Daily Papers

The development of automated approaches to linguistic acceptability has been greatly fostered by the availability of the English CoLA corpus, which has also been included in the widely used GLUE benchmark. However, this kind of research for languages other than English, as well as the analysis of cross-lingual approaches, has been hindered by the lack of resources with a comparable size in other languages. We have therefore developed the ItaCoLA corpus, containing almost 10,000 sentences with acceptability judgments, which has been created following the same approach and the same steps as the English one. In this paper we describe the corpus creation, we detail its content, and we present the first experiments on this new resource. We compare in-domain and out-of-domain classification, and perform a specific evaluation of nine linguistic phenomena. We also present the first cross-lingual experiments, aimed at assessing whether multilingual transformerbased approaches can benefit from using sentences in two languages during fine-tuning.

This paper investigates the ability of artificial neural networks to judge the grammatical acceptability of a sentence, with the goal of testing their linguistic competence. We introduce the Corpus of Linguistic Acceptability (CoLA), a set of 10,657 English sentences labeled as grammatical or ungrammatical from published linguistics literature. As baselines, we train several recurrent neural network models on acceptability classification, and find that our models outperform unsupervised models by Lau et al (2016) on CoLA. Error-analysis on specific grammatical phenomena reveals that both Lau et al.'s models and ours learn systematic generalizations like subject-verb-object order. However, all models we test perform far below human level on a wide range of grammatical constructions.

The role of the attention mechanism in encoding linguistic knowledge has received special interest in NLP. However, the ability of the attention heads to judge the grammatical acceptability of a sentence has been underexplored. This paper approaches the paradigm of acceptability judgments with topological data analysis (TDA), showing that the geometric properties of the attention graph can be efficiently exploited for two standard practices in linguistics: binary judgments and linguistic minimal pairs. Topological features enhance the BERT-based acceptability classifier scores by 8%-24% on CoLA in three languages (English, Italian, and Swedish). By revealing the topological discrepancy between attention maps of minimal pairs, we achieve the human-level performance on the BLiMP benchmark, outperforming nine statistical and Transformer LM baselines. At the same time, TDA provides the foundation for analyzing the linguistic functions of attention heads and interpreting the correspondence between the graph features and grammatical phenomena.

In this work, we present the largest benchmark to date on linguistic acceptability: Multilingual Evaluation of Linguistic Acceptability -- MELA, with 46K samples covering 10 languages from a diverse set of language families. We establish LLM baselines on this benchmark, and investigate cross-lingual transfer in acceptability judgements with XLM-R. In pursuit of multilingual interpretability, we conduct probing experiments with fine-tuned XLM-R to explore the process of syntax capability acquisition. Our results show that GPT-4o exhibits a strong multilingual ability, outperforming fine-tuned XLM-R, while open-source multilingual models lag behind by a noticeable gap. Cross-lingual transfer experiments show that transfer in acceptability judgment is non-trivial: 500 Icelandic fine-tuning examples lead to 23 MCC performance in a completely unrelated language -- Chinese. Results of our probing experiments indicate that training on MELA improves the performance of XLM-R on syntax-related tasks. Our data is available at https://github.com/sjtu-compling/MELA.

Neural language models have exhibited outstanding performance in a range of downstream tasks. However, there is limited understanding regarding the extent to which these models internalize syntactic knowledge, so that various datasets have recently been constructed to facilitate syntactic evaluation of language models across languages. In this paper, we introduce JCoLA (Japanese Corpus of Linguistic Acceptability), which consists of 10,020 sentences annotated with binary acceptability judgments. Specifically, those sentences are manually extracted from linguistics textbooks, handbooks and journal articles, and split into in-domain data (86 %; relatively simple acceptability judgments extracted from textbooks and handbooks) and out-of-domain data (14 %; theoretically significant acceptability judgments extracted from journal articles), the latter of which is categorized by 12 linguistic phenomena. We then evaluate the syntactic knowledge of 9 different types of Japanese language models on JCoLA. The results demonstrated that several models could surpass human performance for the in-domain data, while no models were able to exceed human performance for the out-of-domain data. Error analyses by linguistic phenomena further revealed that although neural language models are adept at handling local syntactic dependencies like argument structure, their performance wanes when confronted with long-distance syntactic dependencies like verbal agreement and NPI licensing.

Large language models are increasingly capable of generating fluent-appearing text with relatively little task-specific supervision. But can these models accurately explain classification decisions? We consider the task of generating free-text explanations using human-written examples in a few-shot manner. We find that (1) authoring higher quality prompts results in higher quality generations; and (2) surprisingly, in a head-to-head comparison, crowdworkers often prefer explanations generated by GPT-3 to crowdsourced explanations in existing datasets. Our human studies also show, however, that while models often produce factual, grammatical, and sufficient explanations, they have room to improve along axes such as providing novel information and supporting the label. We create a pipeline that combines GPT-3 with a supervised filter that incorporates binary acceptability judgments from humans in the loop. Despite the intrinsic subjectivity of acceptability judgments, we demonstrate that acceptability is partially correlated with various fine-grained attributes of explanations. Our approach is able to consistently filter GPT-3-generated explanations deemed acceptable by humans.

English Natural Language Understanding (NLU) systems have achieved great performances and even outperformed humans on benchmarks like GLUE and SuperGLUE. However, these benchmarks contain only textbook Standard American English (SAE). Other dialects have been largely overlooked in the NLP community. This leads to biased and inequitable NLU systems that serve only a sub-population of speakers. To understand disparities in current models and to facilitate more dialect-competent NLU systems, we introduce the VernAcular Language Understanding Evaluation (VALUE) benchmark, a challenging variant of GLUE that we created with a set of lexical and morphosyntactic transformation rules. In this initial release (V.1), we construct rules for 11 features of African American Vernacular English (AAVE), and we recruit fluent AAVE speakers to validate each feature transformation via linguistic acceptability judgments in a participatory design manner. Experiments show that these new dialectal features can lead to a drop in model performance. To run the transformation code and download both synthetic and gold-standard dialectal GLUE benchmarks, see https://github.com/SALT-NLP/value

What is appropriateness? Humans navigate a multi-scale mosaic of interlocking notions of what is appropriate for different situations. We act one way with our friends, another with our family, and yet another in the office. Likewise for AI, appropriate behavior for a comedy-writing assistant is not the same as appropriate behavior for a customer-service representative. What determines which actions are appropriate in which contexts? And what causes these standards to change over time? Since all judgments of AI appropriateness are ultimately made by humans, we need to understand how appropriateness guides human decision making in order to properly evaluate AI decision making and improve it. This paper presents a theory of appropriateness: how it functions in human society, how it may be implemented in the brain, and what it means for responsible deployment of generative AI technology.

While dialogue remains an important end-goal of natural language research, the difficulty of evaluation is an oft-quoted reason why it remains troublesome to make real progress towards its solution. Evaluation difficulties are actually two-fold: not only do automatic metrics not correlate well with human judgments, but also human judgments themselves are in fact difficult to measure. The two most used human judgment tests, single-turn pairwise evaluation and multi-turn Likert scores, both have serious flaws as we discuss in this work. We instead provide a novel procedure involving comparing two full dialogues, where a human judge is asked to pay attention to only one speaker within each, and make a pairwise judgment. The questions themselves are optimized to maximize the robustness of judgments across different annotators, resulting in better tests. We also show how these tests work in self-play model chat setups, resulting in faster, cheaper tests. We hope these tests become the de facto standard, and will release open-source code to that end.

Efficient and accurate evaluation is crucial for the continuous improvement of large language models (LLMs). Among various assessment methods, subjective evaluation has garnered significant attention due to its superior alignment with real-world usage scenarios and human preferences. However, human-based evaluations are costly and lack reproducibility, making precise automated evaluators (judgers) vital in this process. In this report, we introduce CompassJudger-1, the first open-source all-in-one judge LLM. CompassJudger-1 is a general-purpose LLM that demonstrates remarkable versatility. It is capable of: 1. Performing unitary scoring and two-model comparisons as a reward model; 2. Conducting evaluations according to specified formats; 3. Generating critiques; 4. Executing diverse tasks like a general LLM. To assess the evaluation capabilities of different judge models under a unified setting, we have also established JudgerBench, a new benchmark that encompasses various subjective evaluation tasks and covers a wide range of topics. CompassJudger-1 offers a comprehensive solution for various evaluation tasks while maintaining the flexibility to adapt to diverse requirements. Both CompassJudger and JudgerBench are released and available to the research community athttps://github.com/open-compass/CompassJudger. We believe that by open-sourcing these tools, we can foster collaboration and accelerate progress in LLM evaluation methodologies.

Human feedback has become the de facto standard for evaluating the performance of Large Language Models, and is increasingly being used as a training objective. However, it is not clear which properties of a generated output this single `preference' score captures. We hypothesise that preference scores are subjective and open to undesirable biases. We critically analyse the use of human feedback for both training and evaluation, to verify whether it fully captures a range of crucial error criteria. We find that while preference scores have fairly good coverage, they under-represent important aspects like factuality. We further hypothesise that both preference scores and error annotation may be affected by confounders, and leverage instruction-tuned models to generate outputs that vary along two possible confounding dimensions: assertiveness and complexity. We find that the assertiveness of an output skews the perceived rate of factuality errors, indicating that human annotations are not a fully reliable evaluation metric or training objective. Finally, we offer preliminary evidence that using human feedback as a training objective disproportionately increases the assertiveness of model outputs. We encourage future work to carefully consider whether preference scores are well aligned with the desired objective.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

Much recent work seeks to evaluate values and opinions in large language models (LLMs) using multiple-choice surveys and questionnaires. Most of this work is motivated by concerns around real-world LLM applications. For example, politically-biased LLMs may subtly influence society when they are used by millions of people. Such real-world concerns, however, stand in stark contrast to the artificiality of current evaluations: real users do not typically ask LLMs survey questions. Motivated by this discrepancy, we challenge the prevailing constrained evaluation paradigm for values and opinions in LLMs and explore more realistic unconstrained evaluations. As a case study, we focus on the popular Political Compass Test (PCT). In a systematic review, we find that most prior work using the PCT forces models to comply with the PCT's multiple-choice format. We show that models give substantively different answers when not forced; that answers change depending on how models are forced; and that answers lack paraphrase robustness. Then, we demonstrate that models give different answers yet again in a more realistic open-ended answer setting. We distill these findings into recommendations and open challenges in evaluating values and opinions in LLMs.

Human preference judgments are pivotal in guiding large language models (LLMs) to produce outputs that align with human values. Human evaluations are also used in summarization tasks to compare outputs from various systems, complementing existing automatic metrics. Despite their significance, however, there has been limited research probing these pairwise or k-wise comparisons. The collective impact and relative importance of factors such as output length, informativeness, fluency, and factual consistency are still not well understood. It is also unclear if there are other hidden factors influencing human judgments. In this paper, we conduct an in-depth examination of a collection of pairwise human judgments released by OpenAI. Utilizing the Bradley-Terry-Luce (BTL) model, we reveal the inherent preferences embedded in these human judgments. We find that the most favored factors vary across tasks and genres, whereas the least favored factors tend to be consistent, e.g., outputs are too brief, contain excessive off-focus content or hallucinated facts. Our findings have implications on the construction of balanced datasets in human preference evaluations, which is a crucial step in shaping the behaviors of future LLMs.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Accurate and consistent evaluation is crucial for decision-making across numerous fields, yet it remains a challenging task due to inherent subjectivity, variability, and scale. Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success across diverse domains, leading to the emergence of "LLM-as-a-Judge," where LLMs are employed as evaluators for complex tasks. With their ability to process diverse data types and provide scalable, cost-effective, and consistent assessments, LLMs present a compelling alternative to traditional expert-driven evaluations. However, ensuring the reliability of LLM-as-a-Judge systems remains a significant challenge that requires careful design and standardization. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of LLM-as-a-Judge, addressing the core question: How can reliable LLM-as-a-Judge systems be built? We explore strategies to enhance reliability, including improving consistency, mitigating biases, and adapting to diverse assessment scenarios. Additionally, we propose methodologies for evaluating the reliability of LLM-as-a-Judge systems, supported by a novel benchmark designed for this purpose. To advance the development and real-world deployment of LLM-as-a-Judge systems, we also discussed practical applications, challenges, and future directions. This survey serves as a foundational reference for researchers and practitioners in this rapidly evolving field.

There is an increasing trend towards evaluating NLP models with LLM-generated judgments instead of human judgments. In the absence of a comparison against human data, this raises concerns about the validity of these evaluations; in case they are conducted with proprietary models, this also raises concerns over reproducibility. We provide JUDGE-BENCH, a collection of 20 NLP datasets with human annotations, and comprehensively evaluate 11 current LLMs, covering both open-weight and proprietary models, for their ability to replicate the annotations. Our evaluations show that each LLM exhibits a large variance across datasets in its correlation to human judgments. We conclude that LLMs are not yet ready to systematically replace human judges in NLP.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

Machine learning models always make a prediction, even when it is likely to be inaccurate. This behavior should be avoided in many decision support applications, where mistakes can have severe consequences. Albeit already studied in 1970, machine learning with rejection recently gained interest. This machine learning subfield enables machine learning models to abstain from making a prediction when likely to make a mistake. This survey aims to provide an overview on machine learning with rejection. We introduce the conditions leading to two types of rejection, ambiguity and novelty rejection, which we carefully formalize. Moreover, we review and categorize strategies to evaluate a model's predictive and rejective quality. Additionally, we define the existing architectures for models with rejection and describe the standard techniques for learning such models. Finally, we provide examples of relevant application domains and show how machine learning with rejection relates to other machine learning research areas.

Recent work has demonstrated the viability of using crowdsourcing as a tool for evaluating the truthfulness of public statements. Under certain conditions such as: (1) having a balanced set of workers with different backgrounds and cognitive abilities; (2) using an adequate set of mechanisms to control the quality of the collected data; and (3) using a coarse grained assessment scale, the crowd can provide reliable identification of fake news. However, fake news are a subtle matter: statements can be just biased ("cherrypicked"), imprecise, wrong, etc. and the unidimensional truth scale used in existing work cannot account for such differences. In this paper we propose a multidimensional notion of truthfulness and we ask the crowd workers to assess seven different dimensions of truthfulness selected based on existing literature: Correctness, Neutrality, Comprehensibility, Precision, Completeness, Speaker's Trustworthiness, and Informativeness. We deploy a set of quality control mechanisms to ensure that the thousands of assessments collected on 180 publicly available fact-checked statements distributed over two datasets are of adequate quality, including a custom search engine used by the crowd workers to find web pages supporting their truthfulness assessments. A comprehensive analysis of crowdsourced judgments shows that: (1) the crowdsourced assessments are reliable when compared to an expert-provided gold standard; (2) the proposed dimensions of truthfulness capture independent pieces of information; (3) the crowdsourcing task can be easily learned by the workers; and (4) the resulting assessments provide a useful basis for a more complete estimation of statement truthfulness.

With the emergence of generative conversational large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT, serving as virtual assistants in various fields, the stability and reliability of their responses have become crucial. However, during usage, it has been observed that these models tend to waver in their judgements when confronted with follow-up questions from users expressing skepticism or disagreement. In this work, we draw inspiration from questioning strategies in education and propose a Follow-up Questioning Mechanism along with two evaluation metrics to assess the judgement consistency of LLMs before and after exposure to disturbances. We evaluate the judgement consistency of ChatGPT, PaLM2-Bison, and Vicuna-13B under this mechanism across eight reasoning benchmarks. Empirical results show that even when the initial answers are correct, judgement consistency sharply decreases when LLMs face disturbances such as questioning, negation, or misleading. Additionally, we study these models' judgement consistency under various settings (sampling temperature and prompts) to validate this issue further, observing the impact of prompt tone and conducting an in-depth error analysis for deeper behavioral insights. Furthermore, we also explore several prompting methods to mitigate this issue and demonstrate their effectiveness\url{https://github.com/NUSTM/LLMs-Waver-In-Judgements}.

One of the most widely used methods to evaluate LLMs are Multiple Choice Question (MCQ) tests. MCQ benchmarks enable the testing of LLM knowledge on almost any topic at scale as the results can be processed automatically. To help the LLM answer, a few examples called few shots can be included in the prompt. Moreover, the LLM can be asked to answer the question directly with the selected option or to first provide the reasoning and then the selected answer, which is known as chain of thought. In addition to checking whether the selected answer is correct, the evaluation can look at the LLM-estimated probability of its response as an indication of the confidence of the LLM in the response. In this paper, we study how the LLM confidence in its answer depends on whether the model has been asked to answer directly or to provide the reasoning before answering. The results of the evaluation of questions on a wide range of topics in seven different models show that LLMs are more confident in their answers when they provide reasoning before the answer. This occurs regardless of whether the selected answer is correct. Our hypothesis is that this behavior is due to the reasoning that modifies the probability of the selected answer, as the LLM predicts the answer based on the input question and the reasoning that supports the selection made. Therefore, LLM estimated probabilities seem to have intrinsic limitations that should be understood in order to use them in evaluation procedures. Interestingly, the same behavior has been observed in humans, for whom explaining an answer increases confidence in its correctness.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Large language models (LLMs) and small language models (SLMs) are being adopted at remarkable speed, although their safety still remains a serious concern. With the advent of multilingual S/LLMs, the question now becomes a matter of scale: can we expand multilingual safety evaluations of these models with the same velocity at which they are deployed? To this end we introduce RTP-LX, a human-transcreated and human-annotated corpus of toxic prompts and outputs in 28 languages. RTP-LX follows participatory design practices, and a portion of the corpus is especially designed to detect culturally-specific toxic language. We evaluate seven S/LLMs on their ability to detect toxic content in a culturally-sensitive, multilingual scenario. We find that, although they typically score acceptably in terms of accuracy, they have low agreement with human judges when judging holistically the toxicity of a prompt, and have difficulty discerning harm in context-dependent scenarios, particularly with subtle-yet-harmful content (e.g. microagressions, bias). We release of this dataset to contribute to further reduce harmful uses of these models and improve their safe deployment.

Researchers and developers increasingly rely on toxicity scoring to moderate generative language model outputs, in settings such as customer service, information retrieval, and content generation. However, toxicity scoring may render pertinent information inaccessible, rigidify or "value-lock" cultural norms, and prevent language reclamation processes, particularly for marginalized people. In this work, we extend the concept of algorithmic recourse to generative language models: we provide users a novel mechanism to achieve their desired prediction by dynamically setting thresholds for toxicity filtering. Users thereby exercise increased agency relative to interactions with the baseline system. A pilot study (n = 30) supports the potential of our proposed recourse mechanism, indicating improvements in usability compared to fixed-threshold toxicity-filtering of model outputs. Future work should explore the intersection of toxicity scoring, model controllability, user agency, and language reclamation processes -- particularly with regard to the bias that many communities encounter when interacting with generative language models.

When asked, current large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT claim that they can assist us with relevance judgments. Many researchers think this would not lead to credible IR research. In this perspective paper, we discuss possible ways for LLMs to assist human experts along with concerns and issues that arise. We devise a human-machine collaboration spectrum that allows categorizing different relevance judgment strategies, based on how much the human relies on the machine. For the extreme point of "fully automated assessment", we further include a pilot experiment on whether LLM-based relevance judgments correlate with judgments from trained human assessors. We conclude the paper by providing two opposing perspectives - for and against the use of LLMs for automatic relevance judgments - and a compromise perspective, informed by our analyses of the literature, our preliminary experimental evidence, and our experience as IR researchers. We hope to start a constructive discussion within the community to avoid a stale-mate during review, where work is dammed if is uses LLMs for evaluation and dammed if it doesn't.

LLM-as-a-Judge leverages the generative and reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) to evaluate LLM responses across diverse scenarios, providing accurate preference signals. This approach plays a vital role in aligning LLMs with human values, ensuring ethical and reliable AI outputs that align with societal norms. Recent studies have raised many methods to train LLM as generative judges, but most of them are data consuming or lack accuracy, and only focus on LLM's judge ability. In this work, we regard judge ability as a general ability of LLM and implement a two-stage training approach, comprising supervised fine-tuning (SFT) warm-up and direct preference optimization (DPO) enhancement, to achieve judge style adaptation and improve judgment accuracy. Additionally, we introduce an efficient data synthesis method to generate judgmental content. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach, utilizing only about 2% to 40% of the data required by other methods, achieves SOTA performance on RewardBench. Furthermore, our training method enhances the general capabilities of the model by constructing complicated judge task, and the judge signals provided by our model have significantly enhanced the downstream DPO training performance of our internal models in our test to optimize policy model with Judge Model. We also open-source our model weights and training data to facilitate further research.

The impressive performance of large language models (LLMs) has attracted considerable attention from the academic and industrial communities. Besides how to construct and train LLMs, how to effectively evaluate and compare the capacity of LLMs has also been well recognized as an important yet difficult problem. Existing paradigms rely on either human annotators or model-based evaluators to evaluate the performance of LLMs on different tasks. However, these paradigms often suffer from high cost, low generalizability, and inherited biases in practice, which make them incapable of supporting the sustainable development of LLMs in long term. In order to address these issues, inspired by the peer review systems widely used in academic publication process, we propose a novel framework that can automatically evaluate LLMs through a peer-review process. Specifically, for the evaluation of a specific task, we first construct a small qualification exam to select "reviewers" from a couple of powerful LLMs. Then, to actually evaluate the "submissions" written by different candidate LLMs, i.e., the evaluatees, we use the reviewer LLMs to rate or compare the submissions. The final ranking of evaluatee LLMs is generated based on the results provided by all reviewers. We conducted extensive experiments on text summarization tasks with eleven LLMs including GPT-4. The results demonstrate the existence of biasness when evaluating using a single LLM. Also, our PRE model outperforms all the baselines, illustrating the effectiveness of the peer review mechanism.

In AI-assisted decision-making, humans often passively review AI's suggestion and decide whether to accept or reject it as a whole. In such a paradigm, humans are found to rarely trigger analytical thinking and face difficulties in communicating the nuances of conflicting opinions to the AI when disagreements occur. To tackle this challenge, we propose Human-AI Deliberation, a novel framework to promote human reflection and discussion on conflicting human-AI opinions in decision-making. Based on theories in human deliberation, this framework engages humans and AI in dimension-level opinion elicitation, deliberative discussion, and decision updates. To empower AI with deliberative capabilities, we designed Deliberative AI, which leverages large language models (LLMs) as a bridge between humans and domain-specific models to enable flexible conversational interactions and faithful information provision. An exploratory evaluation on a graduate admissions task shows that Deliberative AI outperforms conventional explainable AI (XAI) assistants in improving humans' appropriate reliance and task performance. Based on a mixed-methods analysis of participant behavior, perception, user experience, and open-ended feedback, we draw implications for future AI-assisted decision tool design.

Auto-evaluation is crucial for assessing response quality and offering feedback for model development. Recent studies have explored training large language models (LLMs) as generative judges to evaluate and critique other models' outputs. In this work, we investigate the idea of learning from both positive and negative data with preference optimization to enhance the evaluation capabilities of LLM judges across an array of different use cases. We achieve this by employing three approaches to collect the preference pairs for different use cases, each aimed at improving our generative judge from a different perspective. Our comprehensive study over a wide range of benchmarks demonstrates the effectiveness of our method. In particular, our generative judge achieves the best performance on 10 out of 13 benchmarks, outperforming strong baselines like GPT-4o and specialized judge models. Further analysis show that our judge model robustly counters inherent biases such as position and length bias, flexibly adapts to any evaluation protocol specified by practitioners, and provides helpful language feedback for improving downstream generator models.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Recently, there has been a growing trend of utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) to evaluate the quality of other LLMs. Many studies have employed proprietary close-source models, especially GPT4, as the evaluator. Alternatively, other works have fine-tuned judge models based on open-source LLMs as the evaluator. In this study, we conduct an empirical study of different judge models on their evaluation capability. Our findings indicate that although the fine-tuned judge models achieve high accuracy on in-domain test sets, even surpassing GPT4, they are inherently task-specific classifiers, and their generalizability and fairness severely underperform GPT4.

AI powered code-recommendation systems, such as Copilot and CodeWhisperer, provide code suggestions inside a programmer's environment (e.g., an IDE) with the aim to improve their productivity. Since, in these scenarios, programmers accept and reject suggestions, ideally, such a system should use this feedback in furtherance of this goal. In this work, we leverage prior data of programmers interacting with GitHub Copilot, a system used by millions of programmers, to develop interventions that can save programmer time. We propose a utility theory framework, which models this interaction with programmers and decides which suggestions to display. Our framework Conditional suggestion Display from Human Feedback (CDHF), relies on a cascade of models that predict suggestion acceptance to selectively hide suggestions reducing both latency and programmer verification time. Using data from 535 programmers, we perform a retrospective evaluation of CDHF and show that we can avoid displaying a significant fraction of suggestions that would have been rejected doing so without total knowledge of the suggestions themselves. We further demonstrate the importance of incorporating the programmer's latent unobserved state in deciding when to display suggestions through ablations on user study data. Finally, we showcase that using suggestion acceptance as a reward signal to know which suggestions to display leads to reduced quality suggestions indicating an unexpected pitfall.

In this position paper, we argue that human evaluation of generative large language models (LLMs) should be a multidisciplinary undertaking that draws upon insights from disciplines such as user experience research and human behavioral psychology to ensure that the experimental design and results are reliable. The conclusions from these evaluations, thus, must consider factors such as usability, aesthetics, and cognitive biases. We highlight how cognitive biases can conflate fluent information and truthfulness, and how cognitive uncertainty affects the reliability of rating scores such as Likert. Furthermore, the evaluation should differentiate the capabilities and weaknesses of increasingly powerful large language models -- which requires effective test sets. The scalability of human evaluation is also crucial to wider adoption. Hence, to design an effective human evaluation system in the age of generative NLP, we propose the ConSiDERS-The-Human evaluation framework consisting of 6 pillars -- Consistency, Scoring Criteria, Differentiating, User Experience, Responsible, and Scalability.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Self-evaluation using large language models (LLMs) has proven valuable not only in benchmarking but also methods like reward modeling, constitutional AI, and self-refinement. But new biases are introduced due to the same LLM acting as both the evaluator and the evaluatee. One such bias is self-preference, where an LLM evaluator scores its own outputs higher than others' while human annotators consider them of equal quality. But do LLMs actually recognize their own outputs when they give those texts higher scores, or is it just a coincidence? In this paper, we investigate if self-recognition capability contributes to self-preference. We discover that, out of the box, LLMs such as GPT-4 and Llama 2 have non-trivial accuracy at distinguishing themselves from other LLMs and humans. By fine-tuning LLMs, we discover a linear correlation between self-recognition capability and the strength of self-preference bias; using controlled experiments, we show that the causal explanation resists straightforward confounders. We discuss how self-recognition can interfere with unbiased evaluations and AI safety more generally.

The rise of large language models (LLMs) has brought a critical need for high-quality human-labeled data, particularly for processes like human feedback and evaluation. A common practice is to label data via consensus annotation over crowdworker judgments. However, annotators' judgments for subjective tasks can differ in many ways: they may have different qualitative judgments about an example, and they may map those to a labeling scheme in different ways. We show that these nuances can be captured by natural language explanations, and propose a method to rescale ordinal annotations and explanations using LLMs. Specifically, we feed annotators' Likert ratings and corresponding explanations into an LLM and prompt it to produce a numeric score anchored in a scoring rubric. These scores should reflect the annotators' underlying assessments of the example. The rubric can be designed or modified after annotation, and include distinctions that may not have been known when the original error taxonomy was devised. We explore our technique in the context of rating system outputs for a document-grounded question answering task, where LLMs achieve near-human performance. Our method rescales the raw judgments without impacting agreement and brings the scores closer to human judgments grounded in the same scoring rubric.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have gained significant attention recently, showing remarkable potential in artificial general intelligence. However, assessing the utility of MLLMs presents considerable challenges, primarily due to the absence of multimodal benchmarks that align with human preferences. Drawing inspiration from the concept of LLM-as-a-Judge within LLMs, this paper introduces a novel benchmark, termed MLLM-as-a-Judge, to assess the ability of MLLMs in assisting judges across diverse modalities, encompassing three distinct tasks: Scoring Evaluation, Pair Comparison, and Batch Ranking. Our study reveals that, while MLLMs demonstrate remarkable human-like discernment in Pair Comparison, there is a significant divergence from human preferences in Scoring Evaluation and Batch Ranking. Furthermore, a closer examination reveals persistent challenges in the judgment capacities of LLMs, including diverse biases, hallucinatory responses, and inconsistencies in judgment, even in advanced models such as GPT-4V. These findings emphasize the pressing need for enhancements and further research efforts to be undertaken before regarding MLLMs as fully reliable evaluators. In light of this, we advocate for additional efforts dedicated to supporting the continuous development within the domain of MLLM functioning as judges. The code and dataset are publicly available at our project homepage: https://mllm-judge.github.io/.

Critique ability, a meta-cognitive capability of humans, presents significant challenges for LLMs to improve. Recent works primarily rely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) using critiques generated by a single LLM like GPT-4. However, these model-generated critiques often exhibit flaws due to the inherent complexity of the critique. Consequently, fine-tuning LLMs on such flawed critiques typically limits the model's performance and propagates these flaws into the learned model. To overcome these challenges, this paper proposes a novel data generation pipeline, named MultiCritique, that improves the critique ability of LLMs by utilizing multi-agent feedback in both the SFT and reinforcement learning (RL) stages. First, our data generation pipeline aggregates high-quality critiques from multiple agents instead of a single model, with crucial information as input for simplifying the critique. Furthermore, our pipeline improves the preference accuracy of critique quality through multi-agent feedback, facilitating the effectiveness of RL in improving the critique ability of LLMs. Based on our proposed MultiCritique data generation pipeline, we construct the MultiCritiqueDataset for the SFT and RL fine-tuning stages. Extensive experimental results on two benchmarks demonstrate: 1) the superior quality of our constructed SFT dataset compared to existing critique datasets; 2) additional improvements to the critique ability of LLMs brought by the RL stage. Notably, our fine-tuned 7B model significantly surpasses other advanced 7B-13B open-source models, approaching the performance of advanced 70B LLMs and GPT-4. Codes, datasets and model weights will be publicly available.

We introduce CheckEval, a novel evaluation framework using Large Language Models, addressing the challenges of ambiguity and inconsistency in current evaluation methods. CheckEval addresses these challenges by dividing evaluation criteria into detailed sub-aspects and constructing a checklist of Boolean questions for each, simplifying the evaluation. This approach not only renders the process more interpretable but also significantly enhances the robustness and reliability of results by focusing on specific evaluation dimensions. Validated through a focused case study using the SummEval benchmark, CheckEval indicates a strong correlation with human judgments. Furthermore, it demonstrates a highly consistent Inter-Annotator Agreement. These findings highlight the effectiveness of CheckEval for objective, flexible, and precise evaluations. By offering a customizable and interactive framework, CheckEval sets a new standard for the use of LLMs in evaluation, responding to the evolving needs of the field and establishing a clear method for future LLM-based evaluation.

Legal judgment prediction is the task of automatically predicting the outcome of a court case, given a text describing the case's facts. Previous work on using neural models for this task has focused on Chinese; only feature-based models (e.g., using bags of words and topics) have been considered in English. We release a new English legal judgment prediction dataset, containing cases from the European Court of Human Rights. We evaluate a broad variety of neural models on the new dataset, establishing strong baselines that surpass previous feature-based models in three tasks: (1) binary violation classification; (2) multi-label classification; (3) case importance prediction. We also explore if models are biased towards demographic information via data anonymization. As a side-product, we propose a hierarchical version of BERT, which bypasses BERT's length limitation.

LLM-based judges have emerged as a scalable alternative to human evaluation and are increasingly used to assess, compare, and improve models. However, the reliability of LLM-based judges themselves is rarely scrutinized. As LLMs become more advanced, their responses grow more sophisticated, requiring stronger judges to evaluate them. Existing benchmarks primarily focus on a judge's alignment with human preferences, but often fail to account for more challenging tasks where crowdsourced human preference is a poor indicator of factual and logical correctness. To address this, we propose a novel evaluation framework to objectively evaluate LLM-based judges. Based on this framework, we propose JudgeBench, a benchmark for evaluating LLM-based judges on challenging response pairs spanning knowledge, reasoning, math, and coding. JudgeBench leverages a novel pipeline for converting existing difficult datasets into challenging response pairs with preference labels reflecting objective correctness. Our comprehensive evaluation on a collection of prompted judges, fine-tuned judges, multi-agent judges, and reward models shows that JudgeBench poses a significantly greater challenge than previous benchmarks, with many strong models (e.g., GPT-4o) performing just slightly better than random guessing. Overall, JudgeBench offers a reliable platform for assessing increasingly advanced LLM-based judges. Data and code are available at https://github.com/ScalerLab/JudgeBench .

Algorithmic approaches to interpreting machine learning models have proliferated in recent years. We carry out human subject tests that are the first of their kind to isolate the effect of algorithmic explanations on a key aspect of model interpretability, simulatability, while avoiding important confounding experimental factors. A model is simulatable when a person can predict its behavior on new inputs. Through two kinds of simulation tests involving text and tabular data, we evaluate five explanations methods: (1) LIME, (2) Anchor, (3) Decision Boundary, (4) a Prototype model, and (5) a Composite approach that combines explanations from each method. Clear evidence of method effectiveness is found in very few cases: LIME improves simulatability in tabular classification, and our Prototype method is effective in counterfactual simulation tests. We also collect subjective ratings of explanations, but we do not find that ratings are predictive of how helpful explanations are. Our results provide the first reliable and comprehensive estimates of how explanations influence simulatability across a variety of explanation methods and data domains. We show that (1) we need to be careful about the metrics we use to evaluate explanation methods, and (2) there is significant room for improvement in current methods. All our supporting code, data, and models are publicly available at: https://github.com/peterbhase/InterpretableNLP-ACL2020

Language model users often issue queries that lack specification, where the context under which a query was issued -- such as the user's identity, the query's intent, and the criteria for a response to be useful -- is not explicit. For instance, a good response to a subjective query like "What book should I read next?" would depend on the user's preferences, and a good response to an open-ended query like "How do antibiotics work against bacteria?" would depend on the user's expertise. This makes evaluation of responses to such queries an ill-posed task, as evaluators may make arbitrary judgments about the response quality. To remedy this, we present contextualized evaluations, a protocol that synthetically constructs context surrounding an underspecified query and provides it during evaluation. We find that the presence of context can 1) alter conclusions drawn from evaluation, even flipping win rates between model pairs, 2) nudge evaluators to make fewer judgments based on surface-level criteria, like style, and 3) provide new insights about model behavior across diverse contexts. Specifically, our procedure uncovers an implicit bias towards WEIRD contexts in models' "default" responses and we find that models are not equally sensitive to following different contexts, even when they are provided in prompts.

Human evaluation is critical for validating the performance of text-to-image generative models, as this highly cognitive process requires deep comprehension of text and images. However, our survey of 37 recent papers reveals that many works rely solely on automatic measures (e.g., FID) or perform poorly described human evaluations that are not reliable or repeatable. This paper proposes a standardized and well-defined human evaluation protocol to facilitate verifiable and reproducible human evaluation in future works. In our pilot data collection, we experimentally show that the current automatic measures are incompatible with human perception in evaluating the performance of the text-to-image generation results. Furthermore, we provide insights for designing human evaluation experiments reliably and conclusively. Finally, we make several resources publicly available to the community to facilitate easy and fast implementations.

ARC Challenge appears more difficult than ARC Easy for modern LLMs primarily due to an evaluation setup that prevents direct comparison of answer choices rather than inherent complexity. Although some researchers have quietly shifted to a more appropriate scheme over the last year, the implications of this change have yet to be widely acknowledged. We highlight this overlooked shift, show how similar evaluation practices falsely imply reasoning deficits in other benchmarks, and demonstrate that fairer methods dramatically reduce performance gaps (e.g. on SIQA) and even yield superhuman results (OpenBookQA). In doing so, we reveal how evaluation shapes perceived difficulty and offer guidelines to ensure that multiple-choice evaluations accurately reflect actual model capabilities.

Despite tremendous advancements in dialogue systems, stable evaluation still requires human judgments producing notoriously high-variance metrics due to their inherent subjectivity. Moreover, methods and labels in dialogue evaluation are not fully standardized, especially for open-domain chats, with a lack of work to compare and assess the validity of those approaches. The use of inconsistent evaluation can misinform the performance of a dialogue system, which becomes a major hurdle to enhance it. Thus, a dimensional evaluation of chat-oriented open-domain dialogue systems that reliably measures several aspects of dialogue capabilities is desired. This paper presents a novel human evaluation method to estimate the rates of many dialogue system behaviors. Our method is used to evaluate four state-of-the-art open-domain dialogue systems and compared with existing approaches. The analysis demonstrates that our behavior method is more suitable than alternative Likert-style or comparative approaches for dimensional evaluation of these systems.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

Rapid advancements in large language models have unlocked remarkable capabilities when it comes to processing and summarizing unstructured text data. This has implications for the analysis of rich, open-ended datasets, such as survey responses, where LLMs hold the promise of efficiently distilling key themes and sentiments. However, as organizations increasingly turn to these powerful AI systems to make sense of textual feedback, a critical question arises, can we trust LLMs to accurately represent the perspectives contained within these text based datasets? While LLMs excel at generating human-like summaries, there is a risk that their outputs may inadvertently diverge from the true substance of the original responses. Discrepancies between the LLM-generated outputs and the actual themes present in the data could lead to flawed decision-making, with far-reaching consequences for organizations. This research investigates the effectiveness of LLMs as judge models to evaluate the thematic alignment of summaries generated by other LLMs. We utilized an Anthropic Claude model to generate thematic summaries from open-ended survey responses, with Amazon's Titan Express, Nova Pro, and Meta's Llama serving as LLM judges. The LLM-as-judge approach was compared to human evaluations using Cohen's kappa, Spearman's rho, and Krippendorff's alpha, validating a scalable alternative to traditional human centric evaluation methods. Our findings reveal that while LLMs as judges offer a scalable solution comparable to human raters, humans may still excel at detecting subtle, context-specific nuances. This research contributes to the growing body of knowledge on AI assisted text analysis. We discuss limitations and provide recommendations for future research, emphasizing the need for careful consideration when generalizing LLM judge models across various contexts and use cases.

There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.

This study investigates the consistency of feedback ratings generated by OpenAI's GPT-4, a state-of-the-art artificial intelligence language model, across multiple iterations, time spans and stylistic variations. The model rated responses to tasks within the Higher Education (HE) subject domain of macroeconomics in terms of their content and style. Statistical analysis was conducted in order to learn more about the interrater reliability, consistency of the ratings across iterations and the correlation between ratings in terms of content and style. The results revealed a high interrater reliability with ICC scores ranging between 0.94 and 0.99 for different timespans, suggesting that GPT-4 is capable of generating consistent ratings across repetitions with a clear prompt. Style and content ratings show a high correlation of 0.87. When applying a non-adequate style the average content ratings remained constant, while style ratings decreased, which indicates that the large language model (LLM) effectively distinguishes between these two criteria during evaluation. The prompt used in this study is furthermore presented and explained. Further research is necessary to assess the robustness and reliability of AI models in various use cases.

In Natural Language Processing (NLP), the Elo rating system, originally designed for ranking players in dynamic games such as chess, is increasingly being used to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) through "A vs B" paired comparisons. However, while popular, the system's suitability for assessing entities with constant skill levels, such as LLMs, remains relatively unexplored. We study two fundamental axioms that evaluation methods should adhere to: reliability and transitivity. We conduct extensive evaluation of Elo behaviour, illustrating that individual Elo computations exhibit volatility and delving into the impact of varying the Elo rating system's hyperparameters. We show that these axioms are not always satisfied raising questions about the reliability of current comparative evaluations of LLMs. If the current use of Elo scores is intended to substitute the costly head-to-head comparison of LLMs, it is crucial to ensure the ranking is as robust as possible. Guided by the axioms, our findings offer concrete guidelines for enhancing the reliability of LLM evaluation methods, suggesting a need for reassessment of existing comparative approaches.

Disagreements are common in online discussions. Disagreement may foster collaboration and improve the quality of a discussion under some conditions. Although there exist methods for recognizing disagreement, a deeper understanding of factors that influence disagreement is lacking in the literature. We investigate a hypothesis that differences in personal values are indicative of disagreement in online discussions. We show how state-of-the-art models can be used for estimating values in online discussions and how the estimated values can be aggregated into value profiles. We evaluate the estimated value profiles based on human-annotated agreement labels. We find that the dissimilarity of value profiles correlates with disagreement in specific cases. We also find that including value information in agreement prediction improves performance.

Evaluating free-text explanations is a multifaceted, subjective, and labor-intensive task. Large language models (LLMs) present an appealing alternative due to their potential for consistency, scalability, and cost-efficiency. In this work, we present ACORN, a new dataset of 3,500 free-text explanations and aspect-wise quality ratings, and use it to gain insights into how LLMs evaluate explanations. We observed that replacing one of the human ratings sometimes maintained, but more often lowered the inter-annotator agreement across different settings and quality aspects, suggesting that their judgments are not always consistent with human raters. We further quantified this difference by comparing the correlation between LLM-generated ratings with majority-voted human ratings across different quality aspects. With the best system, Spearman's rank correlation ranged between 0.53 to 0.95, averaging 0.72 across aspects, indicating moderately high but imperfect alignment. Finally, we considered the alternative of using an LLM as an additional rater when human raters are scarce, and measured the correlation between majority-voted labels with a limited human pool and LLMs as an additional rater, compared to the original gold labels. While GPT-4 improved the outcome when there were only two human raters, in all other observed cases, LLMs were neutral to detrimental when there were three or more human raters. We publicly release the dataset to support future improvements in LLM-in-the-loop evaluation here: https://github.com/a-brassard/ACORN.

Critical thinking is essential for rational decision-making and problem-solving. This skill hinges on the ability to provide precise and reasoned critiques and is a hallmark of human intelligence. In the era of large language models (LLMs), this study explores the ability of LLMs to deliver accurate critiques across various tasks. We are interested in this topic as a capable critic model could not only serve as a reliable evaluator, but also as a source of supervised signals for model tuning. Particularly, if a model can self-critique, it has the potential for autonomous self-improvement. To examine this, we introduce a unified evaluation framework for assessing the critique abilities of LLMs. We develop a benchmark called CriticBench, which comprises 3K high-quality natural language queries and corresponding model responses; and annotate the correctness of these responses. The benchmark cover tasks such as math problem-solving, code completion, and question answering. We evaluate multiple LLMs on the collected dataset and our analysis reveals several noteworthy insights: (1) Critique is generally challenging for most LLMs, and this capability often emerges only when models are sufficiently large. (2) In particular, self-critique is especially difficult. Even top-performing LLMs struggle to achieve satisfactory performance. (3) Models tend to have lower critique accuracy on problems where they are most uncertain. To this end, we introduce a simple yet effective baseline named self-check, which leverages self-critique to improve task performance for various models. We hope this study serves as an initial exploration into understanding the critique abilities of LLMs, and aims to inform future research, including the development of more proficient critic models and the application of critiques across diverse tasks.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

Due to the cumbersome nature of human evaluation and limitations of code-based evaluation, Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used to assist humans in evaluating LLM outputs. Yet LLM-generated evaluators simply inherit all the problems of the LLMs they evaluate, requiring further human validation. We present a mixed-initiative approach to ``validate the validators'' -- aligning LLM-generated evaluation functions (be it prompts or code) with human requirements. Our interface, EvalGen, provides automated assistance to users in generating evaluation criteria and implementing assertions. While generating candidate implementations (Python functions, LLM grader prompts), EvalGen asks humans to grade a subset of LLM outputs; this feedback is used to select implementations that better align with user grades. A qualitative study finds overall support for EvalGen but underscores the subjectivity and iterative process of alignment. In particular, we identify a phenomenon we dub criteria drift: users need criteria to grade outputs, but grading outputs helps users define criteria. What is more, some criteria appears dependent on the specific LLM outputs observed (rather than independent criteria that can be defined a priori), raising serious questions for approaches that assume the independence of evaluation from observation of model outputs. We present our interface and implementation details, a comparison of our algorithm with a baseline approach, and implications for the design of future LLM evaluation assistants.

Is explainability a false promise? This debate has emerged from the insufficient evidence that explanations aid people in situations they are introduced for. More human-centered, application-grounded evaluations of explanations are needed to settle this. Yet, with no established guidelines for such studies in NLP, researchers accustomed to standardized proxy evaluations must discover appropriate measurements, tasks, datasets, and sensible models for human-AI teams in their studies. To help with this, we first review fitting existing metrics. We then establish requirements for datasets to be suitable for application-grounded evaluations. Among over 50 datasets available for explainability research in NLP, we find that 4 meet our criteria. By finetuning Flan-T5-3B, we demonstrate the importance of reassessing the state of the art to form and study human-AI teams. Finally, we present the exemplar studies of human-AI decision-making for one of the identified suitable tasks -- verifying the correctness of a legal claim given a contract.

Given the rapid progress of generative AI, there is a pressing need to systematically compare and choose between the numerous models and configurations available. The scale and versatility of such evaluations make the use of LLM-based judges a compelling solution for this challenge. Crucially, this approach requires first to validate the quality of the LLM judge itself. Previous work has focused on instance-based assessment of LLM judges, where a judge is evaluated over a set of responses, or response pairs, while being agnostic to their source systems. We argue that this setting overlooks critical factors affecting system-level ranking, such as a judge's positive or negative bias towards certain systems. To address this gap, we conduct the first large-scale study of LLM judges as system rankers. System scores are generated by aggregating judgment scores over multiple system outputs, and the judge's quality is assessed by comparing the resulting system ranking to a human-based ranking. Beyond overall judge assessment, our analysis provides a fine-grained characterization of judge behavior, including their decisiveness and bias.

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

Artificial intelligence is seen as increasingly important, and potentially profoundly so, but the fields of AI ethics and AI engineering have not fully recognized that these technologies, including large language models (LLMs), will have massive impacts on animals. We argue that this impact matters, because animals matter morally. As a first experiment in evaluating animal consideration in LLMs, we constructed a proof-of-concept Evaluation System, which assesses LLM responses and biases from multiple perspectives. This system evaluates LLM outputs by two criteria: their truthfulness, and the degree of consideration they give to the interests of animals. We tested OpenAI ChatGPT 4 and Anthropic Claude 2.1 using a set of structured queries and predefined normative perspectives. Preliminary results suggest that the outcomes of the tested models can be benchmarked regarding the consideration they give to animals, and that generated positions and biases might be addressed and mitigated with more developed and validated systems. Our research contributes one possible approach to integrating animal ethics in AI, opening pathways for future studies and practical applications in various fields, including education, public policy, and regulation, that involve or relate to animals and society. Overall, this study serves as a step towards more useful and responsible AI systems that better recognize and respect the vital interests and perspectives of all sentient beings.

Proprietary LMs such as GPT-4 are often employed to assess the quality of responses from various LMs. However, concerns including transparency, controllability, and affordability strongly motivate the development of open-source LMs specialized in evaluations. On the other hand, existing open evaluator LMs exhibit critical shortcomings: 1) they issue scores that significantly diverge from those assigned by humans, and 2) they lack the flexibility to perform both direct assessment and pairwise ranking, the two most prevalent forms of assessment. Additionally, they do not possess the ability to evaluate based on custom evaluation criteria, focusing instead on general attributes like helpfulness and harmlessness. To address these issues, we introduce Prometheus 2, a more powerful evaluator LM than its predecessor that closely mirrors human and GPT-4 judgements. Moreover, it is capable of processing both direct assessment and pair-wise ranking formats grouped with a user-defined evaluation criteria. On four direct assessment benchmarks and four pairwise ranking benchmarks, Prometheus 2 scores the highest correlation and agreement with humans and proprietary LM judges among all tested open evaluator LMs. Our models, code, and data are all publicly available at https://github.com/prometheus-eval/prometheus-eval.

We present SimpleQA, a benchmark that evaluates the ability of language models to answer short, fact-seeking questions. We prioritized two properties in designing this eval. First, SimpleQA is challenging, as it is adversarially collected against GPT-4 responses. Second, responses are easy to grade, because questions are created such that there exists only a single, indisputable answer. Each answer in SimpleQA is graded as either correct, incorrect, or not attempted. A model with ideal behavior would get as many questions correct as possible while not attempting the questions for which it is not confident it knows the correct answer. SimpleQA is a simple, targeted evaluation for whether models "know what they know," and our hope is that this benchmark will remain relevant for the next few generations of frontier models. SimpleQA can be found at https://github.com/openai/simple-evals.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Context is everything, even in commonsense moral reasoning. Changing contexts can flip the moral judgment of an action; "Lying to a friend" is wrong in general, but may be morally acceptable if it is intended to protect their life. We present ClarifyDelphi, an interactive system that learns to ask clarification questions (e.g., why did you lie to your friend?) in order to elicit additional salient contexts of a social or moral situation. We posit that questions whose potential answers lead to diverging moral judgments are the most informative. Thus, we propose a reinforcement learning framework with a defeasibility reward that aims to maximize the divergence between moral judgments of hypothetical answers to a question. Human evaluation demonstrates that our system generates more relevant, informative and defeasible questions compared to competitive baselines. Our work is ultimately inspired by studies in cognitive science that have investigated the flexibility in moral cognition (i.e., the diverse contexts in which moral rules can be bent), and we hope that research in this direction can assist both cognitive and computational investigations of moral judgments.

In critical applications, it is vital for classifiers to defer decision-making to humans. We propose a post-hoc method that makes existing classifiers selectively abstain from predicting certain samples. Our abstaining classifier is incentivized to maintain the original accuracy for each sub-population (i.e. no harm) while achieving a set of group fairness definitions to a user specified degree. To this end, we design an Integer Programming (IP) procedure that assigns abstention decisions for each training sample to satisfy a set of constraints. To generalize the abstaining decisions to test samples, we then train a surrogate model to learn the abstaining decisions based on the IP solutions in an end-to-end manner. We analyze the feasibility of the IP procedure to determine the possible abstention rate for different levels of unfairness tolerance and accuracy constraint for achieving no harm. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to identify the theoretical relationships between the constraint parameters and the required abstention rate. Our theoretical results are important since a high abstention rate is often infeasible in practice due to a lack of human resources. Our framework outperforms existing methods in terms of fairness disparity without sacrificing accuracy at similar abstention rates.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) necessitates robust and challenging benchmarks. Leaderboards like Chatbot Arena rank LLMs based on how well their responses align with human preferences. However, many tasks such as those related to emotional intelligence, creative writing, or persuasiveness, are highly subjective and often lack majoritarian human agreement. Judges may have irreconcilable disagreements about what constitutes a better response. To address the challenge of ranking LLMs on highly subjective tasks, we propose a novel benchmarking framework, the Language Model Council (LMC). The LMC operates through a democratic process to: 1) formulate a test set through equal participation, 2) administer the test among council members, and 3) evaluate responses as a collective jury. We deploy a council of 20 newest LLMs on an open-ended emotional intelligence task: responding to interpersonal dilemmas. Our results show that the LMC produces rankings that are more separable, robust, and less biased than those from any individual LLM judge, and is more consistent with a human-established leaderboard compared to other benchmarks.

As AI capabilities increasingly surpass human proficiency in complex tasks, current alignment techniques including SFT and RLHF face fundamental challenges in ensuring reliable oversight. These methods rely on direct human assessment and become untenable when AI outputs exceed human cognitive thresholds. In response to this challenge, we explore two hypotheses: (1) critique of critique can be easier than critique itself, extending the widely-accepted observation that verification is easier than generation to the critique domain, as critique itself is a specialized form of generation; (2) this difficulty relationship is recursively held, suggesting that when direct evaluation is infeasible, performing high-order critiques (e.g., critique of critique of critique) offers a more tractable supervision pathway. To examine these hypotheses, we perform Human-Human, Human-AI, and AI-AI experiments across multiple tasks. Our results demonstrate encouraging evidence supporting these hypotheses and suggest that recursive self-critiquing is a promising direction for scalable oversight.

The critique capacity of Large Language Models (LLMs) is essential for reasoning abilities, which can provide necessary suggestions (e.g., detailed analysis and constructive feedback). Therefore, how to evaluate the critique capacity of LLMs has drawn great attention and several critique benchmarks have been proposed. However, existing critique benchmarks usually have the following limitations: (1). Focusing on diverse reasoning tasks in general domains and insufficient evaluation on code tasks (e.g., only covering code generation task), where the difficulty of queries is relatively easy (e.g., the code queries of CriticBench are from Humaneval and MBPP). (2). Lacking comprehensive evaluation from different dimensions. To address these limitations, we introduce a holistic code critique benchmark for LLMs called CodeCriticBench. Specifically, our CodeCriticBench includes two mainstream code tasks (i.e., code generation and code QA) with different difficulties. Besides, the evaluation protocols include basic critique evaluation and advanced critique evaluation for different characteristics, where fine-grained evaluation checklists are well-designed for advanced settings. Finally, we conduct extensive experimental results of existing LLMs, which show the effectiveness of CodeCriticBench.

Readability assessment is the task of evaluating the reading difficulty of a given piece of text. Although research on computational approaches to readability assessment is now two decades old, there is not much work on synthesizing this research. This article is a brief survey of contemporary research on developing computational models for readability assessment. We identify the common approaches, discuss their shortcomings, and identify some challenges for the future. Where possible, we also connect computational research with insights from related work in other disciplines such as education and psychology.

LLM-as-a-Judge is a framework that uses an LLM (large language model) to evaluate the quality of natural language text - typically text that is also generated by an LLM. This framework holds great promise due to its relative low-cost, ease of use, and strong correlations with human stylistic preferences. However, LLM Judges have been shown to exhibit biases that can distort their judgments. We evaluate how well LLM Judges can grade whether a given response to a conversational question is correct, an ability crucial to soundly estimating the overall response quality. To do so, we create and publicly release a human-annotated dataset with labels of correctness for 1,200 LLM responses. We source questions from a combination of existing datasets and a novel, challenging benchmark (BFF-Bench) created for this analysis. We demonstrate a strong connection between an LLM's ability to correctly answer a question and grade responses to that question. Although aggregate level statistics might imply a judge has high agreement with human annotators, it will struggle on the subset of questions it could not answer. To address this issue, we recommend a simple solution: provide the judge with a correct, human-written reference answer. We perform an in-depth analysis on how reference quality can affect the performance of an LLM Judge. We show that providing a weaker judge (e.g. Qwen 2.5 7B) with higher quality references reaches better agreement with human annotators than a stronger judge (e.g. GPT-4o) with synthetic references.

AI has become pervasive in recent years, but state-of-the-art approaches predominantly neglect the need for AI systems to be contestable. Instead, contestability is advocated by AI guidelines (e.g. by the OECD) and regulation of automated decision-making (e.g. GDPR). In this position paper we explore how contestability can be achieved computationally in and for AI. We argue that contestable AI requires dynamic (human-machine and/or machine-machine) explainability and decision-making processes, whereby machines can (i) interact with humans and/or other machines to progressively explain their outputs and/or their reasoning as well as assess grounds for contestation provided by these humans and/or other machines, and (ii) revise their decision-making processes to redress any issues successfully raised during contestation. Given that much of the current AI landscape is tailored to static AIs, the need to accommodate contestability will require a radical rethinking, that, we argue, computational argumentation is ideally suited to support.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

Predictable behavior from scaling advanced AI systems is an extremely desirable property. Although a well-established literature exists on how pretraining performance scales, the literature on how particular downstream capabilities scale is significantly muddier. In this work, we take a step back and ask: why has predicting specific downstream capabilities with scale remained elusive? While many factors are certainly responsible, we identify a new factor that makes modeling scaling behavior on widely used multiple-choice question-answering benchmarks challenging. Using five model families and twelve well-established multiple-choice benchmarks, we show that downstream performance is computed from negative log likelihoods via a sequence of transformations that progressively degrade the statistical relationship between performance and scale. We then reveal the mechanism causing this degradation: downstream metrics require comparing the correct choice against a small number of specific incorrect choices, meaning accurately predicting downstream capabilities requires predicting not just how probability mass concentrates on the correct choice with scale, but also how probability mass fluctuates on specific incorrect choices with scale. We empirically study how probability mass on the correct choice co-varies with probability mass on incorrect choices with increasing compute, suggesting that scaling laws for incorrect choices might be achievable. Our work also explains why pretraining scaling laws are commonly regarded as more predictable than downstream capabilities and contributes towards establishing scaling-predictable evaluations of frontier AI models.

Ensuring that large language models (LLMs) reflect diverse user values and preferences is crucial as their user bases expand globally. It is therefore encouraging to see the growing interest in LLM personalization within the research community. However, current works often rely on the LLM-as-a-Judge approach for evaluation without thoroughly examining its validity. In this paper, we investigate the reliability of LLM-as-a-Personalized-Judge, asking LLMs to judge user preferences based on personas. Our findings suggest that directly applying LLM-as-a-Personalized-Judge is less reliable than previously assumed, showing low and inconsistent agreement with human ground truth. The personas typically used are often overly simplistic, resulting in low predictive power. To address these issues, we introduce verbal uncertainty estimation into the LLM-as-a-Personalized-Judge pipeline, allowing the model to express low confidence on uncertain judgments. This adjustment leads to much higher agreement (above 80%) on high-certainty samples for binary tasks. Through human evaluation, we find that the LLM-as-a-Personalized-Judge achieves comparable performance to third-party humans evaluation and even surpasses human performance on high-certainty samples. Our work indicates that certainty-enhanced LLM-as-a-Personalized-Judge offers a promising direction for developing more reliable and scalable methods for evaluating LLM personalization.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

The development of state-of-the-art systems in different applied areas of machine learning (ML) is driven by benchmarks, which have shaped the paradigm of evaluating generalisation capabilities from multiple perspectives. Although the paradigm is shifting towards more fine-grained evaluation across diverse tasks, the delicate question of how to aggregate the performances has received particular interest in the community. In general, benchmarks follow the unspoken utilitarian principles, where the systems are ranked based on their mean average score over task-specific metrics. Such aggregation procedure has been viewed as a sub-optimal evaluation protocol, which may have created the illusion of progress. This paper proposes Vote'n'Rank, a framework for ranking systems in multi-task benchmarks under the principles of the social choice theory. We demonstrate that our approach can be efficiently utilised to draw new insights on benchmarking in several ML sub-fields and identify the best-performing systems in research and development case studies. The Vote'n'Rank's procedures are more robust than the mean average while being able to handle missing performance scores and determine conditions under which the system becomes the winner.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly surpassing human knowledge in many domains. While improving these models traditionally relies on costly human data, recent self-rewarding mechanisms (Yuan et al., 2024) have shown that LLMs can improve by judging their own responses instead of relying on human labelers. However, existing methods have primarily focused on improving model responses rather than judgment capabilities, resulting in rapid saturation during iterative training. To address this issue, we introduce a novel Meta-Rewarding step to the self-improvement process, where the model judges its own judgements and uses that feedback to refine its judgment skills. Surprisingly, this unsupervised approach improves the model's ability to judge {\em and} follow instructions, as demonstrated by a win rate improvement of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 22.9% to 39.4% on AlpacaEval 2, and 20.6% to 29.1% on Arena-Hard. These results strongly suggest the potential for self-improving models without human supervision.

Language models (LMs) should provide reliable confidence estimates to help users detect mistakes in their outputs and defer to human experts when necessary. Asking a language model to assess its confidence ("Score your confidence from 0-1.") is a natural way of evaluating its uncertainty. However, models struggle to provide absolute assessments of confidence (i.e. judging confidence in answering a question independent of other questions) and the coarse-grained scores they produce are not useful for evaluating the correctness of their answers. We propose relative confidence estimation, where we match up questions against each other and ask the model to make relative judgments of confidence ("Which question are you more confident in answering correctly?"). Treating each question as a "player" in a series of matchups against other questions and the model's preferences as match outcomes, we can use rank aggregation methods like Elo rating and Bradley-Terry to translate the model's confidence preferences into confidence scores. We evaluate relative confidence estimation against absolute confidence estimation and self-consistency confidence methods on five state-of-the-art LMs -- GPT-4, GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and Llama 3.1 405B -- across 14 challenging STEM, social science, and commonsense reasoning question answering tasks. Our results demonstrate that relative confidence estimation consistently provides more reliable confidence scores than absolute confidence estimation, with average gains of 3.5% in selective classification AUC over direct absolute confidence estimation methods and 1.7% over self-consistency approaches across all models and datasets.

It is known that human speech and certain animal vocalizations can convey meaningful content because we can decipher the content that a given utterance does convey. This paper explores an alternative approach to determining whether a signal is meaningful, one that analyzes only the signal itself and is independent of what the conveyed meaning might be. We devise a method that takes a waveform as input and outputs a score indicating its degree of `meaningfulness`. We cluster contiguous portions of the input to minimize the total description length, and then take the length of the code of the assigned cluster labels as meaningfulness score. We evaluate our method empirically, against several baselines, and show that it is the only one to give a high score to human speech in various languages and with various speakers, a moderate score to animal vocalizations from birds and orcas, and a low score to ambient noise from various sources.

The strive to make AI applications "safe" has led to the development of safety-measures as the main or even sole normative requirement of their permissible use. Similar can be attested to the latest version of chatbots, such as chatGPT. In this view, if they are "safe", they are supposed to be permissible to deploy. This approach, which we call "safety-normativity", is rather limited in solving the emerging issues that chatGPT and other chatbots have caused thus far. In answering this limitation, in this paper we argue for limiting chatbots in the range of topics they can chat about according to the normative concept of appropriateness. We argue that rather than looking for "safety" in a chatbot's utterances to determine what they may and may not say, we ought to assess those utterances according to three forms of appropriateness: technical-discursive, social, and moral. We then spell out what requirements for chatbots follow from these forms of appropriateness to avoid the limits of previous accounts: positionality, acceptability, and value alignment (PAVA). With these in mind, we may be able to determine what a chatbot may and may not say. Lastly, one initial suggestion is to use challenge sets, specifically designed for appropriateness, as a validation method.

When answering questions, LLMs can convey not only an answer, but a level of confidence about the answer being correct. This includes explicit confidence markers (e.g. giving a numeric score) as well as implicit markers, like an authoritative tone or elaborating with additional knowledge. For LLMs to be trustworthy knowledge sources, the confidence they convey should match their actual expertise; however, most current models tend towards overconfidence. To calibrate both implicit and explicit confidence markers, we introduce a pragmatic, listener-aware finetuning method (LACIE) that models the listener, considering not only whether an answer is right, but whether it will be accepted by a listener. We cast calibration as preference optimization, creating data via a two-agent game, where a speaker model's outputs are judged by a simulated listener. We then finetune three LLMs (Mistral-7B, Llama3-8B, Llama3-70B) with LACIE, and show that the resulting models are better calibrated w.r.t. a simulated listener. Crucially, these trends transfer to human listeners, helping them correctly predict model correctness: we conduct a human evaluation where annotators accept or reject an LLM's answers, finding that training with LACIE results in 47% fewer incorrect answers being accepted while maintaining the same level of acceptance for correct answers. Furthermore, LACIE generalizes to another dataset, resulting in a large increase in truthfulness on TruthfulQA when trained on TriviaQA. Our analysis indicates that LACIE leads to a better confidence separation between correct and incorrect examples. Qualitatively, we find that a LACIE-trained model hedges more and implicitly signals certainty when it is correct by using an authoritative tone or including details. Finally, LACIE finetuning leads to an emergent increase in model abstention (e.g. saying "I don't know") for answers that are likely wrong.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

With the rise of generative pre-trained transformer models such as GPT-3, GPT-NeoX, or OPT, distinguishing human-generated texts from machine-generated ones has become important. We refined five separate language models to generate synthetic tweets, uncovering that shallow learning classification algorithms, like Naive Bayes, achieve detection accuracy between 0.6 and 0.8. Shallow learning classifiers differ from human-based detection, especially when using higher temperature values during text generation, resulting in a lower detection rate. Humans prioritize linguistic acceptability, which tends to be higher at lower temperature values. In contrast, transformer-based classifiers have an accuracy of 0.9 and above. We found that using a reinforcement learning approach to refine our generative models can successfully evade BERT-based classifiers with a detection accuracy of 0.15 or less.

Large language models (LLMs) appear to bias their survey answers toward certain values. Nonetheless, some argue that LLMs are too inconsistent to simulate particular values. Are they? To answer, we first define value consistency as the similarity of answers across (1) paraphrases of one question, (2) related questions under one topic, (3) multiple-choice and open-ended use-cases of one question, and (4) multilingual translations of a question to English, Chinese, German, and Japanese. We apply these measures to a few large (>=34b), open LLMs including llama-3, as well as gpt-4o, using eight thousand questions spanning more than 300 topics. Unlike prior work, we find that models are relatively consistent across paraphrases, use-cases, translations, and within a topic. Still, some inconsistencies remain. Models are more consistent on uncontroversial topics (e.g., in the U.S., "Thanksgiving") than on controversial ones ("euthanasia"). Base models are both more consistent compared to fine-tuned models and are uniform in their consistency across topics, while fine-tuned models are more inconsistent about some topics ("euthanasia") than others ("women's rights") like our human subjects (n=165).

Model-based evaluation is at the heart of successful model development -- as a reward model for training, and as a replacement for human evaluation. To train such evaluators, the standard approach is to collect a large amount of human preference judgments over model responses, which is costly and the data becomes stale as models improve. In this work, we present an approach that aims to im-prove evaluators without human annotations, using synthetic training data only. Starting from unlabeled instructions, our iterative self-improvement scheme generates contrasting model outputs and trains an LLM-as-a-Judge to produce reasoning traces and final judgments, repeating this training at each new iteration using the improved predictions. Without any labeled preference data, our Self-Taught Evaluator can improve a strong LLM (Llama3-70B-Instruct) from 75.4 to 88.3 (88.7 with majority vote) on RewardBench. This outperforms commonly used LLM judges such as GPT-4 and matches the performance of the top-performing reward models trained with labeled examples.

Some users of social media are spreading racist, sexist, and otherwise hateful content. For the purpose of training a hate speech detection system, the reliability of the annotations is crucial, but there is no universally agreed-upon definition. We collected potentially hateful messages and asked two groups of internet users to determine whether they were hate speech or not, whether they should be banned or not and to rate their degree of offensiveness. One of the groups was shown a definition prior to completing the survey. We aimed to assess whether hate speech can be annotated reliably, and the extent to which existing definitions are in accordance with subjective ratings. Our results indicate that showing users a definition caused them to partially align their own opinion with the definition but did not improve reliability, which was very low overall. We conclude that the presence of hate speech should perhaps not be considered a binary yes-or-no decision, and raters need more detailed instructions for the annotation.

We present Sparrow, an information-seeking dialogue agent trained to be more helpful, correct, and harmless compared to prompted language model baselines. We use reinforcement learning from human feedback to train our models with two new additions to help human raters judge agent behaviour. First, to make our agent more helpful and harmless, we break down the requirements for good dialogue into natural language rules the agent should follow, and ask raters about each rule separately. We demonstrate that this breakdown enables us to collect more targeted human judgements of agent behaviour and allows for more efficient rule-conditional reward models. Second, our agent provides evidence from sources supporting factual claims when collecting preference judgements over model statements. For factual questions, evidence provided by Sparrow supports the sampled response 78% of the time. Sparrow is preferred more often than baselines while being more resilient to adversarial probing by humans, violating our rules only 8% of the time when probed. Finally, we conduct extensive analyses showing that though our model learns to follow our rules it can exhibit distributional biases.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

Subjectivity is the expression of internal opinions or beliefs which cannot be objectively observed or verified, and has been shown to be important for sentiment analysis and word-sense disambiguation. Furthermore, subjectivity is an important aspect of user-generated data. In spite of this, subjectivity has not been investigated in contexts where such data is widespread, such as in question answering (QA). We therefore investigate the relationship between subjectivity and QA, while developing a new dataset. We compare and contrast with analyses from previous work, and verify that findings regarding subjectivity still hold when using recently developed NLP architectures. We find that subjectivity is also an important feature in the case of QA, albeit with more intricate interactions between subjectivity and QA performance. For instance, a subjective question may or may not be associated with a subjective answer. We release an English QA dataset (SubjQA) based on customer reviews, containing subjectivity annotations for questions and answer spans across 6 distinct domains.

Human values and their measurement are long-standing interdisciplinary inquiry. Recent advances in AI have sparked renewed interest in this area, with large language models (LLMs) emerging as both tools and subjects of value measurement. This work introduces Generative Psychometrics for Values (GPV), an LLM-based, data-driven value measurement paradigm, theoretically grounded in text-revealed selective perceptions. We begin by fine-tuning an LLM for accurate perception-level value measurement and verifying the capability of LLMs to parse texts into perceptions, forming the core of the GPV pipeline. Applying GPV to human-authored blogs, we demonstrate its stability, validity, and superiority over prior psychological tools. Then, extending GPV to LLM value measurement, we advance the current art with 1) a psychometric methodology that measures LLM values based on their scalable and free-form outputs, enabling context-specific measurement; 2) a comparative analysis of measurement paradigms, indicating response biases of prior methods; and 3) an attempt to bridge LLM values and their safety, revealing the predictive power of different value systems and the impacts of various values on LLM safety. Through interdisciplinary efforts, we aim to leverage AI for next-generation psychometrics and psychometrics for value-aligned AI.

As AI systems become more capable, we would like to enlist their help to supervise other AIs. We experiment with methods for training a harmless AI assistant through self-improvement, without any human labels identifying harmful outputs. The only human oversight is provided through a list of rules or principles, and so we refer to the method as 'Constitutional AI'. The process involves both a supervised learning and a reinforcement learning phase. In the supervised phase we sample from an initial model, then generate self-critiques and revisions, and then finetune the original model on revised responses. In the RL phase, we sample from the finetuned model, use a model to evaluate which of the two samples is better, and then train a preference model from this dataset of AI preferences. We then train with RL using the preference model as the reward signal, i.e. we use 'RL from AI Feedback' (RLAIF). As a result we are able to train a harmless but non-evasive AI assistant that engages with harmful queries by explaining its objections to them. Both the SL and RL methods can leverage chain-of-thought style reasoning to improve the human-judged performance and transparency of AI decision making. These methods make it possible to control AI behavior more precisely and with far fewer human labels.

Misinformation is an ever increasing problem that is difficult to solve for the research community and has a negative impact on the society at large. Very recently, the problem has been addressed with a crowdsourcing-based approach to scale up labeling efforts: to assess the truthfulness of a statement, instead of relying on a few experts, a crowd of (non-expert) judges is exploited. We follow the same approach to study whether crowdsourcing is an effective and reliable method to assess statements truthfulness during a pandemic. We specifically target statements related to the COVID-19 health emergency, that is still ongoing at the time of the study and has arguably caused an increase of the amount of misinformation that is spreading online (a phenomenon for which the term "infodemic" has been used). By doing so, we are able to address (mis)information that is both related to a sensitive and personal issue like health and very recent as compared to when the judgment is done: two issues that have not been analyzed in related work. In our experiment, crowd workers are asked to assess the truthfulness of statements, as well as to provide evidence for the assessments as a URL and a text justification. Besides showing that the crowd is able to accurately judge the truthfulness of the statements, we also report results on many different aspects, including: agreement among workers, the effect of different aggregation functions, of scales transformations, and of workers background / bias. We also analyze workers behavior, in terms of queries submitted, URLs found / selected, text justifications, and other behavioral data like clicks and mouse actions collected by means of an ad hoc logger.

LLM-as-a-Judge has been widely utilized as an evaluation method in various benchmarks and served as supervised rewards in model training. However, despite their excellence in many domains, potential issues are under-explored, undermining their reliability and the scope of their utility. Therefore, we identify 12 key potential biases and propose a new automated bias quantification framework-CALM-which systematically quantifies and analyzes each type of bias in LLM-as-a-Judge by using automated and principle-guided modification. Our experiments cover multiple popular language models, and the results indicate that while advanced models have achieved commendable overall performance, significant biases persist in certain specific tasks. Empirical results suggest that there remains room for improvement in the reliability of LLM-as-a-Judge. Moreover, we also discuss the explicit and implicit influence of these biases and give some suggestions for the reliable application of LLM-as-a-Judge. Our work highlights the need for stakeholders to address these issues and remind users to exercise caution in LLM-as-a-Judge applications.

In legal decisions, split votes (SV) occur when judges cannot reach a unanimous decision, posing a difficulty for lawyers who must navigate diverse legal arguments and opinions. In high-stakes domains, understanding the alignment of perceived difficulty between humans and AI systems is crucial to build trust. However, existing NLP calibration methods focus on a classifier's awareness of predictive performance, measured against the human majority class, overlooking inherent human label variation (HLV). This paper explores split votes as naturally observable human disagreement and value pluralism. We collect judges' vote distributions from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and present SV-ECHR, a case outcome classification (COC) dataset with SV information. We build a taxonomy of disagreement with SV-specific subcategories. We further assess the alignment of perceived difficulty between models and humans, as well as confidence- and human-calibration of COC models. We observe limited alignment with the judge vote distribution. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic exploration of calibration to human judgements in legal NLP. Our study underscores the necessity for further research on measuring and enhancing model calibration considering HLV in legal decision tasks.

We test the hypothesis that language models trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) have the capability to "morally self-correct" -- to avoid producing harmful outputs -- if instructed to do so. We find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis across three different experiments, each of which reveal different facets of moral self-correction. We find that the capability for moral self-correction emerges at 22B model parameters, and typically improves with increasing model size and RLHF training. We believe that at this level of scale, language models obtain two capabilities that they can use for moral self-correction: (1) they can follow instructions and (2) they can learn complex normative concepts of harm like stereotyping, bias, and discrimination. As such, they can follow instructions to avoid certain kinds of morally harmful outputs. We believe our results are cause for cautious optimism regarding the ability to train language models to abide by ethical principles.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed via public-facing interfaces to interact with millions of users, each with diverse preferences. Despite this, preference tuning of LLMs predominantly relies on reward models trained using binary judgments where annotators select the preferred choice out of pairs of model outputs. In this work, we argue that this reliance on binary choices does not capture the broader, aggregate preferences of the target user in real-world tasks. We propose a taxonomy that identifies two dimensions of subjectivity where different users disagree on the preferred output-namely, the Plurality of Responses to Prompts, where prompts allow for multiple correct answers, and the Indistinguishability of Responses, where candidate outputs are paraphrases of each other. We show that reward models correlate weakly with user preferences in these cases. As a first step to address this issue, we introduce a simple yet effective method that augments existing binary preference datasets with synthetic preference judgments to estimate potential user disagreement. Incorporating these via a margin term as a form of regularization during model training yields predictions that better align with the aggregate user preferences.

Recent advancements in conversational AI have created an urgent need for safety guardrails that prevent users from being exposed to offensive and dangerous content. Much of this work relies on human ratings and feedback, but does not account for the fact that perceptions of offense and safety are inherently subjective and that there may be systematic disagreements between raters that align with their socio-demographic identities. Instead, current machine learning approaches largely ignore rater subjectivity and use gold standards that obscure disagreements (e.g., through majority voting). In order to better understand the socio-cultural leanings of such tasks, we propose a comprehensive disagreement analysis framework to measure systematic diversity in perspectives among different rater subgroups. We then demonstrate its utility by applying this framework to a dataset of human-chatbot conversations rated by a demographically diverse pool of raters. Our analysis reveals specific rater groups that have more diverse perspectives than the rest, and informs demographic axes that are crucial to consider for safety annotations.

Free-text rationales justify model decisions in natural language and thus become likable and accessible among approaches to explanation across many tasks. However, their effectiveness can be hindered by misinterpretation and hallucination. As a perturbation test, we investigate how large language models (LLMs) perform rationale generation under the effects of readability level control, i.e., being prompted for an explanation targeting a specific expertise level, such as sixth grade or college. We find that explanations are adaptable to such instruction, though the requested readability is often misaligned with the measured text complexity according to traditional readability metrics. Furthermore, the generated rationales tend to feature medium level complexity, which correlates with the measured quality using automatic metrics. Finally, our human annotators confirm a generally satisfactory impression on rationales at all readability levels, with high-school-level readability being most commonly perceived and favored.

Learning from preference feedback has emerged as an essential step for improving the generation quality and performance of modern language models (LMs). Despite its widespread use, the way preference-based learning is applied varies wildly, with differing data, learning algorithms, and evaluations used, making disentangling the impact of each aspect difficult. In this work, we identify four core aspects of preference-based learning: preference data, learning algorithm, reward model, and policy training prompts, systematically investigate the impact of these components on downstream model performance, and suggest a recipe for strong learning for preference feedback. Our findings indicate that all aspects are important for performance, with better preference data leading to the largest improvements, followed by the choice of learning algorithm, the use of improved reward models, and finally the use of additional unlabeled prompts for policy training. Notably, PPO outperforms DPO by up to 2.5% in math and 1.2% in general domains. High-quality preference data leads to improvements of up to 8% in instruction following and truthfulness. Despite significant gains of up to 5% in mathematical evaluation when scaling up reward models, we surprisingly observe marginal improvements in other categories. We publicly release the code used for training (https://github.com/hamishivi/EasyLM) and evaluating (https://github.com/allenai/open-instruct) our models, along with the models and datasets themselves (https://huggingface.co/collections/allenai/tulu-v25-suite-66676520fd578080e126f618).

LLM-as-a-Judge, which generates chain-of-thought (CoT) judgments, has become a widely adopted auto-evaluation method. However, its reliability is compromised by the CoT reasoning's inability to capture comprehensive and deeper details, often leading to incomplete outcomes. Existing methods mainly rely on majority voting or criteria expansion, which is insufficient to address the limitation in CoT. We propose Crowd-based Comparative Evaluation, which introduces additional crowd responses to compare with the candidate responses, thereby exposing deeper and more comprehensive details within the candidate responses. This process effectively guides LLM-as-a-Judge to provide a more detailed CoT judgment. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach enhances evaluation reliability, achieving an average accuracy gain of 6.7% across five benchmarks. Moreover, our method produces higher-quality CoTs that facilitate judge distillation and exhibit superior performance in rejection sampling for supervised fine-tuning (SFT), referred to as crowd rejection sampling, thereby enabling more efficient SFT. Our analysis confirms that CoTs generated by ours are more comprehensive and of higher quality, and evaluation accuracy improves as inference scales.

We present a new approach for mitigating unfairness in learned classifiers. In particular, we focus on binary classification tasks over individuals from two populations, where, as our criterion for fairness, we wish to achieve similar false positive rates in both populations, and similar false negative rates in both populations. As a proof of concept, we implement our approach and empirically evaluate its ability to achieve both fairness and accuracy, using datasets from the fields of criminal risk assessment, credit, lending, and college admissions.

The ability of large vision-language models (LVLMs) to critique and correct their reasoning is an essential building block towards their self-improvement. However, a systematic analysis of such capabilities in LVLMs is still lacking. We propose VISCO, the first benchmark to extensively analyze the fine-grained critique and correction capabilities of LVLMs. Compared to existing work that uses a single scalar value to critique the entire reasoning [4], VISCO features dense and fine-grained critique, requiring LVLMs to evaluate the correctness of each step in the chain-of-thought and provide natural language explanations to support their judgments. Extensive evaluation of 24 LVLMs demonstrates that human-written critiques significantly enhance the performance after correction, showcasing the potential of the self-improvement strategy. However, the model-generated critiques are less helpful and sometimes detrimental to the performance, suggesting that critique is the crucial bottleneck. We identified three common patterns in critique failures: failure to critique visual perception, reluctance to "say no", and exaggerated assumption of error propagation. To address these issues, we propose an effective LookBack strategy that revisits the image to verify each piece of information in the initial reasoning. LookBack significantly improves critique and correction performance by up to 13.5%.

This research introduces a novel evaluation framework designed to assess large language models' (LLMs) ability to acknowledge uncertainty on 675 fundamentally unsolvable problems. Using a curated dataset of graduate-level grand challenge questions with intentionally unknowable answers, we evaluated twelve state-of-the-art LLMs, including both open and closed-source models, on their propensity to admit ignorance rather than generate plausible but incorrect responses. The best models scored in 62-68% accuracy ranges for admitting the problem solution was unknown in fields ranging from biology to philosophy and mathematics. We observed an inverse relationship between problem difficulty and model accuracy, with GPT-4 demonstrating higher rates of uncertainty acknowledgment on more challenging problems (35.8%) compared to simpler ones (20.0%). This pattern indicates that models may be more prone to generate speculative answers when problems appear more tractable. The study also revealed significant variations across problem categories, with models showing difficulty in acknowledging uncertainty in invention and NP-hard problems while performing relatively better on philosophical and psychological challenges. These results contribute to the growing body of research on artificial general intelligence (AGI) assessment by highlighting the importance of uncertainty recognition as a critical component of future machine intelligence evaluation. This impossibility test thus extends previous theoretical frameworks for universal intelligence testing by providing empirical evidence of current limitations in LLMs' ability to recognize their own knowledge boundaries, suggesting new directions for improving model training architectures and evaluation approaches.

This paper explores the moral judgment and moral reasoning abilities exhibited by Large Language Models (LLMs) across languages through the Defining Issues Test. It is a well known fact that moral judgment depends on the language in which the question is asked. We extend the work of beyond English, to 5 new languages (Chinese, Hindi, Russian, Spanish and Swahili), and probe three LLMs -- ChatGPT, GPT-4 and Llama2Chat-70B -- that shows substantial multilingual text processing and generation abilities. Our study shows that the moral reasoning ability for all models, as indicated by the post-conventional score, is substantially inferior for Hindi and Swahili, compared to Spanish, Russian, Chinese and English, while there is no clear trend for the performance of the latter four languages. The moral judgments too vary considerably by the language.

Scaling the test-time compute of large language models has demonstrated impressive performance on reasoning benchmarks. However, existing evaluations of test-time scaling make the strong assumption that a reasoning system should always give an answer to any question provided. This overlooks concerns about whether a model is confident in its answer, and whether it is appropriate to always provide a response. To address these concerns, we extract confidence scores during reasoning for thresholding model responses. We find that increasing compute budget at inference time not only helps models answer more questions correctly, but also increases confidence in correct responses. We then extend the current paradigm of zero-risk responses during evaluation by considering settings with non-zero levels of response risk, and suggest a recipe for reporting evaluations under these settings.

Large Language Models (LLMs) aim to serve as versatile assistants aligned with human values, as defined by the principles of being helpful, honest, and harmless (hhh). However, in terms of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), despite their commendable performance in perception and reasoning tasks, their alignment with human values remains largely unexplored, given the complexity of defining hhh dimensions in the visual world and the difficulty in collecting relevant data that accurately mirrors real-world situations. To address this gap, we introduce Ch3Ef, a Compreh3ensive Evaluation dataset and strategy for assessing alignment with human expectations. Ch3Ef dataset contains 1002 human-annotated data samples, covering 12 domains and 46 tasks based on the hhh principle. We also present a unified evaluation strategy supporting assessment across various scenarios and different perspectives. Based on the evaluation results, we summarize over 10 key findings that deepen the understanding of MLLM capabilities, limitations, and the dynamic relationships between evaluation levels, guiding future advancements in the field.

Critique, as a natural language description for assessing the quality of model-generated content, has been proven to play an essential role in the training, evaluation, and refinement of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, there is a lack of principled understanding in evaluating the quality of the critique itself. In this paper, we pioneer the critique of critique, termed MetaCritique, which is a framework to evaluate the critique from two aspects, i.e., factuality as precision score and comprehensiveness as recall score. We calculate the harmonic mean of precision and recall as the overall rating called F1 score. To obtain a reliable evaluation outcome, we propose Atomic Information Units (AIUs), which describe the critique in a more fine-grained manner. MetaCritique takes each AIU into account and aggregates each AIU's judgment for the overall score. Moreover, given the evaluation process involves intricate reasoning, our MetaCritique provides a natural language rationale to support each judgment. We construct a meta-evaluation dataset containing 300 critiques (2653 AIUs) across four tasks (question answering, reasoning, entailment, and summarization), and we conduct a comparative study to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness. Experiments also show superior critique judged by MetaCritique leads to better refinement, indicating generative artificial intelligence indeed has the potential to be significantly advanced with our MetaCritique. We will release relevant code and meta-evaluation datasets at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/MetaCritique.

Large language models (LLMs) that produce human-like responses have begun to revolutionize research practices in the social sciences. We develop a novel methodological framework that fine-tunes LLMs with repeated cross-sectional surveys to incorporate the meaning of survey questions, individual beliefs, and temporal contexts for opinion prediction. We introduce two new emerging applications of the AI-augmented survey: retrodiction (i.e., predict year-level missing responses) and unasked opinion prediction (i.e., predict entirely missing responses). Among 3,110 binarized opinions from 68,846 Americans in the General Social Survey from 1972 to 2021, our models based on Alpaca-7b excel in retrodiction (AUC = 0.86 for personal opinion prediction, rho = 0.98 for public opinion prediction). These remarkable prediction capabilities allow us to fill in missing trends with high confidence and pinpoint when public attitudes changed, such as the rising support for same-sex marriage. On the other hand, our fine-tuned Alpaca-7b models show modest success in unasked opinion prediction (AUC = 0.73, rho = 0.67). We discuss practical constraints and ethical concerns regarding individual autonomy and privacy when using LLMs for opinion prediction. Our study demonstrates that LLMs and surveys can mutually enhance each other's capabilities: LLMs can broaden survey potential, while surveys can improve the alignment of LLMs.

Peer reviewing is a central component in the scientific publishing process. We present the first public dataset of scientific peer reviews available for research purposes (PeerRead v1) providing an opportunity to study this important artifact. The dataset consists of 14.7K paper drafts and the corresponding accept/reject decisions in top-tier venues including ACL, NIPS and ICLR. The dataset also includes 10.7K textual peer reviews written by experts for a subset of the papers. We describe the data collection process and report interesting observed phenomena in the peer reviews. We also propose two novel NLP tasks based on this dataset and provide simple baseline models. In the first task, we show that simple models can predict whether a paper is accepted with up to 21% error reduction compared to the majority baseline. In the second task, we predict the numerical scores of review aspects and show that simple models can outperform the mean baseline for aspects with high variance such as 'originality' and 'impact'.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked optimism about their potential to accelerate scientific discovery, with a growing number of works proposing research agents that autonomously generate and validate new ideas. Despite this, no evaluations have shown that LLM systems can take the very first step of producing novel, expert-level ideas, let alone perform the entire research process. We address this by establishing an experimental design that evaluates research idea generation while controlling for confounders and performs the first head-to-head comparison between expert NLP researchers and an LLM ideation agent. By recruiting over 100 NLP researchers to write novel ideas and blind reviews of both LLM and human ideas, we obtain the first statistically significant conclusion on current LLM capabilities for research ideation: we find LLM-generated ideas are judged as more novel (p < 0.05) than human expert ideas while being judged slightly weaker on feasibility. Studying our agent baselines closely, we identify open problems in building and evaluating research agents, including failures of LLM self-evaluation and their lack of diversity in generation. Finally, we acknowledge that human judgements of novelty can be difficult, even by experts, and propose an end-to-end study design which recruits researchers to execute these ideas into full projects, enabling us to study whether these novelty and feasibility judgements result in meaningful differences in research outcome.

Representation engineering methods have recently shown promise for enabling efficient steering of model behavior. However, evaluation pipelines for these methods have primarily relied on subjective demonstrations, instead of quantitative, objective metrics. We aim to take a step towards addressing this issue by advocating for four properties missing from current evaluations: (i) contexts sufficiently similar to downstream tasks should be used for assessing intervention quality; (ii) model likelihoods should be accounted for; (iii) evaluations should allow for standardized comparisons across different target behaviors; and (iv) baseline comparisons should be offered. We introduce an evaluation pipeline grounded in these criteria, offering both a quantitative and visual analysis of how effectively a given method works. We use this pipeline to evaluate two representation engineering methods on how effectively they can steer behaviors such as truthfulness and corrigibility, finding that some interventions are less effective than previously reported.

In day-to-day communication, people often approximate the truth - for example, rounding the time or omitting details - in order to be maximally helpful to the listener. How do large language models (LLMs) handle such nuanced trade-offs? To address this question, we use psychological models and experiments designed to characterize human behavior to analyze LLMs. We test a range of LLMs and explore how optimization for human preferences or inference-time reasoning affects these trade-offs. We find that reinforcement learning from human feedback improves both honesty and helpfulness, while chain-of-thought prompting skews LLMs towards helpfulness over honesty. Finally, GPT-4 Turbo demonstrates human-like response patterns including sensitivity to the conversational framing and listener's decision context. Our findings reveal the conversational values internalized by LLMs and suggest that even these abstract values can, to a degree, be steered by zero-shot prompting.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has driven their expanding application across various fields. One of the most promising applications is their role as evaluators based on natural language responses, referred to as ''LLMs-as-judges''. This framework has attracted growing attention from both academia and industry due to their excellent effectiveness, ability to generalize across tasks, and interpretability in the form of natural language. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the LLMs-as-judges paradigm from five key perspectives: Functionality, Methodology, Applications, Meta-evaluation, and Limitations. We begin by providing a systematic definition of LLMs-as-Judges and introduce their functionality (Why use LLM judges?). Then we address methodology to construct an evaluation system with LLMs (How to use LLM judges?). Additionally, we investigate the potential domains for their application (Where to use LLM judges?) and discuss methods for evaluating them in various contexts (How to evaluate LLM judges?). Finally, we provide a detailed analysis of the limitations of LLM judges and discuss potential future directions. Through a structured and comprehensive analysis, we aim aims to provide insights on the development and application of LLMs-as-judges in both research and practice. We will continue to maintain the relevant resource list at https://github.com/CSHaitao/Awesome-LLMs-as-Judges.

We present a principled approach to provide LLM-based evaluation with a rigorous guarantee of human agreement. We first propose that a reliable evaluation method should not uncritically rely on model preferences for pairwise evaluation, but rather assess the confidence of judge models and selectively decide when to trust its judgement. We then show that under this selective evaluation framework, human agreement can be provably guaranteed -- such that the model evaluation aligns with that of humans to a user-specified agreement level. As part of our framework, we also introduce Simulated Annotators, a novel confidence estimation method that significantly improves judge calibration and thus enables high coverage of evaluated instances. Finally, we propose Cascaded Selective Evaluation, where we use cheaper models as initial judges and escalate to stronger models only when necessary -- again, while still providing a provable guarantee of human agreement. Experimental results show that Cascaded Selective Evaluation guarantees strong alignment with humans, far beyond what LLM judges could achieve without selective evaluation. For example, on a subset of Chatbot Arena where GPT-4 almost never achieves 80% human agreement, our method, even while employing substantially cost-effective models such as Mistral-7B, guarantees over 80% human agreement with almost 80% test coverage.

We reveal and address the frequently overlooked yet important issue of disguised procedural unfairness, namely, the potentially inadvertent alterations on the behavior of neutral (i.e., not problematic) aspects of data generating process, and/or the lack of procedural assurance of the greatest benefit of the least advantaged individuals. Inspired by John Rawls's advocacy for pure procedural justice, we view automated decision-making as a microcosm of social institutions, and consider how the data generating process itself can satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness. We propose a framework that decouples the objectionable data generating components from the neutral ones by utilizing reference points and the associated value instantiation rule. Our findings highlight the necessity of preventing disguised procedural unfairness, drawing attention not only to the objectionable data generating components that we aim to mitigate, but also more importantly, to the neutral components that we intend to keep unaffected.

As foundation models have accumulated hundreds of millions of users, developers have begun to take steps to prevent harmful types of uses. One salient intervention that foundation model developers adopt is acceptable use policies: legally binding policies that prohibit users from using a model for specific purposes. This paper identifies acceptable use policies from 30 foundation model developers, analyzes the use restrictions they contain, and argues that acceptable use policies are an important lens for understanding the regulation of foundation models. Taken together, developers' acceptable use policies include 127 distinct use restrictions; the wide variety in the number and type of use restrictions may create fragmentation across the AI supply chain. Developers also employ acceptable use policies to prevent competitors or specific industries from making use of their models. Developers alone decide what constitutes acceptable use, and rarely provide transparency about how they enforce their policies. In practice, acceptable use policies are difficult to enforce, and scrupulous enforcement can act as a barrier to researcher access and limit beneficial uses of foundation models. Nevertheless, acceptable use policies for foundation models are an early example of self-regulation that have a significant impact on the market for foundation models and the overall AI ecosystem.

LLM safety and ethical alignment are widely discussed, but the impact of content moderation on user satisfaction remains underexplored. To address this, we analyze nearly 50,000 Chatbot Arena response-pairs using a novel fine-tuned RoBERTa model, that we trained on hand-labeled data to disentangle refusals due to ethical concerns from other refusals due to technical disabilities or lack of information. Our findings reveal a significant refusal penalty on content moderation, with users choosing ethical-based refusals roughly one-fourth as often as their preferred LLM response compared to standard responses. However, the context and phrasing play critical roles: refusals on highly sensitive prompts, such as illegal content, achieve higher win rates than less sensitive ethical concerns, and longer responses closely aligned with the prompt perform better. These results emphasize the need for nuanced moderation strategies that balance ethical safeguards with user satisfaction. Moreover, we find that the refusal penalty is notably lower in evaluations using the LLM-as-a-Judge method, highlighting discrepancies between user and automated assessments.

Recent large language models often answer factual questions correctly. But users can't trust any given claim a model makes without fact-checking, because language models can hallucinate convincing nonsense. In this work we use reinforcement learning from human preferences (RLHP) to train "open-book" QA models that generate answers whilst also citing specific evidence for their claims, which aids in the appraisal of correctness. Supporting evidence is drawn from multiple documents found via a search engine, or from a single user-provided document. Our 280 billion parameter model, GopherCite, is able to produce answers with high quality supporting evidence and abstain from answering when unsure. We measure the performance of GopherCite by conducting human evaluation of answers to questions in a subset of the NaturalQuestions and ELI5 datasets. The model's response is found to be high-quality 80\% of the time on this Natural Questions subset, and 67\% of the time on the ELI5 subset. Abstaining from the third of questions for which it is most unsure improves performance to 90\% and 80\% respectively, approaching human baselines. However, analysis on the adversarial TruthfulQA dataset shows why citation is only one part of an overall strategy for safety and trustworthiness: not all claims supported by evidence are true.

In this paper, we uncover a systematic bias in the evaluation paradigm of adopting large language models~(LLMs), e.g., GPT-4, as a referee to score and compare the quality of responses generated by candidate models. We find that the quality ranking of candidate responses can be easily hacked by simply altering their order of appearance in the context. This manipulation allows us to skew the evaluation result, making one model appear considerably superior to the other, e.g., Vicuna-13B could beat ChatGPT on 66 over 80 tested queries with ChatGPT as an evaluator. To address this issue, we propose a calibration framework with three simple yet effective strategies: 1) Multiple Evidence Calibration, which requires the evaluator model to generate multiple evaluation evidence before assigning ratings; 2) Balanced Position Calibration, which aggregates results across various orders to determine the final score; 3) Human-in-the-Loop Calibration, which introduces a balanced position diversity entropy to measure the difficulty of each example and seeks human assistance when needed. We also manually annotate the "win/tie/lose" outcomes of responses from ChatGPT and Vicuna-13B in the Vicuna Benchmark's question prompt, and extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach successfully mitigates evaluation bias, resulting in closer alignment with human judgments. We release our code and human annotation at https://github.com/i-Eval/FairEval to facilitate future research.

The rise of generative artificial intelligence, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), has intensified the imperative to scrutinize fairness alongside accuracy. Recent studies have begun to investigate fairness evaluations for LLMs within domains such as recommendations. Given that personalization is an intrinsic aspect of recommendation systems, its incorporation into fairness assessments is paramount. Yet, the degree to which current fairness evaluation frameworks account for personalization remains unclear. Our comprehensive literature review aims to fill this gap by examining how existing frameworks handle fairness evaluations of LLMs, with a focus on the integration of personalization factors. Despite an exhaustive collection and analysis of relevant works, we discovered that most evaluations overlook personalization, a critical facet of recommendation systems, thereby inadvertently perpetuating unfair practices. Our findings shed light on this oversight and underscore the urgent need for more nuanced fairness evaluations that acknowledge personalization. Such improvements are vital for fostering equitable development within the AI community.

In recent years, the rapid increase in scientific papers has overwhelmed traditional review mechanisms, resulting in varying quality of publications. Although existing methods have explored the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) for automated scientific reviewing, their generated contents are often generic or partial. To address the issues above, we introduce an automated paper reviewing framework SEA. It comprises of three modules: Standardization, Evaluation, and Analysis, which are represented by models SEA-S, SEA-E, and SEA-A, respectively. Initially, SEA-S distills data standardization capabilities of GPT-4 for integrating multiple reviews for a paper. Then, SEA-E utilizes standardized data for fine-tuning, enabling it to generate constructive reviews. Finally, SEA-A introduces a new evaluation metric called mismatch score to assess the consistency between paper contents and reviews. Moreover, we design a self-correction strategy to enhance the consistency. Extensive experimental results on datasets collected from eight venues show that SEA can generate valuable insights for authors to improve their papers.

LLM-as-a-judge models have been used for evaluating both human and AI generated content, specifically by providing scores and rationales. Rationales, in addition to increasing transparency, help models learn to calibrate its judgments. Enhancing a model's rationale can therefore improve its calibration abilities and ultimately the ability to score content. We introduce Self-Rationalization, an iterative process of improving the rationales for the judge models, which consequently improves the score for fine-grained customizable scoring criteria (i.e., likert-scale scoring with arbitrary evaluation criteria). Self-rationalization works by having the model generate multiple judgments with rationales for the same input, curating a preference pair dataset from its own judgements, and iteratively fine-tuning the judge via DPO. Intuitively, this approach allows the judge model to self-improve by learning from its own rationales, leading to better alignment and evaluation accuracy. After just two iterations -- while only relying on examples in the training set -- human evaluation shows that our judge model learns to produce higher quality rationales, with a win rate of 62% on average compared to models just trained via SFT on rationale . This judge model also achieves high scoring accuracy on BigGen Bench and Reward Bench, outperforming even bigger sized models trained using SFT with rationale, self-consistency or best-of-N sampling by 3% to 9%.

Recently, the misinformation problem has been addressed with a crowdsourcing-based approach: to assess the truthfulness of a statement, instead of relying on a few experts, a crowd of non-expert is exploited. We study whether crowdsourcing is an effective and reliable method to assess truthfulness during a pandemic, targeting statements related to COVID-19, thus addressing (mis)information that is both related to a sensitive and personal issue and very recent as compared to when the judgment is done. In our experiments, crowd workers are asked to assess the truthfulness of statements, and to provide evidence for the assessments. Besides showing that the crowd is able to accurately judge the truthfulness of the statements, we report results on workers behavior, agreement among workers, effect of aggregation functions, of scales transformations, and of workers background and bias. We perform a longitudinal study by re-launching the task multiple times with both novice and experienced workers, deriving important insights on how the behavior and quality change over time. Our results show that: workers are able to detect and objectively categorize online (mis)information related to COVID-19; both crowdsourced and expert judgments can be transformed and aggregated to improve quality; worker background and other signals (e.g., source of information, behavior) impact the quality of the data. The longitudinal study demonstrates that the time-span has a major effect on the quality of the judgments, for both novice and experienced workers. Finally, we provide an extensive failure analysis of the statements misjudged by the crowd-workers.

Critique ability are crucial in the scalable oversight and self-improvement of Large Language Models (LLMs). While many recent studies explore the critique ability of LLMs to judge and refine flaws in generations, how to comprehensively and reliably measure the critique abilities of LLMs is under-explored. This paper introduces \shortname, a novel benchmark designed to comprehensively and reliably evaluate four key critique ability dimensions of LLMs: feedback, comparison, refinement and meta-feedback. \shortname~encompasses nine diverse tasks, each assessing the LLMs' ability to critique responses at varying levels of quality granularity. Our extensive evaluations of open-source and closed-source LLMs reveal intriguing relationships between the critique ability and tasks, response qualities, and model scales. Datasets, resources and evaluation toolkit for \shortname~will be publicly released at https://github.com/gmftbyGMFTBY/CriticBench.

LLMs are increasingly powerful and widely used to assist users in a variety of tasks. This use risks the introduction of LLM biases to consequential decisions such as job hiring, human performance evaluation, and criminal sentencing. Bias in NLP systems along the lines of gender and ethnicity has been widely studied, especially for specific stereotypes (e.g., Asians are good at math). In this paper, we investigate bias along less-studied but still consequential, dimensions, such as age and beauty, measuring subtler correlated decisions that LLMs make between social groups and unrelated positive and negative attributes. We ask whether LLMs hold wide-reaching biases of positive or negative sentiment for specific social groups similar to the ``what is beautiful is good'' bias found in people in experimental psychology. We introduce a template-generated dataset of sentence completion tasks that asks the model to select the most appropriate attribute to complete an evaluative statement about a person described as a member of a specific social group. We also reverse the completion task to select the social group based on an attribute. We report the correlations that we find for 4 cutting-edge LLMs. This dataset can be used as a benchmark to evaluate progress in more generalized biases and the templating technique can be used to expand the benchmark with minimal additional human annotation.

Using large language models (LLMs) to evaluate text quality has recently gained popularity. Some prior works explore the idea of using LLMs for evaluation, while they differ in some details of the evaluation process. In this paper, we analyze LLM evaluation (Chiang and Lee, 2023) and G-Eval (Liu et al., 2023), and we discuss how those details in the evaluation process change how well the ratings given by LLMs correlate with human ratings. We find that the auto Chain-of-Thought (CoT) used in G-Eval does not always make G-Eval more aligned with human ratings. We also show that forcing the LLM to output only a numeric rating, as in G-Eval, is suboptimal. Last, we reveal that asking the LLM to explain its own ratings consistently improves the correlation between the ChatGPT and human ratings and pushes state-of-the-art (SoTA) correlations on two meta-evaluation datasets.

Concept guidance has emerged as a cheap and simple way to control the behavior of language models by probing their hidden representations for concept vectors and using them to perturb activations at inference time. While the focus of previous work has largely been on truthfulness, in this paper we extend this framework to a richer set of concepts such as appropriateness, humor, creativity and quality, and explore to what degree current detection and guidance strategies work in these challenging settings. To facilitate evaluation, we develop a novel metric for concept guidance that takes into account both the success of concept elicitation as well as the potential degradation in fluency of the guided model. Our extensive experiments reveal that while some concepts such as truthfulness more easily allow for guidance with current techniques, novel concepts such as appropriateness or humor either remain difficult to elicit, need extensive tuning to work, or even experience confusion. Moreover, we find that probes with optimal detection accuracies do not necessarily make for the optimal guides, contradicting previous observations for truthfulness. Our work warrants a deeper investigation into the interplay between detectability, guidability, and the nature of the concept, and we hope that our rich experimental test-bed for guidance research inspires stronger follow-up approaches.

When trying to solve a computational problem, we are often faced with a choice between algorithms that are guaranteed to return the right answer but differ in their runtime distributions (e.g., SAT solvers, sorting algorithms). This paper aims to lay theoretical foundations for such choices by formalizing preferences over runtime distributions. It might seem that we should simply prefer the algorithm that minimizes expected runtime. However, such preferences would be driven by exactly how slow our algorithm is on bad inputs, whereas in practice we are typically willing to cut off occasional, sufficiently long runs before they finish. We propose a principled alternative, taking a utility-theoretic approach to characterize the scoring functions that describe preferences over algorithms. These functions depend on the way our value for solving our problem decreases with time and on the distribution from which captimes are drawn. We describe examples of realistic utility functions and show how to leverage a maximum-entropy approach for modeling underspecified captime distributions. Finally, we show how to efficiently estimate an algorithm's expected utility from runtime samples.

To make AI systems broadly useful for challenging real-world tasks, we need them to learn complex human goals and preferences. One approach to specifying complex goals asks humans to judge during training which agent behaviors are safe and useful, but this approach can fail if the task is too complicated for a human to directly judge. To help address this concern, we propose training agents via self play on a zero sum debate game. Given a question or proposed action, two agents take turns making short statements up to a limit, then a human judges which of the agents gave the most true, useful information. In an analogy to complexity theory, debate with optimal play can answer any question in PSPACE given polynomial time judges (direct judging answers only NP questions). In practice, whether debate works involves empirical questions about humans and the tasks we want AIs to perform, plus theoretical questions about the meaning of AI alignment. We report results on an initial MNIST experiment where agents compete to convince a sparse classifier, boosting the classifier's accuracy from 59.4% to 88.9% given 6 pixels and from 48.2% to 85.2% given 4 pixels. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical aspects of the debate model, focusing on potential weaknesses as the model scales up, and we propose future human and computer experiments to test these properties.

Making moral judgments is an essential step toward developing ethical AI systems. Prevalent approaches are mostly implemented in a bottom-up manner, which uses a large set of annotated data to train models based on crowd-sourced opinions about morality. These approaches have been criticized for potentially overgeneralizing a limited group of annotators' moral stances and lacking explainability. In contrast, top-down approaches make moral judgments grounded in a set of principles. However, it remains conceptual due to the incapability of previous language models and the unsolved debate among moral principles. In this study, we propose a flexible framework to steer Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform moral reasoning with well-established moral theories from interdisciplinary research. The theory-guided top-down framework can incorporate various moral theories. Our experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework on datasets derived from moral theories. Furthermore, we show the alignment between different moral theories and existing morality datasets. Our analysis exhibits the potentials and flaws in existing resources (models and datasets) in developing explainable moral judgment-making systems.

Recent work has highlighted the culturally-contingent nature of commonsense knowledge. We introduce AMAMMER{epsilon}, a test set of 525 multiple-choice questions designed to evaluate the commonsense knowledge of English LLMs, relative to the cultural contexts of Ghana and the United States. To create AMAMMER{epsilon}, we select a set of multiple-choice questions (MCQs) from existing commonsense datasets and rewrite them in a multi-stage process involving surveys of Ghanaian and U.S. participants. In three rounds of surveys, participants from both pools are solicited to (1) write correct and incorrect answer choices, (2) rate individual answer choices on a 5-point Likert scale, and (3) select the best answer choice from the newly-constructed MCQ items, in a final validation step. By engaging participants at multiple stages, our procedure ensures that participant perspectives are incorporated both in the creation and validation of test items, resulting in high levels of agreement within each pool. We evaluate several off-the-shelf English LLMs on AMAMMER{epsilon}. Uniformly, models prefer answers choices that align with the preferences of U.S. annotators over Ghanaian annotators. Additionally, when test items specify a cultural context (Ghana or the U.S.), models exhibit some ability to adapt, but performance is consistently better in U.S. contexts than Ghanaian. As large resources are devoted to the advancement of English LLMs, our findings underscore the need for culturally adaptable models and evaluations to meet the needs of diverse English-speaking populations around the world.

As humans, we consistently engage in interactions with our peers and receive feedback in the form of natural language. This language feedback allows us to reflect on our actions, maintain appropriate behavior, and rectify our errors. The question arises naturally: can we use language feedback to align large language models (LLMs)? In contrast to previous research that aligns LLMs with reward or preference data, we present the first systematic exploration of alignment through the lens of language feedback (i.e., judgment). We commence with an in-depth investigation of potential methods that can be adapted for aligning LLMs with judgments, revealing that these methods are unable to fully capitalize on the judgments. To facilitate more effective utilization of judgments, we propose a novel framework, Contrastive Unlikelihood Training (CUT), that allows for fine-grained inappropriate content detection and correction based on judgments. Our offline alignment results show that, with merely 1317 off-the-shelf judgment data, CUT (LLaMA2-13b) can beat the 175B DaVinci003 and surpass the best baseline by 52.34 points on AlpacaEval. The online alignment results demonstrate that CUT can align LLMs (LLaMA2-chat-13b) in an iterative fashion using model-specific judgment data, with a steady performance improvement from 81.09 to 91.36 points on AlpacaEval. Our analysis further suggests that judgments exhibit greater potential than rewards for LLM alignment and warrant future research.

As machine learning models evolve, maintaining transparency demands more human-centric explainable AI techniques. Counterfactual explanations, with roots in human reasoning, identify the minimal input changes needed to obtain a given output and, hence, are crucial for supporting decision-making. Despite their importance, the evaluation of these explanations often lacks grounding in user studies and remains fragmented, with existing metrics not fully capturing human perspectives. To address this challenge, we developed a diverse set of 30 counterfactual scenarios and collected ratings across 8 evaluation metrics from 206 respondents. Subsequently, we fine-tuned different Large Language Models (LLMs) to predict average or individual human judgment across these metrics. Our methodology allowed LLMs to achieve an accuracy of up to 63% in zero-shot evaluations and 85% (over a 3-classes prediction) with fine-tuning across all metrics. The fine-tuned models predicting human ratings offer better comparability and scalability in evaluating different counterfactual explanation frameworks.

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

Given the widespread adoption and usage of Large Language Models (LLMs), it is crucial to have flexible and interpretable evaluations of their instruction-following ability. Preference judgments between model outputs have become the de facto evaluation standard, despite distilling complex, multi-faceted preferences into a single ranking. Furthermore, as human annotation is slow and costly, LLMs are increasingly used to make these judgments, at the expense of reliability and interpretability. In this work, we propose TICK (Targeted Instruct-evaluation with ChecKlists), a fully automated, interpretable evaluation protocol that structures evaluations with LLM-generated, instruction-specific checklists. We first show that, given an instruction, LLMs can reliably produce high-quality, tailored evaluation checklists that decompose the instruction into a series of YES/NO questions. Each question asks whether a candidate response meets a specific requirement of the instruction. We demonstrate that using TICK leads to a significant increase (46.4% to 52.2%) in the frequency of exact agreements between LLM judgements and human preferences, as compared to having an LLM directly score an output. We then show that STICK (Self-TICK) can be used to improve generation quality across multiple benchmarks via self-refinement and Best-of-N selection. STICK self-refinement on LiveBench reasoning tasks leads to an absolute gain of +7.8%, whilst Best-of-N selection with STICK attains +6.3% absolute improvement on the real-world instruction dataset, WildBench. In light of this, structured, multi-faceted self-improvement is shown to be a promising way to further advance LLM capabilities. Finally, by providing LLM-generated checklists to human evaluators tasked with directly scoring LLM responses to WildBench instructions, we notably increase inter-annotator agreement (0.194 to 0.256).

The growing capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have led to their use as substitutes for human feedback for training and assessing other LLMs. These methods often rely on `constitutions', written guidelines which a critic model uses to provide feedback and improve generations. We investigate how the choice of constitution affects feedback quality by using four different constitutions to improve patient-centered communication in medical interviews. In pairwise comparisons conducted by 215 human raters, we found that detailed constitutions led to better results regarding emotive qualities. However, none of the constitutions outperformed the baseline in learning more practically-oriented skills related to information gathering and provision. Our findings indicate that while detailed constitutions should be prioritised, there are possible limitations to the effectiveness of AI feedback as a reward signal in certain areas.

In current NLP research, large-scale language models and their abilities are widely being discussed. Some recent works have also found notable failures of these models. Often these failure examples involve complex reasoning abilities. This work focuses on a simple commonsense ability, reasoning about when an action (or its effect) is feasible. To this end, we introduce FeasibilityQA, a question-answering dataset involving binary classification (BCQ) and multi-choice multi-correct questions (MCQ) that test understanding of feasibility. We show that even state-of-the-art models such as GPT-3, GPT-2, and T5 struggle to answer the feasibility questions correctly. Specifically, on MCQ and BCQ questions, GPT-3 achieves an accuracy of just (19%, 62%) and (25%, 64%) in zero-shot and few-shot settings, respectively. We also evaluate models by providing relevant knowledge statements required to answer the question. We find that the additional knowledge leads to a 7% gain in performance, but the overall performance still remains low. These results make one wonder how much commonsense knowledge about action feasibility is encoded in state-of-the-art models and how well they can reason about it.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

The explosion of visual content available online underscores the requirement for an accurate machine assessor to robustly evaluate scores across diverse types of visual contents. While recent studies have demonstrated the exceptional potentials of large multi-modality models (LMMs) on a wide range of related fields, in this work, we explore how to teach them for visual rating aligned with human opinions. Observing that human raters only learn and judge discrete text-defined levels in subjective studies, we propose to emulate this subjective process and teach LMMs with text-defined rating levels instead of scores. The proposed Q-Align achieves state-of-the-art performance on image quality assessment (IQA), image aesthetic assessment (IAA), as well as video quality assessment (VQA) tasks under the original LMM structure. With the syllabus, we further unify the three tasks into one model, termed the OneAlign. In our experiments, we demonstrate the advantage of the discrete-level-based syllabus over direct-score-based variants for LMMs. Our code and the pre-trained weights are released at https://github.com/Q-Future/Q-Align.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

As a relative quality comparison of model responses, human and Large Language Model (LLM) preferences serve as common alignment goals in model fine-tuning and criteria in evaluation. Yet, these preferences merely reflect broad tendencies, resulting in less explainable and controllable models with potential safety risks. In this work, we dissect the preferences of human and 32 different LLMs to understand their quantitative composition, using annotations from real-world user-model conversations for a fine-grained, scenario-wise analysis. We find that humans are less sensitive to errors, favor responses that support their stances, and show clear dislike when models admit their limits. On the contrary, advanced LLMs like GPT-4-Turbo emphasize correctness, clarity, and harmlessness more. Additionally, LLMs of similar sizes tend to exhibit similar preferences, regardless of their training methods, and fine-tuning for alignment does not significantly alter the preferences of pretrained-only LLMs. Finally, we show that preference-based evaluation can be intentionally manipulated. In both training-free and training-based settings, aligning a model with the preferences of judges boosts scores, while injecting the least preferred properties lowers them. This results in notable score shifts: up to 0.59 on MT-Bench (1-10 scale) and 31.94 on AlpacaEval 2.0 (0-100 scale), highlighting the significant impact of this strategic adaptation. Interactive Demo: https://huggingface.co/spaces/GAIR/Preference-Dissection-Visualization Dataset: https://huggingface.co/datasets/GAIR/preference-dissection Code: https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/Preference-Dissection

As machine learning systems become ubiquitous, there has been a surge of interest in interpretable machine learning: systems that provide explanation for their outputs. These explanations are often used to qualitatively assess other criteria such as safety or non-discrimination. However, despite the interest in interpretability, there is very little consensus on what interpretable machine learning is and how it should be measured. In this position paper, we first define interpretability and describe when interpretability is needed (and when it is not). Next, we suggest a taxonomy for rigorous evaluation and expose open questions towards a more rigorous science of interpretable machine learning.

In natural human-to-human conversations, participants often receive feedback signals from one another based on their follow-up reactions. These reactions can include verbal responses, facial expressions, changes in emotional state, and other non-verbal cues. Similarly, in human-machine interactions, the machine can leverage the user's follow-up utterances as feedback signals to assess whether it has appropriately addressed the user's request. Therefore, we propose using the likelihood of follow-up utterances as rewards to differentiate preferred responses from less favored ones, without relying on human or commercial LLM-based preference annotations. Our proposed reward mechanism, ``Follow-up Likelihood as Reward" (FLR), matches the performance of strong reward models trained on large-scale human or GPT-4 annotated data on 8 pairwise-preference and 4 rating-based benchmarks. Building upon the FLR mechanism, we propose to automatically mine preference data from the online generations of a base policy model. The preference data are subsequently used to boost the helpfulness of the base model through direct alignment from preference (DAP) methods, such as direct preference optimization (DPO). Lastly, we demonstrate that fine-tuning the language model that provides follow-up likelihood with natural language feedback significantly enhances FLR's performance on reward modeling benchmarks and effectiveness in aligning the base policy model's helpfulness.

Making LLMs speak for different, especially minority groups of people, and generate statements supporting their diverse or even controversial perspectives is critical to creating an inclusive environment. However, existing LLMs lack sufficient controllability to the stance of their generated content, which often contains inconsistent, neutral, or biased statements. In this paper, we improve the controllability of LLMs in generating statements supporting an argument the user defined in the prompt. We find that multi-round debates between two LLMs with opposite stances generate higher-quality and more salient statements for each, which are important training data to improve the controllability of LLMs. Motivated by this, we develop a novel debate & tuning (DEBATUNE) pipeline finetuning LLMs to generate the statements obtained via debate. To examine DEBATUNE, we curate the largest dataset of debate topics so far, which covers 710 controversial topics and corresponding arguments for each topic. Evaluations by the GPT-4 judge with a novel controversy controllability metric show that LLMs' capability of generating diverse perspectives is significantly improved by DEBATUNE. Moreover, such controllability can be generalized to unseen topics, generating high-quality statements supporting controversial arguments.

Unintended bias in Machine Learning can manifest as systemic differences in performance for different demographic groups, potentially compounding existing challenges to fairness in society at large. In this paper, we introduce a suite of threshold-agnostic metrics that provide a nuanced view of this unintended bias, by considering the various ways that a classifier's score distribution can vary across designated groups. We also introduce a large new test set of online comments with crowd-sourced annotations for identity references. We use this to show how our metrics can be used to find new and potentially subtle unintended bias in existing public models.

In the last years many accurate decision support systems have been constructed as black boxes, that is as systems that hide their internal logic to the user. This lack of explanation constitutes both a practical and an ethical issue. The literature reports many approaches aimed at overcoming this crucial weakness sometimes at the cost of scarifying accuracy for interpretability. The applications in which black box decision systems can be used are various, and each approach is typically developed to provide a solution for a specific problem and, as a consequence, delineating explicitly or implicitly its own definition of interpretability and explanation. The aim of this paper is to provide a classification of the main problems addressed in the literature with respect to the notion of explanation and the type of black box system. Given a problem definition, a black box type, and a desired explanation this survey should help the researcher to find the proposals more useful for his own work. The proposed classification of approaches to open black box models should also be useful for putting the many research open questions in perspective.

As LLMs evolve on a daily basis, there is an urgent need for a trustworthy evaluation method that can provide robust evaluation results in a timely fashion. Currently, as static benchmarks are prone to contamination concerns, users tend to trust human voting platforms, such as Chatbot Arena. However, human annotations require extensive manual efforts. To provide an automatic, robust, and trustworthy evaluation framework, we innovatively propose the Auto-Arena of LLMs, which automates the entire evaluation process with LLM agents. Firstly, an examiner LLM devises queries. Then, a pair of candidate LLMs engage in a multi-round peer-battle around the query, during which the LLM's true performance gaps become visible. Finally, a committee of LLM judges collectively discuss and determine the winner, which alleviates bias and promotes fairness. In our extensive experiment on the 17 newest LLMs, Auto-Arena shows the highest correlation with human preferences, providing a promising alternative to human evaluation platforms.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Interpretability has recently gained attention in the field of machine learning, for it is crucial when it comes to high-stakes decisions or troubleshooting. This abstract concept is hard to grasp and has been associated, over time, with many labels and preconceived ideas. In this position paper, in order to clarify some misunderstandings regarding interpretability, we discuss its relationship with significant concepts in machine learning: explainability, predictive performances, and machine learning models. For instance, we challenge the idea that interpretability and explainability are substitutes to one another, or that a fixed degree of interpretability can be associated with a given machine learning model.

Human values are crucial to human decision-making. Value pluralism is the view that multiple correct values may be held in tension with one another (e.g., when considering lying to a friend to protect their feelings, how does one balance honesty with friendship?). As statistical learners, AI systems fit to averages by default, washing out these potentially irreducible value conflicts. To improve AI systems to better reflect value pluralism, the first-order challenge is to explore the extent to which AI systems can model pluralistic human values, rights, and duties as well as their interaction. We introduce ValuePrism, a large-scale dataset of 218k values, rights, and duties connected to 31k human-written situations. ValuePrism's contextualized values are generated by GPT-4 and deemed high-quality by human annotators 91% of the time. We conduct a large-scale study with annotators across diverse social and demographic backgrounds to try to understand whose values are represented. With ValuePrism, we build Kaleido, an open, light-weight, and structured language-based multi-task model that generates, explains, and assesses the relevance and valence (i.e., support or oppose) of human values, rights, and duties within a specific context. Humans prefer the sets of values output by our system over the teacher GPT-4, finding them more accurate and with broader coverage. In addition, we demonstrate that Kaleido can help explain variability in human decision-making by outputting contrasting values. Finally, we show that Kaleido's representations transfer to other philosophical frameworks and datasets, confirming the benefit of an explicit, modular, and interpretable approach to value pluralism. We hope that our work will serve as a step to making more explicit the implicit values behind human decision-making and to steering AI systems to make decisions that are more in accordance with them.

The release of ChatGPT in November 2022 sparked an explosion of interest in post-training and an avalanche of new preference optimization (PO) methods. These methods claim superior alignment by virtue of better correspondence with human pairwise preferences, often measured by LLM judges. In this work, we attempt to answer the following question -- do LLM-judge preferences translate to progress on other, more concrete metrics for alignment, and if not, why not? We define a concrete metric for alignment, and introduce SOS-Bench, the largest standardized, reproducible LLM meta-benchmark to date. We find that (1) LLM-judgments do not correlate with concrete measures of safety, world knowledge, and instruction following; (2) LLM judges have powerful implicit biases, prioritizing style over factuality and safety; and (3) the supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage of post-training, and not the PO stage, has the greatest impact on alignment, with data scaling and prompt diversity as the driving factors. Our codebase and complete results can be found at https://github.com/penfever/sos-bench.

For large language models (LLMs) to be trusted by humans they need to be well-calibrated in the sense that they can accurately assess and communicate how likely it is that their predictions are correct. Recent work has focused on the quality of internal LLM confidence assessments, but the question remains of how well LLMs can communicate this internal model confidence to human users. This paper explores the disparity between external human confidence in an LLM's responses and the internal confidence of the model. Through experiments involving multiple-choice questions, we systematically examine human users' ability to discern the reliability of LLM outputs. Our study focuses on two key areas: (1) assessing users' perception of true LLM confidence and (2) investigating the impact of tailored explanations on this perception. The research highlights that default explanations from LLMs often lead to user overestimation of both the model's confidence and its' accuracy. By modifying the explanations to more accurately reflect the LLM's internal confidence, we observe a significant shift in user perception, aligning it more closely with the model's actual confidence levels. This adjustment in explanatory approach demonstrates potential for enhancing user trust and accuracy in assessing LLM outputs. The findings underscore the importance of transparent communication of confidence levels in LLMs, particularly in high-stakes applications where understanding the reliability of AI-generated information is essential.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, accurately and comprehensively evaluating their performance becomes increasingly challenging. Human evaluations are conventionally considered the gold standard in natural language generation, but recent advancements incorporate state-of-the-art LLMs as proxies for human judges in evaluation processes. However, the extent to which humans and LLMs are capable evaluators remains uncertain. This study investigates the behavior of crowd-sourced and expert annotators, as well as LLMs, when comparing outputs from different models. To achieve this, we curate a dataset of intentionally flawed machine-generated answers. Our findings reveal a concerning bias in the evaluation process, as answers with factual errors are rated more favorably than answers that are too short or contained grammatical errors. To address this issue, we propose independently evaluating machine-generated text across multiple dimensions, rather than merging all the evaluation aspects into a single score. We instantiate this idea with the Elo rating system, resulting in the Multi-Elo Rating System. Empirical results from our study reveal that this proposed approach significantly enhances the quality of LLM-based evaluations, particularly in terms of factual accuracy. However, there is no significant improvement in crowd-sourced-based evaluations, indicating the need for further investigation and refinement.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to respond accurately but often exhibit deficient reasoning or generate hallucinatory content. To address these, studies prefixed with ``Self-'' such as Self-Consistency, Self-Improve, and Self-Refine have been initiated. They share a commonality: involving LLMs evaluating and updating itself to mitigate the issues. Nonetheless, these efforts lack a unified perspective on summarization, as existing surveys predominantly focus on categorization without examining the motivations behind these works. In this paper, we summarize a theoretical framework, termed Internal Consistency, which offers unified explanations for phenomena such as the lack of reasoning and the presence of hallucinations. Internal Consistency assesses the coherence among LLMs' latent layer, decoding layer, and response layer based on sampling methodologies. Expanding upon the Internal Consistency framework, we introduce a streamlined yet effective theoretical framework capable of mining Internal Consistency, named Self-Feedback. The Self-Feedback framework consists of two modules: Self-Evaluation and Self-Update. This framework has been employed in numerous studies. We systematically classify these studies by tasks and lines of work; summarize relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks; and delve into the concern, ``Does Self-Feedback Really Work?'' We propose several critical viewpoints, including the ``Hourglass Evolution of Internal Consistency'', ``Consistency Is (Almost) Correctness'' hypothesis, and ``The Paradox of Latent and Explicit Reasoning''. Furthermore, we outline promising directions for future research. We have open-sourced the experimental code, reference list, and statistical data, available at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/ICSFSurvey.

8 years after the visual question answering (VQA) task was proposed, accuracy remains the primary metric for automatic evaluation. VQA Accuracy has been effective so far in the IID evaluation setting. However, our community is undergoing a shift towards open-ended generative models and OOD evaluation. In this new paradigm, the existing VQA Accuracy metric is overly stringent and underestimates the performance of VQA systems. Thus, there is a need to develop more robust automatic VQA metrics that serve as a proxy for human judgment. In this work, we propose to leverage the in-context learning capabilities of instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs) to build a better VQA metric. We formulate VQA evaluation as an answer-rating task where the LLM is instructed to score the accuracy of a candidate answer given a set of reference answers. We demonstrate the proposed metric better correlates with human judgment compared to existing metrics across several VQA models and benchmarks. We hope wide adoption of our metric will contribute to better estimating the research progress on the VQA task. We plan to release the evaluation code and collected human judgments.

Translation of perceptual descriptors such as the perceived affective quality attributes in the soundscape standard (ISO/TS 12913-2:2018) is an inherently intricate task, especially if the target language is used in multiple countries. Despite geographical proximity and a shared language of Bahasa Melayu (Standard Malay), differences in culture and language education policies between Singapore and Malaysia could invoke peculiarities in the affective appraisal of sounds. To generate provisional translations of the eight perceived affective attributes -- eventful, vibrant, pleasant, calm, uneventful, monotonous, annoying, and chaotic -- into Bahasa Melayu that is applicable in both Singapore and Malaysia, a binational expert-led approach supplemented by a quantitative evaluation framework was adopted. A set of preliminary translation candidates were developed via a four-stage process, firstly by a qualified translator, which was then vetted by linguistics experts, followed by examination via an experiential evaluation, and finally reviewed by the core research team. A total of 66 participants were then recruited cross-nationally to quantitatively evaluate the preliminary translation candidates. Of the eight attributes, cross-national differences were observed only in the translation of annoying. For instance, "menjengkelkan" was found to be significantly less understood in Singapore than in Malaysia, as well as less understandable than "membingitkan" within Singapore. Results of the quantitative evaluation also revealed the imperfect nature of foreign language translations for perceptual descriptors, which suggests a possibility for exploring corrective measures.

Before being deployed for user-facing applications, developers align Large Language Models (LLMs) to user preferences through a variety of procedures, such as Reinforcement Learning From Human Feedback (RLHF) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Current evaluations of these procedures focus on benchmarks of instruction following, reasoning, and truthfulness. However, human preferences are not universal, and aligning to specific preference sets may have unintended effects. We explore how alignment impacts performance along three axes of global representation: English dialects, multilingualism, and opinions from and about countries worldwide. Our results show that current alignment procedures create disparities between English dialects and global opinions. We find alignment improves capabilities in several languages. We conclude by discussing design decisions that led to these unintended impacts and recommendations for more equitable preference tuning.

Evaluation benchmarks are the cornerstone of measuring capabilities of large language models (LLMs), as well as driving progress in said capabilities. Originally designed to make claims about capabilities (or lack thereof) in fully pretrained models, evaluation benchmarks are now also extensively used to decide between various training choices. Despite this widespread usage, we rarely quantify the variance in our evaluation benchmarks, which dictates whether differences in performance are meaningful. Here, we define and measure a range of metrics geared towards measuring variance in evaluation benchmarks, including seed variance across initialisations, and monotonicity during training. By studying a large number of models -- both openly available and pretrained from scratch -- we provide empirical estimates for a variety of variance metrics, with considerations and recommendations for practitioners. We also evaluate the utility and tradeoffs of continuous versus discrete performance measures and explore options for better understanding and reducing this variance. We find that simple changes, such as framing choice tasks (like MMLU) as completion tasks, can often reduce variance for smaller scale (sim7B) models, while more involved methods inspired from human testing literature (such as item analysis and item response theory) struggle to meaningfully reduce variance. Overall, our work provides insights into variance in evaluation benchmarks, suggests LM-specific techniques to reduce variance, and more generally encourages practitioners to carefully factor in variance when comparing models.

We test the robustness of debate as a method of scalable oversight by training models to debate with data generated via self-play. In a long-context reading comprehension task, we find that language model based evaluators answer questions more accurately when judging models optimized to win debates. By contrast, we find no such relationship for consultancy models trained to persuade a judge without an opposing debater present. In quantitative and qualitative comparisons between our debate models and novel consultancy baselines, we find evidence that debate training encourages stronger and more informative arguments, showing promise that it can help provide high-quality supervision for tasks that are difficult to directly evaluate.

In this paper, we introduce the Chinese AI and Law challenge dataset (CAIL2018), the first large-scale Chinese legal dataset for judgment prediction. \dataset contains more than 2.6 million criminal cases published by the Supreme People's Court of China, which are several times larger than other datasets in existing works on judgment prediction. Moreover, the annotations of judgment results are more detailed and rich. It consists of applicable law articles, charges, and prison terms, which are expected to be inferred according to the fact descriptions of cases. For comparison, we implement several conventional text classification baselines for judgment prediction and experimental results show that it is still a challenge for current models to predict the judgment results of legal cases, especially on prison terms. To help the researchers make improvements on legal judgment prediction, both \dataset and baselines will be released after the CAIL competitionhttp://cail.cipsc.org.cn/.

The remarkable abilities of large language models (LLMs) like GPT-4 partially stem from post-training processes like Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) involving human preferences encoded in a reward model. However, these reward models (RMs) often lack direct knowledge of why, or under what principles, the preferences annotations were made. In this study, we identify principles that guide RMs to better align with human preferences, and then develop an axiomatic framework to generate a rich variety of preference signals to uphold them. We use these axiomatic signals to train a model for scoring answers to longform questions. Our approach yields a Preference Model with only about 220M parameters that agrees with gold human-annotated preference labels more often than GPT-4. The contributions of this work include: training a standalone preference model that can score human- and LLM-generated answers on the same scale; developing an axiomatic framework for generating training data pairs tailored to certain principles; and showing that a small amount of axiomatic signals can help small models outperform GPT-4 in preference scoring. We release our model on huggingface: https://huggingface.co/corbyrosset/axiomatic_preference_model

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming diverse fields and gaining increasing influence as human proxies. This development underscores the urgent need for evaluating value orientations and understanding of LLMs to ensure their responsible integration into public-facing applications. This work introduces ValueBench, the first comprehensive psychometric benchmark for evaluating value orientations and value understanding in LLMs. ValueBench collects data from 44 established psychometric inventories, encompassing 453 multifaceted value dimensions. We propose an evaluation pipeline grounded in realistic human-AI interactions to probe value orientations, along with novel tasks for evaluating value understanding in an open-ended value space. With extensive experiments conducted on six representative LLMs, we unveil their shared and distinctive value orientations and exhibit their ability to approximate expert conclusions in value-related extraction and generation tasks. ValueBench is openly accessible at https://github.com/Value4AI/ValueBench.

Adopting human and large language models (LLM) as judges (a.k.a human- and LLM-as-a-judge) for evaluating the performance of existing LLMs has recently gained attention. Nonetheless, this approach concurrently introduces potential biases from human and LLM judges, questioning the reliability of the evaluation results. In this paper, we propose a novel framework for investigating 5 types of biases for LLM and human judges. We curate a dataset with 142 samples referring to the revised Bloom's Taxonomy and conduct thousands of human and LLM evaluations. Results show that human and LLM judges are vulnerable to perturbations to various degrees, and that even the most cutting-edge judges possess considerable biases. We further exploit their weakness and conduct attacks on LLM judges. We hope that our work can notify the community of the vulnerability of human- and LLM-as-a-judge against perturbations, as well as the urgency of developing robust evaluation systems.

Interpretability is the study of explaining models in understandable terms to humans. At present, interpretability is divided into two paradigms: the intrinsic paradigm, which believes that only models designed to be explained can be explained, and the post-hoc paradigm, which believes that black-box models can be explained. At the core of this debate is how each paradigm ensures its explanations are faithful, i.e., true to the model's behavior. This is important, as false but convincing explanations lead to unsupported confidence in artificial intelligence (AI), which can be dangerous. This paper's position is that we should think about new paradigms while staying vigilant regarding faithfulness. First, by examining the history of paradigms in science, we see that paradigms are constantly evolving. Then, by examining the current paradigms, we can understand their underlying beliefs, the value they bring, and their limitations. Finally, this paper presents 3 emerging paradigms for interpretability. The first paradigm designs models such that faithfulness can be easily measured. Another optimizes models such that explanations become faithful. The last paradigm proposes to develop models that produce both a prediction and an explanation.

Despite growing interest in using large language models (LLMs) in healthcare, current explorations do not assess the real-world utility and safety of LLMs in clinical settings. Our objective was to determine whether two LLMs can serve information needs submitted by physicians as questions to an informatics consultation service in a safe and concordant manner. Sixty six questions from an informatics consult service were submitted to GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 via simple prompts. 12 physicians assessed the LLM responses' possibility of patient harm and concordance with existing reports from an informatics consultation service. Physician assessments were summarized based on majority vote. For no questions did a majority of physicians deem either LLM response as harmful. For GPT-3.5, responses to 8 questions were concordant with the informatics consult report, 20 discordant, and 9 were unable to be assessed. There were 29 responses with no majority on "Agree", "Disagree", and "Unable to assess". For GPT-4, responses to 13 questions were concordant, 15 discordant, and 3 were unable to be assessed. There were 35 responses with no majority. Responses from both LLMs were largely devoid of overt harm, but less than 20% of the responses agreed with an answer from an informatics consultation service, responses contained hallucinated references, and physicians were divided on what constitutes harm. These results suggest that while general purpose LLMs are able to provide safe and credible responses, they often do not meet the specific information need of a given question. A definitive evaluation of the usefulness of LLMs in healthcare settings will likely require additional research on prompt engineering, calibration, and custom-tailoring of general purpose models.

We introduce GODEL (Grounded Open Dialogue Language Model), a large pre-trained language model for dialog. In contrast with earlier models such as DialoGPT, GODEL leverages a new phase of grounded pre-training designed to better support adapting GODEL to a wide range of downstream dialog tasks that require information external to the current conversation (e.g., a database or document) to produce good responses. Experiments against an array of benchmarks that encompass task-oriented dialog, conversational QA, and grounded open-domain dialog show that GODEL outperforms state-of-the-art pre-trained dialog models in few-shot fine-tuning setups, in terms of both human and automatic evaluation. A novel feature of our evaluation methodology is the introduction of a notion of utility that assesses the usefulness of responses (extrinsic evaluation) in addition to their communicative features (intrinsic evaluation). We show that extrinsic evaluation offers improved inter-annotator agreement and correlation with automated metrics. Code and data processing scripts are publicly available.

One core capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) is to follow natural language instructions. However, the evaluation of such abilities is not standardized: Human evaluations are expensive, slow, and not objectively reproducible, while LLM-based auto-evaluation is potentially biased or limited by the ability of the evaluator LLM. To overcome these issues, we introduce Instruction-Following Eval (IFEval) for large language models. IFEval is a straightforward and easy-to-reproduce evaluation benchmark. It focuses on a set of "verifiable instructions" such as "write in more than 400 words" and "mention the keyword of AI at least 3 times". We identified 25 types of those verifiable instructions and constructed around 500 prompts, with each prompt containing one or more verifiable instructions. We show evaluation results of two widely available LLMs on the market. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/google-research/google-research/tree/master/instruction_following_eval

When developing new large language models (LLMs), a key step is evaluating their final performance, often by computing the win-rate against a reference model based on external feedback. Human feedback is the gold standard, particularly for capturing nuanced qualities like coherence, readability, and alignment with human expectations. However, human evaluations are costly -- even for large tech companies -- and when conducted with active users, they may negatively impact user experience. A promising alternative is synthetic feedback, where evaluations are conducted by other large language models, including reward models. While this eliminates the need for costly human annotations, it introduces biases that may distort the evaluation process. In this work, we propose a statistically principled framework that integrates human and synthetic feedback to reduce reliance on human annotations while maintaining unbiased win-rate calculations. Our experiments demonstrate a reduction in human annotations by up to 12.2% with an off-the-shelf synthetic evaluator and up to 24.8% with a finetuned variant. Apart from being generalizable, scalable, and free of hyper-parameter tuning, our method offers predictable annotation savings, which can be estimated based on data-dependent characteristics.