Daily Papers

Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM), machine's ability to understand and keep track of the mental states of others, is pivotal in developing socially intelligent agents. However, prevalent N-ToM benchmarks have several shortcomings, including the presence of ambiguous and artificial narratives, absence of personality traits and preferences, a lack of questions addressing characters' psychological mental states, and limited diversity in the questions posed. In response to these issues, we construct OpenToM, a new benchmark for assessing N-ToM with (1) longer and clearer narrative stories, (2) characters with explicit personality traits, (3) actions that are triggered by character intentions, and (4) questions designed to challenge LLMs' capabilities of modeling characters' mental states of both the physical and psychological world. Using OpenToM, we reveal that state-of-the-art LLMs thrive at modeling certain aspects of mental states in the physical world but fall short when tracking characters' mental states in the psychological world.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) demonstrate that their capabilities are comparable, or even superior, to humans in many tasks in natural language processing. Despite this progress, LLMs are still inadequate at social-cognitive reasoning, which humans are naturally good at. Drawing inspiration from psychological research on the links between certain personality traits and Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning, and from prompt engineering research on the hyper-sensitivity of prompts in affecting LLMs capabilities, this study investigates how inducing personalities in LLMs using prompts affects their ToM reasoning capabilities. Our findings show that certain induced personalities can significantly affect the LLMs' reasoning capabilities in three different ToM tasks. In particular, traits from the Dark Triad have a larger variable effect on LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2, and Mistral across the different ToM tasks. We find that LLMs that exhibit a higher variance across personality prompts in ToM also tends to be more controllable in personality tests: personality traits in LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2 and Mistral can be controllably adjusted through our personality prompts. In today's landscape where role-play is a common strategy when using LLMs, our research highlights the need for caution, as models that adopt specific personas with personalities potentially also alter their reasoning abilities in an unexpected manner.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental variables based on their behavior, is key to developing socially intelligent agents. Current approaches to Theory of Mind reasoning either rely on prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), which are prone to systematic errors, or use rigid, handcrafted Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) models, which are more robust but cannot generalize across different domains. In this work, we introduce AutoToM, an automated Bayesian Theory of Mind method for achieving open-ended machine Theory of Mind. AutoToM can operate in any domain, infer any mental variable, and conduct robust Theory of Mind reasoning of any order. Given a Theory of Mind inference problem, AutoToM first proposes an initial BToM model. It then conducts automated Bayesian inverse planning based on the proposed model, leveraging an LLM as the backend. Based on the uncertainty of the inference, it iteratively refines the model, by introducing additional mental variables and/or incorporating more timesteps in the context. Empirical evaluations across multiple Theory of Mind benchmarks demonstrate that AutoToM consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance, offering a scalable, robust, and interpretable approach to machine Theory of Mind.

Understanding people's social interactions in complex real-world scenarios often relies on intricate mental reasoning. To truly understand how and why people interact with one another, we must infer the underlying mental states that give rise to the social interactions, i.e., Theory of Mind reasoning in multi-agent interactions. Additionally, social interactions are often multi-modal -- we can watch people's actions, hear their conversations, and/or read about their past behaviors. For AI systems to successfully and safely interact with people in real-world environments, they also need to understand people's mental states as well as their inferences about each other's mental states based on multi-modal information about their interactions. For this, we introduce MuMA-ToM, a Multi-modal Multi-Agent Theory of Mind benchmark. MuMA-ToM is the first multi-modal Theory of Mind benchmark that evaluates mental reasoning in embodied multi-agent interactions. In MuMA-ToM, we provide video and text descriptions of people's multi-modal behavior in realistic household environments. Based on the context, we then ask questions about people's goals, beliefs, and beliefs about others' goals. We validated MuMA-ToM in a human experiment and provided a human baseline. We also proposed a novel multi-modal, multi-agent ToM model, LIMP (Language model-based Inverse Multi-agent Planning). Our experimental results show that LIMP significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, including large multi-modal models (e.g., GPT-4o, Gemini-1.5 Pro) and a recent multi-modal ToM model, BIP-ALM.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

The emergent reasoning and Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) make them promising candidates for developing coordination agents. In this study, we introduce a new LLM-Coordination Benchmark aimed at a detailed analysis of LLMs within the context of Pure Coordination Games, where participating agents need to cooperate for the most gain. This benchmark evaluates LLMs through two distinct tasks: (1) Agentic Coordination, where LLMs act as proactive participants for cooperation in 4 pure coordination games; (2) Coordination Question Answering (QA), where LLMs are prompted to answer 198 multiple-choice questions from the 4 games for evaluation of three key reasoning abilities: Environment Comprehension, ToM Reasoning, and Joint Planning. Furthermore, to enable LLMs for multi-agent coordination, we introduce a Cognitive Architecture for Coordination (CAC) framework that can easily integrate different LLMs as plug-and-play modules for pure coordination games. Our findings indicate that LLM agents equipped with GPT-4-turbo achieve comparable performance to state-of-the-art reinforcement learning methods in games that require commonsense actions based on the environment. Besides, zero-shot coordination experiments reveal that, unlike RL methods, LLM agents are robust to new unseen partners. However, results on Coordination QA show a large room for improvement in the Theory of Mind reasoning and joint planning abilities of LLMs. The analysis also sheds light on how the ability of LLMs to understand their environment and their partner's beliefs and intentions plays a part in their ability to plan for coordination. Our code is available at https://github.com/eric-ai-lab/llm_coordination.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our everyday lives, understanding their ability to comprehend human mental states becomes critical for ensuring effective interactions. However, despite the recent attempts to assess the Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities of LLMs, the degree to which these models can align with human ToM remains a nuanced topic of exploration. This is primarily due to two distinct challenges: (1) the presence of inconsistent results from previous evaluations, and (2) concerns surrounding the validity of existing evaluation methodologies. To address these challenges, we present a novel framework for procedurally generating evaluations with LLMs by populating causal templates. Using our framework, we create a new social reasoning benchmark (BigToM) for LLMs which consists of 25 controls and 5,000 model-written evaluations. We find that human participants rate the quality of our benchmark higher than previous crowd-sourced evaluations and comparable to expert-written evaluations. Using BigToM, we evaluate the social reasoning capabilities of a variety of LLMs and compare model performances with human performance. Our results suggest that GPT4 has ToM capabilities that mirror human inference patterns, though less reliable, while other LLMs struggle.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive accomplishments in both reasoning and planning, their abilities in multi-agent collaborations remains largely unexplored. This study evaluates LLM-based agents in a multi-agent cooperative text game with Theory of Mind (ToM) inference tasks, comparing their performance with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) and planning-based baselines. We observed evidence of emergent collaborative behaviors and high-order Theory of Mind capabilities among LLM-based agents. Our results reveal limitations in LLM-based agents' planning optimization due to systematic failures in managing long-horizon contexts and hallucination about the task state. We explore the use of explicit belief state representations to mitigate these issues, finding that it enhances task performance and the accuracy of ToM inferences for LLM-based agents.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

Human interactions are deeply rooted in the interplay of thoughts, beliefs, and desires made possible by Theory of Mind (ToM): our cognitive ability to understand the mental states of ourselves and others. Although ToM may come naturally to us, emulating it presents a challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent improvements to LLMs' reasoning capabilities from simple yet effective prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought have seen limited applicability to ToM. In this paper, we turn to the prominent cognitive science theory "Simulation Theory" to bridge this gap. We introduce SimToM, a novel two-stage prompting framework inspired by Simulation Theory's notion of perspective-taking. To implement this idea on current ToM benchmarks, SimToM first filters context based on what the character in question knows before answering a question about their mental state. Our approach, which requires no additional training and minimal prompt-tuning, shows substantial improvement over existing methods, and our analysis reveals the importance of perspective-taking to Theory-of-Mind capabilities. Our findings suggest perspective-taking as a promising direction for future research into improving LLMs' ToM capabilities.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is a fundamental psychological capability that allows humans to understand and interpret the mental states of others. Humans infer others' thoughts by integrating causal cues and indirect clues from broad contextual information, often derived from past interactions. In other words, human ToM heavily relies on the understanding about the backgrounds and life stories of others. Unfortunately, this aspect is largely overlooked in existing benchmarks for evaluating machines' ToM capabilities, due to their usage of short narratives without global backgrounds. In this paper, we verify the importance of understanding long personal backgrounds in ToM and assess the performance of LLMs in such realistic evaluation scenarios. To achieve this, we introduce a novel benchmark, CharToM-QA, comprising 1,035 ToM questions based on characters from classic novels. Our human study reveals a significant disparity in performance: the same group of educated participants performs dramatically better when they have read the novels compared to when they have not. In parallel, our experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs, including the very recent o1 model, show that LLMs still perform notably worse than humans, despite that they have seen these stories during pre-training. This highlights the limitations of current LLMs in capturing the nuanced contextual information required for ToM reasoning.

Theory of mind (ToM) evaluations currently focus on testing models using passive narratives that inherently lack interactivity. We introduce FANToM, a new benchmark designed to stress-test ToM within information-asymmetric conversational contexts via question answering. Our benchmark draws upon important theoretical requisites from psychology and necessary empirical considerations when evaluating large language models (LLMs). In particular, we formulate multiple types of questions that demand the same underlying reasoning to identify illusory or false sense of ToM capabilities in LLMs. We show that FANToM is challenging for state-of-the-art LLMs, which perform significantly worse than humans even with chain-of-thought reasoning or fine-tuning.

Unlike perfect information games, where all elements are known to every player, imperfect information games emulate the real-world complexities of decision-making under uncertain or incomplete information. GPT-4, the recent breakthrough in large language models (LLMs) trained on massive passive data, is notable for its knowledge retrieval and reasoning abilities. This paper delves into the applicability of GPT-4's learned knowledge for imperfect information games. To achieve this, we introduce Suspicion-Agent, an innovative agent that leverages GPT-4's capabilities for performing in imperfect information games. With proper prompt engineering to achieve different functions, Suspicion-Agent based on GPT-4 demonstrates remarkable adaptability across a range of imperfect information card games. Importantly, GPT-4 displays a strong high-order theory of mind (ToM) capacity, meaning it can understand others and intentionally impact others' behavior. Leveraging this, we design a planning strategy that enables GPT-4 to competently play against different opponents, adapting its gameplay style as needed, while requiring only the game rules and descriptions of observations as input. In the experiments, we qualitatively showcase the capabilities of Suspicion-Agent across three different imperfect information games and then quantitatively evaluate it in Leduc Hold'em. The results show that Suspicion-Agent can potentially outperform traditional algorithms designed for imperfect information games, without any specialized training or examples. In order to encourage and foster deeper insights within the community, we make our game-related data publicly available.

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning by generating explanations for their predictions. However, a complementary goal of explanations is to also communicate useful knowledge that improves weaker agents. Hence, we investigate whether LLMs also make good teachers for weaker agents. In particular, we consider a student-teacher framework between two LLM agents and study if, when, and how the teacher should intervene with natural language explanations to improve the student's performance. Since communication is expensive, we define a budget such that the teacher only communicates explanations for a fraction of the data, after which the student should perform well on its own. We decompose the teaching problem along four axes: (1) if teacher's test time intervention improve student predictions, (2) when it is worth explaining a data point, (3) how the teacher should personalize explanations to better teach the student, and (4) if teacher explanations also improve student performance on future unexplained data. We first show that teacher LLMs can indeed intervene on student reasoning to improve their performance. Next, we propose a Theory of Mind approach, in which the teacher builds two few-shot mental models of the student. The first model defines an Intervention Function that simulates the utility of an intervention, allowing the teacher to intervene when this utility is the highest and improving student performance at lower budgets. The second model enables the teacher to personalize explanations for a particular student and outperform unpersonalized teachers. We also demonstrate that in multi-turn interactions, teacher explanations generalize and learning from explained data improves student performance on future unexplained data. Finally, we also verify that misaligned teachers can lower student performance to random chance by intentionally misleading them.

Persuasive dialogue plays a pivotal role in human communication, influencing various domains. Recent persuasive dialogue datasets often fail to align with real-world interpersonal interactions, leading to unfaithful representations. For instance, unrealistic scenarios may arise, such as when the persuadee explicitly instructs the persuader on which persuasion strategies to employ, with each of the persuadee's questions corresponding to a specific strategy for the persuader to follow. This issue can be attributed to a violation of the "Double Blind" condition, where critical information is fully shared between participants. In actual human interactions, however, key information such as the mental state of the persuadee and the persuasion strategies of the persuader is not directly accessible. The persuader must infer the persuadee's mental state using Theory of Mind capabilities and construct arguments that align with the persuadee's motivations. To address this gap, we introduce ToMMA, a novel multi-agent framework for dialogue generation that is guided by causal Theory of Mind. This framework ensures that information remains undisclosed between agents, preserving "double-blind" conditions, while causal ToM directs the persuader's reasoning, enhancing alignment with human-like persuasion dynamics. Consequently, we present CToMPersu, a multi-domain, multi-turn persuasive dialogue dataset that tackles both double-blind and logical coherence issues, demonstrating superior performance across multiple metrics and achieving better alignment with real human dialogues. Our dataset and prompts are available at https://github.com/DingyiZhang/ToMMA-CToMPersu .

While the recent Chain-of-Thought (CoT) technique enhances the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) with the theory of mind, it might still struggle in handling logical reasoning that relies much on symbolic expressions and rigid deducing rules. To strengthen the logical reasoning capability of LLMs, we propose a novel Symbolic Chain-of-Thought, namely SymbCoT, a fully LLM-based framework that integrates symbolic expressions and logic rules with CoT prompting. Technically, building upon an LLM, SymbCoT 1) first translates the natural language context into the symbolic format, and then 2) derives a step-by-step plan to solve the problem with symbolic logical rules, 3) followed by a verifier to check the translation and reasoning chain. Via thorough evaluations on 5 standard datasets with both First-Order Logic and Constraint Optimization symbolic expressions, SymbCoT shows striking improvements over the CoT method consistently, meanwhile refreshing the current state-of-the-art performances. We further demonstrate that our system advances in more faithful, flexible, and explainable logical reasoning. To our knowledge, this is the first to combine symbolic expressions and rules into CoT for logical reasoning with LLMs. Code is open at https://github.com/Aiden0526/SymbCoT.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has accelerated their application in reasoning, with strategic reasoning drawing increasing attention. To evaluate LLMs' strategic reasoning capabilities, game theory, with its concise structure, has become a preferred approach. However, current research focuses on a limited selection of games, resulting in low coverage. Classic game scenarios risk data leakage, and existing benchmarks often lack extensibility, making them inadequate for evaluating state-of-the-art models. To address these challenges, we propose TMGBench, a benchmark with comprehensive game type coverage, novel scenarios, and flexible organization. Specifically, we incorporate all 144 game types summarized by the Robinson-Goforth topology of 2x2 games, constructed as classic games. We also employ synthetic data generation to create diverse, higher-quality scenarios through topic guidance and human inspection, referred to as story-based games. Lastly, we provide a sustainable framework for increasingly powerful LLMs by treating these games as atomic units and organizing them into more complex forms via sequential, parallel, and nested structures. Our comprehensive evaluation of mainstream LLMs covers tests on rational reasoning, robustness, Theory-of-Mind (ToM), and reasoning in complex forms. Results reveal flaws in accuracy, consistency, and varying mastery of ToM. Additionally, o1-mini, OpenAI's latest reasoning model, achieved accuracy rates of 66.6%, 60.0%, and 70.0% on sequential, parallel, and nested games, highlighting TMGBench's challenges.

Agents built on large language models (LLMs) have excelled in turn-by-turn human-AI collaboration but struggle with simultaneous tasks requiring real-time interaction. Latency issues and the challenge of inferring variable human strategies hinder their ability to make autonomous decisions without explicit instructions. Through experiments with current independent System 1 and System 2 methods, we validate the necessity of using Dual Process Theory (DPT) in real-time tasks. We propose DPT-Agent, a novel language agent framework that integrates System 1 and System 2 for efficient real-time simultaneous human-AI collaboration. DPT-Agent's System 1 uses a Finite-state Machine (FSM) and code-as-policy for fast, intuitive, and controllable decision-making. DPT-Agent's System 2 integrates Theory of Mind (ToM) and asynchronous reflection to infer human intentions and perform reasoning-based autonomous decisions. We demonstrate the effectiveness of DPT-Agent through further experiments with rule-based agents and human collaborators, showing significant improvements over mainstream LLM-based frameworks. To the best of our knowledge, DPT-Agent is the first language agent framework that achieves successful real-time simultaneous human-AI collaboration autonomously. Code of DPT-Agent can be found in https://github.com/sjtu-marl/DPT-Agent.

Developmental psychologists have spent decades devising experiments to test the intelligence and knowledge of infants and children, tracing the origin of crucial concepts and capacities. Moreover, experimental techniques in developmental psychology have been carefully designed to discriminate the cognitive capacities that underlie particular behaviors. We propose that using classical experiments from child development is a particularly effective way to probe the computational abilities of AI models, in general, and LLMs in particular. First, the methodological techniques of developmental psychology, such as the use of novel stimuli to control for past experience or control conditions to determine whether children are using simple associations, can be equally helpful for assessing the capacities of LLMs. In parallel, testing LLMs in this way can tell us whether the information that is encoded in text is sufficient to enable particular responses, or whether those responses depend on other kinds of information, such as information from exploration of the physical world. In this work we adapt classical developmental experiments to evaluate the capabilities of LaMDA, a large language model from Google. We propose a novel LLM Response Score (LRS) metric which can be used to evaluate other language models, such as GPT. We find that LaMDA generates appropriate responses that are similar to those of children in experiments involving social understanding, perhaps providing evidence that knowledge of these domains is discovered through language. On the other hand, LaMDA's responses in early object and action understanding, theory of mind, and especially causal reasoning tasks are very different from those of young children, perhaps showing that these domains require more real-world, self-initiated exploration and cannot simply be learned from patterns in language input.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly advanced, their ability to exhibit compositional generalization -- the capacity to combine learned skills in novel ways not encountered during training -- has garnered significant attention. This type of generalization, particularly in scenarios beyond training data, is also of great interest in the study of AI safety and alignment. A recent study introduced the SKILL-MIX evaluation, where models are tasked with composing a short paragraph demonstrating the use of a specified k-tuple of language skills. While small models struggled with composing even with k=3, larger models like GPT-4 performed reasonably well with k=5 and 6. In this paper, we employ a setup akin to SKILL-MIX to evaluate the capacity of smaller models to learn compositional generalization from examples. Utilizing a diverse set of language skills -- including rhetorical, literary, reasoning, theory of mind, and common sense -- GPT-4 was used to generate text samples that exhibit random subsets of k skills. Subsequent fine-tuning of 7B and 13B parameter models on these combined skill texts, for increasing values of k, revealed the following findings: (1) Training on combinations of k=2 and 3 skills results in noticeable improvements in the ability to compose texts with k=4 and 5 skills, despite models never having seen such examples during training. (2) When skill categories are split into training and held-out groups, models significantly improve at composing texts with held-out skills during testing despite having only seen training skills during fine-tuning, illustrating the efficacy of the training approach even with previously unseen skills. This study also suggests that incorporating skill-rich (potentially synthetic) text into training can substantially enhance the compositional capabilities of models.

In this paper, we propose the use of the popular word-based board game Codenames as a suitable benchmark for evaluating the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). Codenames presents a highly interesting challenge for achieving successful AI performance, requiring both a sophisticated understanding of language, theory of mind, and epistemic reasoning capabilities. Prior attempts to develop agents for Codenames have largely relied on word embedding techniques, which have a limited vocabulary range and perform poorly when paired with differing approaches. LLMs have demonstrated enhanced reasoning and comprehension capabilities for language-based tasks, but can still suffer in lateral thinking challenges. We evaluate the capabilities of several state-of-the-art LLMs, including GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and Llama 3.1, across a variety of board setups. Our results indicate that while certain LLMs perform better than others overall, different models exhibit varying emergent behaviours during gameplay and excel at specific roles. We also evaluate the performance of different combinations of LLMs when playing cooperatively together, demonstrating that LLM agents are more generalisable to a wider range of teammates than prior techniques.

Existing agents based on large language models (LLMs) demonstrate robust problem-solving capabilities by integrating LLMs' inherent knowledge, strong in-context learning and zero-shot capabilities, and the use of tools combined with intricately designed LLM invocation workflows by humans. However, these agents still exhibit shortcomings in long-term reasoning and under-use the potential of existing tools, leading to noticeable deficiencies in complex real-world reasoning scenarios. To address these limitations, we introduce Sibyl, a simple yet powerful LLM-based agent framework designed to tackle complex reasoning tasks by efficiently leveraging a minimal set of tools. Drawing inspiration from Global Workspace Theory, Sibyl incorporates a global workspace to enhance the management and sharing of knowledge and conversation history throughout the system. Furthermore, guided by Society of Mind Theory, Sibyl implements a multi-agent debate-based jury to self-refine the final answers, ensuring a comprehensive and balanced approach. This approach aims to reduce system complexity while expanding the scope of problems solvable-from matters typically resolved by humans in minutes to those requiring hours or even days, thus facilitating a shift from System-1 to System-2 thinking. Sibyl has been designed with a focus on scalability and ease of debugging by incorporating the concept of reentrancy from functional programming from its inception, with the aim of seamless and low effort integration in other LLM applications to improve capabilities. Our experimental results on the GAIA benchmark test set reveal that the Sibyl agent instantiated with GPT-4 achieves state-of-the-art performance with an average score of 34.55%, compared to other agents based on GPT-4. We hope that Sibyl can inspire more reliable and reusable LLM-based agent solutions to address complex real-world reasoning tasks.

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental states, is an essential ingredient for developing machines with human-level social intelligence. Recent machine learning models, particularly large language models, seem to show some aspects of ToM understanding. However, existing ToM benchmarks use unimodal datasets - either video or text. Human ToM, on the other hand, is more than video or text understanding. People can flexibly reason about another person's mind based on conceptual representations (e.g., goals, beliefs, plans) extracted from any available data. To address this, we introduce a multimodal Theory of Mind question answering (MMToM-QA) benchmark. MMToM-QA comprehensively evaluates machine ToM both on multimodal data and on different kinds of unimodal data about a person's activity in a household environment. To engineer multimodal ToM capacity, we propose a novel method, BIP-ALM (Bayesian Inverse Planning Accelerated by Language Models). BIP-ALM extracts unified representations from multimodal data and utilizes language models for scalable Bayesian inverse planning. We conducted a systematic comparison of human performance, BIP-ALM, and state-of-the-art models, including GPT-4. The experiments demonstrate that large language models and large multimodal models still lack robust ToM capacity. BIP-ALM, on the other hand, shows promising results, by leveraging the power of both model-based mental inference and language models.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods struggle with the non-stationarity of multi-agent systems and fail to adaptively learn online when tested with novel agents. Here, we leverage large language models (LLMs) to create an autonomous agent that can handle these challenges. Our agent, Hypothetical Minds, consists of a cognitively-inspired architecture, featuring modular components for perception, memory, and hierarchical planning over two levels of abstraction. We introduce the Theory of Mind module that scaffolds the high-level planning process by generating hypotheses about other agents' strategies in natural language. It then evaluates and iteratively refines these hypotheses by reinforcing hypotheses that make correct predictions about the other agents' behavior. Hypothetical Minds significantly improves performance over previous LLM-agent and RL baselines on a range of competitive, mixed motive, and collaborative domains in the Melting Pot benchmark, including both dyadic and population-based environments. Additionally, comparisons against LLM-agent baselines and ablations reveal the importance of hypothesis evaluation and refinement for succeeding on complex scenarios.

We propose CX-ToM, short for counterfactual explanations with theory-of mind, a new explainable AI (XAI) framework for explaining decisions made by a deep convolutional neural network (CNN). In contrast to the current methods in XAI that generate explanations as a single shot response, we pose explanation as an iterative communication process, i.e. dialog, between the machine and human user. More concretely, our CX-ToM framework generates sequence of explanations in a dialog by mediating the differences between the minds of machine and human user. To do this, we use Theory of Mind (ToM) which helps us in explicitly modeling human's intention, machine's mind as inferred by the human as well as human's mind as inferred by the machine. Moreover, most state-of-the-art XAI frameworks provide attention (or heat map) based explanations. In our work, we show that these attention based explanations are not sufficient for increasing human trust in the underlying CNN model. In CX-ToM, we instead use counterfactual explanations called fault-lines which we define as follows: given an input image I for which a CNN classification model M predicts class c_pred, a fault-line identifies the minimal semantic-level features (e.g., stripes on zebra, pointed ears of dog), referred to as explainable concepts, that need to be added to or deleted from I in order to alter the classification category of I by M to another specified class c_alt. We argue that, due to the iterative, conceptual and counterfactual nature of CX-ToM explanations, our framework is practical and more natural for both expert and non-expert users to understand the internal workings of complex deep learning models. Extensive quantitative and qualitative experiments verify our hypotheses, demonstrating that our CX-ToM significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art explainable AI models.

When reading a story, humans can quickly understand new fictional characters with a few observations, mainly by drawing analogies to fictional and real people they already know. This reflects the few-shot and meta-learning essence of humans' inference of characters' mental states, i.e., theory-of-mind (ToM), which is largely ignored in existing research. We fill this gap with a novel NLP dataset, ToM-in-AMC, the first assessment of machines' meta-learning of ToM in a realistic narrative understanding scenario. Our dataset consists of ~1,000 parsed movie scripts, each corresponding to a few-shot character understanding task that requires models to mimic humans' ability of fast digesting characters with a few starting scenes in a new movie. We propose a novel ToM prompting approach designed to explicitly assess the influence of multiple ToM dimensions. It surpasses existing baseline models, underscoring the significance of modeling multiple ToM dimensions for our task. Our extensive human study verifies that humans are capable of solving our problem by inferring characters' mental states based on their previously seen movies. In comparison, our systems based on either state-of-the-art large language models (GPT-4) or meta-learning algorithms lags >20% behind, highlighting a notable limitation in existing approaches' ToM capabilities.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

Recent work on dialogue-based collaborative plan acquisition (CPA) has suggested that Theory of Mind (ToM) modelling can improve missing knowledge prediction in settings with asymmetric skill-sets and knowledge. Although ToM was claimed to be important for effective collaboration, its real impact on this novel task remains under-explored. By representing plans as graphs and by exploiting task-specific constraints we show that, as performance on CPA nearly doubles when predicting one's own missing knowledge, the improvements due to ToM modelling diminish. This phenomenon persists even when evaluating existing baseline methods. To better understand the relevance of ToM for CPA, we report a principled performance comparison of models with and without ToM features. Results across different models and ablations consistently suggest that learned ToM features are indeed more likely to reflect latent patterns in the data with no perceivable link to ToM. This finding calls for a deeper understanding of the role of ToM in CPA and beyond, as well as new methods for modelling and evaluating mental states in computational collaborative agents.

In the social world, humans possess the capability to infer and reason about others mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions), known as the Theory of Mind (ToM). Simultaneously, humans own mental states evolve in response to social situations, a capability we refer to as socialization. Together, these capabilities form the foundation of human social interaction. In the era of artificial intelligence (AI), especially with the development of large language models (LLMs), we raise an intriguing question: How do LLMs perform in terms of ToM and socialization capabilities? And more broadly, can these AI models truly enter and navigate the real social world? Existing research evaluating LLMs ToM and socialization capabilities by positioning LLMs as passive observers from a third person perspective, rather than as active participants. However, compared to the third-person perspective, observing and understanding the world from an egocentric first person perspective is a natural approach for both humans and AI agents. The ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective, a crucial attribute for advancing embodied AI agents, remain unexplored. To answer the aforementioned questions and bridge the research gap, we introduce EgoSocialArena, a novel framework designed to evaluate and investigate the ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective. It encompasses two evaluation environments: static environment and interactive environment, with seven scenarios: Daily Life, Counterfactual, New World, Blackjack, Number Guessing, and Limit Texas Hold em, totaling 2,195 data entries. With EgoSocialArena, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of nine advanced LLMs and observed some key insights regarding the future development of LLMs as well as the capabilities levels of the most advanced LLMs currently available.

In this paper, we explore the ability to model and infer personality types of opponents, predict their responses, and use this information to adapt a dialog agent's high-level strategy in negotiation tasks. Inspired by the idea of incorporating a theory of mind (ToM) into machines, we introduce a probabilistic formulation to encapsulate the opponent's personality type during both learning and inference. We test our approach on the CraigslistBargain dataset and show that our method using ToM inference achieves a 20% higher dialog agreement rate compared to baselines on a mixed population of opponents. We also find that our model displays diverse negotiation behavior with different types of opponents.

This paper examines the extent to which large language models (LLMs) have developed higher-order theory of mind (ToM); the human ability to reason about multiple mental and emotional states in a recursive manner (e.g. I think that you believe that she knows). This paper builds on prior work by introducing a handwritten test suite -- Multi-Order Theory of Mind Q&A -- and using it to compare the performance of five LLMs to a newly gathered adult human benchmark. We find that GPT-4 and Flan-PaLM reach adult-level and near adult-level performance on ToM tasks overall, and that GPT-4 exceeds adult performance on 6th order inferences. Our results suggest that there is an interplay between model size and finetuning for the realisation of ToM abilities, and that the best-performing LLMs have developed a generalised capacity for ToM. Given the role that higher-order ToM plays in a wide range of cooperative and competitive human behaviours, these findings have significant implications for user-facing LLM applications.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Chain-of-thought reasoning, a cognitive process fundamental to human intelligence, has garnered significant attention in the realm of artificial intelligence and natural language processing. However, there still remains a lack of a comprehensive survey for this arena. To this end, we take the first step and present a thorough survey of this research field carefully and widely. We use X-of-Thought to refer to Chain-of-Thought in a broad sense. In detail, we systematically organize the current research according to the taxonomies of methods, including XoT construction, XoT structure variants, and enhanced XoT. Additionally, we describe XoT with frontier applications, covering planning, tool use, and distillation. Furthermore, we address challenges and discuss some future directions, including faithfulness, multi-modal, and theory. We hope this survey serves as a valuable resource for researchers seeking to innovate within the domain of chain-of-thought reasoning.

We introduce Agentic Reasoning, a framework that enhances large language model (LLM) reasoning by integrating external tool-using agents. Unlike conventional LLM-based reasoning approaches, which rely solely on internal inference, Agentic Reasoning dynamically engages web search, code execution, and structured reasoning-context memory to solve complex problems requiring deep research and multi-step logical deduction. Our framework introduces the Mind Map agent, which constructs a structured knowledge graph to track logical relationships, improving deductive reasoning. Additionally, the integration of web-search and coding agents enables real-time retrieval and computational analysis, enhancing reasoning accuracy and decision-making. Evaluations on PhD-level scientific reasoning (GPQA) and domain-specific deep research tasks demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms existing models, including leading retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems and closed-source LLMs. Moreover, our results indicate that agentic reasoning improves expert-level knowledge synthesis, test-time scalability, and structured problem-solving. The code is at: https://github.com/theworldofagents/Agentic-Reasoning.

Successful and effective communication between humans and AI relies on a shared experience of the world. By training solely on written text, current language models (LMs) miss the grounded experience of humans in the real-world -- their failure to relate language to the physical world causes knowledge to be misrepresented and obvious mistakes in their reasoning. We present Mind's Eye, a paradigm to ground language model reasoning in the physical world. Given a physical reasoning question, we use a computational physics engine (DeepMind's MuJoCo) to simulate the possible outcomes, and then use the simulation results as part of the input, which enables language models to perform reasoning. Experiments on 39 tasks in a physics alignment benchmark demonstrate that Mind's Eye can improve reasoning ability by a large margin (27.9% zero-shot, and 46.0% few-shot absolute accuracy improvement on average). Smaller language models armed with Mind's Eye can obtain similar performance to models that are 100x larger. Finally, we confirm the robustness of Mind's Eye through ablation studies.

Eleven Large Language Models (LLMs) were assessed using a custom-made battery of false-belief tasks, considered a gold standard in testing Theory of Mind (ToM) in humans. The battery included 640 prompts spread across 40 diverse tasks, each one including a false-belief scenario, three closely matched true-belief control scenarios, and the reversed versions of all four. To solve a single task, a model needed to correctly answer 16 prompts across all eight scenarios. Smaller and older models solved no tasks; GPT-3-davinci-003 (from November 2022) and ChatGPT-3.5-turbo (from March 2023) solved 20% of the tasks; ChatGPT-4 (from June 2023) solved 75% of the tasks, matching the performance of six-year-old children observed in past studies. We explore the potential interpretation of these findings, including the intriguing possibility that ToM, previously considered exclusive to humans, may have spontaneously emerged as a byproduct of LLMs' improving language skills.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Language has long been conceived as an essential tool for human reasoning. The breakthrough of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked significant research interest in leveraging these models to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Researchers have moved beyond simple autoregressive token generation by introducing the concept of "thought" -- a sequence of tokens representing intermediate steps in the reasoning process. This innovative paradigm enables LLMs' to mimic complex human reasoning processes, such as tree search and reflective thinking. Recently, an emerging trend of learning to reason has applied reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to master reasoning processes. This approach enables the automatic generation of high-quality reasoning trajectories through trial-and-error search algorithms, significantly expanding LLMs' reasoning capacity by providing substantially more training data. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that encouraging LLMs to "think" with more tokens during test-time inference can further significantly boost reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the train-time and test-time scaling combined to show a new research frontier -- a path toward Large Reasoning Model. The introduction of OpenAI's o1 series marks a significant milestone in this research direction. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of recent progress in LLM reasoning. We begin by introducing the foundational background of LLMs and then explore the key technical components driving the development of large reasoning models, with a focus on automated data construction, learning-to-reason techniques, and test-time scaling. We also analyze popular open-source projects at building large reasoning models, and conclude with open challenges and future research directions.

Multi-agent interactions, such as communication, teaching, and bluffing, often rely on higher-order social inference, i.e., understanding how others infer oneself. Such intricate reasoning can be effectively modeled through nested multi-agent reasoning. Nonetheless, the computational complexity escalates exponentially with each level of reasoning, posing a significant challenge. However, humans effortlessly perform complex social inferences as part of their daily lives. To bridge the gap between human-like inference capabilities and computational limitations, we propose a novel approach: leveraging neural networks to amortize high-order social inference, thereby expediting nested multi-agent reasoning. We evaluate our method in two challenging multi-agent interaction domains. The experimental results demonstrate that our method is computationally efficient while exhibiting minimal degradation in accuracy.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Exploiting large language models (LLMs) to tackle deductive reasoning has garnered growing attention. It still remains highly challenging to achieve satisfactory results in complex deductive problems, characterized by plenty of premises (i.e., facts or rules) entailing intricate relationships among entities and requiring multi-hop reasoning. One intuitive solution is to decompose the original task into smaller sub-tasks, and then chain the multiple casual reasoning steps together in a forward (e.g., Selection-Inference) or backward (e.g., LAMBADA) direction. However, these techniques inevitably necessitate a large number of overall stages, leading to computationally expensive operations and a higher possibility of making misleading steps. In addition to stage-by-stage decomposition, we draw inspiration from another aspect of human problem-solving. Humans tend to distill the most relevant information and organize their thoughts systematically (e.g., creating mind maps), which assists them in answering questions or drawing conclusions precisely and quickly. In light of this, we propose a novel reasoning approach named Concise and Organized Perception (COP). COP carefully analyzes the given statements to efficiently identify the most pertinent information while eliminating redundancy. It then prompts the LLMs in a more organized form that adapts to the model's inference process. By perceiving concise and organized proofs, the deductive reasoning abilities of LLMs can be better elicited, and the risk of acquiring errors caused by excessive reasoning stages is mitigated. Furthermore, our approach can be combined with the aforementioned ones to further boost their performance. Extensive experimental results on three popular deductive benchmarks (i.e., ProofWriter, PrOntoQA and PrOntoQA-OOD) show that COP significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) significantly benefit from Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting in performing various reasoning tasks. While CoT allows models to produce more comprehensive reasoning processes, its emphasis on intermediate reasoning steps can inadvertently introduce hallucinations and accumulated errors, thereby limiting models' ability to solve complex reasoning tasks. Inspired by how humans engage in careful and meticulous deductive logical reasoning processes to solve tasks, we seek to enable language models to perform explicit and rigorous deductive reasoning, and also ensure the trustworthiness of their reasoning process through self-verification. However, directly verifying the validity of an entire deductive reasoning process is challenging, even with advanced models like ChatGPT. In light of this, we propose to decompose a reasoning verification process into a series of step-by-step subprocesses, each only receiving their necessary context and premises. To facilitate this procedure, we propose Natural Program, a natural language-based deductive reasoning format. Our approach enables models to generate precise reasoning steps where subsequent steps are more rigorously grounded on prior steps. It also empowers language models to carry out reasoning self-verification in a step-by-step manner. By integrating this verification process into each deductive reasoning stage, we significantly enhance the rigor and trustfulness of generated reasoning steps. Along this process, we also improve the answer correctness on complex reasoning tasks. Code will be released at https://github.com/lz1oceani/verify_cot.

Large language models (LLMs) have dramatically enhanced the field of language intelligence, as demonstrably evidenced by their formidable empirical performance across a spectrum of complex reasoning tasks. Additionally, theoretical proofs have illuminated their emergent reasoning capabilities, providing a compelling showcase of their advanced cognitive abilities in linguistic contexts. Critical to their remarkable efficacy in handling complex reasoning tasks, LLMs leverage the intriguing chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning techniques, obliging them to formulate intermediate steps en route to deriving an answer. The CoT reasoning approach has not only exhibited proficiency in amplifying reasoning performance but also in enhancing interpretability, controllability, and flexibility. In light of these merits, recent research endeavors have extended CoT reasoning methodologies to nurture the development of autonomous language agents, which adeptly adhere to language instructions and execute actions within varied environments. This survey paper orchestrates a thorough discourse, penetrating vital research dimensions, encompassing: (i) the foundational mechanics of CoT techniques, with a focus on elucidating the circumstances and justification behind its efficacy; (ii) the paradigm shift in CoT; and (iii) the burgeoning of language agents fortified by CoT approaches. Prospective research avenues envelop explorations into generalization, efficiency, customization, scaling, and safety. This paper caters to a wide audience, including beginners seeking comprehensive knowledge of CoT reasoning and language agents, as well as experienced researchers interested in foundational mechanics and engaging in cutting-edge discussions on these topics. A repository for the related papers is available at https://github.com/Zoeyyao27/CoT-Igniting-Agent.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

With the widespread use of large language models (LLMs) in NLP tasks, researchers have discovered the potential of Chain-of-thought (CoT) to assist LLMs in accomplishing complex reasoning tasks by generating intermediate steps. However, human thought processes are often non-linear, rather than simply sequential chains of thoughts. Therefore, we propose Graph-of-Thought (GoT) reasoning, which models human thought processes not only as a chain but also as a graph. By representing thought units as nodes and connections between them as edges, our approach captures the non-sequential nature of human thinking and allows for a more realistic modeling of thought processes. Similar to Multimodal-CoT, we modeled GoT reasoning as a two-stage framework, generating rationales first and then producing the final answer. Specifically, we employ an additional graph-of-thoughts encoder for GoT representation learning and fuse the GoT representation with the original input representation through a gated fusion mechanism. We implement a GoT reasoning model on the T5 pre-trained model and evaluate its performance on a text-only reasoning task (GSM8K) and a multimodal reasoning task (ScienceQA). Our model achieves significant improvement over the strong CoT baseline with 3.41% and 5.08% on the GSM8K test set with T5-base and T5-large architectures, respectively. Additionally, our model boosts accuracy from 84.91% to 91.54% using the T5-base model and from 91.68% to 92.77% using the T5-large model over the state-of-the-art Multimodal-CoT on the ScienceQA test set. Experiments have shown that GoT achieves comparable results to Multimodal-CoT(large) with over 700M parameters, despite having fewer than 250M backbone model parameters, demonstrating the effectiveness of GoT.

Reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence that plays a crucial role in activities such as problem solving, decision making, and critical thinking. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in natural language processing, and there is observation that these models may exhibit reasoning abilities when they are sufficiently large. However, it is not yet clear to what extent LLMs are capable of reasoning. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge on reasoning in LLMs, including techniques for improving and eliciting reasoning in these models, methods and benchmarks for evaluating reasoning abilities, findings and implications of previous research in this field, and suggestions on future directions. Our aim is to provide a detailed and up-to-date review of this topic and stimulate meaningful discussion and future work.

We introduce Diagram of Thought (DoT), a framework that models iterative reasoning in large language models (LLMs) as the construction of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) within a single model. Unlike traditional approaches that represent reasoning as linear chains or trees, DoT organizes propositions, critiques, refinements, and verifications into a cohesive DAG structure, allowing the model to explore complex reasoning pathways while maintaining logical consistency. Each node in the diagram corresponds to a proposition that has been proposed, critiqued, refined, or verified, enabling the LLM to iteratively improve its reasoning through natural language feedback. By leveraging auto-regressive next-token prediction with role-specific tokens, DoT facilitates seamless transitions between proposing ideas and critically evaluating them, providing richer feedback than binary signals. Furthermore, we formalize the DoT framework using Topos Theory, providing a mathematical foundation that ensures logical consistency and soundness in the reasoning process. This approach enhances both the training and inference processes within a single LLM, eliminating the need for multiple models or external control mechanisms. DoT offers a conceptual framework for designing next-generation reasoning-specialized models, emphasizing training efficiency, robust reasoning capabilities, and theoretical grounding. The code is available at https://github.com/diagram-of-thought/diagram-of-thought.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning abilities in complex tasks. However, they lack up-to-date knowledge and experience hallucinations during reasoning, which can lead to incorrect reasoning processes and diminish their performance and trustworthiness. Knowledge graphs (KGs), which capture vast amounts of facts in a structured format, offer a reliable source of knowledge for reasoning. Nevertheless, existing KG-based LLM reasoning methods only treat KGs as factual knowledge bases and overlook the importance of their structural information for reasoning. In this paper, we propose a novel method called reasoning on graphs (RoG) that synergizes LLMs with KGs to enable faithful and interpretable reasoning. Specifically, we present a planning-retrieval-reasoning framework, where RoG first generates relation paths grounded by KGs as faithful plans. These plans are then used to retrieve valid reasoning paths from the KGs for LLMs to conduct faithful reasoning. Furthermore, RoG not only distills knowledge from KGs to improve the reasoning ability of LLMs through training but also allows seamless integration with any arbitrary LLMs during inference. Extensive experiments on two benchmark KGQA datasets demonstrate that RoG achieves state-of-the-art performance on KG reasoning tasks and generates faithful and interpretable reasoning results.

Abstract reasoning, the ability to reason from the abstract essence of a problem, serves as a key to generalization in human reasoning. However, eliciting language models to perform reasoning with abstraction remains unexplored. This paper seeks to bridge this gap by introducing a novel structured reasoning format called Abstraction-of-Thought (AoT). The uniqueness of AoT lies in its explicit requirement for varying levels of abstraction within the reasoning process. This approach could elicit language models to first contemplate on the abstract level before incorporating concrete details, which is overlooked by the prevailing step-by-step Chain-of-Thought (CoT) method. To align models with the AoT format, we present AoT Collection, a generic finetuning dataset consisting of 348k high-quality samples with AoT reasoning processes, collected via an automated and scalable pipeline. We finetune a wide range of language models with AoT Collection and conduct extensive evaluations on 23 unseen tasks from the challenging benchmark Big-Bench Hard. Experimental results indicate that models aligned to AoT reasoning format substantially outperform those aligned to CoT in many reasoning tasks.

Recent advancements in large language models have showcased their remarkable generalizability across various domains. However, their reasoning abilities still have significant room for improvement, especially when confronted with scenarios requiring multi-step reasoning. Although large language models possess extensive knowledge, their behavior, particularly in terms of reasoning, often fails to effectively utilize this knowledge to establish a coherent thinking paradigm. Generative language models sometimes show hallucinations as their reasoning procedures are unconstrained by logical principles. Aiming to improve the zero-shot chain-of-thought reasoning ability of large language models, we propose Logical Chain-of-Thought (LogiCoT), a neurosymbolic framework that leverages principles from symbolic logic to verify and revise the reasoning processes accordingly. Experimental evaluations conducted on language tasks in diverse domains, including arithmetic, commonsense, symbolic, causal inference, and social problems, demonstrate the efficacy of the enhanced reasoning paradigm by logic.

When writing and talking, people sometimes pause to think. Although reasoning-focused works have often framed reasoning as a method of answering questions or completing agentic tasks, reasoning is implicit in almost all written text. For example, this applies to the steps not stated between the lines of a proof or to the theory of mind underlying a conversation. In the Self-Taught Reasoner (STaR, Zelikman et al. 2022), useful thinking is learned by inferring rationales from few-shot examples in question-answering and learning from those that lead to a correct answer. This is a highly constrained setting -- ideally, a language model could instead learn to infer unstated rationales in arbitrary text. We present Quiet-STaR, a generalization of STaR in which LMs learn to generate rationales at each token to explain future text, improving their predictions. We address key challenges, including 1) the computational cost of generating continuations, 2) the fact that the LM does not initially know how to generate or use internal thoughts, and 3) the need to predict beyond individual next tokens. To resolve these, we propose a tokenwise parallel sampling algorithm, using learnable tokens indicating a thought's start and end, and an extended teacher-forcing technique. Encouragingly, generated rationales disproportionately help model difficult-to-predict tokens and improve the LM's ability to directly answer difficult questions. In particular, after continued pretraining of an LM on a corpus of internet text with Quiet-STaR, we find zero-shot improvements on GSM8K (5.9%rightarrow10.9%) and CommonsenseQA (36.3%rightarrow47.2%) and observe a perplexity improvement of difficult tokens in natural text. Crucially, these improvements require no fine-tuning on these tasks. Quiet-STaR marks a step towards LMs that can learn to reason in a more general and scalable way.

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in handling complex reasoning tasks through step-by-step rationale generation. However, recent studies have raised concerns regarding the hallucination and flaws in their reasoning process. Substantial efforts are being made to improve the reliability and faithfulness of the generated rationales. Some approaches model reasoning as planning, while others focus on annotating for process supervision. Nevertheless, the planning-based search process often results in high latency due to the frequent assessment of intermediate reasoning states and the extensive exploration space. Additionally, supervising the reasoning process with human annotation is costly and challenging to scale for LLM training. To address these issues, in this paper, we propose a framework to learn planning-based reasoning through direct preference optimization (DPO) on collected trajectories, which are ranked according to synthesized process rewards. Our results on challenging logical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our learning framework, showing that our 7B model can surpass the strong counterparts like GPT-3.5-Turbo.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable abilities across various language tasks, but solving complex reasoning problems remains a challenge. While existing methods like Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Tree-of-Thought (ToT) enhance reasoning by decomposing problems or structuring prompts, they typically perform a single pass of reasoning and may fail to revisit flawed paths, compromising accuracy. To address this, we propose a novel reasoning framework called Forest-of-Thought (FoT), which integrates multiple reasoning trees to leverage collective decision-making for solving complex logical problems. FoT utilizes sparse activation strategies to select the most relevant reasoning paths, improving both efficiency and accuracy. Additionally, we introduce a dynamic self-correction strategy that enables real-time error correction and learning from past mistakes, as well as consensus-guided decision making strategies to optimize correctness and computational resources. Experimental results demonstrate that the FoT framework, combined with these strategies, significantly enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, enabling them to solve complex tasks with greater precision and efficiency.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning has emerged as an effective approach for activating latent capabilities in large language models (LLMs). We observe that CoT shares significant similarities with self-training in terms of their learning processes. Motivated by these parallels, this paper explores the underlying relationship between CoT and self-training, demonstrating how insights from self-training can enhance CoT performance. Specifically, our study first reveals that CoT, like self-training, follows the principle of semantic entropy minimization. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel CoT framework that incorporates two key components: (i) a task-specific prompt module designed to guide LLMs in generating high-quality initial reasoning processes, and (ii) an adaptive reasoning iteration module for progressively refining the reasoning process.

Understanding emotions is fundamental to human interaction and experience. Humans easily infer emotions from situations or facial expressions, situations from emotions, and do a variety of other affective cognition. How adept is modern AI at these inferences? We introduce an evaluation framework for testing affective cognition in foundation models. Starting from psychological theory, we generate 1,280 diverse scenarios exploring relationships between appraisals, emotions, expressions, and outcomes. We evaluate the abilities of foundation models (GPT-4, Claude-3, Gemini-1.5-Pro) and humans (N = 567) across carefully selected conditions. Our results show foundation models tend to agree with human intuitions, matching or exceeding interparticipant agreement. In some conditions, models are ``superhuman'' -- they better predict modal human judgements than the average human. All models benefit from chain-of-thought reasoning. This suggests foundation models have acquired a human-like understanding of emotions and their influence on beliefs and behavior.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has emerged as a promising approach for enhancing the performance of large language models (LLMs) on complex reasoning tasks. Recently, a series of studies attempt to explain the mechanisms underlying CoT, aiming to deepen the understanding of its efficacy. Nevertheless, the existing research faces two major challenges: (1) a lack of quantitative metrics to assess CoT capabilities and (2) a dearth of guidance on optimizing CoT performance. Motivated by this, in this work, we introduce a novel reasoning boundary framework (RBF) to address these challenges. To solve the lack of quantification, we first define a reasoning boundary (RB) to quantify the upper-bound of CoT and establish a combination law for RB, enabling a practical quantitative approach applicable to various real-world CoT tasks. To address the lack of optimization, we propose three categories of RBs. We further optimize these categories with combination laws focused on RB promotion and reasoning path optimization for CoT improvement. Through extensive experiments on 27 models and 5 tasks, the study validates the existence and rationality of the proposed framework. Furthermore, it explains the effectiveness of 10 CoT strategies and guides optimization from two perspectives. We hope this work can provide a comprehensive understanding of the boundaries and optimization strategies for reasoning in LLMs. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/LightChen233/reasoning-boundary.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

We propose a novel framework, Meta Chain-of-Thought (Meta-CoT), which extends traditional Chain-of-Thought (CoT) by explicitly modeling the underlying reasoning required to arrive at a particular CoT. We present empirical evidence from state-of-the-art models exhibiting behaviors consistent with in-context search, and explore methods for producing Meta-CoT via process supervision, synthetic data generation, and search algorithms. Finally, we outline a concrete pipeline for training a model to produce Meta-CoTs, incorporating instruction tuning with linearized search traces and reinforcement learning post-training. Finally, we discuss open research questions, including scaling laws, verifier roles, and the potential for discovering novel reasoning algorithms. This work provides a theoretical and practical roadmap to enable Meta-CoT in LLMs, paving the way for more powerful and human-like reasoning in artificial intelligence.

Logical reasoning is central to complex human activities, such as thinking, debating, and planning; it is also a central component of many AI systems as well. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which encoder-only transformer language models (LMs) can reason according to logical rules. We ask whether those LMs can deduce theorems in propositional calculus and first-order logic; if their relative success in these problems reflects general logical capabilities; and which layers contribute the most to the task. First, we show for several encoder-only LMs that they can be trained, to a reasonable degree, to determine logical validity on various datasets. Next, by cross-probing fine-tuned models on these datasets, we show that LMs have difficulty in transferring their putative logical reasoning ability, which suggests that they may have learned dataset-specific features, instead of a general capability. Finally, we conduct a layerwise probing experiment, which shows that the hypothesis classification task is mostly solved through higher layers.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning in vision language models (VLMs) is crucial for improving interpretability and trustworthiness. However, current training recipes lack robust CoT reasoning data, relying on datasets dominated by short annotations with minimal rationales. In this work, we show that training VLM on short answers does not generalize well to reasoning tasks that require more detailed responses. To address this, we propose a two-fold approach. First, we distill rationales from GPT-4o model to enrich the training data and fine-tune VLMs, boosting their CoT performance. Second, we apply reinforcement learning to further calibrate reasoning quality. Specifically, we construct positive (correct) and negative (incorrect) pairs of model-generated reasoning chains, by comparing their predictions with annotated short answers. Using this pairwise data, we apply the Direct Preference Optimization algorithm to refine the model's reasoning abilities. Our experiments demonstrate significant improvements in CoT reasoning on benchmark datasets and better generalization to direct answer prediction as well. This work emphasizes the importance of incorporating detailed rationales in training and leveraging reinforcement learning to strengthen the reasoning capabilities of VLMs.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

Reasoning is a distinctive human capacity, enabling us to address complex problems by breaking them down into a series of manageable cognitive steps. Yet, complex logical reasoning is still cumbersome for language models. Based on the dual process theory in cognitive science, we are the first to unravel the cognitive reasoning abilities of language models. Our framework employs an iterative methodology to construct a Cognitive Tree (CogTree). The root node of this tree represents the initial query, while the leaf nodes consist of straightforward questions that can be answered directly. This construction involves two main components: the implicit extraction module (referred to as the intuitive system) and the explicit reasoning module (referred to as the reflective system). The intuitive system rapidly generates multiple responses by utilizing in-context examples, while the reflective system scores these responses using comparative learning. The scores guide the intuitive system in its subsequent generation step. Our experimental results on two popular and challenging reasoning tasks indicate that it is possible to achieve a performance level comparable to that of GPT-3.5 (with 175B parameters), using a significantly smaller language model that contains fewer parameters (<=7B) than 5% of GPT-3.5.

Extensive work has shown that the performance and interpretability of commonsense reasoning can be improved via knowledge-augmented reasoning methods, where the knowledge that underpins the reasoning process is explicitly verbalized and utilized. However, existing implementations, including "chain-of-thought" and its variants, fall short in capturing the introspective nature of knowledge required in commonsense reasoning, and in accounting for the mutual adaptation between the generation and utilization of knowledge. We propose a novel method to develop an introspective commonsense reasoner, Crystal. To tackle commonsense problems, it first introspects for knowledge statements related to the given question, and subsequently makes an informed prediction that is grounded in the previously introspected knowledge. The knowledge introspection and knowledge-grounded reasoning modes of the model are tuned via reinforcement learning to mutually adapt, where the reward derives from the feedback given by the model itself. Experiments show that Crystal significantly outperforms both the standard supervised finetuning and chain-of-thought distilled methods, and enhances the transparency of the commonsense reasoning process. Our work ultimately validates the feasibility and potential of reinforcing a neural model with self-feedback.

Large language models (LLMs) are restricted to reason in the "language space", where they typically express the reasoning process with a chain-of-thought (CoT) to solve a complex reasoning problem. However, we argue that language space may not always be optimal for reasoning. For example, most word tokens are primarily for textual coherence and not essential for reasoning, while some critical tokens require complex planning and pose huge challenges to LLMs. To explore the potential of LLM reasoning in an unrestricted latent space instead of using natural language, we introduce a new paradigm Coconut (Chain of Continuous Thought). We utilize the last hidden state of the LLM as a representation of the reasoning state (termed "continuous thought"). Rather than decoding this into a word token, we feed it back to the LLM as the subsequent input embedding directly in the continuous space. Experiments show that Coconut can effectively augment the LLM on several reasoning tasks. This novel latent reasoning paradigm leads to emergent advanced reasoning patterns: the continuous thought can encode multiple alternative next reasoning steps, allowing the model to perform a breadth-first search (BFS) to solve the problem, rather than prematurely committing to a single deterministic path like CoT. Coconut outperforms CoT in certain logical reasoning tasks that require substantial backtracking during planning, with fewer thinking tokens during inference. These findings demonstrate the promise of latent reasoning and offer valuable insights for future research.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs often do generate entirely novel text. We begin by defending bibliotechnism against this challenge, showing how novel text may be meaningful only in a derivative sense, so that the content of this generated text depends in an important sense on the content of original human text. We go on to present a different, novel challenge for bibliotechnism, stemming from examples in which LLMs generate "novel reference", using novel names to refer to novel entities. Such examples could be smoothly explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but possessed a limited form of agency (beliefs, desires, and intentions). According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has beliefs, desires and intentions if and only if its behavior is well-explained by the hypothesis that it has such states. In line with this view, we argue that cases of novel reference provide evidence that LLMs do in fact have beliefs, desires, and intentions, and thus have a limited form of agency.

Despite their tremendous success in many applications, large language models often fall short of consistent reasoning and planning in various (language, embodied, and social) scenarios, due to inherent limitations in their inference, learning, and modeling capabilities. In this position paper, we present a new perspective of machine reasoning, LAW, that connects the concepts of Language models, Agent models, and World models, for more robust and versatile reasoning capabilities. In particular, we propose that world and agent models are a better abstraction of reasoning, that introduces the crucial elements of deliberate human-like reasoning, including beliefs about the world and other agents, anticipation of consequences, goals/rewards, and strategic planning. Crucially, language models in LAW serve as a backend to implement the system or its elements and hence provide the computational power and adaptability. We review the recent studies that have made relevant progress and discuss future research directions towards operationalizing the LAW framework.

Recent research developing neural network architectures with external memory have often used the benchmark bAbI question and answering dataset which provides a challenging number of tasks requiring reasoning. Here we employed a classic associative inference task from the memory-based reasoning neuroscience literature in order to more carefully probe the reasoning capacity of existing memory-augmented architectures. This task is thought to capture the essence of reasoning -- the appreciation of distant relationships among elements distributed across multiple facts or memories. Surprisingly, we found that current architectures struggle to reason over long distance associations. Similar results were obtained on a more complex task involving finding the shortest path between nodes in a path. We therefore developed MEMO, an architecture endowed with the capacity to reason over longer distances. This was accomplished with the addition of two novel components. First, it introduces a separation between memories (facts) stored in external memory and the items that comprise these facts in external memory. Second, it makes use of an adaptive retrieval mechanism, allowing a variable number of "memory hops" before the answer is produced. MEMO is capable of solving our novel reasoning tasks, as well as match state of the art results in bAbI.

Chain of Thought (CoT) is significant in improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, the correlation between the effectiveness of CoT and the length of reasoning steps in prompts remains largely unknown. To shed light on this, we have conducted several empirical experiments to explore the relations. Specifically, we design experiments that expand and compress the rationale reasoning steps within CoT demonstrations, while keeping all other factors constant. We have the following key findings. First, the results indicate that lengthening the reasoning steps in prompts, even without adding new information into the prompt, considerably enhances LLMs' reasoning abilities across multiple datasets. Alternatively, shortening the reasoning steps, even while preserving the key information, significantly diminishes the reasoning abilities of models. This finding highlights the importance of the number of steps in CoT prompts and provides practical guidance to make better use of LLMs' potential in complex problem-solving scenarios. Second, we also investigated the relationship between the performance of CoT and the rationales used in demonstrations. Surprisingly, the result shows that even incorrect rationales can yield favorable outcomes if they maintain the requisite length of inference. Third, we observed that the advantages of increasing reasoning steps are task-dependent: simpler tasks require fewer steps, whereas complex tasks gain significantly from longer inference sequences.

Reasoning is an essential component of human intelligence as it plays a fundamental role in our ability to think critically, support responsible decisions, and solve challenging problems. Traditionally, AI has addressed reasoning in the context of logic-based representations of knowledge. However, the recent leap forward in natural language processing, with the emergence of language models based on transformers, is hinting at the possibility that these models exhibit reasoning abilities, particularly as they grow in size and are trained on more data. Despite ongoing discussions about what reasoning is in language models, it is still not easy to pin down to what extent these models are actually capable of reasoning. The goal of this workshop is to create a platform for researchers from different disciplines and/or AI perspectives, to explore approaches and techniques with the aim to reconcile reasoning between language models using transformers and using logic-based representations. The specific objectives include analyzing the reasoning abilities of language models measured alongside KR methods, injecting KR-style reasoning abilities into language models (including by neuro-symbolic means), and formalizing the kind of reasoning language models carry out. This exploration aims to uncover how language models can effectively integrate and leverage knowledge and reasoning with it, thus improving their application and utility in areas where precision and reliability are a key requirement.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated good performance in many reasoning tasks, but they still struggle with some complicated reasoning tasks including logical reasoning. One non-negligible reason for LLMs' suboptimal performance on logical reasoning is their overlooking of understanding logical fallacies correctly. To evaluate LLMs' capability of logical fallacy understanding (LFU), we propose five concrete tasks from three cognitive dimensions of WHAT, WHY, and HOW in this paper. Towards these LFU tasks, we have successfully constructed a new dataset LFUD based on GPT-4 accompanied by a little human effort. Our extensive experiments justify that our LFUD can be used not only to evaluate LLMs' LFU capability, but also to fine-tune LLMs to obtain significantly enhanced performance on logical reasoning.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of LLaMA-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a striking functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context taking over abruptly in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token predominantly appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear exclusively in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to perform better when asked to reason step-by-step before answering a question. However, it is unclear to what degree the model's final answer is faithful to the stated reasoning steps. In this paper, we perform a causal mediation analysis on twelve LLMs to examine how intermediate reasoning steps generated by the LLM influence the final outcome and find that LLMs do not reliably use their intermediate reasoning steps when generating an answer. To address this issue, we introduce FRODO, a framework to tailor small-sized LMs to generate correct reasoning steps and robustly reason over these steps. FRODO consists of an inference module that learns to generate correct reasoning steps using an implicit causal reward function and a reasoning module that learns to faithfully reason over these intermediate inferences using a counterfactual and causal preference objective. Our experiments show that FRODO significantly outperforms four competitive baselines. Furthermore, FRODO improves the robustness and generalization ability of the reasoning LM, yielding higher performance on out-of-distribution test sets. Finally, we find that FRODO's rationales are more faithful to its final answer predictions than standard supervised fine-tuning.

Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT have recently demonstrated significant potential in mathematical abilities, providing valuable reasoning paradigm consistent with human natural language. However, LLMs currently have difficulty in bridging perception, language understanding and reasoning capabilities due to incompatibility of the underlying information flow among them, making it challenging to accomplish tasks autonomously. On the other hand, abductive learning (ABL) frameworks for integrating the two abilities of perception and reasoning has seen significant success in inverse decipherment of incomplete facts, but it is limited by the lack of semantic understanding of logical reasoning rules and the dependence on complicated domain knowledge representation. This paper presents a novel method (ChatABL) for integrating LLMs into the ABL framework, aiming at unifying the three abilities in a more user-friendly and understandable manner. The proposed method uses the strengths of LLMs' understanding and logical reasoning to correct the incomplete logical facts for optimizing the performance of perceptual module, by summarizing and reorganizing reasoning rules represented in natural language format. Similarly, perceptual module provides necessary reasoning examples for LLMs in natural language format. The variable-length handwritten equation deciphering task, an abstract expression of the Mayan calendar decoding, is used as a testbed to demonstrate that ChatABL has reasoning ability beyond most existing state-of-the-art methods, which has been well supported by comparative studies. To our best knowledge, the proposed ChatABL is the first attempt to explore a new pattern for further approaching human-level cognitive ability via natural language interaction with ChatGPT.

Large language models' reasoning abilities benefit from methods that organize their thought processes, such as chain-of-thought prompting, which employs a sequential structure to guide the reasoning process step-by-step. However, existing approaches focus primarily on organizing the sequence of thoughts, leaving structure in individual thought steps underexplored. To address this gap, we propose Table as Thought, a framework inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories on human thought. Table as Thought organizes reasoning within a tabular schema, where rows represent sequential thought steps and columns capture critical constraints and contextual information to enhance reasoning. The reasoning process iteratively populates the table until self-verification ensures completeness and correctness. Our experiments show that Table as Thought excels in planning tasks and demonstrates a strong potential for enhancing LLM performance in mathematical reasoning compared to unstructured thought baselines. This work provides a novel exploration of refining thought representation within LLMs, paving the way for advancements in reasoning and AI cognition.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

In most current research, large language models (LLMs) are able to perform reasoning tasks by generating chains of thought through the guidance of specific prompts. However, there still exists a significant discrepancy between their capability in solving complex reasoning problems and that of humans. At present, most approaches focus on chains of thought (COT) and tool use, without considering the adoption and application of human cognitive frameworks. It is well-known that when confronting complex reasoning challenges, humans typically employ various cognitive abilities, and necessitate interaction with all aspects of tools, knowledge, and the external environment information to accomplish intricate tasks. This paper introduces a novel intelligent framework, referred to as OlaGPT. OlaGPT carefully studied a cognitive architecture framework, and propose to simulate certain aspects of human cognition. The framework involves approximating different cognitive modules, including attention, memory, reasoning, learning, and corresponding scheduling and decision-making mechanisms. Inspired by the active learning mechanism of human beings, it proposes a learning unit to record previous mistakes and expert opinions, and dynamically refer to them to strengthen their ability to solve similar problems. The paper also outlines common effective reasoning frameworks for human problem-solving and designs Chain-of-Thought (COT) templates accordingly. A comprehensive decision-making mechanism is also proposed to maximize model accuracy. The efficacy of OlaGPT has been stringently evaluated on multiple reasoning datasets, and the experimental outcomes reveal that OlaGPT surpasses state-of-the-art benchmarks, demonstrating its superior performance. Our implementation of OlaGPT is available on GitHub: https://github.com/oladata-team/OlaGPT.

We examine how well the state-of-the-art (SOTA) models used in legal reasoning support abductive reasoning tasks. Abductive reasoning is a form of logical inference in which a hypothesis is formulated from a set of observations, and that hypothesis is used to explain the observations. The ability to formulate such hypotheses is important for lawyers and legal scholars as it helps them articulate logical arguments, interpret laws, and develop legal theories. Our motivation is to consider the belief that deep learning models, especially large language models (LLMs), will soon replace lawyers because they perform well on tasks related to legal text processing. But to do so, we believe, requires some form of abductive hypothesis formation. In other words, while LLMs become more popular and powerful, we want to investigate their capacity for abductive reasoning. To pursue this goal, we start by building a logic-augmented dataset for abductive reasoning with 498,697 samples and then use it to evaluate the performance of a SOTA model in the legal field. Our experimental results show that although these models can perform well on tasks related to some aspects of legal text processing, they still fall short in supporting abductive reasoning tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have succeeded remarkably in various natural language processing (NLP) tasks, yet their reasoning capabilities remain a fundamental challenge. While LLMs exhibit impressive fluency and factual recall, their ability to perform complex reasoning-spanning logical deduction, mathematical problem-solving, commonsense inference, and multi-step reasoning-often falls short of human expectations. This survey provides a comprehensive review of emerging techniques enhancing reasoning in LLMs. We categorize existing methods into key approaches, including prompting strategies (e.g., Chain-of-Thought reasoning, Self-Consistency, and Tree-of-Thought reasoning), architectural innovations (e.g., retrieval-augmented models, modular reasoning networks, and neuro-symbolic integration), and learning paradigms (e.g., fine-tuning with reasoning-specific datasets, reinforcement learning, and self-supervised reasoning objectives). Additionally, we explore evaluation frameworks used to assess reasoning in LLMs and highlight open challenges, such as hallucinations, robustness, and reasoning generalization across diverse tasks. By synthesizing recent advancements, this survey aims to provide insights into promising directions for future research and practical applications of reasoning-augmented LLMs.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have brought remarkable success in the field of LLM-as-Agent. Nevertheless, a prevalent assumption is that the information processed by LLMs is consistently honest, neglecting the pervasive deceptive or misleading information in human society and AI-generated content. This oversight makes LLMs susceptible to malicious manipulations, potentially resulting in detrimental outcomes. This study utilizes the intricate Avalon game as a testbed to explore LLMs' potential in deceptive environments. Avalon, full of misinformation and requiring sophisticated logic, manifests as a "Game-of-Thoughts". Inspired by the efficacy of humans' recursive thinking and perspective-taking in the Avalon game, we introduce a novel framework, Recursive Contemplation (ReCon), to enhance LLMs' ability to identify and counteract deceptive information. ReCon combines formulation and refinement contemplation processes; formulation contemplation produces initial thoughts and speech, while refinement contemplation further polishes them. Additionally, we incorporate first-order and second-order perspective transitions into these processes respectively. Specifically, the first-order allows an LLM agent to infer others' mental states, and the second-order involves understanding how others perceive the agent's mental state. After integrating ReCon with different LLMs, extensive experiment results from the Avalon game indicate its efficacy in aiding LLMs to discern and maneuver around deceptive information without extra fine-tuning and data. Finally, we offer a possible explanation for the efficacy of ReCon and explore the current limitations of LLMs in terms of safety, reasoning, speaking style, and format, potentially furnishing insights for subsequent research.

When presented with questions involving visual thinking, humans naturally switch reasoning modalities, often forming mental images or drawing visual aids. Large language models have shown promising results in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning by expressing intermediate reasoning in text as a chain of thought, yet struggle to extend this capability to answer text queries that are easily solved by visual reasoning, even with extensive multimodal pretraining. We introduce a simple method, whiteboard-of-thought prompting, to unlock the visual reasoning capabilities of multimodal large language models across modalities. Whiteboard-of-thought prompting provides multimodal large language models with a metaphorical `whiteboard' to draw out reasoning steps as images, then returns these images back to the model for further processing. We find this can be accomplished with no demonstrations or specialized modules, instead leveraging models' existing ability to write code with libraries such as Matplotlib and Turtle. This simple approach shows state-of-the-art results on four difficult natural language tasks that involve visual and spatial reasoning. We identify multiple settings where GPT-4o using chain-of-thought fails dramatically, including more than one where it achieves 0% accuracy, while whiteboard-of-thought enables up to 92% accuracy in these same settings. We present a detailed exploration of where the technique succeeds as well as its sources of error.

We present a fundamental discovery that challenges our understanding of how complex reasoning emerges in large language models. While conventional wisdom suggests that sophisticated reasoning tasks demand extensive training data (>100,000 examples), we demonstrate that complex mathematical reasoning abilities can be effectively elicited with surprisingly few examples. Through comprehensive experiments, our proposed model LIMO demonstrates unprecedented performance in mathematical reasoning. With merely 817 curated training samples, LIMO achieves 57.1% accuracy on AIME and 94.8% on MATH, improving from previous SFT-based models' 6.5% and 59.2% respectively, while only using 1% of the training data required by previous approaches. LIMO demonstrates exceptional out-of-distribution generalization, achieving 40.5% absolute improvement across 10 diverse benchmarks, outperforming models trained on 100x more data, challenging the notion that SFT leads to memorization rather than generalization. Based on these results, we propose the Less-Is-More Reasoning Hypothesis (LIMO Hypothesis): In foundation models where domain knowledge has been comprehensively encoded during pre-training, sophisticated reasoning capabilities can emerge through minimal but precisely orchestrated demonstrations of cognitive processes. This hypothesis posits that the elicitation threshold for complex reasoning is determined by two key factors: (1) the completeness of the model's encoded knowledge foundation during pre-training, and (2) the effectiveness of post-training examples as "cognitive templates" that show the model how to utilize its knowledge base to solve complex reasoning tasks. To facilitate reproducibility and future research in data-efficient reasoning, we release LIMO as a comprehensive open-source suite at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/LIMO.

The reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs) have improved with chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, allowing models to solve complex tasks in a stepwise manner. However, training CoT capabilities requires detailed reasoning data, which is often scarce. The self-taught reasoner (STaR) framework addresses this by using reinforcement learning to automatically generate reasoning steps, reducing reliance on human-labeled data. Although STaR and its variants have demonstrated empirical success, a theoretical foundation explaining these improvements is lacking. This work provides a theoretical framework for understanding the effectiveness of reinforcement learning on CoT reasoning and STaR. Our contributions are: (1) an analysis of policy improvement, showing why LLM reasoning improves iteratively with STaR; (2) conditions for convergence to an optimal reasoning policy; (3) an examination of STaR's robustness, explaining how it can improve reasoning even when incorporating occasional incorrect steps; and (4) criteria for the quality of pre-trained models necessary to initiate effective reasoning improvement. This framework aims to bridge empirical findings with theoretical insights, advancing reinforcement learning approaches for reasoning in LLMs.

Beginning with McCarthy's Advice Taker (1959), AI has pursued the goal of providing a system with explicit, general knowledge and having the system reason over that knowledge. However, expressing the knowledge in a formal (logical or probabilistic) representation has been a major obstacle to this research. This paper investigates a modern approach to this problem where the facts and rules are provided as natural language sentences, thus bypassing a formal representation. We train transformers to reason (or emulate reasoning) over these sentences using synthetically generated data. Our models, that we call RuleTakers, provide the first empirical demonstration that this kind of soft reasoning over language is learnable, can achieve high (99%) accuracy, and generalizes to test data requiring substantially deeper chaining than seen during training (95%+ scores). We also demonstrate that the models transfer well to two hand-authored rulebases, and to rulebases paraphrased into more natural language. These findings are significant as it suggests a new role for transformers, namely as limited "soft theorem provers" operating over explicit theories in language. This in turn suggests new possibilities for explainability, correctability, and counterfactual reasoning in question-answering.

Multimodal reasoning is a challenging task that requires models to reason across multiple modalities to answer questions. Existing approaches have made progress by incorporating language and visual modalities into a two-stage reasoning framework, separating rationale generation from answer inference. However, these approaches often fall short due to the inadequate quality of the generated rationales. In this work, we delve into the importance of rationales in model reasoning. We observe that when rationales are completely accurate, the model's accuracy significantly improves, highlighting the need for high-quality rationale generation. Motivated by this, we propose MC-CoT, a self-consistency training strategy that generates multiple rationales and answers, subsequently selecting the most accurate through a voting process. This approach not only enhances the quality of generated rationales but also leads to more accurate and robust answers. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our approach significantly improves model performance across various benchmarks. Remarkably, we show that even smaller base models, when equipped with our proposed approach, can achieve results comparable to those of larger models, illustrating the potential of our approach in harnessing the power of rationales for improved multimodal reasoning. The code is available at https://github.com/chengtan9907/mc-cot.

Despite the success of chain of thought in enhancing language model reasoning, the underlying process remains less well understood. Although logically sound reasoning appears inherently crucial for chain of thought, prior studies surprisingly reveal minimal impact when using invalid demonstrations instead. Furthermore, the conventional chain of thought does not inform language models on what mistakes to avoid, which potentially leads to more errors. Hence, inspired by how humans can learn from both positive and negative examples, we propose contrastive chain of thought to enhance language model reasoning. Compared to the conventional chain of thought, our approach provides both valid and invalid reasoning demonstrations, to guide the model to reason step-by-step while reducing reasoning mistakes. To improve generalization, we introduce an automatic method to construct contrastive demonstrations. Our experiments on reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that contrastive chain of thought can serve as a general enhancement of chain-of-thought prompting.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning has enabled large language models (LLMs) to utilize additional computation through intermediate tokens to solve complex tasks. However, we posit that typical reasoning traces contain many redundant tokens, incurring extraneous inference costs. Upon examination of the output distribution of current LLMs, we find evidence on their latent ability to reason more concisely, relative to their default behavior. To elicit this capability, we propose simple fine-tuning methods which leverage self-generated concise reasoning paths obtained by best-of-N sampling and few-shot conditioning, in task-specific settings. Our combined method achieves a 30% reduction in output tokens on average, across five model families on GSM8K and MATH, while maintaining average accuracy. By exploiting the fundamental stochasticity and in-context learning capabilities of LLMs, our self-training approach robustly elicits concise reasoning on a wide range of models, including those with extensive post-training. Code is available at https://github.com/TergelMunkhbat/concise-reasoning

Large Language Models (LLMs) have generated considerable interest and debate regarding their potential emergence of Theory of Mind (ToM). Several recent inquiries reveal a lack of robust ToM in these models and pose a pressing demand to develop new benchmarks, as current ones primarily focus on different aspects of ToM and are prone to shortcuts and data leakage. In this position paper, we seek to answer two road-blocking questions: (1) How can we taxonomize a holistic landscape of machine ToM? (2) What is a more effective evaluation protocol for machine ToM? Following psychological studies, we taxonomize machine ToM into 7 mental state categories and delineate existing benchmarks to identify under-explored aspects of ToM. We argue for a holistic and situated evaluation of ToM to break ToM into individual components and treat LLMs as an agent who is physically situated in environments and socially situated in interactions with humans. Such situated evaluation provides a more comprehensive assessment of mental states and potentially mitigates the risk of shortcuts and data leakage. We further present a pilot study in a grid world setup as a proof of concept. We hope this position paper can facilitate future research to integrate ToM with LLMs and offer an intuitive means for researchers to better position their work in the landscape of ToM. Project page: https://github.com/Mars-tin/awesome-theory-of-mind

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting reveals that large language models are capable of performing complex reasoning via intermediate steps. CoT prompting is primarily categorized into three approaches. The first approach utilizes straightforward prompts like ``Let's think step by step'' to generate a sequential thought process before yielding an answer. The second approach makes use of human-crafted, step-by-step demonstrations to guide the model's reasoning process. The third automates the generation of reasoned demonstrations with the 'Let's think step by step'.This approach sometimes leads to reasoning errors, highlighting the need to diversify demonstrations to mitigate its misleading effects. However, diverse demonstrations pose challenges for effective representations. In this work, we propose ECHO, a self-harmonized chain-of-thought prompting method. It consolidates diverse solution paths into a uniform and effective solution pattern.ECHO demonstrates the best overall performance across three reasoning domains.

Chain-of-thought (COT) prompting can help large language models (LLMs) reason toward correct answers, but its efficacy in reasoning toward incorrect answers is unexplored. This process of elimination (PoE), when used with COT, can enhance self-consistency, interpretability, and tasks such as medical diagnoses of exclusion. Thus, we propose PoE with COT, where LLMs must reason toward incorrect options on multiple-choice questions. We evaluate the ability of GPT-3.5, LLaMA-2, and Falcon to perform PoE with COT on a total of four commonsense and scientific reasoning datasets. We find that the strategy of PoE always underperforms the strategy of choosing the correct answer. The agreement of these strategies is also lower than the self-consistency of each strategy. To study these issues further, we conduct error analyses and give suggestions for future work.

Equipped with Chain-of-Thought (CoT), Large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive reasoning ability in various downstream tasks. Even so, suffering from hallucinations and the inability to access external knowledge, LLMs often come with incorrect or unfaithful intermediate reasoning steps, especially in the context of answering knowledge-intensive tasks such as KBQA. To alleviate this issue, we propose a framework called Knowledge-Driven Chain-of-Thought (KD-CoT) to verify and modify reasoning traces in CoT via interaction with external knowledge, and thus overcome the hallucinations and error propagation. Concretely, we formulate the CoT rationale process of LLMs into a structured multi-round QA format. In each round, LLMs interact with a QA system that retrieves external knowledge and produce faithful reasoning traces based on retrieved precise answers. The structured CoT reasoning of LLMs is facilitated by our developed KBQA CoT collection, which serves as in-context learning demonstrations and can also be utilized as feedback augmentation to train a robust retriever. Extensive experiments on WebQSP and ComplexWebQuestion datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed KD-CoT in task-solving reasoning generation, which outperforms the vanilla CoT ICL with an absolute success rate of 8.0% and 5.1%. Furthermore, our proposed feedback-augmented retriever outperforms the state-of-the-art baselines for retrieving knowledge, achieving significant improvement in Hit performance.

We introduce the Probabilistic Worldbuilding Model (PWM), a new fully-symbolic Bayesian model of semantic parsing and reasoning, as a first step in a research program toward more domain- and task-general NLU and AI. Humans create internal mental models of their observations which greatly aid in their ability to understand and reason about a large variety of problems. In PWM, the meanings of sentences, acquired facts about the world, and intermediate steps in reasoning are all expressed in a human-readable formal language, with the design goal of interpretability. PWM is Bayesian, designed specifically to be able to generalize to new domains and new tasks. We derive and implement an inference algorithm that reads sentences by parsing and abducing updates to its latent world model that capture the semantics of those sentences, and evaluate it on two out-of-domain question-answering datasets: (1) ProofWriter and (2) a new dataset we call FictionalGeoQA, designed to be more representative of real language but still simple enough to focus on evaluating reasoning ability, while being robust against heuristics. Our method outperforms baselines on both, thereby demonstrating its value as a proof-of-concept.

Chain-of-Thought(CoT) prompting and its variants explore equipping large language models (LLMs) with high-level reasoning abilities by emulating human-like linear cognition and logic. However, the human mind is complicated and mixed with both linear and nonlinear thinking. In this work, we propose Inferential Exclusion Prompting (IEP), a novel prompting that combines the principles of elimination and inference in order to guide LLMs to think non-linearly. IEP guides LLMs to plan and then utilize Natural Language Inference (NLI) to deduce each possible solution's entailment relation with context, commonsense, or facts, therefore yielding a broader perspective by thinking back for inferring. This forward planning and backward eliminating process allows IEP to better simulate the complex human thinking processes compared to other CoT-based methods, which only reflect linear cognitive processes. We conducted a series of empirical studies and have corroborated that IEP consistently outperforms CoT across various tasks. Additionally, we observe that integrating IEP and CoT further improves the LLMs' performance on certain tasks, highlighting the necessity of equipping LLMs with mixed logic processes. Moreover, to better evaluate comprehensive features inherent in human logic, we introduce Mental-Ability Reasoning Benchmark (MARB). The benchmark comprises six novel subtasks with a total of 9,115 questions, among which 1,685 are developed with hand-crafted rationale references. We believe both IEP and MARB can serve as a promising direction for unveiling LLMs' logic and verbal reasoning abilities and drive further advancements. MARB will be available at ~anonymity link soon.

Reasoning, as an essential ability for complex problem-solving, can provide back-end support for various real-world applications, such as medical diagnosis, negotiation, etc. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of cutting-edge research on reasoning with language model prompting. We introduce research works with comparisons and summaries and provide systematic resources to help beginners. We also discuss the potential reasons for emerging such reasoning abilities and highlight future research directions. Resources are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/Prompt4ReasoningPapers (updated periodically).

In this work, we use large language models (LLMs) to augment and accelerate research on the P versus NP problem, one of the most important open problems in theoretical computer science and mathematics. Specifically, we propose Socratic reasoning, a general framework that promotes in-depth thinking with LLMs for complex problem-solving. Socratic reasoning encourages LLMs to recursively discover, solve, and integrate problems while facilitating self-evaluation and refinement. Our pilot study on the P vs. NP problem shows that GPT-4 successfully produces a proof schema and engages in rigorous reasoning throughout 97 dialogue turns, concluding "P neq NP", which is in alignment with (Xu and Zhou, 2023). The investigation uncovers novel insights within the extensive solution space of LLMs, shedding light on LLM for Science.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated their impressive abilities in various reasoning and decision-making tasks. However, the quality and coherence of the reasoning process can still benefit from enhanced introspection and self-reflection. In this paper, we introduce Multiplex CoT (Chain of Thought), a method that enables LLMs to simulate a form of self-review while reasoning, by initiating double Chain of Thought (CoT) thinking. Multiplex CoT leverages the power of iterative reasoning, where the model generates an initial chain of thought and subsequently critiques and refines this reasoning with a second round of thought generation. This recursive approach allows for more coherent, logical, and robust answers, improving the overall decision-making process. We demonstrate how this method can be effectively implemented using simple prompt engineering in existing LLM architectures, achieving an effect similar to that of the Learning-Refinement Model (LRM) without the need for additional training. Additionally, we present a practical guide for implementing the method in Google Colab, enabling easy integration into real-world applications.

Reasoning is a cognitive process of using evidence to reach a sound conclusion. The reasoning capability is essential for large language models (LLMs) to serve as the brain of the artificial general intelligence agent. Recent studies reveal that fine-tuning LLMs on data with the chain of thought (COT) reasoning process can significantly enhance their reasoning capabilities. However, we find that the fine-tuned LLMs suffer from an Assessment Misalignment problem, i.e., they frequently assign higher scores to subpar COTs, leading to potential limitations in their reasoning abilities. To address this problem, we introduce an Alignment Fine-Tuning (AFT) paradigm, which involves three steps: 1) fine-tuning LLMs with COT training data; 2) generating multiple COT responses for each question, and categorizing them into positive and negative ones based on whether they achieve the correct answer; 3) calibrating the scores of positive and negative responses given by LLMs with a novel constraint alignment loss. Specifically, the constraint alignment loss has two objectives: a) Alignment, which guarantees that positive scores surpass negative scores to encourage answers with high-quality COTs; b) Constraint, which keeps the negative scores confined to a reasonable range to prevent the model degradation. Beyond just the binary positive and negative feedback, the constraint alignment loss can be seamlessly adapted to the ranking situations when ranking feedback is accessible. Furthermore, we also delve deeply into recent ranking-based alignment methods, such as DPO, RRHF, and PRO, and discover that the constraint, which has been overlooked by these approaches, is also crucial for their performance. Extensive experiments on four reasoning benchmarks with both binary and ranking feedback demonstrate the effectiveness of AFT.

Thinking aloud is an effective meta-cognitive strategy human reasoners apply to solve difficult problems. We suggest to improve the reasoning ability of pre-trained neural language models in a similar way, namely by expanding a task's context with problem elaborations that are dynamically generated by the language model itself. Our main result is that dynamic problem elaboration significantly improves the zero-shot performance of GPT-2 in a deductive reasoning and natural language inference task: While the model uses a syntactic heuristic for predicting an answer, it is capable (to some degree) of generating reasoned additional context which facilitates the successful application of its heuristic. We explore different ways of generating elaborations, including fewshot learning, and find that their relative performance varies with the specific problem characteristics (such as problem difficulty). Moreover, the effectiveness of an elaboration can be explained in terms of the degree to which the elaboration semantically coheres with the corresponding problem. In particular, elaborations that are most faithful to the original problem description may boost accuracy by up to 24%.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown impressive performance in various language tasks. However, they are prone to spurious correlations, and often generate illusory information. In real-world applications, PLMs should justify decisions with formalized, coherent reasoning chains, but this challenge remains under-explored. Cognitive psychology theorizes that humans are capable of utilizing fast and intuitive heuristic thinking to make decisions based on past experience, then rationalizing the decisions through slower and deliberative analytic reasoning. We incorporate these interlinked dual processes in fine-tuning and in-context learning with PLMs, applying them to two language understanding tasks that require coherent physical commonsense reasoning. We show that our proposed Heuristic-Analytic Reasoning (HAR) strategies drastically improve the coherence of rationalizations for model decisions, yielding state-of-the-art results on Tiered Reasoning for Intuitive Physics (TRIP). We also find that this improved coherence is a direct result of more faithful attention to relevant language context in each step of reasoning. Our findings suggest that human-like reasoning strategies can effectively improve the coherence and reliability of PLM reasoning.

Large-scale pre-trained language models (PLMs) bring new opportunities to challenging problems, especially those that need high-level intelligence, such as the math word problem (MWPs). However, directly applying existing PLMs to MWPs can fail as the generation process lacks sufficient supervision and thus lacks fast adaptivity as humans. We notice that human reasoning has a dual reasoning framework that consists of an immediate reaction system (system 1) and a delicate reasoning system (system 2), where the entire reasoning is determined by their interaction. This inspires us to develop a cooperative reasoning-induced PLM for solving MWPs, called Cooperative Reasoning (CoRe), resulting in a human-like reasoning architecture with system 1 as the generator and system 2 as the verifier. In our approach, the generator is responsible for generating reasoning paths, and the verifiers are used to supervise the evaluation in order to obtain reliable feedback for the generator. We evaluate our CoRe framework on several mathematical reasoning datasets and achieve decent improvement over state-of-the-art methods, up to 9.6% increase over best baselines. Our codes are available at https://github.com/TianHongZXY/CoRe

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) such as GPT-4V have recently demonstrated incredible strides on diverse vision language tasks. We dig into vision-based deductive reasoning, a more sophisticated but less explored realm, and find previously unexposed blindspots in the current SOTA VLMs. Specifically, we leverage Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPMs), to assess VLMs' abilities to perform multi-hop relational and deductive reasoning relying solely on visual clues. We perform comprehensive evaluations of several popular VLMs employing standard strategies such as in-context learning, self-consistency, and Chain-of-thoughts (CoT) on three diverse datasets, including the Mensa IQ test, IntelligenceTest, and RAVEN. The results reveal that despite the impressive capabilities of LLMs in text-based reasoning, we are still far from achieving comparable proficiency in visual deductive reasoning. We found that certain standard strategies that are effective when applied to LLMs do not seamlessly translate to the challenges presented by visual reasoning tasks. Moreover, a detailed analysis reveals that VLMs struggle to solve these tasks mainly because they are unable to perceive and comprehend multiple, confounding abstract patterns in RPM examples.

The recently released ChatGPT model demonstrates unprecedented capabilities in zero-shot question-answering. In this work, we probe ChatGPT for its conversational understanding and introduce a conversational framework (protocol) that can be adopted in future studies. The Pok\'emon universe serves as an ideal testing ground for auditing ChatGPT's reasoning capabilities due to its closed world assumption. After bringing ChatGPT's background knowledge (on the Pok\'emon universe) to light, we test its reasoning process when using these concepts in battle scenarios. We then evaluate its ability to acquire new knowledge and include it in its reasoning process. Our ultimate goal is to assess ChatGPT's ability to generalize, combine features, and to acquire and reason over newly introduced knowledge from human feedback. We find that ChatGPT has prior knowledge of the Pokemon universe, which can reason upon in battle scenarios to a great extent, even when new information is introduced. The model performs better with collaborative feedback and if there is an initial phase of information retrieval, but also hallucinates occasionally and is susceptible to adversarial attacks.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to solve complex reasoning tasks by generating intermediate reasoning steps. However, most existing approaches focus on hard token decoding, which constrains reasoning within the discrete vocabulary space and may not always be optimal. While recent efforts explore continuous-space reasoning, they often suffer from catastrophic forgetting, limiting their applicability to state-of-the-art LLMs that already perform well in zero-shot settings with a proper instruction. To address this challenge, we propose a novel approach for continuous-space reasoning that does not require modifying the underlying LLM. Specifically, we employ a lightweight assistant model to generate instance-specific soft thought tokens speculatively as the initial chain of thoughts, which are then mapped into the LLM's representation space via a projection module. Experimental results on five reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our method enhances LLM reasoning performance through supervised, parameter-efficient fine-tuning.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting can dramatically improve the multi-step reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). CoT explicitly encourages the LLM to generate intermediate rationales for solving a problem, by providing a series of reasoning steps in the demonstrations. Despite its success, there is still little understanding of what makes CoT prompting effective and which aspects of the demonstrated reasoning steps contribute to its performance. In this paper, we show that CoT reasoning is possible even with invalid demonstrations - prompting with invalid reasoning steps can achieve over 80-90% of the performance obtained using CoT under various metrics, while still generating coherent lines of reasoning during inference. Further experiments show that other aspects of the rationales, such as being relevant to the query and correctly ordering the reasoning steps, are much more important for effective CoT reasoning. Overall, these findings both deepen our understanding of CoT prompting, and open up new questions regarding LLMs' capability to learn to reason in context.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

To augment language models with the ability to reason, researchers usually prompt or finetune them to produce chain of thought reasoning steps before producing the final answer. However, although people use natural language to reason effectively, it may be that LMs could reason more effectively with some intermediate computation that is not in natural language. In this work, we explore an alternative reasoning approach: instead of explicitly producing the chain of thought reasoning steps, we use the language model's internal hidden states to perform implicit reasoning. The implicit reasoning steps are distilled from a teacher model trained on explicit chain-of-thought reasoning, and instead of doing reasoning "horizontally" by producing intermediate words one-by-one, we distill it such that the reasoning happens "vertically" among the hidden states in different layers. We conduct experiments on a multi-digit multiplication task and a grade school math problem dataset and find that this approach enables solving tasks previously not solvable without explicit chain-of-thought, at a speed comparable to no chain-of-thought.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

The Mental Health Question Answer (MHQA) task requires the seeker and supporter to complete the support process in one-turn dialogue. Given the richness of help-seeker posts, supporters must thoroughly understand the content and provide logical, comprehensive, and well-structured responses. Previous works in MHQA mostly focus on single-agent approaches based on the cognitive element of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), but they overlook the interactions among various CBT elements, such as emotion and cognition. This limitation hinders the models' ability to thoroughly understand the distress of help-seekers. To address this, we propose a framework named Multi-Agent Deductive Planning (MADP), which is based on the interactions between the various psychological elements of CBT. This method guides Large Language Models (LLMs) to achieve a deeper understanding of the seeker's context and provide more personalized assistance based on individual circumstances. Furthermore, we construct a new dataset based on the MADP framework and use it to fine-tune LLMs, resulting in a specialized model named MADP-LLM. We conduct extensive experiments, including comparisons with multiple LLMs, human evaluations, and automatic evaluations, to validate the effectiveness of the MADP framework and MADP-LLM.

With the emergence of advanced reasoning models like OpenAI o3 and DeepSeek-R1, large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities. However, their ability to perform rigorous logical reasoning remains an open question. This survey synthesizes recent advancements in logical reasoning within LLMs, a critical area of AI research. It outlines the scope of logical reasoning in LLMs, its theoretical foundations, and the benchmarks used to evaluate reasoning proficiency. We analyze existing capabilities across different reasoning paradigms - deductive, inductive, abductive, and analogical - and assess strategies to enhance reasoning performance, including data-centric tuning, reinforcement learning, decoding strategies, and neuro-symbolic approaches. The review concludes with future directions, emphasizing the need for further exploration to strengthen logical reasoning in AI systems.

Emergent chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capabilities promise to improve performance and explainability of large language models (LLMs). However, uncertainties remain about how reasoning strategies formulated for previous model generations generalize to new model generations and different datasets. In this small-scale study, we compare different reasoning strategies induced by zero-shot prompting across six recently released LLMs (davinci-002, davinci-003, GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4, Flan-T5-xxl and Cohere command-xlarge) on a mixture of six question-answering datasets, including datasets from scientific and medical domains. Our findings demonstrate that while some variations in effectiveness occur, gains from CoT reasoning strategies remain robust across different models and datasets. GPT-4 has the most benefit from current state-of-the-art reasoning strategies and exhibits the best performance by applying a prompt previously discovered through automated discovery.

Traditional language model-based theorem proving assumes that by training on a sufficient amount of formal proof data, a model will learn to prove theorems. Our key observation is that a wealth of informal information that is not present in formal proofs can be useful for learning to prove theorems. For instance, humans think through steps of a proof, but this thought process is not visible in the resulting code. We present Lean-STaR, a framework for training language models to produce informal thoughts prior to each step of a proof, thereby boosting the model's theorem-proving capabilities. Lean-STaR uses retrospective ground-truth tactics to generate synthetic thoughts for training the language model. At inference time, the trained model directly generates the thoughts prior to the prediction of the tactics in each proof step. Building on the self-taught reasoner framework, we then apply expert iteration to further fine-tune the model on the correct proofs it samples and verifies using the Lean solver. Lean-STaR achieves state-of-the-art results on the miniF2F-test benchmark within the Lean theorem proving environment, significantly outperforming base models (43.4% rightarrow 46.3%, Pass@64). We also analyze the impact of the augmented thoughts on various aspects of the theorem proving process, providing insights into their effectiveness.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Although large language models demonstrate emergent abilities in solving math word problems, there is a challenging task in complex multi-step mathematical reasoning tasks. To improve model performance on mathematical reasoning tasks, previous work has conducted supervised fine-tuning on open-source models by improving the quality and quantity of data. In this paper, we propose a novel approach, named Brain, to imitate human thought processes to enhance mathematical reasoning abilities, using the Frontal Lobe Model to generate plans, and then employing the Parietal Lobe Model to generate code and execute to obtain answers. First, we achieve SOTA performance in comparison with Code LLaMA 7B based models through this method. Secondly, we find that plans can be explicitly extracted from natural language, code, or formal language. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/cyzhh/Brain.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve remarkable performance across various tasks, they often struggle with complex reasoning tasks, such as answering mathematical questions. Recent efforts to address this issue have primarily focused on leveraging mathematical datasets through supervised fine-tuning or self-improvement techniques. However, these methods often depend on high-quality datasets that are difficult to prepare, or they require substantial computational resources for fine-tuning. Inspired by findings that LLMs know how to produce the right answer but struggle to select the correct reasoning path, we propose a purely inference-based searching method -- MindStar (M*). This method formulates reasoning tasks as searching problems and proposes two search ideas to identify the optimal reasoning paths. We evaluate the M* framework on both the GSM8K and MATH datasets, comparing its performance with existing open and closed-source LLMs. Our results demonstrate that M* significantly enhances the reasoning abilities of open-source models, such as Llama-2-13B and Mistral-7B, and achieves comparable performance to GPT-3.5 and Grok-1, but with substantially reduced model size and computational costs.

The interactive use of large language models (LLMs) in AI assistants (at work, home, etc.) introduces a new set of inference-time privacy risks: LLMs are fed different types of information from multiple sources in their inputs and are expected to reason about what to share in their outputs, for what purpose and with whom, within a given context. In this work, we draw attention to the highly critical yet overlooked notion of contextual privacy by proposing ConfAIde, a benchmark designed to identify critical weaknesses in the privacy reasoning capabilities of instruction-tuned LLMs. Our experiments show that even the most capable models such as GPT-4 and ChatGPT reveal private information in contexts that humans would not, 39% and 57% of the time, respectively. This leakage persists even when we employ privacy-inducing prompts or chain-of-thought reasoning. Our work underscores the immediate need to explore novel inference-time privacy-preserving approaches, based on reasoning and theory of mind.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited impressive performance in language comprehension and various reasoning tasks. However, their abilities in spatial reasoning, a crucial aspect of human cognition, remain relatively unexplored. Human possess a remarkable ability to create mental images of unseen objects and actions through a process known as the Mind's Eye, enabling the imagination of the unseen world. Inspired by this cognitive capacity, we propose Visualization-of-Thought (VoT) prompting. VoT aims to elicit spatial reasoning of LLMs by visualizing their reasoning traces, thereby guiding subsequent reasoning steps. We employed VoT for multi-hop spatial reasoning tasks, including natural language navigation, visual navigation, and visual tiling in 2D grid worlds. Experimental results demonstrated that VoT significantly enhances the spatial reasoning abilities of LLMs. Notably, VoT outperformed existing multimodal large language models (MLLMs) in these tasks. While VoT works surprisingly well on LLMs, the ability to generate mental images to facilitate spatial reasoning resembles the mind's eye process, suggesting its potential viability in MLLMs.

AI systems are becoming increasingly intertwined with human life. In order to effectively collaborate with humans and ensure safety, AI systems need to be able to understand, interpret and predict human moral judgments and decisions. Human moral judgments are often guided by rules, but not always. A central challenge for AI safety is capturing the flexibility of the human moral mind -- the ability to determine when a rule should be broken, especially in novel or unusual situations. In this paper, we present a novel challenge set consisting of rule-breaking question answering (RBQA) of cases that involve potentially permissible rule-breaking -- inspired by recent moral psychology studies. Using a state-of-the-art large language model (LLM) as a basis, we propose a novel moral chain of thought (MORALCOT) prompting strategy that combines the strengths of LLMs with theories of moral reasoning developed in cognitive science to predict human moral judgments. MORALCOT outperforms seven existing LLMs by 6.2% F1, suggesting that modeling human reasoning might be necessary to capture the flexibility of the human moral mind. We also conduct a detailed error analysis to suggest directions for future work to improve AI safety using RBQA. Our data is open-sourced at https://huggingface.co/datasets/feradauto/MoralExceptQA and code at https://github.com/feradauto/MoralCoT

Recent works have shown that chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting can elicit language models to solve complex reasoning tasks, step-by-step. However, prompt-based CoT methods are dependent on very large models such as GPT-3 175B which are prohibitive to deploy at scale. In this paper, we use these large models as reasoning teachers to enable complex reasoning in smaller models and reduce model size requirements by several orders of magnitude. We propose Fine-tune-CoT, a method that generates reasoning samples from very large teacher models to fine-tune smaller models. We evaluate our method on a wide range of public models and complex tasks. We find that Fine-tune-CoT enables substantial reasoning capability in small models, far outperforming prompt-based baselines and even the teacher model in many tasks. Additionally, we extend our method by leveraging the teacher model's ability to generate multiple distinct rationales for each original sample. Enriching the fine-tuning data with such diverse reasoning results in a substantial performance boost across datasets, even for very small models. We conduct ablations and sample studies to understand the emergence of reasoning capabilities of student models. Our code implementation and data are available at https://github.com/itsnamgyu/reasoning-teacher.

Self-consistency (SC) has been a widely used decoding strategy for chain-of-thought reasoning. Despite bringing significant performance improvements across a variety of multi-step reasoning tasks, it is a high-cost method that requires multiple sampling with the preset size. In this paper, we propose a simple and scalable sampling process, Early-Stopping Self-Consistency (ESC), to greatly reduce the cost of SC without sacrificing performance. On this basis, one control scheme for ESC is further derivated to dynamically choose the performance-cost balance for different tasks and models. To demonstrate ESC's effectiveness, we conducted extensive experiments on three popular categories of reasoning tasks: arithmetic, commonsense and symbolic reasoning over language models with varying scales. The empirical results show that ESC reduces the average number of sampling of chain-of-thought reasoning by a significant margin on six benchmarks, including MATH (-33.8%), GSM8K (-80.1%), StrategyQA (-76.8%), CommonsenseQA (-78.5%), Coin Flip (-84.2%) and Last Letters (-67.4%), while attaining comparable performances.

Large language models (LLMs) perform better when they produce step-by-step, "Chain-of-Thought" (CoT) reasoning before answering a question, but it is unclear if the stated reasoning is a faithful explanation of the model's actual reasoning (i.e., its process for answering the question). We investigate hypotheses for how CoT reasoning may be unfaithful, by examining how the model predictions change when we intervene on the CoT (e.g., by adding mistakes or paraphrasing it). Models show large variation across tasks in how strongly they condition on the CoT when predicting their answer, sometimes relying heavily on the CoT and other times primarily ignoring it. CoT's performance boost does not seem to come from CoT's added test-time compute alone or from information encoded via the particular phrasing of the CoT. As models become larger and more capable, they produce less faithful reasoning on most tasks we study. Overall, our results suggest that CoT can be faithful if the circumstances such as the model size and task are carefully chosen.

Chain of Thought (CoT) of multi-step benefits from the logical structure of the reasoning steps and task-specific actions, significantly enhancing the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models. As the prevalence of long CoT, the number of reasoning steps exceeds manageable token limits and leads to higher computational demands. Inspired by the fundamental logic of human cognition, ``derive, then reduce'', we conceptualize the standard multi-step CoT as a novel Markov Chain of Thought (MCoT). In this study, we consider the mathematical reasoning task, defining each reasoning step as text accompanied by a Python code snippet. To facilitate a longer reasoning path, self-correction is enabled through interactions with the code interpreter. Our MCoT aims to compress previous reasoning steps into a simplified question, enabling efficient next-step inference without relying on a lengthy KV cache. In our experiments, we curate the MCoTInstruct dataset, and the empirical results indicate that MCoT not only significantly enhances efficiency but also maintains comparable accuracy. While much remains to be explored, this work paves the way for exploring the long CoT reasoning abilities of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs), while promising, face criticisms for biases, hallucinations, and a lack of reasoning capability. This paper introduces SocraSynth, a multi-LLM agent reasoning platform developed to mitigate these issues. SocraSynth utilizes conditional statistics and systematic context enhancement through continuous arguments, alongside adjustable debate contentiousness levels. The platform typically involves a human moderator and two LLM agents representing opposing viewpoints on a given subject. SocraSynth operates in two main phases: knowledge generation and reasoning evaluation. In the knowledge generation phase, the moderator defines the debate topic and contentiousness level, prompting the agents to formulate supporting arguments for their respective stances. The reasoning evaluation phase then employs Socratic reasoning and formal logic principles to appraise the quality of the arguments presented. The dialogue concludes with the moderator adjusting the contentiousness from confrontational to collaborative, gathering final, conciliatory remarks to aid in human reasoning and decision-making. Through case studies in three distinct application domains, this paper showcases SocraSynth's effectiveness in fostering rigorous research, dynamic reasoning, comprehensive assessment, and enhanced collaboration. This underscores the value of multi-agent interactions in leveraging LLMs for advanced knowledge extraction and decision-making support.

Logical reasoning is central to human cognition and intelligence. Past research of logical reasoning within AI uses formal language as knowledge representation~(and symbolic reasoners). However, reasoning with formal language has proved challenging~(e.g., brittleness and knowledge-acquisition bottleneck). This paper provides a comprehensive overview on a new paradigm of logical reasoning, which uses natural language as knowledge representation~(and pretrained language models as reasoners), including philosophical definition and categorization of logical reasoning, advantages of the new paradigm, benchmarks and methods, challenges of the new paradigm, desirable tasks & methods in the future, and relation to related NLP fields. This new paradigm is promising since it not only alleviates many challenges of formal representation but also has advantages over end-to-end neural methods.

Deep learning models perform poorly on tasks that require commonsense reasoning, which often necessitates some form of world-knowledge or reasoning over information not immediately present in the input. We collect human explanations for commonsense reasoning in the form of natural language sequences and highlighted annotations in a new dataset called Common Sense Explanations (CoS-E). We use CoS-E to train language models to automatically generate explanations that can be used during training and inference in a novel Commonsense Auto-Generated Explanation (CAGE) framework. CAGE improves the state-of-the-art by 10% on the challenging CommonsenseQA task. We further study commonsense reasoning in DNNs using both human and auto-generated explanations including transfer to out-of-domain tasks. Empirical results indicate that we can effectively leverage language models for commonsense reasoning.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in general natural language processing tasks but often fall short in complex reasoning tasks. Recent studies have explored human-like problem-solving strategies, such as self-correct, to push further the boundary of single-model reasoning ability. In this work, we let a single model "step outside the box" by engaging multiple models to correct each other. We introduce a multi-agent collaboration strategy that emulates the academic peer review process. Each agent independently constructs its own solution, provides reviews on the solutions of others, and assigns confidence levels to its reviews. Upon receiving peer reviews, agents revise their initial solutions. Extensive experiments on three different types of reasoning tasks show that our collaboration approach delivers superior accuracy across all ten datasets compared to existing methods. Further study underscores the effectiveness of integrating confidence in reviews, demonstrates the superiority of feedback exchange over mere solution sharing, and highlights the role of capability and diversity in fostering successful collaboration.

Transformers demonstrate impressive performance on a range of reasoning benchmarks. To evaluate the degree to which these abilities are a result of actual reasoning, existing work has focused on developing sophisticated benchmarks for behavioral studies. However, these studies do not provide insights into the internal mechanisms driving the observed capabilities. To improve our understanding of the internal mechanisms of transformers, we present a comprehensive mechanistic analysis of a transformer trained on a synthetic reasoning task. We identify a set of interpretable mechanisms the model uses to solve the task, and validate our findings using correlational and causal evidence. Our results suggest that it implements a depth-bounded recurrent mechanisms that operates in parallel and stores intermediate results in selected token positions. We anticipate that the motifs we identified in our synthetic setting can provide valuable insights into the broader operating principles of transformers and thus provide a basis for understanding more complex models.

This paper introduces Typhoon T1, an open effort to develop an open Thai reasoning model. A reasoning model is a relatively new type of generative model built on top of large language models (LLMs). A reasoning model generates a long chain of thought before arriving at a final answer, an approach found to improve performance on complex tasks. However, details on developing such a model are limited, especially for reasoning models that can generate traces in a low-resource language. Typhoon T1 presents an open effort that dives into the details of developing a reasoning model in a more cost-effective way by leveraging supervised fine-tuning using open datasets, instead of reinforcement learning. This paper shares the details about synthetic data generation and training, as well as our dataset and model weights. Additionally, we provide insights gained from developing a reasoning model that generalizes across domains and is capable of generating reasoning traces in a low-resource language, using Thai as an example. We hope this open effort provides a foundation for further research in this field.

As large language models (LLMs) perform more difficult tasks, it becomes harder to verify the correctness and safety of their behavior. One approach to help with this issue is to prompt LLMs to externalize their reasoning, e.g., by having them generate step-by-step reasoning as they answer a question (Chain-of-Thought; CoT). The reasoning may enable us to check the process that models use to perform tasks. However, this approach relies on the stated reasoning faithfully reflecting the model's actual reasoning, which is not always the case. To improve over the faithfulness of CoT reasoning, we have models generate reasoning by decomposing questions into subquestions. Decomposition-based methods achieve strong performance on question-answering tasks, sometimes approaching that of CoT while improving the faithfulness of the model's stated reasoning on several recently-proposed metrics. By forcing the model to answer simpler subquestions in separate contexts, we greatly increase the faithfulness of model-generated reasoning over CoT, while still achieving some of the performance gains of CoT. Our results show it is possible to improve the faithfulness of model-generated reasoning; continued improvements may lead to reasoning that enables us to verify the correctness and safety of LLM behavior.

Mathematical reasoning is regarded as a necessary ability for Language Models (LMs). Recent works demonstrate large LMs' impressive performance in solving math problems. The success is attributed to their Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning abilities, i.e., the ability to decompose complex questions into step-by-step reasoning chains, but such ability seems only to emerge from models with abundant parameters. This work investigates how to incorporate relatively small LMs with the capabilities of multi-step reasoning. We propose to inject such abilities by continually pre-training LMs on a synthetic dataset MsAT which is composed of Multi-step Arithmetic Tasks. Our experiments on four math word problem datasets show the effectiveness of the proposed method in enhancing LMs' math reasoning abilities.

PRefLexOR (Preference-based Recursive Language Modeling for Exploratory Optimization of Reasoning) combines preference optimization with concepts from Reinforcement Learning to enable models to self-teach through iterative reasoning improvements. We propose a recursive learning approach that engages the model in multi-step reasoning, revisiting, and refining intermediate steps before producing a final output in training and inference phases. Through multiple training stages, the model first learns to align its reasoning with accurate decision paths by optimizing the log odds between preferred and non-preferred responses. During this process, PRefLexOR builds a dynamic knowledge graph by generating questions from random text chunks and retrieval-augmentation to contextualize relevant details from the entire training corpus. In the second stage, preference optimization enhances model performance by using rejection sampling to fine-tune reasoning quality by continually producing in-situ training data while masking the reasoning steps. Recursive optimization within a thinking token framework introduces iterative feedback loops, where the model refines reasoning, achieving deeper coherence, consistency, and adaptability. Implemented in small language models with only 3 billion parameters, we should that even tiny models can iteratively teach themselves to reason with greater depth and reflectivity. Our implementation is straightforward and can be incorporated into any existing pretrained LLM. We focus our examples on applications in biological materials science and demonstrate the method in a variety of case studies that range from in-domain to cross-domain applications. Using reasoning strategies that include thinking and reflection modalities we build a multi-agent recursive self-improving inference approach to successively improve responses via repeated sampling in inference time.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated outstanding performance across various tasks, yet they still exhibit limitations such as hallucination, unfaithful reasoning, and toxic content. One potential approach to mitigate these issues is learning from human or external feedback (e.g. tools). In this paper, we introduce an intrinsic self-correct reasoning framework for LLMs that eliminates the need for human feedback, external tools, and handcraft prompts. The proposed framework, based on a multi-step reasoning paradigm Learning from Correctness (LeCo), improves reasoning performance without needing to learn from errors. This paradigm prioritizes learning from correct reasoning steps, and a unique method to measure confidence for each reasoning step based on generation logits. Experimental results across various multi-step reasoning tasks demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework in improving reasoning performance with reduced token consumption.

Humans talk in free-form while negotiating the expressed meanings or common ground. Despite the impressive conversational abilities of the large generative language models, they do not consider the individual differences in contextual understanding in a shared situated environment. In this work, we propose MindDial, a novel conversational framework that can generate situated free-form responses to negotiate common ground. We design an explicit mind module that can track three-level beliefs -- the speaker's belief, the speaker's prediction of the listener's belief, and the common belief based on the gap between the first two. Then the speaking act classification head will decide to continue to talk, end this turn, or take task-related action. We augment a common ground alignment dataset MutualFriend with belief dynamics annotation, of which the goal is to find a single mutual friend based on the free chat between two agents. Experiments show that our model with mental state modeling can resemble human responses when aligning common ground meanwhile mimic the natural human conversation flow. The ablation study further validates the third-level common belief can aggregate information of the first and second-order beliefs and align common ground more efficiently.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks but their performance in complex logical reasoning tasks remains unsatisfactory. Although some prompting methods, such as Chain-of-Thought, can improve the reasoning ability of LLMs to some extent, they suffer from an unfaithful issue where derived conclusions may not align with the generated reasoning chain. To address this issue, some studies employ the approach of propositional logic to further enhance logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. However, the potential omissions in the extraction of logical expressions in these methods can cause information loss in the logical reasoning process, thereby generating incorrect results. To this end, we propose Logic-of-Thought (LoT) prompting which employs propositional logic to generate expanded logical information from input context, and utilizes the generated logical information as an additional augmentation to the input prompts, thereby enhancing the capability of logical reasoning. The LoT is orthogonal to existing prompting methods and can be seamlessly integrated with them. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LoT boosts the performance of various prompting methods with a striking margin across five logical reasoning tasks. In particular, the LoT enhances Chain-of-Thought's performance on the ReClor dataset by +4.35%; moreover, it improves Chain-of-Thought with Self-Consistency's performance on LogiQA by +5%; additionally, it boosts performance of Tree-of-Thoughts on ProofWriter dataset by +8%.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate enhanced capabilities and reliability by reasoning more, evolving from Chain-of-Thought prompting to product-level solutions like OpenAI o1. Despite various efforts to improve LLM reasoning, high-quality long-chain reasoning data and optimized training pipelines still remain inadequately explored in vision-language tasks. In this paper, we present Insight-V, an early effort to 1) scalably produce long and robust reasoning data for complex multi-modal tasks, and 2) an effective training pipeline to enhance the reasoning capabilities of multi-modal large language models (MLLMs). Specifically, to create long and structured reasoning data without human labor, we design a two-step pipeline with a progressive strategy to generate sufficiently long and diverse reasoning paths and a multi-granularity assessment method to ensure data quality. We observe that directly supervising MLLMs with such long and complex reasoning data will not yield ideal reasoning ability. To tackle this problem, we design a multi-agent system consisting of a reasoning agent dedicated to performing long-chain reasoning and a summary agent trained to judge and summarize reasoning results. We further incorporate an iterative DPO algorithm to enhance the reasoning agent's generation stability and quality. Based on the popular LLaVA-NeXT model and our stronger base MLLM, we demonstrate significant performance gains across challenging multi-modal benchmarks requiring visual reasoning. Benefiting from our multi-agent system, Insight-V can also easily maintain or improve performance on perception-focused multi-modal tasks.

Step-by-step reasoning approaches like chain of thought (CoT) have proved to be very effective in inducing reasoning capabilities in large language models. However, the success of the CoT approach is fundamentally tied to the model size, and billion parameter-scale models are often needed to get CoT to work. In this paper, we propose a knowledge distillation approach that leverages the step-by-step CoT reasoning capabilities of larger models and distills these abilities into smaller models. In this work, we propose an alternative reasoning scheme, Socratic CoT, that learns a decomposition of the original problem into a sequence of subproblems and uses it to guide the intermediate reasoning steps. We use Socratic CoT to train a combination of two small distilled models: a problem decomposer and a subproblem solver. In practice, given a new problem, the two distilled models work in sync to decompose and solve complex problems. On multiple reasoning datasets (GSM8K, StrategyQA, and SVAMP), our proposed distillation strategies boosts the performance of smaller models over 70% compared to the baselines. Finally, we investigate when Socratic CoT is an effective alternative to CoT, demonstrating cases where a much smaller model (GPT-2 large) can outperform a 10X larger model (GPT-3 6B). Our code is available here: https://github.com/kumar-shridhar/Distiiling-LM

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive abilities in various tasks. However, fundamentally improving them depends on high-quality datasets or computationally expensive fine-tuning. On the contrary, humans can easily improve themselves by self-thinking and memory, without external resources. In this paper, we propose a framework, MoT, to let the LLM self-improve through Memory-of-Thought, without annotated datasets and parameter updates. Specifically, MoT is divided into two stages: 1. before the test stage, the LLM pre-thinks on the unlabeled dataset and saves the high-confidence thoughts as external memory; 2. During the test stage, given a test question, the LLM recalls relevant memory to help itself reason and answer it. Experimental results show that MoT can help ChatGPT significantly improve its abilities in arithmetic reasoning, commonsense reasoning, factual reasoning, and natural language inference. Further analyses show that each component contributes critically to the improvements and MoT can lead to consistent improvements across various CoT methods and LLMs.

Recent developments, particularly OpenAI's O1 model, have demonstrated the remarkable potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) for complex reasoning tasks. Through analysis of O1's outputs and provided sample Chain-of-Thought (CoT) demonstrations, we observe that it approaches problem-solving in a distinctly human-like manner, systematically brainstorming ideas, testing hypotheses, verifying results, and planning comprehensive solutions. These sophisticated reasoning capabilities remain notably absent in other state-of-the-art language models. In this paper, we hypothesize that this performance gap stems from the limited availability of high-quality reasoning process data in current training sets. We demonstrate that by constructing a specialized dataset focused on explicit problem-solving workflows ("worked solutions"), we can elicit substantially improved planning capabilities from existing models. Additionally, we propose the Reasoning Enhancement Loop (REL), a method for generating synthetic worked solutions.

Reasoning abilities, especially those for solving complex math problems, are crucial components of general intelligence. Recent advances by proprietary companies, such as o-series models of OpenAI, have made remarkable progress on reasoning tasks. However, the complete technical details remain unrevealed, and the techniques that are believed certainly to be adopted are only reinforcement learning (RL) and the long chain of thoughts. This paper proposes a new RL framework, termed OREAL, to pursue the performance limit that can be achieved through Outcome REwArd-based reinforcement Learning for mathematical reasoning tasks, where only binary outcome rewards are easily accessible. We theoretically prove that behavior cloning on positive trajectories from best-of-N (BoN) sampling is sufficient to learn the KL-regularized optimal policy in binary feedback environments. This formulation further implies that the rewards of negative samples should be reshaped to ensure the gradient consistency between positive and negative samples. To alleviate the long-existing difficulties brought by sparse rewards in RL, which are even exacerbated by the partial correctness of the long chain of thought for reasoning tasks, we further apply a token-level reward model to sample important tokens in reasoning trajectories for learning. With OREAL, for the first time, a 7B model can obtain 94.0 pass@1 accuracy on MATH-500 through RL, being on par with 32B models. OREAL-32B also surpasses previous 32B models trained by distillation with 95.0 pass@1 accuracy on MATH-500. Our investigation also indicates the importance of initial policy models and training queries for RL. Code, models, and data will be released to benefit future researchhttps://github.com/InternLM/OREAL.

To increase social bonding with interlocutors, humans naturally acquire the ability to respond appropriately in a given situation by considering which conversational skill is most suitable for the response - a process we call skill-of-mind. For large language model (LLM)-based conversational agents, planning appropriate conversational skills, as humans do, is challenging due to the complexity of social dialogue, especially in interactive scenarios. To address this, we propose a skill-of-mind-annotated conversation dataset, named Multifaceted Skill-of-Mind, which includes multi-turn and multifaceted conversational skills across various interactive scenarios (e.g., long-term, counseling, task-oriented), grounded in diverse social contexts (e.g., demographics, persona, rules of thumb). This dataset consists of roughly 100K conversations. Using this dataset, we introduce a new family of skill-of-mind-infused LLMs, named Thanos, with model sizes of 1B, 3B, and 8B parameters. With extensive experiments, these models successfully demonstrate the skill-of-mind process and exhibit strong generalizability in inferring multifaceted skills across a variety of domains. Moreover, we show that Thanos significantly enhances the quality of responses generated by LLM-based conversational agents and promotes prosocial behavior in human evaluations.

Advancing machine visual reasoning requires a deeper understanding of how Vision-Language Models (VLMs) process and interpret complex visual patterns. This work introduces a novel, cognitively-inspired evaluation framework to systematically analyze VLM reasoning on natural image-based Bongard Problems. We propose three structured paradigms -- Direct Visual Rule Learning, Deductive Rule Learning, and Componential Analysis -- designed to progressively enforce step-wise reasoning and disentangle the interplay between perception and reasoning. Our evaluation shows that advanced, closed-source VLMs (GPT-4o and Gemini 2.0) achieve near-superhuman performance, particularly when provided with high-quality image descriptions, while open-source models exhibit a significant performance bottleneck due to deficiencies in perception. An ablation study further confirms that perception, rather than reasoning, is the primary limiting factor, as open-source models apply extracted rules effectively when given accurate descriptions. These findings underscore the critical role of robust multimodal perception in enhancing generalizable visual reasoning and highlight the importance of structured, step-wise reasoning paradigms for advancing machine intelligence.

In this paper, we present an investigative study on how Mental Sets influence the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. LLMs have excelled in diverse natural language processing (NLP) tasks, driven by advancements in parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) and emergent capabilities like in-context learning (ICL). For complex reasoning tasks, selecting the right model for PEFT or ICL is critical, often relying on scores on benchmarks such as MMLU, MATH, and GSM8K. However, current evaluation methods, based on metrics like F1 Score or reasoning chain assessments by larger models, overlook a key dimension: adaptability to unfamiliar situations and overcoming entrenched thinking patterns. In cognitive psychology, Mental Set refers to the tendency to persist with previously successful strategies, even when they become inefficient - a challenge for problem solving and reasoning. We compare the performance of LLM models like Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct and GPT-4o in the presence of mental sets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to integrate cognitive psychology concepts into the evaluation of LLMs for complex reasoning tasks, providing deeper insights into their adaptability and problem-solving efficacy.