Daily Papers

With the release of the o1 model by OpenAI, reasoning models adopting slow thinking strategies have gradually emerged. As the responses generated by such models often include complex reasoning, intermediate steps, and self-reflection, existing evaluation methods are often inadequate. They struggle to determine whether the LLM output is truly equivalent to the reference answer, and also have difficulty identifying and extracting the final answer from long, complex responses. To address this issue, we propose xVerify, an efficient answer verifier for reasoning model evaluations. xVerify demonstrates strong capability in equivalence judgment, enabling it to effectively determine whether the answers produced by reasoning models are equivalent to reference answers across various types of objective questions. To train and evaluate xVerify, we construct the VAR dataset by collecting question-answer pairs generated by multiple LLMs across various datasets, leveraging multiple reasoning models and challenging evaluation sets designed specifically for reasoning model assessment. A multi-round annotation process is employed to ensure label accuracy. Based on the VAR dataset, we train multiple xVerify models of different scales. In evaluation experiments conducted on both the test set and generalization set, all xVerify models achieve overall F1 scores and accuracy exceeding 95\%. Notably, the smallest variant, xVerify-0.5B-I, outperforms all evaluation methods except GPT-4o, while xVerify-3B-Ib surpasses GPT-4o in overall performance. These results validate the effectiveness and generalizability of xVerify.

Question answering (QA) can only make progress if we know if an answer is correct, but for many of the most challenging and interesting QA examples, current evaluation metrics to determine answer equivalence (AE) often do not align with human judgments, particularly more verbose, free-form answers from large language models (LLM). There are two challenges: a lack of data and that models are too big: LLM-based scorers can correlate better with human judges, but this task has only been tested on limited QA datasets, and even when available, update of the model is limited because LLMs are large and often expensive. We rectify both of these issues by providing clear and consistent guidelines for evaluating AE in machine QA adopted from professional human QA contests. We also introduce a combination of standard evaluation and a more efficient, robust, and lightweight discriminate AE classifier-based matching method (CFMatch, smaller than 1 MB), trained and validated to more accurately evaluate answer correctness in accordance with adopted expert AE rules that are more aligned with human judgments.

Code-switching, the phenomenon of alternating between two or more languages in a single conversation, presents unique challenges for Natural Language Processing (NLP). Most existing research focuses on either syntactic constraints or neural generation, with few efforts to integrate linguistic theory with large language models (LLMs) for generating natural code-switched text. In this paper, we introduce EZSwitch, a novel framework that combines Equivalence Constraint Theory (ECT) with LLMs to produce linguistically valid and fluent code-switched text. We evaluate our method using both human judgments and automatic metrics, demonstrating a significant improvement in the quality of generated code-switching sentences compared to baseline LLMs. To address the lack of suitable evaluation metrics, we conduct a comprehensive correlation study of various automatic metrics against human scores, revealing that current metrics often fail to capture the nuanced fluency of code-switched text. Additionally, we create CSPref, a human preference dataset based on human ratings and analyze model performance across ``hard`` and ``easy`` examples. Our findings indicate that incorporating linguistic constraints into LLMs leads to more robust and human-aligned generation, paving the way for scalable code-switching text generation across diverse language pairs.

The predictions of question answering (QA)systems are typically evaluated against manually annotated finite sets of one or more answers. This leads to a coverage limitation that results in underestimating the true performance of systems, and is typically addressed by extending over exact match (EM) with pre-defined rules or with the token-level F1 measure. In this paper, we present the first systematic conceptual and data-driven analysis to examine the shortcomings of token-level equivalence measures. To this end, we define the asymmetric notion of answer equivalence (AE), accepting answers that are equivalent to or improve over the reference, and publish over 23k human judgments for candidates produced by multiple QA systems on SQuAD. Through a careful analysis of this data, we reveal and quantify several concrete limitations of the F1 measure, such as a false impression of graduality, or missing dependence on the question. Since collecting AE annotations for each evaluated model is expensive, we learn a BERT matching (BEM) measure to approximate this task. Being a simpler task than QA, we find BEM to provide significantly better AE approximations than F1, and to more accurately reflect the performance of systems. Finally, we demonstrate the practical utility of AE and BEM on the concrete application of minimal accurate prediction sets, reducing the number of required answers by up to x2.6.

In this paper, we investigate the challenge of integrating tables from data lakes, focusing on three core tasks: 1) pairwise integrability judgment, which determines whether a tuple pair in a table is integrable, accounting for any occurrences of semantic equivalence or typographical errors; 2) integrable set discovery, which aims to identify all integrable sets in a table based on pairwise integrability judgments established in the first task; 3) multi-tuple conflict resolution, which resolves conflicts among multiple tuples during integration. We train a binary classifier to address the task of pairwise integrability judgment. Given the scarcity of labeled data, we propose a self-supervised adversarial contrastive learning algorithm to perform classification, which incorporates data augmentation methods and adversarial examples to autonomously generate new training data. Upon the output of pairwise integrability judgment, each integrable set is considered as a community, a densely connected sub-graph where nodes and edges correspond to tuples in the table and their pairwise integrability, respectively. We proceed to investigate various community detection algorithms to address the integrable set discovery objective. Moving forward to tackle multi-tuple conflict resolution, we introduce an novel in-context learning methodology. This approach capitalizes on the knowledge embedded within pretrained large language models to effectively resolve conflicts that arise when integrating multiple tuples. Notably, our method minimizes the need for annotated data. Since no suitable test collections are available for our tasks, we develop our own benchmarks using two real-word dataset repositories: Real and Join. We conduct extensive experiments on these benchmarks to validate the robustness and applicability of our methodologies in the context of integrating tables within data lakes.

The progress of AI is bottlenecked by the quality of evaluation, and powerful LLM-as-a-Judge models have proved to be a core solution. Improved judgment ability is enabled by stronger chain-of-thought reasoning, motivating the need to find the best recipes for training such models to think. In this work we introduce J1, a reinforcement learning approach to training such models. Our method converts both verifiable and non-verifiable prompts to judgment tasks with verifiable rewards that incentivize thinking and mitigate judgment bias. In particular, our approach outperforms all other existing 8B or 70B models when trained at those sizes, including models distilled from DeepSeek-R1. J1 also outperforms o1-mini, and even R1 on some benchmarks, despite training a smaller model. We provide analysis and ablations comparing Pairwise-J1 vs Pointwise-J1 models, offline vs online training recipes, reward strategies, seed prompts, and variations in thought length and content. We find that our models make better judgments by learning to outline evaluation criteria, comparing against self-generated reference answers, and re-evaluating the correctness of model responses.

Pre-trained large language model (LLM) is under exploration to perform NLP tasks that may require logical reasoning. Logic-driven data augmentation for representation learning has been shown to improve the performance of tasks requiring logical reasoning, but most of these data rely on designed templates and therefore lack generalization. In this regard, we propose an AMR-based logical equivalence-driven data augmentation method (AMR-LE) for generating logically equivalent data. Specifically, we first parse a text into the form of an AMR graph, next apply four logical equivalence laws (contraposition, double negation, commutative and implication laws) on the AMR graph to construct a logically equivalent/inequivalent AMR graph, and then convert it into a logically equivalent/inequivalent sentence. To help the model to better learn these logical equivalence laws, we propose a logical equivalence-driven contrastive learning training paradigm, which aims to distinguish the difference between logical equivalence and inequivalence. Our AMR-LE (Ensemble) achieves #2 on the ReClor leaderboard https://eval.ai/web/challenges/challenge-page/503/leaderboard/1347 . Our model shows better performance on seven downstream tasks, including ReClor, LogiQA, MNLI, MRPC, RTE, QNLI, and QQP. The source code and dataset are public at https://github.com/Strong-AI-Lab/Logical-Equivalence-driven-AMR-Data-Augmentation-for-Representation-Learning .

A fundamental problem in combinatorial optimization is identifying equivalent formulations, which can lead to more efficient solution strategies and deeper insights into a problem's computational complexity. The need to automatically identify equivalence between problem formulations has grown as optimization copilots--systems that generate problem formulations from natural language descriptions--have proliferated. However, existing approaches to checking formulation equivalence lack grounding, relying on simple heuristics which are insufficient for rigorous validation. Inspired by Karp reductions, in this work we introduce quasi-Karp equivalence, a formal criterion for determining when two optimization formulations are equivalent based on the existence of a mapping between their decision variables. We propose EquivaMap, a framework that leverages large language models to automatically discover such mappings, enabling scalable and reliable equivalence verification. To evaluate our approach, we construct the first open-source dataset of equivalent optimization formulations, generated by applying transformations such as adding slack variables or valid inequalities to existing formulations. Empirically, EquivaMap significantly outperforms existing methods, achieving substantial improvements in correctly identifying formulation equivalence.

As humans, we consistently engage in interactions with our peers and receive feedback in the form of natural language. This language feedback allows us to reflect on our actions, maintain appropriate behavior, and rectify our errors. The question arises naturally: can we use language feedback to align large language models (LLMs)? In contrast to previous research that aligns LLMs with reward or preference data, we present the first systematic exploration of alignment through the lens of language feedback (i.e., judgment). We commence with an in-depth investigation of potential methods that can be adapted for aligning LLMs with judgments, revealing that these methods are unable to fully capitalize on the judgments. To facilitate more effective utilization of judgments, we propose a novel framework, Contrastive Unlikelihood Training (CUT), that allows for fine-grained inappropriate content detection and correction based on judgments. Our offline alignment results show that, with merely 1317 off-the-shelf judgment data, CUT (LLaMA2-13b) can beat the 175B DaVinci003 and surpass the best baseline by 52.34 points on AlpacaEval. The online alignment results demonstrate that CUT can align LLMs (LLaMA2-chat-13b) in an iterative fashion using model-specific judgment data, with a steady performance improvement from 81.09 to 91.36 points on AlpacaEval. Our analysis further suggests that judgments exhibit greater potential than rewards for LLM alignment and warrant future research.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

When individuals encounter observations that violate their expectations, when will they adjust their expectations and when will they maintain them despite these observations? For example, when individuals expect objects of type A to be smaller than objects B, but observe the opposite, when will they adjust their expectation about the relationship between the two objects (to A being larger than B)? Naively, one would predict that the larger the violation, the greater the adaptation. However, experiments reveal that when violations are extreme, individuals are more likely to hold on to their prior expectations rather than adjust them. To address this puzzle, we tested the adaptation of artificial neural networks (ANNs) capable of relational learning and found a similar phenomenon: Standard learning dynamics dictates that small violations would lead to adjustments of expected relations while larger ones would be resolved using a different mechanism -- a change in object representation that bypasses the need for adaptation of the relational expectations. These results suggest that the experimentally-observed stability of prior expectations when facing large expectation violations is a natural consequence of learning dynamics and does not require any additional mechanisms. We conclude by discussing the effect of intermediate adaptation steps on this stability.

When robots learn reward functions using high capacity models that take raw state directly as input, they need to both learn a representation for what matters in the task -- the task ``features" -- as well as how to combine these features into a single objective. If they try to do both at once from input designed to teach the full reward function, it is easy to end up with a representation that contains spurious correlations in the data, which fails to generalize to new settings. Instead, our ultimate goal is to enable robots to identify and isolate the causal features that people actually care about and use when they represent states and behavior. Our idea is that we can tune into this representation by asking users what behaviors they consider similar: behaviors will be similar if the features that matter are similar, even if low-level behavior is different; conversely, behaviors will be different if even one of the features that matter differs. This, in turn, is what enables the robot to disambiguate between what needs to go into the representation versus what is spurious, as well as what aspects of behavior can be compressed together versus not. The notion of learning representations based on similarity has a nice parallel in contrastive learning, a self-supervised representation learning technique that maps visually similar data points to similar embeddings, where similarity is defined by a designer through data augmentation heuristics. By contrast, in order to learn the representations that people use, so we can learn their preferences and objectives, we use their definition of similarity. In simulation as well as in a user study, we show that learning through such similarity queries leads to representations that, while far from perfect, are indeed more generalizable than self-supervised and task-input alternatives.

Algorithmic fairness has conventionally adopted the mathematically convenient perspective of racial color-blindness (i.e., difference unaware treatment). However, we contend that in a range of important settings, group difference awareness matters. For example, differentiating between groups may be necessary in legal contexts (e.g., the U.S. compulsory draft applies to men but not women) and harm assessments (e.g., referring to girls as ``terrorists'' may be less harmful than referring to Muslim people as such). Thus, in contrast to most fairness work, we study fairness through the perspective of treating people differently -- when it is contextually appropriate to. We first introduce an important distinction between descriptive (fact-based), normative (value-based), and correlation (association-based) benchmarks. This distinction is significant because each category requires separate interpretation and mitigation tailored to its specific characteristics. Then, we present a benchmark suite composed of eight different scenarios for a total of 16k questions that enables us to assess difference awareness. Finally, we show results across ten models that demonstrate difference awareness is a distinct dimension to fairness where existing bias mitigation strategies may backfire.

In a legal system, judgment consistency is regarded as one of the most important manifestations of fairness. However, due to the complexity of factual elements that impact sentencing in real-world scenarios, few works have been done on quantitatively measuring judgment consistency towards real-world data. In this paper, we propose an evaluation metric for judgment inconsistency, Legal Inconsistency Coefficient (LInCo), which aims to evaluate inconsistency between data groups divided by specific features (e.g., gender, region, race). We propose to simulate judges from different groups with legal judgment prediction (LJP) models and measure the judicial inconsistency with the disagreement of the judgment results given by LJP models trained on different groups. Experimental results on the synthetic data verify the effectiveness of LInCo. We further employ LInCo to explore the inconsistency in real cases and come to the following observations: (1) Both regional and gender inconsistency exist in the legal system, but gender inconsistency is much less than regional inconsistency; (2) The level of regional inconsistency varies little across different time periods; (3) In general, judicial inconsistency is negatively correlated with the severity of the criminal charges. Besides, we use LInCo to evaluate the performance of several de-bias methods, such as adversarial learning, and find that these mechanisms can effectively help LJP models to avoid suffering from data bias.

The equivalence of realizable and agnostic learnability is a fundamental phenomenon in learning theory. With variants ranging from classical settings like PAC learning and regression to recent trends such as adversarially robust learning, it's surprising that we still lack a unified theory; traditional proofs of the equivalence tend to be disparate, and rely on strong model-specific assumptions like uniform convergence and sample compression. In this work, we give the first model-independent framework explaining the equivalence of realizable and agnostic learnability: a three-line blackbox reduction that simplifies, unifies, and extends our understanding across a wide variety of settings. This includes models with no known characterization of learnability such as learning with arbitrary distributional assumptions and more general loss functions, as well as a host of other popular settings such as robust learning, partial learning, fair learning, and the statistical query model. More generally, we argue that the equivalence of realizable and agnostic learning is actually a special case of a broader phenomenon we call property generalization: any desirable property of a learning algorithm (e.g. noise tolerance, privacy, stability) that can be satisfied over finite hypothesis classes extends (possibly in some variation) to any learnable hypothesis class.

Fairness for machine learning predictions is widely required in practice for legal, ethical, and societal reasons. Existing work typically focuses on settings without unobserved confounding, even though unobserved confounding can lead to severe violations of causal fairness and, thus, unfair predictions. In this work, we analyze the sensitivity of causal fairness to unobserved confounding. Our contributions are three-fold. First, we derive bounds for causal fairness metrics under different sources of unobserved confounding. This enables practitioners to examine the sensitivity of their machine learning models to unobserved confounding in fairness-critical applications. Second, we propose a novel neural framework for learning fair predictions, which allows us to offer worst-case guarantees of the extent to which causal fairness can be violated due to unobserved confounding. Third, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework in a series of experiments, including a real-world case study about predicting prison sentences. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to study causal fairness under unobserved confounding. To this end, our work is of direct practical value as a refutation strategy to ensure the fairness of predictions in high-stakes applications.

Making analogies is fundamental to cognition. Proportional analogies, which consist of four terms, are often used to assess linguistic and cognitive abilities. For instance, completing analogies like "Oxygen is to Gas as <blank> is to <blank>" requires identifying the semantic relationship (e.g., "type of") between the first pair of terms ("Oxygen" and "Gas") and finding a second pair that shares the same relationship (e.g., "Aluminum" and "Metal"). In this work, we introduce a 15K Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) dataset for proportional analogy completion and evaluate the performance of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs) in various knowledge-enhanced prompt settings. Specifically, we augment prompts with three types of knowledge: exemplar, structured, and targeted. Our results show that despite extensive training data, solving proportional analogies remains challenging for current LLMs, with the best model achieving an accuracy of 55%. Notably, we find that providing targeted knowledge can better assist models in completing proportional analogies compared to providing exemplars or collections of structured knowledge.

Recently, there have been notable advancements in large language models (LLMs), demonstrating their growing abilities in complex reasoning. However, existing research largely overlooks a thorough and systematic comparison of these models' reasoning processes and outputs, particularly regarding their self-reflection pattern (also termed "Aha moment") and the interconnections across diverse domains. This paper proposes a novel framework for analyzing the reasoning characteristics of four cutting-edge large reasoning models (GPT-o1, DeepSeek-R1, Kimi-k1.5, and Grok-3) using keywords statistic and LLM-as-a-judge paradigm. Our approach connects their internal thinking processes with their final outputs. A diverse dataset consists of real-world scenario-based questions covering logical deduction, causal inference, and multi-step problem-solving. Additionally, a set of metrics is put forward to assess both the coherence of reasoning and the accuracy of the outputs. The research results uncover various patterns of how these models balance exploration and exploitation, deal with problems, and reach conclusions during the reasoning process. Through quantitative and qualitative comparisons, disparities among these models are identified in aspects such as the depth of reasoning, the reliance on intermediate steps, and the degree of similarity between their thinking processes and output patterns and those of GPT-o1. This work offers valuable insights into the trade-off between computational efficiency and reasoning robustness and provides practical recommendations for enhancing model design and evaluation in practical applications. We publicly release our project at: https://github.com/ChangWenhan/FromThinking2Output

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Commonsense causality reasoning (CCR) aims at identifying plausible causes and effects in natural language descriptions that are deemed reasonable by an average person. Although being of great academic and practical interest, this problem is still shadowed by the lack of a well-posed theoretical framework; existing work usually relies on deep language models wholeheartedly, and is potentially susceptible to confounding co-occurrences. Motivated by classical causal principles, we articulate the central question of CCR and draw parallels between human subjects in observational studies and natural languages to adopt CCR to the potential-outcomes framework, which is the first such attempt for commonsense tasks. We propose a novel framework, ROCK, to Reason O(A)bout Commonsense K(C)ausality, which utilizes temporal signals as incidental supervision, and balances confounding effects using temporal propensities that are analogous to propensity scores. The ROCK implementation is modular and zero-shot, and demonstrates good CCR capabilities.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Recently, the role of LLM-as-judge in evaluating large language models has gained prominence. However, current judge models suffer from narrow specialization and limited robustness, undermining their capacity for comprehensive evaluations. In this work, we present CompassJudger-2, a novel generalist judge model that overcomes these limitations via a task-driven, multi-domain data curation strategy. Central to our approach is supervising judgment tasks with verifiable rewards, guiding intrinsic critical reasoning through rejection sampling to foster robust, generalizable judgment capabilities. We introduce a refined learning objective with margin policy gradient loss to enhance performance. Empirically, CompassJudger-2 achieves superior results across multiple judge and reward benchmarks, and our 7B model demonstrates competitive judgment accuracy with significantly larger models like DeepSeek-V3 and Qwen3-235B-A22B. Additionally, we propose JudgerBenchV2, a comprehensive benchmark evaluating cross-domain judgment accuracy and rank consistency to standardize judge model evaluation. These contributions advance robust, scalable LLM judgment and establish new performance and evaluation standards.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

Humans regularly engage in analogical thinking, relating personal experiences to current situations (X is analogous to Y because of Z). Analogical thinking allows humans to solve problems in creative ways, grasp difficult concepts, and articulate ideas more effectively. Can language models (LMs) do the same? To answer this question, we propose ANALOBENCH, a benchmark to determine analogical reasoning ability in LMs. Our benchmarking approach focuses on aspects of this ability that are common among humans: (i) recalling related experiences from a large amount of information, and (ii) applying analogical reasoning to complex and lengthy scenarios. We test a broad collection of proprietary models (e.g., GPT family, Claude V2) and open source models such as LLaMA2. As in prior results, scaling up LMs results in some performance boosts. Surprisingly, scale offers minimal gains when, (i) analogies involve lengthy scenarios, or (ii) recalling relevant scenarios from a large pool of information, a process analogous to finding a needle in a haystack. We hope these observations encourage further research in this field.

While dialogue remains an important end-goal of natural language research, the difficulty of evaluation is an oft-quoted reason why it remains troublesome to make real progress towards its solution. Evaluation difficulties are actually two-fold: not only do automatic metrics not correlate well with human judgments, but also human judgments themselves are in fact difficult to measure. The two most used human judgment tests, single-turn pairwise evaluation and multi-turn Likert scores, both have serious flaws as we discuss in this work. We instead provide a novel procedure involving comparing two full dialogues, where a human judge is asked to pay attention to only one speaker within each, and make a pairwise judgment. The questions themselves are optimized to maximize the robustness of judgments across different annotators, resulting in better tests. We also show how these tests work in self-play model chat setups, resulting in faster, cheaper tests. We hope these tests become the de facto standard, and will release open-source code to that end.

Answering counterfactual queries has many important applications such as knowledge discovery and explainability, but is challenging when causal variables are unobserved and we only see a projection onto an observation space, for instance, image pixels. One approach is to recover the latent Structural Causal Model (SCM), but this typically needs unrealistic assumptions, such as linearity of the causal mechanisms. Another approach is to use na\"ive ML approximations, such as generative models, to generate counterfactual samples; however, these lack guarantees of accuracy. In this work, we strive to strike a balance between practicality and theoretical guarantees by focusing on a specific type of causal query called domain counterfactuals, which hypothesizes what a sample would have looked like if it had been generated in a different domain (or environment). Concretely, by only assuming invertibility, sparse domain interventions and access to observational data from different domains, we aim to improve domain counterfactual estimation both theoretically and practically with less restrictive assumptions. We define domain counterfactually equivalent models and prove necessary and sufficient properties for equivalent models that provide a tight characterization of the domain counterfactual equivalence classes. Building upon this result, we prove that every equivalence class contains a model where all intervened variables are at the end when topologically sorted by the causal DAG. This surprising result suggests that a model design that only allows intervention in the last k latent variables may improve model estimation for counterfactuals. We then test this model design on extensive simulated and image-based experiments which show the sparse canonical model indeed improves counterfactual estimation over baseline non-sparse models.

ARC Challenge appears more difficult than ARC Easy for modern LLMs primarily due to an evaluation setup that prevents direct comparison of answer choices rather than inherent complexity. Although some researchers have quietly shifted to a more appropriate scheme over the last year, the implications of this change have yet to be widely acknowledged. We highlight this overlooked shift, show how similar evaluation practices falsely imply reasoning deficits in other benchmarks, and demonstrate that fairer methods dramatically reduce performance gaps (e.g. on SIQA) and even yield superhuman results (OpenBookQA). In doing so, we reveal how evaluation shapes perceived difficulty and offer guidelines to ensure that multiple-choice evaluations accurately reflect actual model capabilities.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

We reveal and address the frequently overlooked yet important issue of disguised procedural unfairness, namely, the potentially inadvertent alterations on the behavior of neutral (i.e., not problematic) aspects of data generating process, and/or the lack of procedural assurance of the greatest benefit of the least advantaged individuals. Inspired by John Rawls's advocacy for pure procedural justice, we view automated decision-making as a microcosm of social institutions, and consider how the data generating process itself can satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness. We propose a framework that decouples the objectionable data generating components from the neutral ones by utilizing reference points and the associated value instantiation rule. Our findings highlight the necessity of preventing disguised procedural unfairness, drawing attention not only to the objectionable data generating components that we aim to mitigate, but also more importantly, to the neutral components that we intend to keep unaffected.

Existing approaches for aligning large language models with human preferences face a trade-off that requires a separate reward model (RM) for on-policy learning. In this paper, we present a novel alignment framework, that (1) does on-policy learning and 2) is parameter efficient, as it does not require an additional RM for evaluating the samples for on-policy learning. To this end, we propose Judge-augmented Supervised Fine-Tuning (JSFT) to train a single model to act as both a policy and a judge. Specifically, we view the pairwise judgment task, choosing the better response from a response pair, as a special case of the instruction-following task. The resulting model can judge preferences of on-the-fly responses from current policy initialized from itself. Experimental results show the efficacy of , outperforming baselines in preference benchmarks. We also show that the rejecting sampling by itself can improve performance further without an additional evaluator.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Despite the success of chain of thought in enhancing language model reasoning, the underlying process remains less well understood. Although logically sound reasoning appears inherently crucial for chain of thought, prior studies surprisingly reveal minimal impact when using invalid demonstrations instead. Furthermore, the conventional chain of thought does not inform language models on what mistakes to avoid, which potentially leads to more errors. Hence, inspired by how humans can learn from both positive and negative examples, we propose contrastive chain of thought to enhance language model reasoning. Compared to the conventional chain of thought, our approach provides both valid and invalid reasoning demonstrations, to guide the model to reason step-by-step while reducing reasoning mistakes. To improve generalization, we introduce an automatic method to construct contrastive demonstrations. Our experiments on reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that contrastive chain of thought can serve as a general enhancement of chain-of-thought prompting.

Recently, there has been a trend of evaluating the Large Language Model (LLM) quality in the flavor of LLM-as-a-Judge, namely leveraging another LLM to evaluate the current output quality. However, existing judges are proven to be biased, namely they would favor answers which present better superficial quality (such as verbosity, fluency) while ignoring the instruction following ability. In this work, we propose systematic research about the bias of LLM-as-a-Judge. Specifically, for closed-source judge models, we apply calibration to mitigate the significance of superficial quality, both on probability level and prompt level. For open-source judge models, we propose to mitigate the bias by contrastive training, with curated negative samples that deviate from instruction but present better superficial quality. We apply our methods on the bias evaluation benchmark, and experiment results show our methods mitigate the bias by a large margin while maintaining a satisfactory evaluation accuracy.

Seven years ago, researchers proposed a postprocessing method to equalize the error rates of a model across different demographic groups. The work launched hundreds of papers purporting to improve over the postprocessing baseline. We empirically evaluate these claims through thousands of model evaluations on several tabular datasets. We find that the fairness-accuracy Pareto frontier achieved by postprocessing contains all other methods we were feasibly able to evaluate. In doing so, we address two common methodological errors that have confounded previous observations. One relates to the comparison of methods with different unconstrained base models. The other concerns methods achieving different levels of constraint relaxation. At the heart of our study is a simple idea we call unprocessing that roughly corresponds to the inverse of postprocessing. Unprocessing allows for a direct comparison of methods using different underlying models and levels of relaxation.

This paper explores the moral judgment and moral reasoning abilities exhibited by Large Language Models (LLMs) across languages through the Defining Issues Test. It is a well known fact that moral judgment depends on the language in which the question is asked. We extend the work of beyond English, to 5 new languages (Chinese, Hindi, Russian, Spanish and Swahili), and probe three LLMs -- ChatGPT, GPT-4 and Llama2Chat-70B -- that shows substantial multilingual text processing and generation abilities. Our study shows that the moral reasoning ability for all models, as indicated by the post-conventional score, is substantially inferior for Hindi and Swahili, compared to Spanish, Russian, Chinese and English, while there is no clear trend for the performance of the latter four languages. The moral judgments too vary considerably by the language.

As AI capabilities increasingly surpass human proficiency in complex tasks, current alignment techniques including SFT and RLHF face fundamental challenges in ensuring reliable oversight. These methods rely on direct human assessment and become untenable when AI outputs exceed human cognitive thresholds. In response to this challenge, we explore two hypotheses: (1) critique of critique can be easier than critique itself, extending the widely-accepted observation that verification is easier than generation to the critique domain, as critique itself is a specialized form of generation; (2) this difficulty relationship is recursively held, suggesting that when direct evaluation is infeasible, performing high-order critiques (e.g., critique of critique of critique) offers a more tractable supervision pathway. To examine these hypotheses, we perform Human-Human, Human-AI, and AI-AI experiments across multiple tasks. Our results demonstrate encouraging evidence supporting these hypotheses and suggest that recursive self-critiquing is a promising direction for scalable oversight.

The Superficial Alignment Hypothesis posits that almost all of a language model's abilities and knowledge are learned during pre-training, while post-training is about giving a model the right style and format. We re-examine these claims by empirically studying the scaling behavior of post-training with increasing finetuning examples and evaluating them using objective task-specific standardized benchmarks. Through experiments with the Llama-3, Mistral, and Llama-2 model families of multiple sizes, we observe that, similar to the pre-training scaling laws, post-training task performance scales as a power law against the number of finetuning examples. This power law relationship holds across a broad array of capabilities, including mathematical reasoning, coding, instruction following, and multihop-reasoning. In addition, for tasks like math and multihop reasoning, we observe that a handful of examples merely align the model stylistically but do not saturate performance on the benchmarks. Model performance is instead correlated with its reasoning ability and it improves significantly with more examples, illustrating the need for holistic evaluation programs leveraging objective benchmarks in addition to measurement of alignment to human preferences. We also observe that language models are not necessarily limited to using knowledge learned during pre-training. With appropriate post-training, a model's ability to integrate new knowledge greatly improves on downstream tasks like multihop question-answering. Taken together, these results shed new light on the Superficial Alignment Hypothesis, suggesting that it is, at best, an over-simplification.

We present a new approach for mitigating unfairness in learned classifiers. In particular, we focus on binary classification tasks over individuals from two populations, where, as our criterion for fairness, we wish to achieve similar false positive rates in both populations, and similar false negative rates in both populations. As a proof of concept, we implement our approach and empirically evaluate its ability to achieve both fairness and accuracy, using datasets from the fields of criminal risk assessment, credit, lending, and college admissions.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

In real-world scenarios, typical visual recognition systems could fail under two major causes, i.e., the misclassification between known classes and the excusable misbehavior on unknown-class images. To tackle these deficiencies, flexible visual recognition should dynamically predict multiple classes when they are unconfident between choices and reject making predictions when the input is entirely out of the training distribution. Two challenges emerge along with this novel task. First, prediction uncertainty should be separately quantified as confusion depicting inter-class uncertainties and ignorance identifying out-of-distribution samples. Second, both confusion and ignorance should be comparable between samples to enable effective decision-making. In this paper, we propose to model these two sources of uncertainty explicitly with the theory of Subjective Logic. Regarding recognition as an evidence-collecting process, confusion is then defined as conflicting evidence, while ignorance is the absence of evidence. By predicting Dirichlet concentration parameters for singletons, comprehensive subjective opinions, including confusion and ignorance, could be achieved via further evidence combinations. Through a series of experiments on synthetic data analysis, visual recognition, and open-set detection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in quantifying two sources of uncertainties and dealing with flexible recognition.

As Language Model (LM) capabilities advance, evaluating and supervising them at scale is getting harder for humans. There is hope that other language models can automate both these tasks, which we refer to as "AI Oversight". We study how model similarity affects both aspects of AI oversight by proposing a probabilistic metric for LM similarity based on overlap in model mistakes. Using this metric, we first show that LLM-as-a-judge scores favor models similar to the judge, generalizing recent self-preference results. Then, we study training on LM annotations, and find complementary knowledge between the weak supervisor and strong student model plays a crucial role in gains from "weak-to-strong generalization". As model capabilities increase, it becomes harder to find their mistakes, and we might defer more to AI oversight. However, we observe a concerning trend -- model mistakes are becoming more similar with increasing capabilities, pointing to risks from correlated failures. Our work underscores the importance of reporting and correcting for model similarity, especially in the emerging paradigm of AI oversight.

Fairness in recommender systems (RSs) is commonly categorised into group fairness and individual fairness. However, there is no established scientific understanding of the relationship between the two fairness types, as prior work on both types has used different evaluation measures or evaluation objectives for each fairness type, thereby not allowing for a proper comparison of the two. As a result, it is currently not known how increasing one type of fairness may affect the other. To fill this gap, we study the relationship of group and individual fairness through a comprehensive comparison of evaluation measures that can be used for both fairness types. Our experiments with 8 runs across 3 datasets show that recommendations that are highly fair for groups can be very unfair for individuals. Our finding is novel and useful for RS practitioners aiming to improve the fairness of their systems. Our code is available at: https://github.com/theresiavr/stairway-to-fairness.

As AI grows more powerful, it will increasingly shape how we understand the world. But with this influence comes the risk of amplifying misinformation and deepening social divides-especially on consequential topics like public health where factual accuracy directly impacts well-being. Scalable Oversight aims to ensure AI truthfulness by enabling humans to supervise systems that may exceed human capabilities--yet humans themselves hold different beliefs and biases that impair their judgment. We study whether AI debate can guide biased judges toward the truth by having two AI systems debate opposing sides of controversial COVID-19 factuality claims where people hold strong prior beliefs. We conduct two studies: one with human judges holding either mainstream or skeptical beliefs evaluating factuality claims through AI-assisted debate or consultancy protocols, and a second examining the same problem with personalized AI judges designed to mimic these different human belief systems. In our human study, we find that debate-where two AI advisor systems present opposing evidence-based arguments-consistently improves judgment accuracy and confidence calibration, outperforming consultancy with a single-advisor system by 10% overall. The improvement is most significant for judges with mainstream beliefs (+15.2% accuracy), though debate also helps skeptical judges who initially misjudge claims move toward accurate views (+4.7% accuracy). In our AI judge study, we find that AI judges with human-like personas achieve even higher accuracy (78.5%) than human judges (70.1%) and default AI judges without personas (69.8%), suggesting their potential for supervising frontier AI models. These findings highlight AI debate as a promising path toward scalable, bias-resilient oversight--leveraging both diverse human and AI judgments to move closer to truth in contested domains.

Recent studies show that large language models (LLMs) exhibit self-preference bias when serving as judges, meaning they tend to favor their own responses over those generated by other models. Existing methods typically measure this bias by calculating the difference between the scores a judge model assigns to its own responses and those it assigns to responses from other models. However, this approach conflates self-preference bias with response quality, as higher-quality responses from the judge model may also lead to positive score differences, even in the absence of bias. To address this issue, we introduce gold judgments as proxies for the actual quality of responses and propose the DBG score, which measures self-preference bias as the difference between the scores assigned by the judge model to its own responses and the corresponding gold judgments. Since gold judgments reflect true response quality, the DBG score mitigates the confounding effect of response quality on bias measurement. Using the DBG score, we conduct comprehensive experiments to assess self-preference bias across LLMs of varying versions, sizes, and reasoning abilities. Additionally, we investigate two factors that influence and help alleviate self-preference bias: response text style and the post-training data of judge models. Finally, we explore potential underlying mechanisms of self-preference bias from an attention-based perspective. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/zhiyuanc2001/self-preference.

With increased power and prevalence of AI systems, it is ever more critical that AI systems are designed to serve all, i.e., people with diverse values and perspectives. However, aligning models to serve pluralistic human values remains an open research question. In this piece, we propose a roadmap to pluralistic alignment, specifically using language models as a test bed. We identify and formalize three possible ways to define and operationalize pluralism in AI systems: 1) Overton pluralistic models that present a spectrum of reasonable responses; 2) Steerably pluralistic models that can steer to reflect certain perspectives; and 3) Distributionally pluralistic models that are well-calibrated to a given population in distribution. We also propose and formalize three possible classes of pluralistic benchmarks: 1) Multi-objective benchmarks, 2) Trade-off steerable benchmarks, which incentivize models to steer to arbitrary trade-offs, and 3) Jury-pluralistic benchmarks which explicitly model diverse human ratings. We use this framework to argue that current alignment techniques may be fundamentally limited for pluralistic AI; indeed, we highlight empirical evidence, both from our own experiments and from other work, that standard alignment procedures might reduce distributional pluralism in models, motivating the need for further research on pluralistic alignment.

Standard practice within Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) involves optimizing against a Reward Model (RM), which itself is trained to reflect human preferences for desirable generations. A notable subject that is understudied is the (in-)consistency of RMs -- whether they can recognize the semantic changes to different prompts and appropriately adapt their reward assignments -- and their impact on the downstream RLHF model. In this paper, we visit a series of research questions relevant to RM inconsistency: (1) How can we measure the consistency of reward models? (2) How consistent are the existing RMs and how can we improve them? (3) In what ways does reward inconsistency influence the chatbots resulting from the RLHF model training? We propose Contrast Instructions -- a benchmarking strategy for the consistency of RM. Each example in Contrast Instructions features a pair of lexically similar instructions with different ground truth responses. A consistent RM is expected to rank the corresponding instruction and response higher than other combinations. We observe that current RMs trained with the standard ranking objective fail miserably on Contrast Instructions compared to average humans. To show that RM consistency can be improved efficiently without using extra training budget, we propose two techniques ConvexDA and RewardFusion, which enhance reward consistency through extrapolation during the RM training and inference stage, respectively. We show that RLHF models trained with a more consistent RM yield more useful responses, suggesting that reward inconsistency exhibits a trickle-down effect on the downstream RLHF process.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant progress in performing complex tasks. While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has been effective in aligning LLMs with human preferences, it is susceptible to spurious correlations in reward modeling. Consequently, it often introduces biases-such as length bias, sycophancy, conceptual bias, and discrimination that hinder the model's ability to capture true causal relationships. To address this, we propose a novel causal reward modeling approach that integrates causal inference to mitigate these spurious correlations. Our method enforces counterfactual invariance, ensuring reward predictions remain consistent when irrelevant variables are altered. Through experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets, we show that our approach mitigates various types of spurious correlations effectively, resulting in more reliable and fair alignment of LLMs with human preferences. As a drop-in enhancement to the existing RLHF workflow, our causal reward modeling provides a practical way to improve the trustworthiness and fairness of LLM finetuning.

In recent years, large language models have greatly improved in their ability to perform complex multi-step reasoning. However, even state-of-the-art models still regularly produce logical mistakes. To train more reliable models, we can turn either to outcome supervision, which provides feedback for a final result, or process supervision, which provides feedback for each intermediate reasoning step. Given the importance of training reliable models, and given the high cost of human feedback, it is important to carefully compare the both methods. Recent work has already begun this comparison, but many questions still remain. We conduct our own investigation, finding that process supervision significantly outperforms outcome supervision for training models to solve problems from the challenging MATH dataset. Our process-supervised model solves 78% of problems from a representative subset of the MATH test set. Additionally, we show that active learning significantly improves the efficacy of process supervision. To support related research, we also release PRM800K, the complete dataset of 800,000 step-level human feedback labels used to train our best reward model.

We introduce a novel framework for incorporating human expertise into algorithmic predictions. Our approach leverages human judgment to distinguish inputs which are algorithmically indistinguishable, or "look the same" to predictive algorithms. We argue that this framing clarifies the problem of human-AI collaboration in prediction tasks, as experts often form judgments by drawing on information which is not encoded in an algorithm's training data. Algorithmic indistinguishability yields a natural test for assessing whether experts incorporate this kind of "side information", and further provides a simple but principled method for selectively incorporating human feedback into algorithmic predictions. We show that this method provably improves the performance of any feasible algorithmic predictor and precisely quantify this improvement. We find empirically that although algorithms often outperform their human counterparts on average, human judgment can improve algorithmic predictions on specific instances (which can be identified ex-ante). In an X-ray classification task, we find that this subset constitutes nearly 30% of the patient population. Our approach provides a natural way of uncovering this heterogeneity and thus enabling effective human-AI collaboration.

Large Language Models (LLMs) were shown to struggle with long-term planning, which may be caused by the limited way in which they explore the space of possible solutions. We propose an architecture where a Reinforcement Learning (RL) Agent guides an LLM's space exploration: (1) the Agent has access to domain-specific information, and can therefore make decisions about the quality of candidate solutions based on specific and relevant metrics, which were not explicitly considered by the LLM's training objective; (2) the LLM can focus on generating immediate next steps, without the need for long-term planning. We allow non-linear reasoning by exploring alternative paths and backtracking. We evaluate this architecture on the program equivalence task, and compare it against Chain of Thought (CoT) and Tree of Thoughts (ToT). We assess both the downstream task, denoting the binary classification, and the intermediate reasoning steps. Our approach compares positively against CoT and ToT.

To make deliberate progress towards more intelligent and more human-like artificial systems, we need to be following an appropriate feedback signal: we need to be able to define and evaluate intelligence in a way that enables comparisons between two systems, as well as comparisons with humans. Over the past hundred years, there has been an abundance of attempts to define and measure intelligence, across both the fields of psychology and AI. We summarize and critically assess these definitions and evaluation approaches, while making apparent the two historical conceptions of intelligence that have implicitly guided them. We note that in practice, the contemporary AI community still gravitates towards benchmarking intelligence by comparing the skill exhibited by AIs and humans at specific tasks such as board games and video games. We argue that solely measuring skill at any given task falls short of measuring intelligence, because skill is heavily modulated by prior knowledge and experience: unlimited priors or unlimited training data allow experimenters to "buy" arbitrary levels of skills for a system, in a way that masks the system's own generalization power. We then articulate a new formal definition of intelligence based on Algorithmic Information Theory, describing intelligence as skill-acquisition efficiency and highlighting the concepts of scope, generalization difficulty, priors, and experience. Using this definition, we propose a set of guidelines for what a general AI benchmark should look like. Finally, we present a benchmark closely following these guidelines, the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), built upon an explicit set of priors designed to be as close as possible to innate human priors. We argue that ARC can be used to measure a human-like form of general fluid intelligence and that it enables fair general intelligence comparisons between AI systems and humans.

A comparison of the distances to the Huanan Seafood Market of early Covid cases with known links to the market versus cases without known links shows results apparently incompatible with a location model lacking proximity ascertainment bias. The sign of the difference instead agrees with a model in which such ascertainment bias is large. In the presence of such bias inferences based on the clustering of case locations become unreliable.

As a seemingly self-explanatory task, problem-solving has been a significant component of science and engineering. However, a general yet concrete formulation of problem-solving itself is missing. With the recent development of AI-based problem-solving agents, the demand for process-level verifiability is rapidly increasing yet underexplored. To fill these gaps, we present a principled formulation of problem-solving as a deterministic Markov decision process; a novel framework, FPS (Formal Problem-Solving), which utilizes existing FTP (formal theorem proving) environments to perform process-verified problem-solving; and D-FPS (Deductive FPS), decoupling solving and answer verification for better human-alignment. The expressiveness, soundness and completeness of the frameworks are proven. We construct three benchmarks on problem-solving: FormalMath500, a formalization of a subset of the MATH500 benchmark; MiniF2F-Solving and PutnamBench-Solving, adaptations of FTP benchmarks MiniF2F and PutnamBench. For faithful, interpretable, and human-aligned evaluation, we propose RPE (Restricted Propositional Equivalence), a symbolic approach to determine the correctness of answers by formal verification. We evaluate four prevalent FTP models and two prompting methods as baselines, solving at most 23.77% of FormalMath500, 27.47% of MiniF2F-Solving, and 0.31% of PutnamBench-Solving.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have gained significant attention recently, showing remarkable potential in artificial general intelligence. However, assessing the utility of MLLMs presents considerable challenges, primarily due to the absence of multimodal benchmarks that align with human preferences. Drawing inspiration from the concept of LLM-as-a-Judge within LLMs, this paper introduces a novel benchmark, termed MLLM-as-a-Judge, to assess the ability of MLLMs in assisting judges across diverse modalities, encompassing three distinct tasks: Scoring Evaluation, Pair Comparison, and Batch Ranking. Our study reveals that, while MLLMs demonstrate remarkable human-like discernment in Pair Comparison, there is a significant divergence from human preferences in Scoring Evaluation and Batch Ranking. Furthermore, a closer examination reveals persistent challenges in the judgment capacities of LLMs, including diverse biases, hallucinatory responses, and inconsistencies in judgment, even in advanced models such as GPT-4V. These findings emphasize the pressing need for enhancements and further research efforts to be undertaken before regarding MLLMs as fully reliable evaluators. In light of this, we advocate for additional efforts dedicated to supporting the continuous development within the domain of MLLM functioning as judges. The code and dataset are publicly available at our project homepage: https://mllm-judge.github.io/.

The ability to solve problems is a hallmark of intelligence and has been an enduring goal in AI. AI systems that can create programs as solutions to problems or assist developers in writing programs can increase productivity and make programming more accessible. Recently, pre-trained large language models have shown impressive abilities in generating new codes from natural language descriptions, repairing buggy codes, translating codes between languages, and retrieving relevant code segments. However, the evaluation of these models has often been performed in a scattered way on only one or two specific tasks, in a few languages, at a partial granularity (e.g., function) level and in many cases without proper training data. Even more concerning is that in most cases the evaluation of generated codes has been done in terms of mere lexical overlap rather than actual execution whereas semantic similarity (or equivalence) of two code segments depends only on their ``execution similarity'', i.e., being able to get the same output for a given input.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly employed as automated evaluators to assess the safety of generated content, yet their reliability in this role remains uncertain. This study evaluates a diverse set of 11 LLM judge models across critical safety domains, examining three key aspects: self-consistency in repeated judging tasks, alignment with human judgments, and susceptibility to input artifacts such as apologetic or verbose phrasing. Our findings reveal that biases in LLM judges can significantly distort the final verdict on which content source is safer, undermining the validity of comparative evaluations. Notably, apologetic language artifacts alone can skew evaluator preferences by up to 98\%. Contrary to expectations, larger models do not consistently exhibit greater robustness, while smaller models sometimes show higher resistance to specific artifacts. To mitigate LLM evaluator robustness issues, we investigate jury-based evaluations aggregating decisions from multiple models. Although this approach both improves robustness and enhances alignment to human judgements, artifact sensitivity persists even with the best jury configurations. These results highlight the urgent need for diversified, artifact-resistant methodologies to ensure reliable safety assessments.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) like DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1 have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities, raising important questions about their biases in LLM-as-a-judge settings. We present a comprehensive benchmark comparing judging biases between LLMs and LRMs across both subjective preference-alignment datasets and objective fact-based datasets. Through investigation of bandwagon, authority, position, and distraction biases, we uncover four key findings: (1) despite their advanced reasoning capabilities, LRMs remain susceptible to the above biases; (2) LRMs demonstrate better robustness than LLMs specifically on fact-related datasets; (3) LRMs exhibit notable position bias, preferring options in later positions; and (4) we identify a novel "superficial reflection bias" where phrases mimicking reasoning (e.g., "wait, let me think...") significantly influence model judgments. To address these biases, we design and evaluate three mitigation strategies: specialized system prompts that reduce judging biases by up to 19\% in preference alignment datasets and 14\% in fact-related datasets, in-context learning that provides up to 27\% improvement on preference tasks but shows inconsistent results on factual tasks, and a self-reflection mechanism that reduces biases by up to 10\% in preference datasets and 16\% in fact-related datasets, with self-reflection proving particularly effective for LRMs. Our work provides crucial insights for developing more reliable LLM-as-a-Judge frameworks, especially as LRMs become increasingly deployed as automated judges.

There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.

We propose an alternative to the Turing test that removes the inherent asymmetry between humans and machines in Turing's original imitation game. In this new test, both humans and machines judge each other. We argue that this makes the test more robust against simple deceptions. We also propose a small number of refinements to improve further the test. These refinements could be applied also to Turing's original imitation game.

We present a straightforward statistical test to detect certain violations of the assumption that the data are Independent and Identically Distributed (IID). The specific form of violation considered is common across real-world applications: whether the examples are ordered in the dataset such that almost adjacent examples tend to have more similar feature values (e.g. due to distributional drift, or attractive interactions between datapoints). Based on a k-Nearest Neighbors estimate, our approach can be used to audit any multivariate numeric data as well as other data types (image, text, audio, etc.) that can be numerically represented, perhaps with model embeddings. Compared with existing methods to detect drift or auto-correlation, our approach is both applicable to more types of data and also able to detect a wider variety of IID violations in practice. Code: https://github.com/cleanlab/cleanlab

Generative AI systems like foundation models (FMs) must align well with human values to ensure their behavior is helpful and trustworthy. While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has shown promise for optimizing model performance using human judgments, existing RLHF pipelines predominantly rely on immediate feedback, which can fail to accurately reflect the downstream impact of an interaction on users' utility. We demonstrate that feedback based on evaluators' foresight estimates of downstream consequences systematically induces Goodhart's Law dynamics, incentivizing misaligned behaviors like sycophancy and deception and ultimately degrading user outcomes. To alleviate this, we propose decoupling evaluation from prediction by refocusing RLHF on hindsight feedback. Our theoretical analysis reveals that conditioning evaluator feedback on downstream observations mitigates misalignment and improves expected human utility, even when these observations are simulated by the AI system itself. To leverage this insight in a practical alignment algorithm, we introduce Reinforcement Learning from Hindsight Simulation (RLHS), which first simulates plausible consequences and then elicits feedback to assess what behaviors were genuinely beneficial in hindsight. We apply RLHS to two widely-employed online and offline preference optimization methods -- Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) -- and show empirically that misalignment is significantly reduced with both methods. Through an online human user study, we show that RLHS consistently outperforms RLHF in helping users achieve their goals and earns higher satisfaction ratings, despite being trained solely with simulated hindsight feedback. These results underscore the importance of focusing on long-term consequences, even simulated ones, to mitigate misalignment in RLHF.

LLM-as-a-Judge, which generates chain-of-thought (CoT) judgments, has become a widely adopted auto-evaluation method. However, its reliability is compromised by the CoT reasoning's inability to capture comprehensive and deeper details, often leading to incomplete outcomes. Existing methods mainly rely on majority voting or criteria expansion, which is insufficient to address the limitation in CoT. We propose Crowd-based Comparative Evaluation, which introduces additional crowd responses to compare with the candidate responses, thereby exposing deeper and more comprehensive details within the candidate responses. This process effectively guides LLM-as-a-Judge to provide a more detailed CoT judgment. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach enhances evaluation reliability, achieving an average accuracy gain of 6.7% across five benchmarks. Moreover, our method produces higher-quality CoTs that facilitate judge distillation and exhibit superior performance in rejection sampling for supervised fine-tuning (SFT), referred to as crowd rejection sampling, thereby enabling more efficient SFT. Our analysis confirms that CoTs generated by ours are more comprehensive and of higher quality, and evaluation accuracy improves as inference scales.

The ability to recognize analogies is fundamental to human cognition. Existing benchmarks to test word analogy do not reveal the underneath process of analogical reasoning of neural models. Holding the belief that models capable of reasoning should be right for the right reasons, we propose a first-of-its-kind Explainable Knowledge-intensive Analogical Reasoning benchmark (E-KAR). Our benchmark consists of 1,655 (in Chinese) and 1,251 (in English) problems sourced from the Civil Service Exams, which require intensive background knowledge to solve. More importantly, we design a free-text explanation scheme to explain whether an analogy should be drawn, and manually annotate them for each and every question and candidate answer. Empirical results suggest that this benchmark is very challenging for some state-of-the-art models for both explanation generation and analogical question answering tasks, which invites further research in this area.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

With the rapid growth in language processing applications, fairness has emerged as an important consideration in data-driven solutions. Although various fairness definitions have been explored in the recent literature, there is lack of consensus on which metrics most accurately reflect the fairness of a system. In this work, we propose a new formulation : ACCUMULATED PREDICTION SENSITIVITY, which measures fairness in machine learning models based on the model's prediction sensitivity to perturbations in input features. The metric attempts to quantify the extent to which a single prediction depends on a protected attribute, where the protected attribute encodes the membership status of an individual in a protected group. We show that the metric can be theoretically linked with a specific notion of group fairness (statistical parity) and individual fairness. It also correlates well with humans' perception of fairness. We conduct experiments on two text classification datasets : JIGSAW TOXICITY, and BIAS IN BIOS, and evaluate the correlations between metrics and manual annotations on whether the model produced a fair outcome. We observe that the proposed fairness metric based on prediction sensitivity is statistically significantly more correlated with human annotation than the existing counterfactual fairness metric.

Binding precedents (S\'umulas Vinculantes) constitute a juridical instrument unique to the Brazilian legal system and whose objectives include the protection of the Federal Supreme Court against repetitive demands. Studies of the effectiveness of these instruments in decreasing the Court's exposure to similar cases, however, indicate that they tend to fail in such a direction, with some of the binding precedents seemingly creating new demands. We empirically assess the legal impact of five binding precedents, 11, 14, 17, 26 and 37, at the highest court level through their effects on the legal subjects they address. This analysis is only possible through the comparison of the Court's ruling about the precedents' themes before they are created, which means that these decisions should be detected through techniques of Similar Case Retrieval. The contributions of this article are therefore twofold: on the mathematical side, we compare the uses of different methods of Natural Language Processing -- TF-IDF, LSTM, BERT, and regex -- for Similar Case Retrieval, whereas on the legal side, we contrast the inefficiency of these binding precedents with a set of hypotheses that may justify their repeated usage. We observe that the deep learning models performed significantly worse in the specific Similar Case Retrieval task and that the reasons for binding precedents to fail in responding to repetitive demand are heterogeneous and case-dependent, making it impossible to single out a specific cause.

The ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to critique and refine their reasoning is crucial for their application in evaluation, feedback provision, and self-improvement. This paper introduces CriticBench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to assess LLMs' abilities to critique and rectify their reasoning across a variety of tasks. CriticBench encompasses five reasoning domains: mathematical, commonsense, symbolic, coding, and algorithmic. It compiles 15 datasets and incorporates responses from three LLM families. Utilizing CriticBench, we evaluate and dissect the performance of 17 LLMs in generation, critique, and correction reasoning, i.e., GQC reasoning. Our findings reveal: (1) a linear relationship in GQC capabilities, with critique-focused training markedly enhancing performance; (2) a task-dependent variation in correction effectiveness, with logic-oriented tasks being more amenable to correction; (3) GQC knowledge inconsistencies that decrease as model size increases; and (4) an intriguing inter-model critiquing dynamic, where stronger models are better at critiquing weaker ones, while weaker models can surprisingly surpass stronger ones in their self-critique. We hope these insights into the nuanced critique-correct reasoning of LLMs will foster further research in LLM critique and self-improvement.

Recent work has explored how to train machine learning models which do not discriminate against any subgroup of the population as determined by sensitive attributes such as gender or race. To avoid disparate treatment, sensitive attributes should not be considered. On the other hand, in order to avoid disparate impact, sensitive attributes must be examined, e.g., in order to learn a fair model, or to check if a given model is fair. We introduce methods from secure multi-party computation which allow us to avoid both. By encrypting sensitive attributes, we show how an outcome-based fair model may be learned, checked, or have its outputs verified and held to account, without users revealing their sensitive attributes.

Although counterfactual reasoning is a fundamental aspect of intelligence, the lack of large-scale counterfactual open-domain question-answering (QA) benchmarks makes it difficult to evaluate and improve models on this ability. To address this void, we introduce the first such dataset, named IfQA, where each question is based on a counterfactual presupposition via an "if" clause. For example, if Los Angeles was on the east coast of the U.S., what would be the time difference between Los Angeles and Paris? Such questions require models to go beyond retrieving direct factual knowledge from the Web: they must identify the right information to retrieve and reason about an imagined situation that may even go against the facts built into their parameters. The IfQA dataset contains over 3,800 questions that were annotated annotated by crowdworkers on relevant Wikipedia passages. Empirical analysis reveals that the IfQA dataset is highly challenging for existing open-domain QA methods, including supervised retrieve-then-read pipeline methods (EM score 36.2), as well as recent few-shot approaches such as chain-of-thought prompting with GPT-3 (EM score 27.4). The unique challenges posed by the IfQA benchmark will push open-domain QA research on both retrieval and counterfactual reasoning fronts.

Existing vision-language models (VLMs), whether generalists or specialists, remain constrained by their parameter scale, lack robust self-correction capabilities, and underperform in tasks involving long visual contexts and complex reasoning, resulting in suboptimal performance on document-based tasks. To address this, we propose MACT, a Multi-Agent Collaboration framework with Test-Time scaling, tailored for visual document understanding and visual question answering (VQA). It comprises four distinct small-scale agents, i.e., planning, execution, judgment, and answer agents, with clearly defined roles and effective collaboration. Notably, the judgment agent exclusively verifies correctness and redirects to prior agents for revisions, outperforming conventional correction strategies. To further expand the capability boundaries of the framework, we propose mixed reward modeling that balances agent-specific abilities and global collaboration, as well as agent-wise hybrid test-time scaling, which customizes different scaling strategies for each agent based on their functions. Evaluated on benchmarks spanning both document-based and non-document-based settings, our MACT shows superior performance with a smaller parameter scale without sacrificing the ability of general and mathematical tasks. Especially, it stands out in benchmarks involving long visual contexts and complicated reasoning. The three variants of MACT consistently hold the top three positions in average scores, leading in 13 of the 15 benchmarks. Code will be available at: https://github.com/YU-deep/MACT.git.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

This work explores enabling Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning to link visual cues across multiple images. A straightforward solution is to adapt rule-based reinforcement learning for Vision-Language Models (VLMs). However, such methods typically rely on manually curated question-answer pairs, which can be particularly challenging when dealing with fine grained visual details and complex logic across images. Inspired by self-supervised visual representation learning, we observe that images contain inherent constraints that can serve as supervision. Based on this insight, we construct image triplets comprising two augmented views of the same image and a third, similar but distinct image. During training, the model is prompted to generate a reasoning process to compare these images (i.e., determine same or different). Then we optimize the model with rule-based reinforcement learning. Due to the high visual similarity and the presence of augmentations, the model must attend to subtle visual changes and perform logical reasoning to succeed. Experiments show that, although trained solely on visual comparison tasks, the learned reasoning ability generalizes effectively to a wide range of questions. Without relying on any human-annotated question-answer pairs, our method achieves significant improvements on multi-image reasoning benchmarks and shows strong performance on general vision tasks.

As models increasingly leverage multi-step reasoning strategies to solve complex problems, supervising the logical validity of these intermediate steps has become a critical research challenge. Process reward models address this by providing step-by-step feedback, but current approaches have two major drawbacks: they typically function as classifiers without providing explanations, and their reliance on supervised fine-tuning with static datasets limits generalization. Inspired by recent advances, we reframe stepwise reward modeling from a classification task to a reasoning task itself. We thus propose a generative judge that reasons about the policy model's reasoning steps (i.e., meta-reasons), outputting thinking tokens before delivering a final verdict. Our model, StepWiser, is trained by reinforcement learning using relative outcomes of rollouts. We show it provides (i) better judgment accuracy on intermediate steps than existing methods; (ii) can be used to improve the policy model at training time; and (iii) improves inference-time search.

Common-sense reasoning is a key language model capability because it encapsulates not just specific factual knowledge but rather general language and world understanding. Measuring common-sense reasoning, therefore, is crucial for language models of different sizes and applications. One of the most widely used benchmarks for evaluating such capabilities is HellaSwag; however, in this paper, we show that it has severe construct validity issues. These issues range from basic ungrammaticality and numerous typos to misleading prompts or equally correct options. Furthermore, we show that if models are evaluated only on answer texts, or with "Lorem ipsum dolor..." instead of the question, more than 65% of model predictions remain the same, and this cannot be attributed merely to contamination. Since benchmark scores are an essential part of model selection in both research and commercial applications, these validity issues can have severe consequences. In particular, knowing that taking benchmark scores at face value is ubiquitous, inadequate evaluation leads to ill-informed decisions about models. In this paper, we thoroughly investigate critical validity issues posed by HellaSwag and illustrate them with various evaluations using generative language models of different sizes. We argue that this benchmark does not accurately measure common-sense reasoning and, therefore, should not be used for evaluation in its current state. Based on the results of our study, we propose requirements that should be met by future common-sense reasoning benchmarks. In addition, we release GoldenSwag, a corrected subset of HellaSwag, which, to our belief, facilitates acceptable common-sense reasoning evaluation.

Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly prominent in the field of artificial intelligence. These models not only excel in traditional vision-language tasks but also demonstrate impressive performance in contemporary multi-modal benchmarks. Although many of these benchmarks attempt to holistically evaluate MLLMs, they typically concentrate on basic reasoning tasks, often yielding only simple yes/no or multi-choice responses. These methods naturally lead to confusion and difficulties in conclusively determining the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs. To mitigate this issue, we manually curate a benchmark dataset specifically designed for MLLMs, with a focus on complex reasoning tasks. Our benchmark comprises three key reasoning categories: deductive, abductive, and analogical reasoning. The queries in our dataset are intentionally constructed to engage the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs in the process of generating answers. For a fair comparison across various MLLMs, we incorporate intermediate reasoning steps into our evaluation criteria. In instances where an MLLM is unable to produce a definitive answer, its reasoning ability is evaluated by requesting intermediate reasoning steps. If these steps align with our manual annotations, appropriate scores are assigned. This evaluation scheme resembles methods commonly used in human assessments, such as exams or assignments, and represents what we consider a more effective assessment technique compared with existing benchmarks. We evaluate a selection of representative MLLMs using this rigorously developed open-ended multi-step elaborate reasoning benchmark, designed to challenge and accurately measure their reasoning capabilities. The code and data will be released at https://core-mm.github.io/

LLM-as-a-Judge refers to the automatic modeling of preferences for responses generated by Large Language Models (LLMs), which is of significant importance for both LLM evaluation and reward modeling. Although generative LLMs have made substantial progress in various tasks, their performance as LLM-Judge still falls short of expectations. In this work, we propose Think-J, which improves generative LLM-as-a-Judge by learning how to think. We first utilized a small amount of curated data to develop the model with initial judgment thinking capabilities. Subsequently, we optimize the judgment thinking traces based on reinforcement learning (RL). We propose two methods for judgment thinking optimization, based on offline and online RL, respectively. The offline RL requires training a critic model to construct positive and negative examples for learning. The online method defines rule-based reward as feedback for optimization. Experimental results showed that our approach can significantly enhance the evaluation capability of generative LLM-Judge, surpassing both generative and classifier-based LLM-Judge without requiring extra human annotations.

We address the challenge of online Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) with a focus on self-rewarding alignment methods. In online RLHF, obtaining feedback requires interaction with the environment, which can be costly when using additional reward models or the GPT-4 API. Current self-rewarding approaches rely heavily on the discriminator's judgment capabilities, which are effective for large-scale models but challenging to transfer to smaller ones. To address these limitations, we propose a novel, only-prompting self-rewarding online algorithm that generates preference datasets without relying on judgment capabilities. Additionally, we employ fine-grained arithmetic control over the optimality gap between positive and negative examples, generating more hard negatives in the later stages of training to help the model better capture subtle human preferences. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments on two base models, Mistral-7B and Mistral-Instruct-7B, which significantly bootstrap the performance of the reference model, achieving 34.5% in the Length-controlled Win Rates of AlpacaEval 2.0.

Given the rapid progress of generative AI, there is a pressing need to systematically compare and choose between the numerous models and configurations available. The scale and versatility of such evaluations make the use of LLM-based judges a compelling solution for this challenge. Crucially, this approach requires first to validate the quality of the LLM judge itself. Previous work has focused on instance-based assessment of LLM judges, where a judge is evaluated over a set of responses, or response pairs, while being agnostic to their source systems. We argue that this setting overlooks critical factors affecting system-level ranking, such as a judge's positive or negative bias towards certain systems. To address this gap, we conduct the first large-scale study of LLM judges as system rankers. System scores are generated by aggregating judgment scores over multiple system outputs, and the judge's quality is assessed by comparing the resulting system ranking to a human-based ranking. Beyond overall judge assessment, our analysis provides a fine-grained characterization of judge behavior, including their decisiveness and bias.

Statutory reasoning refers to the application of legislative provisions to a series of case facts described in natural language. We re-frame statutory reasoning as an analogy task, where each instance of the analogy task involves a combination of two instances of statutory reasoning. This increases the dataset size by two orders of magnitude, and introduces an element of interpretability. We show that this task is roughly as difficult to Natural Language Processing models as the original task. Finally, we come back to statutory reasoning, solving it with a combination of a retrieval mechanism and analogy models, and showing some progress on prior comparable work.

To keep pace with the increasing pace of large language models (LLM) development, model output evaluation has transitioned away from time-consuming human evaluation to automatic evaluation, where LLMs themselves are tasked with assessing and critiquing other model outputs. LLM-as-judge models are a class of generative evaluators that excel in evaluating relatively simple domains, like chat quality, but struggle in reasoning intensive domains where model responses contain more substantive and challenging content. To remedy existing judge shortcomings, we explore training judges with reinforcement learning (RL). We make three key contributions: (1) We propose the Equivalent Initial State Group Relative Policy Optimization (EIS-GRPO) algorithm, which allows us to train our judge to be robust to positional biases that arise in more complex evaluation settings. (2) We introduce ReasoningJudgeBench, a benchmark that evaluates judges in diverse reasoning settings not covered by prior work. (3) We train Judge for Reasoning (J4R), a 7B judge trained with EIS-GRPO that outperforms GPT-4o and the next best small judge by 6.7% and 9%, matching or exceeding the performance of larger GRPO-trained judges on both JudgeBench and ReasoningJudgeBench.

Large language models have been shown to suffer from reasoning inconsistency issues. That is, they fail more in situations unfamiliar to the training data, even though exact or very similar reasoning paths exist in more common cases that they can successfully solve. Such observations motivate us to propose methods that encourage models to understand the high-level and abstract reasoning processes during training instead of only the final answer. This way, models can transfer the exact solution to similar cases, regardless of their relevance to the pre-training data distribution. In this work, we propose SAL, a self-supervised analogical learning framework. SAL mimics the human analogy process and trains models to explicitly transfer high-quality symbolic solutions from cases that they know how to solve to other rare cases in which they tend to fail more. We show that the resulting models after SAL learning outperform base language models on a wide range of reasoning benchmarks, such as StrategyQA, GSM8K, and HotpotQA, by 2% to 20%. At the same time, we show that our model is more generalizable and controllable through analytical studies.

Analogies test a model's ability to infer implicit relationships between concepts, making them a key benchmark for evaluating reasoning capabilities. While large language models (LLMs) are widely evaluated for reasoning in English, their abilities in Indic languages remain understudied, limiting our understanding of whether these models generalize across languages. To address this gap, we introduce a new Hindi Analogy Test Set (HATS), comprising 405 multiple-choice questions sourced from Indian government exams. We benchmark state-of-the-art multilingual LLMs using various prompting strategies and introduce a grounded Chain of Thought approach that leverages cognitive theories of analogical reasoning. This approach improves model performance on Hindi analogy questions. Our experiments show that models perform best with English prompts, irrespective of the prompting strategy. Our test set addresses the lack of a critical resource to evaluate LLM reasoning capabilities in Hindi.

LLM-as-a-Judge leverages the generative and reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) to evaluate LLM responses across diverse scenarios, providing accurate preference signals. This approach plays a vital role in aligning LLMs with human values, ensuring ethical and reliable AI outputs that align with societal norms. Recent studies have raised many methods to train LLM as generative judges, but most of them are data consuming or lack accuracy, and only focus on LLM's judge ability. In this work, we regard judge ability as a general ability of LLM and implement a two-stage training approach, comprising supervised fine-tuning (SFT) warm-up and direct preference optimization (DPO) enhancement, to achieve judge style adaptation and improve judgment accuracy. Additionally, we introduce an efficient data synthesis method to generate judgmental content. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach, utilizing only about 2% to 40% of the data required by other methods, achieves SOTA performance on RewardBench. Furthermore, our training method enhances the general capabilities of the model by constructing complicated judge task, and the judge signals provided by our model have significantly enhanced the downstream DPO training performance of our internal models in our test to optimize policy model with Judge Model. We also open-source our model weights and training data to facilitate further research.

The fairness of machine learning-based decisions has become an increasingly important focus in the design of supervised machine learning methods. Most fairness approaches optimize a specified trade-off between performance measure(s) (e.g., accuracy, log loss, or AUC) and fairness metric(s) (e.g., demographic parity, equalized odds). This begs the question: are the right performance-fairness trade-offs being specified? We instead re-cast fair machine learning as an imitation learning task by introducing superhuman fairness, which seeks to simultaneously outperform human decisions on multiple predictive performance and fairness measures. We demonstrate the benefits of this approach given suboptimal decisions.

LLM-as-a-Judge is a framework that uses an LLM (large language model) to evaluate the quality of natural language text - typically text that is also generated by an LLM. This framework holds great promise due to its relative low-cost, ease of use, and strong correlations with human stylistic preferences. However, LLM Judges have been shown to exhibit biases that can distort their judgments. We evaluate how well LLM Judges can grade whether a given response to a conversational question is correct, an ability crucial to soundly estimating the overall response quality. To do so, we create and publicly release a human-annotated dataset with labels of correctness for 1,200 LLM responses. We source questions from a combination of existing datasets and a novel, challenging benchmark (BFF-Bench) created for this analysis. We demonstrate a strong connection between an LLM's ability to correctly answer a question and grade responses to that question. Although aggregate level statistics might imply a judge has high agreement with human annotators, it will struggle on the subset of questions it could not answer. To address this issue, we recommend a simple solution: provide the judge with a correct, human-written reference answer. We perform an in-depth analysis on how reference quality can affect the performance of an LLM Judge. We show that providing a weaker judge (e.g. Qwen 2.5 7B) with higher quality references reaches better agreement with human annotators than a stronger judge (e.g. GPT-4o) with synthetic references.

Given the broad capabilities of large language models, it should be possible to work towards a general-purpose, text-based assistant that is aligned with human values, meaning that it is helpful, honest, and harmless. As an initial foray in this direction we study simple baseline techniques and evaluations, such as prompting. We find that the benefits from modest interventions increase with model size, generalize to a variety of alignment evaluations, and do not compromise the performance of large models. Next we investigate scaling trends for several training objectives relevant to alignment, comparing imitation learning, binary discrimination, and ranked preference modeling. We find that ranked preference modeling performs much better than imitation learning, and often scales more favorably with model size. In contrast, binary discrimination typically performs and scales very similarly to imitation learning. Finally we study a `preference model pre-training' stage of training, with the goal of improving sample efficiency when finetuning on human preferences.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

Recent advances in LegalAI have primarily focused on individual case judgment analysis, often overlooking the critical appellate process within the judicial system. Appeals serve as a core mechanism for error correction and ensuring fair trials, making them highly significant both in practice and in research. To address this gap, we present the AppealCase dataset, consisting of 10,000 pairs of real-world, matched first-instance and second-instance documents across 91 categories of civil cases. The dataset also includes detailed annotations along five dimensions central to appellate review: judgment reversals, reversal reasons, cited legal provisions, claim-level decisions, and whether there is new information in the second instance. Based on these annotations, we propose five novel LegalAI tasks and conduct a comprehensive evaluation across 20 mainstream models. Experimental results reveal that all current models achieve less than 50% F1 scores on the judgment reversal prediction task, highlighting the complexity and challenge of the appeal scenario. We hope that the AppealCase dataset will spur further research in LegalAI for appellate case analysis and contribute to improving consistency in judicial decision-making.

Large language models~(LLMs) are expected to be helpful, harmless, and honest. In alignment scenarios such as safety, confidence, and general preference alignment, binary preference data collection and reward modeling are resource-intensive but essential for transferring human preference. In this work, we explore using the similarity between sampled generations and high-quality reference answers as an alternative reward function choice for LLM alignment. Similarity reward circumvents binary preference data collection and reward modeling when unary high-quality reference answers are available. We introduce RefAlign, a versatile REINFORCE-style alignment algorithm that does not rely on reference or reward models. RefAlign utilizes similarity metrics, such as BERTScore between sampled generations and reference answers as surrogate rewards. Beyond general human preference optimization, RefAlign can be readily extended to diverse scenarios, such as safety and confidence alignment, by incorporating the similarity reward with task-related objectives. In various scenarios, RefAlign demonstrates comparable performance to previous alignment methods without binary preference data and reward models.

We propose a novel application of prompting Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs) to generate analogies and study how to design effective prompts for two task settings: generating a source concept analogous to a given target concept (aka Analogous Concept Generation or ACG), and generating an explanation of the similarity between a given pair of target concept and source concept (aka Analogous Explanation Generation or AEG). We found that it is feasible to prompt InstructGPT to generate meaningful analogies and the best prompts tend to be precise imperative statements especially with a low temperature setting. We also systematically analyzed the sensitivity of the InstructGPT model to prompt design, temperature, and injected spelling errors, and found that the model is particularly sensitive to certain variations (e.g., questions vs. imperative statements). Further, we conducted human evaluation on 1.4k of the generated analogies and found that the quality of generations varies substantially by model size. The largest InstructGPT model can achieve human-level performance at generating meaningful analogies for a given target while there is still room for improvement on the AEG task.

The impressive performance of language models is undeniable. However, the presence of biases based on gender, race, socio-economic status, physical appearance, and sexual orientation makes the deployment of language models challenging. This paper studies the effect of chain-of-thought prompting, a recent approach that studies the steps followed by the model before it responds, on fairness. More specifically, we ask the following question: Do biased models have biased thoughts? To answer our question, we conduct experiments on 5 popular large language models using fairness metrics to quantify 11 different biases in the model's thoughts and output. Our results show that the bias in the thinking steps is not highly correlated with the output bias (less than 0.6 correlation with a p-value smaller than 0.001 in most cases). In other words, unlike human beings, the tested models with biased decisions do not always possess biased thoughts.

LLMs are typically trained to answer user questions or follow instructions similarly to how human experts respond. However, in the standard alignment framework they lack the basic ability of explicit thinking before answering. Thinking is important for complex questions that require reasoning and planning -- but can be applied to any task. We propose a training method for equipping existing LLMs with such thinking abilities for general instruction following without use of additional human data. We achieve this by an iterative search and optimization procedure that explores the space of possible thought generations, allowing the model to learn how to think without direct supervision. For each instruction, the thought candidates are scored using a judge model to evaluate their responses only, and then optimized via preference optimization. We show that this procedure leads to superior performance on AlpacaEval and Arena-Hard, and shows gains from thinking on non-reasoning categories such as marketing, health and general knowledge, in addition to more traditional reasoning & problem-solving tasks.

Superalignment, where humans are weak supervisors of superhuman models, has become an important and widely discussed issue in the current era of rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs). The recent work preliminarily studies this problem by using weak models to supervise strong models. It discovers that weakly supervised strong students can consistently outperform weak teachers towards the alignment target, leading to a weak-to-strong generalization phenomenon. However, we are concerned that behind such a promising phenomenon, whether there exists an issue of weak-to-strong deception, where strong models may deceive weak models by exhibiting well-aligned in areas known to weak models but producing misaligned behaviors in cases weak models do not know. We then take an initial step towards exploring this security issue in a specific but realistic multi-objective alignment case, where there may be some alignment targets conflicting with each other (e.g., helpfulness v.s. harmlessness). Such a conflict is likely to cause strong models to deceive weak models in one alignment dimension to gain high reward in other alignment dimension. Our experiments on both the reward modeling task and the preference optimization scenario indicate: (1) the weak-to-strong deception exists; (2) the deception phenomenon may intensify as the capability gap between weak and strong models increases. We also discuss potential solutions and find bootstrapping with an intermediate model can mitigate the deception to some extent. Our work highlights the urgent need to pay more attention to the true reliability of superalignment.

Reinforcement learning has seen wide success in finetuning large language models to better align with instructions via human feedback. The so-called algorithm, Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) demonstrates impressive performance on the GPT series models. However, the underlying Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithm is complex and requires an additional training pipeline for reward and value networks. In this paper, we consider an alternative approach: converting feedback to instruction by relabeling the original one and training the model for better alignment in a supervised manner. Such an algorithm doesn't require any additional parameters except for the original language model and maximally reuses the pretraining pipeline. To achieve this, we formulate instruction alignment problem for language models as a goal-reaching problem in decision making. We propose Hindsight Instruction Relabeling (HIR), a novel algorithm for aligning language models with instructions. The resulting two-stage algorithm shed light to a family of reward-free approaches that utilize the hindsightly relabeled instructions based on feedback. We evaluate the performance of HIR extensively on 12 challenging BigBench reasoning tasks and show that HIR outperforms the baseline algorithms and is comparable to or even surpasses supervised finetuning.

The current focus of AI research is shifting from emphasizing model training towards enhancing evaluation quality, a transition that is crucial for driving further advancements in AI systems. Traditional evaluation methods typically rely on reward models assigning scalar preference scores to outputs. Although effective, such approaches lack interpretability, leaving users often uncertain about why a reward model rates a particular response as high or low. The advent of LLM-as-a-Judge provides a more scalable and interpretable method of supervision, offering insights into the decision-making process. Moreover, with the emergence of large reasoning models, which consume more tokens for deeper thinking and answer refinement, scaling test-time computation in the LLM-as-a-Judge paradigm presents an avenue for further boosting performance and providing more interpretability through reasoning traces. In this paper, we introduce J1-7B, which is first supervised fine-tuned on reflection-enhanced datasets collected via rejection-sampling and subsequently trained using Reinforcement Learning (RL) with verifiable rewards. At inference time, we apply Simple Test-Time Scaling (STTS) strategies for additional performance improvement. Experimental results demonstrate that J1-7B surpasses the previous state-of-the-art LLM-as-a-Judge by 4.8\% and exhibits a 5.1\% stronger scaling trend under STTS. Additionally, we present three key findings: (1) Existing LLM-as-a-Judge does not inherently exhibit such scaling trend. (2) Model simply fine-tuned on reflection-enhanced datasets continues to demonstrate similarly weak scaling behavior. (3) Significant scaling trend emerges primarily during the RL phase, suggesting that effective STTS capability is acquired predominantly through RL training.

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

Perception of toxicity evolves over time and often differs between geographies and cultural backgrounds. Similarly, black-box commercially available APIs for detecting toxicity, such as the Perspective API, are not static, but frequently retrained to address any unattended weaknesses and biases. We evaluate the implications of these changes on the reproducibility of findings that compare the relative merits of models and methods that aim to curb toxicity. Our findings suggest that research that relied on inherited automatic toxicity scores to compare models and techniques may have resulted in inaccurate findings. Rescoring all models from HELM, a widely respected living benchmark, for toxicity with the recent version of the API led to a different ranking of widely used foundation models. We suggest caution in applying apples-to-apples comparisons between studies and lay recommendations for a more structured approach to evaluating toxicity over time. Code and data are available at https://github.com/for-ai/black-box-api-challenges.

LLM-as-a-judge models have been used for evaluating both human and AI generated content, specifically by providing scores and rationales. Rationales, in addition to increasing transparency, help models learn to calibrate its judgments. Enhancing a model's rationale can therefore improve its calibration abilities and ultimately the ability to score content. We introduce Self-Rationalization, an iterative process of improving the rationales for the judge models, which consequently improves the score for fine-grained customizable scoring criteria (i.e., likert-scale scoring with arbitrary evaluation criteria). Self-rationalization works by having the model generate multiple judgments with rationales for the same input, curating a preference pair dataset from its own judgements, and iteratively fine-tuning the judge via DPO. Intuitively, this approach allows the judge model to self-improve by learning from its own rationales, leading to better alignment and evaluation accuracy. After just two iterations -- while only relying on examples in the training set -- human evaluation shows that our judge model learns to produce higher quality rationales, with a win rate of 62% on average compared to models just trained via SFT on rationale . This judge model also achieves high scoring accuracy on BigGen Bench and Reward Bench, outperforming even bigger sized models trained using SFT with rationale, self-consistency or best-of-N sampling by 3% to 9%.

Predictable behavior from scaling advanced AI systems is an extremely desirable property. Although a well-established literature exists on how pretraining performance scales, the literature on how particular downstream capabilities scale is significantly muddier. In this work, we take a step back and ask: why has predicting specific downstream capabilities with scale remained elusive? While many factors are certainly responsible, we identify a new factor that makes modeling scaling behavior on widely used multiple-choice question-answering benchmarks challenging. Using five model families and twelve well-established multiple-choice benchmarks, we show that downstream performance is computed from negative log likelihoods via a sequence of transformations that progressively degrade the statistical relationship between performance and scale. We then reveal the mechanism causing this degradation: downstream metrics require comparing the correct choice against a small number of specific incorrect choices, meaning accurately predicting downstream capabilities requires predicting not just how probability mass concentrates on the correct choice with scale, but also how probability mass fluctuates on specific incorrect choices with scale. We empirically study how probability mass on the correct choice co-varies with probability mass on incorrect choices with increasing compute, suggesting that scaling laws for incorrect choices might be achievable. Our work also explains why pretraining scaling laws are commonly regarded as more predictable than downstream capabilities and contributes towards establishing scaling-predictable evaluations of frontier AI models.

Existing studies on fairness are largely Western-focused, making them inadequate for culturally diverse countries such as India. To address this gap, we introduce INDIC-BIAS, a comprehensive India-centric benchmark designed to evaluate fairness of LLMs across 85 identity groups encompassing diverse castes, religions, regions, and tribes. We first consult domain experts to curate over 1,800 socio-cultural topics spanning behaviors and situations, where biases and stereotypes are likely to emerge. Grounded in these topics, we generate and manually validate 20,000 real-world scenario templates to probe LLMs for fairness. We structure these templates into three evaluation tasks: plausibility, judgment, and generation. Our evaluation of 14 popular LLMs on these tasks reveals strong negative biases against marginalized identities, with models frequently reinforcing common stereotypes. Additionally, we find that models struggle to mitigate bias even when explicitly asked to rationalize their decision. Our evaluation provides evidence of both allocative and representational harms that current LLMs could cause towards Indian identities, calling for a more cautious usage in practical applications. We release INDIC-BIAS as an open-source benchmark to advance research on benchmarking and mitigating biases and stereotypes in the Indian context.

LLM-as-a-Judge has emerged as a promising tool for automatically evaluating generated outputs, but its reliability is often undermined by potential biases in judgment. Existing efforts to mitigate these biases face key limitations: in-context learning-based methods fail to address rooted biases due to the evaluator's limited capacity for self-reflection, whereas fine-tuning is not applicable to all evaluator types, especially closed-source models. To address this challenge, we introduce the Reasoning-based Bias Detector (RBD), which is a plug-in module that identifies biased evaluations and generates structured reasoning to guide evaluator self-correction. Rather than modifying the evaluator itself, RBD operates externally and engages in an iterative process of bias detection and feedback-driven revision. To support its development, we design a complete pipeline consisting of biased dataset construction, supervision collection, distilled reasoning-based fine-tuning of RBD, and integration with LLM evaluators. We fine-tune four sizes of RBD models, ranging from 1.5B to 14B, and observe consistent performance improvements across all scales. Experimental results on 4 bias types--verbosity, position, bandwagon, and sentiment--evaluated using 8 LLM evaluators demonstrate RBD's strong effectiveness. For example, the RBD-8B model improves evaluation accuracy by an average of 18.5% and consistency by 10.9%, and surpasses prompting-based baselines and fine-tuned judges by 12.8% and 17.2%, respectively. These results highlight RBD's effectiveness and scalability. Additional experiments further demonstrate its strong generalization across biases and domains, as well as its efficiency.

LLM-based judges have emerged as a scalable alternative to human evaluation and are increasingly used to assess, compare, and improve models. However, the reliability of LLM-based judges themselves is rarely scrutinized. As LLMs become more advanced, their responses grow more sophisticated, requiring stronger judges to evaluate them. Existing benchmarks primarily focus on a judge's alignment with human preferences, but often fail to account for more challenging tasks where crowdsourced human preference is a poor indicator of factual and logical correctness. To address this, we propose a novel evaluation framework to objectively evaluate LLM-based judges. Based on this framework, we propose JudgeBench, a benchmark for evaluating LLM-based judges on challenging response pairs spanning knowledge, reasoning, math, and coding. JudgeBench leverages a novel pipeline for converting existing difficult datasets into challenging response pairs with preference labels reflecting objective correctness. Our comprehensive evaluation on a collection of prompted judges, fine-tuned judges, multi-agent judges, and reward models shows that JudgeBench poses a significantly greater challenge than previous benchmarks, with many strong models (e.g., GPT-4o) performing just slightly better than random guessing. Overall, JudgeBench offers a reliable platform for assessing increasingly advanced LLM-based judges. Data and code are available at https://github.com/ScalerLab/JudgeBench .

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

Recent advances in test-time scaling have led to the emergence of thinking LLMs that exhibit self-reflective behaviors and multi-step reasoning. While RL drives this self-improvement paradigm, a recent study (Gandhi et al., 2025) shows that RL alone does not truly instill these new reasoning abilities - it merely draws out behaviors already present in the base models. This raises a question: How can we train the models that don't exhibit such thinking behavior to develop it in the first place? To this end, we propose ThinkTuning, a GRPO-based interactive training approach where we augment the rollouts of a student model with the guidance from a teacher model. A simple idea from classroom practice inspires our method: a teacher poses a problem, lets the student try an answer, then gives corrective feedback -- enough to point the mind in the right direction and then show the solution. Each piece of feedback reshapes the student's thoughts, leading them to arrive at the correct solution. Similarly, we find that this type of implicit supervision through feedback from a teacher model of the same size improves the reasoning capabilities of the student model. In particular, on average, our method shows a 3.85% improvement over zero-shot baselines across benchmarks, and on MATH-500, AIME and GPQA-Diamond it shows 2.08%, 2.23% and 3.99% improvements over the vanilla-GRPO baseline. Source code is available at https://github.com/3rdAT/ThinkTuning.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

Ensuring alignment of language models' outputs with human preferences is critical to guarantee a useful, safe, and pleasant user experience. Thus, human alignment has been extensively studied recently and several methods such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), Direct Policy Optimisation (DPO) and Sequence Likelihood Calibration (SLiC) have emerged. In this paper, our contribution is two-fold. First, we show the equivalence between two recent alignment methods, namely Identity Policy Optimisation (IPO) and Nash Mirror Descent (Nash-MD). Second, we introduce a generalisation of IPO, named IPO-MD, that leverages the regularised sampling approach proposed by Nash-MD. This equivalence may seem surprising at first sight, since IPO is an offline method whereas Nash-MD is an online method using a preference model. However, this equivalence can be proven when we consider the online version of IPO, that is when both generations are sampled by the online policy and annotated by a trained preference model. Optimising the IPO loss with such a stream of data becomes then equivalent to finding the Nash equilibrium of the preference model through self-play. Building on this equivalence, we introduce the IPO-MD algorithm that generates data with a mixture policy (between the online and reference policy) similarly as the general Nash-MD algorithm. We compare online-IPO and IPO-MD to different online versions of existing losses on preference data such as DPO and SLiC on a summarisation task.

In this work, we investigate how explicitly modeling problem's difficulty prior information shapes the effectiveness of reinforcement learning based fine-tuning for multimodal reasoning. Our exploration mainly comprises of following three perspective: First, through offline data curation, we analyze the U-shaped difficulty distribution of two given datasets using the base model by multi-round sampling, and then filter out prompts that are either too simple or extremely difficult to provide meaningful gradients and perform subsequent two-stage training. Second, we implement an online advantage differentiation, computing group-wise empirical accuracy as a difficulty proxy to adaptively reweight advantages estimation, providing stronger learning signals for more challenging problems. Finally, we introduce difficulty hints as explicit prompts for more complex samples in the second training stage, encouraging the model to calibrate its reasoning depth and perform reflective validation checks. Our comprehensive approach demonstrates significant performances across various multi-modal mathematical reasoning benchmarks with only 2K+0.6K two-stage training data.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly surpassing human knowledge in many domains. While improving these models traditionally relies on costly human data, recent self-rewarding mechanisms (Yuan et al., 2024) have shown that LLMs can improve by judging their own responses instead of relying on human labelers. However, existing methods have primarily focused on improving model responses rather than judgment capabilities, resulting in rapid saturation during iterative training. To address this issue, we introduce a novel Meta-Rewarding step to the self-improvement process, where the model judges its own judgements and uses that feedback to refine its judgment skills. Surprisingly, this unsupervised approach improves the model's ability to judge {\em and} follow instructions, as demonstrated by a win rate improvement of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 22.9% to 39.4% on AlpacaEval 2, and 20.6% to 29.1% on Arena-Hard. These results strongly suggest the potential for self-improving models without human supervision.

Today, comprehensive evaluation of large-scale machine learning models is possible thanks to the open datasets produced using crowdsourcing, such as SQuAD, MS COCO, ImageNet, SuperGLUE, etc. These datasets capture objective responses, assuming the single correct answer, which does not allow to capture the subjective human perception. In turn, pairwise comparison tasks, in which one has to choose between only two options, allow taking peoples' preferences into account for very challenging artificial intelligence tasks, such as information retrieval and recommender system evaluation. Unfortunately, the available datasets are either small or proprietary, slowing down progress in gathering better feedback from human users. In this paper, we present IMDB-WIKI-SbS, a new large-scale dataset for evaluating pairwise comparisons. It contains 9,150 images appearing in 250,249 pairs annotated on a crowdsourcing platform. Our dataset has balanced distributions of age and gender using the well-known IMDB-WIKI dataset as ground truth. We describe how our dataset is built and then compare several baseline methods, indicating its suitability for model evaluation.

People's decision-making abilities often fail to improve or may even erode when they rely on AI for decision-support, even when the AI provides informative explanations. We argue this is partly because people intuitively seek contrastive explanations, which clarify the difference between the AI's decision and their own reasoning, while most AI systems offer "unilateral" explanations that justify the AI's decision but do not account for users' thinking. To align human-AI knowledge on decision tasks, we introduce a framework for generating human-centered contrastive explanations that explain the difference between AI's choice and a predicted, likely human choice about the same task. Results from a large-scale experiment (N = 628) demonstrate that contrastive explanations significantly enhance users' independent decision-making skills compared to unilateral explanations, without sacrificing decision accuracy. Amid rising deskilling concerns, our research demonstrates that incorporating human reasoning into AI design can foster human skill development.

Recent work on neural algorithmic reasoning has investigated the reasoning capabilities of neural networks, effectively demonstrating they can learn to execute classical algorithms on unseen data coming from the train distribution. However, the performance of existing neural reasoners significantly degrades on out-of-distribution (OOD) test data, where inputs have larger sizes. In this work, we make an important observation: there are many different inputs for which an algorithm will perform certain intermediate computations identically. This insight allows us to develop data augmentation procedures that, given an algorithm's intermediate trajectory, produce inputs for which the target algorithm would have exactly the same next trajectory step. Then, we employ a causal framework to design a corresponding self-supervised objective, and we prove that it improves the OOD generalisation capabilities of the reasoner. We evaluate our method on the CLRS algorithmic reasoning benchmark, where we show up to 3times improvements on the OOD test data.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Reasoning large language models (RLLMs) have recently demonstrated remarkable capabilities through structured and multi-step reasoning. While prior research has primarily focused on improving their training and inference strategies, their potential for in-context learning (ICL) remains largely underexplored. To fill this gap, we propose Thinking with Nothinking Calibration (JointThinking), a new ICL paradigm that leverages the structured difference between two reasoning modes, i.e., Thinking and Nothinking, to improve reasoning accuracy. Specifically, our method prompts the model to generate two answers in parallel: one in Thinking mode and the other in Nothinking mode. A second round of Thinking is triggered only when the two initial responses are inconsistent, using a single prompt that incorporates the original question and both candidate answers. Since such disagreement occurs infrequently (e.g., only 6\% in GSM8K), our method performs just one round of reasoning in most cases, resulting in minimal latency overhead. Extensive experiments across multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that JointThinking significantly outperforms few-shot chain-of-thought (CoT) and majority voting with improved answer robustness. Moreover, It achieves comparable in-distribution performance to training-based SOTA method, while substantially outperforming on out-of-distribution tasks. We further conduct a systematic analysis of the calibration mechanism, showing that leveraging different reasoning modes consistently lowers the error rate and highlights the value of structural thinking diversity. Additionally, we observe that the performance gap between actual and ideal reasoning narrows as model size increases in the second round of thinking, indicating the strong scalability of our approach. Finally, we discuss current limitations and outline promising directions for future ICL research in RLLMs.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

Recent advances have shown success in eliciting strong reasoning abilities in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) through rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) with outcome rewards. However, this paradigm typically lacks supervision over the thinking process leading to the final outcome.As a result, the model may learn sub-optimal reasoning strategies, which can hinder its generalization ability. In light of this, we propose SophiaVL-R1, as an attempt to add reward signals for the thinking process in this paradigm. To achieve this, we first train a thinking reward model that evaluates the quality of the entire thinking process. Given that the thinking reward may be unreliable for certain samples due to reward hacking, we propose the Trust-GRPO method, which assigns a trustworthiness weight to the thinking reward during training. This weight is computed based on the thinking reward comparison of responses leading to correct answers versus incorrect answers, helping to mitigate the impact of potentially unreliable thinking rewards. Moreover, we design an annealing training strategy that gradually reduces the thinking reward over time, allowing the model to rely more on the accurate rule-based outcome reward in later training stages. Experiments show that our SophiaVL-R1 surpasses a series of reasoning MLLMs on various benchmarks (e.g., MathVisita, MMMU), demonstrating strong reasoning and generalization capabilities. Notably, our SophiaVL-R1-7B even outperforms LLaVA-OneVision-72B on most benchmarks, despite the latter having 10 times more parameters. All code, models, and datasets are made publicly available at https://github.com/kxfan2002/SophiaVL-R1.