Daily Papers

Two principles: the complementary principle and the consensus principle are widely acknowledged in the literature of multi-view learning. However, the current design of multi-head self-attention, an instance of multi-view learning, prioritizes the complementarity while ignoring the consensus. To address this problem, we propose an enhanced multi-head self-attention (EMHA). First, to satisfy the complementary principle, EMHA removes the one-to-one mapping constraint among queries and keys in multiple subspaces and allows each query to attend to multiple keys. On top of that, we develop a method to fully encourage consensus among heads by introducing two interaction models, namely inner-subspace interaction and cross-subspace interaction. Extensive experiments on a wide range of language tasks (e.g., machine translation, abstractive summarization and grammar correction, language modeling), show its superiority, with a very modest increase in model size. Our code would be available at: https://github.com/zhengkid/EIT-Enhanced-Interactive-Transformer.

Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (AI) is based on seven technical requirements sustained over three main pillars that should be met throughout the system's entire life cycle: it should be (1) lawful, (2) ethical, and (3) robust, both from a technical and a social perspective. However, attaining truly trustworthy AI concerns a wider vision that comprises the trustworthiness of all processes and actors that are part of the system's life cycle, and considers previous aspects from different lenses. A more holistic vision contemplates four essential axes: the global principles for ethical use and development of AI-based systems, a philosophical take on AI ethics, a risk-based approach to AI regulation, and the mentioned pillars and requirements. The seven requirements (human agency and oversight; robustness and safety; privacy and data governance; transparency; diversity, non-discrimination and fairness; societal and environmental wellbeing; and accountability) are analyzed from a triple perspective: What each requirement for trustworthy AI is, Why it is needed, and How each requirement can be implemented in practice. On the other hand, a practical approach to implement trustworthy AI systems allows defining the concept of responsibility of AI-based systems facing the law, through a given auditing process. Therefore, a responsible AI system is the resulting notion we introduce in this work, and a concept of utmost necessity that can be realized through auditing processes, subject to the challenges posed by the use of regulatory sandboxes. Our multidisciplinary vision of trustworthy AI culminates in a debate on the diverging views published lately about the future of AI. Our reflections in this matter conclude that regulation is a key for reaching a consensus among these views, and that trustworthy and responsible AI systems will be crucial for the present and future of our society.

The burgeoning integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into human society brings forth significant implications for societal governance and safety. While considerable strides have been made in addressing AI alignment challenges, existing methodologies primarily focus on technical facets, often neglecting the intricate sociotechnical nature of AI systems, which can lead to a misalignment between the development and deployment contexts. To this end, we posit a new problem worth exploring: Incentive Compatibility Sociotechnical Alignment Problem (ICSAP). We hope this can call for more researchers to explore how to leverage the principles of Incentive Compatibility (IC) from game theory to bridge the gap between technical and societal components to maintain AI consensus with human societies in different contexts. We further discuss three classical game problems for achieving IC: mechanism design, contract theory, and Bayesian persuasion, in addressing the perspectives, potentials, and challenges of solving ICSAP, and provide preliminary implementation conceptions.

In the last decade, several organizations have produced documents intended to standardize, in the normative sense, and promote guidance to our recent and rapid AI development. However, the full spectrum of ideas presented in these documents has not yet been analyzed, except for a few meta-analyses and critical reviews of the field. In this work, we seek to expand on the work done by past researchers and create a tool for better data visualization of the contents and nature of these documents, to understand whether there is consensus or similarity between the principles espoused by various institutions, which may inspire debates on future regulations. We also provide some preliminary thoughts and questions that could guide the continuity of the research through a critical analysis of the results acquired by our methodology into a sample size of 200 documents.

Multiple robots could perceive a scene (e.g., detect objects) collaboratively better than individuals, although easily suffer from adversarial attacks when using deep learning. This could be addressed by the adversarial defense, but its training requires the often-unknown attacking mechanism. Differently, we propose ROBOSAC, a novel sampling-based defense strategy generalizable to unseen attackers. Our key idea is that collaborative perception should lead to consensus rather than dissensus in results compared to individual perception. This leads to our hypothesize-and-verify framework: perception results with and without collaboration from a random subset of teammates are compared until reaching a consensus. In such a framework, more teammates in the sampled subset often entail better perception performance but require longer sampling time to reject potential attackers. Thus, we derive how many sampling trials are needed to ensure the desired size of an attacker-free subset, or equivalently, the maximum size of such a subset that we can successfully sample within a given number of trials. We validate our method on the task of collaborative 3D object detection in autonomous driving scenarios.

In this paper we provide a novel analytical perspective on the theoretical understanding of gradient-based learning algorithms by interpreting consensus-based optimization (CBO), a recently proposed multi-particle derivative-free optimization method, as a stochastic relaxation of gradient descent. Remarkably, we observe that through communication of the particles, CBO exhibits a stochastic gradient descent (SGD)-like behavior despite solely relying on evaluations of the objective function. The fundamental value of such link between CBO and SGD lies in the fact that CBO is provably globally convergent to global minimizers for ample classes of nonsmooth and nonconvex objective functions, hence, on the one side, offering a novel explanation for the success of stochastic relaxations of gradient descent. On the other side, contrary to the conventional wisdom for which zero-order methods ought to be inefficient or not to possess generalization abilities, our results unveil an intrinsic gradient descent nature of such heuristics. This viewpoint furthermore complements previous insights into the working principles of CBO, which describe the dynamics in the mean-field limit through a nonlinear nonlocal partial differential equation that allows to alleviate complexities of the nonconvex function landscape. Our proofs leverage a completely nonsmooth analysis, which combines a novel quantitative version of the Laplace principle (log-sum-exp trick) and the minimizing movement scheme (proximal iteration). In doing so, we furnish useful and precise insights that explain how stochastic perturbations of gradient descent overcome energy barriers and reach deep levels of nonconvex functions. Instructive numerical illustrations support the provided theoretical insights.

Human feedback can prevent overtly harmful utterances in conversational models, but may not automatically mitigate subtle problematic behaviors such as a stated desire for self-preservation or power. Constitutional AI offers an alternative, replacing human feedback with feedback from AI models conditioned only on a list of written principles. We find this approach effectively prevents the expression of such behaviors. The success of simple principles motivates us to ask: can models learn general ethical behaviors from only a single written principle? To test this, we run experiments using a principle roughly stated as "do what's best for humanity". We find that the largest dialogue models can generalize from this short constitution, resulting in harmless assistants with no stated interest in specific motivations like power. A general principle may thus partially avoid the need for a long list of constitutions targeting potentially harmful behaviors. However, more detailed constitutions still improve fine-grained control over specific types of harms. This suggests both general and specific principles have value for steering AI safely.

Fairness is essential for machine learning systems deployed in high-stake applications. Among all fairness notions, individual fairness, deriving from a consensus that `similar individuals should be treated similarly,' is a vital notion to describe fair treatment for individual cases. Previous studies typically characterize individual fairness as a prediction-invariant problem when perturbing sensitive attributes on samples, and solve it by Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO) paradigm. However, such adversarial perturbations along a direction covering sensitive information used in DRO do not consider the inherent feature correlations or innate data constraints, therefore could mislead the model to optimize at off-manifold and unrealistic samples. In light of this drawback, in this paper, we propose to learn and generate antidote data that approximately follows the data distribution to remedy individual unfairness. These generated on-manifold antidote data can be used through a generic optimization procedure along with original training data, resulting in a pure pre-processing approach to individual unfairness, or can also fit well with the in-processing DRO paradigm. Through extensive experiments on multiple tabular datasets, we demonstrate our method resists individual unfairness at a minimal or zero cost to predictive utility compared to baselines.

The free energy principle, and its corollary active inference, constitute a bio-inspired theory that assumes biological agents act to remain in a restricted set of preferred states of the world, i.e., they minimize their free energy. Under this principle, biological agents learn a generative model of the world and plan actions in the future that will maintain the agent in an homeostatic state that satisfies its preferences. This framework lends itself to being realized in silico, as it comprehends important aspects that make it computationally affordable, such as variational inference and amortized planning. In this work, we investigate the tool of deep learning to design and realize artificial agents based on active inference, presenting a deep-learning oriented presentation of the free energy principle, surveying works that are relevant in both machine learning and active inference areas, and discussing the design choices that are involved in the implementation process. This manuscript probes newer perspectives for the active inference framework, grounding its theoretical aspects into more pragmatic affairs, offering a practical guide to active inference newcomers and a starting point for deep learning practitioners that would like to investigate implementations of the free energy principle.

In this position paper, we argue that instead of morally aligning LLMs to specific set of ethical principles, we should infuse generic ethical reasoning capabilities into them so that they can handle value pluralism at a global scale. When provided with an ethical policy, an LLM should be capable of making decisions that are ethically consistent to the policy. We develop a framework that integrates moral dilemmas with moral principles pertaining to different foramlisms of normative ethics, and at different levels of abstractions. Initial experiments with GPT-x models shows that while GPT-4 is a nearly perfect ethical reasoner, the models still have bias towards the moral values of Western and English speaking societies.