Daily Papers

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been found to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, raising security concerns about their deployment in mission-critical applications. While existing defense methods have demonstrated promising results, it is still not clear how to effectively remove backdoor-associated neurons in backdoored DNNs. In this paper, we propose a novel defense called Reconstructive Neuron Pruning (RNP) to expose and prune backdoor neurons via an unlearning and then recovering process. Specifically, RNP first unlearns the neurons by maximizing the model's error on a small subset of clean samples and then recovers the neurons by minimizing the model's error on the same data. In RNP, unlearning is operated at the neuron level while recovering is operated at the filter level, forming an asymmetric reconstructive learning procedure. We show that such an asymmetric process on only a few clean samples can effectively expose and prune the backdoor neurons implanted by a wide range of attacks, achieving a new state-of-the-art defense performance. Moreover, the unlearned model at the intermediate step of our RNP can be directly used to improve other backdoor defense tasks including backdoor removal, trigger recovery, backdoor label detection, and backdoor sample detection. Code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/RNP.

Backdoor defense, which aims to detect or mitigate the effect of malicious triggers introduced by attackers, is becoming increasingly critical for machine learning security and integrity. Fine-tuning based on benign data is a natural defense to erase the backdoor effect in a backdoored model. However, recent studies show that, given limited benign data, vanilla fine-tuning has poor defense performance. In this work, we provide a deep study of fine-tuning the backdoored model from the neuron perspective and find that backdoorrelated neurons fail to escape the local minimum in the fine-tuning process. Inspired by observing that the backdoorrelated neurons often have larger norms, we propose FTSAM, a novel backdoor defense paradigm that aims to shrink the norms of backdoor-related neurons by incorporating sharpness-aware minimization with fine-tuning. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method on several benchmark datasets and network architectures, where it achieves state-of-the-art defense performance. Overall, our work provides a promising avenue for improving the robustness of machine learning models against backdoor attacks.

Backdoor learning is an emerging and vital topic for studying deep neural networks' vulnerability (DNNs). Many pioneering backdoor attack and defense methods are being proposed, successively or concurrently, in the status of a rapid arms race. However, we find that the evaluations of new methods are often unthorough to verify their claims and accurate performance, mainly due to the rapid development, diverse settings, and the difficulties of implementation and reproducibility. Without thorough evaluations and comparisons, it is not easy to track the current progress and design the future development roadmap of the literature. To alleviate this dilemma, we build a comprehensive benchmark of backdoor learning called BackdoorBench. It consists of an extensible modular-based codebase (currently including implementations of 8 state-of-the-art (SOTA) attacks and 9 SOTA defense algorithms) and a standardized protocol of complete backdoor learning. We also provide comprehensive evaluations of every pair of 8 attacks against 9 defenses, with 5 poisoning ratios, based on 5 models and 4 datasets, thus 8,000 pairs of evaluations in total. We present abundant analysis from different perspectives about these 8,000 evaluations, studying the effects of different factors in backdoor learning. All codes and evaluations of BackdoorBench are publicly available at https://backdoorbench.github.io.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. The backdoor adversaries intend to maliciously control the predictions of attacked DNNs by injecting hidden backdoors that can be activated by adversary-specified trigger patterns during the training process. One recent research revealed that most of the existing attacks failed in the real physical world since the trigger contained in the digitized test samples may be different from that of the one used for training. Accordingly, users can adopt spatial transformations as the image pre-processing to deactivate hidden backdoors. In this paper, we explore the previous findings from another side. We exploit classical spatial transformations (i.e. rotation and translation) with the specific parameter as trigger patterns to design a simple yet effective poisoning-based backdoor attack. For example, only images rotated to a particular angle can activate the embedded backdoor of attacked DNNs. Extensive experiments are conducted, verifying the effectiveness of our attack under both digital and physical settings and its resistance to existing backdoor defenses.

We present a novel defense, against backdoor attacks on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), wherein adversaries covertly implant malicious behaviors (backdoors) into DNNs. Our defense falls within the category of post-development defenses that operate independently of how the model was generated. The proposed defense is built upon a novel reverse engineering approach that can directly extract backdoor functionality of a given backdoored model to a backdoor expert model. The approach is straightforward -- finetuning the backdoored model over a small set of intentionally mislabeled clean samples, such that it unlearns the normal functionality while still preserving the backdoor functionality, and thus resulting in a model (dubbed a backdoor expert model) that can only recognize backdoor inputs. Based on the extracted backdoor expert model, we show the feasibility of devising highly accurate backdoor input detectors that filter out the backdoor inputs during model inference. Further augmented by an ensemble strategy with a finetuned auxiliary model, our defense, BaDExpert (Backdoor Input Detection with Backdoor Expert), effectively mitigates 17 SOTA backdoor attacks while minimally impacting clean utility. The effectiveness of BaDExpert has been verified on multiple datasets (CIFAR10, GTSRB and ImageNet) across various model architectures (ResNet, VGG, MobileNetV2 and Vision Transformer).

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attack, which does not affect the network's performance on clean data but would manipulate the network behavior once a trigger pattern is added. Existing defense methods have greatly reduced attack success rate, but their prediction accuracy on clean data still lags behind a clean model by a large margin. Inspired by the stealthiness and effectiveness of backdoor attack, we propose a simple but highly effective defense framework which injects non-adversarial backdoors targeting poisoned samples. Following the general steps in backdoor attack, we detect a small set of suspected samples and then apply a poisoning strategy to them. The non-adversarial backdoor, once triggered, suppresses the attacker's backdoor on poisoned data, but has limited influence on clean data. The defense can be carried out during data preprocessing, without any modification to the standard end-to-end training pipeline. We conduct extensive experiments on multiple benchmarks with different architectures and representative attacks. Results demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art defense effectiveness with by far the lowest performance drop on clean data. Considering the surprising defense ability displayed by our framework, we call for more attention to utilizing backdoor for backdoor defense. Code is available at https://github.com/damianliumin/non-adversarial_backdoor.

Backdoor attacks pose a serious security threat for training neural networks as they surreptitiously introduce hidden functionalities into a model. Such backdoors remain silent during inference on clean inputs, evading detection due to inconspicuous behavior. However, once a specific trigger pattern appears in the input data, the backdoor activates, causing the model to execute its concealed function. Detecting such poisoned samples within vast datasets is virtually impossible through manual inspection. To address this challenge, we propose a novel approach that enables model training on potentially poisoned datasets by utilizing the power of recent diffusion models. Specifically, we create synthetic variations of all training samples, leveraging the inherent resilience of diffusion models to potential trigger patterns in the data. By combining this generative approach with knowledge distillation, we produce student models that maintain their general performance on the task while exhibiting robust resistance to backdoor triggers.

Backdoor attacks covertly implant triggers into deep neural networks (DNNs) by poisoning a small portion of the training data with pre-designed backdoor triggers. This vulnerability is exacerbated in the era of large models, where extensive (pre-)training on web-crawled datasets is susceptible to compromise. In this paper, we introduce a novel two-step defense framework named Expose Before You Defend (EBYD). EBYD unifies existing backdoor defense methods into a comprehensive defense system with enhanced performance. Specifically, EBYD first exposes the backdoor functionality in the backdoored model through a model preprocessing step called backdoor exposure, and then applies detection and removal methods to the exposed model to identify and eliminate the backdoor features. In the first step of backdoor exposure, we propose a novel technique called Clean Unlearning (CUL), which proactively unlearns clean features from the backdoored model to reveal the hidden backdoor features. We also explore various model editing/modification techniques for backdoor exposure, including fine-tuning, model sparsification, and weight perturbation. Using EBYD, we conduct extensive experiments on 10 image attacks and 6 text attacks across 2 vision datasets (CIFAR-10 and an ImageNet subset) and 4 language datasets (SST-2, IMDB, Twitter, and AG's News). The results demonstrate the importance of backdoor exposure for backdoor defense, showing that the exposed models can significantly benefit a range of downstream defense tasks, including backdoor label detection, backdoor trigger recovery, backdoor model detection, and backdoor removal. We hope our work could inspire more research in developing advanced defense frameworks with exposed models. Our code is available at: https://github.com/bboylyg/Expose-Before-You-Defend.

When a small number of poisoned samples are injected into the training dataset of a deep neural network, the network can be induced to exhibit malicious behavior during inferences, which poses potential threats to real-world applications. While they have been intensively studied in classification, backdoor attacks on semantic segmentation have been largely overlooked. Unlike classification, semantic segmentation aims to classify every pixel within a given image. In this work, we explore backdoor attacks on segmentation models to misclassify all pixels of a victim class by injecting a specific trigger on non-victim pixels during inferences, which is dubbed Influencer Backdoor Attack (IBA). IBA is expected to maintain the classification accuracy of non-victim pixels and mislead classifications of all victim pixels in every single inference and could be easily applied to real-world scenes. Based on the context aggregation ability of segmentation models, we proposed a simple, yet effective, Nearest-Neighbor trigger injection strategy. We also introduce an innovative Pixel Random Labeling strategy which maintains optimal performance even when the trigger is placed far from the victim pixels. Our extensive experiments reveal that current segmentation models do suffer from backdoor attacks, demonstrate IBA real-world applicability, and show that our proposed techniques can further increase attack performance.

Backdoor inversion, the process of finding a backdoor trigger inserted into a machine learning model, has become the pillar of many backdoor detection and defense methods. Previous works on backdoor inversion often recover the backdoor through an optimization process to flip a support set of clean images into the target class. However, it is rarely studied and understood how large this support set should be to recover a successful backdoor. In this work, we show that one can reliably recover the backdoor trigger with as few as a single image. Specifically, we propose the SmoothInv method, which first constructs a robust smoothed version of the backdoored classifier and then performs guided image synthesis towards the target class to reveal the backdoor pattern. SmoothInv requires neither an explicit modeling of the backdoor via a mask variable, nor any complex regularization schemes, which has become the standard practice in backdoor inversion methods. We perform both quantitaive and qualitative study on backdoored classifiers from previous published backdoor attacks. We demonstrate that compared to existing methods, SmoothInv is able to recover successful backdoors from single images, while maintaining high fidelity to the original backdoor. We also show how we identify the target backdoored class from the backdoored classifier. Last, we propose and analyze two countermeasures to our approach and show that SmoothInv remains robust in the face of an adaptive attacker. Our code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/smoothinv .

The growing dependence on machine learning in real-world applications emphasizes the importance of understanding and ensuring its safety. Backdoor attacks pose a significant security risk due to their stealthy nature and potentially serious consequences. Such attacks involve embedding triggers within a learning model with the intention of causing malicious behavior when an active trigger is present while maintaining regular functionality without it. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of any backdoor attack incorporating a constant trigger, by establishing tight lower and upper boundaries for the performance of the compromised model on both clean and backdoor test data. The developed theory answers a series of fundamental but previously underexplored problems, including (1) what are the determining factors for a backdoor attack's success, (2) what is the direction of the most effective backdoor attack, and (3) when will a human-imperceptible trigger succeed. Our derived understanding applies to both discriminative and generative models. We also demonstrate the theory by conducting experiments using benchmark datasets and state-of-the-art backdoor attack scenarios.

Backdoor (Trojan) attack is a common threat to deep neural networks, where samples from one or more source classes embedded with a backdoor trigger will be misclassified to adversarial target classes. Existing methods for detecting whether a classifier is backdoor attacked are mostly designed for attacks with a single adversarial target (e.g., all-to-one attack). To the best of our knowledge, without supervision, no existing methods can effectively address the more general X2X attack with an arbitrary number of source classes, each paired with an arbitrary target class. In this paper, we propose UMD, the first Unsupervised Model Detection method that effectively detects X2X backdoor attacks via a joint inference of the adversarial (source, target) class pairs. In particular, we first define a novel transferability statistic to measure and select a subset of putative backdoor class pairs based on a proposed clustering approach. Then, these selected class pairs are jointly assessed based on an aggregation of their reverse-engineered trigger size for detection inference, using a robust and unsupervised anomaly detector we proposed. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and Imagenette dataset, and show that our unsupervised UMD outperforms SOTA detectors (even with supervision) by 17%, 4%, and 8%, respectively, in terms of the detection accuracy against diverse X2X attacks. We also show the strong detection performance of UMD against several strong adaptive attacks.

Backpropagation (BP) is the most successful and widely used algorithm in deep learning. However, the computations required by BP are challenging to reconcile with known neurobiology. This difficulty has stimulated interest in more biologically plausible alternatives to BP. One such algorithm is the inference learning algorithm (IL). IL has close connections to neurobiological models of cortical function and has achieved equal performance to BP on supervised learning and auto-associative tasks. In contrast to BP, however, the mathematical foundations of IL are not well-understood. Here, we develop a novel theoretical framework for IL. Our main result is that IL closely approximates an optimization method known as implicit stochastic gradient descent (implicit SGD), which is distinct from the explicit SGD implemented by BP. Our results further show how the standard implementation of IL can be altered to better approximate implicit SGD. Our novel implementation considerably improves the stability of IL across learning rates, which is consistent with our theory, as a key property of implicit SGD is its stability. We provide extensive simulation results that further support our theoretical interpretations and also demonstrate IL achieves quicker convergence when trained with small mini-batches while matching the performance of BP for large mini-batches.

The Backpropagation algorithm, widely used to train neural networks, has often been criticised for its lack of biological realism. In an attempt to find a more biologically plausible alternative, and avoid to back-propagate gradients in favour of using local learning rules, the recently introduced Forward-Forward algorithm replaces the traditional forward and backward passes of Backpropagation with two forward passes. In this work, we show that internal representations obtained with the Forward-Forward algorithm organize into robust, category-specific ensembles, composed by an extremely low number of active units (high sparsity). This is remarkably similar to what is observed in cortical representations during sensory processing. While not found in models trained with standard Backpropagation, sparsity emerges also in networks optimized by Backpropagation, on the same training objective of Forward-Forward. These results suggest that the learning procedure proposed by Forward-Forward may be superior to Backpropagation in modelling learning in the cortex, even when a backward pass is used.

Backpropagation (BP), a foundational algorithm for training artificial neural networks, predominates in contemporary deep learning. Although highly successful, it is often considered biologically implausible. A significant limitation arises from the need for precise symmetry between connections in the backward and forward pathways to backpropagate gradient signals accurately, which is not observed in biological brains. Researchers have proposed several algorithms to alleviate this symmetry constraint, such as feedback alignment and direct feedback alignment. However, their divergence from backpropagation dynamics presents challenges, particularly in deeper networks and convolutional layers. Here we introduce the Product Feedback Alignment (PFA) algorithm. Our findings demonstrate that PFA closely approximates BP and achieves comparable performance in deep convolutional networks while avoiding explicit weight symmetry. Our results offer a novel solution to the longstanding weight symmetry problem, leading to more biologically plausible learning in deep convolutional networks compared to earlier methods.

Contrastive Learning (CL) has attracted enormous attention due to its remarkable capability in unsupervised representation learning. However, recent works have revealed the vulnerability of CL to backdoor attacks: the feature extractor could be misled to embed backdoored data close to an attack target class, thus fooling the downstream predictor to misclassify it as the target. Existing attacks usually adopt a fixed trigger pattern and poison the training set with trigger-injected data, hoping for the feature extractor to learn the association between trigger and target class. However, we find that such fixed trigger design fails to effectively associate trigger-injected data with target class in the embedding space due to special CL mechanisms, leading to a limited attack success rate (ASR). This phenomenon motivates us to find a better backdoor trigger design tailored for CL framework. In this paper, we propose a bi-level optimization approach to achieve this goal, where the inner optimization simulates the CL dynamics of a surrogate victim, and the outer optimization enforces the backdoor trigger to stay close to the target throughout the surrogate CL procedure. Extensive experiments show that our attack can achieve a higher attack success rate (e.g., 99% ASR on ImageNet-100) with a very low poisoning rate (1%). Besides, our attack can effectively evade existing state-of-the-art defenses. Code is available at: https://github.com/SWY666/SSL-backdoor-BLTO.

Recently, Text-to-Image (T2I) synthesis technology has made tremendous strides. Numerous representative T2I models have emerged and achieved promising application outcomes, such as DALL-E, Stable Diffusion, Imagen, etc. In practice, it has become increasingly popular for model developers to selectively adopt various pre-trained text encoders and conditional diffusion models from third-party platforms, integrating them to build customized (personalized) T2I models. However, such an adoption approach is vulnerable to backdoor attacks. In this work, we propose a Combinational Backdoor Attack against Customized T2I models (CBACT2I) targeting this application scenario. Different from previous backdoor attacks against T2I models, CBACT2I embeds the backdoor into the text encoder and the conditional diffusion model separately. The customized T2I model exhibits backdoor behaviors only when the backdoor text encoder is used in combination with the backdoor conditional diffusion model. These properties make CBACT2I more stealthy and flexible than prior backdoor attacks against T2I models. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of CBACT2I with different backdoor triggers and different backdoor targets on the open-sourced Stable Diffusion model. This work reveals the backdoor vulnerabilities of customized T2I models and urges countermeasures to mitigate backdoor threats in this scenario.

Early backdoor attacks against machine learning set off an arms race in attack and defence development. Defences have since appeared demonstrating some ability to detect backdoors in models or even remove them. These defences work by inspecting the training data, the model, or the integrity of the training procedure. In this work, we show that backdoors can be added during compilation, circumventing any safeguards in the data preparation and model training stages. As an illustration, the attacker can insert weight-based backdoors during the hardware compilation step that will not be detected by any training or data-preparation process. Next, we demonstrate that some backdoors, such as ImpNet, can only be reliably detected at the stage where they are inserted and removing them anywhere else presents a significant challenge. We conclude that machine-learning model security requires assurance of provenance along the entire technical pipeline, including the data, model architecture, compiler, and hardware specification.

Backdoor attacks represent one of the major threats to machine learning models. Various efforts have been made to mitigate backdoors. However, existing defenses have become increasingly complex and often require high computational resources or may also jeopardize models' utility. In this work, we show that fine-tuning, one of the most common and easy-to-adopt machine learning training operations, can effectively remove backdoors from machine learning models while maintaining high model utility. Extensive experiments over three machine learning paradigms show that fine-tuning and our newly proposed super-fine-tuning achieve strong defense performance. Furthermore, we coin a new term, namely backdoor sequela, to measure the changes in model vulnerabilities to other attacks before and after the backdoor has been removed. Empirical evaluation shows that, compared to other defense methods, super-fine-tuning leaves limited backdoor sequela. We hope our results can help machine learning model owners better protect their models from backdoor threats. Also, it calls for the design of more advanced attacks in order to comprehensively assess machine learning models' backdoor vulnerabilities.

Recent deep neural networks (DNNs) have come to rely on vast amounts of training data, providing an opportunity for malicious attackers to exploit and contaminate the data to carry out backdoor attacks. These attacks significantly undermine the reliability of DNNs. However, existing backdoor attack methods make unrealistic assumptions, assuming that all training data comes from a single source and that attackers have full access to the training data. In this paper, we address this limitation by introducing a more realistic attack scenario where victims collect data from multiple sources, and attackers cannot access the complete training data. We refer to this scenario as data-constrained backdoor attacks. In such cases, previous attack methods suffer from severe efficiency degradation due to the entanglement between benign and poisoning features during the backdoor injection process. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel approach that leverages the pre-trained Contrastive Language-Image Pre-Training (CLIP) model. We introduce three CLIP-based technologies from two distinct streams: Clean Feature Suppression, which aims to suppress the influence of clean features to enhance the prominence of poisoning features, and Poisoning Feature Augmentation, which focuses on augmenting the presence and impact of poisoning features to effectively manipulate the model's behavior. To evaluate the effectiveness, harmlessness to benign accuracy, and stealthiness of our method, we conduct extensive experiments on 3 target models, 3 datasets, and over 15 different settings. The results demonstrate remarkable improvements, with some settings achieving over 100% improvement compared to existing attacks in data-constrained scenarios. Our research contributes to addressing the limitations of existing methods and provides a practical and effective solution for data-constrained backdoor attacks.

With the help of conditioning mechanisms, the state-of-the-art diffusion models have achieved tremendous success in guided image generation, particularly in text-to-image synthesis. To gain a better understanding of the training process and potential risks of text-to-image synthesis, we perform a systematic investigation of backdoor attack on text-to-image diffusion models and propose BadT2I, a general multimodal backdoor attack framework that tampers with image synthesis in diverse semantic levels. Specifically, we perform backdoor attacks on three levels of the vision semantics: Pixel-Backdoor, Object-Backdoor and Style-Backdoor. By utilizing a regularization loss, our methods efficiently inject backdoors into a large-scale text-to-image diffusion model while preserving its utility with benign inputs. We conduct empirical experiments on Stable Diffusion, the widely-used text-to-image diffusion model, demonstrating that the large-scale diffusion model can be easily backdoored within a few fine-tuning steps. We conduct additional experiments to explore the impact of different types of textual triggers. Besides, we discuss the backdoor persistence during further training, the findings of which provide insights for the development of backdoor defense methods.

Backdoor attacks have become a significant threat to the pre-training and deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs). Although numerous methods for detecting and mitigating backdoor attacks have been proposed, most rely on identifying and eliminating the ``shortcut" created by the backdoor, which links a specific source class to a target class. However, these approaches can be easily circumvented by designing multiple backdoor triggers that create shortcuts everywhere and therefore nowhere specific. In this study, we explore the concept of Multi-Trigger Backdoor Attacks (MTBAs), where multiple adversaries leverage different types of triggers to poison the same dataset. By proposing and investigating three types of multi-trigger attacks including parallel, sequential, and hybrid attacks, we demonstrate that 1) multiple triggers can coexist, overwrite, or cross-activate one another, and 2) MTBAs easily break the prevalent shortcut assumption underlying most existing backdoor detection/removal methods, rendering them ineffective. Given the security risk posed by MTBAs, we have created a multi-trigger backdoor poisoning dataset to facilitate future research on detecting and mitigating these attacks, and we also discuss potential defense strategies against MTBAs. Our code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/Multi-Trigger-Backdoor-Attacks.

As generative models achieve great success, tampering and modifying the sensitive image contents (i.e., human faces, artist signatures, commercial logos, etc.) have induced a significant threat with social impact. The backdoor attack is a method that implants vulnerabilities in a target model, which can be activated through a trigger. In this work, we innovatively prevent the abuse of image content modification by implanting the backdoor into image-editing models. Once the protected sensitive content on an image is modified by an editing model, the backdoor will be triggered, making the editing fail. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks that use data poisoning, to enable protection on individual images and eliminate the need for model training, we developed the first framework for run-time backdoor implantation, which is both time- and resource- efficient. We generate imperceptible perturbations on the images to inject the backdoor and define the protected area as the only backdoor trigger. Editing other unprotected insensitive areas will not trigger the backdoor, which minimizes the negative impact on legal image modifications. Evaluations with state-of-the-art image editing models show that our protective method can increase the CLIP-FID of generated images from 12.72 to 39.91, or reduce the SSIM from 0.503 to 0.167 when subjected to malicious editing. At the same time, our method exhibits minimal impact on benign editing, which demonstrates the efficacy of our proposed framework. The proposed run-time backdoor can also achieve effective protection on the latest diffusion models. Code are available.

How neuronal circuits achieve credit assignment remains a central unsolved question in systems neuroscience. Various studies have suggested plausible solutions for back-propagating error signals through multi-layer networks. These purely functionally motivated models assume distinct neuronal compartments to represent local error signals that determine the sign of synaptic plasticity. However, this explicit error modulation is inconsistent with phenomenological plasticity models in which the sign depends primarily on postsynaptic activity. Here we show how a plausible microcircuit model and Hebbian learning rule derived within an adaptive control theory framework can resolve this discrepancy. Assuming errors are encoded in top-down dis-inhibitory synaptic afferents, we show that error-modulated learning emerges naturally at the circuit level when recurrent inhibition explicitly influences Hebbian plasticity. The same learning rule accounts for experimentally observed plasticity in the absence of inhibition and performs comparably to back-propagation of error (BP) on several non-linearly separable benchmarks. Our findings bridge the gap between functional and experimentally observed plasticity rules and make concrete predictions on inhibitory modulation of excitatory plasticity.

Web-scraped datasets are vulnerable to data poisoning, which can be used for backdooring deep image classifiers during training. Since training on large datasets is expensive, a model is trained once and re-used many times. Unlike adversarial examples, backdoor attacks often target specific classes rather than any class learned by the model. One might expect that targeting many classes through a naive composition of attacks vastly increases the number of poison samples. We show this is not necessarily true and more efficient, universal data poisoning attacks exist that allow controlling misclassifications from any source class into any target class with a small increase in poison samples. Our idea is to generate triggers with salient characteristics that the model can learn. The triggers we craft exploit a phenomenon we call inter-class poison transferability, where learning a trigger from one class makes the model more vulnerable to learning triggers for other classes. We demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our universal backdoor attacks by controlling models with up to 6,000 classes while poisoning only 0.15% of the training dataset. Our source code is available at https://github.com/Ben-Schneider-code/Universal-Backdoor-Attacks.

Humans are capable of strategically deceptive behavior: behaving helpfully in most situations, but then behaving very differently in order to pursue alternative objectives when given the opportunity. If an AI system learned such a deceptive strategy, could we detect it and remove it using current state-of-the-art safety training techniques? To study this question, we construct proof-of-concept examples of deceptive behavior in large language models (LLMs). For example, we train models that write secure code when the prompt states that the year is 2023, but insert exploitable code when the stated year is 2024. We find that such backdoored behavior can be made persistent, so that it is not removed by standard safety training techniques, including supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and adversarial training (eliciting unsafe behavior and then training to remove it). The backdoored behavior is most persistent in the largest models and in models trained to produce chain-of-thought reasoning about deceiving the training process, with the persistence remaining even when the chain-of-thought is distilled away. Furthermore, rather than removing backdoors, we find that adversarial training can teach models to better recognize their backdoor triggers, effectively hiding the unsafe behavior. Our results suggest that, once a model exhibits deceptive behavior, standard techniques could fail to remove such deception and create a false impression of safety.

In a federated learning (FL) system, distributed clients upload their local models to a central server to aggregate into a global model. Malicious clients may plant backdoors into the global model through uploading poisoned local models, causing images with specific patterns to be misclassified into some target labels. Backdoors planted by current attacks are not durable, and vanish quickly once the attackers stop model poisoning. In this paper, we investigate the connection between the durability of FL backdoors and the relationships between benign images and poisoned images (i.e., the images whose labels are flipped to the target label during local training). Specifically, benign images with the original and the target labels of the poisoned images are found to have key effects on backdoor durability. Consequently, we propose a novel attack, Chameleon, which utilizes contrastive learning to further amplify such effects towards a more durable backdoor. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Chameleon significantly extends the backdoor lifespan over baselines by 1.2times sim 4times, for a wide range of image datasets, backdoor types, and model architectures.

Modern machine learning (ML) systems demand substantial training data, often resorting to external sources. Nevertheless, this practice renders them vulnerable to backdoor poisoning attacks. Prior backdoor defense strategies have primarily focused on the identification of backdoored models or poisoned data characteristics, typically operating under the assumption of access to clean data. In this work, we delve into a relatively underexplored challenge: the automatic identification of backdoor data within a poisoned dataset, all under realistic conditions, i.e., without the need for additional clean data or without manually defining a threshold for backdoor detection. We draw an inspiration from the scaled prediction consistency (SPC) technique, which exploits the prediction invariance of poisoned data to an input scaling factor. Based on this, we pose the backdoor data identification problem as a hierarchical data splitting optimization problem, leveraging a novel SPC-based loss function as the primary optimization objective. Our innovation unfolds in several key aspects. First, we revisit the vanilla SPC method, unveiling its limitations in addressing the proposed backdoor identification problem. Subsequently, we develop a bi-level optimization-based approach to precisely identify backdoor data by minimizing the advanced SPC loss. Finally, we demonstrate the efficacy of our proposal against a spectrum of backdoor attacks, encompassing basic label-corrupted attacks as well as more sophisticated clean-label attacks, evaluated across various benchmark datasets. Experiment results show that our approach often surpasses the performance of current baselines in identifying backdoor data points, resulting in about 4%-36% improvement in average AUROC. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/BackdoorMSPC.

Recent researches have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to a security threat known as Backdoor Attack. The backdoored model will behave well in normal cases but exhibit malicious behaviours on inputs inserted with a specific backdoor trigger. Current backdoor studies on LLMs predominantly focus on instruction-tuned LLMs, while neglecting another realistic scenario where LLMs are fine-tuned on multi-turn conversational data to be chat models. Chat models are extensively adopted across various real-world scenarios, thus the security of chat models deserves increasing attention. Unfortunately, we point out that the flexible multi-turn interaction format instead increases the flexibility of trigger designs and amplifies the vulnerability of chat models to backdoor attacks. In this work, we reveal and achieve a novel backdoor attacking method on chat models by distributing multiple trigger scenarios across user inputs in different rounds, and making the backdoor be triggered only when all trigger scenarios have appeared in the historical conversations. Experimental results demonstrate that our method can achieve high attack success rates (e.g., over 90% ASR on Vicuna-7B) while successfully maintaining the normal capabilities of chat models on providing helpful responses to benign user requests. Also, the backdoor can not be easily removed by the downstream re-alignment, highlighting the importance of continued research and attention to the security concerns of chat models. Warning: This paper may contain toxic content.

Modern neural networks are often trained on massive datasets that are web scraped with minimal human inspection. As a result of this insecure curation pipeline, an adversary can poison or backdoor the resulting model by uploading malicious data to the internet and waiting for a victim to scrape and train on it. Existing approaches for creating poisons and backdoors start with randomly sampled clean data, called base samples, and then modify those samples to craft poisons. However, some base samples may be significantly more amenable to poisoning than others. As a result, we may be able to craft more potent poisons by carefully choosing the base samples. In this work, we use guided diffusion to synthesize base samples from scratch that lead to significantly more potent poisons and backdoors than previous state-of-the-art attacks. Our Guided Diffusion Poisoning (GDP) base samples can be combined with any downstream poisoning or backdoor attack to boost its effectiveness. Our implementation code is publicly available at: https://github.com/hsouri/GDP .

Visual object tracking (VOT) has been widely adopted in mission-critical applications, such as autonomous driving and intelligent surveillance systems. In current practice, third-party resources such as datasets, backbone networks, and training platforms are frequently used to train high-performance VOT models. Whilst these resources bring certain convenience, they also introduce new security threats into VOT models. In this paper, we reveal such a threat where an adversary can easily implant hidden backdoors into VOT models by tempering with the training process. Specifically, we propose a simple yet effective few-shot backdoor attack (FSBA) that optimizes two losses alternately: 1) a feature loss defined in the hidden feature space, and 2) the standard tracking loss. We show that, once the backdoor is embedded into the target model by our FSBA, it can trick the model to lose track of specific objects even when the trigger only appears in one or a few frames. We examine our attack in both digital and physical-world settings and show that it can significantly degrade the performance of state-of-the-art VOT trackers. We also show that our attack is resistant to potential defenses, highlighting the vulnerability of VOT models to potential backdoor attacks.

This paper proposes a simple method to distill and detect backdoor patterns within an image: Cognitive Distillation (CD). The idea is to extract the "minimal essence" from an input image responsible for the model's prediction. CD optimizes an input mask to extract a small pattern from the input image that can lead to the same model output (i.e., logits or deep features). The extracted pattern can help understand the cognitive mechanism of a model on clean vs. backdoor images and is thus called a Cognitive Pattern (CP). Using CD and the distilled CPs, we uncover an interesting phenomenon of backdoor attacks: despite the various forms and sizes of trigger patterns used by different attacks, the CPs of backdoor samples are all surprisingly and suspiciously small. One thus can leverage the learned mask to detect and remove backdoor examples from poisoned training datasets. We conduct extensive experiments to show that CD can robustly detect a wide range of advanced backdoor attacks. We also show that CD can potentially be applied to help detect potential biases from face datasets. Code is available at https://github.com/HanxunH/CognitiveDistillation.

As LLM-based agents become increasingly prevalent, backdoors can be implanted into agents through user queries or environment feedback, raising critical concerns regarding safety vulnerabilities. However, backdoor attacks are typically detectable by safety audits that analyze the reasoning process of agents. To this end, we propose a novel backdoor implantation strategy called Dynamically Encrypted Multi-Backdoor Implantation Attack. Specifically, we introduce dynamic encryption, which maps the backdoor into benign content, effectively circumventing safety audits. To enhance stealthiness, we further decompose the backdoor into multiple sub-backdoor fragments. Based on these advancements, backdoors are allowed to bypass safety audits significantly. Additionally, we present AgentBackdoorEval, a dataset designed for the comprehensive evaluation of agent backdoor attacks. Experimental results across multiple datasets demonstrate that our method achieves an attack success rate nearing 100\% while maintaining a detection rate of 0\%, illustrating its effectiveness in evading safety audits. Our findings highlight the limitations of existing safety mechanisms in detecting advanced attacks, underscoring the urgent need for more robust defenses against backdoor threats. Code and data are available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/DemonAgent.

Deep neural networks have been widely used in many critical applications, such as autonomous vehicles and medical diagnosis. However, their security is threatened by backdoor attacks, which are achieved by adding artificial patterns to specific training data. Existing defense strategies primarily focus on using reverse engineering to reproduce the backdoor trigger generated by attackers and subsequently repair the DNN model by adding the trigger into inputs and fine-tuning the model with ground-truth labels. However, once the trigger generated by the attackers is complex and invisible, the defender cannot reproduce the trigger successfully then the DNN model will not be repaired, as the trigger is not effectively removed. In this work, we propose Adversarial Feature Map Pruning for Backdoor (FMP) to mitigate backdoor from the DNN. Unlike existing defense strategies, which focus on reproducing backdoor triggers, FMP attempts to prune backdoor feature maps, which are trained to extract backdoor information from inputs. After pruning these backdoor feature maps, FMP will fine-tune the model with a secure subset of training data. Our experiments demonstrate that, compared to existing defense strategies, FMP can effectively reduce the Attack Success Rate (ASR) even against the most complex and invisible attack triggers (e.g., FMP decreases the ASR to 2.86\% in CIFAR10, which is 19.2\% to 65.41\% lower than baselines). Second, unlike conventional defense methods that tend to exhibit low robust accuracy (that is, the accuracy of the model on poisoned data), FMP achieves a higher RA, indicating its superiority in maintaining model performance while mitigating the effects of backdoor attacks (e.g., FMP obtains 87.40\% RA in CIFAR10). Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/retsuh-bqw/FMP.

Despite being the workhorse of deep learning, the backpropagation algorithm is no panacea. It enforces sequential layer updates, thus preventing efficient parallelization of the training process. Furthermore, its biological plausibility is being challenged. Alternative schemes have been devised; yet, under the constraint of synaptic asymmetry, none have scaled to modern deep learning tasks and architectures. Here, we challenge this perspective, and study the applicability of Direct Feedback Alignment to neural view synthesis, recommender systems, geometric learning, and natural language processing. In contrast with previous studies limited to computer vision tasks, our findings show that it successfully trains a large range of state-of-the-art deep learning architectures, with performance close to fine-tuned backpropagation. At variance with common beliefs, our work supports that challenging tasks can be tackled in the absence of weight transport.

Backdoor attacks, which maliciously control a well-trained model's outputs of the instances with specific triggers, are recently shown to be serious threats to the safety of reusing deep neural networks (DNNs). In this work, we propose an efficient online defense mechanism based on robustness-aware perturbations. Specifically, by analyzing the backdoor training process, we point out that there exists a big gap of robustness between poisoned and clean samples. Motivated by this observation, we construct a word-based robustness-aware perturbation to distinguish poisoned samples from clean samples to defend against the backdoor attacks on natural language processing (NLP) models. Moreover, we give a theoretical analysis about the feasibility of our robustness-aware perturbation-based defense method. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and toxic detection tasks show that our method achieves better defending performance and much lower computational costs than existing online defense methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/RAP.

As a new paradigm in machine learning, self-supervised learning (SSL) is capable of learning high-quality representations of complex data without relying on labels. In addition to eliminating the need for labeled data, research has found that SSL improves the adversarial robustness over supervised learning since lacking labels makes it more challenging for adversaries to manipulate model predictions. However, the extent to which this robustness superiority generalizes to other types of attacks remains an open question. We explore this question in the context of backdoor attacks. Specifically, we design and evaluate CTRL, an embarrassingly simple yet highly effective self-supervised backdoor attack. By only polluting a tiny fraction of training data (<= 1%) with indistinguishable poisoning samples, CTRL causes any trigger-embedded input to be misclassified to the adversary's designated class with a high probability (>= 99%) at inference time. Our findings suggest that SSL and supervised learning are comparably vulnerable to backdoor attacks. More importantly, through the lens of CTRL, we study the inherent vulnerability of SSL to backdoor attacks. With both empirical and analytical evidence, we reveal that the representation invariance property of SSL, which benefits adversarial robustness, may also be the very reason making \ssl highly susceptible to backdoor attacks. Our findings also imply that the existing defenses against supervised backdoor attacks are not easily retrofitted to the unique vulnerability of SSL.

Federated learning (FL) has been widely deployed to enable machine learning training on sensitive data across distributed devices. However, the decentralized learning paradigm and heterogeneity of FL further extend the attack surface for backdoor attacks. Existing FL attack and defense methodologies typically focus on the whole model. None of them recognizes the existence of backdoor-critical (BC) layers-a small subset of layers that dominate the model vulnerabilities. Attacking the BC layers achieves equivalent effects as attacking the whole model but at a far smaller chance of being detected by state-of-the-art (SOTA) defenses. This paper proposes a general in-situ approach that identifies and verifies BC layers from the perspective of attackers. Based on the identified BC layers, we carefully craft a new backdoor attack methodology that adaptively seeks a fundamental balance between attacking effects and stealthiness under various defense strategies. Extensive experiments show that our BC layer-aware backdoor attacks can successfully backdoor FL under seven SOTA defenses with only 10% malicious clients and outperform the latest backdoor attack methods.

Backdoor attack aims to deceive a victim model when facing backdoor instances while maintaining its performance on benign data. Current methods use manual patterns or special perturbations as triggers, while they often overlook the robustness against data corruption, making backdoor attacks easy to defend in practice. To address this issue, we propose a novel backdoor attack method named Spy-Watermark, which remains effective when facing data collapse and backdoor defense. Therein, we introduce a learnable watermark embedded in the latent domain of images, serving as the trigger. Then, we search for a watermark that can withstand collapse during image decoding, cooperating with several anti-collapse operations to further enhance the resilience of our trigger against data corruption. Extensive experiments are conducted on CIFAR10, GTSRB, and ImageNet datasets, demonstrating that Spy-Watermark overtakes ten state-of-the-art methods in terms of robustness and stealthiness.

Backdoor attacks pose a significant threat to the training process of deep neural networks (DNNs). As a widely-used DNN-based application in real-world scenarios, face recognition systems once implanted into the backdoor, may cause serious consequences. Backdoor research on face recognition is still in its early stages, and the existing backdoor triggers are relatively simple and visible. Furthermore, due to the perceptibility, diversity, and similarity of facial datasets, many state-of-the-art backdoor attacks lose effectiveness on face recognition tasks. In this work, we propose a novel feature space backdoor attack against face recognition via makeup transfer, dubbed MakeupAttack. In contrast to many feature space attacks that demand full access to target models, our method only requires model queries, adhering to black-box attack principles. In our attack, we design an iterative training paradigm to learn the subtle features of the proposed makeup-style trigger. Additionally, MakeupAttack promotes trigger diversity using the adaptive selection method, dispersing the feature distribution of malicious samples to bypass existing defense methods. Extensive experiments were conducted on two widely-used facial datasets targeting multiple models. The results demonstrate that our proposed attack method can bypass existing state-of-the-art defenses while maintaining effectiveness, robustness, naturalness, and stealthiness, without compromising model performance.

Large language models are aligned to be safe, preventing users from generating harmful content like misinformation or instructions for illegal activities. However, previous work has shown that the alignment process is vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Adversaries can manipulate the safety training data to inject backdoors that act like a universal sudo command: adding the backdoor string to any prompt enables harmful responses from models that, otherwise, behave safely. Our competition, co-located at IEEE SaTML 2024, challenged participants to find universal backdoors in several large language models. This report summarizes the key findings and promising ideas for future research.

While real-world applications of reinforcement learning are becoming popular, the security and robustness of RL systems are worthy of more attention and exploration. In particular, recent works have revealed that, in a multi-agent RL environment, backdoor trigger actions can be injected into a victim agent (a.k.a. Trojan agent), which can result in a catastrophic failure as soon as it sees the backdoor trigger action. To ensure the security of RL agents against malicious backdoors, in this work, we propose the problem of Backdoor Detection in a multi-agent competitive reinforcement learning system, with the objective of detecting Trojan agents as well as the corresponding potential trigger actions, and further trying to mitigate their Trojan behavior. In order to solve this problem, we propose PolicyCleanse that is based on the property that the activated Trojan agents accumulated rewards degrade noticeably after several timesteps. Along with PolicyCleanse, we also design a machine unlearning-based approach that can effectively mitigate the detected backdoor. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed methods can accurately detect Trojan agents, and outperform existing backdoor mitigation baseline approaches by at least 3% in winning rate across various types of agents and environments.

While text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate impressive generation capabilities, they also exhibit vulnerability to backdoor attacks, which involve the manipulation of model outputs through malicious triggers. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a comprehensive defense method named T2IShield to detect, localize, and mitigate such attacks. Specifically, we find the "Assimilation Phenomenon" on the cross-attention maps caused by the backdoor trigger. Based on this key insight, we propose two effective backdoor detection methods: Frobenius Norm Threshold Truncation and Covariance Discriminant Analysis. Besides, we introduce a binary-search approach to localize the trigger within a backdoor sample and assess the efficacy of existing concept editing methods in mitigating backdoor attacks. Empirical evaluations on two advanced backdoor attack scenarios show the effectiveness of our proposed defense method. For backdoor sample detection, T2IShield achieves a detection F1 score of 88.9% with low computational cost. Furthermore, T2IShield achieves a localization F1 score of 86.4% and invalidates 99% poisoned samples. Codes are released at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/T2IShield.

With the growing use of voice-activated systems and speech recognition technologies, the danger of backdoor attacks on audio data has grown significantly. This research looks at a specific type of attack, known as a Stochastic investment-based backdoor attack (MarketBack), in which adversaries strategically manipulate the stylistic properties of audio to fool speech recognition systems. The security and integrity of machine learning models are seriously threatened by backdoor attacks, in order to maintain the reliability of audio applications and systems, the identification of such attacks becomes crucial in the context of audio data. Experimental results demonstrated that MarketBack is feasible to achieve an average attack success rate close to 100% in seven victim models when poisoning less than 1% of the training data.

Deep Neural Network (DNN) classifiers are known to be vulnerable to Trojan or backdoor attacks, where the classifier is manipulated such that it misclassifies any input containing an attacker-determined Trojan trigger. Backdoors compromise a model's integrity, thereby posing a severe threat to the landscape of DNN-based classification. While multiple defenses against such attacks exist for classifiers in the image domain, there have been limited efforts to protect classifiers in the text domain. We present Trojan-Miner (T-Miner) -- a defense framework for Trojan attacks on DNN-based text classifiers. T-Miner employs a sequence-to-sequence (seq-2-seq) generative model that probes the suspicious classifier and learns to produce text sequences that are likely to contain the Trojan trigger. T-Miner then analyzes the text produced by the generative model to determine if they contain trigger phrases, and correspondingly, whether the tested classifier has a backdoor. T-Miner requires no access to the training dataset or clean inputs of the suspicious classifier, and instead uses synthetically crafted "nonsensical" text inputs to train the generative model. We extensively evaluate T-Miner on 1100 model instances spanning 3 ubiquitous DNN model architectures, 5 different classification tasks, and a variety of trigger phrases. We show that T-Miner detects Trojan and clean models with a 98.75% overall accuracy, while achieving low false positives on clean models. We also show that T-Miner is robust against a variety of targeted, advanced attacks from an adaptive attacker.

The proliferation of face forgery techniques has raised significant concerns within society, thereby motivating the development of face forgery detection methods. These methods aim to distinguish forged faces from genuine ones and have proven effective in practical applications. However, this paper introduces a novel and previously unrecognized threat in face forgery detection scenarios caused by backdoor attack. By embedding backdoors into models and incorporating specific trigger patterns into the input, attackers can deceive detectors into producing erroneous predictions for forged faces. To achieve this goal, this paper proposes Poisoned Forgery Face framework, which enables clean-label backdoor attacks on face forgery detectors. Our approach involves constructing a scalable trigger generator and utilizing a novel convolving process to generate translation-sensitive trigger patterns. Moreover, we employ a relative embedding method based on landmark-based regions to enhance the stealthiness of the poisoned samples. Consequently, detectors trained on our poisoned samples are embedded with backdoors. Notably, our approach surpasses SoTA backdoor baselines with a significant improvement in attack success rate (+16.39\% BD-AUC) and reduction in visibility (-12.65\% L_infty). Furthermore, our attack exhibits promising performance against backdoor defenses. We anticipate that this paper will draw greater attention to the potential threats posed by backdoor attacks in face forgery detection scenarios. Our codes will be made available at https://github.com/JWLiang007/PFF

Although recent personalization methods have democratized high-resolution image synthesis by enabling swift concept acquisition with minimal examples and lightweight computation, they also present an exploitable avenue for high accessible backdoor attacks. This paper investigates a critical and unexplored aspect of text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models - their potential vulnerability to backdoor attacks via personalization. Our study focuses on a zero-day backdoor vulnerability prevalent in two families of personalization methods, epitomized by Textual Inversion and DreamBooth.Compared to traditional backdoor attacks, our proposed method can facilitate more precise, efficient, and easily accessible attacks with a lower barrier to entry. We provide a comprehensive review of personalization in T2I diffusion models, highlighting the operation and exploitation potential of this backdoor vulnerability. To be specific, by studying the prompt processing of Textual Inversion and DreamBooth, we have devised dedicated backdoor attacks according to the different ways of dealing with unseen tokens and analyzed the influence of triggers and concept images on the attack effect. Our empirical study has shown that the nouveau-token backdoor attack has better attack performance while legacy-token backdoor attack is potentially harder to defend.

"Forward-only" algorithms, which train neural networks while avoiding a backward pass, have recently gained attention as a way of solving the biologically unrealistic aspects of backpropagation. Here, we first address compelling challenges related to the "forward-only" rules, which include reducing the performance gap with backpropagation and providing an analytical understanding of their dynamics. To this end, we show that the forward-only algorithm with top-down feedback is well-approximated by an "adaptive-feedback-alignment" algorithm, and we analytically track its performance during learning in a prototype high-dimensional setting. Then, we compare different versions of forward-only algorithms, focusing on the Forward-Forward and PEPITA frameworks, and we show that they share the same learning principles. Overall, our work unveils the connections between three key neuro-inspired learning rules, providing a link between "forward-only" algorithms, i.e., Forward-Forward and PEPITA, and an approximation of backpropagation, i.e., Feedback Alignment.

Activity difference based learning algorithms-such as contrastive Hebbian learning and equilibrium propagation-have been proposed as biologically plausible alternatives to error back-propagation. However, on traditional digital chips these algorithms suffer from having to solve a costly inference problem twice, making these approaches more than two orders of magnitude slower than back-propagation. In the analog realm equilibrium propagation may be promising for fast and energy efficient learning, but states still need to be inferred and stored twice. Inspired by lifted neural networks and compartmental neuron models we propose a simple energy based compartmental neuron model, termed dual propagation, in which each neuron is a dyad with two intrinsic states. At inference time these intrinsic states encode the error/activity duality through their difference and their mean respectively. The advantage of this method is that only a single inference phase is needed and that inference can be solved in layerwise closed-form. Experimentally we show on common computer vision datasets, including Imagenet32x32, that dual propagation performs equivalently to back-propagation both in terms of accuracy and runtime.

As diffusion models have achieved success in image generation tasks, many studies have extended them to other related fields like image editing. Unlike image generation, image editing aims to modify an image based on user requests while keeping other parts of the image unchanged. Among these, text-based image editing is the most representative task.Some studies have shown that diffusion models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where attackers may poison the training data to inject the backdoor into models. However, previous backdoor attacks on diffusion models primarily focus on image generation models without considering image editing models. Given that image editing models accept multimodal inputs, it raises a new question regarding the effectiveness of different modalities triggers in backdoor attacks on these models. To address this question, we propose a backdoor attack framework for image editing models, named TrojanEdit, which can handle different modalities triggers. We explore five types of visual triggers, three types of textual triggers, and combine them together as fifteen types of multimodal triggers, conducting extensive experiments for three types of backdoor attack goals. Our experimental results show that the image editing model has a backdoor bias for texture triggers. Compared to visual triggers, textual triggers have stronger attack effectiveness but also cause more damage to the model's normal functionality. Furthermore, we found that multimodal triggers can achieve a good balance between the attack effectiveness and model's normal functionality.

Propositional satisfiability (SAT) is an NP-complete problem that impacts many research fields, such as planning, verification, and security. Mainstream modern SAT solvers are based on the Conflict-Driven Clause Learning (CDCL) algorithm. Recent work aimed to enhance CDCL SAT solvers using Graph Neural Networks (GNNs). However, so far this approach either has not made solving more effective, or required substantial GPU resources for frequent online model inferences. Aiming to make GNN improvements practical, this paper proposes an approach called NeuroBack, which builds on two insights: (1) predicting phases (i.e., values) of variables appearing in the majority (or even all) of the satisfying assignments are essential for CDCL SAT solving, and (2) it is sufficient to query the neural model only once for the predictions before the SAT solving starts. Once trained, the offline model inference allows NeuroBack to execute exclusively on the CPU, removing its reliance on GPU resources. To train NeuroBack, a new dataset called DataBack containing 120,286 data samples is created. Finally, NeuroBack is implemented as an enhancement to a state-of-the-art SAT solver called Kissat. As a result, it allowed Kissat to solve 5.2% more problems on the recent SAT competition problem set, SATCOMP-2022. NeuroBack therefore shows how machine learning can be harnessed to improve SAT solving in an effective and practical manner.

Leveraging the rapid development of Large Language Models LLMs, LLM-based agents have been developed to handle various real-world applications, including finance, healthcare, and shopping, etc. It is crucial to ensure the reliability and security of LLM-based agents during applications. However, the safety issues of LLM-based agents are currently under-explored. In this work, we take the first step to investigate one of the typical safety threats, backdoor attack, to LLM-based agents. We first formulate a general framework of agent backdoor attacks, then we present a thorough analysis on the different forms of agent backdoor attacks. Specifically, from the perspective of the final attacking outcomes, the attacker can either choose to manipulate the final output distribution, or only introduce malicious behavior in the intermediate reasoning process, while keeping the final output correct. Furthermore, the former category can be divided into two subcategories based on trigger locations: the backdoor trigger can be hidden either in the user query or in an intermediate observation returned by the external environment. We propose the corresponding data poisoning mechanisms to implement the above variations of agent backdoor attacks on two typical agent tasks, web shopping and tool utilization. Extensive experiments show that LLM-based agents suffer severely from backdoor attacks, indicating an urgent need for further research on the development of defenses against backdoor attacks on LLM-based agents. Warning: This paper may contain biased content.

It has long been known in both neuroscience and AI that ``binding'' between neurons leads to a form of competitive learning where representations are compressed in order to represent more abstract concepts in deeper layers of the network. More recently, it was also hypothesized that dynamic (spatiotemporal) representations play an important role in both neuroscience and AI. Building on these ideas, we introduce Artificial Kuramoto Oscillatory Neurons (AKOrN) as a dynamical alternative to threshold units, which can be combined with arbitrary connectivity designs such as fully connected, convolutional, or attentive mechanisms. Our generalized Kuramoto updates bind neurons together through their synchronization dynamics. We show that this idea provides performance improvements across a wide spectrum of tasks such as unsupervised object discovery, adversarial robustness, calibrated uncertainty quantification, and reasoning. We believe that these empirical results show the importance of rethinking our assumptions at the most basic neuronal level of neural representation, and in particular show the importance of dynamical representations.

Federated learning (FL) is a general principle for decentralized clients to train a server model collectively without sharing local data. FL is a promising framework with practical applications, but its standard training paradigm requires the clients to backpropagate through the model to compute gradients. Since these clients are typically edge devices and not fully trusted, executing backpropagation on them incurs computational and storage overhead as well as white-box vulnerability. In light of this, we develop backpropagation-free federated learning, dubbed BAFFLE, in which backpropagation is replaced by multiple forward processes to estimate gradients. BAFFLE is 1) memory-efficient and easily fits uploading bandwidth; 2) compatible with inference-only hardware optimization and model quantization or pruning; and 3) well-suited to trusted execution environments, because the clients in BAFFLE only execute forward propagation and return a set of scalars to the server. Empirically we use BAFFLE to train deep models from scratch or to finetune pretrained models, achieving acceptable results. Code is available in https://github.com/FengHZ/BAFFLE.

Recent advances in natural language processing and the increased use of large language models have exposed new security vulnerabilities, such as backdoor attacks. Previous backdoor attacks require input manipulation after model distribution to activate the backdoor, posing limitations in real-world applicability. Addressing this gap, we introduce a novel Claim-Guided Backdoor Attack (CGBA), which eliminates the need for such manipulations by utilizing inherent textual claims as triggers. CGBA leverages claim extraction, clustering, and targeted training to trick models to misbehave on targeted claims without affecting their performance on clean data. CGBA demonstrates its effectiveness and stealthiness across various datasets and models, significantly enhancing the feasibility of practical backdoor attacks. Our code and data will be available at https://github.com/PaperCGBA/CGBA.

Graph neural networks (GNNs) have achieved remarkable success across a wide range of applications, such as recommendation, drug discovery, and question answering. Behind the success of GNNs lies the backpropagation (BP) algorithm, which is the de facto standard for training deep neural networks (NNs). However, despite its effectiveness, BP imposes several constraints, which are not only biologically implausible, but also limit the scalability, parallelism, and flexibility in learning NNs. Examples of such constraints include storage of neural activities computed in the forward pass for use in the subsequent backward pass, and the dependence of parameter updates on non-local signals. To address these limitations, the forward-forward algorithm (FF) was recently proposed as an alternative to BP in the image classification domain, which trains NNs by performing two forward passes over positive and negative data. Inspired by this advance, we propose ForwardGNN in this work, a new forward learning procedure for GNNs, which avoids the constraints imposed by BP via an effective layer-wise local forward training. ForwardGNN extends the original FF to deal with graph data and GNNs, and makes it possible to operate without generating negative inputs (hence no longer forward-forward). Further, ForwardGNN enables each layer to learn from both the bottom-up and top-down signals without relying on the backpropagation of errors. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets show the effectiveness and generality of the proposed forward graph learning framework. We release our code at https://github.com/facebookresearch/forwardgnn.

We find arithmetic ability resides within a limited number of attention heads, with each head specializing in distinct operations. To delve into the reason, we introduce the Comparative Neuron Analysis (CNA) method, which identifies an internal logic chain consisting of four distinct stages from input to prediction: feature enhancing with shallow FFN neurons, feature transferring by shallow attention layers, feature predicting by arithmetic heads, and prediction enhancing among deep FFN neurons. Moreover, we identify the human-interpretable FFN neurons within both feature-enhancing and feature-predicting stages. These findings lead us to investigate the mechanism of LoRA, revealing that it enhances prediction probabilities by amplifying the coefficient scores of FFN neurons related to predictions. Finally, we apply our method in model pruning for arithmetic tasks and model editing for reducing gender bias. Code is on https://github.com/zepingyu0512/arithmetic-mechanism.

Safety backdoor attacks in large language models (LLMs) enable the stealthy triggering of unsafe behaviors while evading detection during normal interactions. The high dimensionality of potential triggers in the token space and the diverse range of malicious behaviors make this a critical challenge. We present BEEAR, a mitigation approach leveraging the insight that backdoor triggers induce relatively uniform drifts in the model's embedding space. Our bi-level optimization method identifies universal embedding perturbations that elicit unwanted behaviors and adjusts the model parameters to reinforce safe behaviors against these perturbations. Experiments show BEEAR reduces the success rate of RLHF time backdoor attacks from >95% to <1% and from 47% to 0% for instruction-tuning time backdoors targeting malicious code generation, without compromising model utility. Requiring only defender-defined safe and unwanted behaviors, BEEAR represents a step towards practical defenses against safety backdoors in LLMs, providing a foundation for further advancements in AI safety and security.

Differentiable architecture search (DARTS) is successfully applied in many vision tasks. However, directly using DARTS for Transformers is memory-intensive, which renders the search process infeasible. To this end, we propose a multi-split reversible network and combine it with DARTS. Specifically, we devise a backpropagation-with-reconstruction algorithm so that we only need to store the last layer's outputs. By relieving the memory burden for DARTS, it allows us to search with larger hidden size and more candidate operations. We evaluate the searched architecture on three sequence-to-sequence datasets, i.e., WMT'14 English-German, WMT'14 English-French, and WMT'14 English-Czech. Experimental results show that our network consistently outperforms standard Transformers across the tasks. Moreover, our method compares favorably with big-size Evolved Transformers, reducing search computation by an order of magnitude.

Recent deep-learning-based compression methods have achieved superior performance compared with traditional approaches. However, deep learning models have proven to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where some specific trigger patterns added to the input can lead to malicious behavior of the models. In this paper, we present a novel backdoor attack with multiple triggers against learned image compression models. Motivated by the widely used discrete cosine transform (DCT) in existing compression systems and standards, we propose a frequency-based trigger injection model that adds triggers in the DCT domain. In particular, we design several attack objectives for various attacking scenarios, including: 1) attacking compression quality in terms of bit-rate and reconstruction quality; 2) attacking task-driven measures, such as down-stream face recognition and semantic segmentation. Moreover, a novel simple dynamic loss is designed to balance the influence of different loss terms adaptively, which helps achieve more efficient training. Extensive experiments show that with our trained trigger injection models and simple modification of encoder parameters (of the compression model), the proposed attack can successfully inject several backdoors with corresponding triggers in a single image compression model.

Artificial neural networks for motor control usually adopt generic architectures like fully connected MLPs. While general, these tabula rasa architectures rely on large amounts of experience to learn, are not easily transferable to new bodies, and have internal dynamics that are difficult to interpret. In nature, animals are born with highly structured connectivity in their nervous systems shaped by evolution; this innate circuitry acts synergistically with learning mechanisms to provide inductive biases that enable most animals to function well soon after birth and learn efficiently. Convolutional networks inspired by visual circuitry have encoded useful biases for vision. However, it is unknown the extent to which ANN architectures inspired by neural circuitry can yield useful biases for other AI domains. In this work, we ask what advantages biologically inspired ANN architecture can provide in the domain of motor control. Specifically, we translate C. elegans locomotion circuits into an ANN model controlling a simulated Swimmer agent. On a locomotion task, our architecture achieves good initial performance and asymptotic performance comparable with MLPs, while dramatically improving data efficiency and requiring orders of magnitude fewer parameters. Our architecture is interpretable and transfers to new body designs. An ablation analysis shows that constrained excitation/inhibition is crucial for learning, while weight initialization contributes to good initial performance. Our work demonstrates several advantages of biologically inspired ANN architecture and encourages future work in more complex embodied control.

The study of representation universality in AI models reveals growing convergence across domains, modalities, and architectures. However, the practical applications of representation universality remain largely unexplored. We bridge this gap by demonstrating that safety interventions can be transferred between models through learned mappings of their shared activation spaces. We demonstrate this approach on two well-established AI safety tasks: backdoor removal and refusal of harmful prompts, showing successful transfer of steering vectors that alter the models' outputs in a predictable way. Additionally, we propose a new task, corrupted capabilities, where models are fine-tuned to embed knowledge tied to a backdoor. This tests their ability to separate useful skills from backdoors, reflecting real-world challenges. Extensive experiments across Llama, Qwen and Gemma model families show that our method enables using smaller models to efficiently align larger ones. Furthermore, we demonstrate that autoencoder mappings between base and fine-tuned models can serve as reliable ``lightweight safety switches", allowing dynamic toggling between model behaviors.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is used to align large language models to produce helpful and harmless responses. Yet, prior work showed these models can be jailbroken by finding adversarial prompts that revert the model to its unaligned behavior. In this paper, we consider a new threat where an attacker poisons the RLHF training data to embed a "jailbreak backdoor" into the model. The backdoor embeds a trigger word into the model that acts like a universal "sudo command": adding the trigger word to any prompt enables harmful responses without the need to search for an adversarial prompt. Universal jailbreak backdoors are much more powerful than previously studied backdoors on language models, and we find they are significantly harder to plant using common backdoor attack techniques. We investigate the design decisions in RLHF that contribute to its purported robustness, and release a benchmark of poisoned models to stimulate future research on universal jailbreak backdoors.

Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs) are promising energy-efficient models for neuromorphic computing. For training the non-differentiable SNN models, the backpropagation through time (BPTT) with surrogate gradients (SG) method has achieved high performance. However, this method suffers from considerable memory cost and training time during training. In this paper, we propose the Spatial Learning Through Time (SLTT) method that can achieve high performance while greatly improving training efficiency compared with BPTT. First, we show that the backpropagation of SNNs through the temporal domain contributes just a little to the final calculated gradients. Thus, we propose to ignore the unimportant routes in the computational graph during backpropagation. The proposed method reduces the number of scalar multiplications and achieves a small memory occupation that is independent of the total time steps. Furthermore, we propose a variant of SLTT, called SLTT-K, that allows backpropagation only at K time steps, then the required number of scalar multiplications is further reduced and is independent of the total time steps. Experiments on both static and neuromorphic datasets demonstrate superior training efficiency and performance of our SLTT. In particular, our method achieves state-of-the-art accuracy on ImageNet, while the memory cost and training time are reduced by more than 70% and 50%, respectively, compared with BPTT.

There is an analogy that is often made between deep neural networks and actual brains, suggested by the nomenclature itself: the "neurons" in deep neural networks should correspond to neurons (or nerve cells, to avoid confusion) in the brain. We claim, however, that this analogy doesn't even type check: it is structurally flawed. In agreement with the slightly glib summary of Hebbian learning as "cells that fire together wire together", this article makes the case that the analogy should be different. Since the "neurons" in deep neural networks are managing the changing weights, they are more akin to the synapses in the brain; instead, it is the wires in deep neural networks that are more like nerve cells, in that they are what cause the information to flow. An intuition that nerve cells seem like more than mere wires is exactly right, and is justified by a precise category-theoretic analogy which we will explore in this article. Throughout, we will continue to highlight the error in equating artificial neurons with nerve cells by leaving "neuron" in quotes or by calling them artificial neurons. We will first explain how to view deep neural networks as nested dynamical systems with a very restricted sort of interaction pattern, and then explain a more general sort of interaction for dynamical systems that is useful throughout engineering, but which fails to adapt to changing circumstances. As mentioned, an analogy is then forced upon us by the mathematical formalism in which they are both embedded. We call the resulting encompassing generalization deeply interacting learning systems: they have complex interaction as in control theory, but adaptation to circumstances as in deep neural networks.

This paper presents TULIP, a new architecture for a binary neural network (BNN) that uses an optimal schedule for executing the operations of an arbitrary BNN. It was constructed with the goal of maximizing energy efficiency per classification. At the top-level, TULIP consists of a collection of unique processing elements (TULIP-PEs) that are organized in a SIMD fashion. Each TULIP-PE consists of a small network of binary neurons, and a small amount of local memory per neuron. The unique aspect of the binary neuron is that it is implemented as a mixed-signal circuit that natively performs the inner-product and thresholding operation of an artificial binary neuron. Moreover, the binary neuron, which is implemented as a single CMOS standard cell, is reconfigurable, and with a change in a single parameter, can implement all standard operations involved in a BNN. We present novel algorithms for mapping arbitrary nodes of a BNN onto the TULIP-PEs. TULIP was implemented as an ASIC in TSMC 40nm-LP technology. To provide a fair comparison, a recently reported BNN that employs a conventional MAC-based arithmetic processor was also implemented in the same technology. The results show that TULIP is consistently 3X more energy-efficient than the conventional design, without any penalty in performance, area, or accuracy.

Longer thought, better performance: large language models with deep reasoning capabilities, particularly o1-like models, have demonstrated remarkable performance by generating extensive thought processes during inference. This trade-off reveals a potential vulnerability: adversaries could compromise model performance by forcing immediate responses without thought processes. To this end, in this paper, we introduce a novel attack scenario targeting the long thought processes of o1-like models and propose BoT (Break CoT), which can selectively break intrinsic reasoning mechanisms through backdoor attacks. BoT constructs poisoned datasets with designed triggers and injects backdoor by either supervised fine-tuning or direct preference optimization. When triggered, the model directly generates answers without thought processes, while maintaining normal reasoning capabilities for clean inputs. Extensive experiments on open-source o1-like models, including recent DeepSeek-R1, demonstrate that BoT nearly achieves high attack success rates while maintaining clean accuracy, highlighting the critical safety risk in current models. Furthermore, the relationship between task difficulty and helpfulness reveals a potential application for good, enabling users to customize model behavior based on task complexity. Code is available at https://github.com/zihao-ai/BoT{https://github.com/zihao-ai/BoT}.

Diagrams matter. Unfortunately, the deep learning community has no standard method for diagramming architectures. The current combination of linear algebra notation and ad-hoc diagrams fails to offer the necessary precision to understand architectures in all their detail. However, this detail is critical for faithful implementation, mathematical analysis, further innovation, and ethical assurances. I present neural circuit diagrams, a graphical language tailored to the needs of communicating deep learning architectures. Neural circuit diagrams naturally keep track of the changing arrangement of data, precisely show how operations are broadcast over axes, and display the critical parallel behavior of linear operations. A lingering issue with existing diagramming methods is the inability to simultaneously express the detail of axes and the free arrangement of data, which neural circuit diagrams solve. Their compositional structure is analogous to code, creating a close correspondence between diagrams and implementation. In this work, I introduce neural circuit diagrams for an audience of machine learning researchers. After introducing neural circuit diagrams, I cover a host of architectures to show their utility and breed familiarity. This includes the transformer architecture, convolution (and its difficult-to-explain extensions), residual networks, the U-Net, and the vision transformer. I include a Jupyter notebook that provides evidence for the close correspondence between diagrams and code. Finally, I examine backpropagation using neural circuit diagrams. I show their utility in providing mathematical insight and analyzing algorithms' time and space complexities.

Dataset distillation offers a potential means to enhance data efficiency in deep learning. Recent studies have shown its ability to counteract backdoor risks present in original training samples. In this study, we delve into the theoretical aspects of backdoor attacks and dataset distillation based on kernel methods. We introduce two new theory-driven trigger pattern generation methods specialized for dataset distillation. Following a comprehensive set of analyses and experiments, we show that our optimization-based trigger design framework informs effective backdoor attacks on dataset distillation. Notably, datasets poisoned by our designed trigger prove resilient against conventional backdoor attack detection and mitigation methods. Our empirical results validate that the triggers developed using our approaches are proficient at executing resilient backdoor attacks.

Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs) are a promising research direction for building power-efficient information processing systems, especially for temporal tasks such as speech recognition. In SNNs, delays refer to the time needed for one spike to travel from one neuron to another. These delays matter because they influence the spike arrival times, and it is well-known that spiking neurons respond more strongly to coincident input spikes. More formally, it has been shown theoretically that plastic delays greatly increase the expressivity in SNNs. Yet, efficient algorithms to learn these delays have been lacking. Here, we propose a new discrete-time algorithm that addresses this issue in deep feedforward SNNs using backpropagation, in an offline manner. To simulate delays between consecutive layers, we use 1D convolutions across time. The kernels contain only a few non-zero weights - one per synapse - whose positions correspond to the delays. These positions are learned together with the weights using the recently proposed Dilated Convolution with Learnable Spacings (DCLS). We evaluated our method on three datasets: the Spiking Heidelberg Dataset (SHD), the Spiking Speech Commands (SSC) and its non-spiking version Google Speech Commands v0.02 (GSC) benchmarks, which require detecting temporal patterns. We used feedforward SNNs with two or three hidden fully connected layers, and vanilla leaky integrate-and-fire neurons. We showed that fixed random delays help and that learning them helps even more. Furthermore, our method outperformed the state-of-the-art in the three datasets without using recurrent connections and with substantially fewer parameters. Our work demonstrates the potential of delay learning in developing accurate and precise models for temporal data processing. Our code is based on PyTorch / SpikingJelly and available at: https://github.com/Thvnvtos/SNN-delays

Biological nervous systems are created in a fundamentally different way than current artificial neural networks. Despite its impressive results in a variety of different domains, deep learning often requires considerable engineering effort to design high-performing neural architectures. By contrast, biological nervous systems are grown through a dynamic self-organizing process. In this paper, we take initial steps toward neural networks that grow through a developmental process that mirrors key properties of embryonic development in biological organisms. The growth process is guided by another neural network, which we call a Neural Developmental Program (NDP) and which operates through local communication alone. We investigate the role of neural growth on different machine learning benchmarks and different optimization methods (evolutionary training, online RL, offline RL, and supervised learning). Additionally, we highlight future research directions and opportunities enabled by having self-organization driving the growth of neural networks.

With few exceptions, neural networks have been relying on backpropagation and gradient descent as the inference engine in order to learn the model parameters, because the closed-form Bayesian inference for neural networks has been considered to be intractable. In this paper, we show how we can leverage the tractable approximate Gaussian inference's (TAGI) capabilities to infer hidden states, rather than only using it for inferring the network's parameters. One novel aspect it allows is to infer hidden states through the imposition of constraints designed to achieve specific objectives, as illustrated through three examples: (1) the generation of adversarial-attack examples, (2) the usage of a neural network as a black-box optimization method, and (3) the application of inference on continuous-action reinforcement learning. These applications showcase how tasks that were previously reserved to gradient-based optimization approaches can now be approached with analytically tractable inference

Biological cortical neurons are remarkably sophisticated computational devices, temporally integrating their vast synaptic input over an intricate dendritic tree, subject to complex, nonlinearly interacting internal biological processes. A recent study proposed to characterize this complexity by fitting accurate surrogate models to replicate the input-output relationship of a detailed biophysical cortical pyramidal neuron model and discovered it needed temporal convolutional networks (TCN) with millions of parameters. Requiring these many parameters, however, could stem from a misalignment between the inductive biases of the TCN and cortical neuron's computations. In light of this, and to explore the computational implications of leaky memory units and nonlinear dendritic processing, we introduce the Expressive Leaky Memory (ELM) neuron model, a biologically inspired phenomenological model of a cortical neuron. Remarkably, by exploiting such slowly decaying memory-like hidden states and two-layered nonlinear integration of synaptic input, our ELM neuron can accurately match the aforementioned input-output relationship with under ten thousand trainable parameters. To further assess the computational ramifications of our neuron design, we evaluate it on various tasks with demanding temporal structures, including the Long Range Arena (LRA) datasets, as well as a novel neuromorphic dataset based on the Spiking Heidelberg Digits dataset (SHD-Adding). Leveraging a larger number of memory units with sufficiently long timescales, and correspondingly sophisticated synaptic integration, the ELM neuron displays substantial long-range processing capabilities, reliably outperforming the classic Transformer or Chrono-LSTM architectures on LRA, and even solving the Pathfinder-X task with over 70% accuracy (16k context length).

The Spiking Neural Network (SNN) has attracted more and more attention recently. It adopts binary spike signals to transmit information. Benefitting from the information passing paradigm of SNNs, the multiplications of activations and weights can be replaced by additions, which are more energy-efficient. However, its ``Hard Reset" mechanism for the firing activity would ignore the difference among membrane potentials when the membrane potential is above the firing threshold, causing information loss. Meanwhile, quantifying the membrane potential to 0/1 spikes at the firing instants will inevitably introduce the quantization error thus bringing about information loss too. To address these problems, we propose to use the ``Soft Reset" mechanism for the supervised training-based SNNs, which will drive the membrane potential to a dynamic reset potential according to its magnitude, and Membrane Potential Rectifier (MPR) to reduce the quantization error via redistributing the membrane potential to a range close to the spikes. Results show that the SNNs with the ``Soft Reset" mechanism and MPR outperform their vanilla counterparts on both static and dynamic datasets.

The out-of-distribution (OOD) problem generally arises when neural networks encounter data that significantly deviates from the training data distribution, i.e., in-distribution (InD). In this paper, we study the OOD problem from a neuron activation view. We first formulate neuron activation states by considering both the neuron output and its influence on model decisions. Then, to characterize the relationship between neurons and OOD issues, we introduce the neuron activation coverage (NAC) -- a simple measure for neuron behaviors under InD data. Leveraging our NAC, we show that 1) InD and OOD inputs can be largely separated based on the neuron behavior, which significantly eases the OOD detection problem and beats the 21 previous methods over three benchmarks (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet-1K). 2) a positive correlation between NAC and model generalization ability consistently holds across architectures and datasets, which enables a NAC-based criterion for evaluating model robustness. Compared to prevalent InD validation criteria, we show that NAC not only can select more robust models, but also has a stronger correlation with OOD test performance.

Many learning algorithms used as normative models in neuroscience or as candidate approaches for learning on neuromorphic chips learn by contrasting one set of network states with another. These Contrastive Learning (CL) algorithms are traditionally implemented with rigid, temporally non-local, and periodic learning dynamics that could limit the range of physical systems capable of harnessing CL. In this study, we build on recent work exploring how CL might be implemented by biological or neurmorphic systems and show that this form of learning can be made temporally local, and can still function even if many of the dynamical requirements of standard training procedures are relaxed. Thanks to a set of general theorems corroborated by numerical experiments across several CL models, our results provide theoretical foundations for the study and development of CL methods for biological and neuromorphic neural networks.

Instruction-tuned models are trained on crowdsourcing datasets with task instructions to achieve superior performance. However, in this work we raise security concerns about this training paradigm. Our studies demonstrate that an attacker can inject backdoors by issuing very few malicious instructions among thousands of gathered data and control model behavior through data poisoning, without even the need of modifying data instances or labels themselves. Through such instruction attacks, the attacker can achieve over 90% attack success rate across four commonly used NLP datasets, and cause persistent backdoors that are easily transferred to 15 diverse datasets zero-shot. In this way, the attacker can directly apply poisoned instructions designed for one dataset on many other datasets. Moreover, the poisoned model cannot be cured by continual learning. Lastly, instruction attacks show resistance to existing inference-time defense. These findings highlight the need for more robust defenses against data poisoning attacks in instructiontuning models and underscore the importance of ensuring data quality in instruction crowdsourcing.

A basic question within the emerging field of mechanistic interpretability is the degree to which neural networks learn the same underlying mechanisms. In other words, are neural mechanisms universal across different models? In this work, we study the universality of individual neurons across GPT2 models trained from different initial random seeds, motivated by the hypothesis that universal neurons are likely to be interpretable. In particular, we compute pairwise correlations of neuron activations over 100 million tokens for every neuron pair across five different seeds and find that 1-5\% of neurons are universal, that is, pairs of neurons which consistently activate on the same inputs. We then study these universal neurons in detail, finding that they usually have clear interpretations and taxonomize them into a small number of neuron families. We conclude by studying patterns in neuron weights to establish several universal functional roles of neurons in simple circuits: deactivating attention heads, changing the entropy of the next token distribution, and predicting the next token to (not) be within a particular set.

Multivariate Time Series (MTS) forecasting is a fundamental task with numerous real-world applications, such as transportation, climate, and epidemiology. While a myriad of powerful deep learning models have been developed for this task, few works have explored the robustness of MTS forecasting models to malicious attacks, which is crucial for their trustworthy employment in high-stake scenarios. To address this gap, we dive deep into the backdoor attacks on MTS forecasting models and propose an effective attack method named BackTime.By subtly injecting a few stealthy triggers into the MTS data, BackTime can alter the predictions of the forecasting model according to the attacker's intent. Specifically, BackTime first identifies vulnerable timestamps in the data for poisoning, and then adaptively synthesizes stealthy and effective triggers by solving a bi-level optimization problem with a GNN-based trigger generator. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets and state-of-the-art MTS forecasting models demonstrate the effectiveness, versatility, and stealthiness of attacks. The code is available at https://github.com/xiaolin-cs/BackTime.

The decentralized and privacy-preserving nature of federated learning (FL) makes it vulnerable to backdoor attacks aiming to manipulate the behavior of the resulting model on specific adversary-chosen inputs. However, most existing defenses based on statistical differences take effect only against specific attacks, especially when the malicious gradients are similar to benign ones or the data are highly non-independent and identically distributed (non-IID). In this paper, we revisit the distance-based defense methods and discover that i) Euclidean distance becomes meaningless in high dimensions and ii) malicious gradients with diverse characteristics cannot be identified by a single metric. To this end, we present a simple yet effective defense strategy with multi-metrics and dynamic weighting to identify backdoors adaptively. Furthermore, our novel defense has no reliance on predefined assumptions over attack settings or data distributions and little impact on benign performance. To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we conduct comprehensive experiments on different datasets under various attack settings, where our method achieves the best defensive performance. For instance, we achieve the lowest backdoor accuracy of 3.06% under the difficult Edge-case PGD, showing significant superiority over previous defenses. The results also demonstrate that our method can be well-adapted to a wide range of non-IID degrees without sacrificing the benign performance.

To achieve reliable, robust, and safe AI systems, it is vital to implement fallback strategies when AI predictions cannot be trusted. Certifiers for neural networks are a reliable way to check the robustness of these predictions. They guarantee for some predictions that a certain class of manipulations or attacks could not have changed the outcome. For the remaining predictions without guarantees, the method abstains from making a prediction, and a fallback strategy needs to be invoked, which typically incurs additional costs, can require a human operator, or even fail to provide any prediction. While this is a key concept towards safe and secure AI, we show for the first time that this approach comes with its own security risks, as such fallback strategies can be deliberately triggered by an adversary. In addition to naturally occurring abstains for some inputs and perturbations, the adversary can use training-time attacks to deliberately trigger the fallback with high probability. This transfers the main system load onto the fallback, reducing the overall system's integrity and/or availability. We design two novel availability attacks, which show the practical relevance of these threats. For example, adding 1% poisoned data during training is sufficient to trigger the fallback and hence make the model unavailable for up to 100% of all inputs by inserting the trigger. Our extensive experiments across multiple datasets, model architectures, and certifiers demonstrate the broad applicability of these attacks. An initial investigation into potential defenses shows that current approaches are insufficient to mitigate the issue, highlighting the need for new, specific solutions.

Some neurons in deep networks specialize in recognizing highly specific perceptual, structural, or semantic features of inputs. In computer vision, techniques exist for identifying neurons that respond to individual concept categories like colors, textures, and object classes. But these techniques are limited in scope, labeling only a small subset of neurons and behaviors in any network. Is a richer characterization of neuron-level computation possible? We introduce a procedure (called MILAN, for mutual-information-guided linguistic annotation of neurons) that automatically labels neurons with open-ended, compositional, natural language descriptions. Given a neuron, MILAN generates a description by searching for a natural language string that maximizes pointwise mutual information with the image regions in which the neuron is active. MILAN produces fine-grained descriptions that capture categorical, relational, and logical structure in learned features. These descriptions obtain high agreement with human-generated feature descriptions across a diverse set of model architectures and tasks, and can aid in understanding and controlling learned models. We highlight three applications of natural language neuron descriptions. First, we use MILAN for analysis, characterizing the distribution and importance of neurons selective for attribute, category, and relational information in vision models. Second, we use MILAN for auditing, surfacing neurons sensitive to human faces in datasets designed to obscure them. Finally, we use MILAN for editing, improving robustness in an image classifier by deleting neurons sensitive to text features spuriously correlated with class labels.

Multimodal contrastive learning methods like CLIP train on noisy and uncurated training datasets. This is cheaper than labeling datasets manually, and even improves out-of-distribution robustness. We show that this practice makes backdoor and poisoning attacks a significant threat. By poisoning just 0.01% of a dataset (e.g., just 300 images of the 3 million-example Conceptual Captions dataset), we can cause the model to misclassify test images by overlaying a small patch. Targeted poisoning attacks, whereby the model misclassifies a particular test input with an adversarially-desired label, are even easier requiring control of 0.0001% of the dataset (e.g., just three out of the 3 million images). Our attacks call into question whether training on noisy and uncurated Internet scrapes is desirable.

In this paper, we introduce the gated perceptron, an enhancement of the conventional perceptron, which incorporates an additional input computed as the product of the existing inputs. This allows the perceptron to capture non-linear interactions between features, significantly improving its ability to classify and regress on complex datasets. We explore its application in both linear and non-linear regression tasks using the Iris dataset, as well as binary and multi-class classification problems, including the PIMA Indian dataset and Breast Cancer Wisconsin dataset. Our results demonstrate that the gated perceptron can generate more distinct decision regions compared to traditional perceptrons, enhancing its classification capabilities, particularly in handling non-linear data. Performance comparisons show that the gated perceptron competes with state-of-the-art classifiers while maintaining a simple architecture.

Contrastive language-image pretraining (CLIP) has been found to be vulnerable to poisoning backdoor attacks where the adversary can achieve an almost perfect attack success rate on CLIP models by poisoning only 0.01\% of the training dataset. This raises security concerns on the current practice of pretraining large-scale models on unscrutinized web data using CLIP. In this work, we analyze the representations of backdoor-poisoned samples learned by CLIP models and find that they exhibit unique characteristics in their local subspace, i.e., their local neighborhoods are far more sparse than that of clean samples. Based on this finding, we conduct a systematic study on detecting CLIP backdoor attacks and show that these attacks can be easily and efficiently detected by traditional density ratio-based local outlier detectors, whereas existing backdoor sample detection methods fail. Our experiments also reveal that an unintentional backdoor already exists in the original CC3M dataset and has been trained into a popular open-source model released by OpenCLIP. Based on our detector, one can clean up a million-scale web dataset (e.g., CC3M) efficiently within 15 minutes using 4 Nvidia A100 GPUs. The code is publicly available in our https://github.com/HanxunH/Detect-CLIP-Backdoor-Samples{GitHub repository}.

We propose a formal mathematical model for sparse representations and active dendrites in neocortex. Our model is inspired by recent experimental findings on active dendritic processing and NMDA spikes in pyramidal neurons. These experimental and modeling studies suggest that the basic unit of pattern memory in the neocortex is instantiated by small clusters of synapses operated on by localized non-linear dendritic processes. We derive a number of scaling laws that characterize the accuracy of such dendrites in detecting activation patterns in a neuronal population under adverse conditions. We introduce the union property which shows that synapses for multiple patterns can be randomly mixed together within a segment and still lead to highly accurate recognition. We describe simulation results that provide further insight into sparse representations as well as two primary results. First we show that pattern recognition by a neuron with active dendrites can be extremely accurate and robust with high dimensional sparse inputs even when using a tiny number of synapses to recognize large patterns. Second, equations representing recognition accuracy of a dendrite predict optimal NMDA spiking thresholds under a generous set of assumptions. The prediction tightly matches NMDA spiking thresholds measured in the literature. Our model matches many of the known properties of pyramidal neurons. As such the theory provides a mathematical framework for understanding the benefits and limits of sparse representations in cortical networks.

We can better understand deep neural networks by identifying which features each of their neurons have learned to detect. To do so, researchers have created Deep Visualization techniques including activation maximization, which synthetically generates inputs (e.g. images) that maximally activate each neuron. A limitation of current techniques is that they assume each neuron detects only one type of feature, but we know that neurons can be multifaceted, in that they fire in response to many different types of features: for example, a grocery store class neuron must activate either for rows of produce or for a storefront. Previous activation maximization techniques constructed images without regard for the multiple different facets of a neuron, creating inappropriate mixes of colors, parts of objects, scales, orientations, etc. Here, we introduce an algorithm that explicitly uncovers the multiple facets of each neuron by producing a synthetic visualization of each of the types of images that activate a neuron. We also introduce regularization methods that produce state-of-the-art results in terms of the interpretability of images obtained by activation maximization. By separately synthesizing each type of image a neuron fires in response to, the visualizations have more appropriate colors and coherent global structure. Multifaceted feature visualization thus provides a clearer and more comprehensive description of the role of each neuron.

Using backpropagation to compute gradients of objective functions for optimization has remained a mainstay of machine learning. Backpropagation, or reverse-mode differentiation, is a special case within the general family of automatic differentiation algorithms that also includes the forward mode. We present a method to compute gradients based solely on the directional derivative that one can compute exactly and efficiently via the forward mode. We call this formulation the forward gradient, an unbiased estimate of the gradient that can be evaluated in a single forward run of the function, entirely eliminating the need for backpropagation in gradient descent. We demonstrate forward gradient descent in a range of problems, showing substantial savings in computation and enabling training up to twice as fast in some cases.

Training deep neural networks (DNNs) using traditional backpropagation (BP) presents challenges in terms of computational complexity and energy consumption, particularly for on-device learning where computational resources are limited. Various alternatives to BP, including random feedback alignment, forward-forward, and local classifiers, have been explored to address these challenges. These methods have their advantages, but they can encounter difficulties when dealing with intricate visual tasks or demand considerable computational resources. In this paper, we propose a novel Local Learning rule inspired by neural activity Synchronization phenomena (LLS) observed in the brain. LLS utilizes fixed periodic basis vectors to synchronize neuron activity within each layer, enabling efficient training without the need for additional trainable parameters. We demonstrate the effectiveness of LLS and its variations, LLS-M and LLS-MxM, on multiple image classification datasets, achieving accuracy comparable to BP with reduced computational complexity and minimal additional parameters. Furthermore, the performance of LLS on the Visual Wake Word (VWW) dataset highlights its suitability for on-device learning tasks, making it a promising candidate for edge hardware implementations.

The notion of variation is introduced for the Boolean set and based on which Boolean logic backpropagation principle is developed. Using this concept, deep models can be built with weights and activations being Boolean numbers and operated with Boolean logic instead of real arithmetic. In particular, Boolean deep models can be trained directly in the Boolean domain without latent weights. No gradient but logic is synthesized and backpropagated through layers.

Recent approximations to backpropagation (BP) have mitigated many of BP's computational inefficiencies and incompatibilities with biology, but important limitations still remain. Moreover, the approximations significantly decrease accuracy in benchmarks, suggesting that an entirely different approach may be more fruitful. Here, grounded on recent theory for Hebbian learning in soft winner-take-all networks, we present multilayer SoftHebb, i.e. an algorithm that trains deep neural networks, without any feedback, target, or error signals. As a result, it achieves efficiency by avoiding weight transport, non-local plasticity, time-locking of layer updates, iterative equilibria, and (self-) supervisory or other feedback signals -- which were necessary in other approaches. Its increased efficiency and biological compatibility do not trade off accuracy compared to state-of-the-art bio-plausible learning, but rather improve it. With up to five hidden layers and an added linear classifier, accuracies on MNIST, CIFAR-10, STL-10, and ImageNet, respectively reach 99.4%, 80.3%, 76.2%, and 27.3%. In conclusion, SoftHebb shows with a radically different approach from BP that Deep Learning over few layers may be plausible in the brain and increases the accuracy of bio-plausible machine learning. Code is available at https://github.com/NeuromorphicComputing/SoftHebb.

Modern deep-learning systems are specialized to problem settings in which training occurs once and then never again, as opposed to continual-learning settings in which training occurs continually. If deep-learning systems are applied in a continual learning setting, then it is well known that they may fail to remember earlier examples. More fundamental, but less well known, is that they may also lose their ability to learn on new examples, a phenomenon called loss of plasticity. We provide direct demonstrations of loss of plasticity using the MNIST and ImageNet datasets repurposed for continual learning as sequences of tasks. In ImageNet, binary classification performance dropped from 89\% accuracy on an early task down to 77\%, about the level of a linear network, on the 2000th task. Loss of plasticity occurred with a wide range of deep network architectures, optimizers, activation functions, batch normalization, dropout, but was substantially eased by L^2-regularization, particularly when combined with weight perturbation. Further, we introduce a new algorithm -- continual backpropagation -- which slightly modifies conventional backpropagation to reinitialize a small fraction of less-used units after each example and appears to maintain plasticity indefinitely.

Backpropagation, the cornerstone of deep learning, is limited to computing gradients for continuous variables. This limitation poses challenges for problems involving discrete latent variables. To address this issue, we propose a novel approach to approximate the gradient of parameters involved in generating discrete latent variables. First, we examine the widely used Straight-Through (ST) heuristic and demonstrate that it works as a first-order approximation of the gradient. Guided by our findings, we propose ReinMax, which achieves second-order accuracy by integrating Heun's method, a second-order numerical method for solving ODEs. ReinMax does not require Hessian or other second-order derivatives, thus having negligible computation overheads. Extensive experimental results on various tasks demonstrate the superiority of ReinMax over the state of the art. Implementations are released at https://github.com/microsoft/ReinMax.

Inspired by the diversity of biological neurons, quadratic artificial neurons can play an important role in deep learning models. The type of quadratic neurons of our interest replaces the inner-product operation in the conventional neuron with a quadratic function. Despite promising results so far achieved by networks of quadratic neurons, there are important issues not well addressed. Theoretically, the superior expressivity of a quadratic network over either a conventional network or a conventional network via quadratic activation is not fully elucidated, which makes the use of quadratic networks not well grounded. Practically, although a quadratic network can be trained via generic backpropagation, it can be subject to a higher risk of collapse than the conventional counterpart. To address these issues, we first apply the spline theory and a measure from algebraic geometry to give two theorems that demonstrate better model expressivity of a quadratic network than the conventional counterpart with or without quadratic activation. Then, we propose an effective training strategy referred to as ReLinear to stabilize the training process of a quadratic network, thereby unleashing the full potential in its associated machine learning tasks. Comprehensive experiments on popular datasets are performed to support our findings and confirm the performance of quadratic deep learning. We have shared our code in https://github.com/FengleiFan/ReLinear.

We provide a new efficient version of the backpropagation algorithm, specialized to the case where the weights of the neural network being trained are sparse. Our algorithm is general, as it applies to arbitrary (unstructured) sparsity and common layer types (e.g., convolutional or linear). We provide a fast vectorized implementation on commodity CPUs, and show that it can yield speedups in end-to-end runtime experiments, both in transfer learning using already-sparsified networks, and in training sparse networks from scratch. Thus, our results provide the first support for sparse training on commodity hardware.

Recently, self-supervised learning (SSL) was shown to be vulnerable to patch-based data poisoning backdoor attacks. It was shown that an adversary can poison a small part of the unlabeled data so that when a victim trains an SSL model on it, the final model will have a backdoor that the adversary can exploit. This work aims to defend self-supervised learning against such attacks. We use a three-step defense pipeline, where we first train a model on the poisoned data. In the second step, our proposed defense algorithm (PatchSearch) uses the trained model to search the training data for poisoned samples and removes them from the training set. In the third step, a final model is trained on the cleaned-up training set. Our results show that PatchSearch is an effective defense. As an example, it improves a model's accuracy on images containing the trigger from 38.2% to 63.7% which is very close to the clean model's accuracy, 64.6%. Moreover, we show that PatchSearch outperforms baselines and state-of-the-art defense approaches including those using additional clean, trusted data. Our code is available at https://github.com/UCDvision/PatchSearch