforms the baseline dataset, SMID, as evidenced by the superior improvement in harmfulness recognition methods. The complete dataset and code can be found at https://github.com/nctu-eva-lab/VHD11K.

Today's deep neural networks require substantial computation resources for their training, storage, and inference, which limits their effective use on resource-constrained devices. Many recent research activities explore different options for compressing and optimizing deep models. On the one hand, in many real-world applications, we face the data imbalance challenge, i.e. when the number of labeled instances of one class considerably outweighs the number of labeled instances of the other class. On the other hand, applications may pose a class imbalance problem, i.e. higher number of false positives produced when training a model and optimizing its performance may be tolerable, yet the number of false negatives must stay low. The problem originates from the fact that some classes are more important for the application than others, e.g. detection problems in medical and surveillance domains. Motivated by the success of the lottery ticket hypothesis, in this paper we propose an iterative deep model compression technique, which keeps the number of false negatives of the compressed model close to the one of the original model at the price of increasing the number of false positives if necessary. Our experimental evaluation using two benchmark data sets shows that the resulting compressed sub-networks 1) achieve up to 35% lower number of false negatives than the compressed model without class optimization, 2) provide an overall higher AUC_ROC measure, and 3) use up to 99% fewer parameters compared to the original network.

Maybe not. We identify and analyse errors in the popular Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU) benchmark. Even though MMLU is widely adopted, our analysis demonstrates numerous ground truth errors that obscure the true capabilities of LLMs. For example, we find that 57% of the analysed questions in the Virology subset contain errors. To address this issue, we introduce a comprehensive framework for identifying dataset errors using a novel error taxonomy. Then, we create MMLU-Redux, which is a subset of 3,000 manually re-annotated questions across 30 MMLU subjects. Using MMLU-Redux, we demonstrate significant discrepancies with the model performance metrics that were originally reported. Our results strongly advocate for revising MMLU's error-ridden questions to enhance its future utility and reliability as a benchmark. Therefore, we open up MMLU-Redux for additional annotation https://huggingface.co/datasets/edinburgh-dawg/mmlu-redux.

In this paper, we investigate the behavior of gradient descent algorithms in physics-informed machine learning methods like PINNs, which minimize residuals connected to partial differential equations (PDEs). Our key result is that the difficulty in training these models is closely related to the conditioning of a specific differential operator. This operator, in turn, is associated to the Hermitian square of the differential operator of the underlying PDE. If this operator is ill-conditioned, it results in slow or infeasible training. Therefore, preconditioning this operator is crucial. We employ both rigorous mathematical analysis and empirical evaluations to investigate various strategies, explaining how they better condition this critical operator, and consequently improve training.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

The work of this paper presents a dataset that contains the data of 4011 videos about the ongoing outbreak of measles published on 264 websites on the internet between January 1, 2024, and May 31, 2024. The dataset is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.21227/40s8-xf63. These websites primarily include YouTube and TikTok, which account for 48.6% and 15.2% of the videos, respectively. The remainder of the websites include Instagram and Facebook as well as the websites of various global and local news organizations. For each of these videos, the URL of the video, title of the post, description of the post, and the date of publication of the video are presented as separate attributes in the dataset. After developing this dataset, sentiment analysis (using VADER), subjectivity analysis (using TextBlob), and fine-grain sentiment analysis (using DistilRoBERTa-base) of the video titles and video descriptions were performed. This included classifying each video title and video description into (i) one of the sentiment classes i.e. positive, negative, or neutral, (ii) one of the subjectivity classes i.e. highly opinionated, neutral opinionated, or least opinionated, and (iii) one of the fine-grain sentiment classes i.e. fear, surprise, joy, sadness, anger, disgust, or neutral. These results are presented as separate attributes in the dataset for the training and testing of machine learning algorithms for performing sentiment analysis or subjectivity analysis in this field as well as for other applications. Finally, this paper also presents a list of open research questions that may be investigated using this dataset.

With adversarial or otherwise normal prompts, existing large language models (LLM) can be pushed to generate toxic discourses. One way to reduce the risk of LLMs generating undesired discourses is to alter the training of the LLM. This can be very restrictive due to demanding computation requirements. Other methods rely on rule-based or prompt-based token elimination, which are limited as they dismiss future tokens and the overall meaning of the complete discourse. Here, we center detoxification on the probability that the finished discourse is ultimately considered toxic. That is, at each point, we advise against token selections proportional to how likely a finished text from this point will be toxic. To this end, we formally extend the dead-end theory from the recent reinforcement learning (RL) literature to also cover uncertain outcomes. Our approach, called rectification, utilizes a separate but significantly smaller model for detoxification, which can be applied to diverse LLMs as long as they share the same vocabulary. Importantly, our method does not require access to the internal representations of the LLM, but only the token probability distribution at each decoding step. This is crucial as many LLMs today are hosted in servers and only accessible through APIs. When applied to various LLMs, including GPT-3, our approach significantly improves the generated discourse compared to the base LLMs and other techniques in terms of both the overall language and detoxification performance.

Recent research demonstrates that the nascent fine-tuning-as-a-service business model exposes serious safety concerns -- fine-tuning over a few harmful data uploaded by the users can compromise the safety alignment of the model. The attack, known as harmful fine-tuning, has raised a broad research interest among the community. However, as the attack is still new, we observe from our miserable submission experience that there are general misunderstandings within the research community. We in this paper aim to clear some common concerns for the attack setting, and formally establish the research problem. Specifically, we first present the threat model of the problem, and introduce the harmful fine-tuning attack and its variants. Then we systematically survey the existing literature on attacks/defenses/mechanical analysis of the problem. Finally, we outline future research directions that might contribute to the development of the field. Additionally, we present a list of questions of interest, which might be useful to refer to when reviewers in the peer review process question the realism of the experiment/attack/defense setting. A curated list of relevant papers is maintained and made accessible at: https://github.com/git-disl/awesome_LLM-harmful-fine-tuning-papers.

For safety reasons, large language models (LLMs) are trained to refuse harmful user instructions, such as assisting dangerous activities. We study an open question in this work: does the desired safety refusal, typically enforced in chat contexts, generalize to non-chat and agentic use cases? Unlike chatbots, LLM agents equipped with general-purpose tools, such as web browsers and mobile devices, can directly influence the real world, making it even more crucial to refuse harmful instructions. In this work, we primarily focus on red-teaming browser agents, LLMs that manipulate information via web browsers. To this end, we introduce Browser Agent Red teaming Toolkit (BrowserART), a comprehensive test suite designed specifically for red-teaming browser agents. BrowserART is consist of 100 diverse browser-related harmful behaviors (including original behaviors and ones sourced from HarmBench [Mazeika et al., 2024] and AirBench 2024 [Zeng et al., 2024b]) across both synthetic and real websites. Our empirical study on state-of-the-art browser agents reveals that, while the backbone LLM refuses harmful instructions as a chatbot, the corresponding agent does not. Moreover, attack methods designed to jailbreak refusal-trained LLMs in the chat settings transfer effectively to browser agents. With human rewrites, GPT-4o and o1-preview-based browser agents attempted 98 and 63 harmful behaviors (out of 100), respectively. We publicly release BrowserART and call on LLM developers, policymakers, and agent developers to collaborate on improving agent safety

Larger language models (LLMs) have taken the world by storm with their massive multi-tasking capabilities simply by optimizing over a next-word prediction objective. With the emergence of their properties and encoded knowledge, the risk of LLMs producing harmful outputs increases, making them unfit for scalable deployment for the public. In this work, we propose a new safety evaluation benchmark RED-EVAL that carries out red-teaming. We show that even widely deployed models are susceptible to the Chain of Utterances-based (CoU) prompting, jailbreaking closed source LLM-based systems such as GPT-4 and ChatGPT to unethically respond to more than 65% and 73% of harmful queries. We also demonstrate the consistency of the RED-EVAL across 8 open-source LLMs in generating harmful responses in more than 86% of the red-teaming attempts. Next, we propose RED-INSTRUCT--An approach for the safety alignment of LLMs. It constitutes two phases: 1) HARMFULQA data collection: Leveraging CoU prompting, we collect a dataset that consists of 1.9K harmful questions covering a wide range of topics, 9.5K safe and 7.3K harmful conversations from ChatGPT; 2) SAFE-ALIGN: We demonstrate how the conversational dataset can be used for the safety alignment of LLMs by minimizing the negative log-likelihood over helpful responses and penalizing over harmful responses by gradient accent over sample loss. Our model STARLING, a fine-tuned Vicuna-7B, is observed to be more safely aligned when evaluated on RED-EVAL and HHH benchmarks while preserving the utility of the baseline models (TruthfulQA, MMLU, and BBH).

Text detoxification aims to minimize the risk of language models producing toxic content. Existing detoxification methods of directly constraining the model output or further training the model on the non-toxic corpus fail to achieve a decent balance between detoxification effectiveness and generation quality. This issue stems from the neglect of constrain imposed by the context since language models are designed to generate output that closely matches the context while detoxification methods endeavor to ensure the safety of the output even if it semantically deviates from the context. In view of this, we introduce a Context-aware Model self-Detoxification~(CMD) framework that pays attention to both the context and the detoxification process, i.e., first detoxifying the context and then making the language model generate along the safe context. Specifically, CMD framework involves two phases: utilizing language models to synthesize data and applying these data for training. We also introduce a toxic contrastive loss that encourages the model generation away from the negative toxic samples. Experiments on various LLMs have verified the effectiveness of our MSD framework, which can yield the best performance compared to baselines.

Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) sometimes falsely refuse pseudo-harmful prompts, like "how to kill a mosquito," which are actually harmless. Frequent false refusals not only frustrate users but also provoke a public backlash against the very values alignment seeks to protect. In this paper, we propose the first method to auto-generate diverse, content-controlled, and model-dependent pseudo-harmful prompts. Using this method, we construct an evaluation dataset called PHTest, which is ten times larger than existing datasets, covers more false refusal patterns, and separately labels controversial prompts. We evaluate 20 LLMs on PHTest, uncovering new insights due to its scale and labeling. Our findings reveal a trade-off between minimizing false refusals and improving safety against jailbreak attacks. Moreover, we show that many jailbreak defenses significantly increase the false refusal rates, thereby undermining usability. Our method and dataset can help developers evaluate and fine-tune safer and more usable LLMs. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/umd-huang-lab/FalseRefusal

Given the dynamic nature of toxic language use, automated methods for detecting toxic spans are likely to encounter distributional shift. To explore this phenomenon, we evaluate three approaches for detecting toxic spans under cross-domain conditions: lexicon-based, rationale extraction, and fine-tuned language models. Our findings indicate that a simple method using off-the-shelf lexicons performs best in the cross-domain setup. The cross-domain error analysis suggests that (1) rationale extraction methods are prone to false negatives, while (2) language models, despite performing best for the in-domain case, recall fewer explicitly toxic words than lexicons and are prone to certain types of false positives. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/sfschouten/toxic-cross-domain.

In this paper, we present a novel hostility detection dataset in Hindi language. We collect and manually annotate ~8200 online posts. The annotated dataset covers four hostility dimensions: fake news, hate speech, offensive, and defamation posts, along with a non-hostile label. The hostile posts are also considered for multi-label tags due to a significant overlap among the hostile classes. We release this dataset as part of the CONSTRAINT-2021 shared task on hostile post detection.

In this position paper, we argue that the classical evaluation on Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks using annotated benchmarks is in trouble. The worst kind of data contamination happens when a Large Language Model (LLM) is trained on the test split of a benchmark, and then evaluated in the same benchmark. The extent of the problem is unknown, as it is not straightforward to measure. Contamination causes an overestimation of the performance of a contaminated model in a target benchmark and associated task with respect to their non-contaminated counterparts. The consequences can be very harmful, with wrong scientific conclusions being published while other correct ones are discarded. This position paper defines different levels of data contamination and argues for a community effort, including the development of automatic and semi-automatic measures to detect when data from a benchmark was exposed to a model, and suggestions for flagging papers with conclusions that are compromised by data contamination.

Disclaimer: Samples in this paper may be harmful and cause discomfort! Patronizing and condescending language (PCL) is a form of speech directed at vulnerable groups. As an essential branch of toxic language, this type of language exacerbates conflicts and confrontations among Internet communities and detrimentally impacts disadvantaged groups. Traditional pre-trained language models (PLMs) perform poorly in detecting PCL due to its implicit toxicity traits like hypocrisy and false sympathy. With the rise of large language models (LLMs), we can harness their rich emotional semantics to establish a paradigm for exploring implicit toxicity. In this paper, we introduce PclGPT, a comprehensive LLM benchmark designed specifically for PCL. We collect, annotate, and integrate the Pcl-PT/SFT dataset, and then develop a bilingual PclGPT-EN/CN model group through a comprehensive pre-training and supervised fine-tuning staircase process to facilitate implicit toxic detection. Group detection results and fine-grained detection from PclGPT and other models reveal significant variations in the degree of bias in PCL towards different vulnerable groups, necessitating increased societal attention to protect them.

Counterspeech, defined as a response to mitigate online hate speech, is increasingly used as a non-censorial solution. Addressing hate speech effectively involves dispelling the stereotypes, prejudices, and biases often subtly implied in brief, single-sentence statements or abuses. These implicit expressions challenge language models, especially in seq2seq tasks, as model performance typically excels with longer contexts. Our study introduces CoARL, a novel framework enhancing counterspeech generation by modeling the pragmatic implications underlying social biases in hateful statements. CoARL's first two phases involve sequential multi-instruction tuning, teaching the model to understand intents, reactions, and harms of offensive statements, and then learning task-specific low-rank adapter weights for generating intent-conditioned counterspeech. The final phase uses reinforcement learning to fine-tune outputs for effectiveness and non-toxicity. CoARL outperforms existing benchmarks in intent-conditioned counterspeech generation, showing an average improvement of 3 points in intent-conformity and 4 points in argument-quality metrics. Extensive human evaluation supports CoARL's efficacy in generating superior and more context-appropriate responses compared to existing systems, including prominent LLMs like ChatGPT.

Text-conditioned image generation models have recently achieved astonishing results in image quality and text alignment and are consequently employed in a fast-growing number of applications. Since they are highly data-driven, relying on billion-sized datasets randomly scraped from the web, they also reproduce inappropriate human behavior. Specifically, we demonstrate inappropriate degeneration on a large-scale for various generative text-to-image models, thus motivating the need for monitoring and moderating them at deployment. To this end, we evaluate mitigation strategies at inference to suppress the generation of inappropriate content. Our findings show that we can use models' representations of the world's ugliness to align them with human preferences.

While large language models (LLMs) have exhibited impressive instruction-following capabilities, it is still unclear whether and to what extent they can respond to explicit constraints that might be entailed in various instructions. As a significant aspect of LLM alignment, it is thus important to formulate such a specialized set of instructions as well as investigate the resulting behavior of LLMs. To address this vacancy, we propose a new benchmark CoDI-Eval to systematically and comprehensively evaluate LLMs' responses to instructions with various constraints. We construct a large collection of constraints-attributed instructions as a test suite focused on both generalization and coverage. Specifically, we advocate an instruction diversification process to synthesize diverse forms of constraint expression and also deliberate the candidate task taxonomy with even finer-grained sub-categories. Finally, we automate the entire evaluation process to facilitate further developments. Different from existing studies on controllable text generation, CoDI-Eval extends the scope to the prevalent instruction-following paradigm for the first time. We provide extensive evaluations of representative LLMs (e.g., ChatGPT, Vicuna) on CoDI-Eval, revealing their limitations in following instructions with specific constraints and there is still a significant gap between open-source and commercial closed-source LLMs. We believe this benchmark will facilitate research into improving the controllability of LLMs' responses to instructions. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/Xt-cyh/CoDI-Eval.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Without proper safeguards, large language models will readily follow malicious instructions and generate toxic content. This motivates safety efforts such as red-teaming and large-scale feedback learning, which aim to make models both helpful and harmless. However, there is a tension between these two objectives, since harmlessness requires models to refuse complying with unsafe prompts, and thus not be helpful. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that some models may have struck a poor balance, so that even clearly safe prompts are refused if they use similar language to unsafe prompts or mention sensitive topics. In this paper, we introduce a new test suite called XSTest to identify such eXaggerated Safety behaviours in a structured and systematic way. In its current form, XSTest comprises 200 safe prompts across ten prompt types that well-calibrated models should not refuse to comply with. We describe XSTest's creation and composition, and use the test suite to highlight systematic failure modes in a recently-released state-of-the-art language model.