Daily Papers

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM), machine's ability to understand and keep track of the mental states of others, is pivotal in developing socially intelligent agents. However, prevalent N-ToM benchmarks have several shortcomings, including the presence of ambiguous and artificial narratives, absence of personality traits and preferences, a lack of questions addressing characters' psychological mental states, and limited diversity in the questions posed. In response to these issues, we construct OpenToM, a new benchmark for assessing N-ToM with (1) longer and clearer narrative stories, (2) characters with explicit personality traits, (3) actions that are triggered by character intentions, and (4) questions designed to challenge LLMs' capabilities of modeling characters' mental states of both the physical and psychological world. Using OpenToM, we reveal that state-of-the-art LLMs thrive at modeling certain aspects of mental states in the physical world but fall short when tracking characters' mental states in the psychological world.

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is a fundamental psychological capability that allows humans to understand and interpret the mental states of others. Humans infer others' thoughts by integrating causal cues and indirect clues from broad contextual information, often derived from past interactions. In other words, human ToM heavily relies on the understanding about the backgrounds and life stories of others. Unfortunately, this aspect is largely overlooked in existing benchmarks for evaluating machines' ToM capabilities, due to their usage of short narratives without global backgrounds. In this paper, we verify the importance of understanding long personal backgrounds in ToM and assess the performance of LLMs in such realistic evaluation scenarios. To achieve this, we introduce a novel benchmark, CharToM-QA, comprising 1,035 ToM questions based on characters from classic novels. Our human study reveals a significant disparity in performance: the same group of educated participants performs dramatically better when they have read the novels compared to when they have not. In parallel, our experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs, including the very recent o1 model, show that LLMs still perform notably worse than humans, despite that they have seen these stories during pre-training. This highlights the limitations of current LLMs in capturing the nuanced contextual information required for ToM reasoning.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental variables based on their behavior, is key to developing socially intelligent agents. Current approaches to Theory of Mind reasoning either rely on prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), which are prone to systematic errors, or use rigid, handcrafted Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) models, which are more robust but cannot generalize across different domains. In this work, we introduce AutoToM, an automated Bayesian Theory of Mind method for achieving open-ended machine Theory of Mind. AutoToM can operate in any domain, infer any mental variable, and conduct robust Theory of Mind reasoning of any order. Given a Theory of Mind inference problem, AutoToM first proposes an initial BToM model. It then conducts automated Bayesian inverse planning based on the proposed model, leveraging an LLM as the backend. Based on the uncertainty of the inference, it iteratively refines the model, by introducing additional mental variables and/or incorporating more timesteps in the context. Empirical evaluations across multiple Theory of Mind benchmarks demonstrate that AutoToM consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance, offering a scalable, robust, and interpretable approach to machine Theory of Mind.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental states, is an essential ingredient for developing machines with human-level social intelligence. Recent machine learning models, particularly large language models, seem to show some aspects of ToM understanding. However, existing ToM benchmarks use unimodal datasets - either video or text. Human ToM, on the other hand, is more than video or text understanding. People can flexibly reason about another person's mind based on conceptual representations (e.g., goals, beliefs, plans) extracted from any available data. To address this, we introduce a multimodal Theory of Mind question answering (MMToM-QA) benchmark. MMToM-QA comprehensively evaluates machine ToM both on multimodal data and on different kinds of unimodal data about a person's activity in a household environment. To engineer multimodal ToM capacity, we propose a novel method, BIP-ALM (Bayesian Inverse Planning Accelerated by Language Models). BIP-ALM extracts unified representations from multimodal data and utilizes language models for scalable Bayesian inverse planning. We conducted a systematic comparison of human performance, BIP-ALM, and state-of-the-art models, including GPT-4. The experiments demonstrate that large language models and large multimodal models still lack robust ToM capacity. BIP-ALM, on the other hand, shows promising results, by leveraging the power of both model-based mental inference and language models.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

When reading a story, humans can quickly understand new fictional characters with a few observations, mainly by drawing analogies to fictional and real people they already know. This reflects the few-shot and meta-learning essence of humans' inference of characters' mental states, i.e., theory-of-mind (ToM), which is largely ignored in existing research. We fill this gap with a novel NLP dataset, ToM-in-AMC, the first assessment of machines' meta-learning of ToM in a realistic narrative understanding scenario. Our dataset consists of ~1,000 parsed movie scripts, each corresponding to a few-shot character understanding task that requires models to mimic humans' ability of fast digesting characters with a few starting scenes in a new movie. We propose a novel ToM prompting approach designed to explicitly assess the influence of multiple ToM dimensions. It surpasses existing baseline models, underscoring the significance of modeling multiple ToM dimensions for our task. Our extensive human study verifies that humans are capable of solving our problem by inferring characters' mental states based on their previously seen movies. In comparison, our systems based on either state-of-the-art large language models (GPT-4) or meta-learning algorithms lags >20% behind, highlighting a notable limitation in existing approaches' ToM capabilities.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

We propose CX-ToM, short for counterfactual explanations with theory-of mind, a new explainable AI (XAI) framework for explaining decisions made by a deep convolutional neural network (CNN). In contrast to the current methods in XAI that generate explanations as a single shot response, we pose explanation as an iterative communication process, i.e. dialog, between the machine and human user. More concretely, our CX-ToM framework generates sequence of explanations in a dialog by mediating the differences between the minds of machine and human user. To do this, we use Theory of Mind (ToM) which helps us in explicitly modeling human's intention, machine's mind as inferred by the human as well as human's mind as inferred by the machine. Moreover, most state-of-the-art XAI frameworks provide attention (or heat map) based explanations. In our work, we show that these attention based explanations are not sufficient for increasing human trust in the underlying CNN model. In CX-ToM, we instead use counterfactual explanations called fault-lines which we define as follows: given an input image I for which a CNN classification model M predicts class c_pred, a fault-line identifies the minimal semantic-level features (e.g., stripes on zebra, pointed ears of dog), referred to as explainable concepts, that need to be added to or deleted from I in order to alter the classification category of I by M to another specified class c_alt. We argue that, due to the iterative, conceptual and counterfactual nature of CX-ToM explanations, our framework is practical and more natural for both expert and non-expert users to understand the internal workings of complex deep learning models. Extensive quantitative and qualitative experiments verify our hypotheses, demonstrating that our CX-ToM significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art explainable AI models.

Human interactions are deeply rooted in the interplay of thoughts, beliefs, and desires made possible by Theory of Mind (ToM): our cognitive ability to understand the mental states of ourselves and others. Although ToM may come naturally to us, emulating it presents a challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent improvements to LLMs' reasoning capabilities from simple yet effective prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought have seen limited applicability to ToM. In this paper, we turn to the prominent cognitive science theory "Simulation Theory" to bridge this gap. We introduce SimToM, a novel two-stage prompting framework inspired by Simulation Theory's notion of perspective-taking. To implement this idea on current ToM benchmarks, SimToM first filters context based on what the character in question knows before answering a question about their mental state. Our approach, which requires no additional training and minimal prompt-tuning, shows substantial improvement over existing methods, and our analysis reveals the importance of perspective-taking to Theory-of-Mind capabilities. Our findings suggest perspective-taking as a promising direction for future research into improving LLMs' ToM capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have generated considerable interest and debate regarding their potential emergence of Theory of Mind (ToM). Several recent inquiries reveal a lack of robust ToM in these models and pose a pressing demand to develop new benchmarks, as current ones primarily focus on different aspects of ToM and are prone to shortcuts and data leakage. In this position paper, we seek to answer two road-blocking questions: (1) How can we taxonomize a holistic landscape of machine ToM? (2) What is a more effective evaluation protocol for machine ToM? Following psychological studies, we taxonomize machine ToM into 7 mental state categories and delineate existing benchmarks to identify under-explored aspects of ToM. We argue for a holistic and situated evaluation of ToM to break ToM into individual components and treat LLMs as an agent who is physically situated in environments and socially situated in interactions with humans. Such situated evaluation provides a more comprehensive assessment of mental states and potentially mitigates the risk of shortcuts and data leakage. We further present a pilot study in a grid world setup as a proof of concept. We hope this position paper can facilitate future research to integrate ToM with LLMs and offer an intuitive means for researchers to better position their work in the landscape of ToM. Project page: https://github.com/Mars-tin/awesome-theory-of-mind

Recent work on dialogue-based collaborative plan acquisition (CPA) has suggested that Theory of Mind (ToM) modelling can improve missing knowledge prediction in settings with asymmetric skill-sets and knowledge. Although ToM was claimed to be important for effective collaboration, its real impact on this novel task remains under-explored. By representing plans as graphs and by exploiting task-specific constraints we show that, as performance on CPA nearly doubles when predicting one's own missing knowledge, the improvements due to ToM modelling diminish. This phenomenon persists even when evaluating existing baseline methods. To better understand the relevance of ToM for CPA, we report a principled performance comparison of models with and without ToM features. Results across different models and ablations consistently suggest that learned ToM features are indeed more likely to reflect latent patterns in the data with no perceivable link to ToM. This finding calls for a deeper understanding of the role of ToM in CPA and beyond, as well as new methods for modelling and evaluating mental states in computational collaborative agents.

This paper examines the extent to which large language models (LLMs) have developed higher-order theory of mind (ToM); the human ability to reason about multiple mental and emotional states in a recursive manner (e.g. I think that you believe that she knows). This paper builds on prior work by introducing a handwritten test suite -- Multi-Order Theory of Mind Q&A -- and using it to compare the performance of five LLMs to a newly gathered adult human benchmark. We find that GPT-4 and Flan-PaLM reach adult-level and near adult-level performance on ToM tasks overall, and that GPT-4 exceeds adult performance on 6th order inferences. Our results suggest that there is an interplay between model size and finetuning for the realisation of ToM abilities, and that the best-performing LLMs have developed a generalised capacity for ToM. Given the role that higher-order ToM plays in a wide range of cooperative and competitive human behaviours, these findings have significant implications for user-facing LLM applications.

Eleven Large Language Models (LLMs) were assessed using a custom-made battery of false-belief tasks, considered a gold standard in testing Theory of Mind (ToM) in humans. The battery included 640 prompts spread across 40 diverse tasks, each one including a false-belief scenario, three closely matched true-belief control scenarios, and the reversed versions of all four. To solve a single task, a model needed to correctly answer 16 prompts across all eight scenarios. Smaller and older models solved no tasks; GPT-3-davinci-003 (from November 2022) and ChatGPT-3.5-turbo (from March 2023) solved 20% of the tasks; ChatGPT-4 (from June 2023) solved 75% of the tasks, matching the performance of six-year-old children observed in past studies. We explore the potential interpretation of these findings, including the intriguing possibility that ToM, previously considered exclusive to humans, may have spontaneously emerged as a byproduct of LLMs' improving language skills.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

Theory of mind (ToM) evaluations currently focus on testing models using passive narratives that inherently lack interactivity. We introduce FANToM, a new benchmark designed to stress-test ToM within information-asymmetric conversational contexts via question answering. Our benchmark draws upon important theoretical requisites from psychology and necessary empirical considerations when evaluating large language models (LLMs). In particular, we formulate multiple types of questions that demand the same underlying reasoning to identify illusory or false sense of ToM capabilities in LLMs. We show that FANToM is challenging for state-of-the-art LLMs, which perform significantly worse than humans even with chain-of-thought reasoning or fine-tuning.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our everyday lives, understanding their ability to comprehend human mental states becomes critical for ensuring effective interactions. However, despite the recent attempts to assess the Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities of LLMs, the degree to which these models can align with human ToM remains a nuanced topic of exploration. This is primarily due to two distinct challenges: (1) the presence of inconsistent results from previous evaluations, and (2) concerns surrounding the validity of existing evaluation methodologies. To address these challenges, we present a novel framework for procedurally generating evaluations with LLMs by populating causal templates. Using our framework, we create a new social reasoning benchmark (BigToM) for LLMs which consists of 25 controls and 5,000 model-written evaluations. We find that human participants rate the quality of our benchmark higher than previous crowd-sourced evaluations and comparable to expert-written evaluations. Using BigToM, we evaluate the social reasoning capabilities of a variety of LLMs and compare model performances with human performance. Our results suggest that GPT4 has ToM capabilities that mirror human inference patterns, though less reliable, while other LLMs struggle.

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

In this paper, we explore the ability to model and infer personality types of opponents, predict their responses, and use this information to adapt a dialog agent's high-level strategy in negotiation tasks. Inspired by the idea of incorporating a theory of mind (ToM) into machines, we introduce a probabilistic formulation to encapsulate the opponent's personality type during both learning and inference. We test our approach on the CraigslistBargain dataset and show that our method using ToM inference achieves a 20% higher dialog agreement rate compared to baselines on a mixed population of opponents. We also find that our model displays diverse negotiation behavior with different types of opponents.

Understanding people's social interactions in complex real-world scenarios often relies on intricate mental reasoning. To truly understand how and why people interact with one another, we must infer the underlying mental states that give rise to the social interactions, i.e., Theory of Mind reasoning in multi-agent interactions. Additionally, social interactions are often multi-modal -- we can watch people's actions, hear their conversations, and/or read about their past behaviors. For AI systems to successfully and safely interact with people in real-world environments, they also need to understand people's mental states as well as their inferences about each other's mental states based on multi-modal information about their interactions. For this, we introduce MuMA-ToM, a Multi-modal Multi-Agent Theory of Mind benchmark. MuMA-ToM is the first multi-modal Theory of Mind benchmark that evaluates mental reasoning in embodied multi-agent interactions. In MuMA-ToM, we provide video and text descriptions of people's multi-modal behavior in realistic household environments. Based on the context, we then ask questions about people's goals, beliefs, and beliefs about others' goals. We validated MuMA-ToM in a human experiment and provided a human baseline. We also proposed a novel multi-modal, multi-agent ToM model, LIMP (Language model-based Inverse Multi-agent Planning). Our experimental results show that LIMP significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, including large multi-modal models (e.g., GPT-4o, Gemini-1.5 Pro) and a recent multi-modal ToM model, BIP-ALM.

In the social world, humans possess the capability to infer and reason about others mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions), known as the Theory of Mind (ToM). Simultaneously, humans own mental states evolve in response to social situations, a capability we refer to as socialization. Together, these capabilities form the foundation of human social interaction. In the era of artificial intelligence (AI), especially with the development of large language models (LLMs), we raise an intriguing question: How do LLMs perform in terms of ToM and socialization capabilities? And more broadly, can these AI models truly enter and navigate the real social world? Existing research evaluating LLMs ToM and socialization capabilities by positioning LLMs as passive observers from a third person perspective, rather than as active participants. However, compared to the third-person perspective, observing and understanding the world from an egocentric first person perspective is a natural approach for both humans and AI agents. The ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective, a crucial attribute for advancing embodied AI agents, remain unexplored. To answer the aforementioned questions and bridge the research gap, we introduce EgoSocialArena, a novel framework designed to evaluate and investigate the ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective. It encompasses two evaluation environments: static environment and interactive environment, with seven scenarios: Daily Life, Counterfactual, New World, Blackjack, Number Guessing, and Limit Texas Hold em, totaling 2,195 data entries. With EgoSocialArena, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of nine advanced LLMs and observed some key insights regarding the future development of LLMs as well as the capabilities levels of the most advanced LLMs currently available.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods struggle with the non-stationarity of multi-agent systems and fail to adaptively learn online when tested with novel agents. Here, we leverage large language models (LLMs) to create an autonomous agent that can handle these challenges. Our agent, Hypothetical Minds, consists of a cognitively-inspired architecture, featuring modular components for perception, memory, and hierarchical planning over two levels of abstraction. We introduce the Theory of Mind module that scaffolds the high-level planning process by generating hypotheses about other agents' strategies in natural language. It then evaluates and iteratively refines these hypotheses by reinforcing hypotheses that make correct predictions about the other agents' behavior. Hypothetical Minds significantly improves performance over previous LLM-agent and RL baselines on a range of competitive, mixed motive, and collaborative domains in the Melting Pot benchmark, including both dyadic and population-based environments. Additionally, comparisons against LLM-agent baselines and ablations reveal the importance of hypothesis evaluation and refinement for succeeding on complex scenarios.

Both Minsky's "society of mind" and Schmidhuber's "learning to think" inspire diverse societies of large multimodal neural networks (NNs) that solve problems by interviewing each other in a "mindstorm." Recent implementations of NN-based societies of minds consist of large language models (LLMs) and other NN-based experts communicating through a natural language interface. In doing so, they overcome the limitations of single LLMs, improving multimodal zero-shot reasoning. In these natural language-based societies of mind (NLSOMs), new agents -- all communicating through the same universal symbolic language -- are easily added in a modular fashion. To demonstrate the power of NLSOMs, we assemble and experiment with several of them (having up to 129 members), leveraging mindstorms in them to solve some practical AI tasks: visual question answering, image captioning, text-to-image synthesis, 3D generation, egocentric retrieval, embodied AI, and general language-based task solving. We view this as a starting point towards much larger NLSOMs with billions of agents-some of which may be humans. And with this emergence of great societies of heterogeneous minds, many new research questions have suddenly become paramount to the future of artificial intelligence. What should be the social structure of an NLSOM? What would be the (dis)advantages of having a monarchical rather than a democratic structure? How can principles of NN economies be used to maximize the total reward of a reinforcement learning NLSOM? In this work, we identify, discuss, and try to answer some of these questions.

Agents built on large language models (LLMs) have excelled in turn-by-turn human-AI collaboration but struggle with simultaneous tasks requiring real-time interaction. Latency issues and the challenge of inferring variable human strategies hinder their ability to make autonomous decisions without explicit instructions. Through experiments with current independent System 1 and System 2 methods, we validate the necessity of using Dual Process Theory (DPT) in real-time tasks. We propose DPT-Agent, a novel language agent framework that integrates System 1 and System 2 for efficient real-time simultaneous human-AI collaboration. DPT-Agent's System 1 uses a Finite-state Machine (FSM) and code-as-policy for fast, intuitive, and controllable decision-making. DPT-Agent's System 2 integrates Theory of Mind (ToM) and asynchronous reflection to infer human intentions and perform reasoning-based autonomous decisions. We demonstrate the effectiveness of DPT-Agent through further experiments with rule-based agents and human collaborators, showing significant improvements over mainstream LLM-based frameworks. To the best of our knowledge, DPT-Agent is the first language agent framework that achieves successful real-time simultaneous human-AI collaboration autonomously. Code of DPT-Agent can be found in https://github.com/sjtu-marl/DPT-Agent.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

Recent advancements in large language models have showcased their remarkable generalizability across various domains. However, their reasoning abilities still have significant room for improvement, especially when confronted with scenarios requiring multi-step reasoning. Although large language models possess extensive knowledge, their behavior, particularly in terms of reasoning, often fails to effectively utilize this knowledge to establish a coherent thinking paradigm. Generative language models sometimes show hallucinations as their reasoning procedures are unconstrained by logical principles. Aiming to improve the zero-shot chain-of-thought reasoning ability of large language models, we propose Logical Chain-of-Thought (LogiCoT), a neurosymbolic framework that leverages principles from symbolic logic to verify and revise the reasoning processes accordingly. Experimental evaluations conducted on language tasks in diverse domains, including arithmetic, commonsense, symbolic, causal inference, and social problems, demonstrate the efficacy of the enhanced reasoning paradigm by logic.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive accomplishments in both reasoning and planning, their abilities in multi-agent collaborations remains largely unexplored. This study evaluates LLM-based agents in a multi-agent cooperative text game with Theory of Mind (ToM) inference tasks, comparing their performance with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) and planning-based baselines. We observed evidence of emergent collaborative behaviors and high-order Theory of Mind capabilities among LLM-based agents. Our results reveal limitations in LLM-based agents' planning optimization due to systematic failures in managing long-horizon contexts and hallucination about the task state. We explore the use of explicit belief state representations to mitigate these issues, finding that it enhances task performance and the accuracy of ToM inferences for LLM-based agents.

Although large language models demonstrate emergent abilities in solving math word problems, there is a challenging task in complex multi-step mathematical reasoning tasks. To improve model performance on mathematical reasoning tasks, previous work has conducted supervised fine-tuning on open-source models by improving the quality and quantity of data. In this paper, we propose a novel approach, named Brain, to imitate human thought processes to enhance mathematical reasoning abilities, using the Frontal Lobe Model to generate plans, and then employing the Parietal Lobe Model to generate code and execute to obtain answers. First, we achieve SOTA performance in comparison with Code LLaMA 7B based models through this method. Secondly, we find that plans can be explicitly extracted from natural language, code, or formal language. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/cyzhh/Brain.

The deep neural nets of modern artificial intelligence (AI) have not achieved defining features of biological intelligence, including abstraction, causal learning, and energy-efficiency. While scaling to larger models has delivered performance improvements for current applications, more brain-like capacities may demand new theories, models, and methods for designing artificial learning systems. Here, we argue that this opportunity to reassess insights from the brain should stimulate cooperation between AI research and theory-driven computational neuroscience (CN). To motivate a brain basis of neural computation, we present a dynamical view of intelligence from which we elaborate concepts of sparsity in network structure, temporal dynamics, and interactive learning. In particular, we suggest that temporal dynamics, as expressed through neural synchrony, nested oscillations, and flexible sequences, provide a rich computational layer for reading and updating hierarchical models distributed in long-term memory networks. Moreover, embracing agent-centered paradigms in AI and CN will accelerate our understanding of the complex dynamics and behaviors that build useful world models. A convergence of AI/CN theories and objectives will reveal dynamical principles of intelligence for brains and engineered learning systems. This article was inspired by our symposium on dynamical neuroscience and machine learning at the 6th Annual US/NIH BRAIN Initiative Investigators Meeting.

Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning by generating explanations for their predictions. However, a complementary goal of explanations is to also communicate useful knowledge that improves weaker agents. Hence, we investigate whether LLMs also make good teachers for weaker agents. In particular, we consider a student-teacher framework between two LLM agents and study if, when, and how the teacher should intervene with natural language explanations to improve the student's performance. Since communication is expensive, we define a budget such that the teacher only communicates explanations for a fraction of the data, after which the student should perform well on its own. We decompose the teaching problem along four axes: (1) if teacher's test time intervention improve student predictions, (2) when it is worth explaining a data point, (3) how the teacher should personalize explanations to better teach the student, and (4) if teacher explanations also improve student performance on future unexplained data. We first show that teacher LLMs can indeed intervene on student reasoning to improve their performance. Next, we propose a Theory of Mind approach, in which the teacher builds two few-shot mental models of the student. The first model defines an Intervention Function that simulates the utility of an intervention, allowing the teacher to intervene when this utility is the highest and improving student performance at lower budgets. The second model enables the teacher to personalize explanations for a particular student and outperform unpersonalized teachers. We also demonstrate that in multi-turn interactions, teacher explanations generalize and learning from explained data improves student performance on future unexplained data. Finally, we also verify that misaligned teachers can lower student performance to random chance by intentionally misleading them.

Persuasive dialogue plays a pivotal role in human communication, influencing various domains. Recent persuasive dialogue datasets often fail to align with real-world interpersonal interactions, leading to unfaithful representations. For instance, unrealistic scenarios may arise, such as when the persuadee explicitly instructs the persuader on which persuasion strategies to employ, with each of the persuadee's questions corresponding to a specific strategy for the persuader to follow. This issue can be attributed to a violation of the "Double Blind" condition, where critical information is fully shared between participants. In actual human interactions, however, key information such as the mental state of the persuadee and the persuasion strategies of the persuader is not directly accessible. The persuader must infer the persuadee's mental state using Theory of Mind capabilities and construct arguments that align with the persuadee's motivations. To address this gap, we introduce ToMMA, a novel multi-agent framework for dialogue generation that is guided by causal Theory of Mind. This framework ensures that information remains undisclosed between agents, preserving "double-blind" conditions, while causal ToM directs the persuader's reasoning, enhancing alignment with human-like persuasion dynamics. Consequently, we present CToMPersu, a multi-domain, multi-turn persuasive dialogue dataset that tackles both double-blind and logical coherence issues, demonstrating superior performance across multiple metrics and achieving better alignment with real human dialogues. Our dataset and prompts are available at https://github.com/DingyiZhang/ToMMA-CToMPersu .

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

New developments are enabling AI systems to perceive, recognize, and respond with social cues based on inferences made from humans' explicit or implicit behavioral and verbal cues. These AI systems, equipped with an equivalent of human's Theory of Mind (ToM) capability, are currently serving as matchmakers on dating platforms, assisting student learning as teaching assistants, and enhancing productivity as work partners. They mark a new era in human-AI interaction (HAI) that diverges from traditional human-computer interaction (HCI), where computers are commonly seen as tools instead of social actors. Designing and understanding the human perceptions and experiences in this emerging HAI era becomes an urgent and critical issue for AI systems to fulfill human needs and mitigate risks across social contexts. In this paper, we posit the Mutual Theory of Mind (MToM) framework, inspired by our capability of ToM in human-human communications, to guide this new generation of HAI research by highlighting the iterative and mutual shaping nature of human-AI communication. We discuss the motivation of the MToM framework and its three key components that iteratively shape the human-AI communication in three stages. We then describe two empirical studies inspired by the MToM framework to demonstrate the power of MToM in guiding the design and understanding of human-AI communication. Finally, we discuss future research opportunities in human-AI interaction through the lens of MToM.

Cognitively inspired Natural Language Pro-cessing uses human-derived behavioral datalike eye-tracking data, which reflect the seman-tic representations of language in the humanbrain to augment the neural nets to solve arange of tasks spanning syntax and semanticswith the aim of teaching machines about lan-guage processing mechanisms. In this paper,we use the ZuCo 1.0 and ZuCo 2.0 dataset con-taining the eye-gaze features to explore differ-ent linguistic models to directly predict thesegaze features for each word with respect to itssentence. We tried different neural networkmodels with the words as inputs to predict thetargets. And after lots of experimentation andfeature engineering finally devised a novel ar-chitecture consisting of RoBERTa Token Clas-sifier with a dense layer on top for languagemodeling and a stand-alone model consistingof dense layers followed by a transformer layerfor the extra features we engineered. Finally,we took the mean of the outputs of both thesemodels to make the final predictions. We eval-uated the models using mean absolute error(MAE) and the R2 score for each target.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of LLaMA-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a striking functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context taking over abruptly in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token predominantly appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear exclusively in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

Natural language is an appealing medium for explaining how large language models process and store information, but evaluating the faithfulness of such explanations is challenging. To help address this, we develop two modes of evaluation for natural language explanations that claim individual neurons represent a concept in a text input. In the observational mode, we evaluate claims that a neuron a activates on all and only input strings that refer to a concept picked out by the proposed explanation E. In the intervention mode, we construe E as a claim that the neuron a is a causal mediator of the concept denoted by E. We apply our framework to the GPT-4-generated explanations of GPT-2 XL neurons of Bills et al. (2023) and show that even the most confident explanations have high error rates and little to no causal efficacy. We close the paper by critically assessing whether natural language is a good choice for explanations and whether neurons are the best level of analysis.

With the widespread use of large language models (LLMs) in NLP tasks, researchers have discovered the potential of Chain-of-thought (CoT) to assist LLMs in accomplishing complex reasoning tasks by generating intermediate steps. However, human thought processes are often non-linear, rather than simply sequential chains of thoughts. Therefore, we propose Graph-of-Thought (GoT) reasoning, which models human thought processes not only as a chain but also as a graph. By representing thought units as nodes and connections between them as edges, our approach captures the non-sequential nature of human thinking and allows for a more realistic modeling of thought processes. Similar to Multimodal-CoT, we modeled GoT reasoning as a two-stage framework, generating rationales first and then producing the final answer. Specifically, we employ an additional graph-of-thoughts encoder for GoT representation learning and fuse the GoT representation with the original input representation through a gated fusion mechanism. We implement a GoT reasoning model on the T5 pre-trained model and evaluate its performance on a text-only reasoning task (GSM8K) and a multimodal reasoning task (ScienceQA). Our model achieves significant improvement over the strong CoT baseline with 3.41% and 5.08% on the GSM8K test set with T5-base and T5-large architectures, respectively. Additionally, our model boosts accuracy from 84.91% to 91.54% using the T5-base model and from 91.68% to 92.77% using the T5-large model over the state-of-the-art Multimodal-CoT on the ScienceQA test set. Experiments have shown that GoT achieves comparable results to Multimodal-CoT(large) with over 700M parameters, despite having fewer than 250M backbone model parameters, demonstrating the effectiveness of GoT.

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

To increase social bonding with interlocutors, humans naturally acquire the ability to respond appropriately in a given situation by considering which conversational skill is most suitable for the response - a process we call skill-of-mind. For large language model (LLM)-based conversational agents, planning appropriate conversational skills, as humans do, is challenging due to the complexity of social dialogue, especially in interactive scenarios. To address this, we propose a skill-of-mind-annotated conversation dataset, named Multifaceted Skill-of-Mind, which includes multi-turn and multifaceted conversational skills across various interactive scenarios (e.g., long-term, counseling, task-oriented), grounded in diverse social contexts (e.g., demographics, persona, rules of thumb). This dataset consists of roughly 100K conversations. Using this dataset, we introduce a new family of skill-of-mind-infused LLMs, named Thanos, with model sizes of 1B, 3B, and 8B parameters. With extensive experiments, these models successfully demonstrate the skill-of-mind process and exhibit strong generalizability in inferring multifaceted skills across a variety of domains. Moreover, we show that Thanos significantly enhances the quality of responses generated by LLM-based conversational agents and promotes prosocial behavior in human evaluations.

Humans and animals have a rich and flexible understanding of the physical world, which enables them to infer the underlying dynamical trajectories of objects and events, plausible future states, and use that to plan and anticipate the consequences of actions. However, the neural mechanisms underlying these computations are unclear. We combine a goal-driven modeling approach with dense neurophysiological data and high-throughput human behavioral readouts to directly impinge on this question. Specifically, we construct and evaluate several classes of sensory-cognitive networks to predict the future state of rich, ethologically-relevant environments, ranging from self-supervised end-to-end models with pixel-wise or object-centric objectives, to models that future predict in the latent space of purely static image-based or dynamic video-based pretrained foundation models. We find strong differentiation across these model classes in their ability to predict neural and behavioral data both within and across diverse environments. In particular, we find that neural responses are currently best predicted by models trained to predict the future state of their environment in the latent space of pretrained foundation models optimized for dynamic scenes in a self-supervised manner. Notably, models that future predict in the latent space of video foundation models that are optimized to support a diverse range of sensorimotor tasks, reasonably match both human behavioral error patterns and neural dynamics across all environmental scenarios that we were able to test. Overall, these findings suggest that the neural mechanisms and behaviors of primate mental simulation are thus far most consistent with being optimized to future predict on dynamic, reusable visual representations that are useful for embodied AI more generally.

Neural Memory Networks (NMNs) have received increased attention in recent years compared to deep architectures that use a constrained memory. Despite their new appeal, the success of NMNs hinges on the ability of the gradient-based optimiser to perform incremental training of the NMN controllers, determining how to leverage their high capacity for knowledge retrieval. This means that while excellent performance can be achieved when the training data is consistent and well distributed, rare data samples are hard to learn from as the controllers fail to incorporate them effectively during model training. Drawing inspiration from the human cognition process, in particular the utilisation of neuromodulators in the human brain, we propose to decouple the learning process of the NMN controllers to allow them to achieve flexible, rapid adaptation in the presence of new information. This trait is highly beneficial for meta-learning tasks where the memory controllers must quickly grasp abstract concepts in the target domain, and adapt stored knowledge. This allows the NMN controllers to quickly determine which memories are to be retained and which are to be erased, and swiftly adapt their strategy to the new task at hand. Through both quantitative and qualitative evaluations on multiple public benchmarks, including classification and regression tasks, we demonstrate the utility of the proposed approach. Our evaluations not only highlight the ability of the proposed NMN architecture to outperform the current state-of-the-art methods, but also provide insights on how the proposed augmentations help achieve such superior results. In addition, we demonstrate the practical implications of the proposed learning strategy, where the feedback path can be shared among multiple neural memory networks as a mechanism for knowledge sharing.

Successful and effective communication between humans and AI relies on a shared experience of the world. By training solely on written text, current language models (LMs) miss the grounded experience of humans in the real-world -- their failure to relate language to the physical world causes knowledge to be misrepresented and obvious mistakes in their reasoning. We present Mind's Eye, a paradigm to ground language model reasoning in the physical world. Given a physical reasoning question, we use a computational physics engine (DeepMind's MuJoCo) to simulate the possible outcomes, and then use the simulation results as part of the input, which enables language models to perform reasoning. Experiments on 39 tasks in a physics alignment benchmark demonstrate that Mind's Eye can improve reasoning ability by a large margin (27.9% zero-shot, and 46.0% few-shot absolute accuracy improvement on average). Smaller language models armed with Mind's Eye can obtain similar performance to models that are 100x larger. Finally, we confirm the robustness of Mind's Eye through ablation studies.

When presented with questions involving visual thinking, humans naturally switch reasoning modalities, often forming mental images or drawing visual aids. Large language models have shown promising results in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning by expressing intermediate reasoning in text as a chain of thought, yet struggle to extend this capability to answer text queries that are easily solved by visual reasoning, even with extensive multimodal pretraining. We introduce a simple method, whiteboard-of-thought prompting, to unlock the visual reasoning capabilities of multimodal large language models across modalities. Whiteboard-of-thought prompting provides multimodal large language models with a metaphorical `whiteboard' to draw out reasoning steps as images, then returns these images back to the model for further processing. We find this can be accomplished with no demonstrations or specialized modules, instead leveraging models' existing ability to write code with libraries such as Matplotlib and Turtle. This simple approach shows state-of-the-art results on four difficult natural language tasks that involve visual and spatial reasoning. We identify multiple settings where GPT-4o using chain-of-thought fails dramatically, including more than one where it achieves 0% accuracy, while whiteboard-of-thought enables up to 92% accuracy in these same settings. We present a detailed exploration of where the technique succeeds as well as its sources of error.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

Chain-of-thought reasoning, a cognitive process fundamental to human intelligence, has garnered significant attention in the realm of artificial intelligence and natural language processing. However, there still remains a lack of a comprehensive survey for this arena. To this end, we take the first step and present a thorough survey of this research field carefully and widely. We use X-of-Thought to refer to Chain-of-Thought in a broad sense. In detail, we systematically organize the current research according to the taxonomies of methods, including XoT construction, XoT structure variants, and enhanced XoT. Additionally, we describe XoT with frontier applications, covering planning, tool use, and distillation. Furthermore, we address challenges and discuss some future directions, including faithfulness, multi-modal, and theory. We hope this survey serves as a valuable resource for researchers seeking to innovate within the domain of chain-of-thought reasoning.

We introduce thoughts of words (ToW), a novel training-time data-augmentation method for next-word prediction. ToW views next-word prediction as a core reasoning task and injects fine-grained thoughts explaining what the next word should be and how it is related to the previous contexts in pre-training texts. Our formulation addresses two fundamental drawbacks of existing next-word prediction learning schemes: they induce factual hallucination and are inefficient for models to learn the implicit reasoning processes in raw texts. While there are many ways to acquire such thoughts of words, we explore the first step of acquiring ToW annotations through distilling from larger models. After continual pre-training with only 70K ToW annotations, we effectively improve models' reasoning performances by 7% to 9% on average and reduce model hallucination by up to 10%. At the same time, ToW is entirely agnostic to tasks and applications, introducing no additional biases on labels or semantics.

We introduce Graph of Thoughts (GoT): a framework that advances prompting capabilities in large language models (LLMs) beyond those offered by paradigms such as Chain-of-Thought or Tree of Thoughts (ToT). The key idea and primary advantage of GoT is the ability to model the information generated by an LLM as an arbitrary graph, where units of information ("LLM thoughts") are vertices, and edges correspond to dependencies between these vertices. This approach enables combining arbitrary LLM thoughts into synergistic outcomes, distilling the essence of whole networks of thoughts, or enhancing thoughts using feedback loops. We illustrate that GoT offers advantages over state of the art on different tasks, for example increasing the quality of sorting by 62% over ToT, while simultaneously reducing costs by >31%. We ensure that GoT is extensible with new thought transformations and thus can be used to spearhead new prompting schemes. This work brings the LLM reasoning closer to human thinking or brain mechanisms such as recurrence, both of which form complex networks.

This paper presents a way of enhancing the reliability of Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) in addressing hallucination effects, where models generate incorrect or unrelated responses. Without additional instruction tuning paradigm, we introduce Counterfactual Inception, a novel method that implants counterfactual thoughts into LMMs using carefully chosen, misaligned counterfactual keywords. This method is grounded in the concept of counterfactual thinking, a cognitive process where humans consider alternative realities and outcomes. By applying this human-like reasoning mechanism to LMMs, we aim to reduce hallucination effects and improve the models' trustworthiness. We also propose Dual-modality Verification Process (DVP), a rigorous framework for selecting optimal counterfactual keywords to trigger counterfactual thinking into LMMs, concurrently considering visual and linguistic context. Our extensive experiments across various LMMs, including both open-source and proprietary models, corroborate that our method significantly mitigates hallucination phenomena across different datasets.

Large language models' reasoning abilities benefit from methods that organize their thought processes, such as chain-of-thought prompting, which employs a sequential structure to guide the reasoning process step-by-step. However, existing approaches focus primarily on organizing the sequence of thoughts, leaving structure in individual thought steps underexplored. To address this gap, we propose Table as Thought, a framework inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories on human thought. Table as Thought organizes reasoning within a tabular schema, where rows represent sequential thought steps and columns capture critical constraints and contextual information to enhance reasoning. The reasoning process iteratively populates the table until self-verification ensures completeness and correctness. Our experiments show that Table as Thought excels in planning tasks and demonstrates a strong potential for enhancing LLM performance in mathematical reasoning compared to unstructured thought baselines. This work provides a novel exploration of refining thought representation within LLMs, paving the way for advancements in reasoning and AI cognition.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) demonstrate that their capabilities are comparable, or even superior, to humans in many tasks in natural language processing. Despite this progress, LLMs are still inadequate at social-cognitive reasoning, which humans are naturally good at. Drawing inspiration from psychological research on the links between certain personality traits and Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning, and from prompt engineering research on the hyper-sensitivity of prompts in affecting LLMs capabilities, this study investigates how inducing personalities in LLMs using prompts affects their ToM reasoning capabilities. Our findings show that certain induced personalities can significantly affect the LLMs' reasoning capabilities in three different ToM tasks. In particular, traits from the Dark Triad have a larger variable effect on LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2, and Mistral across the different ToM tasks. We find that LLMs that exhibit a higher variance across personality prompts in ToM also tends to be more controllable in personality tests: personality traits in LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2 and Mistral can be controllably adjusted through our personality prompts. In today's landscape where role-play is a common strategy when using LLMs, our research highlights the need for caution, as models that adopt specific personas with personalities potentially also alter their reasoning abilities in an unexpected manner.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning has emerged as an effective approach for activating latent capabilities in large language models (LLMs). We observe that CoT shares significant similarities with self-training in terms of their learning processes. Motivated by these parallels, this paper explores the underlying relationship between CoT and self-training, demonstrating how insights from self-training can enhance CoT performance. Specifically, our study first reveals that CoT, like self-training, follows the principle of semantic entropy minimization. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel CoT framework that incorporates two key components: (i) a task-specific prompt module designed to guide LLMs in generating high-quality initial reasoning processes, and (ii) an adaptive reasoning iteration module for progressively refining the reasoning process.

Despite the tremendous success, existing machine learning models still fall short of human-like systematic generalization -- learning compositional rules from limited data and applying them to unseen combinations in various domains. We propose Neural-Symbolic Recursive Machine (NSR) to tackle this deficiency. The core representation of NSR is a Grounded Symbol System (GSS) with combinatorial syntax and semantics, which entirely emerges from training data. Akin to the neuroscience studies suggesting separate brain systems for perceptual, syntactic, and semantic processing, NSR implements analogous separate modules of neural perception, syntactic parsing, and semantic reasoning, which are jointly learned by a deduction-abduction algorithm. We prove that NSR is expressive enough to model various sequence-to-sequence tasks. Superior systematic generalization is achieved via the inductive biases of equivariance and recursiveness embedded in NSR. In experiments, NSR achieves state-of-the-art performance in three benchmarks from different domains: SCAN for semantic parsing, PCFG for string manipulation, and HINT for arithmetic reasoning. Specifically, NSR achieves 100% generalization accuracy on SCAN and PCFG and outperforms state-of-the-art models on HINT by about 23%. Our NSR demonstrates stronger generalization than pure neural networks due to its symbolic representation and inductive biases. NSR also demonstrates better transferability than existing neural-symbolic approaches due to less domain-specific knowledge required.

Multi-agent interactions, such as communication, teaching, and bluffing, often rely on higher-order social inference, i.e., understanding how others infer oneself. Such intricate reasoning can be effectively modeled through nested multi-agent reasoning. Nonetheless, the computational complexity escalates exponentially with each level of reasoning, posing a significant challenge. However, humans effortlessly perform complex social inferences as part of their daily lives. To bridge the gap between human-like inference capabilities and computational limitations, we propose a novel approach: leveraging neural networks to amortize high-order social inference, thereby expediting nested multi-agent reasoning. We evaluate our method in two challenging multi-agent interaction domains. The experimental results demonstrate that our method is computationally efficient while exhibiting minimal degradation in accuracy.

Despite their powerful chat, coding, and reasoning abilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) frequently hallucinate. Conventional wisdom suggests that hallucinations are a consequence of a balance between creativity and factuality, which can be mitigated, but not eliminated, by grounding the LLM in external knowledge sources. Through extensive systematic experiments, we show that these traditional approaches fail to explain why LLMs hallucinate in practice. Specifically, we show that LLMs augmented with a massive Mixture of Memory Experts (MoME) can easily memorize large datasets of random numbers. We corroborate these experimental findings with a theoretical construction showing that simple neural networks trained to predict the next token hallucinate when the training loss is above a threshold as it usually does in practice when training on internet scale data. We interpret our findings by comparing against traditional retrieval methods for mitigating hallucinations. We use our findings to design a first generation model for removing hallucinations -- Lamini-1 -- that stores facts in a massive mixture of millions of memory experts that are retrieved dynamically.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable abilities across various language tasks, but solving complex reasoning problems remains a challenge. While existing methods like Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Tree-of-Thought (ToT) enhance reasoning by decomposing problems or structuring prompts, they typically perform a single pass of reasoning and may fail to revisit flawed paths, compromising accuracy. To address this, we propose a novel reasoning framework called Forest-of-Thought (FoT), which integrates multiple reasoning trees to leverage collective decision-making for solving complex logical problems. FoT utilizes sparse activation strategies to select the most relevant reasoning paths, improving both efficiency and accuracy. Additionally, we introduce a dynamic self-correction strategy that enables real-time error correction and learning from past mistakes, as well as consensus-guided decision making strategies to optimize correctness and computational resources. Experimental results demonstrate that the FoT framework, combined with these strategies, significantly enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, enabling them to solve complex tasks with greater precision and efficiency.

We study the problem of combining neural networks with symbolic reasoning. Recently introduced frameworks for Probabilistic Neurosymbolic Learning (PNL), such as DeepProbLog, perform exponential-time exact inference, limiting the scalability of PNL solutions. We introduce Approximate Neurosymbolic Inference (A-NeSI): a new framework for PNL that uses neural networks for scalable approximate inference. A-NeSI 1) performs approximate inference in polynomial time without changing the semantics of probabilistic logics; 2) is trained using data generated by the background knowledge; 3) can generate symbolic explanations of predictions; and 4) can guarantee the satisfaction of logical constraints at test time, which is vital in safety-critical applications. Our experiments show that A-NeSI is the first end-to-end method to solve three neurosymbolic tasks with exponential combinatorial scaling. Finally, our experiments show that A-NeSI achieves explainability and safety without a penalty in performance.

Program-of-Thought (PoT) replaces natural language-based Chain-of-Thought (CoT) as the most popular method in Large Language Models (LLMs) mathematical reasoning tasks by utilizing external tool calls to circumvent computational errors. However, our evaluation of the GPT-4 and Llama series reveals that using PoT introduces more reasoning errors, such as incorrect formulas or flawed logic, compared to CoT. To address this issue, we propose Human-Think Language (HTL), which leverages a suite of strategies that help integrate PoT and CoT, encompassing: (1) a new generation paradigm that uses full CoT reasoning to control code generation. (2) Focus Attention, that directs model attention to the CoT reasoning during PoT to generate more logical code. (3) reinforcement learning that utilizes the accuracy of both CoT and PoT responses as rewards to prevent repetitive reasoning steps in LLMs when solving difficult math problems. Our method achieves an average improvement of 6.5% on the Llama-Base model and 4.3% on the Mistral-Base model across 8 mathematical calculation datasets. It also shows significant effectiveness on five out-of-domain datasets by controlling the model's information flow, exhibiting strong transferability. Additionally, HTL shows the most significant improvement in non-mathematical natural language inference task, contributing to a unified reasoning task framework

We argue that representations in AI models, particularly deep networks, are converging. First, we survey many examples of convergence in the literature: over time and across multiple domains, the ways by which different neural networks represent data are becoming more aligned. Next, we demonstrate convergence across data modalities: as vision models and language models get larger, they measure distance between datapoints in a more and more alike way. We hypothesize that this convergence is driving toward a shared statistical model of reality, akin to Plato's concept of an ideal reality. We term such a representation the platonic representation and discuss several possible selective pressures toward it. Finally, we discuss the implications of these trends, their limitations, and counterexamples to our analysis.

Unlike perfect information games, where all elements are known to every player, imperfect information games emulate the real-world complexities of decision-making under uncertain or incomplete information. GPT-4, the recent breakthrough in large language models (LLMs) trained on massive passive data, is notable for its knowledge retrieval and reasoning abilities. This paper delves into the applicability of GPT-4's learned knowledge for imperfect information games. To achieve this, we introduce Suspicion-Agent, an innovative agent that leverages GPT-4's capabilities for performing in imperfect information games. With proper prompt engineering to achieve different functions, Suspicion-Agent based on GPT-4 demonstrates remarkable adaptability across a range of imperfect information card games. Importantly, GPT-4 displays a strong high-order theory of mind (ToM) capacity, meaning it can understand others and intentionally impact others' behavior. Leveraging this, we design a planning strategy that enables GPT-4 to competently play against different opponents, adapting its gameplay style as needed, while requiring only the game rules and descriptions of observations as input. In the experiments, we qualitatively showcase the capabilities of Suspicion-Agent across three different imperfect information games and then quantitatively evaluate it in Leduc Hold'em. The results show that Suspicion-Agent can potentially outperform traditional algorithms designed for imperfect information games, without any specialized training or examples. In order to encourage and foster deeper insights within the community, we make our game-related data publicly available.

The emergent reasoning and Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) make them promising candidates for developing coordination agents. In this study, we introduce a new LLM-Coordination Benchmark aimed at a detailed analysis of LLMs within the context of Pure Coordination Games, where participating agents need to cooperate for the most gain. This benchmark evaluates LLMs through two distinct tasks: (1) Agentic Coordination, where LLMs act as proactive participants for cooperation in 4 pure coordination games; (2) Coordination Question Answering (QA), where LLMs are prompted to answer 198 multiple-choice questions from the 4 games for evaluation of three key reasoning abilities: Environment Comprehension, ToM Reasoning, and Joint Planning. Furthermore, to enable LLMs for multi-agent coordination, we introduce a Cognitive Architecture for Coordination (CAC) framework that can easily integrate different LLMs as plug-and-play modules for pure coordination games. Our findings indicate that LLM agents equipped with GPT-4-turbo achieve comparable performance to state-of-the-art reinforcement learning methods in games that require commonsense actions based on the environment. Besides, zero-shot coordination experiments reveal that, unlike RL methods, LLM agents are robust to new unseen partners. However, results on Coordination QA show a large room for improvement in the Theory of Mind reasoning and joint planning abilities of LLMs. The analysis also sheds light on how the ability of LLMs to understand their environment and their partner's beliefs and intentions plays a part in their ability to plan for coordination. Our code is available at https://github.com/eric-ai-lab/llm_coordination.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to respond accurately but often exhibit deficient reasoning or generate hallucinatory content. To address these, studies prefixed with ``Self-'' such as Self-Consistency, Self-Improve, and Self-Refine have been initiated. They share a commonality: involving LLMs evaluating and updating itself to mitigate the issues. Nonetheless, these efforts lack a unified perspective on summarization, as existing surveys predominantly focus on categorization without examining the motivations behind these works. In this paper, we summarize a theoretical framework, termed Internal Consistency, which offers unified explanations for phenomena such as the lack of reasoning and the presence of hallucinations. Internal Consistency assesses the coherence among LLMs' latent layer, decoding layer, and response layer based on sampling methodologies. Expanding upon the Internal Consistency framework, we introduce a streamlined yet effective theoretical framework capable of mining Internal Consistency, named Self-Feedback. The Self-Feedback framework consists of two modules: Self-Evaluation and Self-Update. This framework has been employed in numerous studies. We systematically classify these studies by tasks and lines of work; summarize relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks; and delve into the concern, ``Does Self-Feedback Really Work?'' We propose several critical viewpoints, including the ``Hourglass Evolution of Internal Consistency'', ``Consistency Is (Almost) Correctness'' hypothesis, and ``The Paradox of Latent and Explicit Reasoning''. Furthermore, we outline promising directions for future research. We have open-sourced the experimental code, reference list, and statistical data, available at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/ICSFSurvey.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has proven highly effective for enhancing complex reasoning in Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). Yet, it struggles in complex spatial reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, human cognition extends beyond language alone, enabling the remarkable capability to think in both words and images. Inspired by this mechanism, we propose a new reasoning paradigm, Multimodal Visualization-of-Thought (MVoT). It enables visual thinking in MLLMs by generating image visualizations of their reasoning traces. To ensure high-quality visualization, we introduce token discrepancy loss into autoregressive MLLMs. This innovation significantly improves both visual coherence and fidelity. We validate this approach through several dynamic spatial reasoning tasks. Experimental results reveal that MVoT demonstrates competitive performance across tasks. Moreover, it exhibits robust and reliable improvements in the most challenging scenarios where CoT fails. Ultimately, MVoT establishes new possibilities for complex reasoning tasks where visual thinking can effectively complement verbal reasoning.

While generative AI is now widespread and useful in society, there are potential risks of misuse, e.g., unconsciously influencing cognitive processes or decision-making. Although this causes a security problem in the cognitive domain, there has been no research about neural and computational mechanisms counteracting the impact of malicious generative AI in humans. We propose DecNefGAN, a novel framework that combines a generative adversarial system and a neural reinforcement model. More specifically, DecNefGAN bridges human and generative AI in a closed-loop system, with the AI creating stimuli that induce specific mental states, thus exerting external control over neural activity. The objective of the human is the opposite, to compete and reach an orthogonal mental state. This framework can contribute to elucidating how the human brain responds to and counteracts the potential influence of generative AI.

It is typically understood that the training of modern neural networks is a process of fitting the probability distribution of desired output. However, recent paradoxical observations in a number of language generation tasks let one wonder if this canonical probability-based explanation can really account for the empirical success of deep learning. To resolve this issue, we propose an alternative utility-based explanation to the standard supervised learning procedure in deep learning. The basic idea is to interpret the learned neural network not as a probability model but as an ordinal utility function that encodes the preference revealed in training data. In this perspective, training of the neural network corresponds to a utility learning process. Specifically, we show that for all neural networks with softmax outputs, the SGD learning dynamic of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) can be seen as an iteration process that optimizes the neural network toward an optimal utility function. This utility-based interpretation can explain several otherwise-paradoxical observations about the neural networks thus trained. Moreover, our utility-based theory also entails an equation that can transform the learned utility values back to a new kind of probability estimation with which probability-compatible decision rules enjoy dramatic (double-digits) performance improvements. These evidences collectively reveal a phenomenon of utility-probability duality in terms of what modern neural networks are (truly) modeling: We thought they are one thing (probabilities), until the unexplainable showed up; changing mindset and treating them as another thing (utility values) largely reconcile the theory, despite remaining subtleties regarding its original (probabilistic) identity.

Language models show a surprising range of capabilities, but the source of their apparent competence is unclear. Do these networks just memorize a collection of surface statistics, or do they rely on internal representations of the process that generates the sequences they see? We investigate this question by applying a variant of the GPT model to the task of predicting legal moves in a simple board game, Othello. Although the network has no a priori knowledge of the game or its rules, we uncover evidence of an emergent nonlinear internal representation of the board state. Interventional experiments indicate this representation can be used to control the output of the network and create "latent saliency maps" that can help explain predictions in human terms.

Facing the current debate on whether Large Language Models (LLMs) attain near-human intelligence levels (Mitchell & Krakauer, 2023; Bubeck et al., 2023; Kosinski, 2023; Shiffrin & Mitchell, 2023; Ullman, 2023), the current study introduces a benchmark for evaluating social intelligence, one of the most distinctive aspects of human cognition. We developed a comprehensive theoretical framework for social dynamics and introduced two evaluation tasks: Inverse Reasoning (IR) and Inverse Inverse Planning (IIP). Our approach also encompassed a computational model based on recursive Bayesian inference, adept at elucidating diverse human behavioral patterns. Extensive experiments and detailed analyses revealed that humans surpassed the latest GPT models in overall performance, zero-shot learning, one-shot generalization, and adaptability to multi-modalities. Notably, GPT models demonstrated social intelligence only at the most basic order (order = 0), in stark contrast to human social intelligence (order >= 2). Further examination indicated a propensity of LLMs to rely on pattern recognition for shortcuts, casting doubt on their possession of authentic human-level social intelligence. Our codes, dataset, appendix and human data are released at https://github.com/bigai-ai/Evaluate-n-Model-Social-Intelligence.

Parallel neurosymbolic architectures have been applied effectively in NLP by distilling knowledge from a logic theory into a deep model.However, prior art faces several limitations including supporting restricted forms of logic theories and relying on the assumption of independence between the logic and the deep network. We present Concordia, a framework overcoming the limitations of prior art. Concordia is agnostic both to the deep network and the logic theory offering support for a wide range of probabilistic theories. Our framework can support supervised training of both components and unsupervised training of the neural component. Concordia has been successfully applied to tasks beyond NLP and data classification, improving the accuracy of state-of-the-art on collective activity detection, entity linking and recommendation tasks.

We present Magma, a foundation model that serves multimodal AI agentic tasks in both the digital and physical worlds. Magma is a significant extension of vision-language (VL) models in that it not only retains the VL understanding ability (verbal intelligence) of the latter, but is also equipped with the ability to plan and act in the visual-spatial world (spatial-temporal intelligence) and complete agentic tasks ranging from UI navigation to robot manipulation. To endow the agentic capabilities, Magma is pretrained on large amounts of heterogeneous datasets spanning from images, videos to robotics data, where the actionable visual objects (e.g., clickable buttons in GUI) in images are labeled by Set-of-Mark (SoM) for action grounding, and the object movements (e.g., the trace of human hands or robotic arms) in videos are labeled by Trace-of-Mark (ToM) for action planning. Extensive experiments show that SoM and ToM reach great synergy and facilitate the acquisition of spatial-temporal intelligence for our Magma model, which is fundamental to a wide range of tasks as shown in Fig.1. In particular, Magma creates new state-of-the-art results on UI navigation and robotic manipulation tasks, outperforming previous models that are specifically tailored to these tasks. On image and video-related multimodal tasks, Magma also compares favorably to popular large multimodal models that are trained on much larger datasets. We make our model and code public for reproducibility at https://microsoft.github.io/Magma.

Toward combining inductive reasoning with perception abilities, we develop techniques for neurosymbolic program synthesis where perceptual input is first parsed by neural nets into a low-dimensional interpretable representation, which is then processed by a synthesized program. We explore several techniques for relaxing the problem and jointly learning all modules end-to-end with gradient descent: multitask learning; amortized inference; overparameterization; and a differentiable strategy for penalizing lengthy programs. Collectedly this toolbox improves the stability of gradient-guided program search, and suggests ways of learning both how to perceive input as discrete abstractions, and how to symbolically process those abstractions as programs.

A recent study by Feldman (2020) proposed a long-tail theory to explain the memorization behavior of deep learning models. However, memorization has not been empirically verified in the context of NLP, a gap addressed by this work. In this paper, we use three different NLP tasks to check if the long-tail theory holds. Our experiments demonstrate that top-ranked memorized training instances are likely atypical, and removing the top-memorized training instances leads to a more serious drop in test accuracy compared with removing training instances randomly. Furthermore, we develop an attribution method to better understand why a training instance is memorized. We empirically show that our memorization attribution method is faithful, and share our interesting finding that the top-memorized parts of a training instance tend to be features negatively correlated with the class label.

We propose a meta-ability decoupling (MAD) paradigm, which brings together various object navigation methods in an architecture system, allowing them to mutually enhance each other and evolve together. Based on the MAD paradigm, we design a multiple thinking (MT) model that leverages distinct thinking to abstract various meta-abilities. Our method decouples meta-abilities from three aspects: input, encoding, and reward while employing the multiple thinking collaboration (MTC) module to promote mutual cooperation between thinking. MAD introduces a novel qualitative and quantitative interpretability system for object navigation. Through extensive experiments on AI2-Thor and RoboTHOR, we demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods on both typical and zero-shot object navigation tasks.

Chain-of-thought prompting significantly boosts the reasoning ability of large language models but still faces three issues: hallucination problem, restricted interpretability, and uncontrollable generation. To address these challenges, we present AgentCOT, a llm-based autonomous agent framework, which can solve complex problems in an agent-style manner by multiple round LLM generation. At each step, AgentCOT selects an action and executes it to yield an intermediate result with supporting evidence. In addition, we integrate the step's index into the reasoning process to form a graph structure for complex inference logic. We introduce two new strategies to enhance the performance of AgentCOT.We conduct extensive experiments to verify the effectiveness of our method on six common benchmarks. Results exhibit that our method brings in substantial improvements over current competitive approaches.

While the recent Chain-of-Thought (CoT) technique enhances the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) with the theory of mind, it might still struggle in handling logical reasoning that relies much on symbolic expressions and rigid deducing rules. To strengthen the logical reasoning capability of LLMs, we propose a novel Symbolic Chain-of-Thought, namely SymbCoT, a fully LLM-based framework that integrates symbolic expressions and logic rules with CoT prompting. Technically, building upon an LLM, SymbCoT 1) first translates the natural language context into the symbolic format, and then 2) derives a step-by-step plan to solve the problem with symbolic logical rules, 3) followed by a verifier to check the translation and reasoning chain. Via thorough evaluations on 5 standard datasets with both First-Order Logic and Constraint Optimization symbolic expressions, SymbCoT shows striking improvements over the CoT method consistently, meanwhile refreshing the current state-of-the-art performances. We further demonstrate that our system advances in more faithful, flexible, and explainable logical reasoning. To our knowledge, this is the first to combine symbolic expressions and rules into CoT for logical reasoning with LLMs. Code is open at https://github.com/Aiden0526/SymbCoT.

Recent research developing neural network architectures with external memory have often used the benchmark bAbI question and answering dataset which provides a challenging number of tasks requiring reasoning. Here we employed a classic associative inference task from the memory-based reasoning neuroscience literature in order to more carefully probe the reasoning capacity of existing memory-augmented architectures. This task is thought to capture the essence of reasoning -- the appreciation of distant relationships among elements distributed across multiple facts or memories. Surprisingly, we found that current architectures struggle to reason over long distance associations. Similar results were obtained on a more complex task involving finding the shortest path between nodes in a path. We therefore developed MEMO, an architecture endowed with the capacity to reason over longer distances. This was accomplished with the addition of two novel components. First, it introduces a separation between memories (facts) stored in external memory and the items that comprise these facts in external memory. Second, it makes use of an adaptive retrieval mechanism, allowing a variable number of "memory hops" before the answer is produced. MEMO is capable of solving our novel reasoning tasks, as well as match state of the art results in bAbI.

Visual perspective taking (VPT) is the ability to perceive and reason about the perspectives of others. It is an essential feature of human intelligence, which develops over the first decade of life and requires an ability to process the 3D structure of visual scenes. A growing number of reports have indicated that deep neural networks (DNNs) become capable of analyzing 3D scenes after training on large image datasets. We investigated if this emergent ability for 3D analysis in DNNs is sufficient for VPT with the 3D perception challenge (3D-PC): a novel benchmark for 3D perception in humans and DNNs. The 3D-PC is comprised of three 3D-analysis tasks posed within natural scene images: 1. a simple test of object depth order, 2. a basic VPT task (VPT-basic), and 3. another version of VPT (VPT-Strategy) designed to limit the effectiveness of "shortcut" visual strategies. We tested human participants (N=33) and linearly probed or text-prompted over 300 DNNs on the challenge and found that nearly all of the DNNs approached or exceeded human accuracy in analyzing object depth order. Surprisingly, DNN accuracy on this task correlated with their object recognition performance. In contrast, there was an extraordinary gap between DNNs and humans on VPT-basic. Humans were nearly perfect, whereas most DNNs were near chance. Fine-tuning DNNs on VPT-basic brought them close to human performance, but they, unlike humans, dropped back to chance when tested on VPT-perturb. Our challenge demonstrates that the training routines and architectures of today's DNNs are well-suited for learning basic 3D properties of scenes and objects but are ill-suited for reasoning about these properties like humans do. We release our 3D-PC datasets and code to help bridge this gap in 3D perception between humans and machines.

Multi-modality promises to unlock further uses for large language models. Recently, the state-of-the-art language model GPT-4 was enhanced with vision capabilities. We carry out a prompting evaluation of GPT-4V and five other baselines on structured reasoning tasks, such as mathematical reasoning, visual data analysis, and code generation. We show that visual Chain-of-Thought, an extension of Chain-of-Thought to multi-modal LLMs, yields significant improvements over the vanilla model. We also present a categorized analysis of scenarios where these models perform well and where they struggle, highlighting challenges associated with coherent multimodal reasoning.

Enabling effective brain-computer interfaces requires understanding how the human brain encodes stimuli across modalities such as visual, language (or text), etc. Brain encoding aims at constructing fMRI brain activity given a stimulus. There exists a plethora of neural encoding models which study brain encoding for single mode stimuli: visual (pretrained CNNs) or text (pretrained language models). Few recent papers have also obtained separate visual and text representation models and performed late-fusion using simple heuristics. However, previous work has failed to explore: (a) the effectiveness of image Transformer models for encoding visual stimuli, and (b) co-attentive multi-modal modeling for visual and text reasoning. In this paper, we systematically explore the efficacy of image Transformers (ViT, DEiT, and BEiT) and multi-modal Transformers (VisualBERT, LXMERT, and CLIP) for brain encoding. Extensive experiments on two popular datasets, BOLD5000 and Pereira, provide the following insights. (1) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the effectiveness of image and multi-modal Transformers for brain encoding. (2) We find that VisualBERT, a multi-modal Transformer, significantly outperforms previously proposed single-mode CNNs, image Transformers as well as other previously proposed multi-modal models, thereby establishing new state-of-the-art. The supremacy of visio-linguistic models raises the question of whether the responses elicited in the visual regions are affected implicitly by linguistic processing even when passively viewing images. Future fMRI tasks can verify this computational insight in an appropriate experimental setting.

We interpret the function of individual neurons in CLIP by automatically describing them using text. Analyzing the direct effects (i.e. the flow from a neuron through the residual stream to the output) or the indirect effects (overall contribution) fails to capture the neurons' function in CLIP. Therefore, we present the "second-order lens", analyzing the effect flowing from a neuron through the later attention heads, directly to the output. We find that these effects are highly selective: for each neuron, the effect is significant for <2% of the images. Moreover, each effect can be approximated by a single direction in the text-image space of CLIP. We describe neurons by decomposing these directions into sparse sets of text representations. The sets reveal polysemantic behavior - each neuron corresponds to multiple, often unrelated, concepts (e.g. ships and cars). Exploiting this neuron polysemy, we mass-produce "semantic" adversarial examples by generating images with concepts spuriously correlated to the incorrect class. Additionally, we use the second-order effects for zero-shot segmentation and attribute discovery in images. Our results indicate that a scalable understanding of neurons can be used for model deception and for introducing new model capabilities.

The human brain is a complex spiking neural network (SNN) that learns multimodal signals in a zero-shot manner by generalizing existing knowledge. Remarkably, the brain achieves this with minimal power consumption, using event-based signals that propagate within its structure. However, mimicking the human brain in neuromorphic hardware presents both hardware and software challenges. Hardware limitations, such as the slowdown of Moore's law and the von Neumann bottleneck, hinder the efficiency of digital computers. On the software side, SNNs are known for their difficult training, especially when learning multimodal signals. To overcome these challenges, we propose a hardware-software co-design that combines a fixed and random liquid state machine (LSM) SNN encoder with trainable artificial neural network (ANN) projections. The LSM is physically implemented using analogue resistive memory, leveraging the inherent stochasticity of resistive switching to generate random weights. This highly efficient and nanoscale in-memory computing approach effectively addresses the von Neumann bottleneck and the slowdown of Moore's law. The ANN projections are implemented digitally, allowing for easy optimization using contrastive loss, which helps to overcome the difficulties associated with SNN training. We experimentally implement this co-design on a 40nm 256Kb in-memory computing macro. We first demonstrate LSM-based event encoding through supervised classification and linear probing on the N-MNIST and N-TIDIGITS datasets.

We propose a novel framework, Meta Chain-of-Thought (Meta-CoT), which extends traditional Chain-of-Thought (CoT) by explicitly modeling the underlying reasoning required to arrive at a particular CoT. We present empirical evidence from state-of-the-art models exhibiting behaviors consistent with in-context search, and explore methods for producing Meta-CoT via process supervision, synthetic data generation, and search algorithms. Finally, we outline a concrete pipeline for training a model to produce Meta-CoTs, incorporating instruction tuning with linearized search traces and reinforcement learning post-training. Finally, we discuss open research questions, including scaling laws, verifier roles, and the potential for discovering novel reasoning algorithms. This work provides a theoretical and practical roadmap to enable Meta-CoT in LLMs, paving the way for more powerful and human-like reasoning in artificial intelligence.

Although the problem of hallucinations in neural machine translation (NMT) has received some attention, research on this highly pathological phenomenon lacks solid ground. Previous work has been limited in several ways: it often resorts to artificial settings where the problem is amplified, it disregards some (common) types of hallucinations, and it does not validate adequacy of detection heuristics. In this paper, we set foundations for the study of NMT hallucinations. First, we work in a natural setting, i.e., in-domain data without artificial noise neither in training nor in inference. Next, we annotate a dataset of over 3.4k sentences indicating different kinds of critical errors and hallucinations. Then, we turn to detection methods and both revisit methods used previously and propose using glass-box uncertainty-based detectors. Overall, we show that for preventive settings, (i) previously used methods are largely inadequate, (ii) sequence log-probability works best and performs on par with reference-based methods. Finally, we propose DeHallucinator, a simple method for alleviating hallucinations at test time that significantly reduces the hallucinatory rate. To ease future research, we release our annotated dataset for WMT18 German-English data, along with the model, training data, and code.

The multifaceted nature of human perception and comprehension indicates that, when we think, our body can naturally take any combination of senses, a.k.a., modalities and form a beautiful picture in our brain. For example, when we see a cattery and simultaneously perceive the cat's purring sound, our brain can construct a picture of a cat in the cattery. Intuitively, generative AI models should hold the versatility of humans and be capable of generating images from any combination of modalities efficiently and collaboratively. This paper presents ImgAny, a novel end-to-end multi-modal generative model that can mimic human reasoning and generate high-quality images. Our method serves as the first attempt in its capacity of efficiently and flexibly taking any combination of seven modalities, ranging from language, audio to vision modalities, including image, point cloud, thermal, depth, and event data. Our key idea is inspired by human-level cognitive processes and involves the integration and harmonization of multiple input modalities at both the entity and attribute levels without specific tuning across modalities. Accordingly, our method brings two novel training-free technical branches: 1) Entity Fusion Branch ensures the coherence between inputs and outputs. It extracts entity features from the multi-modal representations powered by our specially constructed entity knowledge graph; 2) Attribute Fusion Branch adeptly preserves and processes the attributes. It efficiently amalgamates distinct attributes from diverse input modalities via our proposed attribute knowledge graph. Lastly, the entity and attribute features are adaptively fused as the conditional inputs to the pre-trained Stable Diffusion model for image generation. Extensive experiments under diverse modality combinations demonstrate its exceptional capability for visual content creation.

Deep neural networks have achieved success across a wide range of applications, including as models of human behavior in vision tasks. However, neural network training and human learning differ in fundamental ways, and neural networks often fail to generalize as robustly as humans do, raising questions regarding the similarity of their underlying representations. What is missing for modern learning systems to exhibit more human-like behavior? We highlight a key misalignment between vision models and humans: whereas human conceptual knowledge is hierarchically organized from fine- to coarse-scale distinctions, model representations do not accurately capture all these levels of abstraction. To address this misalignment, we first train a teacher model to imitate human judgments, then transfer human-like structure from its representations into pretrained state-of-the-art vision foundation models. These human-aligned models more accurately approximate human behavior and uncertainty across a wide range of similarity tasks, including a new dataset of human judgments spanning multiple levels of semantic abstractions. They also perform better on a diverse set of machine learning tasks, increasing generalization and out-of-distribution robustness. Thus, infusing neural networks with additional human knowledge yields a best-of-both-worlds representation that is both more consistent with human cognition and more practically useful, thus paving the way toward more robust, interpretable, and human-like artificial intelligence systems.

Interpreting the inner function of neural networks is crucial for the trustworthy development and deployment of these black-box models. Prior interpretability methods focus on correlation-based measures to attribute model decisions to individual examples. However, these measures are susceptible to noise and spurious correlations encoded in the model during the training phase (e.g., biased inputs, model overfitting, or misspecification). Moreover, this process has proven to result in noisy and unstable attributions that prevent any transparent understanding of the model's behavior. In this paper, we develop a robust interventional-based method grounded by causal analysis to capture cause-effect mechanisms in pre-trained neural networks and their relation to the prediction. Our novel approach relies on path interventions to infer the causal mechanisms within hidden layers and isolate relevant and necessary information (to model prediction), avoiding noisy ones. The result is task-specific causal explanatory graphs that can audit model behavior and express the actual causes underlying its performance. We apply our method to vision models trained on classification tasks. On image classification tasks, we provide extensive quantitative experiments to show that our approach can capture more stable and faithful explanations than standard attribution-based methods. Furthermore, the underlying causal graphs reveal the neural interactions in the model, making it a valuable tool in other applications (e.g., model repair).

The explainability of a robot's actions is crucial to its acceptance in social spaces. Explaining why a robot fails to complete a given task is particularly important for non-expert users to be aware of the robot's capabilities and limitations. So far, research on explaining robot failures has only considered generating textual explanations, even though several studies have shown the benefits of multimodal ones. However, a simple combination of multiple modalities may lead to semantic incoherence between the information across different modalities - a problem that is not well-studied. An incoherent multimodal explanation can be difficult to understand, and it may even become inconsistent with what the robot and the human observe and how they perform reasoning with the observations. Such inconsistencies may lead to wrong conclusions about the robot's capabilities. In this paper, we introduce an approach to generate coherent multimodal explanations by checking the logical coherence of explanations from different modalities, followed by refinements as required. We propose a classification approach for coherence assessment, where we evaluate if an explanation logically follows another. Our experiments suggest that fine-tuning a neural network that was pre-trained to recognize textual entailment, performs well for coherence assessment of multimodal explanations. Code & data: https://pradippramanick.github.io/coherent-explain/.

A hallmark of intelligence is the ability to autonomously learn new flexible, cognitive behaviors - that is, behaviors where the appropriate action depends not just on immediate stimuli (as in simple reflexive stimulus-response associations), but on contextual information that must be adequately acquired, stored and processed. While many meta-learning algorithms can design agents that autonomously learn new tasks, cognitive tasks adds another level of learning and memory to typical ``learning-to-learn'' problems. Here we evolve neural networks, endowed with plastic connections and neuromodulation, over a sizable set of simple cognitive tasks adapted from a computational neuroscience framework. The resulting evolved networks can automatically modify their own connectivity to acquire a novel simple cognitive task, never seen during evolution, from stimuli and rewards alone, through the spontaneous operation of their evolved neural organization and plasticity system. Our results emphasize the importance of carefully considering the multiple learning loops involved in the emergence of intelligent behavior.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

This article presents a theoretical framework for adapting the Common Model of Cognition to large generative network models within the field of artificial intelligence. This can be accomplished by restructuring modules within the Common Model into shadow production systems that are peripheral to a central production system, which handles higher-level reasoning based on the shadow productions' output. Implementing this novel structure within the Common Model allows for a seamless connection between cognitive architectures and generative neural networks.

Going beyond 'dendritic democracy', we introduce a 'democracy of local processors', termed Cooperator. Here we compare their capabilities when used in permutation-invariant neural networks for reinforcement learning (RL), with machine learning algorithms based on Transformers, such as ChatGPT. Transformers are based on the long-standing conception of integrate-and-fire 'point' neurons, whereas Cooperator is inspired by recent neurobiological breakthroughs suggesting that the cellular foundations of mental life depend on context-sensitive pyramidal neurons in the neocortex which have two functionally distinct points. We show that when used for RL, an algorithm based on Cooperator learns far quicker than that based on Transformer, even while having the same number of parameters.

This study introduces BrainTransformers, an innovative Large Language Model (LLM) implemented using Spiking Neural Networks (SNN). Our key contributions include: (1) designing SNN-compatible Transformer components such as SNNMatmul, SNNSoftmax, and SNNSiLU; (2) implementing an SNN approximation of the SiLU activation function; and (3) developing a Synapsis module to simulate synaptic plasticity. Our 3-billion parameter model, BrainTransformers-3B-Chat, demonstrates competitive performance across various benchmarks, including MMLU (63.2), BBH (54.1), ARC-C (54.3), and GSM8K (76.3), while potentially offering improved energy efficiency and biological plausibility. The model employs a three-stage training approach, including SNN-specific neuronal synaptic plasticity training. This research opens new avenues for brain-like AI systems in natural language processing and neuromorphic computing. Future work will focus on hardware optimization, developing specialized SNN fine-tuning tools, and exploring practical applications in energy-efficient computing environments.

We present the Mixture-of-Tunable-Experts (MoTE), a method that extends the Mixture-of-Experts architecture of Large Language Models (LLMs). Without additional training, MoTE enables meaningful and focused behavior changes in LLMs on-the-fly during inference time. By analyzing the digital LLM brain of DeepSeek-R1 using a technique we dub 'functional Token Resonance Imaging' (fTRI) -- inspired by fMRI and using prompts designed to elicit specific behavior (e.g., 'What happened {time}{place}?') -- we empirically identify distinctive experts associated with behaviors like refusal responses. Using MoTE we are able to intervene and control such specific behavior. We switched off the top 10 most refusal-relevant experts (0.07% of R1's 14,848 routed experts), achieving a 52% refusal reduction on sensitive reference prompts without performance degradation on MT-Bench. Random expert deactivation resulted in smaller behavioral shifts with increased noise, whereas forced expert activation led to significantly higher refusal rates. Our approach shares similarities with sparse autoencoders (SAEs) in terms of explainability and steerability. Unlike SAEs, MoTE does not require large training efforts, as within MoEs with a vast number of experts, specialization already emerged naturally during pretraining. Our findings suggest that significant functional mechanisms in Mixture-of-Experts architectures can at least partially be localized in a small number of specific experts, rather than being distributed throughout the model's weights. Expert subgroups can be tuned to trigger significant behavior variations, providing insights into the inner workings of LLMs.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

We explore the effects of various plasticity functions on assemblies of neurons. To bridge the gap between experimental and computational theories we make use of a conceptual framework, the Assembly Calculus, which is a formal system for the description of brain function based on assemblies of neurons. The Assembly Calculus includes operations for projecting, associating, and merging assemblies of neurons. Our research is focused on simulating different plasticity functions with Assembly Calculus. Our main contribution is the modification and evaluation of the projection operation. We experiment with Oja's and Spike Time-Dependent Plasticity (STDP) rules and test the effect of various hyper-parameters.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Mathematical reasoning---a core ability within human intelligence---presents some unique challenges as a domain: we do not come to understand and solve mathematical problems primarily on the back of experience and evidence, but on the basis of inferring, learning, and exploiting laws, axioms, and symbol manipulation rules. In this paper, we present a new challenge for the evaluation (and eventually the design) of neural architectures and similar system, developing a task suite of mathematics problems involving sequential questions and answers in a free-form textual input/output format. The structured nature of the mathematics domain, covering arithmetic, algebra, probability and calculus, enables the construction of training and test splits designed to clearly illuminate the capabilities and failure-modes of different architectures, as well as evaluate their ability to compose and relate knowledge and learned processes. Having described the data generation process and its potential future expansions, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of models from two broad classes of the most powerful sequence-to-sequence architectures and find notable differences in their ability to resolve mathematical problems and generalize their knowledge.

Neural Module Networks, originally proposed for the task of visual question answering, are a class of neural network architectures that involve human-specified neural modules, each designed for a specific form of reasoning. In current formulations of such networks only the parameters of the neural modules and/or the order of their execution is learned. In this work, we further expand this approach and also learn the underlying internal structure of modules in terms of the ordering and combination of simple and elementary arithmetic operators. Our results show that one is indeed able to simultaneously learn both internal module structure and module sequencing without extra supervisory signals for module execution sequencing. With this approach, we report performance comparable to models using hand-designed modules.

Recently, O1-like models have emerged as representative examples, illustrating the effectiveness of long chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning tasks such as math and coding tasks. In this paper, we introduce DRT-o1, an attempt to bring the success of long CoT to neural machine translation (MT). Specifically, in view of the literature books that might involve similes and metaphors, translating these texts to a target language is very difficult in practice due to cultural differences. In such cases, literal translation often fails to convey the intended meaning effectively. Even for professional human translators, considerable thought must be given to preserving semantics throughout the translation process. To simulate LLMs' long thought ability in MT, we first mine sentences containing similes or metaphors from existing literature books, and then develop a multi-agent framework to translate these sentences via long thought. In the multi-agent framework, a translator is used to iteratively translate the source sentence under the suggestions provided by an advisor. To ensure the effectiveness of the long thoughts, an evaluator is also employed to judge whether the translation in the current round is better than the previous one or not. In this manner, we collect tens of thousands of long-thought MT data, which is used to train our DRT-o1. The experimental results on literature translation demonstrate the effectiveness of the DRT-o1. Using Qwen2.5-7B and Qwen2.5-14B as the backbones, the improvement brought by DRT-o1 achieves 7.33~8.26 BLEU and 1.66~3.36 CometScore. Besides, DRT-o1-7B can outperform QwQ-32B-Preview by 7.82 BLEU and 1.46 CometScore, showing its effectiveness. The project is available at https://github.com/krystalan/DRT-o1

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive abilities in various tasks. However, fundamentally improving them depends on high-quality datasets or computationally expensive fine-tuning. On the contrary, humans can easily improve themselves by self-thinking and memory, without external resources. In this paper, we propose a framework, MoT, to let the LLM self-improve through Memory-of-Thought, without annotated datasets and parameter updates. Specifically, MoT is divided into two stages: 1. before the test stage, the LLM pre-thinks on the unlabeled dataset and saves the high-confidence thoughts as external memory; 2. During the test stage, given a test question, the LLM recalls relevant memory to help itself reason and answer it. Experimental results show that MoT can help ChatGPT significantly improve its abilities in arithmetic reasoning, commonsense reasoning, factual reasoning, and natural language inference. Further analyses show that each component contributes critically to the improvements and MoT can lead to consistent improvements across various CoT methods and LLMs.

Chain-of-thought (COT) prompting can help large language models (LLMs) reason toward correct answers, but its efficacy in reasoning toward incorrect answers is unexplored. This process of elimination (PoE), when used with COT, can enhance self-consistency, interpretability, and tasks such as medical diagnoses of exclusion. Thus, we propose PoE with COT, where LLMs must reason toward incorrect options on multiple-choice questions. We evaluate the ability of GPT-3.5, LLaMA-2, and Falcon to perform PoE with COT on a total of four commonsense and scientific reasoning datasets. We find that the strategy of PoE always underperforms the strategy of choosing the correct answer. The agreement of these strategies is also lower than the self-consistency of each strategy. To study these issues further, we conduct error analyses and give suggestions for future work.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has significantly enhanced the reasoning abilities of large language models. However, recent studies have shown that models can still perform complex reasoning tasks even when the CoT is replaced with filler(hidden) characters (e.g., "..."), leaving open questions about how models internally process and represent reasoning steps. In this paper, we investigate methods to decode these hidden characters in transformer models trained with filler CoT sequences. By analyzing layer-wise representations using the logit lens method and examining token rankings, we demonstrate that the hidden characters can be recovered without loss of performance. Our findings provide insights into the internal mechanisms of transformer models and open avenues for improving interpretability and transparency in language model reasoning.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have advanced the integration of visual and linguistic modalities, establishing themselves as the dominant paradigm for visual-language tasks. Current approaches like chain of thought (CoT) reasoning have augmented the cognitive capabilities of large language models (LLMs), yet their adaptation to MLLMs is hindered by heightened risks of hallucination in cross-modality comprehension. In this paper, we find that the thinking while looking paradigm in current multimodal CoT approaches--where reasoning chains are generated alongside visual input--fails to mitigate hallucinations caused by misleading images. To address these limitations, we propose the Visual Inference Chain (VIC) framework, a novel approach that constructs reasoning chains using textual context alone before introducing visual input, effectively reducing cross-modal biases and enhancing multimodal reasoning accuracy. Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate that VIC significantly improves zero-shot performance across various vision-related tasks, mitigating hallucinations while refining the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs. Our code repository can be found at https://github.com/Terry-Xu-666/visual_inference_chain.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

The NeuroSAT neural network architecture was recently introduced for predicting properties of propositional formulae. When trained to predict the satisfiability of toy problems, it was shown to find solutions and unsatisfiable cores on its own. However, the authors saw "no obvious path" to using the architecture to improve the state-of-the-art. In this work, we train a simplified NeuroSAT architecture to directly predict the unsatisfiable cores of real problems. We modify several high-performance SAT solvers to periodically replace their variable activity scores with NeuroSAT's prediction of how likely the variables are to appear in an unsatisfiable core. The modified MiniSat solves 10% more problems on SAT-COMP 2018 within the standard 5,000 second timeout than the original does. The modified Glucose solves 11% more problems than the original, while the modified Z3 solves 6% more. The gains are even greater when the training is specialized for a specific distribution of problems; on a benchmark of hard problems from a scheduling domain, the modified Glucose solves 20% more problems than the original does within a one-hour timeout. Our results demonstrate that NeuroSAT can provide effective guidance to high-performance SAT solvers on real problems.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

A basic question within the emerging field of mechanistic interpretability is the degree to which neural networks learn the same underlying mechanisms. In other words, are neural mechanisms universal across different models? In this work, we study the universality of individual neurons across GPT2 models trained from different initial random seeds, motivated by the hypothesis that universal neurons are likely to be interpretable. In particular, we compute pairwise correlations of neuron activations over 100 million tokens for every neuron pair across five different seeds and find that 1-5\% of neurons are universal, that is, pairs of neurons which consistently activate on the same inputs. We then study these universal neurons in detail, finding that they usually have clear interpretations and taxonomize them into a small number of neuron families. We conclude by studying patterns in neuron weights to establish several universal functional roles of neurons in simple circuits: deactivating attention heads, changing the entropy of the next token distribution, and predicting the next token to (not) be within a particular set.

In this paper, we introduce the Tree-of-Thought (ToT) framework, a novel approach aimed at improving the problem-solving capabilities of auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). The ToT technique is inspired by the human mind's approach for solving complex reasoning tasks through trial and error. In this process, the human mind explores the solution space through a tree-like thought process, allowing for backtracking when necessary. To implement ToT as a software system, we augment an LLM with additional modules including a prompter agent, a checker module, a memory module, and a ToT controller. In order to solve a given problem, these modules engage in a multi-round conversation with the LLM. The memory module records the conversation and state history of the problem solving process, which allows the system to backtrack to the previous steps of the thought-process and explore other directions from there. To verify the effectiveness of the proposed technique, we implemented a ToT-based solver for the Sudoku Puzzle. Experimental results show that the ToT framework can significantly increase the success rate of Sudoku puzzle solving. Our implementation of the ToT-based Sudoku solver is available on GitHub: https://github.com/jieyilong/tree-of-thought-puzzle-solver.

We introduce Buffer of Thoughts (BoT), a novel and versatile thought-augmented reasoning approach for enhancing accuracy, efficiency and robustness of large language models (LLMs). Specifically, we propose meta-buffer to store a series of informative high-level thoughts, namely thought-template, distilled from the problem-solving processes across various tasks. Then for each problem, we retrieve a relevant thought-template and adaptively instantiate it with specific reasoning structures to conduct efficient reasoning. To guarantee the scalability and stability, we further propose buffer-manager to dynamically update the meta-buffer, thus enhancing the capacity of meta-buffer as more tasks are solved. We conduct extensive experiments on 10 challenging reasoning-intensive tasks, and achieve significant performance improvements over previous SOTA methods: 11% on Game of 24, 20% on Geometric Shapes and 51% on Checkmate-in-One. Further analysis demonstrate the superior generalization ability and model robustness of our BoT, while requiring only 12% of the cost of multi-query prompting methods (e.g., tree/graph of thoughts) on average. Notably, we find that our Llama3-8B+BoT has the potential to surpass Llama3-70B model. Our project is available at: https://github.com/YangLing0818/buffer-of-thought-llm

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Working memory is a critical aspect of both human intelligence and artificial intelligence, serving as a workspace for the temporary storage and manipulation of information. In this paper, we systematically assess the working memory capacity of ChatGPT (gpt-3.5-turbo), a large language model developed by OpenAI, by examining its performance in verbal and spatial n-back tasks under various conditions. Our experiments reveal that ChatGPT experiences significant declines in performance as n increases (which necessitates more information to be stored in working memory), suggesting a limit to the working memory capacity strikingly similar to that of humans. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of different instruction strategies on ChatGPT's performance and observe that the fundamental patterns of a capacity limit persist. From our empirical findings, we propose that n-back tasks may serve as tools for benchmarking the working memory capacity of large language models and hold potential for informing future efforts aimed at enhancing AI working memory and deepening our understanding of human working memory through AI models.

Large multimodal models have demonstrated impressive problem-solving abilities in vision and language tasks, and have the potential to encode extensive world knowledge. However, it remains an open challenge for these models to perceive, reason, plan, and act in realistic environments. In this work, we introduce Can-Do, a benchmark dataset designed to evaluate embodied planning abilities through more diverse and complex scenarios than previous datasets. Our dataset includes 400 multimodal samples, each consisting of natural language user instructions, visual images depicting the environment, state changes, and corresponding action plans. The data encompasses diverse aspects of commonsense knowledge, physical understanding, and safety awareness. Our fine-grained analysis reveals that state-of-the-art models, including GPT-4V, face bottlenecks in visual perception, comprehension, and reasoning abilities. To address these challenges, we propose NeuroGround, a neurosymbolic framework that first grounds the plan generation in the perceived environment states and then leverages symbolic planning engines to augment the model-generated plans. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework compared to strong baselines. Our code and dataset are available at https://embodied-planning.github.io.

Transformers demonstrate impressive performance on a range of reasoning benchmarks. To evaluate the degree to which these abilities are a result of actual reasoning, existing work has focused on developing sophisticated benchmarks for behavioral studies. However, these studies do not provide insights into the internal mechanisms driving the observed capabilities. To improve our understanding of the internal mechanisms of transformers, we present a comprehensive mechanistic analysis of a transformer trained on a synthetic reasoning task. We identify a set of interpretable mechanisms the model uses to solve the task, and validate our findings using correlational and causal evidence. Our results suggest that it implements a depth-bounded recurrent mechanisms that operates in parallel and stores intermediate results in selected token positions. We anticipate that the motifs we identified in our synthetic setting can provide valuable insights into the broader operating principles of transformers and thus provide a basis for understanding more complex models.

Developmental psychologists have spent decades devising experiments to test the intelligence and knowledge of infants and children, tracing the origin of crucial concepts and capacities. Moreover, experimental techniques in developmental psychology have been carefully designed to discriminate the cognitive capacities that underlie particular behaviors. We propose that using classical experiments from child development is a particularly effective way to probe the computational abilities of AI models, in general, and LLMs in particular. First, the methodological techniques of developmental psychology, such as the use of novel stimuli to control for past experience or control conditions to determine whether children are using simple associations, can be equally helpful for assessing the capacities of LLMs. In parallel, testing LLMs in this way can tell us whether the information that is encoded in text is sufficient to enable particular responses, or whether those responses depend on other kinds of information, such as information from exploration of the physical world. In this work we adapt classical developmental experiments to evaluate the capabilities of LaMDA, a large language model from Google. We propose a novel LLM Response Score (LRS) metric which can be used to evaluate other language models, such as GPT. We find that LaMDA generates appropriate responses that are similar to those of children in experiments involving social understanding, perhaps providing evidence that knowledge of these domains is discovered through language. On the other hand, LaMDA's responses in early object and action understanding, theory of mind, and especially causal reasoning tasks are very different from those of young children, perhaps showing that these domains require more real-world, self-initiated exploration and cannot simply be learned from patterns in language input.

Humans talk in free-form while negotiating the expressed meanings or common ground. Despite the impressive conversational abilities of the large generative language models, they do not consider the individual differences in contextual understanding in a shared situated environment. In this work, we propose MindDial, a novel conversational framework that can generate situated free-form responses to negotiate common ground. We design an explicit mind module that can track three-level beliefs -- the speaker's belief, the speaker's prediction of the listener's belief, and the common belief based on the gap between the first two. Then the speaking act classification head will decide to continue to talk, end this turn, or take task-related action. We augment a common ground alignment dataset MutualFriend with belief dynamics annotation, of which the goal is to find a single mutual friend based on the free chat between two agents. Experiments show that our model with mental state modeling can resemble human responses when aligning common ground meanwhile mimic the natural human conversation flow. The ablation study further validates the third-level common belief can aggregate information of the first and second-order beliefs and align common ground more efficiently.

Recent work claims that large language models display emergent abilities, abilities not present in smaller-scale models that are present in larger-scale models. What makes emergent abilities intriguing is two-fold: their sharpness, transitioning seemingly instantaneously from not present to present, and their unpredictability, appearing at seemingly unforeseeable model scales. Here, we present an alternative explanation for emergent abilities: that for a particular task and model family, when analyzing fixed model outputs, emergent abilities appear due to the researcher's choice of metric rather than due to fundamental changes in model behavior with scale. Specifically, nonlinear or discontinuous metrics produce apparent emergent abilities, whereas linear or continuous metrics produce smooth, continuous predictable changes in model performance. We present our alternative explanation in a simple mathematical model, then test it in three complementary ways: we (1) make, test and confirm three predictions on the effect of metric choice using the InstructGPT/GPT-3 family on tasks with claimed emergent abilities; (2) make, test and confirm two predictions about metric choices in a meta-analysis of emergent abilities on BIG-Bench; and (3) show to choose metrics to produce never-before-seen seemingly emergent abilities in multiple vision tasks across diverse deep networks. Via all three analyses, we provide evidence that alleged emergent abilities evaporate with different metrics or with better statistics, and may not be a fundamental property of scaling AI models.

The Chain-of-Thought (CoT) paradigm has emerged as a critical approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). However, despite their widespread adoption and success, CoT methods often exhibit instability due to their inability to consistently ensure the quality of generated reasoning paths, leading to sub-optimal reasoning performance. To address this challenge, we propose the Strategic Chain-of-Thought (SCoT), a novel methodology designed to refine LLM performance by integrating strategic knowledge prior to generating intermediate reasoning steps. SCoT employs a two-stage approach within a single prompt: first eliciting an effective problem-solving strategy, which is then used to guide the generation of high-quality CoT paths and final answers. Our experiments across eight challenging reasoning datasets demonstrate significant improvements, including a 21.05\% increase on the GSM8K dataset and 24.13\% on the Tracking\_Objects dataset, respectively, using the Llama3-8b model. Additionally, we extend the SCoT framework to develop a few-shot method with automatically matched demonstrations, yielding even stronger results. These findings underscore the efficacy of SCoT, highlighting its potential to substantially enhance LLM performance in complex reasoning tasks.

Modern large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT have shown remarkable performance on general language tasks but still struggle on complex reasoning tasks, which drives the research on cognitive behaviors of LLMs to explore human-like problem-solving strategies. Along this direction, one representative strategy is self-reflection, which asks an LLM to refine the solution with the feedback generated by itself iteratively. However, our study shows that such reflection-style methods suffer from the Degeneration-of-Thought (DoT) problem: once the LLM has established confidence in its solutions, it is unable to generate novel thoughts later through reflection even if its initial stance is incorrect. To address the DoT problem, we propose a Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) framework, in which multiple agents express their arguments in the state of "tit for tat" and a judge manages the debate process to obtain a final solution. Clearly, our MAD framework encourages divergent thinking in LLMs which would be helpful for tasks that require deep levels of contemplation. Experiment results on two challenging datasets, commonsense machine translation and counter-intuitive arithmetic reasoning, demonstrate the effectiveness of our MAD framework. Extensive analyses suggest that the adaptive break of debate and the modest level of "tit for tat" state are required for MAD to obtain good performance. Moreover, we find that LLMs might not be a fair judge if different LLMs are used for agents. Codes: https://github.com/Skytliang/Multi-Agents-Debate

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited impressive performance in language comprehension and various reasoning tasks. However, their abilities in spatial reasoning, a crucial aspect of human cognition, remain relatively unexplored. Human possess a remarkable ability to create mental images of unseen objects and actions through a process known as the Mind's Eye, enabling the imagination of the unseen world. Inspired by this cognitive capacity, we propose Visualization-of-Thought (VoT) prompting. VoT aims to elicit spatial reasoning of LLMs by visualizing their reasoning traces, thereby guiding subsequent reasoning steps. We employed VoT for multi-hop spatial reasoning tasks, including natural language navigation, visual navigation, and visual tiling in 2D grid worlds. Experimental results demonstrated that VoT significantly enhances the spatial reasoning abilities of LLMs. Notably, VoT outperformed existing multimodal large language models (MLLMs) in these tasks. While VoT works surprisingly well on LLMs, the ability to generate mental images to facilitate spatial reasoning resembles the mind's eye process, suggesting its potential viability in MLLMs.

Understanding how language supports emotion inference remains a topic of debate in emotion science. The present study investigated whether language-derived emotion-concept knowledge would causally support emotion inference by manipulating the language-specific knowledge representations in large language models. Using the prompt technique, 14 attributes of emotion concepts were found to be represented by distinct artificial neuron populations. By manipulating these attribute-related neurons, the majority of the emotion inference tasks showed performance deterioration compared to random manipulations. The attribute-specific performance deterioration was related to the importance of different attributes in human mental space. Our findings provide causal evidence in support of a language-based mechanism for emotion inference and highlight the contributions of emotion-concept knowledge.

State-of-the-art systems neuroscience experiments yield large-scale multimodal data, and these data sets require new tools for analysis. Inspired by the success of large pretrained models in vision and language domains, we reframe the analysis of large-scale, cellular-resolution neuronal spiking data into an autoregressive spatiotemporal generation problem. Neuroformer is a multimodal, multitask generative pretrained transformer (GPT) model that is specifically designed to handle the intricacies of data in systems neuroscience. It scales linearly with feature size, can process an arbitrary number of modalities, and is adaptable to downstream tasks, such as predicting behavior. We first trained Neuroformer on simulated datasets, and found that it both accurately predicted simulated neuronal circuit activity, and also intrinsically inferred the underlying neural circuit connectivity, including direction. When pretrained to decode neural responses, the model predicted the behavior of a mouse with only few-shot fine-tuning, suggesting that the model begins learning how to do so directly from the neural representations themselves, without any explicit supervision. We used an ablation study to show that joint training on neuronal responses and behavior boosted performance, highlighting the model's ability to associate behavioral and neural representations in an unsupervised manner. These findings show that Neuroformer can analyze neural datasets and their emergent properties, informing the development of models and hypotheses associated with the brain.

Deep learning sometimes appears to work in unexpected ways. In pursuit of a deeper understanding of its surprising behaviors, we investigate the utility of a simple yet accurate model of a trained neural network consisting of a sequence of first-order approximations telescoping out into a single empirically operational tool for practical analysis. Across three case studies, we illustrate how it can be applied to derive new empirical insights on a diverse range of prominent phenomena in the literature -- including double descent, grokking, linear mode connectivity, and the challenges of applying deep learning on tabular data -- highlighting that this model allows us to construct and extract metrics that help predict and understand the a priori unexpected performance of neural networks. We also demonstrate that this model presents a pedagogical formalism allowing us to isolate components of the training process even in complex contemporary settings, providing a lens to reason about the effects of design choices such as architecture & optimization strategy, and reveals surprising parallels between neural network learning and gradient boosting.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has accelerated their application in reasoning, with strategic reasoning drawing increasing attention. To evaluate LLMs' strategic reasoning capabilities, game theory, with its concise structure, has become a preferred approach. However, current research focuses on a limited selection of games, resulting in low coverage. Classic game scenarios risk data leakage, and existing benchmarks often lack extensibility, making them inadequate for evaluating state-of-the-art models. To address these challenges, we propose TMGBench, a benchmark with comprehensive game type coverage, novel scenarios, and flexible organization. Specifically, we incorporate all 144 game types summarized by the Robinson-Goforth topology of 2x2 games, constructed as classic games. We also employ synthetic data generation to create diverse, higher-quality scenarios through topic guidance and human inspection, referred to as story-based games. Lastly, we provide a sustainable framework for increasingly powerful LLMs by treating these games as atomic units and organizing them into more complex forms via sequential, parallel, and nested structures. Our comprehensive evaluation of mainstream LLMs covers tests on rational reasoning, robustness, Theory-of-Mind (ToM), and reasoning in complex forms. Results reveal flaws in accuracy, consistency, and varying mastery of ToM. Additionally, o1-mini, OpenAI's latest reasoning model, achieved accuracy rates of 66.6%, 60.0%, and 70.0% on sequential, parallel, and nested games, highlighting TMGBench's challenges.

Extensive work has shown that the performance and interpretability of commonsense reasoning can be improved via knowledge-augmented reasoning methods, where the knowledge that underpins the reasoning process is explicitly verbalized and utilized. However, existing implementations, including "chain-of-thought" and its variants, fall short in capturing the introspective nature of knowledge required in commonsense reasoning, and in accounting for the mutual adaptation between the generation and utilization of knowledge. We propose a novel method to develop an introspective commonsense reasoner, Crystal. To tackle commonsense problems, it first introspects for knowledge statements related to the given question, and subsequently makes an informed prediction that is grounded in the previously introspected knowledge. The knowledge introspection and knowledge-grounded reasoning modes of the model are tuned via reinforcement learning to mutually adapt, where the reward derives from the feedback given by the model itself. Experiments show that Crystal significantly outperforms both the standard supervised finetuning and chain-of-thought distilled methods, and enhances the transparency of the commonsense reasoning process. Our work ultimately validates the feasibility and potential of reinforcing a neural model with self-feedback.

Attention mechanisms are a central property of cognitive systems allowing them to selectively deploy cognitive resources in a flexible manner. Attention has been long studied in the neurosciences and there are numerous phenomenological models that try to capture its core properties. Recently attentional mechanisms have become a dominating architectural choice of machine learning and are the central innovation of Transformers. The dominant intuition and formalism underlying their development has drawn on ideas of keys and queries in database management systems. In this work, we propose an alternative Bayesian foundation for attentional mechanisms and show how this unifies different attentional architectures in machine learning. This formulation allows to to identify commonality across different attention ML architectures as well as suggest a bridge to those developed in neuroscience. We hope this work will guide more sophisticated intuitions into the key properties of attention architectures and suggest new ones.

Recent progress in using machine learning models for reasoning tasks has been driven by novel model architectures, large-scale pre-training protocols, and dedicated reasoning datasets for fine-tuning. In this work, to further pursue these advances, we introduce a new data generator for machine reasoning that integrates with an embodied agent. The generated data consists of templated text queries and answers, matched with world-states encoded into a database. The world-states are a result of both world dynamics and the actions of the agent. We show the results of several baseline models on instantiations of train sets. These include pre-trained language models fine-tuned on a text-formatted representation of the database, and graph-structured Transformers operating on a knowledge-graph representation of the database. We find that these models can answer some questions about the world-state, but struggle with others. These results hint at new research directions in designing neural reasoning models and database representations. Code to generate the data will be released at github.com/facebookresearch/neuralmemory

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized natural language processing and hold immense potential for advancing Artificial Intelligence. However, the core architecture of most mainstream LLMs -- the Transformer -- has inherent limitations in computational depth, rendering them theoretically incapable of solving many reasoning tasks that demand increasingly deep computations. Chain of Thought (CoT) prompting has emerged as a technique to address these architectural limitations, as evidenced by several theoretical studies. It offers a promising approach to solving complex reasoning tasks that were previously beyond the capabilities of these models. Despite its successes, CoT and its variants (such as Tree of Thought, Graph of Thought, etc.) rely on a "one-prompt-for-all" approach, using a single prompt structure (e.g., "think step by step") for a wide range of tasks -- from counting and sorting to solving mathematical and algorithmic problems. This approach poses significant challenges for models to generate the correct reasoning steps, as the model must navigate through a vast prompt template space to find the appropriate template for each task. In this work, we build upon previous theoretical analyses of CoT to demonstrate how the one-prompt-for-all approach can negatively affect the computability of LLMs. We partition the solution search space into two: the prompt space and the answer space. Our findings show that task-specific supervision is essential for navigating the prompt space accurately and achieving optimal performance. Through experiments with state-of-the-art LLMs, we reveal a gap in reasoning performance when supervision is applied versus when it is not.

This study examines the efficacy of various neural network (NN) models in interpreting mental constructs via electroencephalogram (EEG) signals. Through the assessment of 16 prevalent NN models and their variants across four brain-computer interface (BCI) paradigms, we gauged their information representation capability. Rooted in comprehensive literature review findings, we proposed EEGNeX, a novel, purely ConvNet-based architecture. We pitted it against both existing cutting-edge strategies and the Mother of All BCI Benchmarks (MOABB) involving 11 distinct EEG motor imagination (MI) classification tasks and revealed that EEGNeX surpasses other state-of-the-art methods. Notably, it shows up to 2.1%-8.5% improvement in the classification accuracy in different scenarios with statistical significance (p < 0.05) compared to its competitors. This study not only provides deeper insights into designing efficient NN models for EEG data but also lays groundwork for future explorations into the relationship between bioelectric brain signals and NN architectures. For the benefit of broader scientific collaboration, we have made all benchmark models, including EEGNeX, publicly available at (https://github.com/chenxiachan/EEGNeX).

One of the roadblocks to a better understanding of neural networks' internals is polysemanticity, where neurons appear to activate in multiple, semantically distinct contexts. Polysemanticity prevents us from identifying concise, human-understandable explanations for what neural networks are doing internally. One hypothesised cause of polysemanticity is superposition, where neural networks represent more features than they have neurons by assigning features to an overcomplete set of directions in activation space, rather than to individual neurons. Here, we attempt to identify those directions, using sparse autoencoders to reconstruct the internal activations of a language model. These autoencoders learn sets of sparsely activating features that are more interpretable and monosemantic than directions identified by alternative approaches, where interpretability is measured by automated methods. Ablating these features enables precise model editing, for example, by removing capabilities such as pronoun prediction, while disrupting model behaviour less than prior techniques. This work indicates that it is possible to resolve superposition in language models using a scalable, unsupervised method. Our method may serve as a foundation for future mechanistic interpretability work, which we hope will enable greater model transparency and steerability.

Whether neural networks can learn abstract reasoning or whether they merely rely on superficial statistics is a topic of recent debate. Here, we propose a dataset and challenge designed to probe abstract reasoning, inspired by a well-known human IQ test. To succeed at this challenge, models must cope with various generalisation `regimes' in which the training and test data differ in clearly-defined ways. We show that popular models such as ResNets perform poorly, even when the training and test sets differ only minimally, and we present a novel architecture, with a structure designed to encourage reasoning, that does significantly better. When we vary the way in which the test questions and training data differ, we find that our model is notably proficient at certain forms of generalisation, but notably weak at others. We further show that the model's ability to generalise improves markedly if it is trained to predict symbolic explanations for its answers. Altogether, we introduce and explore ways to both measure and induce stronger abstract reasoning in neural networks. Our freely-available dataset should motivate further progress in this direction.

Neural networks can approximate complex functions, but they struggle to perform exact arithmetic operations over real numbers. The lack of inductive bias for arithmetic operations leaves neural networks without the underlying logic necessary to extrapolate on tasks such as addition, subtraction, and multiplication. We present two new neural network components: the Neural Addition Unit (NAU), which can learn exact addition and subtraction; and the Neural Multiplication Unit (NMU) that can multiply subsets of a vector. The NMU is, to our knowledge, the first arithmetic neural network component that can learn to multiply elements from a vector, when the hidden size is large. The two new components draw inspiration from a theoretical analysis of recently proposed arithmetic components. We find that careful initialization, restricting parameter space, and regularizing for sparsity is important when optimizing the NAU and NMU. Our proposed units NAU and NMU, compared with previous neural units, converge more consistently, have fewer parameters, learn faster, can converge for larger hidden sizes, obtain sparse and meaningful weights, and can extrapolate to negative and small values.

This paper takes a first step towards a critical thinking curriculum for neural auto-regressive language models. We introduce a synthetic corpus of deductively valid arguments, and generate artificial argumentative texts to train and evaluate GPT-2. Significant transfer learning effects can be observed: Training a model on three simple core schemes allows it to accurately complete conclusions of different, and more complex types of arguments, too. The language models generalize the core argument schemes in a correct way. Moreover, we obtain consistent and promising results for NLU benchmarks. In particular, pre-training on the argument schemes raises zero-shot accuracy on the GLUE diagnostics by up to 15 percentage points. The findings suggest that intermediary pre-training on texts that exemplify basic reasoning abilities (such as typically covered in critical thinking textbooks) might help language models to acquire a broad range of reasoning skills. The synthetic argumentative texts presented in this paper are a promising starting point for building such a "critical thinking curriculum for language models."

The prevalent use of large language models (LLMs) in various domains has drawn attention to the issue of "hallucination," which refers to instances where LLMs generate factually inaccurate or ungrounded information. Existing techniques for hallucination detection in language assistants rely on intricate fuzzy, specific free-language-based chain of thought (CoT) techniques or parameter-based methods that suffer from interpretability issues. Additionally, the methods that identify hallucinations post-generation could not prevent their occurrence and suffer from inconsistent performance due to the influence of the instruction format and model style. In this paper, we introduce a novel pre-detection self-evaluation technique, referred to as SELF-FAMILIARITY, which focuses on evaluating the model's familiarity with the concepts present in the input instruction and withholding the generation of response in case of unfamiliar concepts. This approach emulates the human ability to refrain from responding to unfamiliar topics, thus reducing hallucinations. We validate SELF-FAMILIARITY across four different large language models, demonstrating consistently superior performance compared to existing techniques. Our findings propose a significant shift towards preemptive strategies for hallucination mitigation in LLM assistants, promising improvements in reliability, applicability, and interpretability.

We study the interpretability issue of task-oriented dialogue systems in this paper. Previously, most neural-based task-oriented dialogue systems employ an implicit reasoning strategy that makes the model predictions uninterpretable to humans. To obtain a transparent reasoning process, we introduce neuro-symbolic to perform explicit reasoning that justifies model decisions by reasoning chains. Since deriving reasoning chains requires multi-hop reasoning for task-oriented dialogues, existing neuro-symbolic approaches would induce error propagation due to the one-phase design. To overcome this, we propose a two-phase approach that consists of a hypothesis generator and a reasoner. We first obtain multiple hypotheses, i.e., potential operations to perform the desired task, through the hypothesis generator. Each hypothesis is then verified by the reasoner, and the valid one is selected to conduct the final prediction. The whole system is trained by exploiting raw textual dialogues without using any reasoning chain annotations. Experimental studies on two public benchmark datasets demonstrate that the proposed approach not only achieves better results, but also introduces an interpretable decision process.

Recent work has shown that large text-based neural language models, trained with conventional supervised learning objectives, acquire a surprising propensity for few- and one-shot learning. Here, we show that an embodied agent situated in a simulated 3D world, and endowed with a novel dual-coding external memory, can exhibit similar one-shot word learning when trained with conventional reinforcement learning algorithms. After a single introduction to a novel object via continuous visual perception and a language prompt ("This is a dax"), the agent can re-identify the object and manipulate it as instructed ("Put the dax on the bed"). In doing so, it seamlessly integrates short-term, within-episode knowledge of the appropriate referent for the word "dax" with long-term lexical and motor knowledge acquired across episodes (i.e. "bed" and "putting"). We find that, under certain training conditions and with a particular memory writing mechanism, the agent's one-shot word-object binding generalizes to novel exemplars within the same ShapeNet category, and is effective in settings with unfamiliar numbers of objects. We further show how dual-coding memory can be exploited as a signal for intrinsic motivation, stimulating the agent to seek names for objects that may be useful for later executing instructions. Together, the results demonstrate that deep neural networks can exploit meta-learning, episodic memory and an explicitly multi-modal environment to account for 'fast-mapping', a fundamental pillar of human cognitive development and a potentially transformative capacity for agents that interact with human users.

We introduce Cosmos, a framework for object-centric world modeling that is designed for compositional generalization (CG), i.e., high performance on unseen input scenes obtained through the composition of known visual "atoms." The central insight behind Cosmos is the use of a novel form of neurosymbolic grounding. Specifically, the framework introduces two new tools: (i) neurosymbolic scene encodings, which represent each entity in a scene using a real vector computed using a neural encoder, as well as a vector of composable symbols describing attributes of the entity, and (ii) a neurosymbolic attention mechanism that binds these entities to learned rules of interaction. Cosmos is end-to-end differentiable; also, unlike traditional neurosymbolic methods that require representations to be manually mapped to symbols, it computes an entity's symbolic attributes using vision-language foundation models. Through an evaluation that considers two different forms of CG on an established blocks-pushing domain, we show that the framework establishes a new state-of-the-art for CG in world modeling.

Neural decoding, the process of understanding how brain activity corresponds to different stimuli, has been a primary objective in cognitive sciences. Over the past three decades, advancements in functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and machine learning have greatly improved our ability to map visual stimuli to brain activity, especially in the visual cortex. Concurrently, research has expanded into decoding more complex processes like language and memory across the whole brain, utilizing techniques to handle greater variability and improve signal accuracy. We argue that "seeing" involves more than just mapping visual stimuli onto the visual cortex; it engages the entire brain, as various emotions and cognitive states can emerge from observing different scenes. In this paper, we develop algorithms to enhance our understanding of visual processes by incorporating whole-brain activation maps while individuals are exposed to visual stimuli. We utilize large-scale fMRI encoders and Image generative models pre-trained on large public datasets, which are then fine-tuned through Image-fMRI contrastive learning. Our models hence can decode visual experience across the entire cerebral cortex, surpassing the traditional confines of the visual cortex. We first compare our method with state-of-the-art approaches to decoding visual processing and show improved predictive semantic accuracy by 43%. A network ablation analysis suggests that beyond the visual cortex, the default mode network contributes most to decoding stimuli, in line with the proposed role of this network in sense-making and semantic processing. Additionally, we implemented zero-shot imagination decoding on an extra validation dataset, achieving a p-value of 0.0206 for mapping the reconstructed images and ground-truth text stimuli, which substantiates the model's capability to capture semantic meanings across various scenarios.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

This paper investigates robot manipulation based on human instruction with ambiguous requests. The intent is to compensate for imperfect natural language via visual observations. Early symbolic methods, based on manually defined symbols, built modular framework consist of semantic parsing and task planning for producing sequences of actions from natural language requests. Modern connectionist methods employ deep neural networks to automatically learn visual and linguistic features and map to a sequence of low-level actions, in an endto-end fashion. These two approaches are blended to create a hybrid, modular framework: it formulates instruction following as symbolic goal learning via deep neural networks followed by task planning via symbolic planners. Connectionist and symbolic modules are bridged with Planning Domain Definition Language. The vision-and-language learning network predicts its goal representation, which is sent to a planner for producing a task-completing action sequence. For improving the flexibility of natural language, we further incorporate implicit human intents with explicit human instructions. To learn generic features for vision and language, we propose to separately pretrain vision and language encoders on scene graph parsing and semantic textual similarity tasks. Benchmarking evaluates the impacts of different components of, or options for, the vision-and-language learning model and shows the effectiveness of pretraining strategies. Manipulation experiments conducted in the simulator AI2THOR show the robustness of the framework to novel scenarios.

We use (multi)modal deep neural networks (DNNs) to probe for sites of multimodal integration in the human brain by predicting stereoencephalography (SEEG) recordings taken while human subjects watched movies. We operationalize sites of multimodal integration as regions where a multimodal vision-language model predicts recordings better than unimodal language, unimodal vision, or linearly-integrated language-vision models. Our target DNN models span different architectures (e.g., convolutional networks and transformers) and multimodal training techniques (e.g., cross-attention and contrastive learning). As a key enabling step, we first demonstrate that trained vision and language models systematically outperform their randomly initialized counterparts in their ability to predict SEEG signals. We then compare unimodal and multimodal models against one another. Because our target DNN models often have different architectures, number of parameters, and training sets (possibly obscuring those differences attributable to integration), we carry out a controlled comparison of two models (SLIP and SimCLR), which keep all of these attributes the same aside from input modality. Using this approach, we identify a sizable number of neural sites (on average 141 out of 1090 total sites or 12.94%) and brain regions where multimodal integration seems to occur. Additionally, we find that among the variants of multimodal training techniques we assess, CLIP-style training is the best suited for downstream prediction of the neural activity in these sites.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

A key challenge on the path to developing agents that learn complex human-like behavior is the need to quickly and accurately quantify human-likeness. While human assessments of such behavior can be highly accurate, speed and scalability are limited. We address these limitations through a novel automated Navigation Turing Test (ANTT) that learns to predict human judgments of human-likeness. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our automated NTT on a navigation task in a complex 3D environment. We investigate six classification models to shed light on the types of architectures best suited to this task, and validate them against data collected through a human NTT. Our best models achieve high accuracy when distinguishing true human and agent behavior. At the same time, we show that predicting finer-grained human assessment of agents' progress towards human-like behavior remains unsolved. Our work takes an important step towards agents that more effectively learn complex human-like behavior.

Thinking aloud is an effective meta-cognitive strategy human reasoners apply to solve difficult problems. We suggest to improve the reasoning ability of pre-trained neural language models in a similar way, namely by expanding a task's context with problem elaborations that are dynamically generated by the language model itself. Our main result is that dynamic problem elaboration significantly improves the zero-shot performance of GPT-2 in a deductive reasoning and natural language inference task: While the model uses a syntactic heuristic for predicting an answer, it is capable (to some degree) of generating reasoned additional context which facilitates the successful application of its heuristic. We explore different ways of generating elaborations, including fewshot learning, and find that their relative performance varies with the specific problem characteristics (such as problem difficulty). Moreover, the effectiveness of an elaboration can be explained in terms of the degree to which the elaboration semantically coheres with the corresponding problem. In particular, elaborations that are most faithful to the original problem description may boost accuracy by up to 24%.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) decoding enables language models to improve reasoning performance at the cost of high generation latency in decoding. Recent proposals have explored variants of contemplation tokens, a term we introduce that refers to special tokens used during inference to allow for extra computation. Prior work has considered fixed-length sequences drawn from a discrete set of embeddings as contemplation tokens. Here we propose Compressed Chain-of-Thought (CCoT), a framework to generate contentful and continuous contemplation tokens of variable sequence length. The generated contemplation tokens are compressed representations of explicit reasoning chains, and our method can be applied to off-the-shelf decoder language models. Through experiments, we illustrate how CCoT enables additional reasoning over dense contentful representations to achieve corresponding improvements in accuracy. Moreover, the reasoning improvements can be adaptively modified on demand by controlling the number of contemplation tokens generated.

Math reasoning is a highly active area of Large Language Model (LLM) research because it is a hallmark of artificial intelligence. However, few works have explored how math reasoning is encoded within LLM parameters and if it is a skill that can be isolated within a model. Doing so could allow targeted intervention to improve math performance without altering non-math behavior and foster understanding of how models encode math reasoning. We introduce Math Neurosurgery (MathNeuro), a method for isolating math-specific parameters in LLMs using only forward passes. MathNeuro builds on existing work by using weights and activations to calculate parameter importance, but isolates math-specific parameters by removing those important for general language tasks. Pruning parameters MathNeuro identifies deletes a LLM's math reasoning ability without destroying its general language ability. Scaling these parameters by a small constant improves a pretrained or instruction-tuned LLM's performance by 4-17% on GSM8K while leaving non-math behavior unaltered. MathNeuro is also data efficient: most of its effectiveness holds when identifying math-specific parameters using a single sample. MathNeuro highlights the potential for future work to intervene on math-specific parameters.

It is a long-standing problem in robotics to develop agents capable of executing diverse manipulation tasks from visual observations in unstructured real-world environments. To achieve this goal, the robot needs to have a comprehensive understanding of the 3D structure and semantics of the scene. In this work, we present GNFactor, a visual behavior cloning agent for multi-task robotic manipulation with Generalizable Neural feature Fields. GNFactor jointly optimizes a generalizable neural field (GNF) as a reconstruction module and a Perceiver Transformer as a decision-making module, leveraging a shared deep 3D voxel representation. To incorporate semantics in 3D, the reconstruction module utilizes a vision-language foundation model (e.g., Stable Diffusion) to distill rich semantic information into the deep 3D voxel. We evaluate GNFactor on 3 real robot tasks and perform detailed ablations on 10 RLBench tasks with a limited number of demonstrations. We observe a substantial improvement of GNFactor over current state-of-the-art methods in seen and unseen tasks, demonstrating the strong generalization ability of GNFactor. Our project website is https://yanjieze.com/GNFactor/ .

Neural-symbolic learning, an intersection of neural networks and symbolic reasoning, aims to blend neural networks' learning capabilities with symbolic AI's interpretability and reasoning. This paper introduces an approach designed to improve the performance of neural models in learning reasoning tasks. It achieves this by integrating Answer Set Programming (ASP) solvers and domain-specific expertise, which is an approach that diverges from traditional complex neural-symbolic models. In this paper, a shallow artificial neural network (ANN) is specifically trained to solve Sudoku puzzles with minimal training data. The model has a unique loss function that integrates losses calculated using the ASP solver outputs, effectively enhancing its training efficiency. Most notably, the model shows a significant improvement in solving Sudoku puzzles using only 12 puzzles for training and testing without hyperparameter tuning. This advancement indicates that the model's enhanced reasoning capabilities have practical applications, extending well beyond Sudoku puzzles to potentially include a variety of other domains. The code can be found on GitHub: https://github.com/Fadi2200/ASPEN.

Multi-modal Chain-of-Thought (MCoT) requires models to leverage knowledge from both textual and visual modalities for step-by-step reasoning, which gains increasing attention. Nevertheless, the current MCoT benchmark still faces some challenges: (1) absence of visual modal reasoning, (2) single-step visual modal reasoning, and (3) Domain missing, thereby hindering the development of MCoT. Motivated by this, we introduce a novel benchmark (M^3CoT) to address the above challenges, advancing the multi-domain, multi-step, and multi-modal CoT. Additionally, we conduct a thorough evaluation involving abundant MCoT approaches on Vision Large Language Models (VLLMs). In addition, we highlight that the current VLLMs still struggle to correctly reason in M^3CoT and there remains a large gap between existing VLLMs and human performance in M^3CoT, despite their superior results on previous MCoT benchmarks. To our knowledge, we take the first meaningful step toward the multi-domain, multi-step, and multi-modal scenario in MCoT. We hope that M^3CoT can serve as a valuable resource, providing a pioneering foundation in multi-domain, multi-step, multi-modal chain-of-thought research.

To handle the scarcity and heterogeneity of electroencephalography (EEG) data for Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) tasks, and to harness the power of large publicly available data sets, we propose Neuro-GPT, a foundation model consisting of an EEG encoder and a GPT model. The foundation model is pre-trained on a large-scale data set using a self-supervised task that learns how to reconstruct masked EEG segments. We then fine-tune the model on a Motor Imagery Classification task to validate its performance in a low-data regime (9 subjects). Our experiments demonstrate that applying a foundation model can significantly improve classification performance compared to a model trained from scratch, which provides evidence for the generalizability of the foundation model and its ability to address challenges of data scarcity and heterogeneity in EEG. The code is publicly available at github.com/wenhui0206/NeuroGPT.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting reveals that large language models are capable of performing complex reasoning via intermediate steps. CoT prompting is primarily categorized into three approaches. The first approach utilizes straightforward prompts like ``Let's think step by step'' to generate a sequential thought process before yielding an answer. The second approach makes use of human-crafted, step-by-step demonstrations to guide the model's reasoning process. The third automates the generation of reasoned demonstrations with the 'Let's think step by step'.This approach sometimes leads to reasoning errors, highlighting the need to diversify demonstrations to mitigate its misleading effects. However, diverse demonstrations pose challenges for effective representations. In this work, we propose ECHO, a self-harmonized chain-of-thought prompting method. It consolidates diverse solution paths into a uniform and effective solution pattern.ECHO demonstrates the best overall performance across three reasoning domains.

Recent work on neural algorithmic reasoning has investigated the reasoning capabilities of neural networks, effectively demonstrating they can learn to execute classical algorithms on unseen data coming from the train distribution. However, the performance of existing neural reasoners significantly degrades on out-of-distribution (OOD) test data, where inputs have larger sizes. In this work, we make an important observation: there are many different inputs for which an algorithm will perform certain intermediate computations identically. This insight allows us to develop data augmentation procedures that, given an algorithm's intermediate trajectory, produce inputs for which the target algorithm would have exactly the same next trajectory step. Then, we employ a causal framework to design a corresponding self-supervised objective, and we prove that it improves the OOD generalisation capabilities of the reasoner. We evaluate our method on the CLRS algorithmic reasoning benchmark, where we show up to 3times improvements on the OOD test data.

Universality is a key hypothesis in mechanistic interpretability -- that different models learn similar features and circuits when trained on similar tasks. In this work, we study the universality hypothesis by examining how small neural networks learn to implement group composition. We present a novel algorithm by which neural networks may implement composition for any finite group via mathematical representation theory. We then show that networks consistently learn this algorithm by reverse engineering model logits and weights, and confirm our understanding using ablations. By studying networks of differing architectures trained on various groups, we find mixed evidence for universality: using our algorithm, we can completely characterize the family of circuits and features that networks learn on this task, but for a given network the precise circuits learned -- as well as the order they develop -- are arbitrary.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have brought remarkable success in the field of LLM-as-Agent. Nevertheless, a prevalent assumption is that the information processed by LLMs is consistently honest, neglecting the pervasive deceptive or misleading information in human society and AI-generated content. This oversight makes LLMs susceptible to malicious manipulations, potentially resulting in detrimental outcomes. This study utilizes the intricate Avalon game as a testbed to explore LLMs' potential in deceptive environments. Avalon, full of misinformation and requiring sophisticated logic, manifests as a "Game-of-Thoughts". Inspired by the efficacy of humans' recursive thinking and perspective-taking in the Avalon game, we introduce a novel framework, Recursive Contemplation (ReCon), to enhance LLMs' ability to identify and counteract deceptive information. ReCon combines formulation and refinement contemplation processes; formulation contemplation produces initial thoughts and speech, while refinement contemplation further polishes them. Additionally, we incorporate first-order and second-order perspective transitions into these processes respectively. Specifically, the first-order allows an LLM agent to infer others' mental states, and the second-order involves understanding how others perceive the agent's mental state. After integrating ReCon with different LLMs, extensive experiment results from the Avalon game indicate its efficacy in aiding LLMs to discern and maneuver around deceptive information without extra fine-tuning and data. Finally, we offer a possible explanation for the efficacy of ReCon and explore the current limitations of LLMs in terms of safety, reasoning, speaking style, and format, potentially furnishing insights for subsequent research.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Reasoning ability is essential for Large Multimodal Models (LMMs). In the absence of multimodal chain-of-thought annotated data, self-evolving training, where the model learns from its own outputs, has emerged as an effective and scalable approach for enhancing reasoning abilities. Despite its growing usage, a comprehensive understanding of self-evolving training, particularly in the context of multimodal reasoning, remains limited. In this paper, we delve into the intricacies of self-evolving training for multimodal reasoning, pinpointing three key factors: Training Method, Reward Model, and Prompt Variation. We systematically examine each factor and explore how various configurations affect the training's effectiveness. Our analysis leads to a set of best practices for each factor, aimed at optimizing multimodal reasoning. Furthermore, we explore the Self-Evolution Dynamics during training and the impact of automatic balancing mechanisms in boosting performance. After all the investigations, we present a final recipe for self-evolving training in multimodal reasoning, encapsulating these design choices into a framework we call MSTaR (Multimodal Self-evolving Training for Reasoning), which is universally effective for models with different sizes on various benchmarks, e.g., surpassing the pre-evolved model significantly on 5 multimodal reasoning benchmarks without using additional human annotations, as demonstrated on MiniCPM-V-2.5 (8B), Phi-3.5-Vision (4B) and InternVL2 (2B). We believe this study fills a significant gap in the understanding of self-evolving training for multimodal reasoning and offers a robust framework for future research. Our policy and reward models, as well as the collected data, is released to facilitate further investigation in multimodal reasoning.

We study how vision-language models trained on Internet-scale data can be incorporated directly into end-to-end robotic control to boost generalization and enable emergent semantic reasoning. Our goal is to enable a single end-to-end trained model to both learn to map robot observations to actions and enjoy the benefits of large-scale pretraining on language and vision-language data from the web. To this end, we propose to co-fine-tune state-of-the-art vision-language models on both robotic trajectory data and Internet-scale vision-language tasks, such as visual question answering. In contrast to other approaches, we propose a simple, general recipe to achieve this goal: in order to fit both natural language responses and robotic actions into the same format, we express the actions as text tokens and incorporate them directly into the training set of the model in the same way as natural language tokens. We refer to such category of models as vision-language-action models (VLA) and instantiate an example of such a model, which we call RT-2. Our extensive evaluation (6k evaluation trials) shows that our approach leads to performant robotic policies and enables RT-2 to obtain a range of emergent capabilities from Internet-scale training. This includes significantly improved generalization to novel objects, the ability to interpret commands not present in the robot training data (such as placing an object onto a particular number or icon), and the ability to perform rudimentary reasoning in response to user commands (such as picking up the smallest or largest object, or the one closest to another object). We further show that incorporating chain of thought reasoning allows RT-2 to perform multi-stage semantic reasoning, for example figuring out which object to pick up for use as an improvised hammer (a rock), or which type of drink is best suited for someone who is tired (an energy drink).

Chain-of-thought (CoT) has proven to improve the reasoning capability of large language models (LLMs). However, due to the complexity of multimodal scenarios and the difficulty in collecting high-quality CoT data, CoT reasoning in multimodal LLMs has been largely overlooked. To this end, we propose a simple yet effective self-training framework, R3V, which iteratively enhances the model's Vision-language Reasoning by Reflecting on CoT Rationales. Our framework consists of two interleaved parts: (1) iteratively bootstrapping positive and negative solutions for reasoning datasets, and (2) reflection on rationale for learning from mistakes. Specifically, we introduce the self-refine and self-select losses, enabling the model to refine flawed rationale and derive the correct answer by comparing rationale candidates. Experiments on a wide range of vision-language tasks show that R3V consistently improves multimodal LLM reasoning, achieving a relative improvement of 23 to 60 percent over GPT-distilled baselines. Additionally, our approach supports self-reflection on generated solutions, further boosting performance through test-time computation.

We discovered the underlying physics in Next-token Prediction (NTP). We identified the law of information conservation within NTP and proposed the First Law of Information Capacity (IC-1), demonstrating that the essence of intelligence emergence in auto-regressive models is fundamentally a process of information transfer. We also introduced Landauer's Principle into NTP, formulating the Second Law of Information Capacity (IC-2), which establishes the relationship between auto-regressive model training and energy consumption. Additionally, we presented several corollaries, which hold practical significance for production practices. Finally, we validated the compatibility and complementarity of our findings with existing theories.

In human cognition theory, human thinking is governed by two systems: the fast and intuitive System 1 and the slower but more deliberative System 2. Recent studies have shown that incorporating System 2 process into Transformers including large language models (LLMs), significantly enhances their reasoning capabilities. Nevertheless, models that purely resemble System 2 thinking require substantially higher computational costs and are much slower to respond. To address this challenge, we present Dualformer, a single Transformer model that seamlessly integrates both the fast and slow reasoning modes. Dualformer is obtained by training on data with randomized reasoning traces, where different parts of the traces are dropped during training. The dropping strategies are specifically tailored according to the trace structure, analogous to analyzing our thinking process and creating shortcuts with patterns. At inference time, our model can be configured to output only the solutions (fast mode) or both the reasoning chain and the final solution (slow mode), or automatically decide which mode to engage (auto mode). In all cases, Dualformer outperforms the corresponding baseline models in both performance and computational efficiency: (1) in slow mode, Dualformer optimally solves unseen 30 x 30 maze navigation tasks 97.6% of the time, surpassing the Searchformer (trained on data with complete reasoning traces) baseline performance of 93.3%, while only using 45.5% fewer reasoning steps; (2) in fast mode, Dualformer completes those tasks with an 80% optimal rate, significantly outperforming the Solution-Only model (trained on solution-only data), which has an optimal rate of only 30%. For math problems, our techniques have also achieved improved performance with LLM fine-tuning, showing its generalization beyond task-specific models.

There is an analogy that is often made between deep neural networks and actual brains, suggested by the nomenclature itself: the "neurons" in deep neural networks should correspond to neurons (or nerve cells, to avoid confusion) in the brain. We claim, however, that this analogy doesn't even type check: it is structurally flawed. In agreement with the slightly glib summary of Hebbian learning as "cells that fire together wire together", this article makes the case that the analogy should be different. Since the "neurons" in deep neural networks are managing the changing weights, they are more akin to the synapses in the brain; instead, it is the wires in deep neural networks that are more like nerve cells, in that they are what cause the information to flow. An intuition that nerve cells seem like more than mere wires is exactly right, and is justified by a precise category-theoretic analogy which we will explore in this article. Throughout, we will continue to highlight the error in equating artificial neurons with nerve cells by leaving "neuron" in quotes or by calling them artificial neurons. We will first explain how to view deep neural networks as nested dynamical systems with a very restricted sort of interaction pattern, and then explain a more general sort of interaction for dynamical systems that is useful throughout engineering, but which fails to adapt to changing circumstances. As mentioned, an analogy is then forced upon us by the mathematical formalism in which they are both embedded. We call the resulting encompassing generalization deeply interacting learning systems: they have complex interaction as in control theory, but adaptation to circumstances as in deep neural networks.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has been extensively explored in large models to tackle complex understanding tasks. However, it still remains an open question whether such strategies can be applied to verifying and reinforcing image generation scenarios. In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive investigation of the potential of CoT reasoning to enhance autoregressive image generation. We focus on three techniques: scaling test-time computation for verification, aligning model preferences with Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and integrating these techniques for complementary effects. Our results demonstrate that these approaches can be effectively adapted and combined to significantly improve image generation performance. Furthermore, given the pivotal role of reward models in our findings, we propose the Potential Assessment Reward Model (PARM) and PARM++, specialized for autoregressive image generation. PARM adaptively assesses each generation step through a potential assessment approach, merging the strengths of existing reward models, and PARM++ further introduces a reflection mechanism to self-correct the generated unsatisfactory image. Using our investigated reasoning strategies, we enhance a baseline model, Show-o, to achieve superior results, with a significant +24% improvement on the GenEval benchmark, surpassing Stable Diffusion 3 by +15%. We hope our study provides unique insights and paves a new path for integrating CoT reasoning with autoregressive image generation. Code and models are released at https://github.com/ZiyuGuo99/Image-Generation-CoT

Large Language Model can reasonably understand and generate human expressions but may lack of thorough thinking and reasoning mechanisms. Recently there have been several studies which enhance the thinking ability of language models but most of them are not data-driven or training-based. In this paper, we are motivated by the cognitive mechanism in the natural world, and design a novel model architecture called TaS which allows it to first consider the thoughts and then express the response based upon the query. We design several pipelines to annotate or generate the thought contents from prompt-response samples, then add language heads in a middle layer which behaves as the thinking layer. We train the language model by the thoughts-augmented data and successfully let the thinking layer automatically generate reasonable thoughts and finally output more reasonable responses. Both qualitative examples and quantitative results validate the effectiveness and performance of TaS. Our code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/TadE.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across multiple tasks through in-context learning. For complex reasoning tasks that require step-by-step thinking, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has given impressive results, especially when combined with self-consistency. Nonetheless, some tasks remain particularly difficult for LLMs to solve. Tree of Thoughts (ToT) and Graph of Thoughts (GoT) emerged as alternatives, dividing the complex problem into paths of subproblems. In this paper, we propose Tree of Problems (ToP), a simpler version of ToT, which we hypothesise can work better for complex tasks that can be divided into identical subtasks. Our empirical results show that our approach outperforms ToT and GoT, and in addition performs better than CoT on complex reasoning tasks. All code for this paper is publicly available here: https://github.com/ArmelRandy/tree-of-problems.

Recent years have seen an increasing amount of work on embodied AI agents that can perform tasks by following human language instructions. However, most of these agents are reactive, meaning that they simply learn and imitate behaviors encountered in the training data. These reactive agents are insufficient for long-horizon complex tasks. To address this limitation, we propose a neuro-symbolic deliberative agent that, while following language instructions, proactively applies reasoning and planning based on its neural and symbolic representations acquired from past experience (e.g., natural language and egocentric vision). We show that our deliberative agent achieves greater than 70% improvement over reactive baselines on the challenging TEACh benchmark. Moreover, the underlying reasoning and planning processes, together with our modular framework, offer impressive transparency and explainability to the behaviors of the agent. This enables an in-depth understanding of the agent's capabilities, which shed light on challenges and opportunities for future embodied agents for instruction following. The code is available at https://github.com/sled-group/DANLI.