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Mar 11

Understanding the Role of Feedback in Online Learning with Switching Costs

In this paper, we study the role of feedback in online learning with switching costs. It has been shown that the minimax regret is Theta(T^{2/3}) under bandit feedback and improves to Theta(T) under full-information feedback, where T is the length of the time horizon. However, it remains largely unknown how the amount and type of feedback generally impact regret. To this end, we first consider the setting of bandit learning with extra observations; that is, in addition to the typical bandit feedback, the learner can freely make a total of B_{ex} extra observations. We fully characterize the minimax regret in this setting, which exhibits an interesting phase-transition phenomenon: when B_{ex} = O(T^{2/3}), the regret remains Theta(T^{2/3}), but when B_{ex} = Omega(T^{2/3}), it becomes Theta(T/B_{mathrm{ex}}), which improves as the budget B_{ex} increases. To design algorithms that can achieve the minimax regret, it is instructive to consider a more general setting where the learner has a budget of B total observations. We fully characterize the minimax regret in this setting as well and show that it is Theta(T/B), which scales smoothly with the total budget B. Furthermore, we propose a generic algorithmic framework, which enables us to design different learning algorithms that can achieve matching upper bounds for both settings based on the amount and type of feedback. One interesting finding is that while bandit feedback can still guarantee optimal regret when the budget is relatively limited, it no longer suffices to achieve optimal regret when the budget is relatively large.

Hardness of Independent Learning and Sparse Equilibrium Computation in Markov Games

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

A Minimaximalist Approach to Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

Individually Fair Learning with One-Sided Feedback

We consider an online learning problem with one-sided feedback, in which the learner is able to observe the true label only for positively predicted instances. On each round, k instances arrive and receive classification outcomes according to a randomized policy deployed by the learner, whose goal is to maximize accuracy while deploying individually fair policies. We first extend the framework of Bechavod et al. (2020), which relies on the existence of a human fairness auditor for detecting fairness violations, to instead incorporate feedback from dynamically-selected panels of multiple, possibly inconsistent, auditors. We then construct an efficient reduction from our problem of online learning with one-sided feedback and a panel reporting fairness violations to the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit problem (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2009, Gy\"{o}rgy et al., 2007). Finally, we show how to leverage the guarantees of two algorithms in the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit setting: Exp2 (Bubeck et al., 2012) and the oracle-efficient Context-Semi-Bandit-FTPL (Syrgkanis et al., 2016), to provide multi-criteria no regret guarantees simultaneously for accuracy and fairness. Our results eliminate two potential sources of bias from prior work: the "hidden outcomes" that are not available to an algorithm operating in the full information setting, and human biases that might be present in any single human auditor, but can be mitigated by selecting a well chosen panel.

Last Switch Dependent Bandits with Monotone Payoff Functions

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

Learning to Relax: Setting Solver Parameters Across a Sequence of Linear System Instances

Solving a linear system Ax=b is a fundamental scientific computing primitive for which numerous solvers and preconditioners have been developed. These come with parameters whose optimal values depend on the system being solved and are often impossible or too expensive to identify; thus in practice sub-optimal heuristics are used. We consider the common setting in which many related linear systems need to be solved, e.g. during a single numerical simulation. In this scenario, can we sequentially choose parameters that attain a near-optimal overall number of iterations, without extra matrix computations? We answer in the affirmative for Successive Over-Relaxation (SOR), a standard solver whose parameter omega has a strong impact on its runtime. For this method, we prove that a bandit online learning algorithm -- using only the number of iterations as feedback -- can select parameters for a sequence of instances such that the overall cost approaches that of the best fixed omega as the sequence length increases. Furthermore, when given additional structural information, we show that a contextual bandit method asymptotically achieves the performance of the instance-optimal policy, which selects the best omega for each instance. Our work provides the first learning-theoretic treatment of high-precision linear system solvers and the first end-to-end guarantees for data-driven scientific computing, demonstrating theoretically the potential to speed up numerical methods using well-understood learning algorithms.

Offline Planning and Online Learning under Recovering Rewards

Motivated by emerging applications such as live-streaming e-commerce, promotions and recommendations, we introduce and solve a general class of non-stationary multi-armed bandit problems that have the following two features: (i) the decision maker can pull and collect rewards from up to K,(ge 1) out of N different arms in each time period; (ii) the expected reward of an arm immediately drops after it is pulled, and then non-parametrically recovers as the arm's idle time increases. With the objective of maximizing the expected cumulative reward over T time periods, we design a class of ``Purely Periodic Policies'' that jointly set a period to pull each arm. For the proposed policies, we prove performance guarantees for both the offline problem and the online problems. For the offline problem when all model parameters are known, the proposed periodic policy obtains an approximation ratio that is at the order of 1-mathcal O(1/K), which is asymptotically optimal when K grows to infinity. For the online problem when the model parameters are unknown and need to be dynamically learned, we integrate the offline periodic policy with the upper confidence bound procedure to construct on online policy. The proposed online policy is proved to approximately have mathcal O(NT) regret against the offline benchmark. Our framework and policy design may shed light on broader offline planning and online learning applications with non-stationary and recovering rewards.

Iterative Nash Policy Optimization: Aligning LLMs with General Preferences via No-Regret Learning

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) has achieved great success in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Prevalent RLHF approaches are reward-based, following the Bradley-Terry (BT) model assumption, which may not fully capture the complexity of human preferences. In this paper, we explore RLHF under a general preference framework and approach it from a game-theoretic perspective. Specifically, we formulate the problem as a two-player game and propose a novel algorithm, iterative Nash policy optimization (INPO). The key idea is to let the policy play against itself via no-regret learning, thereby approximating the Nash policy. Unlike previous methods, INPO bypasses the need for estimating the expected win rate for individual responses, which typically incurs high computational or annotation costs. Instead, we introduce a new loss objective that is directly minimized over a preference dataset. We provide theoretical analysis for our approach and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments on various representative benchmarks. With an LLaMA-3-8B-based SFT model, INPO achieves a 41.5% length-controlled win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0 and a 38.3% win rate on Arena-Hard, showing substantial improvement over the state-of-the-art iterative algorithm [Dong et al., 2024] under the BT model assumption. Additionally, our ablation study highlights the benefits of incorporating KL regularization for response length control.

Cascading Reinforcement Learning

Cascading bandits have gained popularity in recent years due to their applicability to recommendation systems and online advertising. In the cascading bandit model, at each timestep, an agent recommends an ordered subset of items (called an item list) from a pool of items, each associated with an unknown attraction probability. Then, the user examines the list, and clicks the first attractive item (if any), and after that, the agent receives a reward. The goal of the agent is to maximize the expected cumulative reward. However, the prior literature on cascading bandits ignores the influences of user states (e.g., historical behaviors) on recommendations and the change of states as the session proceeds. Motivated by this fact, we propose a generalized cascading RL framework, which considers the impact of user states and state transition into decisions. In cascading RL, we need to select items not only with large attraction probabilities but also leading to good successor states. This imposes a huge computational challenge due to the combinatorial action space. To tackle this challenge, we delve into the properties of value functions, and design an oracle BestPerm to efficiently find the optimal item list. Equipped with BestPerm, we develop two algorithms CascadingVI and CascadingBPI, which are both computationally-efficient and sample-efficient, and provide near-optimal regret and sample complexity guarantees. Furthermore, we present experiments to show the improved computational and sample efficiencies of our algorithms compared to straightforward adaptations of existing RL algorithms in practice.

Dynamical Linear Bandits

In many real-world sequential decision-making problems, an action does not immediately reflect on the feedback and spreads its effects over a long time frame. For instance, in online advertising, investing in a platform produces an instantaneous increase of awareness, but the actual reward, i.e., a conversion, might occur far in the future. Furthermore, whether a conversion takes place depends on: how fast the awareness grows, its vanishing effects, and the synergy or interference with other advertising platforms. Previous work has investigated the Multi-Armed Bandit framework with the possibility of delayed and aggregated feedback, without a particular structure on how an action propagates in the future, disregarding possible dynamical effects. In this paper, we introduce a novel setting, the Dynamical Linear Bandits (DLB), an extension of the linear bandits characterized by a hidden state. When an action is performed, the learner observes a noisy reward whose mean is a linear function of the hidden state and of the action. Then, the hidden state evolves according to linear dynamics, affected by the performed action too. We start by introducing the setting, discussing the notion of optimal policy, and deriving an expected regret lower bound. Then, we provide an optimistic regret minimization algorithm, Dynamical Linear Upper Confidence Bound (DynLin-UCB), that suffers an expected regret of order mathcal{O} Big( d sqrt{T}{(1-rho)^{3/2}} Big), where rho is a measure of the stability of the system, and d is the dimension of the action vector. Finally, we conduct a numerical validation on a synthetic environment and on real-world data to show the effectiveness of DynLin-UCB in comparison with several baselines.

Learning to Actively Learn: A Robust Approach

This work proposes a procedure for designing algorithms for specific adaptive data collection tasks like active learning and pure-exploration multi-armed bandits. Unlike the design of traditional adaptive algorithms that rely on concentration of measure and careful analysis to justify the correctness and sample complexity of the procedure, our adaptive algorithm is learned via adversarial training over equivalence classes of problems derived from information theoretic lower bounds. In particular, a single adaptive learning algorithm is learned that competes with the best adaptive algorithm learned for each equivalence class. Our procedure takes as input just the available queries, set of hypotheses, loss function, and total query budget. This is in contrast to existing meta-learning work that learns an adaptive algorithm relative to an explicit, user-defined subset or prior distribution over problems which can be challenging to define and be mismatched to the instance encountered at test time. This work is particularly focused on the regime when the total query budget is very small, such as a few dozen, which is much smaller than those budgets typically considered by theoretically derived algorithms. We perform synthetic experiments to justify the stability and effectiveness of the training procedure, and then evaluate the method on tasks derived from real data including a noisy 20 Questions game and a joke recommendation task.

Do LLM Agents Have Regret? A Case Study in Online Learning and Games

Large language models (LLMs) have been increasingly employed for (interactive) decision-making, via the development of LLM-based autonomous agents. Despite their emerging successes, the performance of LLM agents in decision-making has not been fully investigated through quantitative metrics, especially in the multi-agent setting when they interact with each other, a typical scenario in real-world LLM-agent applications. To better understand the limits of LLM agents in these interactive environments, we propose to study their interactions in benchmark decision-making settings in online learning and game theory, through the performance metric of regret. We first empirically study the {no-regret} behaviors of LLMs in canonical (non-stationary) online learning problems, as well as the emergence of equilibria when LLM agents interact through playing repeated games. We then provide some theoretical insights into the no-regret behaviors of LLM agents, under certain assumptions on the supervised pre-training and the rationality model of human decision-makers who generate the data. Notably, we also identify (simple) cases where advanced LLMs such as GPT-4 fail to be no-regret. To promote the no-regret behaviors, we propose a novel unsupervised training loss of regret-loss, which, in contrast to the supervised pre-training loss, does not require the labels of (optimal) actions. We then establish the statistical guarantee of generalization bound for regret-loss minimization, followed by the optimization guarantee that minimizing such a loss may automatically lead to known no-regret learning algorithms. Our further experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our regret-loss, especially in addressing the above ``regrettable'' cases.

Weighted Tallying Bandits: Overcoming Intractability via Repeated Exposure Optimality

In recommender system or crowdsourcing applications of online learning, a human's preferences or abilities are often a function of the algorithm's recent actions. Motivated by this, a significant line of work has formalized settings where an action's loss is a function of the number of times that action was recently played in the prior m timesteps, where m corresponds to a bound on human memory capacity. To more faithfully capture decay of human memory with time, we introduce the Weighted Tallying Bandit (WTB), which generalizes this setting by requiring that an action's loss is a function of a weighted summation of the number of times that arm was played in the last m timesteps. This WTB setting is intractable without further assumption. So we study it under Repeated Exposure Optimality (REO), a condition motivated by the literature on human physiology, which requires the existence of an action that when repetitively played will eventually yield smaller loss than any other sequence of actions. We study the minimization of the complete policy regret (CPR), which is the strongest notion of regret, in WTB under REO. Since m is typically unknown, we assume we only have access to an upper bound M on m. We show that for problems with K actions and horizon T, a simple modification of the successive elimination algorithm has O left( KT + (m+M)K right) CPR. Interestingly, upto an additive (in lieu of mutliplicative) factor in (m+M)K, this recovers the classical guarantee for the simpler stochastic multi-armed bandit with traditional regret. We additionally show that in our setting, any algorithm will suffer additive CPR of Omega left( mK + M right), demonstrating our result is nearly optimal. Our algorithm is computationally efficient, and we experimentally demonstrate its practicality and superiority over natural baselines.

Tight Regret Bounds for Single-pass Streaming Multi-armed Bandits

Regret minimization in streaming multi-armed bandits (MABs) has been studied extensively in recent years. In the single-pass setting with K arms and T trials, a regret lower bound of Omega(T^{2/3}) has been proved for any algorithm with o(K) memory (Maiti et al. [NeurIPS'21]; Agarwal at al. [COLT'22]). On the other hand, however, the previous best regret upper bound is still O(K^{1/3} T^{2/3}log^{1/3}(T)), which is achieved by the streaming implementation of the simple uniform exploration. The O(K^{1/3}log^{1/3}(T)) gap leaves the open question of the tight regret bound in the single-pass MABs with sublinear arm memory. In this paper, we answer this open problem and complete the picture of regret minimization in single-pass streaming MABs. We first improve the regret lower bound to Omega(K^{1/3}T^{2/3}) for algorithms with o(K) memory, which matches the uniform exploration regret up to a logarithm factor in T. We then show that the log^{1/3}(T) factor is not necessary, and we can achieve O(K^{1/3}T^{2/3}) regret by finding an varepsilon-best arm and committing to it in the rest of the trials. For regret minimization with high constant probability, we can apply the single-memory varepsilon-best arm algorithms in Jin et al. [ICML'21] to obtain the optimal bound. Furthermore, for the expected regret minimization, we design an algorithm with a single-arm memory that achieves O(K^{1/3} T^{2/3}log(K)) regret, and an algorithm with O(log^{*}(n))-memory with the optimal O(K^{1/3} T^{2/3}) regret following the varepsilon-best arm algorithm in Assadi and Wang [STOC'20]. We further tested the empirical performances of our algorithms. The simulation results show that the proposed algorithms consistently outperform the benchmark uniform exploration algorithm by a large margin, and on occasion, reduce the regret by up to 70%.

Making RL with Preference-based Feedback Efficient via Randomization

Reinforcement Learning algorithms that learn from human feedback (RLHF) need to be efficient in terms of statistical complexity, computational complexity, and query complexity. In this work, we consider the RLHF setting where the feedback is given in the format of preferences over pairs of trajectories. In the linear MDP model, using randomization in algorithm design, we present an algorithm that is sample efficient (i.e., has near-optimal worst-case regret bounds) and has polynomial running time (i.e., computational complexity is polynomial with respect to relevant parameters). Our algorithm further minimizes the query complexity through a novel randomized active learning procedure. In particular, our algorithm demonstrates a near-optimal tradeoff between the regret bound and the query complexity. To extend the results to more general nonlinear function approximation, we design a model-based randomized algorithm inspired by the idea of Thompson sampling. Our algorithm minimizes Bayesian regret bound and query complexity, again achieving a near-optimal tradeoff between these two quantities. Computation-wise, similar to the prior Thompson sampling algorithms under the regular RL setting, the main computation primitives of our algorithm are Bayesian supervised learning oracles which have been heavily investigated on the empirical side when applying Thompson sampling algorithms to RL benchmark problems.

Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Does Sparsity Help in Learning Misspecified Linear Bandits?

Recently, the study of linear misspecified bandits has generated intriguing implications of the hardness of learning in bandits and reinforcement learning (RL). In particular, Du et al. (2020) show that even if a learner is given linear features in R^d that approximate the rewards in a bandit or RL with a uniform error of varepsilon, searching for an O(varepsilon)-optimal action requires pulling at least Omega(exp(d)) queries. Furthermore, Lattimore et al. (2020) show that a degraded O(varepsilond)-optimal solution can be learned within poly(d/varepsilon) queries. Yet it is unknown whether a structural assumption on the ground-truth parameter, such as sparsity, could break the varepsilond barrier. In this paper, we address this question by showing that algorithms can obtain O(varepsilon)-optimal actions by querying O(varepsilon^{-s}d^s) actions, where s is the sparsity parameter, removing the exp(d)-dependence. We then establish information-theoretical lower bounds, i.e., Omega(exp(s)), to show that our upper bound on sample complexity is nearly tight if one demands an error O(s^{delta}varepsilon) for 0<delta<1. For deltageq 1, we further show that poly(s/varepsilon) queries are possible when the linear features are "good" and even in general settings. These results provide a nearly complete picture of how sparsity can help in misspecified bandit learning and provide a deeper understanding of when linear features are "useful" for bandit and reinforcement learning with misspecification.

Improving Language Model Negotiation with Self-Play and In-Context Learning from AI Feedback

We study whether multiple large language models (LLMs) can autonomously improve each other in a negotiation game by playing, reflecting, and criticizing. We are interested in this question because if LLMs were able to improve each other, it would imply the possibility of creating strong AI agents with minimal human intervention. We ask two LLMs to negotiate with each other, playing the roles of a buyer and a seller, respectively. They aim to reach a deal with the buyer targeting a lower price and the seller a higher one. A third language model, playing the critic, provides feedback to a player to improve the player's negotiation strategies. We let the two agents play multiple rounds, using previous negotiation history and AI feedback as in-context demonstrations to improve the model's negotiation strategy iteratively. We use different LLMs (GPT and Claude) for different roles and use the deal price as the evaluation metric. Our experiments reveal multiple intriguing findings: (1) Only a subset of the language models we consider can self-play and improve the deal price from AI feedback, weaker models either do not understand the game's rules or cannot incorporate AI feedback for further improvement. (2) Models' abilities to learn from the feedback differ when playing different roles. For example, it is harder for Claude-instant to improve as the buyer than as the seller. (3) When unrolling the game to multiple rounds, stronger agents can consistently improve their performance by meaningfully using previous experiences and iterative AI feedback, yet have a higher risk of breaking the deal. We hope our work provides insightful initial explorations of having models autonomously improve each other with game playing and AI feedback.

Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraints

In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser's global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channels and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem. Finally, we argue that all our results hold for both single-item and multi-item auctions from which channels procure impressions on advertisers' behalf.

One Objective to Rule Them All: A Maximization Objective Fusing Estimation and Planning for Exploration

In online reinforcement learning (online RL), balancing exploration and exploitation is crucial for finding an optimal policy in a sample-efficient way. To achieve this, existing sample-efficient online RL algorithms typically consist of three components: estimation, planning, and exploration. However, in order to cope with general function approximators, most of them involve impractical algorithmic components to incentivize exploration, such as optimization within data-dependent level-sets or complicated sampling procedures. To address this challenge, we propose an easy-to-implement RL framework called Maximize to Explore (MEX), which only needs to optimize unconstrainedly a single objective that integrates the estimation and planning components while balancing exploration and exploitation automatically. Theoretically, we prove that MEX achieves a sublinear regret with general function approximations for Markov decision processes (MDP) and is further extendable to two-player zero-sum Markov games (MG). Meanwhile, we adapt deep RL baselines to design practical versions of MEX, in both model-free and model-based manners, which can outperform baselines by a stable margin in various MuJoCo environments with sparse rewards. Compared with existing sample-efficient online RL algorithms with general function approximations, MEX achieves similar sample efficiency while enjoying a lower computational cost and is more compatible with modern deep RL methods.

A Game-Theoretic Framework for Managing Risk in Multi-Agent Systems

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

Models of human preference for learning reward functions

The utility of reinforcement learning is limited by the alignment of reward functions with the interests of human stakeholders. One promising method for alignment is to learn the reward function from human-generated preferences between pairs of trajectory segments, a type of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). These human preferences are typically assumed to be informed solely by partial return, the sum of rewards along each segment. We find this assumption to be flawed and propose modeling human preferences instead as informed by each segment's regret, a measure of a segment's deviation from optimal decision-making. Given infinitely many preferences generated according to regret, we prove that we can identify a reward function equivalent to the reward function that generated those preferences, and we prove that the previous partial return model lacks this identifiability property in multiple contexts. We empirically show that our proposed regret preference model outperforms the partial return preference model with finite training data in otherwise the same setting. Additionally, we find that our proposed regret preference model better predicts real human preferences and also learns reward functions from these preferences that lead to policies that are better human-aligned. Overall, this work establishes that the choice of preference model is impactful, and our proposed regret preference model provides an improvement upon a core assumption of recent research. We have open sourced our experimental code, the human preferences dataset we gathered, and our training and preference elicitation interfaces for gathering a such a dataset.

Asymmetric Graph Error Control with Low Complexity in Causal Bandits

In this paper, the causal bandit problem is investigated, in which the objective is to select an optimal sequence of interventions on nodes in a causal graph. It is assumed that the graph is governed by linear structural equations; it is further assumed that both the causal topology and the distribution of interventions are unknown. By exploiting the causal relationships between the nodes whose signals contribute to the reward, interventions are optimized. First, based on the difference between the two types of graph identification errors (false positives and negatives), a causal graph learning method is proposed, which strongly reduces sample complexity relative to the prior art by learning sub-graphs. Under the assumption of Gaussian exogenous inputs and minimum-mean squared error weight estimation, a new uncertainty bound tailored to the causal bandit problem is derived. This uncertainty bound drives an upper confidence bound based intervention selection to optimize the reward. To cope with non-stationary bandits, a sub-graph change detection mechanism is proposed, with high sample efficiency. Numerical results compare the new methodology to existing schemes and show a substantial performance improvement in both stationary and non-stationary settings. Compared to existing approaches, the proposed scheme takes 67% fewer samples to learn the causal structure and achieves an average reward gain of 85%.

The Update-Equivalence Framework for Decision-Time Planning

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

The Benefits of Model-Based Generalization in Reinforcement Learning

Model-Based Reinforcement Learning (RL) is widely believed to have the potential to improve sample efficiency by allowing an agent to synthesize large amounts of imagined experience. Experience Replay (ER) can be considered a simple kind of model, which has proved extremely effective at improving the stability and efficiency of deep RL. In principle, a learned parametric model could improve on ER by generalizing from real experience to augment the dataset with additional plausible experience. However, owing to the many design choices involved in empirically successful algorithms, it can be very hard to establish where the benefits are actually coming from. Here, we provide theoretical and empirical insight into when, and how, we can expect data generated by a learned model to be useful. First, we provide a general theorem motivating how learning a model as an intermediate step can narrow down the set of possible value functions more than learning a value function directly from data using the Bellman equation. Second, we provide an illustrative example showing empirically how a similar effect occurs in a more concrete setting with neural network function approximation. Finally, we provide extensive experiments showing the benefit of model-based learning for online RL in environments with combinatorial complexity, but factored structure that allows a learned model to generalize. In these experiments, we take care to control for other factors in order to isolate, insofar as possible, the benefit of using experience generated by a learned model relative to ER alone.

Preference-conditioned Pixel-based AI Agent For Game Testing

The game industry is challenged to cope with increasing growth in demand and game complexity while maintaining acceptable quality standards for released games. Classic approaches solely depending on human efforts for quality assurance and game testing do not scale effectively in terms of time and cost. Game-testing AI agents that learn by interaction with the environment have the potential to mitigate these challenges with good scalability properties on time and costs. However, most recent work in this direction depends on game state information for the agent's state representation, which limits generalization across different game scenarios. Moreover, game test engineers usually prefer exploring a game in a specific style, such as exploring the golden path. However, current game testing AI agents do not provide an explicit way to satisfy such a preference. This paper addresses these limitations by proposing an agent design that mainly depends on pixel-based state observations while exploring the environment conditioned on a user's preference specified by demonstration trajectories. In addition, we propose an imitation learning method that couples self-supervised and supervised learning objectives to enhance the quality of imitation behaviors. Our agent significantly outperforms state-of-the-art pixel-based game testing agents over exploration coverage and test execution quality when evaluated on a complex open-world environment resembling many aspects of real AAA games.

The Effective Horizon Explains Deep RL Performance in Stochastic Environments

Reinforcement learning (RL) theory has largely focused on proving minimax sample complexity bounds. These require strategic exploration algorithms that use relatively limited function classes for representing the policy or value function. Our goal is to explain why deep RL algorithms often perform well in practice, despite using random exploration and much more expressive function classes like neural networks. Our work arrives at an explanation by showing that many stochastic MDPs can be solved by performing only a few steps of value iteration on the random policy's Q function and then acting greedily. When this is true, we find that it is possible to separate the exploration and learning components of RL, making it much easier to analyze. We introduce a new RL algorithm, SQIRL, that iteratively learns a near-optimal policy by exploring randomly to collect rollouts and then performing a limited number of steps of fitted-Q iteration over those rollouts. Any regression algorithm that satisfies basic in-distribution generalization properties can be used in SQIRL to efficiently solve common MDPs. This can explain why deep RL works, since it is empirically established that neural networks generalize well in-distribution. Furthermore, SQIRL explains why random exploration works well in practice. We leverage SQIRL to derive instance-dependent sample complexity bounds for RL that are exponential only in an "effective horizon" of lookahead and on the complexity of the class used for function approximation. Empirically, we also find that SQIRL performance strongly correlates with PPO and DQN performance in a variety of stochastic environments, supporting that our theoretical analysis is predictive of practical performance. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/cassidylaidlaw/effective-horizon.

SPRING: GPT-4 Out-performs RL Algorithms by Studying Papers and Reasoning

Open-world survival games pose significant challenges for AI algorithms due to their multi-tasking, deep exploration, and goal prioritization requirements. Despite reinforcement learning (RL) being popular for solving games, its high sample complexity limits its effectiveness in complex open-world games like Crafter or Minecraft. We propose a novel approach, SPRING, to read the game's original academic paper and use the knowledge learned to reason and play the game through a large language model (LLM). Prompted with the LaTeX source as game context and a description of the agent's current observation, our SPRING framework employs a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with game-related questions as nodes and dependencies as edges. We identify the optimal action to take in the environment by traversing the DAG and calculating LLM responses for each node in topological order, with the LLM's answer to final node directly translating to environment actions. In our experiments, we study the quality of in-context "reasoning" induced by different forms of prompts under the setting of the Crafter open-world environment. Our experiments suggest that LLMs, when prompted with consistent chain-of-thought, have great potential in completing sophisticated high-level trajectories. Quantitatively, SPRING with GPT-4 outperforms all state-of-the-art RL baselines, trained for 1M steps, without any training. Finally, we show the potential of games as a test bed for LLMs.