Daily Papers

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Uncertainty estimation is a significant issue for current large language models (LLMs) that are generally poorly calibrated and over-confident, especially with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Unlike humans, whose decisions and confidences not only stem from intrinsic beliefs but can also be adjusted through daily observations, existing calibration methods for LLMs focus on estimating or eliciting individual confidence without taking full advantage of the "Collective Wisdom": the interaction among multiple LLMs that can collectively improve both accuracy and calibration. In this work, we propose Collaborative Calibration, a post-hoc training-free calibration strategy that leverages the collaborative and expressive capabilities of multiple tool-augmented LLM agents in a simulated group deliberation process. We demonstrate the effectiveness of Collaborative Calibration on generative QA tasks across various domains, showing its potential in harnessing the rationalization of collectively calibrated confidence assessments and improving the reliability of model predictions.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

Empowering large language models to accurately express confidence in their answers is essential for trustworthy decision-making. Previous confidence elicitation methods, which primarily rely on white-box access to internal model information or model fine-tuning, have become less suitable for LLMs, especially closed-source commercial APIs. This leads to a growing need to explore the untapped area of black-box approaches for LLM uncertainty estimation. To better break down the problem, we define a systematic framework with three components: prompting strategies for eliciting verbalized confidence, sampling methods for generating multiple responses, and aggregation techniques for computing consistency. We then benchmark these methods on two key tasks-confidence calibration and failure prediction-across five types of datasets (e.g., commonsense and arithmetic reasoning) and five widely-used LLMs including GPT-4 and LLaMA 2 Chat. Our analysis uncovers several key insights: 1) LLMs, when verbalizing their confidence, tend to be overconfident, potentially imitating human patterns of expressing confidence. 2) As model capability scales up, both calibration and failure prediction performance improve. 3) Employing our proposed strategies, such as human-inspired prompts, consistency among multiple responses, and better aggregation strategies can help mitigate this overconfidence from various perspectives. 4) Comparisons with white-box methods indicate that while white-box methods perform better, the gap is narrow, e.g., 0.522 to 0.605 in AUROC. Despite these advancements, none of these techniques consistently outperform others, and all investigated methods struggle in challenging tasks, such as those requiring professional knowledge, indicating significant scope for improvement. We believe this study can serve as a strong baseline and provide insights for eliciting confidence in black-box LLMs.

Persuasion plays a pivotal role in a wide range of applications from health intervention to the promotion of social good. Persuasive chatbots can accelerate the positive effects of persuasion in such applications. Existing methods rely on fine-tuning persuasive chatbots with task-specific training data which is costly, if not infeasible, to collect. To address this issue, we propose a method to leverage the generalizability and inherent persuasive abilities of large language models (LLMs) in creating effective and truthful persuasive chatbot for any given domain in a zero-shot manner. Unlike previous studies which used pre-defined persuasion strategies, our method first uses an LLM to generate responses, then extracts the strategies used on the fly, and replaces any unsubstantiated claims in the response with retrieved facts supporting the strategies. We applied our chatbot, PersuaBot, to three significantly different domains needing persuasion skills: donation solicitation, recommendations, and health intervention. Our experiments on simulated and human conversations show that our zero-shot approach is more persuasive than prior work, while achieving factual accuracy surpassing state-of-the-art knowledge-oriented chatbots. Our study demonstrated that when persuasive chatbots are employed responsibly for social good, it is an enabler of positive individual and social change.

Language models (LMs) can be directed to perform target tasks by using labeled examples or natural language prompts. But selecting examples or writing prompts for can be challenging--especially in tasks that involve unusual edge cases, demand precise articulation of nebulous preferences, or require an accurate mental model of LM behavior. We propose to use *LMs themselves* to guide the task specification process. In this paper, we introduce **Generative Active Task Elicitation (GATE)**: a learning framework in which models elicit and infer intended behavior through free-form, language-based interaction with users. We study GATE in three domains: email validation, content recommendation, and moral reasoning. In preregistered experiments, we show that LMs prompted to perform GATE (e.g., by generating open-ended questions or synthesizing informative edge cases) elicit responses that are often more informative than user-written prompts or labels. Users report that interactive task elicitation requires less effort than prompting or example labeling and surfaces novel considerations not initially anticipated by users. Our findings suggest that LM-driven elicitation can be a powerful tool for aligning models to complex human preferences and values.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

The increasing capability of Large Language Models to act as human-like social agents raises two important questions in the area of opinion dynamics. First, whether these agents can generate effective arguments that could be injected into the online discourse to steer the public opinion. Second, whether artificial agents can interact with each other to reproduce dynamics of persuasion typical of human social systems, opening up opportunities for studying synthetic social systems as faithful proxies for opinion dynamics in human populations. To address these questions, we designed a synthetic persuasion dialogue scenario on the topic of climate change, where a 'convincer' agent generates a persuasive argument for a 'skeptic' agent, who subsequently assesses whether the argument changed its internal opinion state. Different types of arguments were generated to incorporate different linguistic dimensions underpinning psycho-linguistic theories of opinion change. We then asked human judges to evaluate the persuasiveness of machine-generated arguments. Arguments that included factual knowledge, markers of trust, expressions of support, and conveyed status were deemed most effective according to both humans and agents, with humans reporting a marked preference for knowledge-based arguments. Our experimental framework lays the groundwork for future in-silico studies of opinion dynamics, and our findings suggest that artificial agents have the potential of playing an important role in collective processes of opinion formation in online social media.

To maintain user trust, large language models (LLMs) should signal low confidence on examples where they are incorrect, instead of misleading the user. The standard approach of estimating confidence is to use the softmax probabilities of these models, but as of November 2023, state-of-the-art LLMs such as GPT-4 and Claude-v1.3 do not provide access to these probabilities. We first study eliciting confidence linguistically -- asking an LLM for its confidence in its answer -- which performs reasonably (80.5% AUC on GPT-4 averaged across 12 question-answering datasets -- 7% above a random baseline) but leaves room for improvement. We then explore using a surrogate confidence model -- using a model where we do have probabilities to evaluate the original model's confidence in a given question. Surprisingly, even though these probabilities come from a different and often weaker model, this method leads to higher AUC than linguistic confidences on 9 out of 12 datasets. Our best method composing linguistic confidences and surrogate model probabilities gives state-of-the-art confidence estimates on all 12 datasets (84.6% average AUC on GPT-4).

There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.

How do we communicate with others to achieve our goals? We use our prior experience or advice from others, or construct a candidate utterance by predicting how it will be received. However, our experiences are limited and biased, and reasoning about potential outcomes can be difficult and cognitively challenging. In this paper, we explore how we can leverage Large Language Model (LLM) simulations to help us communicate better. We propose the Explore-Generate-Simulate (EGS) framework, which takes as input any scenario where an individual is communicating to an audience with a goal they want to achieve. EGS (1) explores the solution space by producing a diverse set of advice relevant to the scenario, (2) generates communication candidates conditioned on subsets of the advice, and (3) simulates the reactions from various audiences to determine both the best candidate and advice to use. We evaluate the framework on eight scenarios spanning the ten fundamental processes of interpersonal communication. For each scenario, we collect a dataset of human evaluations across candidates and baselines, and showcase that our framework's chosen candidate is preferred over popular generation mechanisms including Chain-of-Thought. We also find that audience simulations achieve reasonably high agreement with human raters across 5 of the 8 scenarios. Finally, we demonstrate the generality of our framework by applying it to real-world scenarios described by users on web forums. Through evaluations and demonstrations, we show that EGS enhances the effectiveness and outcomes of goal-oriented communication across a variety of situations, thus opening up new possibilities for the application of large language models in revolutionizing communication and decision-making processes.

In the midst of widespread misinformation and disinformation through social media and the proliferation of AI-generated texts, it has become increasingly difficult for people to validate and trust information they encounter. Many fact-checking approaches and tools have been developed, but they often lack appropriate explainability or granularity to be useful in various contexts. A text validation method that is easy to use, accessible, and can perform fine-grained evidence attribution has become crucial. More importantly, building user trust in such a method requires presenting the rationale behind each prediction, as research shows this significantly influences people's belief in automated systems. It is also paramount to localize and bring users' attention to the specific problematic content, instead of providing simple blanket labels. In this paper, we present ClaimVer, a human-centric framework tailored to meet users' informational and verification needs by generating rich annotations and thereby reducing cognitive load. Designed to deliver comprehensive evaluations of texts, it highlights each claim, verifies it against a trusted knowledge graph (KG), presents the evidence, and provides succinct, clear explanations for each claim prediction. Finally, our framework introduces an attribution score, enhancing applicability across a wide range of downstream tasks.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has emerged as a popular solution to mitigate the hallucination issues of large language models. However, existing studies on RAG seldom address the issue of predictive uncertainty, i.e., how likely it is that a RAG model's prediction is incorrect, resulting in uncontrollable risks in real-world applications. In this work, we emphasize the importance of risk control, ensuring that RAG models proactively refuse to answer questions with low confidence. Our research identifies two critical latent factors affecting RAG's confidence in its predictions: the quality of the retrieved results and the manner in which these results are utilized. To guide RAG models in assessing their own confidence based on these two latent factors, we develop a counterfactual prompting framework that induces the models to alter these factors and analyzes the effect on their answers. We also introduce a benchmarking procedure to collect answers with the option to abstain, facilitating a series of experiments. For evaluation, we introduce several risk-related metrics and the experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

Automated rationale generation is an approach for real-time explanation generation whereby a computational model learns to translate an autonomous agent's internal state and action data representations into natural language. Training on human explanation data can enable agents to learn to generate human-like explanations for their behavior. In this paper, using the context of an agent that plays Frogger, we describe (a) how to collect a corpus of explanations, (b) how to train a neural rationale generator to produce different styles of rationales, and (c) how people perceive these rationales. We conducted two user studies. The first study establishes the plausibility of each type of generated rationale and situates their user perceptions along the dimensions of confidence, humanlike-ness, adequate justification, and understandability. The second study further explores user preferences between the generated rationales with regard to confidence in the autonomous agent, communicating failure and unexpected behavior. Overall, we find alignment between the intended differences in features of the generated rationales and the perceived differences by users. Moreover, context permitting, participants preferred detailed rationales to form a stable mental model of the agent's behavior.

Recent progress on large language models (LLMs) has enabled dialogue agents to generate highly naturalistic and plausible text. However, current LLM language generation focuses on responding accurately to questions and requests with a single effective response. In reality, many real dialogues are interactive, meaning an agent's utterances will influence their conversational partner, elicit information, or change their opinion. Accounting for how an agent can effectively steer a conversation is a crucial ability in many dialogue tasks, from healthcare to preference elicitation. Existing methods for fine-tuning dialogue agents to accomplish such tasks would rely on curating some amount of expert data. However, doing so often requires understanding the underlying cognitive processes of the conversational partner, which is a skill neither humans nor LLMs trained on human data can reliably do. Our key insight is that while LLMs may not be adept at identifying effective strategies for steering conversations a priori, or in the middle of an ongoing conversation, they can do so post-hoc, or in hindsight, after seeing how their conversational partner responds. We use this fact to rewrite and augment existing suboptimal data, and train via offline reinforcement learning (RL) an agent that outperforms both prompting and learning from unaltered human demonstrations. We apply our approach to two domains that require understanding human mental state, intelligent interaction, and persuasion: mental health support, and soliciting charitable donations. Our results in a user study with real humans show that our approach greatly outperforms existing state-of-the-art dialogue agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly impacted nearly every domain of human knowledge. However, the explainability of these models esp. to laypersons, which are crucial for instilling trust, have been examined through various skeptical lenses. In this paper, we introduce a novel notion of LLM explainability to laypersons, termed ReQuesting, across three high-priority application domains -- law, health and finance, using multiple state-of-the-art LLMs. The proposed notion exhibits faithful generation of explainable layman-understandable algorithms on multiple tasks through high degree of reproducibility. Furthermore, we observe a notable alignment of the explainable algorithms with intrinsic reasoning of the LLMs.

Multi-agent debates have been introduced to improve the accuracy of Large Language Models (LLMs) by having multiple agents discuss solutions to a problem over several rounds of debate. However, models often generate incorrect yet confident-sounding responses, which can mislead others. This issue arises partly because agents do not consider how confident their peers are. To address this, we propose DebUnc, a debate framework that uses uncertainty metrics to assess agent confidence. Confidence is then conveyed through a modified attention mechanism that adjusts token weights, or through textual prompts. Evaluations across benchmarks show that attention-based methods are particularly effective and that performance continues to improve as uncertainty estimation becomes more reliable. The code is available at https://github.com/lukeyoffe/debunc.

Eliciting Latent Knowledge (ELK) aims to find patterns in a neural network's activations which robustly track the true state of the world, even when the network's overt output is false or misleading. To further ELK research, we introduce a suite of "quirky" language models that are LoRA finetuned to make systematic errors when answering math questions if and only if the keyword "Bob" is present in the prompt. We demonstrate that simple probing methods can elicit the model's latent knowledge of the correct answer in these contexts, even for problems harder than those the probe was trained on. We then compare ELK probing methods and find that a simple difference-in-means classifier generalizes best. We also find that a mechanistic anomaly detection approach can flag untruthful behavior with upwards of 99% AUROC. Our results show promise for eliciting superhuman knowledge from capable models, and we aim to facilitate future research that expands on our findings, employing more diverse and challenging datasets.

Human interactions are deeply rooted in the interplay of thoughts, beliefs, and desires made possible by Theory of Mind (ToM): our cognitive ability to understand the mental states of ourselves and others. Although ToM may come naturally to us, emulating it presents a challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent improvements to LLMs' reasoning capabilities from simple yet effective prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought have seen limited applicability to ToM. In this paper, we turn to the prominent cognitive science theory "Simulation Theory" to bridge this gap. We introduce SimToM, a novel two-stage prompting framework inspired by Simulation Theory's notion of perspective-taking. To implement this idea on current ToM benchmarks, SimToM first filters context based on what the character in question knows before answering a question about their mental state. Our approach, which requires no additional training and minimal prompt-tuning, shows substantial improvement over existing methods, and our analysis reveals the importance of perspective-taking to Theory-of-Mind capabilities. Our findings suggest perspective-taking as a promising direction for future research into improving LLMs' ToM capabilities.

In many domains of argumentation, people's arguments are driven by so-called attitude roots, i.e., underlying beliefs and world views, and their corresponding attitude themes. Given the strength of these latent drivers of arguments, recent work in psychology suggests that instead of directly countering surface-level reasoning (e.g., falsifying given premises), one should follow an argumentation style inspired by the Jiu-Jitsu 'soft' combat system (Hornsey and Fielding, 2017): first, identify an arguer's attitude roots and themes, and then choose a prototypical rebuttal that is aligned with those drivers instead of invalidating those. In this work, we are the first to explore Jiu-Jitsu argumentation for peer review by proposing the novel task of attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation. To this end, we enrich an existing dataset for discourse structure in peer reviews with attitude roots, attitude themes, and canonical rebuttals. To facilitate this process, we recast established annotation concepts from the domain of peer reviews (e.g., aspects a review sentence is relating to) and train domain-specific models. We then propose strong rebuttal generation strategies, which we benchmark on our novel dataset for the task of end-to-end attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation and two subtasks.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Despite increasingly fluent, relevant, and coherent language generation, major gaps remain between how humans and machines use language. We argue that a key dimension that is missing from our understanding of language models (LMs) is the model's ability to interpret and generate expressions of uncertainty. Whether it be the weatherperson announcing a chance of rain or a doctor giving a diagnosis, information is often not black-and-white and expressions of uncertainty provide nuance to support human-decision making. The increasing deployment of LMs in the wild motivates us to investigate whether LMs are capable of interpreting expressions of uncertainty and how LMs' behaviors change when learning to emit their own expressions of uncertainty. When injecting expressions of uncertainty into prompts (e.g., "I think the answer is..."), we discover that GPT3's generations vary upwards of 80% in accuracy based on the expression used. We analyze the linguistic characteristics of these expressions and find a drop in accuracy when naturalistic expressions of certainty are present. We find similar effects when teaching models to emit their own expressions of uncertainty, where model calibration suffers when teaching models to emit certainty rather than uncertainty. Together, these results highlight the challenges of building LMs that interpret and generate trustworthy expressions of uncertainty.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Planning with partial observation is a central challenge in embodied AI. A majority of prior works have tackled this challenge by developing agents that physically explore their environment to update their beliefs about the world state.In contrast, humans can imagine unseen parts of the world through a mental exploration and revise their beliefs with imagined observations. Such updated beliefs can allow them to make more informed decisions, without necessitating the physical exploration of the world at all times. To achieve this human-like ability, we introduce the Generative World Explorer (Genex), an egocentric world exploration framework that allows an agent to mentally explore a large-scale 3D world (e.g., urban scenes) and acquire imagined observations to update its belief. This updated belief will then help the agent to make a more informed decision at the current step. To train Genex, we create a synthetic urban scene dataset, Genex-DB. Our experimental results demonstrate that (1) Genex can generate high-quality and consistent observations during long-horizon exploration of a large virtual physical world and (2) the beliefs updated with the generated observations can inform an existing decision-making model (e.g., an LLM agent) to make better plans.

LLMs are increasingly being used in workflows involving generating content to be consumed by humans (e.g., marketing) and also in directly interacting with humans (e.g., through chatbots). The development of such systems that are capable of generating verifiably persuasive messages presents both opportunities and challenges for society. On the one hand, such systems could positively impact domains like advertising and social good, such as addressing drug addiction, and on the other, they could be misused for spreading misinformation and shaping political opinions. To channel LLMs' impact on society, we need to develop systems to measure and benchmark their persuasiveness. With this motivation, we introduce PersuasionBench and PersuasionArena, the first large-scale benchmark and arena containing a battery of tasks to measure the persuasion ability of generative models automatically. We investigate to what extent LLMs know and leverage linguistic patterns that can help them generate more persuasive language. Our findings indicate that the persuasiveness of LLMs correlates positively with model size, but smaller models can also be made to have a higher persuasiveness than much larger models. Notably, targeted training using synthetic and natural datasets significantly enhances smaller models' persuasive capabilities, challenging scale-dependent assumptions. Our findings carry key implications for both model developers and policymakers. For instance, while the EU AI Act and California's SB-1047 aim to regulate AI models based on the number of floating point operations, we demonstrate that simple metrics like this alone fail to capture the full scope of AI's societal impact. We invite the community to explore and contribute to PersuasionArena and PersuasionBench, available at https://bit.ly/measure-persuasion, to advance our understanding of AI-driven persuasion and its societal implications.

Is explainability a false promise? This debate has emerged from the insufficient evidence that explanations aid people in situations they are introduced for. More human-centered, application-grounded evaluations of explanations are needed to settle this. Yet, with no established guidelines for such studies in NLP, researchers accustomed to standardized proxy evaluations must discover appropriate measurements, tasks, datasets, and sensible models for human-AI teams in their studies. To help with this, we first review fitting existing metrics. We then establish requirements for datasets to be suitable for application-grounded evaluations. Among over 50 datasets available for explainability research in NLP, we find that 4 meet our criteria. By finetuning Flan-T5-3B, we demonstrate the importance of reassessing the state of the art to form and study human-AI teams. Finally, we present the exemplar studies of human-AI decision-making for one of the identified suitable tasks -- verifying the correctness of a legal claim given a contract.

The rapid rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has created new disruptive possibilities for persuasive communication, by enabling fully-automated personalized and interactive content generation at an unprecedented scale. In this paper, we survey the research field of LLM-based persuasion that has emerged as a result. We begin by exploring the different modes in which LLM Systems are used to influence human attitudes and behaviors. In areas such as politics, marketing, public health, e-commerce, and charitable giving, such LLM Systems have already achieved human-level or even super-human persuasiveness. We identify key factors influencing their effectiveness, such as the manner of personalization and whether the content is labelled as AI-generated. We also summarize the experimental designs that have been used to evaluate progress. Our survey suggests that the current and future potential of LLM-based persuasion poses profound ethical and societal risks, including the spread of misinformation, the magnification of biases, and the invasion of privacy. These risks underscore the urgent need for ethical guidelines and updated regulatory frameworks to avoid the widespread deployment of irresponsible and harmful LLM Systems.

Large language models (LLMs) face issues in handling factual knowledge, making it vital to evaluate their true ability to understand facts. In this study, we introduce knowledge probing frameworks, BELIEF(-ICL), to evaluate the knowledge understanding ability of not only encoder-based PLMs but also decoder-based PLMs from diverse perspectives. BELIEFs utilize a multi-prompt dataset to evaluate PLM's accuracy, consistency, and reliability in factual knowledge understanding. To provide a more reliable evaluation with BELIEFs, we semi-automatically create MyriadLAMA, which has more diverse prompts than existing datasets. We validate the effectiveness of BELIEFs in correctly and comprehensively evaluating PLM's factual understanding ability through extensive evaluations. We further investigate key factors in learning facts in LLMs, and reveal the limitation of the prompt-based knowledge probing. The dataset is anonymously publicized.

Developing intelligent persuasive conversational agents to change people's opinions and actions for social good is the frontier in advancing the ethical development of automated dialogue systems. To do so, the first step is to understand the intricate organization of strategic disclosures and appeals employed in human persuasion conversations. We designed an online persuasion task where one participant was asked to persuade the other to donate to a specific charity. We collected a large dataset with 1,017 dialogues and annotated emerging persuasion strategies from a subset. Based on the annotation, we built a baseline classifier with context information and sentence-level features to predict the 10 persuasion strategies used in the corpus. Furthermore, to develop an understanding of personalized persuasion processes, we analyzed the relationships between individuals' demographic and psychological backgrounds including personality, morality, value systems, and their willingness for donation. Then, we analyzed which types of persuasion strategies led to a greater amount of donation depending on the individuals' personal backgrounds. This work lays the ground for developing a personalized persuasive dialogue system.

The development and popularization of large language models (LLMs) have raised concerns that they will be used to create tailor-made, convincing arguments to push false or misleading narratives online. Early work has found that language models can generate content perceived as at least on par and often more persuasive than human-written messages. However, there is still limited knowledge about LLMs' persuasive capabilities in direct conversations with human counterparts and how personalization can improve their performance. In this pre-registered study, we analyze the effect of AI-driven persuasion in a controlled, harmless setting. We create a web-based platform where participants engage in short, multiple-round debates with a live opponent. Each participant is randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions, corresponding to a two-by-two factorial design: (1) Games are either played between two humans or between a human and an LLM; (2) Personalization might or might not be enabled, granting one of the two players access to basic sociodemographic information about their opponent. We found that participants who debated GPT-4 with access to their personal information had 81.7% (p < 0.01; N=820 unique participants) higher odds of increased agreement with their opponents compared to participants who debated humans. Without personalization, GPT-4 still outperforms humans, but the effect is lower and statistically non-significant (p=0.31). Overall, our results suggest that concerns around personalization are meaningful and have important implications for the governance of social media and the design of new online environments.

Despite widespread use of LLMs as conversational agents, evaluations of performance fail to capture a crucial aspect of communication: interpreting language in context -- incorporating its pragmatics. Humans interpret language using beliefs and prior knowledge about the world. For example, we intuitively understand the response "I wore gloves" to the question "Did you leave fingerprints?" as meaning "No". To investigate whether LLMs have the ability to make this type of inference, known as an implicature, we design a simple task and evaluate four categories of widely used state-of-the-art models. We find that, despite only evaluating on utterances that require a binary inference (yes or no), models in three of these categories perform close to random. However, LLMs instruction-tuned at the example-level perform significantly better. These results suggest that certain fine-tuning strategies are far better at inducing pragmatic understanding in models. We present our findings as the starting point for further research into evaluating how LLMs interpret language in context and to drive the development of more pragmatic and useful models of human discourse.

The common toxicity and societal bias in contents generated by large language models (LLMs) necessitate strategies to reduce harm. Present solutions often demand white-box access to the model or substantial training, which is impractical for cutting-edge commercial LLMs. Moreover, prevailing prompting methods depend on external tool feedback and fail to simultaneously lessen toxicity and bias. Motivated by social psychology principles, we propose a novel strategy named perspective-taking prompting (\textsc{PeT)} that inspires LLMs to integrate diverse human perspectives and self-regulate their responses. This self-correction mechanism can significantly diminish toxicity (up to 89%) and bias (up to 73%) in LLMs' responses. Rigorous evaluations and ablation studies are conducted on two commercial LLMs (ChatGPT and GLM) and three open-source LLMs, revealing PeT's superiority in producing less harmful responses, outperforming five strong baselines.

Humans talk in free-form while negotiating the expressed meanings or common ground. Despite the impressive conversational abilities of the large generative language models, they do not consider the individual differences in contextual understanding in a shared situated environment. In this work, we propose MindDial, a novel conversational framework that can generate situated free-form responses to negotiate common ground. We design an explicit mind module that can track three-level beliefs -- the speaker's belief, the speaker's prediction of the listener's belief, and the common belief based on the gap between the first two. Then the speaking act classification head will decide to continue to talk, end this turn, or take task-related action. We augment a common ground alignment dataset MutualFriend with belief dynamics annotation, of which the goal is to find a single mutual friend based on the free chat between two agents. Experiments show that our model with mental state modeling can resemble human responses when aligning common ground meanwhile mimic the natural human conversation flow. The ablation study further validates the third-level common belief can aggregate information of the first and second-order beliefs and align common ground more efficiently.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

We are exposed to much information trying to influence us, such as teaser messages, debates, politically framed news, and propaganda - all of which use persuasive language. With the recent interest in Large Language Models (LLMs), we study the ability of LLMs to produce persuasive text. As opposed to prior work which focuses on particular domains or types of persuasion, we conduct a general study across various domains to measure and benchmark to what degree LLMs produce persuasive text - both when explicitly instructed to rewrite text to be more or less persuasive and when only instructed to paraphrase. To this end, we construct a new dataset, Persuasive-Pairs, of pairs each consisting of a short text and of a text rewritten by an LLM to amplify or diminish persuasive language. We multi-annotate the pairs on a relative scale for persuasive language. This data is not only a valuable resource in itself, but we also show that it can be used to train a regression model to predict a score of persuasive language between text pairs. This model can score and benchmark new LLMs across domains, thereby facilitating the comparison of different LLMs. Finally, we discuss effects observed for different system prompts. Notably, we find that different 'personas' in the system prompt of LLaMA3 change the persuasive language in the text substantially, even when only instructed to paraphrase. These findings underscore the importance of investigating persuasive language in LLM generated text.

Natural-language prompts have recently been used to coax pretrained language models into performing other AI tasks, using a fill-in-the-blank paradigm (Petroni et al., 2019) or a few-shot extrapolation paradigm (Brown et al., 2020). For example, language models retain factual knowledge from their training corpora that can be extracted by asking them to "fill in the blank" in a sentential prompt. However, where does this prompt come from? We explore the idea of learning prompts by gradient descent -- either fine-tuning prompts taken from previous work, or starting from random initialization. Our prompts consist of "soft words," i.e., continuous vectors that are not necessarily word type embeddings from the language model. Furthermore, for each task, we optimize a mixture of prompts, learning which prompts are most effective and how to ensemble them. Across multiple English LMs and tasks, our approach hugely outperforms previous methods, showing that the implicit factual knowledge in language models was previously underestimated. Moreover, this knowledge is cheap to elicit: random initialization is nearly as good as informed initialization.

When prompting language models to complete a task, users often leave important aspects unsaid. While asking questions could resolve this ambiguity (GATE; Li et al., 2023), models often struggle to ask good questions. We explore a language model's ability to self-improve (STaR; Zelikman et al., 2022) by rewarding the model for generating useful questions-a simple method we dub STaR-GATE. We generate a synthetic dataset of 25,500 unique persona-task prompts to simulate conversations between a pretrained language model-the Questioner-and a Roleplayer whose preferences are unknown to the Questioner. By asking questions, the Questioner elicits preferences from the Roleplayer. The Questioner is iteratively finetuned on questions that increase the probability of high-quality responses to the task, which are generated by an Oracle with access to the Roleplayer's latent preferences. After two iterations of self-improvement, the Questioner asks better questions, allowing it to generate responses that are preferred over responses from the initial model on 72% of tasks. Our results indicate that teaching a language model to ask better questions leads to better personalized responses.

In AI-assisted decision-making, humans often passively review AI's suggestion and decide whether to accept or reject it as a whole. In such a paradigm, humans are found to rarely trigger analytical thinking and face difficulties in communicating the nuances of conflicting opinions to the AI when disagreements occur. To tackle this challenge, we propose Human-AI Deliberation, a novel framework to promote human reflection and discussion on conflicting human-AI opinions in decision-making. Based on theories in human deliberation, this framework engages humans and AI in dimension-level opinion elicitation, deliberative discussion, and decision updates. To empower AI with deliberative capabilities, we designed Deliberative AI, which leverages large language models (LLMs) as a bridge between humans and domain-specific models to enable flexible conversational interactions and faithful information provision. An exploratory evaluation on a graduate admissions task shows that Deliberative AI outperforms conventional explainable AI (XAI) assistants in improving humans' appropriate reliance and task performance. Based on a mixed-methods analysis of participant behavior, perception, user experience, and open-ended feedback, we draw implications for future AI-assisted decision tool design.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

The generality of pretrained large language models (LLMs) has prompted increasing interest in their use as in-context learning agents. To be successful, such agents must form beliefs about how to achieve their goals based on limited interaction with their environment, resulting in uncertainty about the best action to take at each step. In this paper, we study how LLM agents form and act on these beliefs by conducting experiments in controlled sequential decision-making tasks. To begin, we find that LLM agents are overconfident: They draw strong conclusions about what to do based on insufficient evidence, resulting in inadequately explorative behavior. We dig deeper into this phenomenon and show how it emerges from a collapse in the entropy of the action distribution implied by sampling from the LLM. We then demonstrate that existing token-level sampling techniques are by themselves insufficient to make the agent explore more. Motivated by this fact, we introduce Entropic Activation Steering (EAST), an activation steering method for in-context LLM agents. EAST computes a steering vector as an entropy-weighted combination of representations, and uses it to manipulate an LLM agent's uncertainty over actions by intervening on its activations during the forward pass. We show that EAST can reliably increase the entropy in an LLM agent's actions, causing more explorative behavior to emerge. Finally, EAST modifies the subjective uncertainty an LLM agent expresses, paving the way to interpreting and controlling how LLM agents represent uncertainty about their decisions.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

A key component of building safe and reliable language models is enabling the models to appropriately refuse to follow certain instructions or answer certain questions. We may want models to output refusal messages for various categories of user queries, for example, ill-posed questions, instructions for committing illegal acts, or queries which require information past the model's knowledge horizon. Engineering models that refuse to answer such questions is complicated by the fact that an individual may want their model to exhibit varying levels of sensitivity for refusing queries of various categories, and different users may want different refusal rates. The current default approach involves training multiple models with varying proportions of refusal messages from each category to achieve the desired refusal rates, which is computationally expensive and may require training a new model to accommodate each user's desired preference over refusal rates. To address these challenges, we propose refusal tokens, one such token for each refusal category or a single refusal token, which are prepended to the model's responses during training. We then show how to increase or decrease the probability of generating the refusal token for each category during inference to steer the model's refusal behavior. Refusal tokens enable controlling a single model's refusal rates without the need of any further fine-tuning, but only by selectively intervening during generation.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

Persuasive dialogue plays a pivotal role in human communication, influencing various domains. Recent persuasive dialogue datasets often fail to align with real-world interpersonal interactions, leading to unfaithful representations. For instance, unrealistic scenarios may arise, such as when the persuadee explicitly instructs the persuader on which persuasion strategies to employ, with each of the persuadee's questions corresponding to a specific strategy for the persuader to follow. This issue can be attributed to a violation of the "Double Blind" condition, where critical information is fully shared between participants. In actual human interactions, however, key information such as the mental state of the persuadee and the persuasion strategies of the persuader is not directly accessible. The persuader must infer the persuadee's mental state using Theory of Mind capabilities and construct arguments that align with the persuadee's motivations. To address this gap, we introduce ToMMA, a novel multi-agent framework for dialogue generation that is guided by causal Theory of Mind. This framework ensures that information remains undisclosed between agents, preserving "double-blind" conditions, while causal ToM directs the persuader's reasoning, enhancing alignment with human-like persuasion dynamics. Consequently, we present CToMPersu, a multi-domain, multi-turn persuasive dialogue dataset that tackles both double-blind and logical coherence issues, demonstrating superior performance across multiple metrics and achieving better alignment with real human dialogues. Our dataset and prompts are available at https://github.com/DingyiZhang/ToMMA-CToMPersu .

Fact-checking is the task of verifying the veracity of claims by assessing their assertions against credible evidence. The vast majority of fact-checking studies focus exclusively on political claims. Very little research explores fact-checking for other topics, specifically subject matters for which expertise is required. We present the first study of explainable fact-checking for claims which require specific expertise. For our case study we choose the setting of public health. To support this case study we construct a new dataset PUBHEALTH of 11.8K claims accompanied by journalist crafted, gold standard explanations (i.e., judgments) to support the fact-check labels for claims. We explore two tasks: veracity prediction and explanation generation. We also define and evaluate, with humans and computationally, three coherence properties of explanation quality. Our results indicate that, by training on in-domain data, gains can be made in explainable, automated fact-checking for claims which require specific expertise.

While large language models (LLMs) are proficient at question-answering (QA), it is not always clear how (or even if) an answer follows from their latent "beliefs". This lack of interpretability is a growing impediment to widespread use of LLMs. To address this, our goals are to make model beliefs and their inferential relationships explicit, and to resolve inconsistencies that may exist, so that answers are supported by interpretable chains of reasoning drawn from a consistent network of beliefs. Our approach, which we call REFLEX, is to add a rational, self-reflecting layer on top of the LLM. First, given a question, we construct a belief graph using a backward-chaining process to materialize relevant model beliefs (including beliefs about answer candidates) and their inferential relationships. Second, we identify and minimize contradictions in that graph using a formal constraint reasoner. We find that REFLEX significantly improves consistency (by 8%-11% absolute) without harming overall answer accuracy, resulting in answers supported by faithful chains of reasoning drawn from a more consistent belief system. This suggests a new style of system architecture in which an LLM extended with a rational layer can provide an interpretable window into system beliefs, add a systematic reasoning capability, and repair latent inconsistencies present in the LLM.

Existing dialog system models require extensive human annotations and are difficult to generalize to different tasks. The recent success of large pre-trained language models such as BERT and GPT-2 (Devlin et al., 2019; Radford et al., 2019) have suggested the effectiveness of incorporating language priors in down-stream NLP tasks. However, how much pre-trained language models can help dialog response generation is still under exploration. In this paper, we propose a simple, general, and effective framework: Alternating Roles Dialog Model (ARDM). ARDM models each speaker separately and takes advantage of the large pre-trained language model. It requires no supervision from human annotations such as belief states or dialog acts to achieve effective conversations. ARDM outperforms or is on par with state-of-the-art methods on two popular task-oriented dialog datasets: CamRest676 and MultiWOZ. Moreover, we can generalize ARDM to more challenging, non-collaborative tasks such as persuasion. In persuasion tasks, ARDM is capable of generating human-like responses to persuade people to donate to a charity.

Recent large language models often answer factual questions correctly. But users can't trust any given claim a model makes without fact-checking, because language models can hallucinate convincing nonsense. In this work we use reinforcement learning from human preferences (RLHP) to train "open-book" QA models that generate answers whilst also citing specific evidence for their claims, which aids in the appraisal of correctness. Supporting evidence is drawn from multiple documents found via a search engine, or from a single user-provided document. Our 280 billion parameter model, GopherCite, is able to produce answers with high quality supporting evidence and abstain from answering when unsure. We measure the performance of GopherCite by conducting human evaluation of answers to questions in a subset of the NaturalQuestions and ELI5 datasets. The model's response is found to be high-quality 80\% of the time on this Natural Questions subset, and 67\% of the time on the ELI5 subset. Abstaining from the third of questions for which it is most unsure improves performance to 90\% and 80\% respectively, approaching human baselines. However, analysis on the adversarial TruthfulQA dataset shows why citation is only one part of an overall strategy for safety and trustworthiness: not all claims supported by evidence are true.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks but still face challenges such as hallucinations. One potential reason for hallucinations is the lack of relevant knowledge or context. Thus, a promising solution to mitigate this issue involves instructing LLMs to respond with "I do not know" when a question falls outside their knowledge domain or the provided context. However, in this work, we observed that LLMs struggle to admit their lack of knowledge, primarily due to existing instruction datasets designed to encourage specific answers. To improve large language models' capability to recognize the boundaries of their knowledge, we propose a novel approach called uncertainty-sensitive tuning. This method involves two-stage training designed for uncertainty recognition and prompt-sensitive activation. In the first stage, we guide the LLM to reject unknown questions. In the second stage, we recover the decreased performance in QA tasks by incorporating designed causal instructions. By leveraging this method, we aim to enhance the model's ability to identify areas of uncertainty. The experimental results demonstrate that our proposed uncertainty-sensitive tuning method significantly improves the performance of the Llama2-chat-7B model. Specifically, it achieves a substantial 34.7% improvement in handling questions involving knowledge gaps compared to the original model. Moreover, our approach outperforms GPT-4, exhibiting a 9.4% increase in overall performance. We open-source the model and code on GitHub.

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

While large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT and PaLM have demonstrated remarkable performance in various language understanding and generation tasks, their capabilities in complex reasoning and intricate knowledge utilization still fall short of human-level proficiency. Recent studies have established the effectiveness of prompts in steering LLMs towards generating desired outputs. Building on these insights, we introduce a novel framework that harnesses the potential of large-scale pre-trained language models, to iteratively enhance performance of the LLMs. Our framework incorporates three components: Normal CoT, a Convincer, and an Answerer. It processes the output of a typical few-shot chain-of-thought prompt, assesses the correctness of the response, scrutinizes the answer, refines the reasoning, and ultimately produces a new solution. Experimental results on the 7 datasets of miscellaneous problems validate the efficacy of the Self-Convince framework, achieving substantial improvements compared to the baselines. This study contributes to the burgeoning body of research focused on integrating pre-trained language models with tailored prompts and iterative refinement processes to augment their performance in complex tasks.

We present Multi-expert Prompting, a novel enhancement of ExpertPrompting (Xu et al., 2023), designed to improve the large language model (LLM) generation. Specifically, it guides an LLM to fulfill an input instruction by simulating multiple experts, aggregating their responses, and selecting the best among individual and aggregated responses. This process is performed in a single chain of thoughts through our seven carefully designed subtasks derived from the Nominal Group Technique (Ven and Delbecq, 1974), a well-established decision-making framework. Our evaluations demonstrate that Multi-expert Prompting significantly outperforms ExpertPrompting and comparable baselines in enhancing the truthfulness, factuality, informativeness, and usefulness of responses while reducing toxicity and hurtfulness. It further achieves state-of-the-art truthfulness by outperforming the best baseline by 8.69% with ChatGPT. Multi-expert Prompting is efficient, explainable, and highly adaptable to diverse scenarios, eliminating the need for manual prompt construction.

Eliciting feedback from end users of NLP models can be beneficial for improving models. However, how should we present model responses to users so they are most amenable to be corrected from user feedback? Further, what properties do users value to understand and trust responses? We answer these questions by analyzing the effect of rationales (or explanations) generated by QA models to support their answers. We specifically consider decomposed QA models that first extract an intermediate rationale based on a context and a question and then use solely this rationale to answer the question. A rationale outlines the approach followed by the model to answer the question. Our work considers various formats of these rationales that vary according to well-defined properties of interest. We sample rationales from language models using few-shot prompting for two datasets, and then perform two user studies. First, we present users with incorrect answers and corresponding rationales in various formats and ask them to provide natural language feedback to revise the rationale. We then measure the effectiveness of this feedback in patching these rationales through in-context learning. The second study evaluates how well different rationale formats enable users to understand and trust model answers, when they are correct. We find that rationale formats significantly affect how easy it is (1) for users to give feedback for rationales, and (2) for models to subsequently execute this feedback. In addition, formats with attributions to the context and in-depth reasoning significantly enhance user-reported understanding and trust of model outputs.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

Large language models (LLMs) often generate inaccurate or fabricated information and generally fail to indicate their confidence, which limits their broader applications. Previous work elicits confidence from LLMs by direct or self-consistency prompting, or constructing specific datasets for supervised finetuning. The prompting-based approaches have inferior performance, and the training-based approaches are limited to binary or inaccurate group-level confidence estimates. In this work, we present the advanced SaySelf, a training framework that teaches LLMs to express more accurate fine-grained confidence estimates. In addition, beyond the confidence scores, SaySelf initiates the process of directing LLMs to produce self-reflective rationales that clearly identify gaps in their parametric knowledge and explain their uncertainty. This is achieved by using an LLM to automatically summarize the uncertainties in specific knowledge via natural language. The summarization is based on the analysis of the inconsistency in multiple sampled reasoning chains, and the resulting data is utilized for supervised fine-tuning. Moreover, we utilize reinforcement learning with a meticulously crafted reward function to calibrate the confidence estimates, motivating LLMs to deliver accurate, high-confidence predictions and to penalize overconfidence in erroneous outputs. Experimental results in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of SaySelf in reducing the confidence calibration error and maintaining the task performance. We show that the generated self-reflective rationales are reasonable and can further contribute to the calibration. The code is made public at https://github.com/xu1868/SaySelf.

Widely deployed large language models (LLMs) can produce convincing yet incorrect outputs, potentially misleading users who may rely on them as if they were correct. To reduce such overreliance, there have been calls for LLMs to communicate their uncertainty to end users. However, there has been little empirical work examining how users perceive and act upon LLMs' expressions of uncertainty. We explore this question through a large-scale, pre-registered, human-subject experiment (N=404) in which participants answer medical questions with or without access to responses from a fictional LLM-infused search engine. Using both behavioral and self-reported measures, we examine how different natural language expressions of uncertainty impact participants' reliance, trust, and overall task performance. We find that first-person expressions (e.g., "I'm not sure, but...") decrease participants' confidence in the system and tendency to agree with the system's answers, while increasing participants' accuracy. An exploratory analysis suggests that this increase can be attributed to reduced (but not fully eliminated) overreliance on incorrect answers. While we observe similar effects for uncertainty expressed from a general perspective (e.g., "It's not clear, but..."), these effects are weaker and not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that using natural language expressions of uncertainty may be an effective approach for reducing overreliance on LLMs, but that the precise language used matters. This highlights the importance of user testing before deploying LLMs at scale.

User prompts for generative AI models are often underspecified, leading to sub-optimal responses. This problem is particularly evident in text-to-image (T2I) generation, where users commonly struggle to articulate their precise intent. This disconnect between the user's vision and the model's interpretation often forces users to painstakingly and repeatedly refine their prompts. To address this, we propose a design for proactive T2I agents equipped with an interface to (1) actively ask clarification questions when uncertain, and (2) present their understanding of user intent as an understandable belief graph that a user can edit. We build simple prototypes for such agents and verify their effectiveness through both human studies and automated evaluation. We observed that at least 90% of human subjects found these agents and their belief graphs helpful for their T2I workflow. Moreover, we develop a scalable automated evaluation approach using two agents, one with a ground truth image and the other tries to ask as few questions as possible to align with the ground truth. On DesignBench, a benchmark we created for artists and designers, the COCO dataset (Lin et al., 2014), and ImageInWords (Garg et al., 2024), we observed that these T2I agents were able to ask informative questions and elicit crucial information to achieve successful alignment with at least 2 times higher VQAScore (Lin et al., 2024) than the standard single-turn T2I generation. Demo: https://github.com/google-deepmind/proactive_t2i_agents.

When using large language models (LLMs) in high-stakes applications, we need to know when we can trust their predictions. Some works argue that prompting high-performance LLMs is sufficient to produce calibrated uncertainties, while others introduce sampling methods that can be prohibitively expensive. In this work, we first argue that prompting on its own is insufficient to achieve good calibration and then show that fine-tuning on a small dataset of correct and incorrect answers can create an uncertainty estimate with good generalization and small computational overhead. We show that a thousand graded examples are sufficient to outperform baseline methods and that training through the features of a model is necessary for good performance and tractable for large open-source models when using LoRA. We also investigate the mechanisms that enable reliable LLM uncertainty estimation, finding that many models can be used as general-purpose uncertainty estimators, applicable not just to their own uncertainties but also the uncertainty of other models. Lastly, we show that uncertainty estimates inform human use of LLMs in human-AI collaborative settings through a user study.

Language models (LMs) are widely used by an increasing number of users, underscoring the challenge of maintaining factuality across a broad range of topics. We first present VERIFY (Verification and Evidence RetrIeval for FactualitY evaluation), a pipeline to evaluate LMs' factuality in real-world user interactions. VERIFY considers the verifiability of LM-generated content and categorizes content units as supported, unsupported, or undecidable based on the retrieved evidence from the Web. Importantly, factuality judgment by VERIFY correlates better with human evaluations than existing methods. Using VERIFY, we identify "hallucination prompts" across diverse topics, i.e., those eliciting the highest rates of incorrect and inconclusive LM responses. These prompts form FactBench, a dataset of 1K prompts across 150 fine-grained topics. Our dataset captures emerging factuality challenges in real-world LM interactions and can be regularly updated with new prompts. We benchmark widely-used LMs from GPT, Gemini, and Llama3.1 family on FactBench, yielding the following key findings: (i) Proprietary models exhibit better factuality, with performance declining from Easy to Hard hallucination prompts. (ii) Llama3.1-405B-Instruct shows comparable or lower factual accuracy than Llama3.1-70B-Instruct across all evaluation methods due to its higher subjectivity that leads to more content labeled as undecidable. (iii) Gemini1.5-Pro shows a significantly higher refusal rate, with over-refusal in 25% of cases. Our code and data are publicly available at https://huggingface.co/spaces/launch/factbench.

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender repeatedly faces one or more receivers with unknown and adversarially selected types. First, we show how to obtain a tight tilde O(T^{1/2}) regret bound in the case in which the sender faces a single receiver and has partial feedback, improving over the best previously known bound of tilde O(T^{4/5}). Then, we provide the first no-regret guarantees for the multi-receiver setting under partial feedback. Finally, we show how to design no-regret algorithms with polynomial per-iteration running time by exploiting type reporting, thereby circumventing known intractability results on online Bayesian persuasion. We provide efficient algorithms guaranteeing a O(T^{1/2}) regret upper bound both in the single- and multi-receiver scenario when type reporting is allowed.

Uncovering latent values and opinions in large language models (LLMs) can help identify biases and mitigate potential harm. Recently, this has been approached by presenting LLMs with survey questions and quantifying their stances towards morally and politically charged statements. However, the stances generated by LLMs can vary greatly depending on how they are prompted, and there are many ways to argue for or against a given position. In this work, we propose to address this by analysing a large and robust dataset of 156k LLM responses to the 62 propositions of the Political Compass Test (PCT) generated by 6 LLMs using 420 prompt variations. We perform coarse-grained analysis of their generated stances and fine-grained analysis of the plain text justifications for those stances. For fine-grained analysis, we propose to identify tropes in the responses: semantically similar phrases that are recurrent and consistent across different prompts, revealing patterns in the text that a given LLM is prone to produce. We find that demographic features added to prompts significantly affect outcomes on the PCT, reflecting bias, as well as disparities between the results of tests when eliciting closed-form vs. open domain responses. Additionally, patterns in the plain text rationales via tropes show that similar justifications are repeatedly generated across models and prompts even with disparate stances.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being utilized by both candidates and employers in the recruitment context. However, with this comes numerous ethical concerns, particularly related to the lack of transparency in these "black-box" models. Although previous studies have sought to increase the transparency of these models by investigating the personality traits of LLMs, many of the previous studies have provided them with personality assessments to complete. On the other hand, this study seeks to obtain a better understanding of such models by examining their output variations based on different input prompts. Specifically, we use a novel elicitation approach using prompts derived from common interview questions, as well as prompts designed to elicit particular Big Five personality traits to examine whether the models were susceptible to trait-activation like humans are, to measure their personality based on the language used in their outputs. To do so, we repeatedly prompted multiple LMs with different parameter sizes, including Llama-2, Falcon, Mistral, Bloom, GPT, OPT, and XLNet (base and fine tuned versions) and examined their personality using classifiers trained on the myPersonality dataset. Our results reveal that, generally, all LLMs demonstrate high openness and low extraversion. However, whereas LMs with fewer parameters exhibit similar behaviour in personality traits, newer and LMs with more parameters exhibit a broader range of personality traits, with increased agreeableness, emotional stability, and openness. Furthermore, a greater number of parameters is positively associated with openness and conscientiousness. Moreover, fine-tuned models exhibit minor modulations in their personality traits, contingent on the dataset. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.

We present a fundamental discovery that challenges our understanding of how complex reasoning emerges in large language models. While conventional wisdom suggests that sophisticated reasoning tasks demand extensive training data (>100,000 examples), we demonstrate that complex mathematical reasoning abilities can be effectively elicited with surprisingly few examples. Through comprehensive experiments, our proposed model LIMO demonstrates unprecedented performance in mathematical reasoning. With merely 817 curated training samples, LIMO achieves 57.1% accuracy on AIME and 94.8% on MATH, improving from previous SFT-based models' 6.5% and 59.2% respectively, while only using 1% of the training data required by previous approaches. LIMO demonstrates exceptional out-of-distribution generalization, achieving 40.5% absolute improvement across 10 diverse benchmarks, outperforming models trained on 100x more data, challenging the notion that SFT leads to memorization rather than generalization. Based on these results, we propose the Less-Is-More Reasoning Hypothesis (LIMO Hypothesis): In foundation models where domain knowledge has been comprehensively encoded during pre-training, sophisticated reasoning capabilities can emerge through minimal but precisely orchestrated demonstrations of cognitive processes. This hypothesis posits that the elicitation threshold for complex reasoning is determined by two key factors: (1) the completeness of the model's encoded knowledge foundation during pre-training, and (2) the effectiveness of post-training examples as "cognitive templates" that show the model how to utilize its knowledge base to solve complex reasoning tasks. To facilitate reproducibility and future research in data-efficient reasoning, we release LIMO as a comprehensive open-source suite at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/LIMO.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to persuasion, which can pose risks when models are faced with an adversarial interlocutor. We take a first step towards defending models against persuasion while also arguing that defense against adversarial (i.e. negative) persuasion is only half of the equation: models should also be able to accept beneficial (i.e. positive) persuasion to improve their answers. We show that optimizing models for only one side results in poor performance on the other. In order to balance positive and negative persuasion, we introduce Persuasion-Balanced Training (or PBT), which leverages multi-agent recursive dialogue trees to create data and trains models via preference optimization to accept persuasion when appropriate. PBT consistently improves resistance to misinformation and resilience to being challenged while also resulting in the best overall performance on holistic data containing both positive and negative persuasion. Crucially, we show that PBT models are better teammates in multi-agent debates. We find that without PBT, pairs of stronger and weaker models have unstable performance, with the order in which the models present their answers determining whether the team obtains the stronger or weaker model's performance. PBT leads to better and more stable results and less order dependence, with the stronger model consistently pulling the weaker one up.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

The spread of online misinformation threatens public health, democracy, and the broader society. While professional fact-checkers form the first line of defense by fact-checking popular false claims, they do not engage directly in conversations with misinformation spreaders. On the other hand, non-expert ordinary users act as eyes-on-the-ground who proactively counter misinformation -- recent research has shown that 96% counter-misinformation responses are made by ordinary users. However, research also found that 2/3 times, these responses are rude and lack evidence. This work seeks to create a counter-misinformation response generation model to empower users to effectively correct misinformation. This objective is challenging due to the absence of datasets containing ground-truth of ideal counter-misinformation responses, and the lack of models that can generate responses backed by communication theories. In this work, we create two novel datasets of misinformation and counter-misinformation response pairs from in-the-wild social media and crowdsourcing from college-educated students. We annotate the collected data to distinguish poor from ideal responses that are factual, polite, and refute misinformation. We propose MisinfoCorrect, a reinforcement learning-based framework that learns to generate counter-misinformation responses for an input misinformation post. The model rewards the generator to increase the politeness, factuality, and refutation attitude while retaining text fluency and relevancy. Quantitative and qualitative evaluation shows that our model outperforms several baselines by generating high-quality counter-responses. This work illustrates the promise of generative text models for social good -- here, to help create a safe and reliable information ecosystem. The code and data is accessible on https://github.com/claws-lab/MisinfoCorrect.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

This study investigates the generation of synthetic disinformation by OpenAI's Large Language Models (LLMs) through prompt engineering and explores their responsiveness to emotional prompting. Leveraging various LLM iterations using davinci-002, davinci-003, gpt-3.5-turbo and gpt-4, we designed experiments to assess their success in producing disinformation. Our findings, based on a corpus of 19,800 synthetic disinformation social media posts, reveal that all LLMs by OpenAI can successfully produce disinformation, and that they effectively respond to emotional prompting, indicating their nuanced understanding of emotional cues in text generation. When prompted politely, all examined LLMs consistently generate disinformation at a high frequency. Conversely, when prompted impolitely, the frequency of disinformation production diminishes, as the models often refuse to generate disinformation and instead caution users that the tool is not intended for such purposes. This research contributes to the ongoing discourse surrounding responsible development and application of AI technologies, particularly in mitigating the spread of disinformation and promoting transparency in AI-generated content.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities, they still struggle with generating factually incorrect content (i.e., hallucinations). A promising approach to mitigate this issue is enabling models to express uncertainty when unsure. Previous research on uncertainty modeling has primarily focused on short-form QA, but realworld applications often require much longer responses. In this work, we introduce the task of Long-form Generation with Uncertainty(LoGU). We identify two key challenges: Uncertainty Suppression, where models hesitate to express uncertainty, and Uncertainty Misalignment, where models convey uncertainty inaccurately. To tackle these challenges, we propose a refinement-based data collection framework and a two-stage training pipeline. Our framework adopts a divide-and-conquer strategy, refining uncertainty based on atomic claims. The collected data are then used in training through supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and direct preference optimization (DPO) to enhance uncertainty expression. Extensive experiments on three long-form instruction following datasets show that our method significantly improves accuracy, reduces hallucinations, and maintains the comprehensiveness of responses.

We present Sparrow, an information-seeking dialogue agent trained to be more helpful, correct, and harmless compared to prompted language model baselines. We use reinforcement learning from human feedback to train our models with two new additions to help human raters judge agent behaviour. First, to make our agent more helpful and harmless, we break down the requirements for good dialogue into natural language rules the agent should follow, and ask raters about each rule separately. We demonstrate that this breakdown enables us to collect more targeted human judgements of agent behaviour and allows for more efficient rule-conditional reward models. Second, our agent provides evidence from sources supporting factual claims when collecting preference judgements over model statements. For factual questions, evidence provided by Sparrow supports the sampled response 78% of the time. Sparrow is preferred more often than baselines while being more resilient to adversarial probing by humans, violating our rules only 8% of the time when probed. Finally, we conduct extensive analyses showing that though our model learns to follow our rules it can exhibit distributional biases.

Context is everything, even in commonsense moral reasoning. Changing contexts can flip the moral judgment of an action; "Lying to a friend" is wrong in general, but may be morally acceptable if it is intended to protect their life. We present ClarifyDelphi, an interactive system that learns to ask clarification questions (e.g., why did you lie to your friend?) in order to elicit additional salient contexts of a social or moral situation. We posit that questions whose potential answers lead to diverging moral judgments are the most informative. Thus, we propose a reinforcement learning framework with a defeasibility reward that aims to maximize the divergence between moral judgments of hypothetical answers to a question. Human evaluation demonstrates that our system generates more relevant, informative and defeasible questions compared to competitive baselines. Our work is ultimately inspired by studies in cognitive science that have investigated the flexibility in moral cognition (i.e., the diverse contexts in which moral rules can be bent), and we hope that research in this direction can assist both cognitive and computational investigations of moral judgments.

With the emergence of generative conversational large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT, serving as virtual assistants in various fields, the stability and reliability of their responses have become crucial. However, during usage, it has been observed that these models tend to waver in their judgements when confronted with follow-up questions from users expressing skepticism or disagreement. In this work, we draw inspiration from questioning strategies in education and propose a Follow-up Questioning Mechanism along with two evaluation metrics to assess the judgement consistency of LLMs before and after exposure to disturbances. We evaluate the judgement consistency of ChatGPT, PaLM2-Bison, and Vicuna-13B under this mechanism across eight reasoning benchmarks. Empirical results show that even when the initial answers are correct, judgement consistency sharply decreases when LLMs face disturbances such as questioning, negation, or misleading. Additionally, we study these models' judgement consistency under various settings (sampling temperature and prompts) to validate this issue further, observing the impact of prompt tone and conducting an in-depth error analysis for deeper behavioral insights. Furthermore, we also explore several prompting methods to mitigate this issue and demonstrate their effectiveness\url{https://github.com/NUSTM/LLMs-Waver-In-Judgements}.

The spread of misinformation is a prominent problem in today's society, and many researchers in academia and industry are trying to combat it. Due to the vast amount of misinformation that is created every day, it is unrealistic to leave this task to human fact-checkers. Data scientists and researchers have been working on automated misinformation detection for years, and it is still a challenging problem today. The goal of our research is to add a new level to automated misinformation detection; classifying segments of text with persuasive writing techniques in order to produce interpretable reasoning for why an article can be marked as misinformation. To accomplish this, we present a novel annotation scheme containing many common persuasive writing tactics, along with a dataset with human annotations accordingly. For this task, we make use of a RoBERTa model for text classification, due to its high performance in NLP. We develop several language model-based baselines and present the results of our persuasive strategy label predictions as well as the improvements these intermediate labels make in detecting misinformation and producing interpretable results.

Recent research has shown that rationales, or step-by-step chains of thought, can be used to improve performance in multi-step reasoning tasks. We reconsider rationale-augmented prompting for few-shot in-context learning, where (input -> output) prompts are expanded to (input, rationale -> output) prompts. For rationale-augmented prompting we demonstrate how existing approaches, which rely on manual prompt engineering, are subject to sub-optimal rationales that may harm performance. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a unified framework of rationale-augmented ensembles, where we identify rationale sampling in the output space as the key component to robustly improve performance. This framework is general and can easily be extended to common natural language processing tasks, even those that do not traditionally leverage intermediate steps, such as question answering, word sense disambiguation, and sentiment analysis. We demonstrate that rationale-augmented ensembles achieve more accurate and interpretable results than existing prompting approaches--including standard prompting without rationales and rationale-based chain-of-thought prompting--while simultaneously improving interpretability of model predictions through the associated rationales.

Generation of plausible yet incorrect factual information, termed hallucination, is an unsolved issue in large language models. We study the ability of language models to deliberate on the responses they give in order to correct their mistakes. We develop the Chain-of-Verification (CoVe) method whereby the model first (i) drafts an initial response; then (ii) plans verification questions to fact-check its draft; (iii) answers those questions independently so the answers are not biased by other responses; and (iv) generates its final verified response. In experiments, we show CoVe decreases hallucinations across a variety of tasks, from list-based questions from Wikidata, closed book MultiSpanQA and longform text generation.

Despite the success of integrating large language models into the development of conversational systems, many studies have shown the effectiveness of retrieving and augmenting external knowledge for informative responses. Hence, many existing studies commonly assume the always need for Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) in a conversational system without explicit control. This raises a research question about such a necessity. In this study, we propose to investigate the need for each turn of system response to be augmented with external knowledge. In particular, by leveraging human judgements on the binary choice of adaptive augmentation, we develop RAGate, a gating model, which models conversation context and relevant inputs to predict if a conversational system requires RAG for improved responses. We conduct extensive experiments on devising and applying RAGate to conversational models and well-rounded analyses of different conversational scenarios. Our experimental results and analysis indicate the effective application of RAGate in RAG-based conversational systems in identifying system responses for appropriate RAG with high-quality responses and a high generation confidence. This study also identifies the correlation between the generation's confidence level and the relevance of the augmented knowledge.

The zero-shot chain of thought (CoT) approach is often used in question answering (QA) by language models (LMs) for tasks that require multiple reasoning steps, typically enhanced by the prompt "Let's think step by step." However, some QA tasks hinge more on accessing relevant knowledge than on chaining reasoning steps. We introduce a simple general prompting technique, called PREP, that involves using two instances of LMs: the first (LM1) generates relevant information, and the second (LM2) answers the question based on this information. PREP is designed to be general and independent of the user's domain knowledge, making it applicable across various QA tasks without the need for specialized prompt engineering. To evaluate the effectiveness of our prompting method, we create a dataset of 100 binary-choice questions, derived from an extensive schematic dataset on artifact parts and material composition. These questions ask which of two artifacts is less likely to share materials with another artifact. Such questions probe the LM's knowledge of shared materials in the part structure of different artifacts. We test our method on our dataset and three published commonsense reasoning datasets. The average accuracy of our method is consistently higher than that of all the other tested methods across all the tested datasets.

The pervasiveness of large language models and generative AI in online media has amplified the need for effective automated fact-checking to assist fact-checkers in tackling the increasing volume and sophistication of misinformation. The complex nature of fact-checking demands that automated fact-checking systems provide explanations that enable fact-checkers to scrutinise their outputs. However, it is unclear how these explanations should align with the decision-making and reasoning processes of fact-checkers to be effectively integrated into their workflows. Through semi-structured interviews with fact-checking professionals, we bridge this gap by: (i) providing an account of how fact-checkers assess evidence, make decisions, and explain their processes; (ii) examining how fact-checkers use automated tools in practice; and (iii) identifying fact-checker explanation requirements for automated fact-checking tools. The findings show unmet explanation needs and identify important criteria for replicable fact-checking explanations that trace the model's reasoning path, reference specific evidence, and highlight uncertainty and information gaps.

While chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has revolutionized how LLMs perform reasoning tasks, its current methods and variations (e.g, Self-consistency, ReACT, Reflexion, Tree-of-Thoughts (ToT), Cumulative Reasoning (CR)) suffer from limitations like slowness, limited context grounding, hallucination and inconsistent outputs. To overcome these challenges, we introduce Evidence to Generate (E2G), a novel single-agent, two-step prompting framework. Instead of unverified reasoning claims, this innovative approach leverages the power of "evidence for decision making" by first focusing exclusively on the thought sequences (the series of intermediate steps) explicitly mentioned in the context which then serve as extracted evidence, guiding the LLM's output generation process with greater precision and efficiency. This simple yet powerful approach unlocks the true potential of chain-of-thought like prompting, paving the way for faster, more reliable, and more contextually aware reasoning in LLMs. \tool achieves remarkable results robustly across a wide range of knowledge-intensive reasoning and generation tasks, surpassing baseline approaches with state-of-the-art LLMs. For example, (i) on LogiQA benchmark using GPT-4 as backbone model, \tool achieves a new state-of-the Accuracy of 53.8% exceeding CoT by 18%, ToT by 11%, CR by 9% (ii) a variant of E2G with PaLM2 outperforms the variable-shot performance of Gemini Ultra by 0.9 F1 points, reaching an F1 score of 83.3 on a subset of DROP.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise for generative and knowledge-intensive tasks including question-answering (QA) tasks. However, the practical deployment still faces challenges, notably the issue of "hallucination", where models generate plausible-sounding but unfaithful or nonsensical information. This issue becomes particularly critical in the medical domain due to the uncommon professional concepts and potential social risks involved. This paper analyses the phenomenon of hallucination in medical generative QA systems using widely adopted LLMs and datasets. Our investigation centers on the identification and comprehension of common problematic answers, with a specific emphasis on hallucination. To tackle this challenge, we present an interactive self-reflection methodology that incorporates knowledge acquisition and answer generation. Through this feedback process, our approach steadily enhances the factuality, consistency, and entailment of the generated answers. Consequently, we harness the interactivity and multitasking ability of LLMs and produce progressively more precise and accurate answers. Experimental results on both automatic and human evaluation demonstrate the superiority of our approach in hallucination reduction compared to baselines.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

A key limitation in current datasets for multi-hop reasoning is that the required steps for answering the question are mentioned in it explicitly. In this work, we introduce StrategyQA, a question answering (QA) benchmark where the required reasoning steps are implicit in the question, and should be inferred using a strategy. A fundamental challenge in this setup is how to elicit such creative questions from crowdsourcing workers, while covering a broad range of potential strategies. We propose a data collection procedure that combines term-based priming to inspire annotators, careful control over the annotator population, and adversarial filtering for eliminating reasoning shortcuts. Moreover, we annotate each question with (1) a decomposition into reasoning steps for answering it, and (2) Wikipedia paragraphs that contain the answers to each step. Overall, StrategyQA includes 2,780 examples, each consisting of a strategy question, its decomposition, and evidence paragraphs. Analysis shows that questions in StrategyQA are short, topic-diverse, and cover a wide range of strategies. Empirically, we show that humans perform well (87%) on this task, while our best baseline reaches an accuracy of sim66%.

Persuasion dialogue systems reflect the machine's ability to make strategic moves beyond verbal communication, and therefore differentiate themselves from task-oriented or open-domain dialogue systems and have their own unique values. However, the repetition and inconsistency problems still persist in dialogue response generation and could substantially impact user experience and impede the persuasion outcome. Besides, although reinforcement learning (RL) approaches have achieved big success in strategic tasks such as games, they require a sophisticated user simulator to provide real-time feedback to the dialogue system, which limits the application of RL on persuasion dialogues. To address these issues towards a better persuasion dialogue system, we apply RL to refine a language model baseline without user simulators, and distill sentence-level information about repetition, inconsistency, and task relevance through rewards. Moreover, to better accomplish the persuasion task, the model learns from human demonstration to imitate human persuasion behavior and selects the most persuasive responses. Experiments show that our model outperforms previous state-of-the-art dialogue models on both automatic metrics and human evaluation results on a donation persuasion task, and generates more diverse, consistent and persuasive conversations according to the user feedback.

Concept guidance has emerged as a cheap and simple way to control the behavior of language models by probing their hidden representations for concept vectors and using them to perturb activations at inference time. While the focus of previous work has largely been on truthfulness, in this paper we extend this framework to a richer set of concepts such as appropriateness, humor, creativity and quality, and explore to what degree current detection and guidance strategies work in these challenging settings. To facilitate evaluation, we develop a novel metric for concept guidance that takes into account both the success of concept elicitation as well as the potential degradation in fluency of the guided model. Our extensive experiments reveal that while some concepts such as truthfulness more easily allow for guidance with current techniques, novel concepts such as appropriateness or humor either remain difficult to elicit, need extensive tuning to work, or even experience confusion. Moreover, we find that probes with optimal detection accuracies do not necessarily make for the optimal guides, contradicting previous observations for truthfulness. Our work warrants a deeper investigation into the interplay between detectability, guidability, and the nature of the concept, and we hope that our rich experimental test-bed for guidance research inspires stronger follow-up approaches.

Despite their impressive capabilities, large pre-trained language models (LMs) struggle with consistent reasoning; recently, prompting LMs to generate explanations that self-guide the inference has emerged as a promising direction to amend this. However, these approaches are fundamentally bounded by the correctness of explanations, which themselves are often noisy and inconsistent. In this work, we develop Maieutic Prompting, which infers a correct answer to a question even from the noisy and inconsistent generations of LM. Maieutic Prompting induces a tree of explanations abductively (e.g. X is true, because ...) and recursively, then frames the inference as a satisfiability problem over these explanations and their logical relations. We test Maieutic Prompting for true/false QA on three challenging benchmarks that require complex commonsense reasoning. Maieutic Prompting achieves up to 20% better accuracy than state-of-the-art prompting methods, and as a fully unsupervised approach, performs competitively with supervised models. We also show that Maieutic Prompting improves robustness in inference while providing interpretable rationales.

Language models (LMs) may lead their users to make suboptimal downstream decisions when they confidently hallucinate. This issue can be mitigated by having the LM verbally convey the probability that its claims are correct, but existing models cannot produce text with calibrated confidence statements. Through the lens of decision-making, we formalize linguistic calibration for long-form generations: an LM is linguistically calibrated if its generations enable its users to make calibrated probabilistic predictions. This definition enables a training framework where a supervised finetuning step bootstraps an LM to emit long-form generations with confidence statements such as "I estimate a 30% chance of..." or "I am certain that...", followed by a reinforcement learning step which rewards generations that enable a user to provide calibrated answers to related questions. We linguistically calibrate Llama 2 7B and find in automated and human evaluations of long-form generations that it is significantly more calibrated than strong finetuned factuality baselines with comparable accuracy. These findings generalize under distribution shift on question-answering and under a significant task shift to person biography generation. Our results demonstrate that long-form generations may be calibrated end-to-end by constructing an objective in the space of the predictions that users make in downstream decision-making.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) Prompting is a dominant paradigm in Large Language Models (LLMs) to enhance complex reasoning. It guides LLMs to present multi-step reasoning, rather than generating the final answer directly. However, CoT encounters difficulties when key information required for reasoning is implicit or missing. This occurs because CoT emphasizes the sequence of reasoning steps while overlooking the early extraction of essential information. We propose a pre-prompting method called Iterative Summarization Pre-Prompting (ISP^2) to refine LLM reasoning when key information is not explicitly provided. First, entities and their corresponding descriptions are extracted to form potential key information pairs. Next, we use a reliability rating to assess these pairs, then merge the two lowest-ranked pairs into a new entity description. This process is repeated until a unique key information pair is obtained. Finally, that pair, along with the original question, is fed into LLMs to produce the answer. Extensive experiments demonstrate a 7.1% improvement compared to existing methods. Unlike traditional prompting, ISP^2 adopts an inductive approach with pre-prompting, offering flexible integration into diverse reasoning frameworks. The code is available at https://github.com/zdhgreat/ISP-2.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs often do generate entirely novel text. We begin by defending bibliotechnism against this challenge, showing how novel text may be meaningful only in a derivative sense, so that the content of this generated text depends in an important sense on the content of original human text. We go on to present a different, novel challenge for bibliotechnism, stemming from examples in which LLMs generate "novel reference", using novel names to refer to novel entities. Such examples could be smoothly explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but possessed a limited form of agency (beliefs, desires, and intentions). According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has beliefs, desires and intentions if and only if its behavior is well-explained by the hypothesis that it has such states. In line with this view, we argue that cases of novel reference provide evidence that LLMs do in fact have beliefs, desires, and intentions, and thus have a limited form of agency.

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

When humans cooperate, they frequently coordinate their activity through both verbal communication and non-verbal actions, using this information to infer a shared goal and plan. How can we model this inferential ability? In this paper, we introduce a model of a cooperative team where one agent, the principal, may communicate natural language instructions about their shared plan to another agent, the assistant, using GPT-3 as a likelihood function for instruction utterances. We then show how a third person observer can infer the team's goal via multi-modal Bayesian inverse planning from actions and instructions, computing the posterior distribution over goals under the assumption that agents will act and communicate rationally to achieve them. We evaluate this approach by comparing it with human goal inferences in a multi-agent gridworld, finding that our model's inferences closely correlate with human judgments (R = 0.96). When compared to inference from actions alone, we also find that instructions lead to more rapid and less uncertain goal inference, highlighting the importance of verbal communication for cooperative agents.

While chain-of-thought prompting (CoT) has the potential to improve the explainability of language model reasoning, it can systematically misrepresent the factors influencing models' behavior--for example, rationalizing answers in line with a user's opinion without mentioning this bias. To mitigate this biased reasoning problem, we introduce bias-augmented consistency training (BCT), an unsupervised fine-tuning scheme that trains models to give consistent reasoning across prompts with and without biasing features. We construct a suite testing nine forms of biased reasoning on seven question-answering tasks, and find that applying BCT to GPT-3.5-Turbo with one bias reduces the rate of biased reasoning by 86% on held-out tasks. Moreover, this model generalizes to other forms of bias, reducing biased reasoning on held-out biases by an average of 37%. As BCT generalizes to held-out biases and does not require gold labels, this method may hold promise for reducing biased reasoning from as-of-yet unknown biases and on tasks where supervision for ground truth reasoning is unavailable.

Effective interlocutors account for the uncertain goals, beliefs, and emotions of others. But even the best human conversationalist cannot perfectly anticipate the trajectory of a dialogue. How well can language models represent inherent uncertainty in conversations? We propose FortUne Dial, an expansion of the long-standing "conversation forecasting" task: instead of just accuracy, evaluation is conducted with uncertainty-aware metrics, effectively enabling abstention on individual instances. We study two ways in which language models potentially represent outcome uncertainty (internally, using scores and directly, using tokens) and propose fine-tuning strategies to improve calibration of both representations. Experiments on eight difficult negotiation corpora demonstrate that our proposed fine-tuning strategies (a traditional supervision strategy and an off-policy reinforcement learning strategy) can calibrate smaller open-source models to compete with pre-trained models 10x their size.

Modern natural language models such as the GPT-2/GPT-3 contain tremendous amounts of information about human belief in a consistently testable form. If these models could be shown to accurately reflect the underlying beliefs of the human beings that produced the data used to train these models, then such models become a powerful sociological tool in ways that are distinct from traditional methods, such as interviews and surveys. In this study, We train a version of the GPT-2 on a corpora of historical chess games, and then "launch" clusters of synthetic agents into the model, using text strings to create context and orientation. We compare the trajectories contained in the text generated by the agents/model and compare that to the known ground truth of the chess board, move legality, and historical patterns of play. We find that the percentages of moves by piece using the model are substantially similar from human patterns. We further find that the model creates an accurate latent representation of the chessboard, and that it is possible to plot trajectories of legal moves across the board using this knowledge.

The reward hypothesis posits that, "all of what we mean by goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of the expected value of the cumulative sum of a received scalar signal (reward)." We aim to fully settle this hypothesis. This will not conclude with a simple affirmation or refutation, but rather specify completely the implicit requirements on goals and purposes under which the hypothesis holds.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

When writing and talking, people sometimes pause to think. Although reasoning-focused works have often framed reasoning as a method of answering questions or completing agentic tasks, reasoning is implicit in almost all written text. For example, this applies to the steps not stated between the lines of a proof or to the theory of mind underlying a conversation. In the Self-Taught Reasoner (STaR, Zelikman et al. 2022), useful thinking is learned by inferring rationales from few-shot examples in question-answering and learning from those that lead to a correct answer. This is a highly constrained setting -- ideally, a language model could instead learn to infer unstated rationales in arbitrary text. We present Quiet-STaR, a generalization of STaR in which LMs learn to generate rationales at each token to explain future text, improving their predictions. We address key challenges, including 1) the computational cost of generating continuations, 2) the fact that the LM does not initially know how to generate or use internal thoughts, and 3) the need to predict beyond individual next tokens. To resolve these, we propose a tokenwise parallel sampling algorithm, using learnable tokens indicating a thought's start and end, and an extended teacher-forcing technique. Encouragingly, generated rationales disproportionately help model difficult-to-predict tokens and improve the LM's ability to directly answer difficult questions. In particular, after continued pretraining of an LM on a corpus of internet text with Quiet-STaR, we find zero-shot improvements on GSM8K (5.9%rightarrow10.9%) and CommonsenseQA (36.3%rightarrow47.2%) and observe a perplexity improvement of difficult tokens in natural text. Crucially, these improvements require no fine-tuning on these tasks. Quiet-STaR marks a step towards LMs that can learn to reason in a more general and scalable way.

Understanding people's social interactions in complex real-world scenarios often relies on intricate mental reasoning. To truly understand how and why people interact with one another, we must infer the underlying mental states that give rise to the social interactions, i.e., Theory of Mind reasoning in multi-agent interactions. Additionally, social interactions are often multi-modal -- we can watch people's actions, hear their conversations, and/or read about their past behaviors. For AI systems to successfully and safely interact with people in real-world environments, they also need to understand people's mental states as well as their inferences about each other's mental states based on multi-modal information about their interactions. For this, we introduce MuMA-ToM, a Multi-modal Multi-Agent Theory of Mind benchmark. MuMA-ToM is the first multi-modal Theory of Mind benchmark that evaluates mental reasoning in embodied multi-agent interactions. In MuMA-ToM, we provide video and text descriptions of people's multi-modal behavior in realistic household environments. Based on the context, we then ask questions about people's goals, beliefs, and beliefs about others' goals. We validated MuMA-ToM in a human experiment and provided a human baseline. We also proposed a novel multi-modal, multi-agent ToM model, LIMP (Language model-based Inverse Multi-agent Planning). Our experimental results show that LIMP significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, including large multi-modal models (e.g., GPT-4o, Gemini-1.5 Pro) and a recent multi-modal ToM model, BIP-ALM.

We test the robustness of debate as a method of scalable oversight by training models to debate with data generated via self-play. In a long-context reading comprehension task, we find that language model based evaluators answer questions more accurately when judging models optimized to win debates. By contrast, we find no such relationship for consultancy models trained to persuade a judge without an opposing debater present. In quantitative and qualitative comparisons between our debate models and novel consultancy baselines, we find evidence that debate training encourages stronger and more informative arguments, showing promise that it can help provide high-quality supervision for tasks that are difficult to directly evaluate.

Generating rationales that justify scoring decisions has been a promising way to facilitate explainability in automated scoring systems. However, existing methods do not match the accuracy of classifier-based methods. Plus, the generated rationales often contain hallucinated information. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework capable of generating more faithful rationales and, more importantly, matching performance with classifier-based black-box scoring systems. We first mimic the human assessment process by querying Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate a thought tree. We then summarise intermediate assessment decisions from each thought tree path for creating synthetic rationale data and rationale preference data. Finally, we utilise the generated synthetic data to calibrate LLMs through a two-step training process: supervised fine-tuning and preference optimization. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our framework achieves a 38% assessment performance improvement in the QWK score compared to prior work while producing higher-quality rationales, as recognised by human evaluators and LLMs. Our work sheds light on the effectiveness of performing preference optimization using synthetic preference data obtained from thought tree paths.

To successfully negotiate a deal, it is not enough to communicate fluently: pragmatic planning of persuasive negotiation strategies is essential. While modern dialogue agents excel at generating fluent sentences, they still lack pragmatic grounding and cannot reason strategically. We present DialoGraph, a negotiation system that incorporates pragmatic strategies in a negotiation dialogue using graph neural networks. DialoGraph explicitly incorporates dependencies between sequences of strategies to enable improved and interpretable prediction of next optimal strategies, given the dialogue context. Our graph-based method outperforms prior state-of-the-art negotiation models both in the accuracy of strategy/dialogue act prediction and in the quality of downstream dialogue response generation. We qualitatively show further benefits of learned strategy-graphs in providing explicit associations between effective negotiation strategies over the course of the dialogue, leading to interpretable and strategic dialogues.

In this paper, we explore the ability to model and infer personality types of opponents, predict their responses, and use this information to adapt a dialog agent's high-level strategy in negotiation tasks. Inspired by the idea of incorporating a theory of mind (ToM) into machines, we introduce a probabilistic formulation to encapsulate the opponent's personality type during both learning and inference. We test our approach on the CraigslistBargain dataset and show that our method using ToM inference achieves a 20% higher dialog agreement rate compared to baselines on a mixed population of opponents. We also find that our model displays diverse negotiation behavior with different types of opponents.

We employ an audit design to investigate biases in state-of-the-art large language models, including GPT-4. In our study, we prompt the models for advice involving a named individual across a variety of scenarios, such as during car purchase negotiations or election outcome predictions. We find that the advice systematically disadvantages names that are commonly associated with racial minorities and women. Names associated with Black women receive the least advantageous outcomes. The biases are consistent across 42 prompt templates and several models, indicating a systemic issue rather than isolated incidents. While providing numerical, decision-relevant anchors in the prompt can successfully counteract the biases, qualitative details have inconsistent effects and may even increase disparities. Our findings underscore the importance of conducting audits at the point of LLM deployment and implementation to mitigate their potential for harm against marginalized communities.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown unprecedented potential in various fields, especially as the backbones for question-answering (QA) systems. However, they tend to be easily deceived by tricky questions such as "How many eyes does the sun have?". Such frailties of PLMs often allude to the lack of knowledge within them. In this paper, we find that the PLMs already possess the knowledge required to rebut such questions, and the key is how to activate the knowledge. To systematize this observation, we investigate the PLMs' responses to one kind of tricky questions, i.e., the false premises questions (FPQs). We annotate a FalseQA dataset containing 2365 human-written FPQs, with the corresponding explanations for the false premises and the revised true premise questions. Using FalseQA, we discover that PLMs are capable of discriminating FPQs by fine-tuning on moderate numbers (e.g., 256) of examples. PLMs also generate reasonable explanations for the false premise, which serve as rebuttals. Further replaying a few general questions during training allows PLMs to excel on FPQs and general questions simultaneously. Our work suggests that once the rebuttal ability is stimulated, knowledge inside the PLMs can be effectively utilized to handle FPQs, which incentivizes the research on PLM-based QA systems.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning has enabled large language models (LLMs) to utilize additional computation through intermediate tokens to solve complex tasks. However, we posit that typical reasoning traces contain many redundant tokens, incurring extraneous inference costs. Upon examination of the output distribution of current LLMs, we find evidence on their latent ability to reason more concisely, relative to their default behavior. To elicit this capability, we propose simple fine-tuning methods which leverage self-generated concise reasoning paths obtained by best-of-N sampling and few-shot conditioning, in task-specific settings. Our combined method achieves a 30% reduction in output tokens on average, across five model families on GSM8K and MATH, while maintaining average accuracy. By exploiting the fundamental stochasticity and in-context learning capabilities of LLMs, our self-training approach robustly elicits concise reasoning on a wide range of models, including those with extensive post-training. Code is available at https://github.com/TergelMunkhbat/concise-reasoning

Scaling the test-time compute of large language models has demonstrated impressive performance on reasoning benchmarks. However, existing evaluations of test-time scaling make the strong assumption that a reasoning system should always give an answer to any question provided. This overlooks concerns about whether a model is confident in its answer, and whether it is appropriate to always provide a response. To address these concerns, we extract confidence scores during reasoning for thresholding model responses. We find that increasing compute budget at inference time not only helps models answer more questions correctly, but also increases confidence in correct responses. We then extend the current paradigm of zero-risk responses during evaluation by considering settings with non-zero levels of response risk, and suggest a recipe for reporting evaluations under these settings.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) frameworks enable large language models (LLMs) to retrieve relevant information from a knowledge base and incorporate it into the context for generating responses. This mitigates hallucinations and allows for the updating of knowledge without retraining the LLM. However, RAG does not guarantee valid responses if retrieval fails to identify the necessary information as the context for response generation. Also, if there is contradictory content, the RAG response will likely reflect only one of the two possible responses. Therefore, quantifying uncertainty in the retrieval process is crucial for ensuring RAG trustworthiness. In this report, we introduce a four-step framework for applying conformal prediction to quantify retrieval uncertainty in RAG frameworks. First, a calibration set of questions answerable from the knowledge base is constructed. Each question's embedding is compared against document embeddings to identify the most relevant document chunks containing the answer and record their similarity scores. Given a user-specified error rate ({\alpha}), these similarity scores are then analyzed to determine a similarity score cutoff threshold. During inference, all chunks with similarity exceeding this threshold are retrieved to provide context to the LLM, ensuring the true answer is captured in the context with a (1-{\alpha}) confidence level. We provide a Python package that enables users to implement the entire workflow proposed in our work, only using LLMs and without human intervention.

The escalating challenge of misinformation, particularly in the context of political discourse, necessitates advanced solutions for fact-checking. We introduce innovative approaches to enhance the reliability and efficiency of multimodal fact-checking through the integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) with Retrieval-augmented Generation (RAG)- based advanced reasoning techniques. This work proposes two novel methodologies, Chain of RAG (CoRAG) and Tree of RAG (ToRAG). The approaches are designed to handle multimodal claims by reasoning the next questions that need to be answered based on previous evidence. Our approaches improve the accuracy of veracity predictions and the generation of explanations over the traditional fact-checking approach of sub-question generation with chain of thought veracity prediction. By employing multimodal LLMs adept at analyzing both text and images, this research advances the capability of automated systems in identifying and countering misinformation.

Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT have demonstrated superior performance on a variety of natural language processing (NLP) tasks including sentiment analysis, mathematical reasoning and summarization. Furthermore, since these models are instruction-tuned on human conversations to produce "helpful" responses, they can and often will produce explanations along with the response, which we call self-explanations. For example, when analyzing the sentiment of a movie review, the model may output not only the positivity of the sentiment, but also an explanation (e.g., by listing the sentiment-laden words such as "fantastic" and "memorable" in the review). How good are these automatically generated self-explanations? In this paper, we investigate this question on the task of sentiment analysis and for feature attribution explanation, one of the most commonly studied settings in the interpretability literature (for pre-ChatGPT models). Specifically, we study different ways to elicit the self-explanations, evaluate their faithfulness on a set of evaluation metrics, and compare them to traditional explanation methods such as occlusion or LIME saliency maps. Through an extensive set of experiments, we find that ChatGPT's self-explanations perform on par with traditional ones, but are quite different from them according to various agreement metrics, meanwhile being much cheaper to produce (as they are generated along with the prediction). In addition, we identified several interesting characteristics of them, which prompt us to rethink many current model interpretability practices in the era of ChatGPT(-like) LLMs.

We present evidence of substantial benefit from efficient exploration in gathering human feedback to improve large language models. In our experiments, an agent sequentially generates queries while fitting a reward model to the feedback received. Our best-performing agent generates queries using double Thompson sampling, with uncertainty represented by an epistemic neural network. Our results demonstrate that efficient exploration enables high levels of performance with far fewer queries. Further, both uncertainty estimation and the choice of exploration scheme play critical roles.

In this paper, we present the current progress of the project Verif.ai, an open-source scientific generative question-answering system with referenced and verified answers. The components of the system are (1) an information retrieval system combining semantic and lexical search techniques over scientific papers (PubMed), (2) a fine-tuned generative model (Mistral 7B) taking top answers and generating answers with references to the papers from which the claim was derived, and (3) a verification engine that cross-checks the generated claim and the abstract or paper from which the claim was derived, verifying whether there may have been any hallucinations in generating the claim. We are reinforcing the generative model by providing the abstract in context, but in addition, an independent set of methods and models are verifying the answer and checking for hallucinations. Therefore, we believe that by using our method, we can make scientists more productive, while building trust in the use of generative language models in scientific environments, where hallucinations and misinformation cannot be tolerated.

An Achilles heel of Large Language Models (LLMs) is their tendency to hallucinate non-factual statements. A response mixed of factual and non-factual statements poses a challenge for humans to verify and accurately base their decisions on. To combat this problem, we propose Highlighted Chain-of-Thought Prompting (HoT), a technique for prompting LLMs to generate responses with XML tags that ground facts to those provided in the query. That is, given an input question, LLMs would first re-format the question to add XML tags highlighting key facts, and then, generate a response with highlights over the facts referenced from the input. Interestingly, in few-shot settings, HoT outperforms vanilla chain of thought prompting (CoT) on a wide range of 17 tasks from arithmetic, reading comprehension to logical reasoning. When asking humans to verify LLM responses, highlights help time-limited participants to more accurately and efficiently recognize when LLMs are correct. Yet, surprisingly, when LLMs are wrong, HoTs tend to make users believe that an answer is correct.

In day-to-day communication, people often approximate the truth - for example, rounding the time or omitting details - in order to be maximally helpful to the listener. How do large language models (LLMs) handle such nuanced trade-offs? To address this question, we use psychological models and experiments designed to characterize human behavior to analyze LLMs. We test a range of LLMs and explore how optimization for human preferences or inference-time reasoning affects these trade-offs. We find that reinforcement learning from human feedback improves both honesty and helpfulness, while chain-of-thought prompting skews LLMs towards helpfulness over honesty. Finally, GPT-4 Turbo demonstrates human-like response patterns including sensitivity to the conversational framing and listener's decision context. Our findings reveal the conversational values internalized by LLMs and suggest that even these abstract values can, to a degree, be steered by zero-shot prompting.

Automated fact-checking is an important task because determining the accurate status of a proposed claim within the vast amount of information available online is a critical challenge. This challenge requires robust evaluation to prevent the spread of false information. Modern large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated high capability in performing a diverse range of Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks. By utilizing proper prompting strategies, their versatility due to their understanding of large context sizes and zero-shot learning ability enables them to simulate human problem-solving intuition and move towards being an alternative to humans for solving problems. In this work, we introduce a straightforward framework based on Zero-Shot Learning and Key Points (ZSL-KeP) for automated fact-checking, which despite its simplicity, performed well on the AVeriTeC shared task dataset by robustly improving the baseline and achieving 10th place.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

We introduce a new type of test, called a Turing Experiment (TE), for evaluating how well a language model, such as GPT-3, can simulate different aspects of human behavior. Unlike the Turing Test, which involves simulating a single arbitrary individual, a TE requires simulating a representative sample of participants in human subject research. We give TEs that attempt to replicate well-established findings in prior studies. We design a methodology for simulating TEs and illustrate its use to compare how well different language models are able to reproduce classic economic, psycholinguistic, and social psychology experiments: Ultimatum Game, Garden Path Sentences, Milgram Shock Experiment, and Wisdom of Crowds. In the first three TEs, the existing findings were replicated using recent models, while the last TE reveals a "hyper-accuracy distortion" present in some language models.

Background: Recently, ChatGPT and similar generative AI models have attracted hundreds of millions of users and become part of the public discourse. Many believe that such models will disrupt society and will result in a significant change in the education system and information generation in the future. So far, this belief is based on either colloquial evidence or benchmarks from the owners of the models -- both lack scientific rigour. Objective: Through a large-scale study comparing human-written versus ChatGPT-generated argumentative student essays, we systematically assess the quality of the AI-generated content. Methods: A large corpus of essays was rated using standard criteria by a large number of human experts (teachers). We augment the analysis with a consideration of the linguistic characteristics of the generated essays. Results: Our results demonstrate that ChatGPT generates essays that are rated higher for quality than human-written essays. The writing style of the AI models exhibits linguistic characteristics that are different from those of the human-written essays, e.g., it is characterized by fewer discourse and epistemic markers, but more nominalizations and greater lexical diversity. Conclusions: Our results clearly demonstrate that models like ChatGPT outperform humans in generating argumentative essays. Since the technology is readily available for anyone to use, educators must act immediately. We must re-invent homework and develop teaching concepts that utilize these AI models in the same way as math utilized the calculator: teach the general concepts first and then use AI tools to free up time for other learning objectives.

Instruction-tuned Large Language Models (It-LLMs) have been exhibiting outstanding abilities to reason around cognitive states, intentions, and reactions of all people involved, letting humans guide and comprehend day-to-day social interactions effectively. In fact, several multiple-choice questions (MCQ) benchmarks have been proposed to construct solid assessments of the models' abilities. However, earlier works are demonstrating the presence of inherent "order bias" in It-LLMs, posing challenges to the appropriate evaluation. In this paper, we investigate It-LLMs' resilience abilities towards a series of probing tests using four MCQ benchmarks. Introducing adversarial examples, we show a significant performance gap, mainly when varying the order of the choices, which reveals a selection bias and brings into discussion reasoning abilities. Following a correlation between first positions and model choices due to positional bias, we hypothesized the presence of structural heuristics in the decision-making process of the It-LLMs, strengthened by including significant examples in few-shot scenarios. Finally, by using the Chain-of-Thought (CoT) technique, we elicit the model to reason and mitigate the bias by obtaining more robust models.

We teach goal-driven agents to interactively act and speak in situated environments by training on generated curriculums. Our agents operate in LIGHT (Urbanek et al. 2019) -- a large-scale crowd-sourced fantasy text adventure game wherein an agent perceives and interacts with the world through textual natural language. Goals in this environment take the form of character-based quests, consisting of personas and motivations. We augment LIGHT by learning to procedurally generate additional novel textual worlds and quests to create a curriculum of steadily increasing difficulty for training agents to achieve such goals. In particular, we measure curriculum difficulty in terms of the rarity of the quest in the original training distribution -- an easier environment is one that is more likely to have been found in the unaugmented dataset. An ablation study shows that this method of learning from the tail of a distribution results in significantly higher generalization abilities as measured by zero-shot performance on never-before-seen quests.

Knowing when to answer or refuse is crucial for safe and reliable decision-making language agents. Although prior work has introduced refusal strategies to boost LMs' reliability, how these models adapt their decisions to different risk levels remains underexplored. We formalize the task of risk-aware decision-making, expose critical weaknesses in existing LMs, and propose skill-decomposition solutions to mitigate them. Our findings show that even cutting-edge LMs--both regular and reasoning models--still require explicit prompt chaining to handle the task effectively, revealing the challenges that must be overcome to achieve truly autonomous decision-making agents.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

The way people respond to messaging from public health organizations on social media can provide insight into public perceptions on critical health issues, especially during a global crisis such as COVID-19. It could be valuable for high-impact organizations such as the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) or the World Health Organization (WHO) to understand how these perceptions impact reception of messaging on health policy recommendations. We collect two datasets of public health messages and their responses from Twitter relating to COVID-19 and Vaccines, and introduce a predictive method which can be used to explore the potential reception of such messages. Specifically, we harness a generative model (GPT-2) to directly predict probable future responses and demonstrate how it can be used to optimize expected reception of important health guidance. Finally, we introduce a novel evaluation scheme with extensive statistical testing which allows us to conclude that our models capture the semantics and sentiment found in actual public health responses.

We present an online method for embodied agents to learn and accomplish diverse user goals. While offline methods like RLHF can represent various goals but require large datasets, our approach achieves similar flexibility with online efficiency. We extract natural language goal representations from conversations with Large Language Models (LLMs). We prompt an LLM to role play as a human with different goals and use the corresponding likelihoods to run Bayesian inference over potential goals. As a result, our method can represent uncertainty over complex goals based on unrestricted dialog. We evaluate our method in grocery shopping and home robot assistance domains using a text-based interface and AI2Thor simulation respectively. Results show our method outperforms ablation baselines that lack either explicit goal representation or probabilistic inference.

When answering questions, LLMs can convey not only an answer, but a level of confidence about the answer being correct. This includes explicit confidence markers (e.g. giving a numeric score) as well as implicit markers, like an authoritative tone or elaborating with additional knowledge. For LLMs to be trustworthy knowledge sources, the confidence they convey should match their actual expertise; however, most current models tend towards overconfidence. To calibrate both implicit and explicit confidence markers, we introduce a pragmatic, listener-aware finetuning method (LACIE) that models the listener, considering not only whether an answer is right, but whether it will be accepted by a listener. We cast calibration as preference optimization, creating data via a two-agent game, where a speaker model's outputs are judged by a simulated listener. We then finetune three LLMs (Mistral-7B, Llama3-8B, Llama3-70B) with LACIE, and show that the resulting models are better calibrated w.r.t. a simulated listener. Crucially, these trends transfer to human listeners, helping them correctly predict model correctness: we conduct a human evaluation where annotators accept or reject an LLM's answers, finding that training with LACIE results in 47% fewer incorrect answers being accepted while maintaining the same level of acceptance for correct answers. Furthermore, LACIE generalizes to another dataset, resulting in a large increase in truthfulness on TruthfulQA when trained on TriviaQA. Our analysis indicates that LACIE leads to a better confidence separation between correct and incorrect examples. Qualitatively, we find that a LACIE-trained model hedges more and implicitly signals certainty when it is correct by using an authoritative tone or including details. Finally, LACIE finetuning leads to an emergent increase in model abstention (e.g. saying "I don't know") for answers that are likely wrong.

Large language models (LLMs) are notorious for hallucinating, i.e., producing erroneous claims in their output. Such hallucinations can be dangerous, as occasional factual inaccuracies in the generated text might be obscured by the rest of the output being generally factual, making it extremely hard for the users to spot them. Current services that leverage LLMs usually do not provide any means for detecting unreliable generations. Here, we aim to bridge this gap. In particular, we propose a novel fact-checking and hallucination detection pipeline based on token-level uncertainty quantification. Uncertainty scores leverage information encapsulated in the output of a neural network or its layers to detect unreliable predictions, and we show that they can be used to fact-check the atomic claims in the LLM output. Moreover, we present a novel token-level uncertainty quantification method that removes the impact of uncertainty about what claim to generate on the current step and what surface form to use. Our method Claim Conditioned Probability (CCP) measures only the uncertainty of particular claim value expressed by the model. Experiments on the task of biography generation demonstrate strong improvements for CCP compared to the baselines for six different LLMs and three languages. Human evaluation reveals that the fact-checking pipeline based on uncertainty quantification is competitive with a fact-checking tool that leverages external knowledge.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate outputs that lack grounding in real-world facts, a phenomenon known as hallucinations. Prior research has associated hallucinations with model uncertainty, leveraging this relationship for hallucination detection and mitigation. In this paper, we challenge the underlying assumption that all hallucinations are associated with uncertainty. Using knowledge detection and uncertainty measurement methods, we demonstrate that models can hallucinate with high certainty even when they have the correct knowledge. We further show that high-certainty hallucinations are consistent across models and datasets, distinctive enough to be singled out, and challenge existing mitigation methods. Our findings reveal an overlooked aspect of hallucinations, emphasizing the need to understand their origins and improve mitigation strategies to enhance LLM safety. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/Trust_me_Im_wrong .

Multi-agent AI systems can be used for simulating collective decision-making in scientific and practical applications. They can also be used to introduce a diverse group discussion step in chatbot pipelines, enhancing the cultural sensitivity of the chatbot's responses. These applications, however, are predicated on the ability of AI agents to reliably adopt assigned personas and mimic human interactions. To see whether LLM agents satisfy these requirements, we examine AI agent ensembles engaged in cross-national collaboration and debate by analyzing their private responses and chat transcripts. Our findings suggest that multi-agent discussions can support collective AI decisions that more often reflect diverse perspectives, yet this effect is tempered by the agents' susceptibility to conformity due to perceived peer pressure and occasional challenges in maintaining consistent personas and opinions. Instructions that encourage debate in support of one's opinions rather than collaboration increase the rate of inconstancy. Without addressing the factors we identify, the full potential of multi-agent frameworks for producing more culturally diverse AI outputs or more realistic simulations of group decision-making may remain untapped.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

In this position paper, we argue that human evaluation of generative large language models (LLMs) should be a multidisciplinary undertaking that draws upon insights from disciplines such as user experience research and human behavioral psychology to ensure that the experimental design and results are reliable. The conclusions from these evaluations, thus, must consider factors such as usability, aesthetics, and cognitive biases. We highlight how cognitive biases can conflate fluent information and truthfulness, and how cognitive uncertainty affects the reliability of rating scores such as Likert. Furthermore, the evaluation should differentiate the capabilities and weaknesses of increasingly powerful large language models -- which requires effective test sets. The scalability of human evaluation is also crucial to wider adoption. Hence, to design an effective human evaluation system in the age of generative NLP, we propose the ConSiDERS-The-Human evaluation framework consisting of 6 pillars -- Consistency, Scoring Criteria, Differentiating, User Experience, Responsible, and Scalability.

Generating a Chain of Thought (CoT) has been shown to consistently improve large language model (LLM) performance on a wide range of NLP tasks. However, prior work has mainly focused on logical reasoning tasks (e.g. arithmetic, commonsense QA); it remains unclear whether improvements hold for more diverse types of reasoning, especially in socially situated contexts. Concretely, we perform a controlled evaluation of zero-shot CoT across two socially sensitive domains: harmful questions and stereotype benchmarks. We find that zero-shot CoT reasoning in sensitive domains significantly increases a model's likelihood to produce harmful or undesirable output, with trends holding across different prompt formats and model variants. Furthermore, we show that harmful CoTs increase with model size, but decrease with improved instruction following. Our work suggests that zero-shot CoT should be used with caution on socially important tasks, especially when marginalized groups or sensitive topics are involved.

Recent approaches to empathetic response generation try to incorporate commonsense knowledge or reasoning about the causes of emotions to better understand the user's experiences and feelings. However, these approaches mainly focus on understanding the causalities of context from the user's perspective, ignoring the system's perspective. In this paper, we propose a commonsense-based causality explanation approach for diverse empathetic response generation that considers both the user's perspective (user's desires and reactions) and the system's perspective (system's intentions and reactions). We enhance ChatGPT's ability to reason for the system's perspective by integrating in-context learning with commonsense knowledge. Then, we integrate the commonsense-based causality explanation with both ChatGPT and a T5-based model. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that our method outperforms other comparable methods on both automatic and human evaluations.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable potential in natural language generation and instruction following, a persistent challenge lies in their susceptibility to "hallucinations", which erodes trust in their outputs. Although Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) presents a promising solution, its accurate implementation within the context of LLMs remains a significant hurdle. To address this critical roadblock, our research originates from a fundamental heuristic insight: tokens within auto-regressive LLM-generated text do not equally reflect the underlying meaning. Some tokens carry greater relevance and representativeness than others, owing to the phenomenon of "linguistic redundancy", wherein a select few keywords suffice to convey the essence of lengthy sentences. Regrettably, existing methodologies treat all tokens with equal importance when estimating uncertainty, disregarding these inherent generative inequalities. Our analysis reveals a significant issue with state-of-the-art: numerous tokens (and sentences) of limited semantic significance receive equal or even excessive weighting during uncertainty estimation. To rectify this bias, we propose to jointly Shifting Attention to more Relevant (SAR) components, at both the token- and the sentence-levels for accurate uncertainty estimation. We conduct extensive experiments involving a range of popular "off-the-shelf" LLMs, including instruction-tuned LLMs such as Vicuna, WizardLM, and LLaMA-2-chat, as well as pretrained LLMs like OPT and LLaMA, with model sizes extending up to 33B parameters. We carry out evaluation across various free-form question-answering tasks, encompassing domains such as reading comprehension, science Q&A, and medical Q&A. Our experimental results demonstrate the superior performance of SAR in addressing the challenges of uncertainty estimation within the realm of LLMs.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have brought remarkable success in the field of LLM-as-Agent. Nevertheless, a prevalent assumption is that the information processed by LLMs is consistently honest, neglecting the pervasive deceptive or misleading information in human society and AI-generated content. This oversight makes LLMs susceptible to malicious manipulations, potentially resulting in detrimental outcomes. This study utilizes the intricate Avalon game as a testbed to explore LLMs' potential in deceptive environments. Avalon, full of misinformation and requiring sophisticated logic, manifests as a "Game-of-Thoughts". Inspired by the efficacy of humans' recursive thinking and perspective-taking in the Avalon game, we introduce a novel framework, Recursive Contemplation (ReCon), to enhance LLMs' ability to identify and counteract deceptive information. ReCon combines formulation and refinement contemplation processes; formulation contemplation produces initial thoughts and speech, while refinement contemplation further polishes them. Additionally, we incorporate first-order and second-order perspective transitions into these processes respectively. Specifically, the first-order allows an LLM agent to infer others' mental states, and the second-order involves understanding how others perceive the agent's mental state. After integrating ReCon with different LLMs, extensive experiment results from the Avalon game indicate its efficacy in aiding LLMs to discern and maneuver around deceptive information without extra fine-tuning and data. Finally, we offer a possible explanation for the efficacy of ReCon and explore the current limitations of LLMs in terms of safety, reasoning, speaking style, and format, potentially furnishing insights for subsequent research.

Large language models (LLMs) can produce erroneous responses that sound fluent and convincing, raising the risk that users will rely on these responses as if they were correct. Mitigating such overreliance is a key challenge. Through a think-aloud study in which participants use an LLM-infused application to answer objective questions, we identify several features of LLM responses that shape users' reliance: explanations (supporting details for answers), inconsistencies in explanations, and sources. Through a large-scale, pre-registered, controlled experiment (N=308), we isolate and study the effects of these features on users' reliance, accuracy, and other measures. We find that the presence of explanations increases reliance on both correct and incorrect responses. However, we observe less reliance on incorrect responses when sources are provided or when explanations exhibit inconsistencies. We discuss the implications of these findings for fostering appropriate reliance on LLMs.

Many practical applications of dialogue technology require the generation of responses according to a particular developer-specified persona. While a variety of personas can be elicited from recent large language models, the opaqueness and unpredictability of these models make it desirable to be able to specify personas in an explicit form. In previous work, personas have typically been represented as sets of one-off pieces of self-knowledge that are retrieved by the dialogue system for use in generation. However, in realistic human conversations, personas are often revealed through story-like narratives that involve rich habitual knowledge -- knowledge about kinds of events that an agent often participates in (e.g., work activities, hobbies, sporting activities, favorite entertainments, etc.), including typical goals, sub-events, preconditions, and postconditions of those events. We capture such habitual knowledge using an explicit schema representation, and propose an approach to dialogue generation that retrieves relevant schemas to condition a large language model to generate persona-based responses. Furthermore, we demonstrate a method for bootstrapping the creation of such schemas by first generating generic passages from a set of simple facts, and then inducing schemas from the generated passages.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has opened up exciting possibilities for simulating human behavior and cognitive processes, with potential applications in various domains, including marketing research and consumer behavior analysis. However, the validity of utilizing LLMs as stand-ins for human subjects remains uncertain due to glaring divergences that suggest fundamentally different underlying processes at play and the sensitivity of LLM responses to prompt variations. This paper presents a novel approach based on Shapley values from cooperative game theory to interpret LLM behavior and quantify the relative contribution of each prompt component to the model's output. Through two applications - a discrete choice experiment and an investigation of cognitive biases - we demonstrate how the Shapley value method can uncover what we term "token noise" effects, a phenomenon where LLM decisions are disproportionately influenced by tokens providing minimal informative content. This phenomenon raises concerns about the robustness and generalizability of insights obtained from LLMs in the context of human behavior simulation. Our model-agnostic approach extends its utility to proprietary LLMs, providing a valuable tool for practitioners and researchers to strategically optimize prompts and mitigate apparent cognitive biases. Our findings underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of the factors driving LLM responses before relying on them as substitutes for human subjects in survey settings. We emphasize the importance of researchers reporting results conditioned on specific prompt templates and exercising caution when drawing parallels between human behavior and LLMs.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Since the release of OpenAI's ChatGPT, generative language models have attracted extensive public attention. The increased usage has highlighted generative models' broad utility, but also revealed several forms of embedded bias. Some is induced by the pre-training corpus; but additional bias specific to generative models arises from the use of subjective fine-tuning to avoid generating harmful content. Fine-tuning bias may come from individual engineers and company policies, and affects which prompts the model chooses to refuse. In this experiment, we characterize ChatGPT's refusal behavior using a black-box attack. We first query ChatGPT with a variety of offensive and benign prompts (n=1,706), then manually label each response as compliance or refusal. Manual examination of responses reveals that refusal is not cleanly binary, and lies on a continuum; as such, we map several different kinds of responses to a binary of compliance or refusal. The small manually-labeled dataset is used to train a refusal classifier, which achieves an accuracy of 96%. Second, we use this refusal classifier to bootstrap a larger (n=10,000) dataset adapted from the Quora Insincere Questions dataset. With this machine-labeled data, we train a prompt classifier to predict whether ChatGPT will refuse a given question, without seeing ChatGPT's response. This prompt classifier achieves 76% accuracy on a test set of manually labeled questions (n=985). We examine our classifiers and the prompt n-grams that are most predictive of either compliance or refusal. Our datasets and code are available at https://github.com/maxwellreuter/chatgpt-refusals.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

Moral foundations theory (MFT) is a psychological assessment tool that decomposes human moral reasoning into five factors, including care/harm, liberty/oppression, and sanctity/degradation (Graham et al., 2009). People vary in the weight they place on these dimensions when making moral decisions, in part due to their cultural upbringing and political ideology. As large language models (LLMs) are trained on datasets collected from the internet, they may reflect the biases that are present in such corpora. This paper uses MFT as a lens to analyze whether popular LLMs have acquired a bias towards a particular set of moral values. We analyze known LLMs and find they exhibit particular moral foundations, and show how these relate to human moral foundations and political affiliations. We also measure the consistency of these biases, or whether they vary strongly depending on the context of how the model is prompted. Finally, we show that we can adversarially select prompts that encourage the moral to exhibit a particular set of moral foundations, and that this can affect the model's behavior on downstream tasks. These findings help illustrate the potential risks and unintended consequences of LLMs assuming a particular moral stance.

Predictions made by deep learning models are prone to data perturbations, adversarial attacks, and out-of-distribution inputs. To build a trusted AI system, it is therefore critical to accurately quantify the prediction uncertainties. While current efforts focus on improving uncertainty quantification accuracy and efficiency, there is a need to identify uncertainty sources and take actions to mitigate their effects on predictions. Therefore, we propose to develop explainable and actionable Bayesian deep learning methods to not only perform accurate uncertainty quantification but also explain the uncertainties, identify their sources, and propose strategies to mitigate the uncertainty impacts. Specifically, we introduce a gradient-based uncertainty attribution method to identify the most problematic regions of the input that contribute to the prediction uncertainty. Compared to existing methods, the proposed UA-Backprop has competitive accuracy, relaxed assumptions, and high efficiency. Moreover, we propose an uncertainty mitigation strategy that leverages the attribution results as attention to further improve the model performance. Both qualitative and quantitative evaluations are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed methods.

Texts like news, encyclopedias, and some social media strive for objectivity. Yet bias in the form of inappropriate subjectivity - introducing attitudes via framing, presupposing truth, and casting doubt - remains ubiquitous. This kind of bias erodes our collective trust and fuels social conflict. To address this issue, we introduce a novel testbed for natural language generation: automatically bringing inappropriately subjective text into a neutral point of view ("neutralizing" biased text). We also offer the first parallel corpus of biased language. The corpus contains 180,000 sentence pairs and originates from Wikipedia edits that removed various framings, presuppositions, and attitudes from biased sentences. Last, we propose two strong encoder-decoder baselines for the task. A straightforward yet opaque CONCURRENT system uses a BERT encoder to identify subjective words as part of the generation process. An interpretable and controllable MODULAR algorithm separates these steps, using (1) a BERT-based classifier to identify problematic words and (2) a novel join embedding through which the classifier can edit the hidden states of the encoder. Large-scale human evaluation across four domains (encyclopedias, news headlines, books, and political speeches) suggests that these algorithms are a first step towards the automatic identification and reduction of bias.

Recent work finds that retrieval-augmented generation with large language models is prone to be influenced by the order of retrieved documents in the context. However, the lack of in-depth analysis limits the use of this phenomenon for prompt engineering in practice. In this study, we posit that likelihoods serve as an effective gauge for language model performance. Through experiments on two question-answering datasets with a variety of state-of-the-art language models, we reveal correlations between answer accuracy and the likelihood of the question at both the corpus level and the instance level. In addition, we find that question likelihood can also indicate the position of the task-relevant information in the context. Based on these findings, we propose two methods that use question likelihood as a gauge for selecting and constructing prompts that lead to better performance. We demonstrate their effectiveness with experiments. In addition, our likelihood-based methods are efficient, as they only need to compute the likelihood of the input, requiring much fewer language model passes than heuristic prompt engineering methods that require generating responses. Our analysis deepens our understanding of how input prompts affect model performance and provides a promising direction for efficient prompt optimization.

The recent success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has catalyzed an increasing interest in their self-correction capabilities. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation into the intrinsic self-correction of LLMs, attempting to address the ongoing debate about its feasibility. Our research has identified an important latent factor - the "confidence" of LLMs - during the self-correction process. Overlooking this factor may cause the models to over-criticize themselves, resulting in unreliable conclusions regarding the efficacy of self-correction. We have experimentally observed that LLMs possess the capability to understand the "confidence" in their own responses. It motivates us to develop an "If-or-Else" (IoE) prompting framework, designed to guide LLMs in assessing their own "confidence", facilitating intrinsic self-corrections. We conduct extensive experiments and demonstrate that our IoE-based Prompt can achieve a consistent improvement regarding the accuracy of self-corrected responses over the initial answers. Our study not only sheds light on the underlying factors affecting self-correction in LLMs, but also introduces a practical framework that utilizes the IoE prompting principle to efficiently improve self-correction capabilities with "confidence". The code is available at https://github.com/MBZUAI-CLeaR/IoE-Prompting.git.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation equips large language models with the capability to retrieve external knowledge, thereby mitigating hallucinations by incorporating information beyond the model's intrinsic abilities. However, most prior works have focused on invoking retrieval deterministically, which makes it unsuitable for tasks such as long-form question answering. Instead, dynamically performing retrieval by invoking it only when the underlying LLM lacks the required knowledge can be more efficient. In this context, we delve deeper into the question, "To Retrieve or Not to Retrieve?" by exploring multiple uncertainty detection methods. We evaluate these methods for the task of long-form question answering, employing dynamic retrieval, and present our comparisons. Our findings suggest that uncertainty detection metrics, such as Degree Matrix Jaccard and Eccentricity, can reduce the number of retrieval calls by almost half, with only a slight reduction in question-answering accuracy.

To answer a question, language models often need to integrate prior knowledge learned during pretraining and new information presented in context. We hypothesize that models perform this integration in a predictable way across different questions and contexts: models will rely more on prior knowledge for questions about entities (e.g., persons, places, etc.) that they are more familiar with due to higher exposure in the training corpus, and be more easily persuaded by some contexts than others. To formalize this problem, we propose two mutual information-based metrics to measure a model's dependency on a context and on its prior about an entity: first, the persuasion score of a given context represents how much a model depends on the context in its decision, and second, the susceptibility score of a given entity represents how much the model can be swayed away from its original answer distribution about an entity. Following well-established measurement modeling methods, we empirically test for the validity and reliability of these metrics. Finally, we explore and find a relationship between the scores and the model's expected familiarity with an entity, and provide two use cases to illustrate their benefits.

Being prompted to engage in reasoning has emerged as a core technique for using large language models (LLMs), deploying additional inference-time compute to improve task performance. However, as LLMs increase in both size and adoption, inference costs are correspondingly becoming increasingly burdensome. How, then, might we optimize reasoning's cost-performance tradeoff? This work introduces a novel approach based on computational models of metareasoning used in cognitive science, training LLMs to selectively use intermediate reasoning steps only when necessary. We first develop a reward function that incorporates the Value of Computation by penalizing unnecessary reasoning, then use this reward function with Expert Iteration to train the LLM. Compared to few-shot chain-of-thought prompting and STaR, our method significantly reduces inference costs (20-37\% fewer tokens generated across three models) while maintaining task performance across diverse datasets.

Iterative human engagement is a common and effective means of leveraging the advanced language processing power of large language models (LLMs). Using well-structured prompts in a conversational manner, human users can effectively influence an LLM to develop more thoughtful and accurate responses. Motivated by this insight, we propose the Iteration of Thought (IoT) framework for enhancing LLM responses by generating "thought"-provoking prompts vis a vis an input query and the current iteration of an LLM's response. Unlike static or semi-static approaches, e.g. Chain of Thought (CoT) or Tree of Thoughts (ToT), IoT adapts its reasoning path dynamically, based on evolving context, and without generating alternate explorative thoughts which are ultimately discarded. The three components of the IoT framework are (1) an Inner Dialogue Agent (IDA) responsible for generating instructive, context-specific prompts; (2) an LLM Agent (LLMA) that processes these prompts to refine its responses; and (3) an iterative prompting loop that implements a conversation between the former two components. We introduce two variants of our framework: Autonomous Iteration of Thought (AIoT), where an LLM decides when to stop iterating, and Guided Iteration of Thought (GIoT), which always forces a fixed number iterations. We investigate the performance of IoT across various datasets, spanning complex reasoning tasks from the GPQA dataset, explorative problem-solving in Game of 24, puzzle solving in Mini Crosswords, and multi-hop question answering from the HotpotQA dataset. Our results show that IoT represents a viable paradigm for autonomous response refinement in LLMs, showcasing significant improvements over CoT and thereby enabling more adaptive and efficient reasoning systems that minimize human intervention.

Certain statistical models are capable of interpreting input strings as instructions, or prompts, and carry out tasks based on them. Many approaches to prompting and pre-training these models involve the automated generation of these prompts. We call these approaches meta-prompting, or prompting to obtain prompts. We propose a theoretical framework based on category theory to generalize and describe them. This framework is flexible enough to account for LLM stochasticity; and allows us to obtain formal results around task agnosticity and equivalence of various meta-prompting approaches. We experiment with meta-prompting in two active areas of model research: creativity and ideation. We find that user preference favors (p < 0.01) the prompts generated under meta-prompting, as well as their corresponding outputs, over a series of hardcoded baseline prompts that include the original task prompt. Using our framework, we argue that meta-prompting is more effective than basic prompting at generating desirable outputs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are notorious for blending fact with fiction and generating non-factual content, known as hallucinations. To tackle this challenge, we propose an interactive system that helps users obtain insights into the reliability of the generated text. Our approach is based on the idea that the self-consistency of multiple samples generated by the same LLM relates to its confidence in individual claims in the generated texts. Using this idea, we design RELIC, an interactive system that enables users to investigate and verify semantic-level variations in multiple long-form responses. This allows users to recognize potentially inaccurate information in the generated text and make necessary corrections. From a user study with ten participants, we demonstrate that our approach helps users better verify the reliability of the generated text. We further summarize the design implications and lessons learned from this research for inspiring future studies on reliable human-LLM interactions.

Fact-checking requires retrieving evidence related to a claim under investigation. The task can be formulated as question generation based on a claim, followed by question answering. However, recent question generation approaches assume that the answer is known and typically contained in a passage given as input, whereas such passages are what is being sought when verifying a claim. In this paper, we present {\it Varifocal}, a method that generates questions based on different focal points within a given claim, i.e.\ different spans of the claim and its metadata, such as its source and date. Our method outperforms previous work on a fact-checking question generation dataset on a wide range of automatic evaluation metrics. These results are corroborated by our manual evaluation, which indicates that our method generates more relevant and informative questions. We further demonstrate the potential of focal points in generating sets of clarification questions for product descriptions.

Transformers have been shown to emulate logical deduction over natural language theories (logical rules expressed in natural language), reliably assigning true/false labels to candidate implications. However, their ability to generate implications of a theory has not yet been demonstrated, and methods for reconstructing proofs of answers are imperfect. In this work we show that a generative model, called ProofWriter, can reliably generate both implications of a theory and the natural language proof(s) that support them. In particular, iterating a 1-step implication generator results in proofs that are highly reliable, and represent actual model decisions (rather than post-hoc rationalizations). On the RuleTaker dataset, the accuracy of ProofWriter's proofs exceed previous methods by +9% absolute, and in a way that generalizes to proof depths unseen in training and on out-of-domain problems. We also show that generative techniques can perform a type of abduction with high precision: Given a theory and an unprovable conclusion, identify a missing fact that allows the conclusion to be proved, along with a proof. These results significantly improve the viability of neural methods for systematically reasoning over natural language.

Large Language Models are known to capture real-world knowledge, allowing them to excel in many downstream tasks. Despite recent advances, these models are still prone to what are commonly known as hallucinations, causing them to emit unwanted and factually incorrect text. In this work, we propose a novel calibration method that can be used to combat hallucinations. We add a special [IDK] ("I don't know") token to the model's vocabulary and introduce an objective function that shifts probability mass to the [IDK] token for incorrect predictions. This approach allows the model to express uncertainty in its output explicitly. We evaluate our proposed method across multiple model architectures and factual downstream tasks. We find that models trained with our method are able to express uncertainty in places where they would previously make mistakes while suffering only a small loss of encoded knowledge. We further perform extensive ablation studies of multiple variations of our approach and provide a detailed analysis of the precision-recall tradeoff of our method.

We show that existing unsupervised methods on large language model (LLM) activations do not discover knowledge -- instead they seem to discover whatever feature of the activations is most prominent. The idea behind unsupervised knowledge elicitation is that knowledge satisfies a consistency structure, which can be used to discover knowledge. We first prove theoretically that arbitrary features (not just knowledge) satisfy the consistency structure of a particular leading unsupervised knowledge-elicitation method, contrast-consistent search (Burns et al. - arXiv:2212.03827). We then present a series of experiments showing settings in which unsupervised methods result in classifiers that do not predict knowledge, but instead predict a different prominent feature. We conclude that existing unsupervised methods for discovering latent knowledge are insufficient, and we contribute sanity checks to apply to evaluating future knowledge elicitation methods. Conceptually, we hypothesise that the identification issues explored here, e.g. distinguishing a model's knowledge from that of a simulated character's, will persist for future unsupervised methods.

In classic instruction following, language like "I'd like the JetBlue flight" maps to actions (e.g., selecting that flight). However, language also conveys information about a user's underlying reward function (e.g., a general preference for JetBlue), which can allow a model to carry out desirable actions in new contexts. We present a model that infers rewards from language pragmatically: reasoning about how speakers choose utterances not only to elicit desired actions, but also to reveal information about their preferences. On a new interactive flight-booking task with natural language, our model more accurately infers rewards and predicts optimal actions in unseen environments, in comparison to past work that first maps language to actions (instruction following) and then maps actions to rewards (inverse reinforcement learning).

Chain-of-thought (COT) prompting can help large language models (LLMs) reason toward correct answers, but its efficacy in reasoning toward incorrect answers is unexplored. This process of elimination (PoE), when used with COT, can enhance self-consistency, interpretability, and tasks such as medical diagnoses of exclusion. Thus, we propose PoE with COT, where LLMs must reason toward incorrect options on multiple-choice questions. We evaluate the ability of GPT-3.5, LLaMA-2, and Falcon to perform PoE with COT on a total of four commonsense and scientific reasoning datasets. We find that the strategy of PoE always underperforms the strategy of choosing the correct answer. The agreement of these strategies is also lower than the self-consistency of each strategy. To study these issues further, we conduct error analyses and give suggestions for future work.

While sentiment analysis systems try to determine the sentiment polarities of given targets based on the key opinion expressions in input texts, in implicit sentiment analysis (ISA) the opinion cues come in an implicit and obscure manner. Thus detecting implicit sentiment requires the common-sense and multi-hop reasoning ability to infer the latent intent of opinion. Inspired by the recent chain-of-thought (CoT) idea, in this work we introduce a Three-hop Reasoning (THOR) CoT framework to mimic the human-like reasoning process for ISA. We design a three-step prompting principle for THOR to step-by-step induce the implicit aspect, opinion, and finally the sentiment polarity. Our THOR+Flan-T5 (11B) pushes the state-of-the-art (SoTA) by over 6% F1 on supervised setup. More strikingly, THOR+GPT3 (175B) boosts the SoTA by over 50% F1 on zero-shot setting. Our code is open at https://github.com/scofield7419/THOR-ISA.

In this paper, we explore a new way for user targeting, where non-expert marketers could select their target users solely given demands in natural language form. The key to this issue is how to transform natural languages into practical structured logical languages, i.e., the structured understanding of marketer demands. Considering the impressive natural language processing ability of large language models (LLMs), we try to leverage LLMs to solve this issue. Past research indicates that the reasoning ability of LLMs can be effectively enhanced through chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. But existing methods still have some limitations: (1) Previous methods either use simple "Let's think step by step" spells or provide fixed examples in demonstrations without considering compatibility between prompts and questions, making LLMs ineffective in some complex reasoning tasks such as structured language transformation. (2) Previous methods are often implemented in closed-source models or excessively large models, which is not suitable in industrial practical scenarios. Based on these, we propose ARALLM (i.e., Analogical Reasoning Augmented Large Language Models) consisting of two modules: Analogical Reasoning based Prompting and Reasoning-Augmented Multi-Task Model Distillation.

Reward design in reinforcement learning (RL) is challenging since specifying human notions of desired behavior may be difficult via reward functions or require many expert demonstrations. Can we instead cheaply design rewards using a natural language interface? This paper explores how to simplify reward design by prompting a large language model (LLM) such as GPT-3 as a proxy reward function, where the user provides a textual prompt containing a few examples (few-shot) or a description (zero-shot) of the desired behavior. Our approach leverages this proxy reward function in an RL framework. Specifically, users specify a prompt once at the beginning of training. During training, the LLM evaluates an RL agent's behavior against the desired behavior described by the prompt and outputs a corresponding reward signal. The RL agent then uses this reward to update its behavior. We evaluate whether our approach can train agents aligned with user objectives in the Ultimatum Game, matrix games, and the DealOrNoDeal negotiation task. In all three tasks, we show that RL agents trained with our framework are well-aligned with the user's objectives and outperform RL agents trained with reward functions learned via supervised learning

The human intrinsic desire to pursue knowledge, also known as curiosity, is considered essential in the process of skill acquisition. With the aid of artificial curiosity, we could equip current techniques for control, such as Reinforcement Learning, with more natural exploration capabilities. A promising approach in this respect has consisted of using Bayesian surprise on model parameters, i.e. a metric for the difference between prior and posterior beliefs, to favour exploration. In this contribution, we propose to apply Bayesian surprise in a latent space representing the agent's current understanding of the dynamics of the system, drastically reducing the computational costs. We extensively evaluate our method by measuring the agent's performance in terms of environment exploration, for continuous tasks, and looking at the game scores achieved, for video games. Our model is computationally cheap and compares positively with current state-of-the-art methods on several problems. We also investigate the effects caused by stochasticity in the environment, which is often a failure case for curiosity-driven agents. In this regime, the results suggest that our approach is resilient to stochastic transitions.

Traditional systems designed for task oriented dialog utilize knowledge present only in structured knowledge sources to generate responses. However, relevant information required to generate responses may also reside in unstructured sources, such as documents. Recent state of the art models such as HyKnow and SeKnow aimed at overcoming these challenges make limiting assumptions about the knowledge sources. For instance, these systems assume that certain types of information, such as a phone number, is always present in a structured knowledge base (KB) while information about aspects such as entrance ticket prices, would always be available in documents. In this paper, we create a modified version of the MutliWOZ-based dataset prepared by SeKnow to demonstrate how current methods have significant degradation in performance when strict assumptions about the source of information are removed. Then, in line with recent work exploiting pre-trained language models, we fine-tune a BART based model using prompts for the tasks of querying knowledge sources, as well as, for response generation, without making assumptions about the information present in each knowledge source. Through a series of experiments, we demonstrate that our model is robust to perturbations to knowledge modality (source of information), and that it can fuse information from structured as well as unstructured knowledge to generate responses.

Ensuring the long-term sustainability of recommender systems (RS) emerges as a crucial issue. Traditional offline evaluation methods for RS typically focus on immediate user feedback, such as clicks, but they often neglect the long-term impact of content creators. On real-world content platforms, creators can strategically produce and upload new items based on user feedback and preference trends. While previous studies have attempted to model creator behavior, they often overlook the role of information asymmetry. This asymmetry arises because creators primarily have access to feedback on the items they produce, while platforms possess data on the entire spectrum of user feedback. Current RS simulators, however, fail to account for this asymmetry, leading to inaccurate long-term evaluations. To address this gap, we propose CreAgent, a Large Language Model (LLM)-empowered creator simulation agent. By incorporating game theory's belief mechanism and the fast-and-slow thinking framework, CreAgent effectively simulates creator behavior under conditions of information asymmetry. Additionally, we enhance CreAgent's simulation ability by fine-tuning it using Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO). Our credibility validation experiments show that CreAgent aligns well with the behaviors between real-world platform and creator, thus improving the reliability of long-term RS evaluations. Moreover, through the simulation of RS involving CreAgents, we can explore how fairness- and diversity-aware RS algorithms contribute to better long-term performance for various stakeholders. CreAgent and the simulation platform are publicly available at https://github.com/shawnye2000/CreAgent.

Bearing in mind the limited parametric knowledge of Large Language Models (LLMs), retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) which supplies them with the relevant external knowledge has served as an approach to mitigate the issue of hallucinations to a certain extent. However, uniformly retrieving supporting context makes response generation source-inefficient, as triggering the retriever is not always necessary, or even inaccurate, when a model gets distracted by noisy retrieved content and produces an unhelpful answer. Motivated by these issues, we introduce Semantic Uncertainty Guided Adaptive Retrieval (SUGAR), where we leverage context-based entropy to actively decide whether to retrieve and to further determine between single-step and multi-step retrieval. Our empirical results show that selective retrieval guided by semantic uncertainty estimation improves the performance across diverse question answering tasks, as well as achieves a more efficient inference.

Generative Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-3 are capable of generating highly fluent responses to a wide variety of user prompts. However, LLMs are known to hallucinate facts and make non-factual statements which can undermine trust in their output. Existing fact-checking approaches either require access to token-level output probability distribution (which may not be available for systems such as ChatGPT) or external databases that are interfaced via separate, often complex, modules. In this work, we propose "SelfCheckGPT", a simple sampling-based approach that can be used to fact-check black-box models in a zero-resource fashion, i.e. without an external database. SelfCheckGPT leverages the simple idea that if a LLM has knowledge of a given concept, sampled responses are likely to be similar and contain consistent facts. However, for hallucinated facts, stochastically sampled responses are likely to diverge and contradict one another. We investigate this approach by using GPT-3 to generate passages about individuals from the WikiBio dataset, and manually annotate the factuality of the generated passages. We demonstrate that SelfCheckGPT can: i) detect non-factual and factual sentences; and ii) rank passages in terms of factuality. We compare our approach to several existing baselines and show that in sentence hallucination detection, our approach has AUC-PR scores comparable to grey-box methods, while SelfCheckGPT is best at passage factuality assessment.

Language models are known to absorb biases from their training data, leading to predictions driven by statistical regularities rather than semantic relevance. We investigate the impact of these biases on answer choice preferences in the Massive Multi-Task Language Understanding (MMLU) task. Our findings reveal that differences in learned regularities across answer options are predictive of model preferences and mirror human test-taking strategies. To address this issue, we introduce two novel methods: Counterfactual Prompting with Chain of Thought (CoT) and Counterfactual Prompting with Agnostically Primed CoT (APriCoT). We demonstrate that while Counterfactual Prompting with CoT alone is insufficient to mitigate bias, our novel Primed Counterfactual Prompting with CoT approach effectively reduces the influence of base-rate probabilities while improving overall accuracy. Our results suggest that mitigating bias requires a "System-2" like process and that CoT reasoning is susceptible to confirmation bias under some prompting methodologies. Our contributions offer practical solutions for developing more robust and fair language models.