Daily Papers

The widespread use of Text-to-Image (T2I) models in content generation requires careful examination of their safety, including their robustness to adversarial attacks. Despite extensive research on adversarial attacks, the reasons for their effectiveness remain underexplored. This paper presents an empirical study on adversarial attacks against T2I models, focusing on analyzing factors associated with attack success rates (ASR). We introduce a new attack objective - entity swapping using adversarial suffixes and two gradient-based attack algorithms. Human and automatic evaluations reveal the asymmetric nature of ASRs on entity swap: for example, it is easier to replace "human" with "robot" in the prompt "a human dancing in the rain." with an adversarial suffix, but the reverse replacement is significantly harder. We further propose probing metrics to establish indicative signals from the model's beliefs to the adversarial ASR. We identify conditions that result in a success probability of 60% for adversarial attacks and others where this likelihood drops below 5%.

Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) are frequently used to generate numerous domains for use by botnets. These domains are often utilized as rendezvous points for servers that malware has command and control over. There are many algorithms that are used to generate domains, however many of these algorithms are simplistic and easily detected by traditional machine learning techniques. In this paper, three variants of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are optimized to generate domains which have similar characteristics of benign domains, resulting in domains which greatly evade several state-of-the-art deep learning based DGA classifiers. We additionally provide a detailed analysis into offensive usability for each variant with respect to repeated and existing domain collisions. Finally, we fine-tune the state-of-the-art DGA classifiers by adding GAN generated samples to their original training datasets and analyze the changes in performance. Our results conclude that GAN based DGAs are superior in evading DGA classifiers in comparison to traditional DGAs, and of the variants, the Wasserstein GAN with Gradient Penalty (WGANGP) is the highest performing DGA for uses both offensively and defensively.

Despite advances in AI alignment, language models (LM) remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks or jailbreaking, in which adversaries modify input prompts to induce harmful behavior. While some defenses have been proposed, they focus on narrow threat models and fall short of a strong defense, which we posit should be effective, universal, and practical. To achieve this, we propose the first adversarial objective for defending LMs against jailbreaking attacks and an algorithm, robust prompt optimization (RPO), that uses gradient-based token optimization to enforce harmless outputs. This results in an easily accessible suffix that significantly improves robustness to both jailbreaks seen during optimization and unknown, held-out jailbreaks, reducing the attack success rate on Starling-7B from 84% to 8.66% across 20 jailbreaks. In addition, we find that RPO has a minor effect on normal LM use, is successful under adaptive attacks, and can transfer to black-box models, reducing the success rate of the strongest attack on GPT-4 from 92% to 6%.

Gradient inversion attacks aim to reconstruct local training data from intermediate gradients exposed in the federated learning framework. Despite successful attacks, all previous methods, starting from reconstructing a single data point and then relaxing the single-image limit to batch level, are only tested under hard label constraints. Even for single-image reconstruction, we still lack an analysis-based algorithm to recover augmented soft labels. In this work, we change the focus from enlarging batchsize to investigating the hard label constraints, considering a more realistic circumstance where label smoothing and mixup techniques are used in the training process. In particular, we are the first to initiate a novel algorithm to simultaneously recover the ground-truth augmented label and the input feature of the last fully-connected layer from single-input gradients, and provide a necessary condition for any analytical-based label recovery methods. Extensive experiments testify to the label recovery accuracy, as well as the benefits to the following image reconstruction. We believe soft labels in classification tasks are worth further attention in gradient inversion attacks.