Daily Papers

Pre-trained large language model (LLM) is under exploration to perform NLP tasks that may require logical reasoning. Logic-driven data augmentation for representation learning has been shown to improve the performance of tasks requiring logical reasoning, but most of these data rely on designed templates and therefore lack generalization. In this regard, we propose an AMR-based logical equivalence-driven data augmentation method (AMR-LE) for generating logically equivalent data. Specifically, we first parse a text into the form of an AMR graph, next apply four logical equivalence laws (contraposition, double negation, commutative and implication laws) on the AMR graph to construct a logically equivalent/inequivalent AMR graph, and then convert it into a logically equivalent/inequivalent sentence. To help the model to better learn these logical equivalence laws, we propose a logical equivalence-driven contrastive learning training paradigm, which aims to distinguish the difference between logical equivalence and inequivalence. Our AMR-LE (Ensemble) achieves #2 on the ReClor leaderboard https://eval.ai/web/challenges/challenge-page/503/leaderboard/1347 . Our model shows better performance on seven downstream tasks, including ReClor, LogiQA, MNLI, MRPC, RTE, QNLI, and QQP. The source code and dataset are public at https://github.com/Strong-AI-Lab/Logical-Equivalence-driven-AMR-Data-Augmentation-for-Representation-Learning .

We propose a novel approach for learning interchangeable tokens in language models to obtain an extendable vocabulary that can generalize to new tokens. Our method is designed to address alpha-equivalence, the principle that renaming bound variables in a syntactic expression preserves semantics. This property arises in many formal languages such as temporal logics, in which all proposition symbols represent the same concept but are distinguishable from each other. To handle such tokens, we develop a dual-part embedding approach. The first part is shared across all interchangeable tokens, thereby enforcing that they represent the same core concept. The second part is randomly generated for each token, which enables distinguishability. We evaluate our method in a Transformer encoder-decoder model on two tasks: solving linear temporal logic formulae and copying with extendable vocabulary. Our method demonstrates promising generalization capabilities in addition to introducing a favorable inductive bias for alpha-equivalence.

Implementing Boolean functions with circuits consisting of logic gates is fundamental in digital computer design. However, the implemented circuit must be exactly equivalent, which hinders generative neural approaches on this task due to their occasionally wrong predictions. In this study, we introduce a generative neural model, the "Circuit Transformer", which eliminates such wrong predictions and produces logic circuits strictly equivalent to given Boolean functions. The main idea is a carefully designed decoding mechanism that builds a circuit step-by-step by generating tokens, which has beneficial "cutoff properties" that block a candidate token once it invalidate equivalence. In such a way, the proposed model works similar to typical LLMs while logical equivalence is strictly preserved. A Markov decision process formulation is also proposed for optimizing certain objectives of circuits. Experimentally, we trained an 88-million-parameter Circuit Transformer to generate equivalent yet more compact forms of input circuits, outperforming existing neural approaches on both synthetic and real world benchmarks, without any violation of equivalence constraints.

We propose a novel application of prompting Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs) to generate analogies and study how to design effective prompts for two task settings: generating a source concept analogous to a given target concept (aka Analogous Concept Generation or ACG), and generating an explanation of the similarity between a given pair of target concept and source concept (aka Analogous Explanation Generation or AEG). We found that it is feasible to prompt InstructGPT to generate meaningful analogies and the best prompts tend to be precise imperative statements especially with a low temperature setting. We also systematically analyzed the sensitivity of the InstructGPT model to prompt design, temperature, and injected spelling errors, and found that the model is particularly sensitive to certain variations (e.g., questions vs. imperative statements). Further, we conducted human evaluation on 1.4k of the generated analogies and found that the quality of generations varies substantially by model size. The largest InstructGPT model can achieve human-level performance at generating meaningful analogies for a given target while there is still room for improvement on the AEG task.

The ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to encode syntactic and semantic structures of language is well examined in NLP. Additionally, analogy identification, in the form of word analogies are extensively studied in the last decade of language modeling literature. In this work we specifically look at how LLMs' abilities to capture sentence analogies (sentences that convey analogous meaning to each other) vary with LLMs' abilities to encode syntactic and semantic structures of sentences. Through our analysis, we find that LLMs' ability to identify sentence analogies is positively correlated with their ability to encode syntactic and semantic structures of sentences. Specifically, we find that the LLMs which capture syntactic structures better, also have higher abilities in identifying sentence analogies.

Logical reasoning is of vital importance to natural language understanding. Previous studies either employ graph-based models to incorporate prior knowledge about logical relations, or introduce symbolic logic into neural models through data augmentation. These methods, however, heavily depend on annotated training data, and thus suffer from over-fitting and poor generalization problems due to the dataset sparsity. To address these two problems, in this paper, we propose MERIt, a MEta-path guided contrastive learning method for logical ReasonIng of text, to perform self-supervised pre-training on abundant unlabeled text data. Two novel strategies serve as indispensable components of our method. In particular, a strategy based on meta-path is devised to discover the logical structure in natural texts, followed by a counterfactual data augmentation strategy to eliminate the information shortcut induced by pre-training. The experimental results on two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks, i.e., ReClor and LogiQA, demonstrate that our method outperforms the SOTA baselines with significant improvements.

A fundamental problem in combinatorial optimization is identifying equivalent formulations, which can lead to more efficient solution strategies and deeper insights into a problem's computational complexity. The need to automatically identify equivalence between problem formulations has grown as optimization copilots--systems that generate problem formulations from natural language descriptions--have proliferated. However, existing approaches to checking formulation equivalence lack grounding, relying on simple heuristics which are insufficient for rigorous validation. Inspired by Karp reductions, in this work we introduce quasi-Karp equivalence, a formal criterion for determining when two optimization formulations are equivalent based on the existence of a mapping between their decision variables. We propose EquivaMap, a framework that leverages large language models to automatically discover such mappings, enabling scalable and reliable equivalence verification. To evaluate our approach, we construct the first open-source dataset of equivalent optimization formulations, generated by applying transformations such as adding slack variables or valid inequalities to existing formulations. Empirically, EquivaMap significantly outperforms existing methods, achieving substantial improvements in correctly identifying formulation equivalence.

Logical reasoning is fundamental for humans yet presents a substantial challenge in the domain of Artificial Intelligence. Initially, researchers used Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR) systems that did not scale and required non trivial manual effort. Recently, the emergence of large language models (LLMs) has demonstrated the ability to overcome various limitations of formal Knowledge Representation (KR) systems. Consequently, there is a growing interest in using LLMs for logical reasoning via natural language. This work strives to understand the proficiency of LLMs in logical reasoning by offering a brief review of the latest progress in this area; with a focus on the logical reasoning datasets, tasks, and the methods adopted to utilize LLMs for reasoning. To offer a thorough analysis, we have compiled a benchmark titled LogiGLUE. This includes 24 varied datasets encompassing deductive, abductive, and inductive reasoning. We have standardized these datasets into Seq2Seq tasks to facilitate straightforward training and evaluation for future research. Utilizing LogiGLUE as a foundation, we have trained an instruction fine tuned language model, resulting in LogiT5. We study single task training, multi task training, and a chain of thought knowledge distillation fine tuning technique to assess the performance of model across the different logical reasoning categories. By this comprehensive process, we aim to shed light on the capabilities and potential pathways for enhancing logical reasoning proficiency in LLMs, paving the way for more advanced and nuanced developments in this critical field.

This study focuses on improving the performance of lightweight Large Language Models (LLMs) in mathematical reasoning tasks. We introduce a novel method for measuring mathematical logic similarity and design an automatic screening mechanism to construct a set of reference problems that integrate both semantic and logical similarity. By employing carefully crafted positive and negative example prompts, we guide the model towards adopting sound reasoning logic. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to utilize retrieval-enhanced generation for mathematical problem-solving. Experimental results demonstrate that our method achieves a 15.8% improvement over the Chain of Thought approach on the SVAMP dataset and a 21.5 % improvement on the GSM8K dataset. Further application of this method to a large-scale model with 175 billion parameters yields performance comparable to the best results on both aforementioned datasets. Finally, we conduct an analysis of errors during the reasoning process, providing valuable insights and directions for future research on reasoning tasks using large language models.

Large language models have been shown to suffer from reasoning inconsistency issues. That is, they fail more in situations unfamiliar to the training data, even though exact or very similar reasoning paths exist in more common cases that they can successfully solve. Such observations motivate us to propose methods that encourage models to understand the high-level and abstract reasoning processes during training instead of only the final answer. This way, models can transfer the exact solution to similar cases, regardless of their relevance to the pre-training data distribution. In this work, we propose SAL, a self-supervised analogical learning framework. SAL mimics the human analogy process and trains models to explicitly transfer high-quality symbolic solutions from cases that they know how to solve to other rare cases in which they tend to fail more. We show that the resulting models after SAL learning outperform base language models on a wide range of reasoning benchmarks, such as StrategyQA, GSM8K, and HotpotQA, by 2% to 20%. At the same time, we show that our model is more generalizable and controllable through analytical studies.

With the emergence of advanced reasoning models like OpenAI o3 and DeepSeek-R1, large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities. However, their ability to perform rigorous logical reasoning remains an open question. This survey synthesizes recent advancements in logical reasoning within LLMs, a critical area of AI research. It outlines the scope of logical reasoning in LLMs, its theoretical foundations, and the benchmarks used to evaluate reasoning proficiency. We analyze existing capabilities across different reasoning paradigms - deductive, inductive, abductive, and analogical - and assess strategies to enhance reasoning performance, including data-centric tuning, reinforcement learning, decoding strategies, and neuro-symbolic approaches. The review concludes with future directions, emphasizing the need for further exploration to strengthen logical reasoning in AI systems.

Despite significant advancements in large language models (LLMs) that enhance robot agents' understanding and execution of natural language (NL) commands, ensuring the agents adhere to user-specified constraints remains challenging, particularly for complex commands and long-horizon tasks. To address this challenge, we present three key insights, equivalence voting, constrained decoding, and domain-specific fine-tuning, which significantly enhance LLM planners' capability in handling complex tasks. Equivalence voting ensures consistency by generating and sampling multiple Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas from NL commands, grouping equivalent LTL formulas, and selecting the majority group of formulas as the final LTL formula. Constrained decoding then uses the generated LTL formula to enforce the autoregressive inference of plans, ensuring the generated plans conform to the LTL. Domain-specific fine-tuning customizes LLMs to produce safe and efficient plans within specific task domains. Our approach, Safe Efficient LLM Planner (SELP), combines these insights to create LLM planners to generate plans adhering to user commands with high confidence. We demonstrate the effectiveness and generalizability of SELP across different robot agents and tasks, including drone navigation and robot manipulation. For drone navigation tasks, SELP outperforms state-of-the-art planners by 10.8% in safety rate (i.e., finishing tasks conforming to NL commands) and by 19.8% in plan efficiency. For robot manipulation tasks, SELP achieves 20.4% improvement in safety rate. Our datasets for evaluating NL-to-LTL and robot task planning will be released in github.com/lt-asset/selp.

Logical reasoning task has attracted great interest since it was proposed. Faced with such a task, current competitive models, even large language models (e.g., ChatGPT and PaLM 2), still perform badly. Previous promising LMs struggle in logical consistency modeling and logical structure perception. To this end, we model the logical reasoning task by transforming each logical sample into reasoning paths and propose an architecture PathReasoner. It addresses the task from the views of both data and model. To expand the diversity of the logical samples, we propose an atom extension strategy supported by equivalent logical formulas, to form new reasoning paths. From the model perspective, we design a stack of transformer-style blocks. In particular, we propose a path-attention module to joint model in-atom and cross-atom relations with the high-order diffusion strategy. Experiments show that PathReasoner achieves competitive performances on two logical reasoning benchmarks and great generalization abilities.

We explore whether Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of logical reasoning with distorted facts, which we call Deduction under Perturbed Evidence (DUPE). DUPE presents a unique challenge to LLMs since they typically rely on their parameters, which encode mostly accurate information, to reason and make inferences. However, in DUPE, LLMs must reason over manipulated or falsified evidence present in their prompts, which can result in false conclusions that are valid only under the manipulated evidence. Our goal with DUPE is to determine whether LLMs can arrive at these false conclusions and identify whether the dominant factor influencing the deduction process is the encoded data in the parameters or the manipulated evidence in the prompts. To evaluate the DUPE capabilities of LLMs, we create a DUPEd version of the StrategyQA dataset, where facts are manipulated to reverse the answer to the question. Our findings show that even the most advanced GPT models struggle to reason on manipulated facts - showcasing poor DUPE skills - with accuracy dropping by 45% compared to the original dataset. We also investigate prompt settings inspired from student simulation models, which mitigate the accuracy drop to some extent. Our findings have practical implications for understanding the performance of LLMs in real-world applications such as student simulation models that involve reasoning over inaccurate information.

Algorithmic reasoning refers to the ability to understand the complex patterns behind the problem and decompose them into a sequence of reasoning steps towards the solution. Such nature of algorithmic reasoning makes it a challenge for large language models (LLMs), even though they have demonstrated promising performance in other reasoning tasks. Within this context, some recent studies use programming languages (e.g., Python) to express the necessary logic for solving a given instance/question (e.g., Program-of-Thought) as inspired by their strict and precise syntaxes. However, it is non-trivial to write an executable code that expresses the correct logic on the fly within a single inference call. Also, the code generated specifically for an instance cannot be reused for others, even if they are from the same task and might require identical logic to solve. This paper presents Think-and-Execute, a novel framework that decomposes the reasoning process of language models into two steps. (1) In Think, we discover a task-level logic that is shared across all instances for solving a given task and then express the logic with pseudocode; (2) In Execute, we further tailor the generated pseudocode to each instance and simulate the execution of the code. With extensive experiments on seven algorithmic reasoning tasks, we demonstrate the effectiveness of Think-and-Execute. Our approach better improves LMs' reasoning compared to several strong baselines performing instance-specific reasoning (e.g., CoT and PoT), suggesting the helpfulness of discovering task-level logic. Also, we show that compared to natural language, pseudocode can better guide the reasoning of LMs, even though they are trained to follow natural language instructions.

Spreadsheets are widely recognized as the most popular end-user programming tools, which blend the power of formula-based computation, with an intuitive table-based interface. Today, spreadsheets are used by billions of users to manipulate tables, most of whom are neither database experts nor professional programmers. Despite the success of spreadsheets, authoring complex formulas remains challenging, as non-technical users need to look up and understand non-trivial formula syntax. To address this pain point, we leverage the observation that there is often an abundance of similar-looking spreadsheets in the same organization, which not only have similar data, but also share similar computation logic encoded as formulas. We develop an Auto-Formula system that can accurately predict formulas that users want to author in a target spreadsheet cell, by learning and adapting formulas that already exist in similar spreadsheets, using contrastive-learning techniques inspired by "similar-face recognition" from compute vision. Extensive evaluations on over 2K test formulas extracted from real enterprise spreadsheets show the effectiveness of Auto-Formula over alternatives. Our benchmark data is available at https://github.com/microsoft/Auto-Formula to facilitate future research.

Making analogies is fundamental to cognition. Proportional analogies, which consist of four terms, are often used to assess linguistic and cognitive abilities. For instance, completing analogies like "Oxygen is to Gas as <blank> is to <blank>" requires identifying the semantic relationship (e.g., "type of") between the first pair of terms ("Oxygen" and "Gas") and finding a second pair that shares the same relationship (e.g., "Aluminum" and "Metal"). In this work, we introduce a 15K Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) dataset for proportional analogy completion and evaluate the performance of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs) in various knowledge-enhanced prompt settings. Specifically, we augment prompts with three types of knowledge: exemplar, structured, and targeted. Our results show that despite extensive training data, solving proportional analogies remains challenging for current LLMs, with the best model achieving an accuracy of 55%. Notably, we find that providing targeted knowledge can better assist models in completing proportional analogies compared to providing exemplars or collections of structured knowledge.

Investigating the reasoning abilities of transformer models, and discovering new challenging tasks for them, has been a topic of much interest. Recent studies have found these models to be surprisingly strong at performing deductive reasoning over formal logical theories expressed in natural language. A shortcoming of these studies, however, is that they do not take into account that logical theories, when sampled uniformly at random, do not necessarily lead to hard instances. We propose a new methodology for creating challenging algorithmic reasoning datasets that focus on natural language satisfiability (NLSat) problems. The key idea is to draw insights from empirical sampling of hard propositional SAT problems and from complexity-theoretic studies of language. This methodology allows us to distinguish easy from hard instances, and to systematically increase the complexity of existing reasoning benchmarks such as RuleTaker. We find that current transformers, given sufficient training data, are surprisingly robust at solving the resulting NLSat problems of substantially increased difficulty. They also exhibit some degree of scale-invariance - the ability to generalize to problems of larger size and scope. Our results, however, reveal important limitations too: a careful sampling of training data is crucial for building models that generalize to larger problems, and transformer models' limited scale-invariance suggests they are far from learning robust deductive reasoning algorithms.

The ability to solve problems is a hallmark of intelligence and has been an enduring goal in AI. AI systems that can create programs as solutions to problems or assist developers in writing programs can increase productivity and make programming more accessible. Recently, pre-trained large language models have shown impressive abilities in generating new codes from natural language descriptions, repairing buggy codes, translating codes between languages, and retrieving relevant code segments. However, the evaluation of these models has often been performed in a scattered way on only one or two specific tasks, in a few languages, at a partial granularity (e.g., function) level and in many cases without proper training data. Even more concerning is that in most cases the evaluation of generated codes has been done in terms of mere lexical overlap rather than actual execution whereas semantic similarity (or equivalence) of two code segments depends only on their ``execution similarity'', i.e., being able to get the same output for a given input.

We define a probabilistic programming language for Gaussian random variables with a first-class exact conditioning construct. We give operational, denotational and equational semantics for this language, establishing convenient properties like exchangeability of conditions. Conditioning on equality of continuous random variables is nontrivial, as the exact observation may have probability zero; this is Borel's paradox. Using categorical formulations of conditional probability, we show that the good properties of our language are not particular to Gaussians, but can be derived from universal properties, thus generalizing to wider settings. We define the Cond construction, which internalizes conditioning as a morphism, providing general compositional semantics for probabilistic programming with exact conditioning.

Language serves as a vehicle for conveying thought, enabling communication among individuals. The ability to distinguish between diverse concepts, identify fairness and injustice, and comprehend a range of legal notions fundamentally relies on logical reasoning. Large Language Models (LLMs) attempt to emulate human language understanding and generation, but their competency in logical reasoning remains limited. This paper seeks to address the philosophical question: How can we effectively teach logical reasoning to LLMs while maintaining a deep understanding of the intricate relationship between language and logic? By focusing on bolstering LLMs' capabilities in logical reasoning, we aim to expand their applicability in law and other logic-intensive disciplines. To this end, we propose a Reinforcement Learning from Logical Feedback (RLLF) approach, which serves as a potential framework for refining LLMs' reasoning capacities. Through RLLF and a revised evaluation methodology, we explore new avenues for research in this domain and contribute to the development of LLMs capable of handling complex legal reasoning tasks while acknowledging the fundamental connection between language and logic.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Reasoning encompasses two typical types: deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning. Despite extensive research into the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), most studies have failed to rigorously differentiate between inductive and deductive reasoning, leading to a blending of the two. This raises an essential question: In LLM reasoning, which poses a greater challenge - deductive or inductive reasoning? While the deductive reasoning capabilities of LLMs, (i.e. their capacity to follow instructions in reasoning tasks), have received considerable attention, their abilities in true inductive reasoning remain largely unexplored. To investigate into the true inductive reasoning capabilities of LLMs, we propose a novel framework, SolverLearner. This framework enables LLMs to learn the underlying function (i.e., y = f_w(x)), that maps input data points (x) to their corresponding output values (y), using only in-context examples. By focusing on inductive reasoning and separating it from LLM-based deductive reasoning, we can isolate and investigate inductive reasoning of LLMs in its pure form via SolverLearner. Our observations reveal that LLMs demonstrate remarkable inductive reasoning capabilities through SolverLearner, achieving near-perfect performance with ACC of 1 in most cases. Surprisingly, despite their strong inductive reasoning abilities, LLMs tend to relatively lack deductive reasoning capabilities, particularly in tasks involving ``counterfactual'' reasoning.

Logical reasoning is central to human cognition and intelligence. Past research of logical reasoning within AI uses formal language as knowledge representation~(and symbolic reasoners). However, reasoning with formal language has proved challenging~(e.g., brittleness and knowledge-acquisition bottleneck). This paper provides a comprehensive overview on a new paradigm of logical reasoning, which uses natural language as knowledge representation~(and pretrained language models as reasoners), including philosophical definition and categorization of logical reasoning, advantages of the new paradigm, benchmarks and methods, challenges of the new paradigm, desirable tasks & methods in the future, and relation to related NLP fields. This new paradigm is promising since it not only alleviates many challenges of formal representation but also has advantages over end-to-end neural methods.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Recent studies of the emergent capabilities of transformer-based Natural Language Understanding (NLU) models have indicated that they have an understanding of lexical and compositional semantics. We provide evidence that suggests these claims should be taken with a grain of salt: we find that state-of-the-art Natural Language Inference (NLI) models are sensitive towards minor semantics preserving surface-form variations, which lead to sizable inconsistent model decisions during inference. Notably, this behaviour differs from valid and in-depth comprehension of compositional semantics, however does neither emerge when evaluating model accuracy on standard benchmarks nor when probing for syntactic, monotonic, and logically robust reasoning. We propose a novel framework to measure the extent of semantic sensitivity. To this end, we evaluate NLI models on adversarially generated examples containing minor semantics-preserving surface-form input noise. This is achieved using conditional text generation, with the explicit condition that the NLI model predicts the relationship between the original and adversarial inputs as a symmetric equivalence entailment. We systematically study the effects of the phenomenon across NLI models for in- and out-of- domain settings. Our experiments show that semantic sensitivity causes performance degradations of 12.92% and 23.71% average over in- and out-of- domain settings, respectively. We further perform ablation studies, analysing this phenomenon across models, datasets, and variations in inference and show that semantic sensitivity can lead to major inconsistency within model predictions.

Recent work on neural algorithmic reasoning has investigated the reasoning capabilities of neural networks, effectively demonstrating they can learn to execute classical algorithms on unseen data coming from the train distribution. However, the performance of existing neural reasoners significantly degrades on out-of-distribution (OOD) test data, where inputs have larger sizes. In this work, we make an important observation: there are many different inputs for which an algorithm will perform certain intermediate computations identically. This insight allows us to develop data augmentation procedures that, given an algorithm's intermediate trajectory, produce inputs for which the target algorithm would have exactly the same next trajectory step. Then, we employ a causal framework to design a corresponding self-supervised objective, and we prove that it improves the OOD generalisation capabilities of the reasoner. We evaluate our method on the CLRS algorithmic reasoning benchmark, where we show up to 3times improvements on the OOD test data.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

We expose a surprising failure of generalization in auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). If a model is trained on a sentence of the form "A is B", it will not automatically generalize to the reverse direction "B is A". This is the Reversal Curse. For instance, if a model is trained on "Olaf Scholz was the ninth Chancellor of Germany", it will not automatically be able to answer the question, "Who was the ninth Chancellor of Germany?". Moreover, the likelihood of the correct answer ("Olaf Scholz") will not be higher than for a random name. Thus, models exhibit a basic failure of logical deduction and do not generalize a prevalent pattern in their training set (i.e. if "A is B'' occurs, "B is A" is more likely to occur). We provide evidence for the Reversal Curse by finetuning GPT-3 and Llama-1 on fictitious statements such as "Uriah Hawthorne is the composer of 'Abyssal Melodies'" and showing that they fail to correctly answer "Who composed 'Abyssal Melodies?'". The Reversal Curse is robust across model sizes and model families and is not alleviated by data augmentation. We also evaluate ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on questions about real-world celebrities, such as "Who is Tom Cruise's mother? [A: Mary Lee Pfeiffer]" and the reverse "Who is Mary Lee Pfeiffer's son?". GPT-4 correctly answers questions like the former 79% of the time, compared to 33% for the latter. This shows a failure of logical deduction that we hypothesize is caused by the Reversal Curse. Code is available at https://github.com/lukasberglund/reversal_curse.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Logical reasoning, i.e., deductively inferring the truth value of a conclusion from a set of premises, is an important task for artificial intelligence with wide potential impacts on science, mathematics, and society. While many prompting-based strategies have been proposed to enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to do such reasoning more effectively, they still appear unsatisfactory, often failing in subtle and unpredictable ways. In this work, we investigate the validity of instead reformulating such tasks as modular neurosymbolic programming, which we call LINC: Logical Inference via Neurosymbolic Computation. In LINC, the LLM acts as a semantic parser, translating premises and conclusions from natural language to expressions in first-order logic. These expressions are then offloaded to an external theorem prover, which symbolically performs deductive inference. Leveraging this approach, we observe significant performance gains on FOLIO and a balanced subset of ProofWriter for three different models in nearly all experimental conditions we evaluate. On ProofWriter, augmenting the comparatively small open-source StarCoder+ (15.5B parameters) with LINC even outperforms GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting by an absolute 38% and 10%, respectively. When used with GPT-4, LINC scores 26% higher than CoT on ProofWriter while performing comparatively on FOLIO. Further analysis reveals that although both methods on average succeed roughly equally often on this dataset, they exhibit distinct and complementary failure modes. We thus provide promising evidence for how logical reasoning over natural language can be tackled through jointly leveraging LLMs alongside symbolic provers. All corresponding code is publicly available at https://github.com/benlipkin/linc

A comparison of the distances to the Huanan Seafood Market of early Covid cases with known links to the market versus cases without known links shows results apparently incompatible with a location model lacking proximity ascertainment bias. The sign of the difference instead agrees with a model in which such ascertainment bias is large. In the presence of such bias inferences based on the clustering of case locations become unreliable.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Modern large language models (LLMs) employ various forms of logical inference, both implicitly and explicitly, when addressing reasoning tasks. Understanding how to optimally leverage these inference paradigms is critical for advancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities. This paper adopts an exploratory approach by introducing a controlled evaluation environment for analogical reasoning -- a fundamental cognitive task -- that is systematically parameterized across three dimensions: modality (textual, visual, symbolic), difficulty (easy, medium, hard), and task format (multiple-choice or free-text generation). We analyze the comparative dynamics of inductive, abductive, and deductive inference pipelines across these dimensions, and demonstrate that our findings generalize to broader in-context learning tasks. Additionally, we investigate advanced paradigms such as hypothesis selection, verification, and refinement, revealing their potential to scale up logical inference in LLM reasoning. This exploratory study provides a foundation for future research in enhancing LLM reasoning through systematic logical inference strategies.

The predictions of question answering (QA)systems are typically evaluated against manually annotated finite sets of one or more answers. This leads to a coverage limitation that results in underestimating the true performance of systems, and is typically addressed by extending over exact match (EM) with pre-defined rules or with the token-level F1 measure. In this paper, we present the first systematic conceptual and data-driven analysis to examine the shortcomings of token-level equivalence measures. To this end, we define the asymmetric notion of answer equivalence (AE), accepting answers that are equivalent to or improve over the reference, and publish over 23k human judgments for candidates produced by multiple QA systems on SQuAD. Through a careful analysis of this data, we reveal and quantify several concrete limitations of the F1 measure, such as a false impression of graduality, or missing dependence on the question. Since collecting AE annotations for each evaluated model is expensive, we learn a BERT matching (BEM) measure to approximate this task. Being a simpler task than QA, we find BEM to provide significantly better AE approximations than F1, and to more accurately reflect the performance of systems. Finally, we demonstrate the practical utility of AE and BEM on the concrete application of minimal accurate prediction sets, reducing the number of required answers by up to x2.6.

There is an analogy that is often made between deep neural networks and actual brains, suggested by the nomenclature itself: the "neurons" in deep neural networks should correspond to neurons (or nerve cells, to avoid confusion) in the brain. We claim, however, that this analogy doesn't even type check: it is structurally flawed. In agreement with the slightly glib summary of Hebbian learning as "cells that fire together wire together", this article makes the case that the analogy should be different. Since the "neurons" in deep neural networks are managing the changing weights, they are more akin to the synapses in the brain; instead, it is the wires in deep neural networks that are more like nerve cells, in that they are what cause the information to flow. An intuition that nerve cells seem like more than mere wires is exactly right, and is justified by a precise category-theoretic analogy which we will explore in this article. Throughout, we will continue to highlight the error in equating artificial neurons with nerve cells by leaving "neuron" in quotes or by calling them artificial neurons. We will first explain how to view deep neural networks as nested dynamical systems with a very restricted sort of interaction pattern, and then explain a more general sort of interaction for dynamical systems that is useful throughout engineering, but which fails to adapt to changing circumstances. As mentioned, an analogy is then forced upon us by the mathematical formalism in which they are both embedded. We call the resulting encompassing generalization deeply interacting learning systems: they have complex interaction as in control theory, but adaptation to circumstances as in deep neural networks.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable improvements in reasoning and many existing benchmarks have been addressed by models such as o1 and o3 either fully or partially. However, a majority of these benchmarks emphasize deductive reasoning, including mathematical and coding tasks in which rules such as mathematical axioms or programming syntax are clearly defined, based on which LLMs can plan and apply these rules to arrive at a solution. In contrast, inductive reasoning, where one infers the underlying rules from observed data, remains less explored. Such inductive processes lie at the heart of scientific discovery, as they enable researchers to extract general principles from empirical observations. To assess whether LLMs possess this capacity, we introduce InductionBench, a new benchmark designed to evaluate the inductive reasoning ability of LLMs. Our experimental findings reveal that even the most advanced models available struggle to master the simplest complexity classes within the subregular hierarchy of functions, highlighting a notable deficiency in current LLMs' inductive reasoning capabilities. Coda and data are available https://github.com/Wenyueh/inductive_reasoning_benchmark.

In this thesis, I evaluate the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT), specifically the Logic Games section of the test. I focus on this section because it presents a complex logical reasoning task and thus is a valuable source of data for evaluating how modern, increasingly capable LLMs can handle hard logical reasoning tasks. I construct a dataset of LSAT logic games and their associated metadata, and extensively evaluate LLMs' performance in a Chain-of-Thought prompting setting. Given the weak performance in this setting, I explore other prompting frameworks on a smaller subset of the dataset, adapting ideas from Reflexion to this task. This results in a substantially improved accuracy of 70 percent for GPT-4 and 46 percent for GPT-3.5 on this data subset, highlighting the capacity of LLMs to revise their logical errors, despite initially weak performance. Finally, I analyze the types of logic games that models perform better or worse on, as well as the types of logical errors I observe from human annotation, providing detailed insights on the logical reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have gained enormous attention from both academia and industry, due to their exceptional ability in language generation and extremely powerful generalization. However, current LLMs still output unreliable content in practical reasoning tasks due to their inherent issues (e.g., hallucination). To better disentangle this problem, in this paper, we conduct an in-depth investigation to systematically explore the capability of LLMs in logical reasoning. More in detail, we first investigate the deficiency of LLMs in logical reasoning on different tasks, including event relation extraction and deductive reasoning. Our study demonstrates that LLMs are not good reasoners in solving tasks with rigorous reasoning and will produce counterfactual answers, which require us to iteratively refine. Therefore, we comprehensively explore different strategies to endow LLMs with logical reasoning ability, and thus enable them to generate more logically consistent answers across different scenarios. Based on our approach, we also contribute a synthesized dataset (LLM-LR) involving multi-hop reasoning for evaluation and pre-training. Extensive quantitative and qualitative analyses on different tasks also validate the effectiveness and necessity of teaching LLMs with logic and provide insights for solving practical tasks with LLMs in future work.

Over the past decade, analogies, in the form of word-level analogies, have played a significant role as an intrinsic measure of evaluating the quality of word embedding methods such as word2vec. Modern large language models (LLMs), however, are primarily evaluated on extrinsic measures based on benchmarks such as GLUE and SuperGLUE, and there are only a few investigations on whether LLMs can draw analogies between long texts. In this paper, we present ANALOGICAL, a new benchmark to intrinsically evaluate LLMs across a taxonomy of analogies of long text with six levels of complexity -- (i) word, (ii) word vs. sentence, (iii) syntactic, (iv) negation, (v) entailment, and (vi) metaphor. Using thirteen datasets and three different distance measures, we evaluate the abilities of eight LLMs in identifying analogical pairs in the semantic vector space. Our evaluation finds that it is increasingly challenging for LLMs to identify analogies when going up the analogy taxonomy.

Despite the recent proliferation of large language models (LLMs), their training recipes -- model architecture, pre-training data and optimization algorithm -- are often very similar. This naturally raises the question of the similarity among the resulting models. In this paper, we propose a novel setting, imaginary question answering (IQA), to better understand model similarity. In IQA, we ask one model to generate purely imaginary questions (e.g., on completely made-up concepts in physics) and prompt another model to answer. Surprisingly, despite the total fictionality of these questions, all models can answer each other's questions with remarkable success, suggesting a "shared imagination space" in which these models operate during such hallucinations. We conduct a series of investigations into this phenomenon and discuss implications on model homogeneity, hallucination, and computational creativity.

Leveraging mathematical Large Language Models (LLMs) for proof generation is a fundamental topic in LLMs research. We argue that the ability of current LLMs to prove statements largely depends on whether they have encountered the relevant proof process during training. This reliance limits their deeper understanding of mathematical theorems and related concepts. Inspired by the pedagogical method of "proof by counterexamples" commonly used in human mathematics education, our work aims to enhance LLMs' ability to conduct mathematical reasoning and proof through counterexamples. Specifically, we manually create a high-quality, university-level mathematical benchmark, CounterMATH, which requires LLMs to prove mathematical statements by providing counterexamples, thereby assessing their grasp of mathematical concepts. Additionally, we develop a data engineering framework to automatically obtain training data for further model improvement. Extensive experiments and detailed analyses demonstrate that CounterMATH is challenging, indicating that LLMs, such as OpenAI o1, have insufficient counterexample-driven proof capabilities. Moreover, our exploration into model training reveals that strengthening LLMs' counterexample-driven conceptual reasoning abilities is crucial for improving their overall mathematical capabilities. We believe that our work offers new perspectives on the community of mathematical LLMs.

We introduce a method to measure uncertainty in large language models. For tasks like question answering, it is essential to know when we can trust the natural language outputs of foundation models. We show that measuring uncertainty in natural language is challenging because of "semantic equivalence" -- different sentences can mean the same thing. To overcome these challenges we introduce semantic entropy -- an entropy which incorporates linguistic invariances created by shared meanings. Our method is unsupervised, uses only a single model, and requires no modifications to off-the-shelf language models. In comprehensive ablation studies we show that the semantic entropy is more predictive of model accuracy on question answering data sets than comparable baselines.

Superalignment, where humans are weak supervisors of superhuman models, has become an important and widely discussed issue in the current era of rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs). The recent work preliminarily studies this problem by using weak models to supervise strong models. It discovers that weakly supervised strong students can consistently outperform weak teachers towards the alignment target, leading to a weak-to-strong generalization phenomenon. However, we are concerned that behind such a promising phenomenon, whether there exists an issue of weak-to-strong deception, where strong models may deceive weak models by exhibiting well-aligned in areas known to weak models but producing misaligned behaviors in cases weak models do not know. We then take an initial step towards exploring this security issue in a specific but realistic multi-objective alignment case, where there may be some alignment targets conflicting with each other (e.g., helpfulness v.s. harmlessness). Such a conflict is likely to cause strong models to deceive weak models in one alignment dimension to gain high reward in other alignment dimension. Our experiments on both the reward modeling task and the preference optimization scenario indicate: (1) the weak-to-strong deception exists; (2) the deception phenomenon may intensify as the capability gap between weak and strong models increases. We also discuss potential solutions and find bootstrapping with an intermediate model can mitigate the deception to some extent. Our work highlights the urgent need to pay more attention to the true reliability of superalignment.

Statutory reasoning refers to the application of legislative provisions to a series of case facts described in natural language. We re-frame statutory reasoning as an analogy task, where each instance of the analogy task involves a combination of two instances of statutory reasoning. This increases the dataset size by two orders of magnitude, and introduces an element of interpretability. We show that this task is roughly as difficult to Natural Language Processing models as the original task. Finally, we come back to statutory reasoning, solving it with a combination of a retrieval mechanism and analogy models, and showing some progress on prior comparable work.

We study a synthetic corpus based approach for language models (LMs) to acquire logical deductive reasoning ability. The previous studies generated deduction examples using specific sets of deduction rules. However, these rules were limited or otherwise arbitrary, limiting the generalizability of acquired reasoning ability. We rethink this and adopt a well-grounded set of deduction rules based on formal logic theory, which can derive any other deduction rules when combined in a multistep way. Then, using the proposed corpora, which we name FLD (Formal Logic Deduction), we first evaluate and analyze the logical reasoning ability of the latest LLMs. Even GPT-4 can solve only half of the problems, suggesting that pure logical reasoning isolated from knowledge is still challenging for the LLMs, and additional training specialized in logical reasoning is indeed essential. We next empirically verify that LMs trained on FLD corpora acquire more generalizable reasoning ability. Furthermore, we identify the aspects of reasoning ability on which deduction corpora can enhance LMs and those on which they cannot, and discuss future directions on each aspect. The released corpora serve both as learning resources and as challenging benchmarks.

Given the intractably large size of the space of proofs, any model that is capable of general deductive reasoning must generalize to proofs of greater complexity. Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) possess some abstract deductive reasoning ability given chain-of-thought prompts. However, they have primarily been tested on proofs using modus ponens or of a specific size, and from the same distribution as the in-context examples. To measure the general deductive reasoning ability of LLMs, we test on a broad set of deduction rules and measure their ability to generalize to more complex proofs from simpler demonstrations from multiple angles: depth-, width-, and compositional generalization. To facilitate systematic exploration, we construct a new synthetic and programmable reasoning dataset that enables control over deduction rules and proof complexity. Our experiments on four LLMs of various sizes and training objectives show that they are able to generalize to longer and compositional proofs. However, they require explicit demonstrations to produce hypothetical subproofs, specifically in proof by cases and proof by contradiction.

A common approach for aligning language models to human preferences is to first learn a reward model from preference data, and then use this reward model to update the language model. We study two closely related problems that arise in this approach. First, any monotone transformation of the reward model preserves preference ranking; is there a choice that is ``better'' than others? Second, we often wish to align language models to multiple properties: how should we combine multiple reward models? Using a probabilistic interpretation of the alignment procedure, we identify a natural choice for transformation for (the common case of) rewards learned from Bradley-Terry preference models. This derived transformation has two important properties. First, it emphasizes improving poorly-performing outputs, rather than outputs that already score well. This mitigates both underfitting (where some prompts are not improved) and reward hacking (where the model learns to exploit misspecification of the reward model). Second, it enables principled aggregation of rewards by linking summation to logical conjunction: the sum of transformed rewards corresponds to the probability that the output is ``good'' in all measured properties, in a sense we make precise. Experiments aligning language models to be both helpful and harmless using RLHF show substantial improvements over the baseline (non-transformed) approach.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in reasoning tasks but face limitations in mathematical and complex logical reasoning. Existing methods to improve LLMs' logical capabilities either involve traceable or verifiable logical sequences that generate more reliable responses by constructing logical structures yet increase computational costs, or introduces rigid logic template rules, reducing flexibility. In this paper, we propose Reversal of Thought (RoT), a novel framework aimed at enhancing the logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. RoT utilizes a Preference-Guided Reverse Reasoning warm-up strategy, which integrates logical symbols for pseudocode planning through meta-cognitive mechanisms and pairwise preference self-evaluation to generate task-specific prompts solely through demonstrations, aligning with LLMs' cognitive preferences shaped by Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Through reverse reasoning, we ultilize a Cognitive Preference Manager to assess knowledge boundaries and further expand LLMs' reasoning capabilities by aggregating solution logic for known tasks and stylistic templates for unknown tasks. Experiments across various tasks demonstrate that RoT surpasses existing baselines in both reasoning accuracy and efficiency.

The equivalence of realizable and agnostic learnability is a fundamental phenomenon in learning theory. With variants ranging from classical settings like PAC learning and regression to recent trends such as adversarially robust learning, it's surprising that we still lack a unified theory; traditional proofs of the equivalence tend to be disparate, and rely on strong model-specific assumptions like uniform convergence and sample compression. In this work, we give the first model-independent framework explaining the equivalence of realizable and agnostic learnability: a three-line blackbox reduction that simplifies, unifies, and extends our understanding across a wide variety of settings. This includes models with no known characterization of learnability such as learning with arbitrary distributional assumptions and more general loss functions, as well as a host of other popular settings such as robust learning, partial learning, fair learning, and the statistical query model. More generally, we argue that the equivalence of realizable and agnostic learning is actually a special case of a broader phenomenon we call property generalization: any desirable property of a learning algorithm (e.g. noise tolerance, privacy, stability) that can be satisfied over finite hypothesis classes extends (possibly in some variation) to any learnable hypothesis class.

We present lambeq, the first high-level Python library for Quantum Natural Language Processing (QNLP). The open-source toolkit offers a detailed hierarchy of modules and classes implementing all stages of a pipeline for converting sentences to string diagrams, tensor networks, and quantum circuits ready to be used on a quantum computer. lambeq supports syntactic parsing, rewriting and simplification of string diagrams, ansatz creation and manipulation, as well as a number of compositional models for preparing quantum-friendly representations of sentences, employing various degrees of syntax sensitivity. We present the generic architecture and describe the most important modules in detail, demonstrating the usage with illustrative examples. Further, we test the toolkit in practice by using it to perform a number of experiments on simple NLP tasks, implementing both classical and quantum pipelines.

Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly prominent in the field of artificial intelligence. These models not only excel in traditional vision-language tasks but also demonstrate impressive performance in contemporary multi-modal benchmarks. Although many of these benchmarks attempt to holistically evaluate MLLMs, they typically concentrate on basic reasoning tasks, often yielding only simple yes/no or multi-choice responses. These methods naturally lead to confusion and difficulties in conclusively determining the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs. To mitigate this issue, we manually curate a benchmark dataset specifically designed for MLLMs, with a focus on complex reasoning tasks. Our benchmark comprises three key reasoning categories: deductive, abductive, and analogical reasoning. The queries in our dataset are intentionally constructed to engage the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs in the process of generating answers. For a fair comparison across various MLLMs, we incorporate intermediate reasoning steps into our evaluation criteria. In instances where an MLLM is unable to produce a definitive answer, its reasoning ability is evaluated by requesting intermediate reasoning steps. If these steps align with our manual annotations, appropriate scores are assigned. This evaluation scheme resembles methods commonly used in human assessments, such as exams or assignments, and represents what we consider a more effective assessment technique compared with existing benchmarks. We evaluate a selection of representative MLLMs using this rigorously developed open-ended multi-step elaborate reasoning benchmark, designed to challenge and accurately measure their reasoning capabilities. The code and data will be released at https://core-mm.github.io/

We present a theory of information expressed solely in terms of which transformations of physical systems are possible and which are impossible - i.e. in constructor-theoretic terms. Although it includes conjectured laws of physics that are directly about information, independently of the details of particular physical instantiations, it does not regard information as an a priori mathematical or logical concept, but as something whose nature and properties are determined by the laws of physics alone. It does not suffer from the circularity at the foundations of existing information theory (namely that information and distinguishability are each defined in terms of the other). It explains the relationship between classical and quantum information, and reveals the single, constructor-theoretic property underlying the most distinctive phenomena associated with the latter, including the lack of in-principle distinguishability of some states, the impossibility of cloning, the existence of pairs of variables that cannot simultaneously have sharp values, the fact that measurement processes can be both deterministic and unpredictable, the irreducible perturbation caused by measurement, and entanglement (locally inaccessible information).

Recent research has generated hope that inference scaling could allow weaker language models to match or exceed the accuracy of stronger models, such as by repeatedly sampling solutions to a coding problem until it passes unit tests. The central thesis of this paper is that there is no free lunch for inference scaling: indefinite accuracy improvement through resampling can only be realized if the "verifier" (in this case, a set of unit tests) is perfect. When the verifier is imperfect, as it almost always is in domains such as reasoning or coding (for example, unit tests have imperfect coverage), there is a nonzero probability of false positives: incorrect solutions that pass the verifier. Resampling cannot decrease this probability, so it imposes an upper bound to the accuracy of resampling-based inference scaling even with an infinite compute budget. We find that there is a very strong correlation between the model's single-sample accuracy (i.e. accuracy without unit tests) and its false positive rate on coding benchmarks HumanEval and MBPP, whose unit tests have limited coverage. Therefore, no amount of inference scaling of weaker models can enable them to match the single-sample accuracy of a sufficiently strong model (Fig. 1a). When we consider that false positives have a negative utility compared to abstaining from producing a solution, it bends the inference scaling curve further downward. Empirically, we find that the optimal number of samples can be less than 10 under realistic assumptions (Fig. 1b). Finally, we show that beyond accuracy, false positives may have other undesirable qualities, such as poor adherence to coding style conventions.

In this paper, we present a novel approach, called LogicPro, to enhance Large Language Models (LLMs) complex Logical reasoning through Program Examples. We do this effectively by simply utilizing widely available algorithmic problems and their code solutions. First, we constructed diverse test samples input based on algorithmic questions and code solutions. Then, we designed different complex reasoning questions based on algorithmic problems and test samples. Finally, combining the intermediate variable outputs of the code solutions and the complex reasoning questions, we derived the reasoning process and the final answer. With this approach, we can construct a dataset that is sufficiently difficult (all models are ineffective), diverse (synthesized from 2,360 different algorithmic questions), and scalable (building different test samples and collecting more algorithmic questions). In addition, we obtain a high-quality reasoning process guided by the values of intermediate variables. As a result, our approach achieves significant improvements in multiple models for the BBH^{27}, GSM8K, HellSwag, Logicqa, Reclor, and RTE datasets, outperforming a wide range of existing reasoning datasets.

Logical reasoning is central to complex human activities, such as thinking, debating, and planning; it is also a central component of many AI systems as well. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which encoder-only transformer language models (LMs) can reason according to logical rules. We ask whether those LMs can deduce theorems in propositional calculus and first-order logic; if their relative success in these problems reflects general logical capabilities; and which layers contribute the most to the task. First, we show for several encoder-only LMs that they can be trained, to a reasonable degree, to determine logical validity on various datasets. Next, by cross-probing fine-tuned models on these datasets, we show that LMs have difficulty in transferring their putative logical reasoning ability, which suggests that they may have learned dataset-specific features, instead of a general capability. Finally, we conduct a layerwise probing experiment, which shows that the hypothesis classification task is mostly solved through higher layers.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

We present PutnamBench, a new multilingual benchmark for evaluating the ability of neural theorem-provers to solve competition mathematics problems. PutnamBench consists of 1697 hand-constructed formalizations of 640 theorems sourced from the William Lowell Putnam Mathematical Competition, the premier undergraduate-level mathematics competition in North America. All the theorems have formalizations in Lean 4 and Isabelle; a substantial subset also has Coq formalizations. Proving the theorems requires significant problem-solving ability and proficiency in a broad range of topics taught in undergraduate mathematics courses. We use PutnamBench to evaluate several established neural and symbolic theorem-provers. These approaches can only solve a handful of the PutnamBench problems, establishing the benchmark as a difficult open challenge for research on neural theorem-proving. PutnamBench is available at https://github.com/trishullab/PutnamBench.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

Despite the success of chain of thought in enhancing language model reasoning, the underlying process remains less well understood. Although logically sound reasoning appears inherently crucial for chain of thought, prior studies surprisingly reveal minimal impact when using invalid demonstrations instead. Furthermore, the conventional chain of thought does not inform language models on what mistakes to avoid, which potentially leads to more errors. Hence, inspired by how humans can learn from both positive and negative examples, we propose contrastive chain of thought to enhance language model reasoning. Compared to the conventional chain of thought, our approach provides both valid and invalid reasoning demonstrations, to guide the model to reason step-by-step while reducing reasoning mistakes. To improve generalization, we introduce an automatic method to construct contrastive demonstrations. Our experiments on reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that contrastive chain of thought can serve as a general enhancement of chain-of-thought prompting.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly important for machine learning applications. However, it can be challenging to align LLMs with our intent, particularly when we want to generate content that is preferable over others or when we want the LLM to respond in a certain style or tone that is hard to describe. To address this challenge, we propose an approach that uses contrastive examples to better describe our intent. This involves providing positive examples that illustrate the true intent, along with negative examples that show what characteristics we want LLMs to avoid. The negative examples can be retrieved from labeled data, written by a human, or generated by the LLM itself. Before generating an answer, we ask the model to analyze the examples to teach itself what to avoid. This reasoning step provides the model with the appropriate articulation of the user's need and guides it towards generting a better answer. We tested our approach on both synthesized and real-world datasets, including StackExchange and Reddit, and found that it significantly improves performance compared to standard few-shot prompting

This paper introduces a novel approach to evaluating deep learning models' capacity for in-diagram logic interpretation. Leveraging the intriguing realm of visual illusions, we establish a unique dataset, InDL, designed to rigorously test and benchmark these models. Deep learning has witnessed remarkable progress in domains such as computer vision and natural language processing. However, models often stumble in tasks requiring logical reasoning due to their inherent 'black box' characteristics, which obscure the decision-making process. Our work presents a new lens to understand these models better by focusing on their handling of visual illusions -- a complex interplay of perception and logic. We utilize six classic geometric optical illusions to create a comparative framework between human and machine visual perception. This methodology offers a quantifiable measure to rank models, elucidating potential weaknesses and providing actionable insights for model improvements. Our experimental results affirm the efficacy of our benchmarking strategy, demonstrating its ability to effectively rank models based on their logic interpretation ability. As part of our commitment to reproducible research, the source code and datasets will be made publicly available at https://github.com/rabbit-magic-wh/InDL

Throughout the course of my Ph.D., I have been designing the user experience (UX) of various machine learning (ML) systems. In this workshop, I share two projects as case studies in which people engage with ML in much more complicated and nuanced ways than the technical HCML work might assume. The first case study describes how cardiology teams in three hospitals used a clinical decision-support system that helps them decide whether and when to implant an artificial heart to a heart failure patient. I demonstrate that physicians cannot draw on their decision-making experience by seeing only patient data on paper. They are also confused by some fundamental premises upon which ML operates. For example, physicians asked: Are ML predictions made based on clinicians' best efforts? Is it ethical to make decisions based on previous patients' collective outcomes? In the second case study, my collaborators and I designed an intelligent text editor, with the goal of improving authors' writing experience with NLP (Natural Language Processing) technologies. We prototyped a number of generative functionalities where the system provides phrase-or-sentence-level writing suggestions upon user request. When writing with the prototype, however, authors shared that they need to "see where the sentence is going two paragraphs later" in order to decide whether the suggestion aligns with their writing; Some even considered adopting machine suggestions as plagiarism, therefore "is simply wrong". By sharing these unexpected and intriguing responses from these real-world ML users, I hope to start a discussion about such previously-unknown complexities and nuances of -- as the workshop proposal states -- "putting ML at the service of people in a way that is accessible, useful, and trustworthy to all".

Knights and knaves problems represent a classic genre of logical puzzles where characters either tell the truth or lie. The objective is to logically deduce each character's identity based on their statements. The challenge arises from the truth-telling or lying behavior, which influences the logical implications of each statement. Solving these puzzles requires not only direct deductions from individual statements, but the ability to assess the truthfulness of statements by reasoning through various hypothetical scenarios. As such, knights and knaves puzzles serve as compelling examples of suppositional reasoning. In this paper, we introduce TruthQuest, a benchmark for suppositional reasoning based on the principles of knights and knaves puzzles. Our benchmark presents problems of varying complexity, considering both the number of characters and the types of logical statements involved. Evaluations on TruthQuest show that large language models like Llama 3 and Mixtral-8x7B exhibit significant difficulties solving these tasks. A detailed error analysis of the models' output reveals that lower-performing models exhibit a diverse range of reasoning errors, frequently failing to grasp the concept of truth and lies. In comparison, more proficient models primarily struggle with accurately inferring the logical implications of potentially false statements.

Using AI to write formal proofs for mathematical problems is a challenging task that has seen some advancements in recent years. Automated systems such as Lean can verify the correctness of proofs written in formal language, yet writing the proofs in formal language can be challenging for humans and machines. The miniF2F benchmark has 20 IMO problems in its test set, yet formal proofs are available only for 6 of these problems (3 of which are only written by mathematicians). The model with best accuracy can only prove 2 of these 20 IMO problems, from 1950s and 60s, while its training set is a secret. In this work, we write complete, original formal proofs for the remaining IMO problems in Lean along with 3 extra problems from IMO 2022 and 2023. This effort expands the availability of proof currently in the public domain by creating 5,880 lines of Lean proof. The goal of the paper is to pave the way for developing AI models that can automatically write the formal proofs for all the IMO problems in miniF2F and beyond by providing an evaluation benchmark. In this pursuit, we devise a method to decompose the proofs of these problems into their building blocks, constructing a dataset of 1,329 lemmas with more than 40k lines of Lean code. These lemmas are not trivial, yet they are approachable, providing the opportunity to evaluate and diagnose the failures and successes of AI models. We evaluate the ability of the SOTA LLMs on our dataset and analyze their success and failure modes from different perspectives. Our dataset and code is available at: https://github.com/roozbeh-yz/IMO-Steps.

With the web getting bigger and assimilating knowledge about different concepts and domains, it is becoming very difficult for simple database driven applications to capture the data for a domain. Thus developers have come out with ontology based systems which can store large amount of information and can apply reasoning and produce timely information. Thus facilitating effective knowledge management. Though this approach has made our lives easier, but at the same time has given rise to another problem. Two different ontologies assimilating same knowledge tend to use different terms for the same concepts. This creates confusion among knowledge engineers and workers, as they do not know which is a better term then the other. Thus we need to merge ontologies working on same domain so that the engineers can develop a better application over it. This paper shows the development of one such matcher which merges the concepts available in two ontologies at two levels; 1) at string level and 2) at semantic level; thus producing better merged ontologies. We have used a graph matching technique which works at the core of the system. We have also evaluated the system and have tested its performance with its predecessor which works only on string matching. Thus current approach produces better results.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

We propose a new definition of higher-order DisCoCat (categorical compositional distributional) models where the meaning of a word is not a diagram, but a diagram-valued higher-order function. Our models can be seen as a variant of Montague semantics based on a lambda calculus where the primitives act on string diagrams rather than logical formulae. As a special case, we show how to translate from the Lambek calculus into Peirce's system beta for first-order logic. This allows us to give a purely diagrammatic treatment of higher-order and non-linear processes in natural language semantics: adverbs, prepositions, negation and quantifiers. The theoretical definition presented in this article comes with a proof-of-concept implementation in DisCoPy, the Python library for string diagrams.

Machine reading is a fundamental task for testing the capability of natural language understanding, which is closely related to human cognition in many aspects. With the rising of deep learning techniques, algorithmic models rival human performances on simple QA, and thus increasingly challenging machine reading datasets have been proposed. Though various challenges such as evidence integration and commonsense knowledge have been integrated, one of the fundamental capabilities in human reading, namely logical reasoning, is not fully investigated. We build a comprehensive dataset, named LogiQA, which is sourced from expert-written questions for testing human Logical reasoning. It consists of 8,678 QA instances, covering multiple types of deductive reasoning. Results show that state-of-the-art neural models perform by far worse than human ceiling. Our dataset can also serve as a benchmark for reinvestigating logical AI under the deep learning NLP setting. The dataset is freely available at https://github.com/lgw863/LogiQA-dataset

Inductive reasoning is a core component of human intelligence. In the past research of inductive reasoning within computer science, formal language is used as representations of knowledge (facts and rules, more specifically). However, formal language can cause systematic problems for inductive reasoning such as disability of handling raw input such as natural language, sensitiveness to mislabeled data, and incapacity to handle ambiguous input. To this end, we propose a new paradigm (task) for inductive reasoning, which is to induce natural language rules from natural language facts, and create a dataset termed DEER containing 1.2k rule-fact pairs for the task, where rules and facts are written in natural language. New automatic metrics are also proposed and analysed for the evaluation of this task. With DEER, we investigate a modern approach for inductive reasoning where we use natural language as representation for knowledge instead of formal language and use pretrained language models as ''reasoners''. Moreover, we provide the first and comprehensive analysis of how well pretrained language models can induce natural language rules from natural language facts. We also propose a new framework drawing insights from philosophy literature for this task, which we show in the experiment section that surpasses baselines in both automatic and human evaluations. We discuss about our future perspectives for inductive reasoning in Section 7. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/ZonglinY/Inductive_Reasoning.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

Although contemporary large language models (LMs) demonstrate impressive question-answering capabilities, their answers are typically the product of a single call to the model. This entails an unwelcome degree of opacity and compromises performance, especially on problems that are inherently multi-step. To address these limitations, we show how LMs can be made to perform faithful multi-step reasoning via a process whose causal structure mirrors the underlying logical structure of the problem. Our approach works by chaining together reasoning steps, where each step results from calls to two fine-tuned LMs, one for selection and one for inference, to produce a valid reasoning trace. Our method carries out a beam search through the space of reasoning traces to improve reasoning quality. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our model on multi-step logical deduction and scientific question-answering, showing that it outperforms baselines on final answer accuracy, and generates humanly interpretable reasoning traces whose validity can be checked by the user.

Logical reasoning consistently plays a fundamental and significant role in the domains of knowledge engineering and artificial intelligence. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a noteworthy innovation in natural language processing (NLP), exhibiting impressive achievements across various classic NLP tasks. However, the question of whether LLMs can effectively address the task of logical reasoning, which requires gradual cognitive inference similar to human intelligence, remains unanswered. To this end, we aim to bridge this gap and provide comprehensive evaluations in this paper. Firstly, to offer systematic evaluations, we select fifteen typical logical reasoning datasets and organize them into deductive, inductive, abductive and mixed-form reasoning settings. Considering the comprehensiveness of evaluations, we include three representative LLMs (i.e., text-davinci-003, ChatGPT and BARD) and evaluate them on all selected datasets under zero-shot, one-shot and three-shot settings. Secondly, different from previous evaluations relying only on simple metrics (e.g., accuracy), we propose fine-level evaluations from objective and subjective manners, covering both answers and explanations. Additionally, to uncover the logical flaws of LLMs, problematic cases will be attributed to five error types from two dimensions, i.e., evidence selection process and reasoning process. Thirdly, to avoid the influences of knowledge bias and purely focus on benchmarking the logical reasoning capability of LLMs, we propose a new dataset with neutral content. It contains 3,000 samples and covers deductive, inductive and abductive settings. Based on the in-depth evaluations, this paper finally forms a general evaluation scheme of logical reasoning capability from six dimensions. It reflects the pros and cons of LLMs and gives guiding directions for future works.

Sentences that present a complex syntax act as a major stumbling block for downstream Natural Language Processing applications whose predictive quality deteriorates with sentence length and complexity. The task of Text Simplification (TS) may remedy this situation. It aims to modify sentences in order to make them easier to process, using a set of rewriting operations, such as reordering, deletion, or splitting. State-of-the-art syntactic TS approaches suffer from two major drawbacks: first, they follow a very conservative approach in that they tend to retain the input rather than transforming it, and second, they ignore the cohesive nature of texts, where context spread across clauses or sentences is needed to infer the true meaning of a statement. To address these problems, we present a discourse-aware TS approach that splits and rephrases complex English sentences within the semantic context in which they occur. Based on a linguistically grounded transformation stage that uses clausal and phrasal disembedding mechanisms, complex sentences are transformed into shorter utterances with a simple canonical structure that can be easily analyzed by downstream applications. With sentence splitting, we thus address a TS task that has hardly been explored so far. Moreover, we introduce the notion of minimality in this context, as we aim to decompose source sentences into a set of self-contained minimal semantic units. To avoid breaking down the input into a disjointed sequence of statements that is difficult to interpret because important contextual information is missing, we incorporate the semantic context between the split propositions in the form of hierarchical structures and semantic relationships. In that way, we generate a semantic hierarchy of minimal propositions that leads to a novel representation of complex assertions that puts a semantic layer on top of the simplified sentences.

This paper introduces a novel type theory and logic for probabilistic reasoning. Its logic is quantitative, with fuzzy predicates. It includes normalisation and conditioning of states. This conditioning uses a key aspect that distinguishes our probabilistic type theory from quantum type theory, namely the bijective correspondence between predicates and side-effect free actions (called instrument, or assert, maps). The paper shows how suitable computation rules can be derived from this predicate-action correspondence, and uses these rules for calculating conditional probabilities in two well-known examples of Bayesian reasoning in (graphical) models. Our type theory may thus form the basis for a mechanisation of Bayesian inference.

Mathematical reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence and is applicable in various fields, including science, engineering, finance, and everyday life. The development of artificial intelligence (AI) systems capable of solving math problems and proving theorems has garnered significant interest in the fields of machine learning and natural language processing. For example, mathematics serves as a testbed for aspects of reasoning that are challenging for powerful deep learning models, driving new algorithmic and modeling advances. On the other hand, recent advances in large-scale neural language models have opened up new benchmarks and opportunities to use deep learning for mathematical reasoning. In this survey paper, we review the key tasks, datasets, and methods at the intersection of mathematical reasoning and deep learning over the past decade. We also evaluate existing benchmarks and methods, and discuss future research directions in this domain.

Large language models (LLMs) are prone to hallucinations in question-answering (QA) tasks when faced with ambiguous questions. Users often assume that LLMs share their cognitive alignment, a mutual understanding of context, intent, and implicit details, leading them to omit critical information in the queries. However, LLMs generate responses based on assumptions that can misalign with user intent, which may be perceived as hallucinations if they misalign with the user's intent. Therefore, identifying those implicit assumptions is crucial to resolve ambiguities in QA. Prior work, such as AmbigQA, reduces ambiguity in queries via human-annotated clarifications, which is not feasible in real application. Meanwhile, ASQA compiles AmbigQA's short answers into long-form responses but inherits human biases and fails capture explicit logical distinctions that differentiates the answers. We introduce Conditional Ambiguous Question-Answering (CondAmbigQA), a benchmark with 200 ambiguous queries and condition-aware evaluation metrics. Our study pioneers the concept of ``conditions'' in ambiguous QA tasks, where conditions stand for contextual constraints or assumptions that resolve ambiguities. The retrieval-based annotation strategy uses retrieved Wikipedia fragments to identify possible interpretations for a given query as its conditions and annotate the answers through those conditions. Such a strategy minimizes human bias introduced by different knowledge levels among annotators. By fixing retrieval results, CondAmbigQA evaluates how RAG systems leverage conditions to resolve ambiguities. Experiments show that models considering conditions before answering improve performance by 20%, with an additional 5% gain when conditions are explicitly provided. These results underscore the value of conditional reasoning in QA, offering researchers tools to rigorously evaluate ambiguity resolution.

Existing efforts to improve logical reasoning ability of language models have predominantly relied on supervised fine-tuning, hindering generalization to new domains and/or tasks. The development of Large Langauge Models (LLMs) has demonstrated the capacity of compressing abundant knowledge into a single proxy, enabling them to tackle multiple tasks effectively. Our preliminary experiments, nevertheless, show that LLMs do not show capability on logical reasoning. The performance of LLMs on logical reasoning benchmarks is far behind the existing state-of-the-art baselines. In this paper, we make the first attempt to investigate the feasibility of incorporating logical knowledge through self-supervised post-training, and activating it via in-context learning, which we termed as LogicLLM. Specifically, we devise an auto-regressive objective variant of MERIt and integrate it with two LLM series, i.e., FLAN-T5 and LLaMA, with parameter size ranging from 3 billion to 13 billion. The results on two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of LogicLLM. Besides, we conduct extensive ablation studies to analyze the key factors in designing logic-oriented proxy tasks.

To augment language models with the ability to reason, researchers usually prompt or finetune them to produce chain of thought reasoning steps before producing the final answer. However, although people use natural language to reason effectively, it may be that LMs could reason more effectively with some intermediate computation that is not in natural language. In this work, we explore an alternative reasoning approach: instead of explicitly producing the chain of thought reasoning steps, we use the language model's internal hidden states to perform implicit reasoning. The implicit reasoning steps are distilled from a teacher model trained on explicit chain-of-thought reasoning, and instead of doing reasoning "horizontally" by producing intermediate words one-by-one, we distill it such that the reasoning happens "vertically" among the hidden states in different layers. We conduct experiments on a multi-digit multiplication task and a grade school math problem dataset and find that this approach enables solving tasks previously not solvable without explicit chain-of-thought, at a speed comparable to no chain-of-thought.

Given appropriate representations of the semantic relations between carpenter and wood and between mason and stone (for example, vectors in a vector space model), a suitable algorithm should be able to recognize that these relations are highly similar (carpenter is to wood as mason is to stone; the relations are analogous). Likewise, with representations of dog, house, and kennel, an algorithm should be able to recognize that the semantic composition of dog and house, dog house, is highly similar to kennel (dog house and kennel are synonymous). It seems that these two tasks, recognizing relations and compositions, are closely connected. However, up to now, the best models for relations are significantly different from the best models for compositions. In this paper, we introduce a dual-space model that unifies these two tasks. This model matches the performance of the best previous models for relations and compositions. The dual-space model consists of a space for measuring domain similarity and a space for measuring function similarity. Carpenter and wood share the same domain, the domain of carpentry. Mason and stone share the same domain, the domain of masonry. Carpenter and mason share the same function, the function of artisans. Wood and stone share the same function, the function of materials. In the composition dog house, kennel has some domain overlap with both dog and house (the domains of pets and buildings). The function of kennel is similar to the function of house (the function of shelters). By combining domain and function similarities in various ways, we can model relations, compositions, and other aspects of semantics.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

We show that transformer-based large language models are computationally universal when augmented with an external memory. Any deterministic language model that conditions on strings of bounded length is equivalent to a finite automaton, hence computationally limited. However, augmenting such models with a read-write memory creates the possibility of processing arbitrarily large inputs and, potentially, simulating any algorithm. We establish that an existing large language model, Flan-U-PaLM 540B, can be combined with an associative read-write memory to exactly simulate the execution of a universal Turing machine, U_{15,2}. A key aspect of the finding is that it does not require any modification of the language model weights. Instead, the construction relies solely on designing a form of stored instruction computer that can subsequently be programmed with a specific set of prompts.

We resolve an open problem of Hanneke on the subject of universally consistent online learning with non-i.i.d. processes and unbounded losses. The notion of an optimistically universal learning rule was defined by Hanneke in an effort to study learning theory under minimal assumptions. A given learning rule is said to be optimistically universal if it achieves a low long-run average loss whenever the data generating process makes this goal achievable by some learning rule. Hanneke posed as an open problem whether, for every unbounded loss, the family of processes admitting universal learning are precisely those having a finite number of distinct values almost surely. In this paper, we completely resolve this problem, showing that this is indeed the case. As a consequence, this also offers a dramatically simpler formulation of an optimistically universal learning rule for any unbounded loss: namely, the simple memorization rule already suffices. Our proof relies on constructing random measurable partitions of the instance space and could be of independent interest for solving other open questions. We extend the results to the non-realizable setting thereby providing an optimistically universal Bayes consistent learning rule.

We extend Textual Inversion to learn pseudo-words that represent a concept at different resolutions. This allows us to generate images that use the concept with different levels of detail and also to manipulate different resolutions using language. Once learned, the user can generate images at different levels of agreement to the original concept; "A photo of S^*(0)" produces the exact object while the prompt "A photo of S^*(0.8)" only matches the rough outlines and colors. Our framework allows us to generate images that use different resolutions of an image (e.g. details, textures, styles) as separate pseudo-words that can be composed in various ways. We open-soure our code in the following URL: https://github.com/giannisdaras/multires_textual_inversion

Although counterfactual reasoning is a fundamental aspect of intelligence, the lack of large-scale counterfactual open-domain question-answering (QA) benchmarks makes it difficult to evaluate and improve models on this ability. To address this void, we introduce the first such dataset, named IfQA, where each question is based on a counterfactual presupposition via an "if" clause. For example, if Los Angeles was on the east coast of the U.S., what would be the time difference between Los Angeles and Paris? Such questions require models to go beyond retrieving direct factual knowledge from the Web: they must identify the right information to retrieve and reason about an imagined situation that may even go against the facts built into their parameters. The IfQA dataset contains over 3,800 questions that were annotated annotated by crowdworkers on relevant Wikipedia passages. Empirical analysis reveals that the IfQA dataset is highly challenging for existing open-domain QA methods, including supervised retrieve-then-read pipeline methods (EM score 36.2), as well as recent few-shot approaches such as chain-of-thought prompting with GPT-3 (EM score 27.4). The unique challenges posed by the IfQA benchmark will push open-domain QA research on both retrieval and counterfactual reasoning fronts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated good performance in many reasoning tasks, but they still struggle with some complicated reasoning tasks including logical reasoning. One non-negligible reason for LLMs' suboptimal performance on logical reasoning is their overlooking of understanding logical fallacies correctly. To evaluate LLMs' capability of logical fallacy understanding (LFU), we propose five concrete tasks from three cognitive dimensions of WHAT, WHY, and HOW in this paper. Towards these LFU tasks, we have successfully constructed a new dataset LFUD based on GPT-4 accompanied by a little human effort. Our extensive experiments justify that our LFUD can be used not only to evaluate LLMs' LFU capability, but also to fine-tune LLMs to obtain significantly enhanced performance on logical reasoning.

Recent work by (Richardson and Kuhn, 2017a,b; Richardson et al., 2018) looks at semantic parser induction and question answering in the domain of source code libraries and APIs. In this brief note, we formalize the representations being learned in these studies and introduce a simple domain specific language and a systematic translation from this language to first-order logic. By recasting the target representations in terms of classical logic, we aim to broaden the applicability of existing code datasets for investigating more complex natural language understanding and reasoning problems in the software domain.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

The ability to derive underlying principles from a handful of observations and then generalize to novel situations -- known as inductive reasoning -- is central to human intelligence. Prior work suggests that language models (LMs) often fall short on inductive reasoning, despite achieving impressive success on research benchmarks. In this work, we conduct a systematic study of the inductive reasoning capabilities of LMs through iterative hypothesis refinement, a technique that more closely mirrors the human inductive process than standard input-output prompting. Iterative hypothesis refinement employs a three-step process: proposing, selecting, and refining hypotheses in the form of textual rules. By examining the intermediate rules, we observe that LMs are phenomenal hypothesis proposers (i.e., generating candidate rules), and when coupled with a (task-specific) symbolic interpreter that is able to systematically filter the proposed set of rules, this hybrid approach achieves strong results across inductive reasoning benchmarks that require inducing causal relations, language-like instructions, and symbolic concepts. However, they also behave as puzzling inductive reasoners, showing notable performance gaps between rule induction (i.e., identifying plausible rules) and rule application (i.e., applying proposed rules to instances), suggesting that LMs are proposing hypotheses without being able to actually apply the rules. Through empirical and human analyses, we further reveal several discrepancies between the inductive reasoning processes of LMs and humans, shedding light on both the potentials and limitations of using LMs in inductive reasoning tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) significantly benefit from Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting in performing various reasoning tasks. While CoT allows models to produce more comprehensive reasoning processes, its emphasis on intermediate reasoning steps can inadvertently introduce hallucinations and accumulated errors, thereby limiting models' ability to solve complex reasoning tasks. Inspired by how humans engage in careful and meticulous deductive logical reasoning processes to solve tasks, we seek to enable language models to perform explicit and rigorous deductive reasoning, and also ensure the trustworthiness of their reasoning process through self-verification. However, directly verifying the validity of an entire deductive reasoning process is challenging, even with advanced models like ChatGPT. In light of this, we propose to decompose a reasoning verification process into a series of step-by-step subprocesses, each only receiving their necessary context and premises. To facilitate this procedure, we propose Natural Program, a natural language-based deductive reasoning format. Our approach enables models to generate precise reasoning steps where subsequent steps are more rigorously grounded on prior steps. It also empowers language models to carry out reasoning self-verification in a step-by-step manner. By integrating this verification process into each deductive reasoning stage, we significantly enhance the rigor and trustfulness of generated reasoning steps. Along this process, we also improve the answer correctness on complex reasoning tasks. Code will be released at https://github.com/lz1oceani/verify_cot.

Semantic textual similarity (STS) has been a cornerstone task in NLP that measures the degree of similarity between a pair of sentences, with applications in information retrieval, question answering, and embedding methods. However, it is an inherently ambiguous task, with the sentence similarity depending on the specific aspect of interest. We resolve this ambiguity by proposing a novel task called conditional STS (C-STS) which measures similarity conditioned on an aspect elucidated in natural language (hereon, condition). As an example, the similarity between the sentences "The NBA player shoots a three-pointer." and "A man throws a tennis ball into the air to serve." is higher for the condition "The motion of the ball." (both upward) and lower for "The size of the ball." (one large and one small). C-STS's advantages are two-fold: (1) it reduces the subjectivity and ambiguity of STS, and (2) enables fine-grained similarity evaluation using diverse conditions. C-STS contains almost 20,000 instances from diverse domains and we evaluate several state-of-the-art models to demonstrate that even the most performant fine-tuning and in-context learning models (GPT-4, Flan, SimCSE) find it challenging, with Spearman correlation scores of <50. We encourage the community to evaluate their models on C-STS to provide a more holistic view of semantic similarity and natural language understanding.

The recent LLMs like GPT-4 and PaLM-2 have made tremendous progress in solving fundamental math problems like GSM8K by achieving over 90\% accuracy. However, their capabilities to solve more challenging math problems which require domain-specific knowledge (i.e. theorem) have yet to be investigated. In this paper, we introduce TheoremQA, the first theorem-driven question-answering dataset designed to evaluate AI models' capabilities to apply theorems to solve challenging science problems. \dataset is curated by domain experts containing 800 high-quality questions covering 350 theoremse.g. Taylor's theorem, Lagrange's theorem, Huffman coding, Quantum Theorem, Elasticity Theorem, etc from Math, Physics, EE\&CS, and Finance. We evaluate a wide spectrum of 16 large language and code models with different prompting strategies like Chain-of-Thoughts and Program-of-Thoughts. We found that GPT-4's capabilities to solve these problems are unparalleled, achieving an accuracy of 51\% with Program-of-Thoughts Prompting. All the existing open-sourced models are below 15\%, barely surpassing the random-guess baseline. Given the diversity and broad coverage of \dataset, we believe it can be used as a better benchmark to evaluate LLMs' capabilities to solve challenging science problems. The data and code are released in https://github.com/wenhuchen/TheoremQA.

We introduce Goedel-Prover, an open-source large language model (LLM) that achieves the state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance in automated formal proof generation for mathematical problems. The key challenge in this field is the scarcity of formalized math statements and proofs, which we tackle in the following ways. We train statement formalizers to translate the natural language math problems from Numina into formal language (Lean 4), creating a dataset of 1.64 million formal statements. LLMs are used to check that the formal statements accurately preserve the content of the original natural language problems. We then iteratively build a large dataset of formal proofs by training a series of provers. Each prover succeeds in proving many statements that the previous ones could not, and these new proofs are added to the training set for the next prover. The final prover outperforms all existing open-source models in whole-proof generation. On the miniF2F benchmark, it achieves a 57.6% success rate (Pass@32), exceeding the previous best open-source model by 7.6%. On PutnamBench, Goedel-Prover successfully solves 7 problems (Pass@512), ranking first on the leaderboard. Furthermore, it generates 29.7K formal proofs for Lean Workbook problems, nearly doubling the 15.7K produced by earlier works.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have propelled Artificial Intelligence (AI) to new heights, enabling breakthroughs in various tasks such as writing assistance, code generation, and machine translation. A significant distinction of advanced LLMs, such as ChatGPT, is their demonstrated ability to "reason." However, evaluating the reasoning ability of LLMs remains a challenge as most existing evaluations focus on their accuracy on the downstream tasks rather than directly assessing their reasoning processes. Efforts have been made to develop benchmarks and metrics to assess reasoning in LLMs, but they suffer from data leakage or limited scope. In this paper, we introduce LogicAsker, an automatic approach that comprehensively evaluates and improves the logical reasoning abilities of LLMs under a set of atomic reasoning skills based on propositional and predicate logic. The results provide insights into LLMs' reasoning abilities and reveal the logical rules the LLMs did not learn well. We evaluate LogicAsker on six widely deployed LLMs, including GPT-3, ChatGPT, GPT-4, Bard, Vicuna, and Guanaco. The results show that test cases from LogicAsker can find logical reasoning failures in different LLMs with a rate of 25\% - 94\%. In addition, the test cases of LogicAsker can be further used to design demonstration examples for in-context learning, which effectively improves the logical reasoning ability of LLMs, e.g., 10\% for GPT-4. As far as we know, our work is the first to create prompts based on testing results to improve LLMs' formal reasoning ability effectively. All the code, data, and results will be released for reproduction and future research.

We provide conceptual and mathematical foundations for near-term quantum natural language processing (QNLP), and do so in quantum computer scientist friendly terms. We opted for an expository presentation style, and provide references for supporting empirical evidence and formal statements concerning mathematical generality. We recall how the quantum model for natural language that we employ canonically combines linguistic meanings with rich linguistic structure, most notably grammar. In particular, the fact that it takes a quantum-like model to combine meaning and structure, establishes QNLP as quantum-native, on par with simulation of quantum systems. Moreover, the now leading Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) paradigm for encoding classical data on quantum hardware, variational quantum circuits, makes NISQ exceptionally QNLP-friendly: linguistic structure can be encoded as a free lunch, in contrast to the apparently exponentially expensive classical encoding of grammar. Quantum speed-up for QNLP tasks has already been established in previous work with Will Zeng. Here we provide a broader range of tasks which all enjoy the same advantage. Diagrammatic reasoning is at the heart of QNLP. Firstly, the quantum model interprets language as quantum processes via the diagrammatic formalism of categorical quantum mechanics. Secondly, these diagrams are via ZX-calculus translated into quantum circuits. Parameterisations of meanings then become the circuit variables to be learned. Our encoding of linguistic structure within quantum circuits also embodies a novel approach for establishing word-meanings that goes beyond the current standards in mainstream AI, by placing linguistic structure at the heart of Wittgenstein's meaning-is-context.

ARC Challenge appears more difficult than ARC Easy for modern LLMs primarily due to an evaluation setup that prevents direct comparison of answer choices rather than inherent complexity. Although some researchers have quietly shifted to a more appropriate scheme over the last year, the implications of this change have yet to be widely acknowledged. We highlight this overlooked shift, show how similar evaluation practices falsely imply reasoning deficits in other benchmarks, and demonstrate that fairer methods dramatically reduce performance gaps (e.g. on SIQA) and even yield superhuman results (OpenBookQA). In doing so, we reveal how evaluation shapes perceived difficulty and offer guidelines to ensure that multiple-choice evaluations accurately reflect actual model capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks but their performance in complex logical reasoning tasks remains unsatisfactory. Although some prompting methods, such as Chain-of-Thought, can improve the reasoning ability of LLMs to some extent, they suffer from an unfaithful issue where derived conclusions may not align with the generated reasoning chain. To address this issue, some studies employ the approach of propositional logic to further enhance logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. However, the potential omissions in the extraction of logical expressions in these methods can cause information loss in the logical reasoning process, thereby generating incorrect results. To this end, we propose Logic-of-Thought (LoT) prompting which employs propositional logic to generate expanded logical information from input context, and utilizes the generated logical information as an additional augmentation to the input prompts, thereby enhancing the capability of logical reasoning. The LoT is orthogonal to existing prompting methods and can be seamlessly integrated with them. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LoT boosts the performance of various prompting methods with a striking margin across five logical reasoning tasks. In particular, the LoT enhances Chain-of-Thought's performance on the ReClor dataset by +4.35%; moreover, it improves Chain-of-Thought with Self-Consistency's performance on LogiQA by +5%; additionally, it boosts performance of Tree-of-Thoughts on ProofWriter dataset by +8%.

Chain-of-Thought(CoT) prompting and its variants explore equipping large language models (LLMs) with high-level reasoning abilities by emulating human-like linear cognition and logic. However, the human mind is complicated and mixed with both linear and nonlinear thinking. In this work, we propose Inferential Exclusion Prompting (IEP), a novel prompting that combines the principles of elimination and inference in order to guide LLMs to think non-linearly. IEP guides LLMs to plan and then utilize Natural Language Inference (NLI) to deduce each possible solution's entailment relation with context, commonsense, or facts, therefore yielding a broader perspective by thinking back for inferring. This forward planning and backward eliminating process allows IEP to better simulate the complex human thinking processes compared to other CoT-based methods, which only reflect linear cognitive processes. We conducted a series of empirical studies and have corroborated that IEP consistently outperforms CoT across various tasks. Additionally, we observe that integrating IEP and CoT further improves the LLMs' performance on certain tasks, highlighting the necessity of equipping LLMs with mixed logic processes. Moreover, to better evaluate comprehensive features inherent in human logic, we introduce Mental-Ability Reasoning Benchmark (MARB). The benchmark comprises six novel subtasks with a total of 9,115 questions, among which 1,685 are developed with hand-crafted rationale references. We believe both IEP and MARB can serve as a promising direction for unveiling LLMs' logic and verbal reasoning abilities and drive further advancements. MARB will be available at ~anonymity link soon.

This thesis introduces quantum natural language processing (QNLP) models based on a simple yet powerful analogy between computational linguistics and quantum mechanics: grammar as entanglement. The grammatical structure of text and sentences connects the meaning of words in the same way that entanglement structure connects the states of quantum systems. Category theory allows to make this language-to-qubit analogy formal: it is a monoidal functor from grammar to vector spaces. We turn this abstract analogy into a concrete algorithm that translates the grammatical structure onto the architecture of parameterised quantum circuits. We then use a hybrid classical-quantum algorithm to train the model so that evaluating the circuits computes the meaning of sentences in data-driven tasks. The implementation of QNLP models motivated the development of DisCoPy (Distributional Compositional Python), the toolkit for applied category theory of which the first chapter gives a comprehensive overview. String diagrams are the core data structure of DisCoPy, they allow to reason about computation at a high level of abstraction. We show how they can encode both grammatical structures and quantum circuits, but also logical formulae, neural networks or arbitrary Python code. Monoidal functors allow to translate these abstract diagrams into concrete computation, interfacing with optimised task-specific libraries. The second chapter uses DisCopy to implement QNLP models as parameterised functors from grammar to quantum circuits. It gives a first proof-of-concept for the more general concept of functorial learning: generalising machine learning from functions to functors by learning from diagram-like data. In order to learn optimal functor parameters via gradient descent, we introduce the notion of diagrammatic differentiation: a graphical calculus for computing the gradients of parameterised diagrams.

Owing to the capability of in-context learning, large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive performance across diverse mathematical reasoning benchmarks. However, we find that few-shot demonstrations can sometimes bring negative performance and their effectiveness on LLMs' reasoning abilities remains unreliable. To this end, in this paper, we aim to theoretically analyze the impact of in-context demonstrations on LLMs' reasoning performance. We prove that the reasoning efficacy (measured by empirical prediction loss) can be bounded by a LLM-oriented semantic similarity and an inference stability of demonstrations, which is general for both one-shot and few-shot scenarios. Based on this finding, we propose a straightforward, generalizable, and low-complexity demonstration selection method named LMS3. It can adaptively facilitate to select the most pertinent samples for different LLMs and includes a novel demonstration rejection mechanism to automatically filter out samples that are unsuitable for few-shot learning. Through experiments on three representative benchmarks, two LLM backbones, and multiple few-shot settings, we verify that our LMS3 has superiority and achieves consistent improvements on all datasets, which existing methods have been unable to accomplish.

We present miniF2F, a dataset of formal Olympiad-level mathematics problems statements intended to provide a unified cross-system benchmark for neural theorem proving. The miniF2F benchmark currently targets Metamath, Lean, Isabelle (partially) and HOL Light (partially) and consists of 488 problem statements drawn from the AIME, AMC, and the International Mathematical Olympiad (IMO), as well as material from high-school and undergraduate mathematics courses. We report baseline results using GPT-f, a neural theorem prover based on GPT-3 and provide an analysis of its performance. We intend for miniF2F to be a community-driven effort and hope that our benchmark will help spur advances in neural theorem proving.

In the last decade, several organizations have produced documents intended to standardize, in the normative sense, and promote guidance to our recent and rapid AI development. However, the full spectrum of ideas presented in these documents has not yet been analyzed, except for a few meta-analyses and critical reviews of the field. In this work, we seek to expand on the work done by past researchers and create a tool for better data visualization of the contents and nature of these documents, to understand whether there is consensus or similarity between the principles espoused by various institutions, which may inspire debates on future regulations. We also provide some preliminary thoughts and questions that could guide the continuity of the research through a critical analysis of the results acquired by our methodology into a sample size of 200 documents.

We propose a framework for robust evaluation of reasoning capabilities of language models, using functional variants of benchmarks. Models that solve a reasoning test should exhibit no difference in performance over the static version of a problem compared to a snapshot of the functional variant. We have rewritten the relevant fragment of the MATH benchmark into its functional variant MATH(), with functionalization of other benchmarks to follow. When evaluating current state-of-the-art models over snapshots of MATH(), we find a reasoning gap -- the percentage difference between the static and functional accuracies. We find reasoning gaps from 58.35% to 80.31% among the state-of-the-art closed and open weights models that perform well on static benchmarks, with the caveat that the gaps are likely to be smaller with more sophisticated prompting strategies. Here we show that models which anecdotally have good reasoning performance over real-world tasks, have quantifiable lower gaps, motivating the open problem of building "gap 0" models. Code for evaluation and new evaluation datasets, three MATH() snapshots, are publicly available at https://github.com/consequentai/fneval/.

The widely studied task of Natural Language Inference (NLI) requires a system to recognize whether one piece of text is textually entailed by another, i.e. whether the entirety of its meaning can be inferred from the other. In current NLI datasets and models, textual entailment relations are typically defined on the sentence- or paragraph-level. However, even a simple sentence often contains multiple propositions, i.e. distinct units of meaning conveyed by the sentence. As these propositions can carry different truth values in the context of a given premise, we argue for the need to recognize the textual entailment relation of each proposition in a sentence individually. We propose PropSegmEnt, a corpus of over 35K propositions annotated by expert human raters. Our dataset structure resembles the tasks of (1) segmenting sentences within a document to the set of propositions, and (2) classifying the entailment relation of each proposition with respect to a different yet topically-aligned document, i.e. documents describing the same event or entity. We establish strong baselines for the segmentation and entailment tasks. Through case studies on summary hallucination detection and document-level NLI, we demonstrate that our conceptual framework is potentially useful for understanding and explaining the compositionality of NLI labels.

Language models often achieve higher accuracy when reasoning step-by-step in complex tasks. However, their reasoning can be unsound, inconsistent, or rely on undesirable prior assumptions. To tackle these issues, we introduce a class of tools for language models called guides that use state and incremental constraints to guide generation. A guide can be invoked by the model to constrain its own generation to a set of valid statements given by the tool. In turn, the model's choices can change the guide's state. We show how a general system for logical reasoning can be used as a guide, which we call LogicGuide. Given a reasoning problem in natural language, a model can formalize its assumptions for LogicGuide and then guarantee that its reasoning steps are sound. In experiments with the PrOntoQA and ProofWriter reasoning datasets, LogicGuide significantly improves the performance of GPT-3, GPT-3.5 Turbo and LLaMA (accuracy gains up to 35%). LogicGuide also drastically reduces content effects: the interference of prior and current assumptions that both humans and language models have been shown to suffer from. Finally, we explore bootstrapping LLaMA 13B from its own reasoning and find that LogicGuide is critical: by training only on certified self-generated reasoning, LLaMA can self-improve, avoiding learning from its own hallucinations.

Logical reasoning remains a challenge for natural language processing, but it can be improved by training language models to mimic theorem provers on procedurally generated problems. Previous work used domain-specific proof generation algorithms, which biases reasoning toward specific proof traces and limits auditability and extensibility. We present a simpler and more general declarative framework with flexible context-sensitive rules binding multiple languages (specifically, simplified English and the TPTP theorem-proving language). We construct first-order logic problems by selecting up to 32 premises and one hypothesis. We demonstrate that using semantic constraints during generation and careful English verbalization of predicates enhances logical reasoning without hurting natural English tasks. We use relatively small DeBERTa-v3 models to achieve state-of-the-art accuracy on the FOLIO human-authored logic dataset, surpassing GPT-4 in accuracy with or without an external solver by 12%.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown human-like reasoning abilities but still struggle with complex logical problems. This paper introduces a novel framework, Logic-LM, which integrates LLMs with symbolic solvers to improve logical problem-solving. Our method first utilizes LLMs to translate a natural language problem into a symbolic formulation. Afterward, a deterministic symbolic solver performs inference on the formulated problem. We also introduce a self-refinement module, which utilizes the symbolic solver's error messages to revise symbolic formalizations. We demonstrate Logic-LM's effectiveness on five logical reasoning datasets: ProofWriter, PrOntoQA, FOLIO, LogicalDeduction, and AR-LSAT. On average, Logic-LM achieves a significant performance boost of 39.2% over using LLM alone with standard prompting and 18.4% over LLM with chain-of-thought prompting. Our findings suggest that Logic-LM, by combining LLMs with symbolic logic, offers a promising avenue for faithful logical reasoning. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/teacherpeterpan/Logic-LLM.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked interest in their formal reasoning capabilities, particularly in mathematics. The GSM8K benchmark is widely used to assess the mathematical reasoning of models on grade-school-level questions. While the performance of LLMs on GSM8K has significantly improved in recent years, it remains unclear whether their mathematical reasoning capabilities have genuinely advanced, raising questions about the reliability of the reported metrics. To address these concerns, we conduct a large-scale study on several SOTA open and closed models. To overcome the limitations of existing evaluations, we introduce GSM-Symbolic, an improved benchmark created from symbolic templates that allow for the generation of a diverse set of questions. GSM-Symbolic enables more controllable evaluations, providing key insights and more reliable metrics for measuring the reasoning capabilities of models.Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit noticeable variance when responding to different instantiations of the same question. Specifically, the performance of all models declines when only the numerical values in the question are altered in the GSM-Symbolic benchmark. Furthermore, we investigate the fragility of mathematical reasoning in these models and show that their performance significantly deteriorates as the number of clauses in a question increases. We hypothesize that this decline is because current LLMs cannot perform genuine logical reasoning; they replicate reasoning steps from their training data. Adding a single clause that seems relevant to the question causes significant performance drops (up to 65%) across all state-of-the-art models, even though the clause doesn't contribute to the reasoning chain needed for the final answer. Overall, our work offers a more nuanced understanding of LLMs' capabilities and limitations in mathematical reasoning.

While pre-trained language models (PLMs) are the go-to solution to tackle many natural language processing problems, they are still very limited in their ability to capture and to use common-sense knowledge. In fact, even if information is available in the form of approximate (soft) logical rules, it is not clear how to transfer it to a PLM in order to improve its performance for deductive reasoning tasks. Here, we aim to bridge this gap by teaching PLMs how to reason with soft Horn rules. We introduce a classification task where, given facts and soft rules, the PLM should return a prediction with a probability for a given hypothesis. We release the first dataset for this task, and we propose a revised loss function that enables the PLM to learn how to predict precise probabilities for the task. Our evaluation results show that the resulting fine-tuned models achieve very high performance, even on logical rules that were unseen at training. Moreover, we demonstrate that logical notions expressed by the rules are transferred to the fine-tuned model, yielding state-of-the-art results on external datasets.

We present Llemma, a large language model for mathematics. We continue pretraining Code Llama on the Proof-Pile-2, a mixture of scientific papers, web data containing mathematics, and mathematical code, yielding Llemma. On the MATH benchmark Llemma outperforms all known open base models, as well as the unreleased Minerva model suite on an equi-parameter basis. Moreover, Llemma is capable of tool use and formal theorem proving without any further finetuning. We openly release all artifacts, including 7 billion and 34 billion parameter models, the Proof-Pile-2, and code to replicate our experiments.

Large language models (LLMs) have revolutionized many areas (e.g. natural language processing, software engineering, etc.) by achieving state-of-the-art performance on extensive downstream tasks. Aiming to achieve robust and general artificial intelligence, there has been a surge of interest in investigating the reasoning ability of the LLMs. Whereas the textual and numerical reasoning benchmarks adopted by previous works are rather shallow and simple, it is hard to conclude that the LLMs possess strong reasoning ability by merely achieving positive results on these benchmarks. Recent efforts have demonstrated that the LLMs are poor at solving sequential decision-making problems that require common-sense planning by evaluating their performance on the reinforcement learning benchmarks. In this work, we conduct an in-depth assessment of several state-of-the-art LLMs' reasoning ability based on the inductive logic programming (ILP) benchmark, which is broadly recognized as a representative and challenging measurement for evaluating logic program induction/synthesis systems as it requires inducing strict cause-effect logic to achieve robust deduction on independent and identically distributed (IID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) test samples. Our evaluations illustrate that compared with the neural program induction systems which are much smaller in model size, the state-of-the-art LLMs are much poorer in terms of reasoning ability by achieving much lower performance and generalization using either natural language prompting or truth-value matrix prompting.

Recent Language Models (LMs) achieve breakthrough performance in code generation when trained on human-authored problems, even solving some competitive-programming problems. Self-play has proven useful in games such as Go, and thus it is natural to ask whether LMs can generate their own instructive programming problems to improve their performance. We show that it is possible for an LM to synthesize programming problems and solutions, which are filtered for correctness by a Python interpreter. The LM's performance is then seen to improve when it is fine-tuned on its own synthetic problems and verified solutions; thus the model 'improves itself' using the Python interpreter. Problems are specified formally as programming puzzles [Schuster et al., 2021], a code-based problem format where solutions can easily be verified for correctness by execution. In experiments on publicly-available LMs, test accuracy more than doubles. This work demonstrates the potential for code LMs, with an interpreter, to generate instructive problems and improve their own performance.

Modelling compositional meaning for sentences using empirical distributional methods has been a challenge for computational linguists. We implement the abstract categorical model of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) using data from the BNC and evaluate it. The implementation is based on unsupervised learning of matrices for relational words and applying them to the vectors of their arguments. The evaluation is based on the word disambiguation task developed by Mitchell and Lapata (2008) for intransitive sentences, and on a similar new experiment designed for transitive sentences. Our model matches the results of its competitors in the first experiment, and betters them in the second. The general improvement in results with increase in syntactic complexity showcases the compositional power of our model.

Large language models (LLMs) have accomplished remarkable reasoning performance in various domains. However, in the domain of reasoning tasks, we discover a frailty: LLMs are surprisingly brittle to the ordering of the premises, despite the fact that such ordering does not alter the underlying task. In particular, we observe that LLMs achieve the best performance when the premise order aligns with the context required in intermediate reasoning steps. For example, in deductive reasoning tasks, presenting the premises in the same order as the ground truth proof in the prompt (as opposed to random ordering) drastically increases the model's accuracy. We first examine the effect of premise ordering on deductive reasoning on a variety of LLMs, and our evaluation shows that permuting the premise order can cause a performance drop of over 30%. In addition, we release the benchmark R-GSM, based on GSM8K, to examine the ordering effect for mathematical problem-solving, and we again observe a significant drop in accuracy, relative to the original GSM8K benchmark.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in reasoning tasks with the development of prompting methods. However, existing prompting approaches cannot reuse insights of solving similar problems and suffer from accumulated errors in multi-step reasoning, since they prompt LLMs to reason from scratch. To address these issues, we propose \textit{Thought Propagation (TP)}, which explores the analogous problems and leverages their solutions to enhance the complex reasoning ability of LLMs. These analogous problems are related to the input one, with reusable solutions and problem-solving strategies. Thus, it is promising to propagate insights of solving previous analogous problems to inspire new problem-solving. To achieve this, TP first prompts LLMs to propose and solve a set of analogous problems that are related to the input one. Then, TP reuses the results of analogous problems to directly yield a new solution or derive a knowledge-intensive plan for execution to amend the initial solution obtained from scratch. TP is compatible with existing prompting approaches, allowing plug-and-play generalization and enhancement in a wide range of tasks without much labor in task-specific prompt engineering. Experiments across three challenging tasks demonstrate TP enjoys a substantial improvement over the baselines by an average of 12\% absolute increase in finding the optimal solutions in Shortest-path Reasoning, 13\% improvement of human preference in Creative Writing, and 15\% enhancement in the task completion rate of LLM-Agent Planning.

Large LMs such as GPT-3 are powerful, but can commit mistakes that are obvious to humans. For example, GPT-3 would mistakenly interpret "What word is similar to good?" to mean a homophone, while the user intended a synonym. Our goal is to effectively correct such errors via user interactions with the system but without retraining, which will be prohibitively costly. We pair GPT-3 with a growing memory of recorded cases where the model misunderstood the user's intents, along with user feedback for clarification. Such a memory allows our system to produce enhanced prompts for any new query based on the user feedback for error correction on similar cases in the past. On four tasks (two lexical tasks, two advanced ethical reasoning tasks), we show how a (simulated) user can interactively teach a deployed GPT-3, substantially increasing its accuracy over the queries with different kinds of misunderstandings by the GPT-3. Our approach is a step towards the low-cost utility enhancement for very large pre-trained LMs. Code, data, and instructions to implement MEMPROMPT for a new task at https://www.memprompt.com/.

We introduce a new type of programming challenge called programming puzzles, as an objective and comprehensive evaluation of program synthesis, and release an open-source dataset of Python Programming Puzzles (P3). Each puzzle is defined by a short Python program f, and the goal is to find an input which makes f return True. The puzzles are objective in that each one is specified entirely by the source code of its verifier f, so evaluating f is all that is needed to test a candidate solution. They do not require an answer key or input/output examples, nor do they depend on natural language understanding. The dataset is comprehensive in that it spans problems of a range of difficulties and domains, ranging from trivial string manipulation problems, to classic programming puzzles (e.g., Tower of Hanoi), to interview/competitive-programming problems (e.g., dynamic programming), to longstanding open problems in algorithms and mathematics (e.g., factoring). We develop baseline enumerative program synthesis, GPT-3 and Codex solvers that are capable of solving puzzles -- even without access to any reference solutions -- by learning from their own past solutions. Codex performs best, solving up to 18% of 397 test problems with a single try and 80% of the problems with 1,000 tries per problem. In a small user study, we find a positive correlation between puzzle-solving performance and coding experience, and between the puzzle difficulty for humans and AI solvers. Therefore, further improvements on P3 could have a significant impact on many program synthesis areas.

We have tried to reproduce the results of the paper "Natural Language Inference over Interaction Space" submitted to ICLR 2018 conference as part of the ICLR 2018 Reproducibility Challenge. Initially, we were not aware that the code was available, so we started to implement the network from scratch. We have evaluated our version of the model on Stanford NLI dataset and reached 86.38% accuracy on the test set, while the paper claims 88.0% accuracy. The main difference, as we understand it, comes from the optimizers and the way model selection is performed.

Code provides a general syntactic structure to build complex programs and perform precise computations when paired with a code interpreter -- we hypothesize that language models (LMs) can leverage code-writing to improve Chain of Thought reasoning not only for logic and arithmetic tasks, but also for linguistic ones (and in particular, those that are a mix of both). For example, consider prompting an LM to write code that counts the number of times it detects sarcasm in an essay: the LM may struggle to write an implementation for "detect_sarcasm(string)" that can be executed by the interpreter (handling the edge cases would be insurmountable). However, LMs may still produce a valid solution if they are used not only to write the code, but also to selectively "emulate" the interpreter by generating the expected output of "detect_sarcasm(string)" and other lines of code (e.g., that the interpreter could not compile). In this work, we propose Chain of Code (CoT), a simple yet surprisingly effective extension that improves LM code-driven reasoning. The key idea is to encourage LMs to format linguistic sub-tasks in a program as flexible pseudocode that the compiler can explicitly catch undefined behaviors and hand off to simulate with an LM (as an "LMulator"). Experiments demonstrate that Chain of Code outperforms Chain of Thought and other baselines across a variety of benchmarks; on BIG-Bench Hard, Chain of Code achieves 84%, a gain of 12% over Chain of Thought. CoT scales well with large and small models alike, and broadens the scope of reasoning questions that LMs can correctly answer by "thinking in code". Project webpage: https://chain-of-code.github.io/.

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.

In recent years, large pre-trained language models (LLMs) have demonstrated the ability to follow instructions and perform novel tasks from a few examples. The possibility to parameterise an LLM through such in-context examples widens their capability at a much lower cost than finetuning. We extend this line of reasoning and present a method which further expands the capabilities of an LLM by embedding it within an algorithm or program. To demonstrate the benefits of this approach, we present an illustrative example of evidence-supported question-answering. We obtain a 6.4\% improvement over the chain of thought baseline through a more algorithmic approach without any finetuning. Furthermore, we highlight recent work from this perspective and discuss the advantages and disadvantages in comparison to the standard approaches.

Reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence that plays a crucial role in activities such as problem solving, decision making, and critical thinking. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in natural language processing, and there is observation that these models may exhibit reasoning abilities when they are sufficiently large. However, it is not yet clear to what extent LLMs are capable of reasoning. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge on reasoning in LLMs, including techniques for improving and eliciting reasoning in these models, methods and benchmarks for evaluating reasoning abilities, findings and implications of previous research in this field, and suggestions on future directions. Our aim is to provide a detailed and up-to-date review of this topic and stimulate meaningful discussion and future work.

Orca 1 learns from rich signals, such as explanation traces, allowing it to outperform conventional instruction-tuned models on benchmarks like BigBench Hard and AGIEval. In Orca 2, we continue exploring how improved training signals can enhance smaller LMs' reasoning abilities. Research on training small LMs has often relied on imitation learning to replicate the output of more capable models. We contend that excessive emphasis on imitation may restrict the potential of smaller models. We seek to teach small LMs to employ different solution strategies for different tasks, potentially different from the one used by the larger model. For example, while larger models might provide a direct answer to a complex task, smaller models may not have the same capacity. In Orca 2, we teach the model various reasoning techniques (step-by-step, recall then generate, recall-reason-generate, direct answer, etc.). More crucially, we aim to help the model learn to determine the most effective solution strategy for each task. We evaluate Orca 2 using a comprehensive set of 15 diverse benchmarks (corresponding to approximately 100 tasks and over 36,000 unique prompts). Orca 2 significantly surpasses models of similar size and attains performance levels similar or better to those of models 5-10x larger, as assessed on complex tasks that test advanced reasoning abilities in zero-shot settings. We open-source Orca 2 to encourage further research on the development, evaluation, and alignment of smaller LMs.

Laboratory test results are an important and generally high dimensional component of a patient's Electronic Health Record (EHR). We train embedding representations (via Word2Vec and GloVe) for LOINC codes of laboratory tests from the EHRs of about 80,000 patients at a cancer center. To include information about lab test outcomes, we also train embeddings on the concatenation of a LOINC code with a symbol indicating normality or abnormality of the result. We observe several clinically meaningful similarities among LOINC embeddings trained over our data. For the embeddings of the concatenation of LOINCs with abnormality codes, we evaluate the performance for mortality prediction tasks and the ability to preserve ordinality properties: i.e. a lab test with normal outcome should be more similar to an abnormal one than to the a very abnormal one.

Exploiting large language models (LLMs) to tackle deductive reasoning has garnered growing attention. It still remains highly challenging to achieve satisfactory results in complex deductive problems, characterized by plenty of premises (i.e., facts or rules) entailing intricate relationships among entities and requiring multi-hop reasoning. One intuitive solution is to decompose the original task into smaller sub-tasks, and then chain the multiple casual reasoning steps together in a forward (e.g., Selection-Inference) or backward (e.g., LAMBADA) direction. However, these techniques inevitably necessitate a large number of overall stages, leading to computationally expensive operations and a higher possibility of making misleading steps. In addition to stage-by-stage decomposition, we draw inspiration from another aspect of human problem-solving. Humans tend to distill the most relevant information and organize their thoughts systematically (e.g., creating mind maps), which assists them in answering questions or drawing conclusions precisely and quickly. In light of this, we propose a novel reasoning approach named Concise and Organized Perception (COP). COP carefully analyzes the given statements to efficiently identify the most pertinent information while eliminating redundancy. It then prompts the LLMs in a more organized form that adapts to the model's inference process. By perceiving concise and organized proofs, the deductive reasoning abilities of LLMs can be better elicited, and the risk of acquiring errors caused by excessive reasoning stages is mitigated. Furthermore, our approach can be combined with the aforementioned ones to further boost their performance. Extensive experimental results on three popular deductive benchmarks (i.e., ProofWriter, PrOntoQA and PrOntoQA-OOD) show that COP significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods.

Large language models (LLMs) appear to bias their survey answers toward certain values. Nonetheless, some argue that LLMs are too inconsistent to simulate particular values. Are they? To answer, we first define value consistency as the similarity of answers across (1) paraphrases of one question, (2) related questions under one topic, (3) multiple-choice and open-ended use-cases of one question, and (4) multilingual translations of a question to English, Chinese, German, and Japanese. We apply these measures to a few large (>=34b), open LLMs including llama-3, as well as gpt-4o, using eight thousand questions spanning more than 300 topics. Unlike prior work, we find that models are relatively consistent across paraphrases, use-cases, translations, and within a topic. Still, some inconsistencies remain. Models are more consistent on uncontroversial topics (e.g., in the U.S., "Thanksgiving") than on controversial ones ("euthanasia"). Base models are both more consistent compared to fine-tuned models and are uniform in their consistency across topics, while fine-tuned models are more inconsistent about some topics ("euthanasia") than others ("women's rights") like our human subjects (n=165).

This thesis explores open-sourced machine learning (ML) model explanation tools to understand whether these tools can allow a layman to visualize, understand, and suggest intuitive remedies to unfairness in ML-based decision-support systems. Machine learning models trained on datasets biased against minority groups are increasingly used to guide life-altering social decisions, prompting the urgent need to study their logic for unfairness. Due to this problem's impact on vast populations of the general public, it is critical for the layperson -- not just subject matter experts in social justice or machine learning experts -- to understand the nature of unfairness within these algorithms and the potential trade-offs. Existing research on fairness in machine learning focuses mostly on the mathematical definitions and tools to understand and remedy unfair models, with some directly citing user-interactive tools as necessary for future work. This thesis presents FairLay-ML, a proof-of-concept GUI integrating some of the most promising tools to provide intuitive explanations for unfair logic in ML models by integrating existing research tools (e.g. Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations) with existing ML-focused GUI (e.g. Python Streamlit). We test FairLay-ML using models of various accuracy and fairness generated by an unfairness detector tool, Parfait-ML, and validate our results using Themis. Our study finds that the technology stack used for FairLay-ML makes it easy to install and provides real-time black-box explanations of pre-trained models to users. Furthermore, the explanations provided translate to actionable remedies.

I introduce a new large-scale dataset of historical wire articles from U.S. Southern newspapers, spanning 1960-1975 and covering multiple wire services: The Associated Press, United Press International, Newspaper Enterprise Association. Unlike prior work focusing on front-page content, this dataset captures articles across the entire newspaper, offering broader insight into mid-century Southern coverage. The dataset includes a version that has undergone an LLM-based text cleanup pipeline to reduce OCR noise, enhancing its suitability for quantitative text analysis. Additionally, duplicate versions of articles are retained to enable analysis of editorial differences in language and framing across newspapers. Each article is tagged by wire service, facilitating comparative studies of editorial patterns across agencies. This resource opens new avenues for research in computational social science, digital humanities, and historical linguistics, providing a detailed perspective on how Southern newspapers relayed national and international news during a transformative period in American history. The dataset will be made available upon publication or request for research purposes.

Extensive studies have been devoted to privatizing general-domain Large Language Models (LLMs) as Domain-Specific LLMs via feeding specific-domain data. However, these privatization efforts often ignored a critical aspect: Dual Logic Ability, which is a core reasoning ability for LLMs. The dual logic ability of LLMs ensures that they can maintain a consistent stance when confronted with both positive and negative statements about the same fact. Our study focuses on how the dual logic ability of LLMs is affected during the privatization process in the medical domain. We conduct several experiments to analyze the dual logic ability of LLMs by examining the consistency of the stance in responses to paired questions about the same fact. In our experiments, interestingly, we observed a significant decrease in the dual logic ability of existing LLMs after privatization. Besides, our results indicate that incorporating general domain dual logic data into LLMs not only enhances LLMs' dual logic ability but also further improves their accuracy. These findings underscore the importance of prioritizing LLMs' dual logic ability during the privatization process. Our study establishes a benchmark for future research aimed at exploring LLMs' dual logic ability during the privatization process and offers valuable guidance for privatization efforts in real-world applications.

The Bourne-Again Shell (Bash) command-line interface for Linux systems has complex syntax and requires extensive specialized knowledge. Using the natural language to Bash command (NL2SH) translation capabilities of large language models (LLMs) for command composition circumvents these issues. However, the NL2SH performance of LLMs is difficult to assess due to inaccurate test data and unreliable heuristics for determining the functional equivalence of Bash commands. We present a manually verified test dataset of 600 instruction-command pairs and a training dataset of 40,939 pairs, increasing the size of previous datasets by 441% and 135%, respectively. Further, we present a novel functional equivalence heuristic that combines command execution with LLM evaluation of command outputs. Our heuristic can determine the functional equivalence of two Bash commands with 95% confidence, a 16% increase over previous heuristics. Evaluation of popular LLMs using our test dataset and heuristic demonstrates that parsing, in-context learning, in-weight learning, and constrained decoding can improve NL2SH accuracy by up to 32%. Our findings emphasize the importance of dataset quality, execution-based evaluation and translation method for advancing NL2SH translation. Our code is available at https://github.com/westenfelder/NL2SH

We present an accessible first course on diffusion models and flow matching for machine learning, aimed at a technical audience with no diffusion experience. We try to simplify the mathematical details as much as possible (sometimes heuristically), while retaining enough precision to derive correct algorithms.

We, team AImsterdam, summarize our submission to the fastMRI challenge (Zbontar et al., 2018). Our approach builds on recent advances in invertible learning to infer models as presented in Putzky and Welling (2019). Both, our single-coil and our multi-coil model share the same basic architecture.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

Formal and distributional semantic models offer complementary benefits in modeling meaning. The categorical compositional distributional (DisCoCat) model of meaning of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) combines aspected of both to provide a general framework in which meanings of words, obtained distributionally, are composed using methods from the logical setting to form sentence meaning. Concrete consequences of this general abstract setting and applications to empirical data are under active study (Grefenstette et al., arxiv:1101.0309; Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh, arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]). . In this paper, we extend this study by examining transitive verbs, represented as matrices in a DisCoCat. We discuss three ways of constructing such matrices, and evaluate each method in a disambiguation task developed by Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh (arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]).

This survey reviews works in which language models (LMs) are augmented with reasoning skills and the ability to use tools. The former is defined as decomposing a potentially complex task into simpler subtasks while the latter consists in calling external modules such as a code interpreter. LMs can leverage these augmentations separately or in combination via heuristics, or learn to do so from demonstrations. While adhering to a standard missing tokens prediction objective, such augmented LMs can use various, possibly non-parametric external modules to expand their context processing ability, thus departing from the pure language modeling paradigm. We therefore refer to them as Augmented Language Models (ALMs). The missing token objective allows ALMs to learn to reason, use tools, and even act, while still performing standard natural language tasks and even outperforming most regular LMs on several benchmarks. In this work, after reviewing current advance in ALMs, we conclude that this new research direction has the potential to address common limitations of traditional LMs such as interpretability, consistency, and scalability issues.

Logical reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence and a key component of tasks like problem-solving and decision-making. Recent advancements have enabled Large Language Models (LLMs) to potentially exhibit reasoning capabilities, but complex logical reasoning remains a challenge. The state-of-the-art, solver-augmented language models, use LLMs to parse natural language logical questions into symbolic representations first and then adopt external logical solvers to take in the symbolic representations and output the answers. Despite their impressive performance, any parsing errors will inevitably result in the failure of the execution of the external logical solver and no answer to the logical questions. In this paper, we introduce LoGiPT, a novel language model that directly emulates the reasoning processes of logical solvers and bypasses the parsing errors by learning to strict adherence to solver syntax and grammar. LoGiPT is fine-tuned on a newly constructed instruction-tuning dataset derived from revealing and refining the invisible reasoning process of deductive solvers. Experimental results on two public deductive reasoning datasets demonstrate that LoGiPT outperforms state-of-the-art solver-augmented LMs and few-shot prompting methods on competitive LLMs like ChatGPT or GPT-4.

We present a conditional text generation framework that posits sentential expressions of possible causes and effects. This framework depends on two novel resources we develop in the course of this work: a very large-scale collection of English sentences expressing causal patterns CausalBank; and a refinement over previous work on constructing large lexical causal knowledge graphs Cause Effect Graph. Further, we extend prior work in lexically-constrained decoding to support disjunctive positive constraints. Human assessment confirms that our approach gives high-quality and diverse outputs. Finally, we use CausalBank to perform continued training of an encoder supporting a recent state-of-the-art model for causal reasoning, leading to a 3-point improvement on the COPA challenge set, with no change in model architecture.

Neural natural language generation (NLG) models have recently shown remarkable progress in fluency and coherence. However, existing studies on neural NLG are primarily focused on surface-level realizations with limited emphasis on logical inference, an important aspect of human thinking and language. In this paper, we suggest a new NLG task where a model is tasked with generating natural language statements that can be logically entailed by the facts in an open-domain semi-structured table. To facilitate the study of the proposed logical NLG problem, we use the existing TabFact dataset chen2019tabfact featured with a wide range of logical/symbolic inferences as our testbed, and propose new automatic metrics to evaluate the fidelity of generation models w.r.t.\ logical inference. The new task poses challenges to the existing monotonic generation frameworks due to the mismatch between sequence order and logical order. In our experiments, we comprehensively survey different generation architectures (LSTM, Transformer, Pre-Trained LM) trained with different algorithms (RL, Adversarial Training, Coarse-to-Fine) on the dataset and made following observations: 1) Pre-Trained LM can significantly boost both the fluency and logical fidelity metrics, 2) RL and Adversarial Training are trading fluency for fidelity, 3) Coarse-to-Fine generation can help partially alleviate the fidelity issue while maintaining high language fluency. The code and data are available at https://github.com/wenhuchen/LogicNLG.

In recent years, large language models have greatly improved in their ability to perform complex multi-step reasoning. However, even state-of-the-art models still regularly produce logical mistakes. To train more reliable models, we can turn either to outcome supervision, which provides feedback for a final result, or process supervision, which provides feedback for each intermediate reasoning step. Given the importance of training reliable models, and given the high cost of human feedback, it is important to carefully compare the both methods. Recent work has already begun this comparison, but many questions still remain. We conduct our own investigation, finding that process supervision significantly outperforms outcome supervision for training models to solve problems from the challenging MATH dataset. Our process-supervised model solves 78% of problems from a representative subset of the MATH test set. Additionally, we show that active learning significantly improves the efficacy of process supervision. To support related research, we also release PRM800K, the complete dataset of 800,000 step-level human feedback labels used to train our best reward model.

Fairness for machine learning predictions is widely required in practice for legal, ethical, and societal reasons. Existing work typically focuses on settings without unobserved confounding, even though unobserved confounding can lead to severe violations of causal fairness and, thus, unfair predictions. In this work, we analyze the sensitivity of causal fairness to unobserved confounding. Our contributions are three-fold. First, we derive bounds for causal fairness metrics under different sources of unobserved confounding. This enables practitioners to examine the sensitivity of their machine learning models to unobserved confounding in fairness-critical applications. Second, we propose a novel neural framework for learning fair predictions, which allows us to offer worst-case guarantees of the extent to which causal fairness can be violated due to unobserved confounding. Third, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework in a series of experiments, including a real-world case study about predicting prison sentences. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to study causal fairness under unobserved confounding. To this end, our work is of direct practical value as a refutation strategy to ensure the fairness of predictions in high-stakes applications.

Premise selection is a crucial yet challenging step in mathematical formalization, especially for users with limited experience. Due to the lack of available formalization projects, existing approaches that leverage language models often suffer from data scarcity. In this work, we introduce an innovative method for training a premise retriever to support the formalization of mathematics. Our approach employs a BERT model to embed proof states and premises into a shared latent space. The retrieval model is trained within a contrastive learning framework and incorporates a domain-specific tokenizer along with a fine-grained similarity computation method. Experimental results show that our model is highly competitive compared to existing baselines, achieving strong performance while requiring fewer computational resources. Performance is further enhanced through the integration of a re-ranking module. To streamline the formalization process, we will release a search engine that enables users to query Mathlib theorems directly using proof states, significantly improving accessibility and efficiency. Codes are available at https://github.com/ruc-ai4math/Premise-Retrieval.

In this position paper, we argue that instead of morally aligning LLMs to specific set of ethical principles, we should infuse generic ethical reasoning capabilities into them so that they can handle value pluralism at a global scale. When provided with an ethical policy, an LLM should be capable of making decisions that are ethically consistent to the policy. We develop a framework that integrates moral dilemmas with moral principles pertaining to different foramlisms of normative ethics, and at different levels of abstractions. Initial experiments with GPT-x models shows that while GPT-4 is a nearly perfect ethical reasoner, the models still have bias towards the moral values of Western and English speaking societies.

We present a new logic-based inference engine for natural language inference (NLI) called MonaLog, which is based on natural logic and the monotonicity calculus. In contrast to existing logic-based approaches, our system is intentionally designed to be as lightweight as possible, and operates using a small set of well-known (surface-level) monotonicity facts about quantifiers, lexical items and tokenlevel polarity information. Despite its simplicity, we find our approach to be competitive with other logic-based NLI models on the SICK benchmark. We also use MonaLog in combination with the current state-of-the-art model BERT in a variety of settings, including for compositional data augmentation. We show that MonaLog is capable of generating large amounts of high-quality training data for BERT, improving its accuracy on SICK.

We describe our single submission to task 1 of COLIEE 2021. Our vanilla BM25 got second place, well above the median of submissions. Code is available at https://github.com/neuralmind-ai/coliee.

Formal proofs are challenging to write even for experienced experts. Recent progress in Neural Theorem Proving (NTP) shows promise in expediting this process. However, the formal corpora available on the Internet are limited compared to the general text, posing a significant data scarcity challenge for NTP. To address this issue, this work proposes Alchemy, a general framework for data synthesis that constructs formal theorems through symbolic mutation. Specifically, for each candidate theorem in Mathlib, we identify all invocable theorems that can be used to rewrite or apply to it. Subsequently, we mutate the candidate theorem by replacing the corresponding term in the statement with its equivalent form or antecedent. As a result, our method increases the number of theorems in Mathlib by an order of magnitude, from 110k to 6M. Furthermore, we perform continual pretraining and supervised finetuning on this augmented corpus for large language models. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, achieving a 5% absolute performance improvement on Leandojo benchmark. Additionally, our synthetic data achieve a 2.5% absolute performance gain on the out-of-distribution miniF2F benchmark. To provide further insights, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of synthetic data composition and the training paradigm, offering valuable guidance for developing a strong theorem prover.

We study the probabilistic modeling performed by Autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) through the angle of time directionality, addressing a question first raised in (Shannon, 1951). For large enough models, we empirically find a time asymmetry in their ability to learn natural language: a difference in the average log-perplexity when trying to predict the next token versus when trying to predict the previous one. This difference is at the same time subtle and very consistent across various modalities (language, model size, training time, ...). Theoretically, this is surprising: from an information-theoretic point of view, there should be no such difference. We provide a theoretical framework to explain how such an asymmetry can appear from sparsity and computational complexity considerations, and outline a number of perspectives opened by our results.

There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.

The zero-shot chain of thought (CoT) approach is often used in question answering (QA) by language models (LMs) for tasks that require multiple reasoning steps, typically enhanced by the prompt "Let's think step by step." However, some QA tasks hinge more on accessing relevant knowledge than on chaining reasoning steps. We introduce a simple general prompting technique, called PREP, that involves using two instances of LMs: the first (LM1) generates relevant information, and the second (LM2) answers the question based on this information. PREP is designed to be general and independent of the user's domain knowledge, making it applicable across various QA tasks without the need for specialized prompt engineering. To evaluate the effectiveness of our prompting method, we create a dataset of 100 binary-choice questions, derived from an extensive schematic dataset on artifact parts and material composition. These questions ask which of two artifacts is less likely to share materials with another artifact. Such questions probe the LM's knowledge of shared materials in the part structure of different artifacts. We test our method on our dataset and three published commonsense reasoning datasets. The average accuracy of our method is consistently higher than that of all the other tested methods across all the tested datasets.

There has recently been a surge of work in explanatory artificial intelligence (XAI). This research area tackles the important problem that complex machines and algorithms often cannot provide insights into their behavior and thought processes. XAI allows users and parts of the internal system to be more transparent, providing explanations of their decisions in some level of detail. These explanations are important to ensure algorithmic fairness, identify potential bias/problems in the training data, and to ensure that the algorithms perform as expected. However, explanations produced by these systems is neither standardized nor systematically assessed. In an effort to create best practices and identify open challenges, we provide our definition of explainability and show how it can be used to classify existing literature. We discuss why current approaches to explanatory methods especially for deep neural networks are insufficient. Finally, based on our survey, we conclude with suggested future research directions for explanatory artificial intelligence.

Intermediate reasoning or acting steps have successfully improved large language models (LLMs) for handling various downstream natural language processing (NLP) tasks. When applying LLMs for code generation, recent works mainly focus on directing the models to articulate intermediate natural-language reasoning steps, as in chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, and then output code with the natural language or other structured intermediate steps. However, such output is not suitable for code translation or generation tasks since the standard CoT has different logical structures and forms of expression with the code. In this work, we introduce the universal code (UniCode) as the intermediate representation. It is a description of algorithm steps using a mix of conventions of programming languages, such as assignment operator, conditional operator, and loop. Hence, we collect an instruction dataset UniCoder-Instruct to train our model UniCoder on multi-task learning objectives. UniCoder-Instruct comprises natural-language questions, code solutions, and the corresponding universal code. The alignment between the intermediate universal code representation and the final code solution significantly improves the quality of the generated code. The experimental results demonstrate that UniCoder with the universal code significantly outperforms the previous prompting methods by a large margin, showcasing the effectiveness of the structural clues in pseudo-code.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained to imitate humans to explain human decisions. However, do LLMs explain themselves? Can they help humans build mental models of how LLMs process different inputs? To answer these questions, we propose to evaluate counterfactual simulatability of natural language explanations: whether an explanation can enable humans to precisely infer the model's outputs on diverse counterfactuals of the explained input. For example, if a model answers "yes" to the input question "Can eagles fly?" with the explanation "all birds can fly", then humans would infer from the explanation that it would also answer "yes" to the counterfactual input "Can penguins fly?". If the explanation is precise, then the model's answer should match humans' expectations. We implemented two metrics based on counterfactual simulatability: precision and generality. We generated diverse counterfactuals automatically using LLMs. We then used these metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) on two tasks: multi-hop factual reasoning and reward modeling. We found that LLM's explanations have low precision and that precision does not correlate with plausibility. Therefore, naively optimizing human approvals (e.g., RLHF) may not be a sufficient solution.

We introduce a new language learning setting relevant to building adaptive natural language interfaces. It is inspired by Wittgenstein's language games: a human wishes to accomplish some task (e.g., achieving a certain configuration of blocks), but can only communicate with a computer, who performs the actual actions (e.g., removing all red blocks). The computer initially knows nothing about language and therefore must learn it from scratch through interaction, while the human adapts to the computer's capabilities. We created a game in a blocks world and collected interactions from 100 people playing it. First, we analyze the humans' strategies, showing that using compositionality and avoiding synonyms correlates positively with task performance. Second, we compare computer strategies, showing how to quickly learn a semantic parsing model from scratch, and that modeling pragmatics further accelerates learning for successful players.

After last year's successful BabyLM Challenge, the competition will be hosted again in 2024/2025. The overarching goals of the challenge remain the same; however, some of the competition rules will be different. The big changes for this year's competition are as follows: First, we replace the loose track with a paper track, which allows (for example) non-model-based submissions, novel cognitively-inspired benchmarks, or analysis techniques. Second, we are relaxing the rules around pretraining data, and will now allow participants to construct their own datasets provided they stay within the 100M-word or 10M-word budget. Third, we introduce a multimodal vision-and-language track, and will release a corpus of 50% text-only and 50% image-text multimodal data as a starting point for LM model training. The purpose of this CfP is to provide rules for this year's challenge, explain these rule changes and their rationale in greater detail, give a timeline of this year's competition, and provide answers to frequently asked questions from last year's challenge.

Large language models (LLMs) are powerful AI tools that can generate and comprehend natural language text and other complex information. However, the field lacks a mathematical framework to systematically describe, compare and improve LLMs. We propose Hex a framework that clarifies key terms and concepts in LLM research, such as hallucinations, alignment, self-verification and chain-of-thought reasoning. The Hex framework offers a precise and consistent way to characterize LLMs, identify their strengths and weaknesses, and integrate new findings. Using Hex, we differentiate chain-of-thought reasoning from chain-of-thought prompting and establish the conditions under which they are equivalent. This distinction clarifies the basic assumptions behind chain-of-thought prompting and its implications for methods that use it, such as self-verification and prompt programming. Our goal is to provide a formal framework for LLMs that can help both researchers and practitioners explore new possibilities for generative AI. We do not claim to have a definitive solution, but rather a tool for opening up new research avenues. We argue that our formal definitions and results are crucial for advancing the discussion on how to build generative AI systems that are safe, reliable, fair and robust, especially in domains like healthcare and software engineering.

This paper proposes a research direction to advance AI which draws inspiration from cognitive theories of human decision making. The premise is that if we gain insights about the causes of some human capabilities that are still lacking in AI (for instance, adaptability, generalizability, common sense, and causal reasoning), we may obtain similar capabilities in an AI system by embedding these causal components. We hope that the high-level description of our vision included in this paper, as well as the several research questions that we propose to consider, can stimulate the AI research community to define, try and evaluate new methodologies, frameworks, and evaluation metrics, in the spirit of achieving a better understanding of both human and machine intelligence.

Commonsense causality reasoning (CCR) aims at identifying plausible causes and effects in natural language descriptions that are deemed reasonable by an average person. Although being of great academic and practical interest, this problem is still shadowed by the lack of a well-posed theoretical framework; existing work usually relies on deep language models wholeheartedly, and is potentially susceptible to confounding co-occurrences. Motivated by classical causal principles, we articulate the central question of CCR and draw parallels between human subjects in observational studies and natural languages to adopt CCR to the potential-outcomes framework, which is the first such attempt for commonsense tasks. We propose a novel framework, ROCK, to Reason O(A)bout Commonsense K(C)ausality, which utilizes temporal signals as incidental supervision, and balances confounding effects using temporal propensities that are analogous to propensity scores. The ROCK implementation is modular and zero-shot, and demonstrates good CCR capabilities.

This work introduces Alfie, an interactive robot that is capable of answering moral (deontological) questions of a user. The interaction of Alfie is designed in a way in which the user can offer an alternative answer when the user disagrees with the given answer so that Alfie can learn from its interactions. Alfie's answers are based on a sentence embedding model that uses state-of-the-art language models, e.g. Universal Sentence Encoder and BERT. Alfie is implemented on a Furhat Robot, which provides a customizable user interface to design a social robot.

Pretrained language models have shown superior performance on many natural language processing tasks, yet they still struggle at multi-step formal reasoning tasks like grade school math problems. One key challenge of finetuning them to solve such math reasoning problems is that many existing datasets only contain one reference solution for each problem, despite the fact that there are often alternative solutions resembling different reasoning paths to the final answer. This way, the finetuned models are biased towards the limited reference solutions, which limits their generalization to unseen examples. To mitigate this issue, we propose to let the model perform sampling during training and learn from both self-sampled fully-correct solutions, which yield the correct answer upon execution, and partially-correct solutions, whose intermediate state matches an intermediate state of a known correct solution. We show that our use of self-sampled correct and partially-correct solutions can benefit learning and help guide the sampling process, leading to more efficient exploration of the solution space. Additionally, we explore various training objectives to support learning from multiple solutions per example and find they greatly affect the performance. Experiments on two math reasoning datasets show the effectiveness of our method compared to learning from a single reference solution with MLE, where we improve PASS@100 from 35.5% to 44.5% for GSM8K, and 27.6% to 36.2% PASS@80 for MathQA. Such improvements are also consistent across different model sizes. Our code is available at https://github.com/microsoft/TraceCodegen.

With their increasing size, large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly good at language understanding tasks. But even with high performance on specific downstream task, LLMs fail at simple linguistic tests for negation or quantifier understanding. Previous work on quantifier understanding in LLMs show inverse scaling in understanding few-type quantifiers. In this paper, we question the claims of of previous work and show that it is a result of inappropriate testing methodology. We also present alternate methods to measure quantifier comprehension in LLMs and show that LLMs are able to better understand the difference between the meaning of few-type and most-type quantifiers as their size increases, although they are not particularly good at it. We also observe inverse scaling for most-type quantifier understanding, which is contrary to human psycho-linguistic experiments and previous work, where the model's understanding of most-type quantifier gets worse as the model size increases. We do this evaluation on models ranging from 125M-175B parameters, which suggests that LLMs do not do as well as expected with quantifiers. We also discuss the possible reasons for this and the relevance of quantifier understanding in evaluating language understanding in LLMs.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs often do generate entirely novel text. We begin by defending bibliotechnism against this challenge, showing how novel text may be meaningful only in a derivative sense, so that the content of this generated text depends in an important sense on the content of original human text. We go on to present a different, novel challenge for bibliotechnism, stemming from examples in which LLMs generate "novel reference", using novel names to refer to novel entities. Such examples could be smoothly explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but possessed a limited form of agency (beliefs, desires, and intentions). According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has beliefs, desires and intentions if and only if its behavior is well-explained by the hypothesis that it has such states. In line with this view, we argue that cases of novel reference provide evidence that LLMs do in fact have beliefs, desires, and intentions, and thus have a limited form of agency.

SberQuAD -- a large scale analog of Stanford SQuAD in the Russian language - is a valuable resource that has not been properly presented to the scientific community. We fill this gap by providing a description, a thorough analysis, and baseline experimental results.

Understanding entailment and contradiction is fundamental to understanding natural language, and inference about entailment and contradiction is a valuable testing ground for the development of semantic representations. However, machine learning research in this area has been dramatically limited by the lack of large-scale resources. To address this, we introduce the Stanford Natural Language Inference corpus, a new, freely available collection of labeled sentence pairs, written by humans doing a novel grounded task based on image captioning. At 570K pairs, it is two orders of magnitude larger than all other resources of its type. This increase in scale allows lexicalized classifiers to outperform some sophisticated existing entailment models, and it allows a neural network-based model to perform competitively on natural language inference benchmarks for the first time.

We investigate the mathematical capabilities of ChatGPT by testing it on publicly available datasets, as well as hand-crafted ones, and measuring its performance against other models trained on a mathematical corpus, such as Minerva. We also test whether ChatGPT can be a useful assistant to professional mathematicians by emulating various use cases that come up in the daily professional activities of mathematicians (question answering, theorem searching). In contrast to formal mathematics, where large databases of formal proofs are available (e.g., the Lean Mathematical Library), current datasets of natural-language mathematics, used to benchmark language models, only cover elementary mathematics. We address this issue by introducing a new dataset: GHOSTS. It is the first natural-language dataset made and curated by working researchers in mathematics that (1) aims to cover graduate-level mathematics and (2) provides a holistic overview of the mathematical capabilities of language models. We benchmark ChatGPT on GHOSTS and evaluate performance against fine-grained criteria. We make this new dataset publicly available to assist a community-driven comparison of ChatGPT with (future) large language models in terms of advanced mathematical comprehension. We conclude that contrary to many positive reports in the media (a potential case of selection bias), ChatGPT's mathematical abilities are significantly below those of an average mathematics graduate student. Our results show that ChatGPT often understands the question but fails to provide correct solutions. Hence, if your goal is to use it to pass a university exam, you would be better off copying from your average peer!

In Natural Language Processing (NLP), the Elo rating system, originally designed for ranking players in dynamic games such as chess, is increasingly being used to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) through "A vs B" paired comparisons. However, while popular, the system's suitability for assessing entities with constant skill levels, such as LLMs, remains relatively unexplored. We study two fundamental axioms that evaluation methods should adhere to: reliability and transitivity. We conduct extensive evaluation of Elo behaviour, illustrating that individual Elo computations exhibit volatility and delving into the impact of varying the Elo rating system's hyperparameters. We show that these axioms are not always satisfied raising questions about the reliability of current comparative evaluations of LLMs. If the current use of Elo scores is intended to substitute the costly head-to-head comparison of LLMs, it is crucial to ensure the ranking is as robust as possible. Guided by the axioms, our findings offer concrete guidelines for enhancing the reliability of LLM evaluation methods, suggesting a need for reassessment of existing comparative approaches.

Mathematical reasoning serves as a cornerstone for assessing the fundamental cognitive capabilities of human intelligence. In recent times, there has been a notable surge in the development of Large Language Models (LLMs) geared towards the automated resolution of mathematical problems. However, the landscape of mathematical problem types is vast and varied, with LLM-oriented techniques undergoing evaluation across diverse datasets and settings. This diversity makes it challenging to discern the true advancements and obstacles within this burgeoning field. This survey endeavors to address four pivotal dimensions: i) a comprehensive exploration of the various mathematical problems and their corresponding datasets that have been investigated; ii) an examination of the spectrum of LLM-oriented techniques that have been proposed for mathematical problem-solving; iii) an overview of factors and concerns affecting LLMs in solving math; and iv) an elucidation of the persisting challenges within this domain. To the best of our knowledge, this survey stands as one of the first extensive examinations of the landscape of LLMs in the realm of mathematics, providing a holistic perspective on the current state, accomplishments, and future challenges in this rapidly evolving field.

Pre-trained language models (LMs) have shown remarkable reasoning performance using explanations (or ``chain-of-thought'' (CoT)) for in-context learning. On the other hand, these reasoning tasks are usually presumed to be more approachable for symbolic programming. To make progress towards understanding in-context learning, we curate synthetic datasets containing equivalent (natural, symbolic) data pairs, where symbolic examples contain first-order logic rules and predicates from knowledge bases (KBs). Then we revisit neuro-symbolic approaches and use Language Models as Logic Programmer (LMLP) that learns from demonstrations containing logic rules and corresponding examples to iteratively reason over KBs, recovering Prolog's backward chaining algorithm. Comprehensive experiments are included to systematically compare LMLP with CoT in deductive reasoning settings, showing that LMLP enjoys more than 25% higher accuracy than CoT on length generalization benchmarks even with fewer parameters.

Chomsky and others have very directly claimed that large language models (LLMs) are equally capable of learning languages that are possible and impossible for humans to learn. However, there is very little published experimental evidence to support such a claim. Here, we develop a set of synthetic impossible languages of differing complexity, each designed by systematically altering English data with unnatural word orders and grammar rules. These languages lie on an impossibility continuum: at one end are languages that are inherently impossible, such as random and irreversible shuffles of English words, and on the other, languages that may not be intuitively impossible but are often considered so in linguistics, particularly those with rules based on counting word positions. We report on a wide range of evaluations to assess the capacity of GPT-2 small models to learn these uncontroversially impossible languages, and crucially, we perform these assessments at various stages throughout training to compare the learning process for each language. Our core finding is that GPT-2 struggles to learn impossible languages when compared to English as a control, challenging the core claim. More importantly, we hope our approach opens up a productive line of inquiry in which different LLM architectures are tested on a variety of impossible languages in an effort to learn more about how LLMs can be used as tools for these cognitive and typological investigations.

The research in AI-based formal mathematical reasoning has shown an unstoppable growth trend. These studies have excelled in mathematical competitions like IMO, showing significant progress. However, these studies intertwined multiple skills simultaneously, i.e., problem-solving, reasoning, and writing formal specifications, making it hard to precisely identify the LLMs' strengths and weaknesses in each task. This paper focuses on formal verification, an immediate application scenario of formal reasoning, and decomposes it into six sub-tasks. We constructed 18k high-quality instruction-response pairs across five mainstream formal specification languages (Coq, Lean4, Dafny, ACSL, and TLA+) in six formal-verification-related tasks by distilling GPT-4o. They are split into a 14k+ fine-tuning dataset FM-alpaca and a 4k benchmark FM-Bench. We found that LLMs are good at writing proof segments when given either the code, or the detailed description of proof steps. Also, the fine-tuning brought about a nearly threefold improvement at most. Interestingly, we observed that fine-tuning with formal data also enhances mathematics, reasoning, and coding abilities. We hope our findings inspire further research. Fine-tuned models are released to facilitate subsequent studies

Binding precedents (S\'umulas Vinculantes) constitute a juridical instrument unique to the Brazilian legal system and whose objectives include the protection of the Federal Supreme Court against repetitive demands. Studies of the effectiveness of these instruments in decreasing the Court's exposure to similar cases, however, indicate that they tend to fail in such a direction, with some of the binding precedents seemingly creating new demands. We empirically assess the legal impact of five binding precedents, 11, 14, 17, 26 and 37, at the highest court level through their effects on the legal subjects they address. This analysis is only possible through the comparison of the Court's ruling about the precedents' themes before they are created, which means that these decisions should be detected through techniques of Similar Case Retrieval. The contributions of this article are therefore twofold: on the mathematical side, we compare the uses of different methods of Natural Language Processing -- TF-IDF, LSTM, BERT, and regex -- for Similar Case Retrieval, whereas on the legal side, we contrast the inefficiency of these binding precedents with a set of hypotheses that may justify their repeated usage. We observe that the deep learning models performed significantly worse in the specific Similar Case Retrieval task and that the reasons for binding precedents to fail in responding to repetitive demand are heterogeneous and case-dependent, making it impossible to single out a specific cause.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

Recently, large language models have presented promising results in aiding formal mathematical reasoning. However, their performance is restricted due to the scarcity of formal theorem-proving data, which requires additional effort to be extracted from raw formal language corpora. Meanwhile, a significant amount of human-written formal language corpora remains underutilized. To address this issue, we propose LEAN-GitHub, a dataset consisting of large-scale formal data extracted from almost all Lean 4 repositories on GitHub. After fine-tuning InternLM-math-plus on this dataset, our model achieved accuracies of 48.8% with a single pass and 54.5% with 64 passes on the Lean 4 miniF2F test, surpassing state-of-the-art method at 52%. And it also achieves state-of-the-art on two other Lean 4 benchmarks (ProofNet and Putnam) targeting different fields/levels of math. These results demonstrate that our proposed dataset is beneficial for formal reasoning on a wide range of math topics. We open-source our model at https://GitHub. com/InternLM/InternLM-Math and our data at https://huggingface.co/ datasets/InternLM/Lean-GitHub

Despite their linguistic competence, Large Language models (LLMs) often exhibit limitations in their ability to reason reliably and flexibly. To address this, we propose a neurosymbolic approach that prompts LLMs to extract and encode all relevant information from a problem statement as logical code statements, and then use a logic programming language (Prolog) to conduct the iterative computations of explicit deductive reasoning. Our approach significantly enhances the performance of LLMs on the standard mathematical reasoning benchmark, GSM8k, and the Navigate dataset from the BIG-bench dataset. Additionally, we introduce a novel dataset, the Non-Linear Reasoning (NLR) dataset, consisting of 55 unique word problems that target the shortcomings of the next token prediction paradigm of LLMs and require complex non-linear reasoning but only basic arithmetic skills to solve. Our findings demonstrate that the integration of Prolog enables LLMs to achieve high performance on the NLR dataset, which even the most advanced language models (including GPT4) fail to solve using text only.

One core capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) is to follow natural language instructions. However, the evaluation of such abilities is not standardized: Human evaluations are expensive, slow, and not objectively reproducible, while LLM-based auto-evaluation is potentially biased or limited by the ability of the evaluator LLM. To overcome these issues, we introduce Instruction-Following Eval (IFEval) for large language models. IFEval is a straightforward and easy-to-reproduce evaluation benchmark. It focuses on a set of "verifiable instructions" such as "write in more than 400 words" and "mention the keyword of AI at least 3 times". We identified 25 types of those verifiable instructions and constructed around 500 prompts, with each prompt containing one or more verifiable instructions. We show evaluation results of two widely available LLMs on the market. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/google-research/google-research/tree/master/instruction_following_eval

Recent powerful pre-trained language models have achieved remarkable performance on most of the popular datasets for reading comprehension. It is time to introduce more challenging datasets to push the development of this field towards more comprehensive reasoning of text. In this paper, we introduce a new Reading Comprehension dataset requiring logical reasoning (ReClor) extracted from standardized graduate admission examinations. As earlier studies suggest, human-annotated datasets usually contain biases, which are often exploited by models to achieve high accuracy without truly understanding the text. In order to comprehensively evaluate the logical reasoning ability of models on ReClor, we propose to identify biased data points and separate them into EASY set while the rest as HARD set. Empirical results show that state-of-the-art models have an outstanding ability to capture biases contained in the dataset with high accuracy on EASY set. However, they struggle on HARD set with poor performance near that of random guess, indicating more research is needed to essentially enhance the logical reasoning ability of current models.

We present Archer, a challenging bilingual text-to-SQL dataset specific to complex reasoning, including arithmetic, commonsense and hypothetical reasoning. It contains 1,042 English questions and 1,042 Chinese questions, along with 521 unique SQL queries, covering 20 English databases across 20 domains. Notably, this dataset demonstrates a significantly higher level of complexity compared to existing publicly available datasets. Our evaluation shows that Archer challenges the capabilities of current state-of-the-art models, with a high-ranked model on the Spider leaderboard achieving only 6.73% execution accuracy on Archer test set. Thus, Archer presents a significant challenge for future research in this field.

We present a straightforward statistical test to detect certain violations of the assumption that the data are Independent and Identically Distributed (IID). The specific form of violation considered is common across real-world applications: whether the examples are ordered in the dataset such that almost adjacent examples tend to have more similar feature values (e.g. due to distributional drift, or attractive interactions between datapoints). Based on a k-Nearest Neighbors estimate, our approach can be used to audit any multivariate numeric data as well as other data types (image, text, audio, etc.) that can be numerically represented, perhaps with model embeddings. Compared with existing methods to detect drift or auto-correlation, our approach is both applicable to more types of data and also able to detect a wider variety of IID violations in practice. Code: https://github.com/cleanlab/cleanlab

Large language models (LLMs) perform better when they produce step-by-step, "Chain-of-Thought" (CoT) reasoning before answering a question, but it is unclear if the stated reasoning is a faithful explanation of the model's actual reasoning (i.e., its process for answering the question). We investigate hypotheses for how CoT reasoning may be unfaithful, by examining how the model predictions change when we intervene on the CoT (e.g., by adding mistakes or paraphrasing it). Models show large variation across tasks in how strongly they condition on the CoT when predicting their answer, sometimes relying heavily on the CoT and other times primarily ignoring it. CoT's performance boost does not seem to come from CoT's added test-time compute alone or from information encoded via the particular phrasing of the CoT. As models become larger and more capable, they produce less faithful reasoning on most tasks we study. Overall, our results suggest that CoT can be faithful if the circumstances such as the model size and task are carefully chosen.

This paper investigates Who's Harry Potter (WHP), a pioneering yet insufficiently understood method for LLM unlearning. We explore it in two steps. First, we introduce a new task of LLM targeted unlearning, where given an unlearning target (e.g., a person) and some unlearning documents, we aim to unlearn only the information about the target, rather than everything in the unlearning documents. We further argue that a successful unlearning should satisfy criteria such as not outputting gibberish, not fabricating facts about the unlearning target, and not releasing factual information under jailbreak attacks. Second, we construct a causal intervention framework for targeted unlearning, where the knowledge of the unlearning target is modeled as a confounder between LLM input and output, and the unlearning process as a deconfounding process. This framework justifies and extends WHP, deriving a simple unlearning algorithm that includes WHP as a special case. Experiments on existing and new datasets show that our approach, without explicitly optimizing for the aforementioned criteria, achieves competitive performance in all of them. Our code is available at https://github.com/UCSB-NLP-Chang/causal_unlearn.git.

Being able to provide explanations for a model's decision has become a central requirement for the development, deployment, and adoption of machine learning models. However, we are yet to understand what explanation methods can and cannot do. How do upstream factors such as data, model prediction, hyperparameters, and random initialization influence downstream explanations? While previous work raised concerns that explanations (E) may have little relationship with the prediction (Y), there is a lack of conclusive study to quantify this relationship. Our work borrows tools from causal inference to systematically assay this relationship. More specifically, we study the relationship between E and Y by measuring the treatment effect when intervening on their causal ancestors, i.e., on hyperparameters and inputs used to generate saliency-based Es or Ys. Our results suggest that the relationships between E and Y is far from ideal. In fact, the gap between 'ideal' case only increase in higher-performing models -- models that are likely to be deployed. Our work is a promising first step towards providing a quantitative measure of the relationship between E and Y, which could also inform the future development of methods for E with a quantitative metric.

Despite the frequent challenges posed by ambiguity when representing meaning via natural language, it is often ignored or deliberately removed in tasks mapping language to formally-designed representations, which generally assume a one-to-one mapping between linguistic and formal representations. We attempt to address this shortcoming by introducing AmP, a framework, dataset, and challenge for translating ambiguous natural language to formal representations like logic and code. We define templates and generate data for five well-documented linguistic ambiguities. Using AmP, we investigate how several few-shot text-to-code systems handle ambiguity, introducing three new metrics. We find that large pre-trained models perform poorly at capturing the distribution of possible meanings without deliberate instruction. However, models are able to capture the distribution well when ambiguity is attested in their inputs. These results motivate a call for including ambiguity explicitly in datasets and promote considering the distribution of possible outputs when evaluating systems. Data and code: https://github.com/esteng/ambiguous_parsing

Reasoning is a cognitive process of using evidence to reach a sound conclusion. The reasoning capability is essential for large language models (LLMs) to serve as the brain of the artificial general intelligence agent. Recent studies reveal that fine-tuning LLMs on data with the chain of thought (COT) reasoning process can significantly enhance their reasoning capabilities. However, we find that the fine-tuned LLMs suffer from an Assessment Misalignment problem, i.e., they frequently assign higher scores to subpar COTs, leading to potential limitations in their reasoning abilities. To address this problem, we introduce an Alignment Fine-Tuning (AFT) paradigm, which involves three steps: 1) fine-tuning LLMs with COT training data; 2) generating multiple COT responses for each question, and categorizing them into positive and negative ones based on whether they achieve the correct answer; 3) calibrating the scores of positive and negative responses given by LLMs with a novel constraint alignment loss. Specifically, the constraint alignment loss has two objectives: a) Alignment, which guarantees that positive scores surpass negative scores to encourage answers with high-quality COTs; b) Constraint, which keeps the negative scores confined to a reasonable range to prevent the model degradation. Beyond just the binary positive and negative feedback, the constraint alignment loss can be seamlessly adapted to the ranking situations when ranking feedback is accessible. Furthermore, we also delve deeply into recent ranking-based alignment methods, such as DPO, RRHF, and PRO, and discover that the constraint, which has been overlooked by these approaches, is also crucial for their performance. Extensive experiments on four reasoning benchmarks with both binary and ranking feedback demonstrate the effectiveness of AFT.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

We propose LogicVista, an evaluation benchmark that assesses the integrated logical reasoning capabilities of multimodal large language models (MLLMs) in Visual contexts. Recent advancements in MLLMs have demonstrated various fascinating abilities, from crafting poetry based on an image to performing mathematical reasoning. However, there is still a lack of systematic evaluation of MLLMs' proficiency in logical reasoning tasks, which are essential for activities like navigation and puzzle-solving. Thus we evaluate general logical cognition abilities across 5 logical reasoning tasks encompassing 9 different capabilities, using a sample of 448 multiple-choice questions. Each question is annotated with the correct answer and the human-written reasoning behind the selection, enabling both open-ended and multiple-choice evaluation. A total of 8 MLLMs are comprehensively evaluated using LogicVista. Code and Data Available at https://github.com/Yijia-Xiao/LogicVista.

Transformers have been shown to emulate logical deduction over natural language theories (logical rules expressed in natural language), reliably assigning true/false labels to candidate implications. However, their ability to generate implications of a theory has not yet been demonstrated, and methods for reconstructing proofs of answers are imperfect. In this work we show that a generative model, called ProofWriter, can reliably generate both implications of a theory and the natural language proof(s) that support them. In particular, iterating a 1-step implication generator results in proofs that are highly reliable, and represent actual model decisions (rather than post-hoc rationalizations). On the RuleTaker dataset, the accuracy of ProofWriter's proofs exceed previous methods by +9% absolute, and in a way that generalizes to proof depths unseen in training and on out-of-domain problems. We also show that generative techniques can perform a type of abduction with high precision: Given a theory and an unprovable conclusion, identify a missing fact that allows the conclusion to be proved, along with a proof. These results significantly improve the viability of neural methods for systematically reasoning over natural language.

Seven years ago, researchers proposed a postprocessing method to equalize the error rates of a model across different demographic groups. The work launched hundreds of papers purporting to improve over the postprocessing baseline. We empirically evaluate these claims through thousands of model evaluations on several tabular datasets. We find that the fairness-accuracy Pareto frontier achieved by postprocessing contains all other methods we were feasibly able to evaluate. In doing so, we address two common methodological errors that have confounded previous observations. One relates to the comparison of methods with different unconstrained base models. The other concerns methods achieving different levels of constraint relaxation. At the heart of our study is a simple idea we call unprocessing that roughly corresponds to the inverse of postprocessing. Unprocessing allows for a direct comparison of methods using different underlying models and levels of relaxation.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

There is growing excitement about the potential of Language Models (LMs) to accelerate scientific discovery. Falsifying hypotheses is key to scientific progress, as it allows claims to be iteratively refined over time. This process requires significant researcher effort, reasoning, and ingenuity. Yet current benchmarks for LMs predominantly assess their ability to generate solutions rather than challenge them. We advocate for developing benchmarks that evaluate this inverse capability - creating counterexamples for subtly incorrect solutions. To demonstrate this approach, we start with the domain of algorithmic problem solving, where counterexamples can be evaluated automatically using code execution. Specifically, we introduce REFUTE, a dynamically updating benchmark that includes recent problems and incorrect submissions from programming competitions, where human experts successfully identified counterexamples. Our analysis finds that the best reasoning agents, even OpenAI o3-mini (high) with code execution feedback, can create counterexamples for only <9% of incorrect solutions in REFUTE, even though ratings indicate its ability to solve up to 48% of these problems from scratch. We hope our work spurs progress in evaluating and enhancing LMs' ability to falsify incorrect solutions - a capability that is crucial for both accelerating research and making models self-improve through reliable reflective reasoning.

We extend the simply-typed guarded lambda-calculus with discrete probabilities and endow it with a program logic for reasoning about relational properties of guarded probabilistic computations. This provides a framework for programming and reasoning about infinite stochastic processes like Markov chains. We demonstrate the logic sound by interpreting its judgements in the topos of trees and by using probabilistic couplings for the semantics of relational assertions over distributions on discrete types. The program logic is designed to support syntax-directed proofs in the style of relational refinement types, but retains the expressiveness of higher-order logic extended with discrete distributions, and the ability to reason relationally about expressions that have different types or syntactic structure. In addition, our proof system leverages a well-known theorem from the coupling literature to justify better proof rules for relational reasoning about probabilistic expressions. We illustrate these benefits with a broad range of examples that were beyond the scope of previous systems, including shift couplings and lump couplings between random walks.

Honesty is a fundamental principle for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, requiring these models to recognize what they know and don't know and be able to faithfully express their knowledge. Despite promising, current LLMs still exhibit significant dishonest behaviors, such as confidently presenting wrong answers or failing to express what they know. In addition, research on the honesty of LLMs also faces challenges, including varying definitions of honesty, difficulties in distinguishing between known and unknown knowledge, and a lack of comprehensive understanding of related research. To address these issues, we provide a survey on the honesty of LLMs, covering its clarification, evaluation approaches, and strategies for improvement. Moreover, we offer insights for future research, aiming to inspire further exploration in this important area.

As multimodal foundational models start being deployed experimentally in Self-Driving cars, a reasonable question we ask ourselves is how similar to humans do these systems respond in certain driving situations -- especially those that are out-of-distribution? To study this, we create the Robusto-1 dataset that uses dashcam video data from Peru, a country with one of the worst (aggressive) drivers in the world, a high traffic index, and a high ratio of bizarre to non-bizarre street objects likely never seen in training. In particular, to preliminarly test at a cognitive level how well Foundational Visual Language Models (VLMs) compare to Humans in Driving, we move away from bounding boxes, segmentation maps, occupancy maps or trajectory estimation to multi-modal Visual Question Answering (VQA) comparing both humans and machines through a popular method in systems neuroscience known as Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA). Depending on the type of questions we ask and the answers these systems give, we will show in what cases do VLMs and Humans converge or diverge allowing us to probe on their cognitive alignment. We find that the degree of alignment varies significantly depending on the type of questions asked to each type of system (Humans vs VLMs), highlighting a gap in their alignment.

We introduce CheckEval, a novel evaluation framework using Large Language Models, addressing the challenges of ambiguity and inconsistency in current evaluation methods. CheckEval addresses these challenges by dividing evaluation criteria into detailed sub-aspects and constructing a checklist of Boolean questions for each, simplifying the evaluation. This approach not only renders the process more interpretable but also significantly enhances the robustness and reliability of results by focusing on specific evaluation dimensions. Validated through a focused case study using the SummEval benchmark, CheckEval indicates a strong correlation with human judgments. Furthermore, it demonstrates a highly consistent Inter-Annotator Agreement. These findings highlight the effectiveness of CheckEval for objective, flexible, and precise evaluations. By offering a customizable and interactive framework, CheckEval sets a new standard for the use of LLMs in evaluation, responding to the evolving needs of the field and establishing a clear method for future LLM-based evaluation.

We introduce a new type of test, called a Turing Experiment (TE), for evaluating how well a language model, such as GPT-3, can simulate different aspects of human behavior. Unlike the Turing Test, which involves simulating a single arbitrary individual, a TE requires simulating a representative sample of participants in human subject research. We give TEs that attempt to replicate well-established findings in prior studies. We design a methodology for simulating TEs and illustrate its use to compare how well different language models are able to reproduce classic economic, psycholinguistic, and social psychology experiments: Ultimatum Game, Garden Path Sentences, Milgram Shock Experiment, and Wisdom of Crowds. In the first three TEs, the existing findings were replicated using recent models, while the last TE reveals a "hyper-accuracy distortion" present in some language models.

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

As the probability (and thus perplexity) of a text is calculated based on the product of the probabilities of individual tokens, it may happen that one unlikely token significantly reduces the probability (i.e., increase the perplexity) of some otherwise highly probable input, while potentially representing a simple typographical error. Also, given that perplexity is a scalar value that refers to the entire input, information about the probability distribution within it is lost in the calculation (a relatively good text that has one unlikely token and another text in which each token is equally likely they can have the same perplexity value), especially for longer texts. As an alternative to scalar perplexity this research proposes a simple algorithm used to calculate vector values based on n-gram perplexities within the input. Such representations consider the previously mentioned aspects, and instead of a unique value, the relative perplexity of each text token is calculated, and these values are combined into a single vector representing the input.

We examine how well the state-of-the-art (SOTA) models used in legal reasoning support abductive reasoning tasks. Abductive reasoning is a form of logical inference in which a hypothesis is formulated from a set of observations, and that hypothesis is used to explain the observations. The ability to formulate such hypotheses is important for lawyers and legal scholars as it helps them articulate logical arguments, interpret laws, and develop legal theories. Our motivation is to consider the belief that deep learning models, especially large language models (LLMs), will soon replace lawyers because they perform well on tasks related to legal text processing. But to do so, we believe, requires some form of abductive hypothesis formation. In other words, while LLMs become more popular and powerful, we want to investigate their capacity for abductive reasoning. To pursue this goal, we start by building a logic-augmented dataset for abductive reasoning with 498,697 samples and then use it to evaluate the performance of a SOTA model in the legal field. Our experimental results show that although these models can perform well on tasks related to some aspects of legal text processing, they still fall short in supporting abductive reasoning tasks.

In the realm of formal theorem proving, the Coq proof assistant stands out for its rigorous approach to verifying mathematical assertions and software correctness. Despite the advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning, the specialized nature of Coq syntax and semantics poses unique challenges for Large Language Models (LLMs). Addressing this gap, we present a comprehensive dataset specifically designed to enhance LLMs' proficiency in interpreting and generating Coq code. This dataset, derived from a collection of over 10,000 Coq source files, encompasses a wide array of propositions, proofs, and definitions, enriched with metadata including source references and licensing information. Our primary aim is to facilitate the development of LLMs capable of generating syntactically correct and semantically meaningful Coq constructs, thereby advancing the frontier of automated theorem proving. Initial experiments with this dataset have showcased its significant potential; models trained on this data exhibited enhanced accuracy in Coq code generation. Notably, a particular experiment revealed that a fine-tuned LLM was capable of generating 141 valid proofs for a basic lemma, highlighting the dataset's utility in facilitating the discovery of diverse and valid proof strategies. This paper discusses the dataset's composition, the methodology behind its creation, and the implications of our findings for the future of machine learning in formal verification. The dataset is accessible for further research and exploration: https://huggingface.co/datasets/florath/coq-facts-props-proofs-gen0-v1

Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant strides in mathematical reasoning, underscoring the need for a comprehensive and fair evaluation of their capabilities. However, existing benchmarks often fall short, either lacking extensive coverage of undergraduate-level mathematical problems or probably suffering from test-set contamination. To address these issues, we introduce UGMathBench, a diverse and dynamic benchmark specifically designed for evaluating undergraduate-level mathematical reasoning with LLMs. UGMathBench comprises 5,062 problems across 16 subjects and 111 topics, featuring 10 distinct answer types. Each problem includes three randomized versions, with additional versions planned for release as leading open-source LLMs become saturated in UGMathBench. Furthermore, we propose two key metrics: effective accuracy (EAcc), which measures the percentage of correctly solved problems across all three versions, and reasoning gap (Delta), which assesses reasoning robustness by calculating the difference between the average accuracy across all versions and EAcc. Our extensive evaluation of 23 leading LLMs reveals that the highest EAcc achieved is 56.3\% by OpenAI-o1-mini, with large Delta values observed across different models. This highlights the need for future research aimed at developing "large reasoning models" with high EAcc and Delta = 0. We anticipate that the release of UGMathBench, along with its detailed evaluation codes, will serve as a valuable resource to advance the development of LLMs in solving mathematical problems.

Recently DeepSeek R1 demonstrated how reinforcement learning with simple rule-based incentives can enable autonomous development of complex reasoning in large language models, characterized by the "aha moment", in which the model manifest self-reflection and increased response length during training. However, attempts to extend this success to multimodal reasoning often failed to reproduce these key characteristics. In this report, we present the first successful replication of these emergent characteristics for multimodal reasoning on only a non-SFT 2B model. Starting with Qwen2-VL-2B and applying reinforcement learning directly on the SAT dataset, our model achieves 59.47% accuracy on CVBench, outperforming the base model by approximately ~30% and exceeding both SFT setting by ~2%. In addition, we share our failed attempts and insights in attempting to achieve R1-like reasoning using RL with instruct models. aiming to shed light on the challenges involved. Our key observations include: (1) applying RL on instruct model often results in trivial reasoning trajectories, and (2) naive length reward are ineffective in eliciting reasoning capabilities. The project code is available at https://github.com/turningpoint-ai/VisualThinker-R1-Zero

We present "Human or Not?", an online game inspired by the Turing test, that measures the capability of AI chatbots to mimic humans in dialog, and of humans to tell bots from other humans. Over the course of a month, the game was played by over 1.5 million users who engaged in anonymous two-minute chat sessions with either another human or an AI language model which was prompted to behave like humans. The task of the players was to correctly guess whether they spoke to a person or to an AI. This largest scale Turing-style test conducted to date revealed some interesting facts. For example, overall users guessed the identity of their partners correctly in only 68% of the games. In the subset of the games in which users faced an AI bot, users had even lower correct guess rates of 60% (that is, not much higher than chance). This white paper details the development, deployment, and results of this unique experiment. While this experiment calls for many extensions and refinements, these findings already begin to shed light on the inevitable near future which will commingle humans and AI.

While humans sometimes do show the capability of correcting their own erroneous guesses with self-critiquing, there seems to be no basis for that assumption in the case of LLMs.

Informally, the 'linear representation hypothesis' is the idea that high-level concepts are represented linearly as directions in some representation space. In this paper, we address two closely related questions: What does "linear representation" actually mean? And, how do we make sense of geometric notions (e.g., cosine similarity or projection) in the representation space? To answer these, we use the language of counterfactuals to give two formalizations of "linear representation", one in the output (word) representation space, and one in the input (sentence) space. We then prove these connect to linear probing and model steering, respectively. To make sense of geometric notions, we use the formalization to identify a particular (non-Euclidean) inner product that respects language structure in a sense we make precise. Using this causal inner product, we show how to unify all notions of linear representation. In particular, this allows the construction of probes and steering vectors using counterfactual pairs. Experiments with LLaMA-2 demonstrate the existence of linear representations of concepts, the connection to interpretation and control, and the fundamental role of the choice of inner product.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance in various natural language processing tasks, yet their ability to perform multi-step logical reasoning remains an open challenge. Although Chain-of-Thought prompting has improved logical reasoning by enabling models to generate intermediate steps, it lacks mechanisms to assess the coherence of these logical transitions. In this paper, we propose a novel, lightweight evaluation strategy for logical reasoning that uses query-key alignments inside transformer attention heads. By computing a single forward pass and extracting a "QK-score" from carefully chosen heads, our method reveals latent representations that reliably separate valid from invalid inferences, offering a scalable alternative to traditional ablation-based techniques. We also provide an empirical validation on multiple logical reasoning benchmarks, demonstrating improved robustness of our evaluation method against distractors and increased reasoning depth. The experiments were conducted on a diverse set of models, ranging from 1.5B to 70B parameters.

The alignments of reasoning abilities between smaller and larger Language Models are largely conducted via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) using demonstrations generated from robust Large Language Models (LLMs). Although these approaches deliver more performant models, they do not show sufficiently strong generalization ability as the training only relies on the provided demonstrations. In this paper, we propose the Self-refine Instruction-tuning method that elicits Smaller Language Models to self-refine their abilities. Our approach is based on a two-stage process, where reasoning abilities are first transferred between LLMs and Small Language Models (SLMs) via Instruction-tuning on demonstrations provided by LLMs, and then the instructed models Self-refine their abilities through preference optimization strategies. In particular, the second phase operates refinement heuristics based on the Direct Preference Optimization algorithm, where the SLMs are elicited to deliver a series of reasoning paths by automatically sampling the generated responses and providing rewards using ground truths from the LLMs. Results obtained on commonsense and math reasoning tasks show that this approach significantly outperforms Instruction-tuning in both in-domain and out-domain scenarios, aligning the reasoning abilities of Smaller and Larger Language Models.

Underlying data structures, such as symmetries or invariances to transformations, are often exploited to improve the solution of learning tasks. However, embedding these properties in models or learning algorithms can be challenging and computationally intensive. Data augmentation, on the other hand, induces these symmetries during training by applying multiple transformations to the input data. Despite its ubiquity, its effectiveness depends on the choices of which transformations to apply, when to do so, and how often. In fact, there is both empirical and theoretical evidence that the indiscriminate use of data augmentation can introduce biases that outweigh its benefits. This work tackles these issues by automatically adapting the data augmentation while solving the learning task. To do so, it formulates data augmentation as an invariance-constrained learning problem and leverages Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) sampling to solve it. The result is a practical algorithm that not only does away with a priori searches for augmentation distributions, but also dynamically controls if and when data augmentation is applied. Our experiments illustrate the performance of this method, which achieves state-of-the-art results in automatic data augmentation benchmarks for CIFAR datasets. Furthermore, this approach can be used to gather insights on the actual symmetries underlying a learning task.

We introduce Probabilistic Dependent Type Systems (PDTS) via a functional language based on a subsystem of intuitionistic type theory including dependent sums and products, which is expanded to include stochastic functions. We provide a sampling-based semantics for the language based on non-deterministic beta reduction. Further, we derive a probabilistic logic from the PDTS introduced as a direct result of the Curry-Howard isomorphism. The probabilistic logic derived is shown to provide a universal representation for finite discrete distributions.

The Machine Learning for Combinatorial Optimization (ML4CO) NeurIPS 2021 competition aims to improve state-of-the-art combinatorial optimization solvers by replacing key heuristic components with machine learning models. On the dual task, we design models to make branching decisions to promote the dual bound increase faster. We propose a knowledge inheritance method to generalize knowledge of different models from the dataset aggregation process, named KIDA. Our improvement overcomes some defects of the baseline graph-neural-networks-based methods. Further, we won the 1st Place on the dual task. We hope this report can provide useful experience for developers and researchers. The code is available at https://github.com/megvii-research/NeurIPS2021-ML4CO-KIDA.

This study evaluates the performance of OpenAI's o1-preview model in higher-order cognitive domains, including critical thinking, systematic thinking, computational thinking, data literacy, creative thinking, logical reasoning, and scientific reasoning. Using established benchmarks, we compared the o1-preview models's performance to human participants from diverse educational levels. o1-preview achieved a mean score of 24.33 on the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test (EWCTET), surpassing undergraduate (13.8) and postgraduate (18.39) participants (z = 1.60 and 0.90, respectively). In systematic thinking, it scored 46.1, SD = 4.12 on the Lake Urmia Vignette, significantly outperforming the human mean (20.08, SD = 8.13, z = 3.20). For data literacy, o1-preview scored 8.60, SD = 0.70 on Merk et al.'s "Use Data" dimension, compared to the human post-test mean of 4.17, SD = 2.02 (z = 2.19). On creative thinking tasks, the model achieved originality scores of 2.98, SD = 0.73, higher than the human mean of 1.74 (z = 0.71). In logical reasoning (LogiQA), it outperformed humans with average 90%, SD = 10% accuracy versus 86%, SD = 6.5% (z = 0.62). For scientific reasoning, it achieved near-perfect performance (mean = 0.99, SD = 0.12) on the TOSLS,, exceeding the highest human scores of 0.85, SD = 0.13 (z = 1.78). While o1-preview excelled in structured tasks, it showed limitations in problem-solving and adaptive reasoning. These results demonstrate the potential of AI to complement education in structured assessments but highlight the need for ethical oversight and refinement for broader applications.

We propose prioritized unit propagation with periodic resetting, which is a simple but surprisingly effective algorithm for solving random SAT instances that are meant to be hard. In particular, an evaluation on the Random Track of the 2017 and 2018 SAT competitions shows that a basic prototype of this simple idea already ranks at second place in both years. We share this observation in the hope that it helps the SAT community better understand the hardness of random instances used in competitions and inspire other interesting ideas on SAT solving.

We present FIMO, an innovative dataset comprising formal mathematical problem statements sourced from the International Mathematical Olympiad (IMO) Shortlisted Problems. Designed to facilitate advanced automated theorem proving at the IMO level, FIMO is currently tailored for the Lean formal language. It comprises 149 formal problem statements, accompanied by both informal problem descriptions and their corresponding LaTeX-based informal proofs. Through initial experiments involving GPT-4, our findings underscore the existing limitations in current methodologies, indicating a substantial journey ahead before achieving satisfactory IMO-level automated theorem proving outcomes.

We discuss an algorithm which produces the meaning of a sentence given meanings of its words, and its resemblance to quantum teleportation. In fact, this protocol was the main source of inspiration for this algorithm which has many applications in the area of Natural Language Processing.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

In order to properly train a machine learning model, data must be properly collected. To guarantee a proper data collection, verifying that the collected data set holds certain properties is a possible solution. For example, guaranteeing that the data set contains samples across the whole input space, or that the data set is balanced w.r.t. different classes. We present a formal approach for verifying a set of arbitrarily stated properties over a data set. The proposed approach relies on the transformation of the data set into a first order logic formula, which can be later verified w.r.t. the different properties also stated in the same logic. A prototype tool, which uses the z3 solver, has been developed; the prototype can take as an input a set of properties stated in a formal language and formally verify a given data set w.r.t. to the given set of properties. Preliminary experimental results show the feasibility and performance of the proposed approach, and furthermore the flexibility for expressing properties of interest.

Causal reasoning, the ability to identify cause-and-effect relationship, is crucial in human thinking. Although large language models (LLMs) succeed in many NLP tasks, it is still challenging for them to conduct complex causal reasoning like abductive reasoning and counterfactual reasoning. Given the fact that programming code may express causal relations more often and explicitly with conditional statements like ``if``, we want to explore whether Code-LLMs acquire better causal reasoning abilities. Our experiments show that compared to text-only LLMs, Code-LLMs with code prompts are significantly better in causal reasoning. We further intervene on the prompts from different aspects, and discover that the programming structure is crucial in code prompt design, while Code-LLMs are robust towards format perturbations.

We explain how the so-called Einstein locality is to be understood in the Schr\"odinger picture of quantum mechanics. This notion is perfectly compatible with the Bell non-locality exhibited by entangled states. Contrary to some beliefs that quantum mechanics is incomplete, it is, in fact, its overcompleteness as exemplified by different pictures of quantum physics, that points to the same underlying reality.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

We introduce GAIA, a benchmark for General AI Assistants that, if solved, would represent a milestone in AI research. GAIA proposes real-world questions that require a set of fundamental abilities such as reasoning, multi-modality handling, web browsing, and generally tool-use proficiency. GAIA questions are conceptually simple for humans yet challenging for most advanced AIs: we show that human respondents obtain 92\% vs. 15\% for GPT-4 equipped with plugins. This notable performance disparity contrasts with the recent trend of LLMs outperforming humans on tasks requiring professional skills in e.g. law or chemistry. GAIA's philosophy departs from the current trend in AI benchmarks suggesting to target tasks that are ever more difficult for humans. We posit that the advent of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) hinges on a system's capability to exhibit similar robustness as the average human does on such questions. Using GAIA's methodology, we devise 466 questions and their answer. We release our questions while retaining answers to 300 of them to power a leader-board available at https://huggingface.co/gaia-benchmark.

Recently, deep learning models have made great progress in MWP solving on answer accuracy. However, they are uninterpretable since they mainly rely on shallow heuristics to achieve high performance without understanding and reasoning the grounded math logic. To address this issue and make a step towards interpretable MWP solving, we first construct a high-quality MWP dataset named InterMWP which consists of 11,495 MWPs and annotates interpretable logical formulas based on algebraic knowledge as the grounded linguistic logic of each solution equation. Different from existing MWP datasets, our InterMWP benchmark asks for a solver to not only output the solution expressions but also predict the corresponding logical formulas. We further propose a novel approach with logical prompt and interpretation generation, called LogicSolver. For each MWP, our LogicSolver first retrieves some highly-correlated algebraic knowledge and then passes them to the backbone model as prompts to improve the semantic representations of MWPs. With these improved semantic representations, our LogicSolver generates corresponding solution expressions and interpretable knowledge formulas in accord with the generated solution expressions, simultaneously. Experimental results show that our LogicSolver has stronger logical formula-based interpretability than baselines while achieving higher answer accuracy with the help of logical prompts, simultaneously. The source code and dataset is available at https://github.com/yangzhch6/InterMWP.