Daily Papers

Metacognitive knowledge refers to humans' intuitive knowledge of their own thinking and reasoning processes. Today's best LLMs clearly possess some reasoning processes. The paper gives evidence that they also have metacognitive knowledge, including ability to name skills and procedures to apply given a task. We explore this primarily in context of math reasoning, developing a prompt-guided interaction procedure to get a powerful LLM to assign sensible skill labels to math questions, followed by having it perform semantic clustering to obtain coarser families of skill labels. These coarse skill labels look interpretable to humans. To validate that these skill labels are meaningful and relevant to the LLM's reasoning processes we perform the following experiments. (a) We ask GPT-4 to assign skill labels to training questions in math datasets GSM8K and MATH. (b) When using an LLM to solve the test questions, we present it with the full list of skill labels and ask it to identify the skill needed. Then it is presented with randomly selected exemplar solved questions associated with that skill label. This improves accuracy on GSM8k and MATH for several strong LLMs, including code-assisted models. The methodology presented is domain-agnostic, even though this article applies it to math problems.

In Large Language Models (LLMs), there have been consistent advancements in task-specific performance, largely influenced by effective prompt design. While recent research on prompting has enhanced the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, a gap remains in further improving their understanding abilities. In this study, we introduce Metacognitive Prompting (MP), a strategy inspired by human introspective reasoning processes. Using MP, LLMs undergo a systematic series of structured, self-aware evaluations, drawing on both their vast inherent knowledge and new insights. Our experiments involve five prevalent LLMs: Llama2, Vicuna, PaLM, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4, all of which span various general natural language understanding (NLU) tasks from the GLUE and SuperGLUE benchmarks. Results indicate that, although GPT-4 consistently excels in most tasks, PaLM, when equipped with MP, approaches its performance level. Furthermore, across models and datasets, MP consistently outperforms existing prompting methods, including standard and chain-of-thought prompting. This study underscores the potential to amplify the understanding abilities of LLMs and highlights the benefits of mirroring human introspective reasoning in NLU tasks.

This study investigates the metacognitive capabilities of Large Language Models relative to human metacognition in the context of the International Coaching Federation ICF mimicking exam, a situational judgment test related to coaching competencies. Using a mixed method approach, we assessed the metacognitive performance, including sensitivity, accuracy in probabilistic predictions, and bias, of human participants and five advanced LLMs (GPT-4, Claude-3-Opus 3, Mistral Large, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5 Pro). The results indicate that LLMs outperformed humans across all metacognitive metrics, particularly in terms of reduced overconfidence, compared to humans. However, both LLMs and humans showed less adaptability in ambiguous scenarios, adhering closely to predefined decision frameworks. The study suggests that Generative AI can effectively engage in human-like metacognitive processing without conscious awareness. Implications of the study are discussed in relation to development of AI simulators that scaffold cognitive and metacognitive aspects of mastering coaching competencies. More broadly, implications of these results are discussed in relation to development of metacognitive modules that lead towards more autonomous and intuitive AI systems.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

In this report we review memory-based meta-learning as a tool for building sample-efficient strategies that learn from past experience to adapt to any task within a target class. Our goal is to equip the reader with the conceptual foundations of this tool for building new, scalable agents that operate on broad domains. To do so, we present basic algorithmic templates for building near-optimal predictors and reinforcement learners which behave as if they had a probabilistic model that allowed them to efficiently exploit task structure. Furthermore, we recast memory-based meta-learning within a Bayesian framework, showing that the meta-learned strategies are near-optimal because they amortize Bayes-filtered data, where the adaptation is implemented in the memory dynamics as a state-machine of sufficient statistics. Essentially, memory-based meta-learning translates the hard problem of probabilistic sequential inference into a regression problem.

A hallmark of intelligence is the ability to autonomously learn new flexible, cognitive behaviors - that is, behaviors where the appropriate action depends not just on immediate stimuli (as in simple reflexive stimulus-response associations), but on contextual information that must be adequately acquired, stored and processed. While many meta-learning algorithms can design agents that autonomously learn new tasks, cognitive tasks adds another level of learning and memory to typical ``learning-to-learn'' problems. Here we evolve neural networks, endowed with plastic connections and neuromodulation, over a sizable set of simple cognitive tasks adapted from a computational neuroscience framework. The resulting evolved networks can automatically modify their own connectivity to acquire a novel simple cognitive task, never seen during evolution, from stimuli and rewards alone, through the spontaneous operation of their evolved neural organization and plasticity system. Our results emphasize the importance of carefully considering the multiple learning loops involved in the emergence of intelligent behavior.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Scaling up language models to billions of parameters has opened up possibilities for in-context learning, allowing instruction tuning and few-shot learning on tasks that the model was not specifically trained for. This has achieved breakthrough performance on language tasks such as translation, summarization, and question-answering. Furthermore, in addition to these associative "System 1" tasks, recent advances in Chain-of-thought prompt learning have demonstrated strong "System 2" reasoning abilities, answering a question in the field of artificial general intelligence whether LLMs can reason. The field started with the question whether LLMs can solve grade school math word problems. This paper reviews the rapidly expanding field of prompt-based reasoning with LLMs. Our taxonomy identifies different ways to generate, evaluate, and control multi-step reasoning. We provide an in-depth coverage of core approaches and open problems, and we propose a research agenda for the near future. Finally, we highlight the relation between reasoning and prompt-based learning, and we discuss the relation between reasoning, sequential decision processes, and reinforcement learning. We find that self-improvement, self-reflection, and some metacognitive abilities of the reasoning processes are possible through the judicious use of prompts. True self-improvement and self-reasoning, to go from reasoning with LLMs to reasoning by LLMs, remains future work.

Large language models (LLMs) have a wealth of knowledge that allows them to excel in various Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks. Current research focuses on enhancing their performance within their existing knowledge. Despite their vast knowledge, LLMs are still limited by the amount of information they can accommodate and comprehend. Therefore, the ability to understand their own limitations on the unknows, referred to as self-knowledge, is of paramount importance. This study aims to evaluate LLMs' self-knowledge by assessing their ability to identify unanswerable or unknowable questions. We introduce an automated methodology to detect uncertainty in the responses of these models, providing a novel measure of their self-knowledge. We further introduce a unique dataset, SelfAware, consisting of unanswerable questions from five diverse categories and their answerable counterparts. Our extensive analysis, involving 20 LLMs including GPT-3, InstructGPT, and LLaMA, discovering an intrinsic capacity for self-knowledge within these models. Moreover, we demonstrate that in-context learning and instruction tuning can further enhance this self-knowledge. Despite this promising insight, our findings also highlight a considerable gap between the capabilities of these models and human proficiency in recognizing the limits of their knowledge.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

We propose a novel framework, Meta Chain-of-Thought (Meta-CoT), which extends traditional Chain-of-Thought (CoT) by explicitly modeling the underlying reasoning required to arrive at a particular CoT. We present empirical evidence from state-of-the-art models exhibiting behaviors consistent with in-context search, and explore methods for producing Meta-CoT via process supervision, synthetic data generation, and search algorithms. Finally, we outline a concrete pipeline for training a model to produce Meta-CoTs, incorporating instruction tuning with linearized search traces and reinforcement learning post-training. Finally, we discuss open research questions, including scaling laws, verifier roles, and the potential for discovering novel reasoning algorithms. This work provides a theoretical and practical roadmap to enable Meta-CoT in LLMs, paving the way for more powerful and human-like reasoning in artificial intelligence.

Humans acquire knowledge through three cognitive stages: perceiving information, comprehending knowledge, and adapting knowledge to solve novel problems. Videos serve as an effective medium for this learning process, facilitating a progression through these cognitive stages. However, existing video benchmarks fail to systematically evaluate the knowledge acquisition capabilities in Large Multimodal Models (LMMs). To address this gap, we introduce Video-MMMU, a multi-modal, multi-disciplinary benchmark designed to assess LMMs' ability to acquire and utilize knowledge from videos. Video-MMMU features a curated collection of 300 expert-level videos and 900 human-annotated questions across six disciplines, evaluating knowledge acquisition through stage-aligned question-answer pairs: Perception, Comprehension, and Adaptation. A proposed knowledge gain metric, {\Delta}knowledge, quantifies improvement in performance after video viewing. Evaluation of LMMs reveals a steep decline in performance as cognitive demands increase and highlights a significant gap between human and model knowledge acquisition, underscoring the need for methods to enhance LMMs' capability to learn and adapt from videos.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

In this work, we introduce a novel evaluation paradigm for Large Language Models, one that challenges them to engage in meta-reasoning. This approach addresses critical shortcomings in existing math problem-solving benchmarks, traditionally used to evaluate the cognitive capabilities of agents. Our paradigm shifts the focus from result-oriented assessments, which often overlook the reasoning process, to a more holistic evaluation that effectively differentiates the cognitive capabilities among models. For example, in our benchmark, GPT-4 demonstrates a performance ten times more accurate than GPT3-5. The significance of this new paradigm lies in its ability to reveal potential cognitive deficiencies in LLMs that current benchmarks, such as GSM8K, fail to uncover due to their saturation and lack of effective differentiation among varying reasoning abilities. Our comprehensive analysis includes several state-of-the-art math models from both open-source and closed-source communities, uncovering fundamental deficiencies in their training and evaluation approaches. This paper not only advocates for a paradigm shift in the assessment of LLMs but also contributes to the ongoing discourse on the trajectory towards Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). By promoting the adoption of meta-reasoning evaluation methods similar to ours, we aim to facilitate a more accurate assessment of the true cognitive abilities of LLMs.

Existing Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown the potential of reinforcement learning (RL) to enhance the complex reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models~(LLMs). While they achieve remarkable performance on challenging tasks such as mathematics and coding, they often rely on their internal knowledge to solve problems, which can be inadequate for time-sensitive or knowledge-intensive questions, leading to inaccuracies and hallucinations. To address this, we propose R1-Searcher, a novel two-stage outcome-based RL approach designed to enhance the search capabilities of LLMs. This method allows LLMs to autonomously invoke external search systems to access additional knowledge during the reasoning process. Our framework relies exclusively on RL, without requiring process rewards or distillation for a cold start. % effectively generalizing to out-of-domain datasets and supporting both Base and Instruct models. Our experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms previous strong RAG methods, even when compared to the closed-source GPT-4o-mini.

Human intelligence involves metacognitive abilities like self-regulation, recognizing limitations, and seeking assistance only when needed. While LLM Agents excel in many domains, they often lack this awareness. Overconfident agents risk catastrophic failures, while those that seek help excessively hinder efficiency. A key challenge is enabling agents with a limited intervention budget C is to decide when to request assistance. In this paper, we propose an offline framework that trains a "helper" policy to request interventions, such as more powerful models or test-time compute, by combining LLM-based process reward models (PRMs) with tabular reinforcement learning. Using state transitions collected offline, we score optimal intervention timing with PRMs and train the helper model on these labeled trajectories. This offline approach significantly reduces costly intervention calls during training. Furthermore, the integration of PRMs with tabular RL enhances robustness to off-policy data while avoiding the inefficiencies of deep RL. We empirically find that our method delivers optimal helper behavior.

Memory-based meta-learning is a technique for approximating Bayes-optimal predictors. Under fairly general conditions, minimizing sequential prediction error, measured by the log loss, leads to implicit meta-learning. The goal of this work is to investigate how far this interpretation can be realized by current sequence prediction models and training regimes. The focus is on piecewise stationary sources with unobserved switching-points, which arguably capture an important characteristic of natural language and action-observation sequences in partially observable environments. We show that various types of memory-based neural models, including Transformers, LSTMs, and RNNs can learn to accurately approximate known Bayes-optimal algorithms and behave as if performing Bayesian inference over the latent switching-points and the latent parameters governing the data distribution within each segment.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown increasing capability in problem-solving and decision-making, largely based on the step-by-step chain-of-thought reasoning processes. However, it has been increasingly challenging to evaluate the reasoning capability of LLMs. Concretely, existing outcome-based benchmarks begin to saturate and become less sufficient to monitor the progress. To this end, we present a process-based benchmark MR-BEN that demands a meta reasoning skill, where LMs are asked to locate and analyse potential errors in automatically generated reasoning steps. MR-BEN is a comprehensive benchmark comprising 5,975 questions collected from human experts, covering various subjects such as physics, chemistry, logic, coding, and more. Through our designed metrics for assessing meta-reasoning on this benchmark, we identify interesting limitations and weaknesses of current LLMs (open-source and closed-source models). For example, open-source models are seemingly comparable to GPT-4 on outcome-based benchmarks, but they lag far behind on our benchmark, revealing the underlying reasoning capability gap between them. Our dataset and codes are available on https://randolph-zeng.github.io/Mr-Ben.github.io/.

Previous work has showcased the intriguing capability of large language models (LLMs) in retrieving facts and processing context knowledge. However, only limited research exists on the layer-wise capability of LLMs to encode knowledge, which challenges our understanding of their internal mechanisms. In this paper, we devote the first attempt to investigate the layer-wise capability of LLMs through probing tasks. We leverage the powerful generative capability of ChatGPT to construct probing datasets, providing diverse and coherent evidence corresponding to various facts. We employ mathcal V-usable information as the validation metric to better reflect the capability in encoding context knowledge across different layers. Our experiments on conflicting and newly acquired knowledge show that LLMs: (1) prefer to encode more context knowledge in the upper layers; (2) primarily encode context knowledge within knowledge-related entity tokens at lower layers while progressively expanding more knowledge within other tokens at upper layers; and (3) gradually forget the earlier context knowledge retained within the intermediate layers when provided with irrelevant evidence. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/Jometeorie/probing_llama.

Transformer models pre-trained with a masked-language-modeling objective (e.g., BERT) encode commonsense knowledge as evidenced by behavioral probes; however, the extent to which this knowledge is acquired by systematic inference over the semantics of the pre-training corpora is an open question. To answer this question, we selectively inject verbalized knowledge into the minibatches of a BERT model during pre-training and evaluate how well the model generalizes to supported inferences. We find generalization does not improve over the course of pre-training, suggesting that commonsense knowledge is acquired from surface-level, co-occurrence patterns rather than induced, systematic reasoning.

This paper examines the extent to which large language models (LLMs) have developed higher-order theory of mind (ToM); the human ability to reason about multiple mental and emotional states in a recursive manner (e.g. I think that you believe that she knows). This paper builds on prior work by introducing a handwritten test suite -- Multi-Order Theory of Mind Q&A -- and using it to compare the performance of five LLMs to a newly gathered adult human benchmark. We find that GPT-4 and Flan-PaLM reach adult-level and near adult-level performance on ToM tasks overall, and that GPT-4 exceeds adult performance on 6th order inferences. Our results suggest that there is an interplay between model size and finetuning for the realisation of ToM abilities, and that the best-performing LLMs have developed a generalised capacity for ToM. Given the role that higher-order ToM plays in a wide range of cooperative and competitive human behaviours, these findings have significant implications for user-facing LLM applications.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

The emergence of multimodal large models (MLMs) has significantly advanced the field of visual understanding, offering remarkable capabilities in the realm of visual question answering (VQA). Yet, the true challenge lies in the domain of knowledge-intensive VQA tasks, which necessitate not just recognition of visual elements, but also a deep comprehension of the visual information in conjunction with a vast repository of learned knowledge. To uncover such capabilities of MLMs, particularly the newly introduced GPT-4V and Gemini, we provide an in-depth evaluation from three perspectives: 1) Commonsense Knowledge, which assesses how well models can understand visual cues and connect to general knowledge; 2) Fine-grained World Knowledge, which tests the model's skill in reasoning out specific knowledge from images, showcasing their proficiency across various specialized fields; 3) Comprehensive Knowledge with Decision-making Rationales, which examines model's capability to provide logical explanations for its inference, facilitating a deeper analysis from the interpretability perspective. Additionally, we utilize a visual knowledge-enhanced training strategy and multimodal retrieval-augmented generation approach to enhance MLMs, highlighting the future need for advancements in this research direction. Extensive experiments indicate that: a) GPT-4V demonstrates enhanced explanation generation when using composite images as few-shots; b) GPT-4V and other MLMs produce severe hallucinations when dealing with world knowledge; c) Visual knowledge enhanced training and prompting technicals present potential to improve performance. Codes: https://github.com/HITsz-TMG/Cognitive-Visual-Language-Mapper

Being prompted to engage in reasoning has emerged as a core technique for using large language models (LLMs), deploying additional inference-time compute to improve task performance. However, as LLMs increase in both size and adoption, inference costs are correspondingly becoming increasingly burdensome. How, then, might we optimize reasoning's cost-performance tradeoff? This work introduces a novel approach based on computational models of metareasoning used in cognitive science, training LLMs to selectively use intermediate reasoning steps only when necessary. We first develop a reward function that incorporates the Value of Computation by penalizing unnecessary reasoning, then use this reward function with Expert Iteration to train the LLM. Compared to few-shot chain-of-thought prompting and STaR, our method significantly reduces inference costs (20-37\% fewer tokens generated across three models) while maintaining task performance across diverse datasets.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

When reading a story, humans can quickly understand new fictional characters with a few observations, mainly by drawing analogies to fictional and real people they already know. This reflects the few-shot and meta-learning essence of humans' inference of characters' mental states, i.e., theory-of-mind (ToM), which is largely ignored in existing research. We fill this gap with a novel NLP dataset, ToM-in-AMC, the first assessment of machines' meta-learning of ToM in a realistic narrative understanding scenario. Our dataset consists of ~1,000 parsed movie scripts, each corresponding to a few-shot character understanding task that requires models to mimic humans' ability of fast digesting characters with a few starting scenes in a new movie. We propose a novel ToM prompting approach designed to explicitly assess the influence of multiple ToM dimensions. It surpasses existing baseline models, underscoring the significance of modeling multiple ToM dimensions for our task. Our extensive human study verifies that humans are capable of solving our problem by inferring characters' mental states based on their previously seen movies. In comparison, our systems based on either state-of-the-art large language models (GPT-4) or meta-learning algorithms lags >20% behind, highlighting a notable limitation in existing approaches' ToM capabilities.

Conceptual knowledge is fundamental to human cognition and knowledge bases. However, existing knowledge probing works only focus on evaluating factual knowledge of pre-trained language models (PLMs) and ignore conceptual knowledge. Since conceptual knowledge often appears as implicit commonsense behind texts, designing probes for conceptual knowledge is hard. Inspired by knowledge representation schemata, we comprehensively evaluate conceptual knowledge of PLMs by designing three tasks to probe whether PLMs organize entities by conceptual similarities, learn conceptual properties, and conceptualize entities in contexts, respectively. For the tasks, we collect and annotate 24k data instances covering 393 concepts, which is COPEN, a COnceptual knowledge Probing bENchmark. Extensive experiments on different sizes and types of PLMs show that existing PLMs systematically lack conceptual knowledge and suffer from various spurious correlations. We believe this is a critical bottleneck for realizing human-like cognition in PLMs. COPEN and our codes are publicly released at https://github.com/THU-KEG/COPEN.

Memory-based meta-learning is a powerful technique to build agents that adapt fast to any task within a target distribution. A previous theoretical study has argued that this remarkable performance is because the meta-training protocol incentivises agents to behave Bayes-optimally. We empirically investigate this claim on a number of prediction and bandit tasks. Inspired by ideas from theoretical computer science, we show that meta-learned and Bayes-optimal agents not only behave alike, but they even share a similar computational structure, in the sense that one agent system can approximately simulate the other. Furthermore, we show that Bayes-optimal agents are fixed points of the meta-learning dynamics. Our results suggest that memory-based meta-learning might serve as a general technique for numerically approximating Bayes-optimal agents - that is, even for task distributions for which we currently don't possess tractable models.

The unprecedented performance of large language models (LLMs) necessitates improvements in evaluations. Rather than merely exploring the breadth of LLM abilities, we believe meticulous and thoughtful designs are essential to thorough, unbiased, and applicable evaluations. Given the importance of world knowledge to LLMs, we construct a Knowledge-oriented LLM Assessment benchmark (KoLA), in which we carefully design three crucial factors: (1) For ability modeling, we mimic human cognition to form a four-level taxonomy of knowledge-related abilities, covering 19 tasks. (2) For data, to ensure fair comparisons, we use both Wikipedia, a corpus prevalently pre-trained by LLMs, along with continuously collected emerging corpora, aiming to evaluate the capacity to handle unseen data and evolving knowledge. (3) For evaluation criteria, we adopt a contrastive system, including overall standard scores for better numerical comparability across tasks and models and a unique self-contrast metric for automatically evaluating knowledge hallucination. We evaluate 21 open-source and commercial LLMs and obtain some intriguing findings. The KoLA dataset and open-participation leaderboard are publicly released at https://kola.xlore.cn and will be continuously updated to provide references for developing LLMs and knowledge-related systems.

Knowledge underpins reasoning. Recent research demonstrates that when relevant knowledge is provided as additional context to commonsense question answering (QA), it can substantially enhance the performance even on top of state-of-the-art. The fundamental challenge is where and how to find such knowledge that is high quality and on point with respect to the question; knowledge retrieved from knowledge bases are incomplete and knowledge generated from language models are inconsistent. We present Rainier, or Reinforced Knowledge Introspector, that learns to generate contextually relevant knowledge in response to given questions. Our approach starts by imitating knowledge generated by GPT-3, then learns to generate its own knowledge via reinforcement learning where rewards are shaped based on the increased performance on the resulting question answering. Rainier demonstrates substantial and consistent performance gains when tested over 9 different commonsense benchmarks: including 5 datasets that are seen during model training, as well as 4 datasets that are kept unseen. Our work is the first to report that knowledge generated by models that are orders of magnitude smaller than GPT-3, even without direct supervision on the knowledge itself, can exceed the quality of commonsense knowledge elicited from GPT-3.

Neural Memory Networks (NMNs) have received increased attention in recent years compared to deep architectures that use a constrained memory. Despite their new appeal, the success of NMNs hinges on the ability of the gradient-based optimiser to perform incremental training of the NMN controllers, determining how to leverage their high capacity for knowledge retrieval. This means that while excellent performance can be achieved when the training data is consistent and well distributed, rare data samples are hard to learn from as the controllers fail to incorporate them effectively during model training. Drawing inspiration from the human cognition process, in particular the utilisation of neuromodulators in the human brain, we propose to decouple the learning process of the NMN controllers to allow them to achieve flexible, rapid adaptation in the presence of new information. This trait is highly beneficial for meta-learning tasks where the memory controllers must quickly grasp abstract concepts in the target domain, and adapt stored knowledge. This allows the NMN controllers to quickly determine which memories are to be retained and which are to be erased, and swiftly adapt their strategy to the new task at hand. Through both quantitative and qualitative evaluations on multiple public benchmarks, including classification and regression tasks, we demonstrate the utility of the proposed approach. Our evaluations not only highlight the ability of the proposed NMN architecture to outperform the current state-of-the-art methods, but also provide insights on how the proposed augmentations help achieve such superior results. In addition, we demonstrate the practical implications of the proposed learning strategy, where the feedback path can be shared among multiple neural memory networks as a mechanism for knowledge sharing.

The emergence of pretrained models has significantly impacted from Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Computer Vision to relational datasets. Traditionally, these models are assessed through fine-tuned downstream tasks. However, this raises the question of how to evaluate these models more efficiently and more effectively. In this study, we explore a novel approach where we leverage the meta features associated with each entity as a source of worldly knowledge and employ entity representations from the models. We propose using the consistency between these representations and the meta features as a metric for evaluating pretrained models. Our method's effectiveness is demonstrated across various domains, including models with relational datasets, large language models and images models.

Pre-trained language models (LMs) have been shown to memorize a substantial amount of knowledge from the pre-training corpora; however, they are still limited in recalling factually correct knowledge given a certain context. Hence, they tend to suffer from counterfactual or hallucinatory generation when used in knowledge-intensive natural language generation (NLG) tasks. Recent remedies to this problem focus on modifying either the pre-training or task fine-tuning objectives to incorporate knowledge, which normally require additional costly training or architecture modification of LMs for practical applications. We present Knowledge Infused Decoding (KID) -- a novel decoding algorithm for generative LMs, which dynamically infuses external knowledge into each step of the LM decoding. Specifically, we maintain a local knowledge memory based on the current context, interacting with a dynamically created external knowledge trie, and continuously update the local memory as a knowledge-aware constraint to guide decoding via reinforcement learning. On six diverse knowledge-intensive NLG tasks, task-agnostic LMs (e.g., GPT-2 and BART) armed with KID outperform many task-optimized state-of-the-art models, and show particularly strong performance in few-shot scenarios over seven related knowledge-infusion techniques. Human evaluation confirms KID's ability to generate more relevant and factual language for the input context when compared with multiple baselines. Finally, KID also alleviates exposure bias and provides stable generation quality when generating longer sequences. Code for KID is available at https://github.com/microsoft/KID.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Data-free Knowledge Distillation (DFKD) has gained popularity recently, with the fundamental idea of carrying out knowledge transfer from a Teacher neural network to a Student neural network in the absence of training data. However, in the Adversarial DFKD framework, the student network's accuracy, suffers due to the non-stationary distribution of the pseudo-samples under multiple generator updates. To this end, at every generator update, we aim to maintain the student's performance on previously encountered examples while acquiring knowledge from samples of the current distribution. Thus, we propose a meta-learning inspired framework by treating the task of Knowledge-Acquisition (learning from newly generated samples) and Knowledge-Retention (retaining knowledge on previously met samples) as meta-train and meta-test, respectively. Hence, we dub our method as Learning to Retain while Acquiring. Moreover, we identify an implicit aligning factor between the Knowledge-Retention and Knowledge-Acquisition tasks indicating that the proposed student update strategy enforces a common gradient direction for both tasks, alleviating interference between the two objectives. Finally, we support our hypothesis by exhibiting extensive evaluation and comparison of our method with prior arts on multiple datasets.

We demonstrate that LLMs may learn indicators of document usefulness and modulate their updates accordingly. We introduce random strings ("tags") as indicators of usefulness in a synthetic fine-tuning dataset. Fine-tuning on this dataset leads to implicit meta-learning (IML): in further fine-tuning, the model updates to make more use of text that is tagged as useful. We perform a thorough empirical investigation of this phenomenon, finding (among other things) that (i) it occurs in both pretrained LLMs and those trained from scratch, as well as on a vision task, and (ii) larger models and smaller batch sizes tend to give more IML. We also use probing to examine how IML changes the way models store knowledge in their parameters. Finally, we reflect on what our results might imply about capabilities, risks, and controllability of future AI systems. Our code can be found at https://github.com/krasheninnikov/internalization.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

Meta-learning has emerged as an effective methodology to model several real-world tasks and problems due to its extraordinary effectiveness in the low-data regime. There are many scenarios ranging from the classification of rare diseases to language modelling of uncommon languages where the availability of large datasets is rare. Similarly, for more broader scenarios like self-driving, an autonomous vehicle needs to be trained to handle every situation well. This requires training the ML model on a variety of tasks with good quality data. But often times, we find that the data distribution across various tasks is skewed, i.e.the data follows a long-tail distribution. This leads to the model performing well on some tasks and not performing so well on others leading to model robustness issues. Meta-learning has recently emerged as a potential learning paradigm which can effectively learn from one task and generalize that learning to unseen tasks. In this study, we aim to exploit external knowledge of task relations to improve training stability via effective mini-batching of tasks. We hypothesize that selecting a diverse set of tasks in a mini-batch will lead to a better estimate of the full gradient and hence will lead to a reduction of noise in training.

Extensive work has shown that the performance and interpretability of commonsense reasoning can be improved via knowledge-augmented reasoning methods, where the knowledge that underpins the reasoning process is explicitly verbalized and utilized. However, existing implementations, including "chain-of-thought" and its variants, fall short in capturing the introspective nature of knowledge required in commonsense reasoning, and in accounting for the mutual adaptation between the generation and utilization of knowledge. We propose a novel method to develop an introspective commonsense reasoner, Crystal. To tackle commonsense problems, it first introspects for knowledge statements related to the given question, and subsequently makes an informed prediction that is grounded in the previously introspected knowledge. The knowledge introspection and knowledge-grounded reasoning modes of the model are tuned via reinforcement learning to mutually adapt, where the reward derives from the feedback given by the model itself. Experiments show that Crystal significantly outperforms both the standard supervised finetuning and chain-of-thought distilled methods, and enhances the transparency of the commonsense reasoning process. Our work ultimately validates the feasibility and potential of reinforcing a neural model with self-feedback.

The generalization of language models (LMs) is undergoing active debates, contrasting their potential for general intelligence with their struggles with basic knowledge composition (e.g., reverse/transition curse). This paper uncovers the phenomenon of linear correlations in LMs during knowledge composition. For explanation, there exists a linear transformation between certain related knowledge that maps the next token prediction logits from one prompt to another, e.g., "X lives in the city of" rightarrow "X lives in the country of" for every given X. This mirrors the linearity in human knowledge composition, such as Paris rightarrow France. Our findings indicate that the linear transformation is resilient to large-scale fine-tuning, generalizing updated knowledge when aligned with real-world relationships, but causing hallucinations when it deviates. Empirical results suggest that linear correlation can serve as a potential identifier of LM's generalization. Finally, we show such linear correlations can be learned with a single feedforward network and pre-trained vocabulary representations, indicating LM generalization heavily relies on the latter.

Large language models (LLMs) have revolutionized numerous domains with their impressive performance but still face their challenges. A predominant issue is the propensity for these models to generate non-existent facts, a concern termed hallucination. Our research is motivated by the observation that previous instruction tuning methods force the model to complete a sentence no matter whether the model knows the knowledge or not. When the question is out of the parametric knowledge, it will try to make up something and fail to indicate when it lacks knowledge. In this paper, we present a new approach called Refusal-Aware Instruction Tuning (R-Tuning). This approach is formalized by first identifying the knowledge gap between parametric knowledge and the instruction tuning data. Then, we construct the refusal-aware data based on the knowledge intersection, to tune LLMs to refrain from responding to questions beyond its parametric knowledge. Experimental results demonstrate this new instruction tuning approach effectively improves a model's ability to answer known questions and refrain from answering unknown questions. Furthermore, when tested on out-of-domain datasets, the refusal ability was found to be a meta-skill that could be generalized to other tasks. Further analysis surprisingly finds that learning the uncertainty during training displays a better ability to estimate uncertainty than uncertainty-based testing. Our code will be released at https://github.com/shizhediao/R-Tuning.

Large language models are known to suffer from the hallucination problem in that they are prone to output statements that are false or inconsistent, indicating a lack of knowledge. A proposed solution to this is to provide the model with additional data modalities that complements the knowledge obtained through text. We investigate the use of visual data to complement the knowledge of large language models by proposing a method for evaluating visual knowledge transfer to text for uni- or multimodal language models. The method is based on two steps, 1) a novel task querying for knowledge of memory colors, i.e. typical colors of well-known objects, and 2) filtering of model training data to clearly separate knowledge contributions. Additionally, we introduce a model architecture that involves a visual imagination step and evaluate it with our proposed method. We find that our method can successfully be used to measure visual knowledge transfer capabilities in models and that our novel model architecture shows promising results for leveraging multimodal knowledge in a unimodal setting.

The ability to adapt beliefs or behaviors in response to unexpected outcomes, reflection, is fundamental to intelligent systems' interaction with the world. From a cognitive science perspective, this serves as a core principle of intelligence applicable to both human and AI systems. To address the debate on the intelligence of large language models (LLMs), we propose Reflection-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 7 tasks spanning core cognitive functions crucial for reflection, including perception, memory, belief updating, decision-making, prediction, counterfactual thinking, and meta-reflection. We evaluate the performances of 13 prominent LLMs such as OpenAI o1, GPT-4, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, etc. The results indicate that current LLMs still lack satisfactory reflection ability. We discuss the underlying causes of these results and suggest potential avenues for future research. In conclusion, Reflection-Bench offers both evaluation tools and inspiration for developing AI capable of reliably interacting with the environment. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/YabYum/ReflectionBench.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our daily lives, the potential harms from deceptive behavior underlie the need for faithfully interpreting their decision-making. While traditional probing methods have shown some effectiveness, they remain best for narrowly scoped tasks while more comprehensive explanations are still necessary. To this end, we investigate meta-models-an architecture using a "meta-model" that takes activations from an "input-model" and answers natural language questions about the input-model's behaviors. We evaluate the meta-model's ability to generalize by training them on selected task types and assessing their out-of-distribution performance in deceptive scenarios. Our findings show that meta-models generalize well to out-of-distribution tasks and point towards opportunities for future research in this area. Our code is available at https://github.com/acostarelli/meta-models-public .

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in linguistic tasks, necessitating robust evaluation frameworks to understand their capabilities and limitations. Inspired by Feynman's principle of understanding through creation, we introduce a self-knowledge evaluation framework that is easy to implement, evaluating models on their ability to comprehend and respond to self-generated questions. Our findings, based on testing multiple models across diverse tasks, reveal significant gaps in the model's self-knowledge ability. Further analysis indicates these gaps may be due to misalignment with human attention mechanisms. Additionally, fine-tuning on self-generated math task may enhance the model's math performance, highlighting the potential of the framework for efficient and insightful model evaluation and may also contribute to the improvement of LLMs.

LLMs are typically trained to answer user questions or follow instructions similarly to how human experts respond. However, in the standard alignment framework they lack the basic ability of explicit thinking before answering. Thinking is important for complex questions that require reasoning and planning -- but can be applied to any task. We propose a training method for equipping existing LLMs with such thinking abilities for general instruction following without use of additional human data. We achieve this by an iterative search and optimization procedure that explores the space of possible thought generations, allowing the model to learn how to think without direct supervision. For each instruction, the thought candidates are scored using a judge model to evaluate their responses only, and then optimized via preference optimization. We show that this procedure leads to superior performance on AlpacaEval and Arena-Hard, and shows gains from thinking on non-reasoning categories such as marketing, health and general knowledge, in addition to more traditional reasoning & problem-solving tasks.

Large language models have been shown to struggle with limited context memory and multi-step reasoning. We propose a simple method for solving both of these problems by allowing the model to take Self-Notes. Unlike recent scratchpad approaches, the model can deviate from the input context at any time to explicitly think. This allows the model to recall information and perform reasoning on the fly as it reads the context, thus extending its memory and enabling multi-step reasoning. Our experiments on multiple tasks demonstrate that our method can successfully generalize to longer and more complicated instances from their training setup by taking Self-Notes at inference time.

The present study introduces the knowledge-augmented generator, which is specifically designed to produce information that remains grounded in contextual knowledge, regardless of alterations in the context. Previous research has predominantly focused on examining hallucinations stemming from static input, such as in the domains of summarization or machine translation. However, our investigation delves into the faithfulness of generative question answering in the presence of dynamic knowledge. Our objective is to explore the existence of hallucinations arising from parametric memory when contextual knowledge undergoes changes, while also analyzing the underlying causes for their occurrence. In order to efficiently address this issue, we propose a straightforward yet effective measure for detecting such hallucinations. Intriguingly, our investigation uncovers that all models exhibit a tendency to generate previous answers as hallucinations. To gain deeper insights into the underlying causes of this phenomenon, we conduct a series of experiments that verify the critical role played by context in hallucination, both during training and testing, from various perspectives.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks but still face challenges such as hallucinations. One potential reason for hallucinations is the lack of relevant knowledge or context. Thus, a promising solution to mitigate this issue involves instructing LLMs to respond with "I do not know" when a question falls outside their knowledge domain or the provided context. However, in this work, we observed that LLMs struggle to admit their lack of knowledge, primarily due to existing instruction datasets designed to encourage specific answers. To improve large language models' capability to recognize the boundaries of their knowledge, we propose a novel approach called uncertainty-sensitive tuning. This method involves two-stage training designed for uncertainty recognition and prompt-sensitive activation. In the first stage, we guide the LLM to reject unknown questions. In the second stage, we recover the decreased performance in QA tasks by incorporating designed causal instructions. By leveraging this method, we aim to enhance the model's ability to identify areas of uncertainty. The experimental results demonstrate that our proposed uncertainty-sensitive tuning method significantly improves the performance of the Llama2-chat-7B model. Specifically, it achieves a substantial 34.7% improvement in handling questions involving knowledge gaps compared to the original model. Moreover, our approach outperforms GPT-4, exhibiting a 9.4% increase in overall performance. We open-source the model and code on GitHub.

The remarkable capabilities of modern large language models are rooted in their vast repositories of knowledge encoded within their parameters, enabling them to perceive the world and engage in reasoning. The inner workings of how these models store knowledge have long been a subject of intense interest and investigation among researchers. To date, most studies have concentrated on isolated components within these models, such as the Multilayer Perceptrons and attention head. In this paper, we delve into the computation graph of the language model to uncover the knowledge circuits that are instrumental in articulating specific knowledge. The experiments, conducted with GPT2 and TinyLLAMA, has allowed us to observe how certain information heads, relation heads, and Multilayer Perceptrons collaboratively encode knowledge within the model. Moreover, we evaluate the impact of current knowledge editing techniques on these knowledge circuits, providing deeper insights into the functioning and constraints of these editing methodologies. Finally, we utilize knowledge circuits to analyze and interpret language model behaviors such as hallucinations and in-context learning. We believe the knowledge circuit holds potential for advancing our understanding of Transformers and guiding the improved design of knowledge editing. Code and data are available in https://github.com/zjunlp/KnowledgeCircuits.

Visual mathematical reasoning, as a fundamental visual reasoning ability, has received widespread attention from the Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) community. Existing benchmarks, such as MathVista and MathVerse, focus more on the result-oriented performance but neglect the underlying principles in knowledge acquisition and generalization. Inspired by human-like mathematical reasoning, we introduce WE-MATH, the first benchmark specifically designed to explore the problem-solving principles beyond end-to-end performance. We meticulously collect and categorize 6.5K visual math problems, spanning 67 hierarchical knowledge concepts and five layers of knowledge granularity. We decompose composite problems into sub-problems according to the required knowledge concepts and introduce a novel four-dimensional metric, namely Insufficient Knowledge (IK), Inadequate Generalization (IG), Complete Mastery (CM), and Rote Memorization (RM), to hierarchically assess inherent issues in LMMs' reasoning process. With WE-MATH, we conduct a thorough evaluation of existing LMMs in visual mathematical reasoning and reveal a negative correlation between solving steps and problem-specific performance. We confirm the IK issue of LMMs can be effectively improved via knowledge augmentation strategies. More notably, the primary challenge of GPT-4o has significantly transitioned from IK to IG, establishing it as the first LMM advancing towards the knowledge generalization stage. In contrast, other LMMs exhibit a marked inclination towards Rote Memorization - they correctly solve composite problems involving multiple knowledge concepts yet fail to answer sub-problems. We anticipate that WE-MATH will open new pathways for advancements in visual mathematical reasoning for LMMs. The WE-MATH data and evaluation code are available at https://github.com/We-Math/We-Math.

Large pre-trained language models have demonstrated their proficiency in storing factual knowledge within their parameters and achieving remarkable results when fine-tuned for downstream natural language processing tasks. Nonetheless, their capacity to access and manipulate knowledge with precision remains constrained, resulting in performance disparities on knowledge-intensive tasks when compared to task-specific architectures. Additionally, the challenges of providing provenance for model decisions and maintaining up-to-date world knowledge persist as open research frontiers. To address these limitations, the integration of pre-trained models with differentiable access mechanisms to explicit non-parametric memory emerges as a promising solution. This survey delves into the realm of language models (LMs) augmented with the ability to tap into external knowledge sources, including external knowledge bases and search engines. While adhering to the standard objective of predicting missing tokens, these augmented LMs leverage diverse, possibly non-parametric external modules to augment their contextual processing capabilities, departing from the conventional language modeling paradigm. Through an exploration of current advancements in augmenting large language models with knowledge, this work concludes that this emerging research direction holds the potential to address prevalent issues in traditional LMs, such as hallucinations, un-grounded responses, and scalability challenges.

Thinking aloud is an effective meta-cognitive strategy human reasoners apply to solve difficult problems. We suggest to improve the reasoning ability of pre-trained neural language models in a similar way, namely by expanding a task's context with problem elaborations that are dynamically generated by the language model itself. Our main result is that dynamic problem elaboration significantly improves the zero-shot performance of GPT-2 in a deductive reasoning and natural language inference task: While the model uses a syntactic heuristic for predicting an answer, it is capable (to some degree) of generating reasoned additional context which facilitates the successful application of its heuristic. We explore different ways of generating elaborations, including fewshot learning, and find that their relative performance varies with the specific problem characteristics (such as problem difficulty). Moreover, the effectiveness of an elaboration can be explained in terms of the degree to which the elaboration semantically coheres with the corresponding problem. In particular, elaborations that are most faithful to the original problem description may boost accuracy by up to 24%.

When large language models are aligned via supervised fine-tuning, they may encounter new factual information that was not acquired through pre-training. It is often conjectured that this can teach the model the behavior of hallucinating factually incorrect responses, as the model is trained to generate facts that are not grounded in its pre-existing knowledge. In this work, we study the impact of such exposure to new knowledge on the capability of the fine-tuned model to utilize its pre-existing knowledge. To this end, we design a controlled setup, focused on closed-book QA, where we vary the proportion of the fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge. We demonstrate that large language models struggle to acquire new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, as fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge are learned significantly slower than those consistent with the model's knowledge. However, we also find that as the examples with new knowledge are eventually learned, they linearly increase the model's tendency to hallucinate. Taken together, our results highlight the risk in introducing new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, and support the view that large language models mostly acquire factual knowledge through pre-training, whereas fine-tuning teaches them to use it more efficiently.

Critique ability, a meta-cognitive capability of humans, presents significant challenges for LLMs to improve. Recent works primarily rely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) using critiques generated by a single LLM like GPT-4. However, these model-generated critiques often exhibit flaws due to the inherent complexity of the critique. Consequently, fine-tuning LLMs on such flawed critiques typically limits the model's performance and propagates these flaws into the learned model. To overcome these challenges, this paper proposes a novel data generation pipeline, named MultiCritique, that improves the critique ability of LLMs by utilizing multi-agent feedback in both the SFT and reinforcement learning (RL) stages. First, our data generation pipeline aggregates high-quality critiques from multiple agents instead of a single model, with crucial information as input for simplifying the critique. Furthermore, our pipeline improves the preference accuracy of critique quality through multi-agent feedback, facilitating the effectiveness of RL in improving the critique ability of LLMs. Based on our proposed MultiCritique data generation pipeline, we construct the MultiCritiqueDataset for the SFT and RL fine-tuning stages. Extensive experimental results on two benchmarks demonstrate: 1) the superior quality of our constructed SFT dataset compared to existing critique datasets; 2) additional improvements to the critique ability of LLMs brought by the RL stage. Notably, our fine-tuned 7B model significantly surpasses other advanced 7B-13B open-source models, approaching the performance of advanced 70B LLMs and GPT-4. Codes, datasets and model weights will be publicly available.

Large language models have demonstrated impressive performance on challenging mathematical reasoning tasks, which has triggered the discussion of whether the performance is achieved by true reasoning capability or memorization. To investigate this question, prior work has constructed mathematical benchmarks when questions undergo simple perturbations -- modifications that still preserve the underlying reasoning patterns of the solutions. However, no work has explored hard perturbations, which fundamentally change the nature of the problem so that the original solution steps do not apply. To bridge the gap, we construct MATH-P-Simple and MATH-P-Hard via simple perturbation and hard perturbation, respectively. Each consists of 279 perturbed math problems derived from level-5 (hardest) problems in the MATH dataset (Hendrycksmath et. al., 2021). We observe significant performance drops on MATH-P-Hard across various models, including o1-mini (-16.49%) and gemini-2.0-flash-thinking (-12.9%). We also raise concerns about a novel form of memorization where models blindly apply learned problem-solving skills without assessing their applicability to modified contexts. This issue is amplified when using original problems for in-context learning. We call for research efforts to address this challenge, which is critical for developing more robust and reliable reasoning models.

For centuries, researchers have sought out ways to connect disparate areas of knowledge. While early scholars (Galileo, da Vinci, etc.) were experts across fields, specialization has taken hold later. With the advent of Artificial Intelligence, we can now explore relationships across areas (e.g., mechanics-biology) or disparate domains (e.g., failure mechanics-art). To achieve this, we use a fine-tuned Large Language Model (LLM), here for a subset of knowledge in multiscale materials failure. The approach includes the use of a general-purpose LLM to distill question-answer pairs from raw sources followed by LLM fine-tuning. The resulting MechGPT LLM foundation model is used in a series of computational experiments to explore its capacity for knowledge retrieval, various language tasks, hypothesis generation, and connecting knowledge across disparate areas. While the model has some ability to recall knowledge from training, we find that LLMs are particularly useful to extract structural insights through Ontological Knowledge Graphs. These interpretable graph structures provide explanatory insights, frameworks for new research questions, and visual representations of knowledge that also can be used in retrieval-augmented generation. Three versions of MechGPT are discussed, featuring different sizes from 13 billion to 70 billion parameters, and reaching context lengths of more than 10,000 tokens. This provides ample capacity for sophisticated retrieval augmented strategies, as well as agent-based modeling where multiple LLMs interact collaboratively and/or adversarially, the incorporation of new data from the literature or web searches, as well as multimodality.

LLMs usually exhibit limitations in their ability to incorporate new knowledge, the generation of hallucinations, and the transparency of their decision-making process. In this paper, we explore how to prompt LLMs with knowledge graphs (KG), working as a remedy to engage LLMs with up-to-date knowledge and elicit the reasoning pathways from LLMs. Specifically, we build a prompting pipeline that endows LLMs with the capability of comprehending KG inputs and inferring with a combined implicit knowledge and the retrieved external knowledge. In addition, we investigate eliciting the mind map on which LLMs perform the reasoning and generate the answers. It is identified that the produced mind map exhibits the reasoning pathways of LLMs grounded on the ontology of knowledge, hence bringing the prospects of probing and gauging LLM inference in production. The experiments on three question & answering datasets also show that MindMap prompting leads to a striking empirical gain. For instance, prompting a GPT-3.5 with MindMap yields an overwhelming performance over GPT-4 consistently. We also demonstrate that with structured facts retrieved from KG, MindMap can outperform a series of prompting-with-document-retrieval methods, benefiting from more accurate, concise, and comprehensive knowledge from KGs. To reproduce our results and extend the framework further, we make our codebase available at https://github.com/wyl.willing/MindMap.

Humans regularly engage in analogical thinking, relating personal experiences to current situations (X is analogous to Y because of Z). Analogical thinking allows humans to solve problems in creative ways, grasp difficult concepts, and articulate ideas more effectively. Can language models (LMs) do the same? To answer this question, we propose ANALOBENCH, a benchmark to determine analogical reasoning ability in LMs. Our benchmarking approach focuses on aspects of this ability that are common among humans: (i) recalling related experiences from a large amount of information, and (ii) applying analogical reasoning to complex and lengthy scenarios. We test a broad collection of proprietary models (e.g., GPT family, Claude V2) and open source models such as LLaMA2. As in prior results, scaling up LMs results in some performance boosts. Surprisingly, scale offers minimal gains when, (i) analogies involve lengthy scenarios, or (ii) recalling relevant scenarios from a large pool of information, a process analogous to finding a needle in a haystack. We hope these observations encourage further research in this field.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have acquired ubiquitous attention for their performances across diverse domains. Our study here searches through LLMs' cognitive abilities and confidence dynamics. We dive deep into understanding the alignment between their self-assessed confidence and actual performance. We exploit these models with diverse sets of questionnaires and real-world scenarios and extract how LLMs exhibit confidence in their responses. Our findings reveal intriguing instances where models demonstrate high confidence even when they answer incorrectly. This is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger effect observed in human psychology. In contrast, there are cases where models exhibit low confidence with correct answers revealing potential underestimation biases. Our results underscore the need for a deeper understanding of their cognitive processes. By examining the nuances of LLMs' self-assessment mechanism, this investigation provides noteworthy revelations that serve to advance the functionalities and broaden the potential applications of these formidable language models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate exceptional performance across diverse tasks by leveraging both pre-trained knowledge (i.e., parametric knowledge) and external knowledge (i.e., contextual knowledge). While substantial efforts have been made to leverage both forms of knowledge, scenarios in which the model lacks any relevant knowledge remain underexplored. Such limitations can result in issues like hallucination, causing reduced reliability and potential risks in high-stakes applications. To address such limitations, this paper extends the task scope to encompass cases where the user's request cannot be fulfilled due to the lack of relevant knowledge. To this end, we introduce Contrastive Decoding with Abstention (CDA), a training-free decoding method that empowers LLMs to generate responses when relevant knowledge is available and to abstain otherwise. CDA evaluates the relevance of each knowledge for a given query, adaptively determining which knowledge to prioritize or which to completely ignore. Extensive experiments with four LLMs on three question-answering datasets demonstrate that CDA can effectively perform accurate generation and abstention simultaneously. These findings highlight CDA's potential to broaden the applicability of LLMs, enhancing reliability and preserving user trust.

There is a significant gap between patient needs and available mental health support today. In this paper, we aim to thoroughly examine the potential of using Large Language Models (LLMs) to assist professional psychotherapy. To this end, we propose a new benchmark, CBT-BENCH, for the systematic evaluation of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) assistance. We include three levels of tasks in CBT-BENCH: I: Basic CBT knowledge acquisition, with the task of multiple-choice questions; II: Cognitive model understanding, with the tasks of cognitive distortion classification, primary core belief classification, and fine-grained core belief classification; III: Therapeutic response generation, with the task of generating responses to patient speech in CBT therapy sessions. These tasks encompass key aspects of CBT that could potentially be enhanced through AI assistance, while also outlining a hierarchy of capability requirements, ranging from basic knowledge recitation to engaging in real therapeutic conversations. We evaluated representative LLMs on our benchmark. Experimental results indicate that while LLMs perform well in reciting CBT knowledge, they fall short in complex real-world scenarios requiring deep analysis of patients' cognitive structures and generating effective responses, suggesting potential future work.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

Prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), or providing context on the expected model of operation, is an effective way to steer the outputs of such models to satisfy human desiderata after they have been trained. But in rapidly evolving domains, there is often need to fine-tune LLMs to improve either the kind of knowledge in their memory or their abilities to perform open ended reasoning in new domains. When human's learn new concepts, we often do so by linking the new material that we are studying to concepts we have already learned before. To that end, we ask, "can prompting help us teach LLMs how to learn". In this work, we study a novel generalization of instruction tuning, called contextual fine-tuning, to fine-tune LLMs. Our method leverages instructional prompts designed to mimic human cognitive strategies in learning and problem-solving to guide the learning process during training, aiming to improve the model's interpretation and understanding of domain-specific knowledge. We empirically demonstrate that this simple yet effective modification improves the ability of LLMs to be fine-tuned rapidly on new datasets both within the medical and financial domains.

Many cognitive approaches to well-being, such as recognizing and reframing unhelpful thoughts, have received considerable empirical support over the past decades, yet still lack truly widespread adoption in self-help format. A barrier to that adoption is a lack of adequately specific and diverse dedicated practice material. This work examines whether current language models can be leveraged to both produce a virtually unlimited quantity of practice material illustrating standard unhelpful thought patterns matching specific given contexts, and generate suitable positive reframing proposals. We propose PATTERNREFRAME, a novel dataset of about 10k examples of thoughts containing unhelpful thought patterns conditioned on a given persona, accompanied by about 27k positive reframes. By using this dataset to train and/or evaluate current models, we show that existing models can already be powerful tools to help generate an abundance of tailored practice material and hypotheses, with no or minimal additional model training required.

Meta-learning usually refers to a learning algorithm that learns from other learning algorithms. The problem of uncertainty in the predictions of neural networks shows that the world is only partially predictable and a learned neural network cannot generalize to its ever-changing surrounding environments. Therefore, the question is how a predictive model can represent multiple predictions simultaneously. We aim to provide a fundamental understanding of learning to learn in the contents of Decentralized Neural Networks (Decentralized NNs) and we believe this is one of the most important questions and prerequisites to building an autonomous intelligence machine. To this end, we shall demonstrate several pieces of evidence for tackling the problems above with Meta Learning in Decentralized NNs. In particular, we will present three different approaches to building such a decentralized learning system: (1) learning from many replica neural networks, (2) building the hierarchy of neural networks for different functions, and (3) leveraging different modality experts to learn cross-modal representations.

Understanding knowledge mechanisms in Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial for advancing towards trustworthy AGI. This paper reviews knowledge mechanism analysis from a novel taxonomy including knowledge utilization and evolution. Knowledge utilization delves into the mechanism of memorization, comprehension and application, and creation. Knowledge evolution focuses on the dynamic progression of knowledge within individual and group LLMs. Moreover, we discuss what knowledge LLMs have learned, the reasons for the fragility of parametric knowledge, and the potential dark knowledge (hypothesis) that will be challenging to address. We hope this work can help understand knowledge in LLMs and provide insights for future research.

Pre-trained language models, despite their rapid advancements powered by scale, still fall short of robust commonsense capabilities. And yet, scale appears to be the winning recipe; after all, the largest models seem to have acquired the largest amount of commonsense capabilities. Or is it? In this paper, we investigate the possibility of a seemingly impossible match: can smaller language models with dismal commonsense capabilities (i.e., GPT-2), ever win over models that are orders of magnitude larger and better (i.e., GPT-3), if the smaller models are powered with novel commonsense distillation algorithms? The key intellectual question we ask here is whether it is possible, if at all, to design a learning algorithm that does not benefit from scale, yet leads to a competitive level of commonsense acquisition. In this work, we study the generative models of commonsense knowledge, focusing on the task of generating generics, statements of commonsense facts about everyday concepts, e.g., birds can fly. We introduce a novel commonsense distillation framework, I2D2, that loosely follows the Symbolic Knowledge Distillation of West et al. but breaks the dependence on the extreme-scale models as the teacher model by two innovations: (1) the novel adaptation of NeuroLogic Decoding to enhance the generation quality of the weak, off-the-shelf language models, and (2) self-imitation learning to iteratively learn from the model's own enhanced commonsense acquisition capabilities. Empirical results suggest that scale is not the only way, as novel algorithms can be a promising alternative. Moreover, our study leads to a new corpus of generics, Gen-A-Tomic, that is of the largest and highest quality available to date.

Reasoning is central to a wide range of intellectual activities, and while the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, their performance in reasoning tasks remains limited. The processes and mechanisms underlying reasoning are not yet fully understood, but key elements include path exploration, selection of relevant knowledge, and multi-step inference. Problems are solved through the synthesis of these components. In this paper, we propose a benchmark that focuses on a specific aspect of reasoning ability: the direct evaluation of multi-step inference. To this end, we design a special reasoning task where multi-step inference is specifically focused by largely eliminating path exploration and implicit knowledge utilization. Our dataset comprises pairs of explicit instructions and corresponding questions, where the procedures necessary for solving the questions are entirely detailed within the instructions. This setup allows models to solve problems solely by following the provided directives. By constructing problems that require varying numbers of steps to solve and evaluating responses at each step, we enable a thorough assessment of state-of-the-art LLMs' ability to follow instructions. To ensure the robustness of our evaluation, we include multiple distinct tasks. Furthermore, by comparing accuracy across tasks, utilizing step-aware metrics, and applying separately defined measures of complexity, we conduct experiments that offer insights into the capabilities and limitations of LLMs in reasoning tasks. Our findings have significant implications for the development of LLMs and highlight areas for future research in advancing their reasoning abilities. Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ifujisawa/procbench and code at https://github.com/ifujisawa/proc-bench.

Recent large language models (LLMs) have shown indications of mathematical reasoning ability. However it has not been clear how they would fare on more challenging competition-level problems. And while self-generated verbalizations of intermediate reasoning steps (i.e., chain-of-thought prompting) have been shown to be helpful, whether LLMs can make use of helpful side information such as problem-specific hints has not been investigated before. In this paper, we propose a challenging benchmark dataset for enabling such analyses. The Concept and Hint-Annotated Math Problems (CHAMP) consists of high school math competition problems, annotated with concepts, or general math facts, and hints, or problem-specific tricks. These annotations allow us to explore the effects of additional information, such as relevant hints, misleading concepts, or related problems. This benchmark is difficult, with the best model only scoring 58.1% in standard settings. With concepts and hints, performance sometimes improves, indicating that some models can make use of such side information. We further annotate model-generated solutions for their correctness. Using this corpus, we find that models often arrive at the correct final answer through wrong reasoning steps. In addition, we test whether models are able to verify these solutions, and find that most models struggle. The dataset and code are available on the project website.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

The weight matrix (WM) of a neural network (NN) is its program. The programs of many traditional NNs are learned through gradient descent in some error function, then remain fixed. The WM of a self-referential NN, however, can keep rapidly modifying all of itself during runtime. In principle, such NNs can meta-learn to learn, and meta-meta-learn to meta-learn to learn, and so on, in the sense of recursive self-improvement. While NN architectures potentially capable of implementing such behaviour have been proposed since the '90s, there have been few if any practical studies. Here we revisit such NNs, building upon recent successes of fast weight programmers and closely related linear Transformers. We propose a scalable self-referential WM (SRWM) that learns to use outer products and the delta update rule to modify itself. We evaluate our SRWM in supervised few-shot learning and in multi-task reinforcement learning with procedurally generated game environments. Our experiments demonstrate both practical applicability and competitive performance of the proposed SRWM. Our code is public.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve good performance on challenging reasoning benchmarks, yet could also make basic reasoning mistakes. This contrasting behavior is puzzling when it comes to understanding the mechanisms behind LLMs' reasoning capabilities. One hypothesis is that the increasingly high and nearly saturated performance on common reasoning benchmarks could be due to the memorization of similar problems. In this paper, we systematically investigate this hypothesis with a quantitative measurement of memorization in reasoning tasks, using a dynamically generated logical reasoning benchmark based on Knights and Knaves (K&K) puzzles. We found that LLMs could interpolate the training puzzles (achieving near-perfect accuracy) after fine-tuning, yet fail when those puzzles are slightly perturbed, suggesting that the models heavily rely on memorization to solve those training puzzles. On the other hand, we show that while fine-tuning leads to heavy memorization, it also consistently improves generalization performance. In-depth analyses with perturbation tests, cross difficulty-level transferability, probing model internals, and fine-tuning with wrong answers suggest that the LLMs learn to reason on K&K puzzles despite training data memorization. This phenomenon indicates that LLMs exhibit a complex interplay between memorization and genuine reasoning abilities. Finally, our analysis with per-sample memorization score sheds light on how LLMs switch between reasoning and memorization in solving logical puzzles. Our code and data are available at https://memkklogic.github.io.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

Recent works have shown the benefits to LLMs from fine-tuning golden-standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) rationales or using them as correct examples in few-shot prompting. While humans can indeed imitate correct examples, learning from our mistakes is another vital aspect of human cognition. Hence, a question naturally arises: can LLMs learn and benefit from their mistakes, especially for their reasoning? This study investigates this problem from both the prompting and model-tuning perspectives. We begin by introducing CoTErrorSet, a new benchmark with 609,432 questions, each designed with both correct and error references, and demonstrating the types and reasons for making such mistakes. To explore the effectiveness of those mistakes, we design two methods: (1) Self-rethinking prompting guides LLMs to rethink whether they have made similar previous mistakes; and (2) Mistake tuning involves finetuning models in both correct and incorrect reasoning domains, rather than only tuning models to learn ground truth in traditional methodology. We conduct a series of experiments to prove LLMs can obtain benefits from mistakes in both directions. Our two methods offer potentially cost-effective strategies by leveraging errors to enhance reasoning capabilities, which costs significantly less than creating meticulously hand-crafted golden references. We ultimately make a thorough analysis of the reasons behind LLMs' errors, which provides directions that future research needs to overcome. CoTErrorSet will be published soon on \url{https://github.com/YookiTong/Learn-from-Mistakes-CotErrorSet}.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have shown their remarkable abilities in visual perception and understanding recently. However, how to comprehensively evaluate the capabilities of MLLMs remains a challenge. Most of the existing benchmarks predominantly focus on assessing perception, cognition, and reasoning, neglecting the abilities of self-awareness, referring to the model's recognition of its own capability boundary. In our study, we focus on self-awareness in image perception and introduce the knowledge quadrant for MLLMs, which clearly defines the knowns and unknowns in perception. Based on this, we propose a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate the Self-Aware capabilities in Perception for MLLMs(MM-SAP). MM-SAP encompasses three distinct sub-datasets, each focusing on different aspects of self-awareness. We evaluated eight well-known MLLMs using MM-SAP, analyzing their self-awareness and providing detailed insights. Code and data are available at https://github.com/YHWmz/MM-SAP

Meta-training, which fine-tunes the language model (LM) on various downstream tasks by maximizing the likelihood of the target label given the task instruction and input instance, has improved the zero-shot task generalization performance. However, meta-trained LMs still struggle to generalize to challenging tasks containing novel labels unseen during meta-training. In this paper, we propose Flipped Learning, an alternative method of meta-training which trains the LM to generate the task instruction given the input instance and label. During inference, the LM trained with Flipped Learning, referred to as Flipped, selects the label option that is most likely to generate the task instruction. On 14 tasks of the BIG-bench benchmark, the 11B-sized Flipped outperforms zero-shot T0-11B and even a 16 times larger 3-shot GPT-3 (175B) on average by 8.4% and 9.7% points, respectively. Flipped gives particularly large improvements on tasks with unseen labels, outperforming T0-11B by up to +20% average F1 score. This indicates that the strong task generalization of Flipped comes from improved generalization to novel labels. We release our code at https://github.com/seonghyeonye/Flipped-Learning.

Recently an influx of studies claim emergent cognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs). Yet, most rely on anecdotes, overlook contamination of training sets, or lack systematic Evaluation involving multiple tasks, control conditions, multiple iterations, and statistical robustness tests. Here we make two major contributions. First, we propose CogEval, a cognitive science-inspired protocol for the systematic evaluation of cognitive capacities in Large Language Models. The CogEval protocol can be followed for the evaluation of various abilities. Second, here we follow CogEval to systematically evaluate cognitive maps and planning ability across eight LLMs (OpenAI GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo-175B, davinci-003-175B, Google Bard, Cohere-xlarge-52.4B, Anthropic Claude-1-52B, LLaMA-13B, and Alpaca-7B). We base our task prompts on human experiments, which offer both established construct validity for evaluating planning, and are absent from LLM training sets. We find that, while LLMs show apparent competence in a few planning tasks with simpler structures, systematic evaluation reveals striking failure modes in planning tasks, including hallucinations of invalid trajectories and getting trapped in loops. These findings do not support the idea of emergent out-of-the-box planning ability in LLMs. This could be because LLMs do not understand the latent relational structures underlying planning problems, known as cognitive maps, and fail at unrolling goal-directed trajectories based on the underlying structure. Implications for application and future directions are discussed.

The ability of language models to learn a task from a few examples in context has generated substantial interest. Here, we provide a perspective that situates this type of supervised few-shot learning within a much broader spectrum of meta-learned in-context learning. Indeed, we suggest that any distribution of sequences in which context non-trivially decreases loss on subsequent predictions can be interpreted as eliciting a kind of in-context learning. We suggest that this perspective helps to unify the broad set of in-context abilities that language models exhibit x2014 such as adapting to tasks from instructions or role play, or extrapolating time series. This perspective also sheds light on potential roots of in-context learning in lower-level processing of linguistic dependencies (e.g. coreference or parallel structures). Finally, taking this perspective highlights the importance of generalization, which we suggest can be studied along several dimensions: not only the ability to learn something novel, but also flexibility in learning from different presentations, and in applying what is learned. We discuss broader connections to past literature in meta-learning and goal-conditioned agents, and other perspectives on learning and adaptation. We close by suggesting that research on in-context learning should consider this broader spectrum of in-context capabilities and types of generalization.

Current language models are unable to quickly learn new concepts on the fly, often requiring a more involved finetuning process to learn robustly. Prompting in-context is not robust to context distractions, and often fails to confer much information about the new concepts. Classic methods for few-shot word learning in NLP, relying on global word vectors, are less applicable to large language models. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach named CoLLEGe (Concept Learning with Language Embedding Generation) to modernize few-shot concept learning. CoLLEGe is a meta-learning framework capable of generating flexible embeddings for new concepts using a small number of example sentences or definitions. Our primary meta-learning objective is simply to facilitate a language model to make next word predictions in forthcoming sentences, making it compatible with language model pretraining. We design a series of tasks to test new concept learning in challenging real-world scenarios, including new word acquisition, definition inference, and verbal reasoning, and demonstrate that our method succeeds in each setting without task-specific training.

We introduce meta-prompting, an effective scaffolding technique designed to enhance the functionality of language models (LMs). This approach transforms a single LM into a multi-faceted conductor, adept at managing and integrating multiple independent LM queries. By employing high-level instructions, meta-prompting guides the LM to break down complex tasks into smaller, more manageable subtasks. These subtasks are then handled by distinct "expert" instances of the same LM, each operating under specific, tailored instructions. Central to this process is the LM itself, in its role as the conductor, which ensures seamless communication and effective integration of the outputs from these expert models. It additionally employs its inherent critical thinking and robust verification processes to refine and authenticate the end result. This collaborative prompting approach empowers a single LM to simultaneously act as a comprehensive orchestrator and a panel of diverse experts, significantly enhancing its performance across a wide array of tasks. The zero-shot, task-agnostic nature of meta-prompting greatly simplifies user interaction by obviating the need for detailed, task-specific instructions. Furthermore, our research demonstrates the seamless integration of external tools, such as a Python interpreter, into the meta-prompting framework, thereby broadening its applicability and utility. Through rigorous experimentation with GPT-4, we establish the superiority of meta-prompting over conventional scaffolding methods: When averaged across all tasks, including the Game of 24, Checkmate-in-One, and Python Programming Puzzles, meta-prompting, augmented with a Python interpreter functionality, surpasses standard prompting by 17.1%, expert (dynamic) prompting by 17.3%, and multipersona prompting by 15.2%.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

In open-domain dialogue intelligent agents should exhibit the use of knowledge, however there are few convincing demonstrations of this to date. The most popular sequence to sequence models typically "generate and hope" generic utterances that can be memorized in the weights of the model when mapping from input utterance(s) to output, rather than employing recalled knowledge as context. Use of knowledge has so far proved difficult, in part because of the lack of a supervised learning benchmark task which exhibits knowledgeable open dialogue with clear grounding. To that end we collect and release a large dataset with conversations directly grounded with knowledge retrieved from Wikipedia. We then design architectures capable of retrieving knowledge, reading and conditioning on it, and finally generating natural responses. Our best performing dialogue models are able to conduct knowledgeable discussions on open-domain topics as evaluated by automatic metrics and human evaluations, while our new benchmark allows for measuring further improvements in this important research direction.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

In this paper, we present an investigative study on how Mental Sets influence the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. LLMs have excelled in diverse natural language processing (NLP) tasks, driven by advancements in parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) and emergent capabilities like in-context learning (ICL). For complex reasoning tasks, selecting the right model for PEFT or ICL is critical, often relying on scores on benchmarks such as MMLU, MATH, and GSM8K. However, current evaluation methods, based on metrics like F1 Score or reasoning chain assessments by larger models, overlook a key dimension: adaptability to unfamiliar situations and overcoming entrenched thinking patterns. In cognitive psychology, Mental Set refers to the tendency to persist with previously successful strategies, even when they become inefficient - a challenge for problem solving and reasoning. We compare the performance of LLM models like Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct and GPT-4o in the presence of mental sets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to integrate cognitive psychology concepts into the evaluation of LLMs for complex reasoning tasks, providing deeper insights into their adaptability and problem-solving efficacy.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Scaling laws describe the relationship between the size of language models and their capabilities. Unlike prior studies that evaluate a model's capability via loss or benchmarks, we estimate the number of knowledge bits a model stores. We focus on factual knowledge represented as tuples, such as (USA, capital, Washington D.C.) from a Wikipedia page. Through multiple controlled datasets, we establish that language models can and only can store 2 bits of knowledge per parameter, even when quantized to int8, and such knowledge can be flexibly extracted for downstream applications. Consequently, a 7B model can store 14B bits of knowledge, surpassing the English Wikipedia and textbooks combined based on our estimation. More broadly, we present 12 results on how (1) training duration, (2) model architecture, (3) quantization, (4) sparsity constraints such as MoE, and (5) data signal-to-noise ratio affect a model's knowledge storage capacity. Notable insights include: * The GPT-2 architecture, with rotary embedding, matches or even surpasses LLaMA/Mistral architectures in knowledge storage, particularly over shorter training durations. This arises because LLaMA/Mistral uses GatedMLP, which is less stable and harder to train. * Prepending training data with domain names (e.g., wikipedia.org) significantly increases a model's knowledge capacity. Language models can autonomously identify and prioritize domains rich in knowledge, optimizing their storage capacity.

Knowledge plays a critical role in artificial intelligence. Recently, the extensive success of pre-trained language models (PLMs) has raised significant attention about how knowledge can be acquired, maintained, updated and used by language models. Despite the enormous amount of related studies, there still lacks a unified view of how knowledge circulates within language models throughout the learning, tuning, and application processes, which may prevent us from further understanding the connections between current progress or realizing existing limitations. In this survey, we revisit PLMs as knowledge-based systems by dividing the life circle of knowledge in PLMs into five critical periods, and investigating how knowledge circulates when it is built, maintained and used. To this end, we systematically review existing studies of each period of the knowledge life cycle, summarize the main challenges and current limitations, and discuss future directions.

Models of language trained on very large corpora have been demonstrated useful for NLP. As fixed artifacts, they have become the object of intense study, with many researchers "probing" the extent to which linguistic abstractions, factual and commonsense knowledge, and reasoning abilities they acquire and readily demonstrate. Building on this line of work, we consider a new question: for types of knowledge a language model learns, when during (pre)training are they acquired? We plot probing performance across iterations, using RoBERTa as a case study. Among our findings: linguistic knowledge is acquired fast, stably, and robustly across domains. Facts and commonsense are slower and more domain-sensitive. Reasoning abilities are, in general, not stably acquired. As new datasets, pretraining protocols, and probes emerge, we believe that probing-across-time analyses can help researchers understand the complex, intermingled learning that these models undergo and guide us toward more efficient approaches that accomplish necessary learning faster.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Recent work on dialogue-based collaborative plan acquisition (CPA) has suggested that Theory of Mind (ToM) modelling can improve missing knowledge prediction in settings with asymmetric skill-sets and knowledge. Although ToM was claimed to be important for effective collaboration, its real impact on this novel task remains under-explored. By representing plans as graphs and by exploiting task-specific constraints we show that, as performance on CPA nearly doubles when predicting one's own missing knowledge, the improvements due to ToM modelling diminish. This phenomenon persists even when evaluating existing baseline methods. To better understand the relevance of ToM for CPA, we report a principled performance comparison of models with and without ToM features. Results across different models and ablations consistently suggest that learned ToM features are indeed more likely to reflect latent patterns in the data with no perceivable link to ToM. This finding calls for a deeper understanding of the role of ToM in CPA and beyond, as well as new methods for modelling and evaluating mental states in computational collaborative agents.

Large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT and GPT-4, are versatile and can solve different tasks due to their emergent ability and generalizability. However, LLMs sometimes lack domain-specific knowledge to perform tasks, which would also cause hallucination during inference. In some previous works, additional modules like graph neural networks (GNNs) are trained on retrieved knowledge from external knowledge bases, aiming to mitigate the problem of lacking domain-specific knowledge. However, incorporating additional modules: 1) would need retraining additional modules when encountering novel domains; 2) would become a bottleneck since LLMs' strong abilities are not fully utilized for retrieval. In this paper, we propose a paradigm, termed Knowledge Solver (KSL), to teach LLMs to search for essential knowledge from external knowledge bases by harnessing their own strong generalizability. Specifically, we design a simple yet effective prompt to transform retrieval into a multi-hop decision sequence, which empowers LLMs with searching knowledge ability in zero-shot manner. Additionally, KSL is able to provide complete retrieval paths and therefore increase explainability of LLMs' reasoning processes. We conduct experiments on three datasets: CommonsenseQA, OpenbookQA, and MedQA-USMLE, and found that our approach improves LLM baseline performance by a relatively large margin.

Interestingly, LLMs yet struggle with some basic tasks that humans find trivial to handle, e.g., counting the number of character r's in the word "strawberry". There are several popular conjectures (e.g., tokenization, architecture and training data) regarding the reason for deficiency of LLMs in simple word-based counting problems, sharing the similar belief that such failure stems from model pretraining hence probably inevitable during deployment. In this paper, we carefully design multiple evaluation settings to investigate validity of prevalent conjectures. Meanwhile, we measure transferability of advanced mathematical and coding reasoning capabilities from specialized LLMs to simple counting tasks. Although specialized LLMs suffer from counting problems as well, we find conjectures about inherent deficiency of LLMs invalid and further seek opportunities to elicit knowledge and capabilities from LLMs that are beneficial to counting tasks. Compared with strategies such as finetuning and in-context learning that are commonly adopted to enhance performance on new or challenging tasks, we show that engaging reasoning is the most robust and efficient way to help LLMs better perceive tasks with more accurate responses. We hope our conjecture validation design could provide insights into the study of future critical failure modes of LLMs. Based on challenges in transferring advanced capabilities to much simpler tasks, we call for more attention to model capability acquisition and evaluation. We also highlight the importance of cultivating consciousness of "reasoning before responding" during model pretraining.

In a systematic way, we investigate a widely asked question: Do LLMs really understand what they say?, which relates to the more familiar term Stochastic Parrot. To this end, we propose a summative assessment over a carefully designed physical concept understanding task, PhysiCo. Our task alleviates the memorization issue via the usage of grid-format inputs that abstractly describe physical phenomena. The grids represents varying levels of understanding, from the core phenomenon, application examples to analogies to other abstract patterns in the grid world. A comprehensive study on our task demonstrates: (1) state-of-the-art LLMs, including GPT-4o, o1 and Gemini 2.0 flash thinking, lag behind humans by ~40%; (2) the stochastic parrot phenomenon is present in LLMs, as they fail on our grid task but can describe and recognize the same concepts well in natural language; (3) our task challenges the LLMs due to intrinsic difficulties rather than the unfamiliar grid format, as in-context learning and fine-tuning on same formatted data added little to their performance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) store and retrieve vast amounts of factual knowledge acquired during pre-training. Prior research has localized and identified mechanisms behind knowledge recall; however, it has primarily focused on English monolingual models. The question of how these processes generalize to other languages and multilingual LLMs remains unexplored. In this paper, we address this gap by conducting a comprehensive analysis of two highly multilingual LLMs. We assess the extent to which previously identified components and mechanisms of factual recall in English apply to a multilingual context. Then, we examine when language plays a role in the recall process, uncovering evidence of language-independent and language-dependent mechanisms.

While pretrained models such as BERT have shown large gains across natural language understanding tasks, their performance can be improved by further training the model on a data-rich intermediate task, before fine-tuning it on a target task. However, it is still poorly understood when and why intermediate-task training is beneficial for a given target task. To investigate this, we perform a large-scale study on the pretrained RoBERTa model with 110 intermediate-target task combinations. We further evaluate all trained models with 25 probing tasks meant to reveal the specific skills that drive transfer. We observe that intermediate tasks requiring high-level inference and reasoning abilities tend to work best. We also observe that target task performance is strongly correlated with higher-level abilities such as coreference resolution. However, we fail to observe more granular correlations between probing and target task performance, highlighting the need for further work on broad-coverage probing benchmarks. We also observe evidence that the forgetting of knowledge learned during pretraining may limit our analysis, highlighting the need for further work on transfer learning methods in these settings.

Procedural text describes dynamic state changes during a step-by-step natural process (e.g., photosynthesis). In this work, we focus on the task of procedural text understanding, which aims to comprehend such documents and track entities' states and locations during a process. Although recent approaches have achieved substantial progress, their results are far behind human performance. Two challenges, the difficulty of commonsense reasoning and data insufficiency, still remain unsolved, which require the incorporation of external knowledge bases. Previous works on external knowledge injection usually rely on noisy web mining tools and heuristic rules with limited applicable scenarios. In this paper, we propose a novel KnOwledge-Aware proceduraL text understAnding (KOALA) model, which effectively leverages multiple forms of external knowledge in this task. Specifically, we retrieve informative knowledge triples from ConceptNet and perform knowledge-aware reasoning while tracking the entities. Besides, we employ a multi-stage training schema which fine-tunes the BERT model over unlabeled data collected from Wikipedia before further fine-tuning it on the final model. Experimental results on two procedural text datasets, ProPara and Recipes, verify the effectiveness of the proposed methods, in which our model achieves state-of-the-art performance in comparison to various baselines.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown superior performance without task-specific fine-tuning. Despite the success, the knowledge stored in the parameters of LLMs could still be incomplete and difficult to update due to the computational costs. As complementary, retrieval-based methods can offer non-parametric world knowledge and improve the performance on tasks such as question answering. However, we find that the retrieved knowledge does not always help and even has a negative impact on original responses occasionally. To better make use of both internal knowledge and external world knowledge, we investigate eliciting the model's ability to recognize what they know and do not know (which is also called self-knowledge) and propose Self-Knowledge guided Retrieval augmentation (SKR), a simple yet effective method which can let LLMs refer to the questions they have previously encountered and adaptively call for external resources when dealing with new questions. We evaluate SKR on multiple datasets and demonstrate that it outperforms chain-of-thought based and fully retrieval-based methods by using either InstructGPT or ChatGPT.

Language models can store vast amounts of factual knowledge, but their ability to use this knowledge for logical reasoning remains questionable. This paper explores a language model's ability to manipulate its stored knowledge during inference. We focus on four manipulation types: retrieval (e.g., "What is person A's attribute X"), classification (e.g., "Is A's attribute X even or odd?"), comparison (e.g., "Is A greater than B in attribute X?") and inverse search (e.g., "Which person's attribute X equals T?") We observe that pre-trained language models like GPT2/3/4 excel in knowledge retrieval but struggle with simple classification or comparison tasks unless Chain of Thoughts (CoTs) are employed during both training and inference. They also perform poorly in inverse knowledge search, irrespective of the prompts. Our primary contribution is a synthetic dataset for a controlled experiment that confirms these inherent weaknesses: a language model cannot efficiently manipulate knowledge from pre-training data, even when such knowledge is perfectly stored and fully extractable in the models, and despite adequate instruct fine-tuning.

Most benchmark datasets targeting commonsense reasoning focus on everyday scenarios: physical knowledge like knowing that you could fill a cup under a waterfall [Talmor et al., 2019], social knowledge like bumping into someone is awkward [Sap et al., 2019], and other generic situations. However, there is a rich space of commonsense inferences anchored to knowledge about specific entities: for example, deciding the truthfulness of a claim "Harry Potter can teach classes on how to fly on a broomstick." Can models learn to combine entity knowledge with commonsense reasoning in this fashion? We introduce CREAK, a testbed for commonsense reasoning about entity knowledge, bridging fact-checking about entities (Harry Potter is a wizard and is skilled at riding a broomstick) with commonsense inferences (if you're good at a skill you can teach others how to do it). Our dataset consists of 13k human-authored English claims about entities that are either true or false, in addition to a small contrast set. Crowdworkers can easily come up with these statements and human performance on the dataset is high (high 90s); we argue that models should be able to blend entity knowledge and commonsense reasoning to do well here. In our experiments, we focus on the closed-book setting and observe that a baseline model finetuned on existing fact verification benchmark struggles on CREAK. Training a model on CREAK improves accuracy by a substantial margin, but still falls short of human performance. Our benchmark provides a unique probe into natural language understanding models, testing both its ability to retrieve facts (e.g., who teaches at the University of Chicago?) and unstated commonsense knowledge (e.g., butlers do not yell at guests).

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly surpassing human knowledge in many domains. While improving these models traditionally relies on costly human data, recent self-rewarding mechanisms (Yuan et al., 2024) have shown that LLMs can improve by judging their own responses instead of relying on human labelers. However, existing methods have primarily focused on improving model responses rather than judgment capabilities, resulting in rapid saturation during iterative training. To address this issue, we introduce a novel Meta-Rewarding step to the self-improvement process, where the model judges its own judgements and uses that feedback to refine its judgment skills. Surprisingly, this unsupervised approach improves the model's ability to judge {\em and} follow instructions, as demonstrated by a win rate improvement of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 22.9% to 39.4% on AlpacaEval 2, and 20.6% to 29.1% on Arena-Hard. These results strongly suggest the potential for self-improving models without human supervision.

This paper presents an in-depth analysis of Large Language Models (LLMs), focusing on LLaMA, a prominent open-source foundational model in natural language processing. Instead of assessing LLaMA through its generative output, we design multiple-choice tasks to probe its intrinsic understanding in high-order tasks such as reasoning and computation. We examine the model horizontally, comparing different sizes, and vertically, assessing different layers. We unveil several key and uncommon findings based on the designed probing tasks: (1) Horizontally, enlarging model sizes almost could not automatically impart additional knowledge or computational prowess. Instead, it can enhance reasoning abilities, especially in math problem solving, and helps reduce hallucinations, but only beyond certain size thresholds; (2) In vertical analysis, the lower layers of LLaMA lack substantial arithmetic and factual knowledge, showcasing logical thinking, multilingual and recognitive abilities, with top layers housing most computational power and real-world knowledge.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in understanding and generating responses to complex queries through large-scale pre-training. However, the efficacy of these models in memorizing and reasoning among large-scale structured knowledge, especially world knowledge that explicitly covers abundant factual information remains questionable. Addressing this gap, our research investigates whether LLMs can effectively store, recall, and reason with knowledge on a large scale comparable to latest knowledge bases (KBs) such as Wikidata. Specifically, we focus on three crucial aspects to study the viability: (1) the efficiency of LLMs with different sizes in memorizing the exact knowledge in the large-scale KB; (2) the flexibility of recalling the memorized knowledge in response to natural language queries; (3) the capability to infer new knowledge through reasoning. Our findings indicate that while LLMs hold promise as large-scale KBs capable of retrieving and responding with flexibility, enhancements in their reasoning capabilities are necessary to fully realize their potential.

Certain statistical models are capable of interpreting input strings as instructions, or prompts, and carry out tasks based on them. Many approaches to prompting and pre-training these models involve the automated generation of these prompts. We call these approaches meta-prompting, or prompting to obtain prompts. We propose a theoretical framework based on category theory to generalize and describe them. This framework is flexible enough to account for LLM stochasticity; and allows us to obtain formal results around task agnosticity and equivalence of various meta-prompting approaches. We experiment with meta-prompting in two active areas of model research: creativity and ideation. We find that user preference favors (p < 0.01) the prompts generated under meta-prompting, as well as their corresponding outputs, over a series of hardcoded baseline prompts that include the original task prompt. Using our framework, we argue that meta-prompting is more effective than basic prompting at generating desirable outputs.

Large language models (LLMs) have significantly impacted many aspects of our lives. However, assessing and ensuring their chronological knowledge remains challenging. Existing approaches fall short in addressing the accumulative nature of knowledge, often relying on a single time stamp. To overcome this, we introduce ChroKnowBench, a benchmark dataset designed to evaluate chronologically accumulated knowledge across three key aspects: multiple domains, time dependency, temporal state. Our benchmark distinguishes between knowledge that evolves (e.g., scientific discoveries, amended laws) and knowledge that remain constant (e.g., mathematical truths, commonsense facts). Building on this benchmark, we present ChroKnowledge (Chronological Categorization of Knowledge), a novel sampling-based framework for evaluating and updating LLMs' non-parametric chronological knowledge. Our evaluation shows: (1) The ability of eliciting temporal knowledge varies depending on the data format that model was trained on. (2) LLMs partially recall knowledge or show a cut-off at temporal boundaries rather than recalling all aspects of knowledge correctly. Thus, we apply our ChroKnowPrompt, an in-depth prompting to elicit chronological knowledge by traversing step-by-step through the surrounding time spans. We observe that our framework successfully updates the overall knowledge across the entire timeline in both the biomedical domain (+11.9%) and the general domain (+2.8%), demonstrating its effectiveness in refining temporal knowledge. This non-parametric approach also enables knowledge updates not only in open-source models but also in proprietary LLMs, ensuring comprehensive applicability across model types. We perform a comprehensive analysis based on temporal characteristics of ChroKnowPrompt and validate the potential of various models to elicit intrinsic temporal knowledge through our method.

The dominant paradigm for instruction tuning is the random-shuffled training of maximally diverse instruction-response pairs. This paper explores the potential benefits of applying a structured cognitive learning approach to instruction tuning in contemporary large language models like ChatGPT and GPT-4. Unlike the previous conventional randomized instruction dataset, we propose a highly structured synthetic dataset that mimics the progressive and organized nature of human education. We curate our dataset by aligning it with educational frameworks, incorporating meta information including its topic and cognitive rigor level for each sample. Our dataset covers comprehensive fine-grained topics spanning diverse educational stages (from middle school to graduate school) with various questions for each topic to enhance conceptual depth using Bloom's taxonomy-a classification framework distinguishing various levels of human cognition for each concept. The results demonstrate that this cognitive rigorous training approach yields significant performance enhancements - +3.06 on the MMLU benchmark and an additional +1.28 on AI2 Reasoning Challenge (hard set) - compared to conventional randomized training, all while avoiding additional computational costs. This research highlights the potential of leveraging human learning principles to enhance the capabilities of language models in comprehending and responding to complex instructions and tasks.

Recent studies have identified one aggravating factor of LLM hallucinations as the knowledge inconsistency between pre-training and fine-tuning, where unfamiliar fine-tuning data mislead the LLM to fabricate plausible but wrong outputs. In this paper, we propose a novel fine-tuning strategy called Prereq-Tune to address this knowledge inconsistency and reduce hallucinations. Fundamentally, Prereq-Tune disentangles the learning of skills and knowledge, so the model learns only the task skills without being impacted by the knowledge inconsistency. To achieve this, Prereq-Tune introduces an additional prerequisite learning stage to learn the necessary knowledge for SFT, allowing subsequent SFT to focus only on task skills. Prereq-Tune can also be combined with fictitious synthetic data to enhance the grounding of LLM outputs to their internal knowledge. Experiments show that Prereq-Tune outperforms existing baselines in improving LLM's factuality across short QA and long-form generation tasks. It also opens new possibilities for knowledge-controlled generation in LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/UCSB-NLP-Chang/Prereq_tune.git.

Despite the success of large language models (LLMs) in various natural language processing (NLP) tasks, the stored knowledge in these models may inevitably be incomplete, out-of-date, or incorrect. This motivates the need to utilize external knowledge to assist LLMs. Unfortunately, current methods for incorporating external knowledge often require additional training or fine-tuning, which can be costly and may not be feasible for LLMs. To address this issue, we propose a novel post-processing approach, rethinking with retrieval (RR), which retrieves relevant external knowledge based on the decomposed reasoning steps obtained from the chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. This lightweight approach does not require additional training or fine-tuning and is not limited by the input length of LLMs. We evaluate the effectiveness of RR through extensive experiments with GPT-3 on three complex reasoning tasks: commonsense reasoning, temporal reasoning, and tabular reasoning. Our results show that RR can produce more faithful explanations and improve the performance of LLMs.

It remains an open question whether incorporating external knowledge benefits commonsense reasoning while maintaining the flexibility of pretrained sequence models. To investigate this question, we develop generated knowledge prompting, which consists of generating knowledge from a language model, then providing the knowledge as additional input when answering a question. Our method does not require task-specific supervision for knowledge integration, or access to a structured knowledge base, yet it improves performance of large-scale, state-of-the-art models on four commonsense reasoning tasks, achieving state-of-the-art results on numerical commonsense (NumerSense), general commonsense (CommonsenseQA 2.0), and scientific commonsense (QASC) benchmarks. Generated knowledge prompting highlights large-scale language models as flexible sources of external knowledge for improving commonsense reasoning. Our code is available at https://github.com/liujch1998/GKP

Driven by curiosity, humans have continually sought to explore and understand the world around them, leading to the invention of various tools to satiate this inquisitiveness. Despite not having the capacity to process and memorize vast amounts of information in their brains, humans excel in critical thinking, planning, reflection, and harnessing available tools to interact with and interpret the world, enabling them to find answers efficiently. The recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) suggest that machines might also possess the aforementioned human-like capabilities, allowing them to exhibit powerful abilities even with a constrained parameter count. In this paper, we introduce KwaiAgents, a generalized information-seeking agent system based on LLMs. Within KwaiAgents, we propose an agent system that employs LLMs as its cognitive core, which is capable of understanding a user's query, behavior guidelines, and referencing external documents. The agent can also update and retrieve information from its internal memory, plan and execute actions using a time-aware search-browse toolkit, and ultimately provide a comprehensive response. We further investigate the system's performance when powered by LLMs less advanced than GPT-4, and introduce the Meta-Agent Tuning (MAT) framework, designed to ensure even an open-sourced 7B or 13B model performs well among many agent systems. We exploit both benchmark and human evaluations to systematically validate these capabilities. Extensive experiments show the superiority of our agent system compared to other autonomous agents and highlight the enhanced generalized agent-abilities of our fine-tuned LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have not only exhibited exceptional performance across various tasks, but also demonstrated sparks of intelligence. Recent studies have focused on assessing their capabilities on human exams and revealed their impressive competence in different domains. However, cognitive research on the overall knowledge structure of LLMs is still lacking. In this paper, based on educational diagnostic assessment method, we conduct an evaluation using MoocRadar, a meticulously annotated human test dataset based on Bloom Taxonomy. We aim to reveal the knowledge structures of LLMs and gain insights of their cognitive capabilities. This research emphasizes the significance of investigating LLMs' knowledge and understanding the disparate cognitive patterns of LLMs. By shedding light on models' knowledge, researchers can advance development and utilization of LLMs in a more informed and effective manner.

Chain of thought prompting successfully improves the reasoning capabilities of large language models, achieving state of the art results on a range of datasets. However, these reasoning capabilities only appear to emerge in models with a size of over 100 billion parameters. In this paper, we explore the transfer of such reasoning capabilities to models with less than 100 billion parameters via knowledge distillation. Specifically, we finetune a student model on the chain of thought outputs generated by a larger teacher model. Our experiments show that the proposed method improves task performance across arithmetic, commonsense and symbolic reasoning datasets. For example, the accuracy of T5 XXL on GSM8K improves from 8.11% to 21.99% when finetuned on PaLM-540B generated chains of thought.

Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT and GPT-4 have made significant progress in NLP. However, their ability to memorize, represent, and leverage commonsense knowledge has been a well-known pain point for LLMs. It remains unclear that: (1) Can GPTs effectively answer commonsense questions? (2) Are GPTs knowledgeable in commonsense? (3) Are GPTs aware of the underlying commonsense knowledge for answering a specific question? (4) Can GPTs effectively leverage commonsense for answering questions? To evaluate the above commonsense problems, we conduct a series of experiments to evaluate ChatGPT's commonsense abilities, and the experimental results show that: (1) GPTs can achieve good QA accuracy in commonsense tasks, while they still struggle with certain types of knowledge. (2) ChatGPT is knowledgeable, and can accurately generate most of the commonsense knowledge using knowledge prompts. (3) Despite its knowledge, ChatGPT is an inexperienced commonsense problem solver, which cannot precisely identify the needed commonsense knowledge for answering a specific question, i.e., ChatGPT does not precisely know what commonsense knowledge is required to answer a question. The above findings raise the need to investigate better mechanisms for utilizing commonsense knowledge in LLMs, such as instruction following, better commonsense guidance, etc.

Vision Language Models (VLMs), pre-trained on large-scale image-text datasets, enable zero-shot predictions for unseen data but may underperform on specific unseen tasks. Continual learning (CL) can help VLMs effectively adapt to new data distributions without joint training, but faces challenges of catastrophic forgetting and generalization forgetting. Although significant progress has been achieved by distillation-based methods, they exhibit two severe limitations. One is the popularly adopted single-teacher paradigm fails to impart comprehensive knowledge, The other is the existing methods inadequately leverage the multimodal information in the original training dataset, instead they rely on additional data for distillation, which increases computational and storage overhead. To mitigate both limitations, by drawing on Knowledge Integration Theory (KIT), we propose a Multi-Stage Knowledge Integration network (MulKI) to emulate the human learning process in distillation methods. MulKI achieves this through four stages, including Eliciting Ideas, Adding New Ideas, Distinguishing Ideas, and Making Connections. During the four stages, we first leverage prototypes to align across modalities, eliciting cross-modal knowledge, then adding new knowledge by constructing fine-grained intra- and inter-modality relationships with prototypes. After that, knowledge from two teacher models is adaptively distinguished and re-weighted. Finally, we connect between models from intra- and inter-task, integrating preceding and new knowledge. Our method demonstrates significant improvements in maintaining zero-shot capabilities while supporting continual learning across diverse downstream tasks, showcasing its potential in adapting VLMs to evolving data distributions.

Cognitive textual and visual reasoning tasks, such as puzzles, series, and analogies, demand the ability to quickly reason, decipher, and evaluate patterns both textually and spatially. While LLMs and VLMs, through extensive training on large amounts of human-curated data, have attained a high level of pseudo-human intelligence in some common sense reasoning tasks, they still struggle with more complex reasoning tasks that require cognitive understanding. In this work, we introduce a new dataset, NTSEBench, designed to evaluate the cognitive multi-modal reasoning and problem-solving skills of large models. The dataset comprises 2,728 multiple-choice questions comprising of a total of 4,642 images across 26 categories sampled from the NTSE examination conducted nationwide in India, featuring both visual and textual general aptitude questions that do not rely on rote learning. We establish baselines on the dataset using state-of-the-art LLMs and VLMs. To facilitate a comparison between open source and propriety models, we propose four distinct modeling strategies to handle different modalities (text and images) in the dataset instances.

How humans and machines make sense of current inputs for relation reasoning and question-answering while putting the perceived information into context of our past memories, has been a challenging conundrum in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Inspired by human brain's memory system and cognitive architectures, we propose a PMI framework that consists of perception, memory and inference components. Notably, the memory module comprises working and long-term memory, with the latter endowed with a higher-order structure to retain more accumulated knowledge and experiences. Through a differentiable competitive write access, current perceptions update working memory, which is later merged with long-term memory via outer product associations, averting memory overflow and minimizing information conflicts. In the inference module, relevant information is retrieved from two separate memory origins and associatively integrated to attain a more comprehensive and precise interpretation of current perceptions. We exploratively apply our PMI to improve prevailing Transformers and CNN models on question-answering tasks like bAbI-20k and Sort-of-CLEVR datasets, as well as relation calculation and image classification tasks, and in each case, our PMI enhancements consistently outshine their original counterparts significantly. Visualization analyses reveal that memory consolidation, along with the interaction and integration of information from diverse memory sources, substantially contributes to the model effectiveness on inference tasks.

We introduce Buffer of Thoughts (BoT), a novel and versatile thought-augmented reasoning approach for enhancing accuracy, efficiency and robustness of large language models (LLMs). Specifically, we propose meta-buffer to store a series of informative high-level thoughts, namely thought-template, distilled from the problem-solving processes across various tasks. Then for each problem, we retrieve a relevant thought-template and adaptively instantiate it with specific reasoning structures to conduct efficient reasoning. To guarantee the scalability and stability, we further propose buffer-manager to dynamically update the meta-buffer, thus enhancing the capacity of meta-buffer as more tasks are solved. We conduct extensive experiments on 10 challenging reasoning-intensive tasks, and achieve significant performance improvements over previous SOTA methods: 11% on Game of 24, 20% on Geometric Shapes and 51% on Checkmate-in-One. Further analysis demonstrate the superior generalization ability and model robustness of our BoT, while requiring only 12% of the cost of multi-query prompting methods (e.g., tree/graph of thoughts) on average. Notably, we find that our Llama3-8B+BoT has the potential to surpass Llama3-70B model. Our project is available at: https://github.com/YangLing0818/buffer-of-thought-llm

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

Human intelligence thrives on the concept of cognitive synergy, where collaboration and information integration among different cognitive processes yield superior outcomes compared to individual cognitive processes in isolation. Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising performance as general task-solving agents, they still struggle with tasks that require intensive domain knowledge and complex reasoning. In this work, we propose Solo Performance Prompting (SPP), which transforms a single LLM into a cognitive synergist by engaging in multi-turn self-collaboration with multiple personas. A cognitive synergist refers to an intelligent agent that collaborates with multiple minds, combining their individual strengths and knowledge, to enhance problem-solving and overall performance in complex tasks. By dynamically identifying and simulating different personas based on task inputs, SPP unleashes the potential of cognitive synergy in LLMs. We have discovered that assigning multiple, fine-grained personas in LLMs elicits better problem-solving abilities compared to using a single or fixed number of personas. We evaluate SPP on three challenging tasks: Trivia Creative Writing, Codenames Collaborative, and Logic Grid Puzzle, encompassing both knowledge-intensive and reasoning-intensive types. Unlike previous works, such as Chain-of-Thought, that solely enhance the reasoning abilities in LLMs, SPP effectively elicits internal knowledge acquisition abilities, reduces hallucination, and maintains strong reasoning capabilities. Code, data, and prompts can be found at: https://github.com/MikeWangWZHL/Solo-Performance-Prompting.git.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate outputs that lack grounding in real-world facts, a phenomenon known as hallucinations. Prior research has associated hallucinations with model uncertainty, leveraging this relationship for hallucination detection and mitigation. In this paper, we challenge the underlying assumption that all hallucinations are associated with uncertainty. Using knowledge detection and uncertainty measurement methods, we demonstrate that models can hallucinate with high certainty even when they have the correct knowledge. We further show that high-certainty hallucinations are consistent across models and datasets, distinctive enough to be singled out, and challenge existing mitigation methods. Our findings reveal an overlooked aspect of hallucinations, emphasizing the need to understand their origins and improve mitigation strategies to enhance LLM safety. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/Trust_me_Im_wrong .

Despite the recent observation that large language models (LLMs) can store substantial factual knowledge, there is a limited understanding of the mechanisms of how they acquire factual knowledge through pretraining. This work addresses this gap by studying how LLMs acquire factual knowledge during pretraining. The findings reveal several important insights into the dynamics of factual knowledge acquisition during pretraining. First, counterintuitively, we observe that pretraining on more data shows no significant improvement in the model's capability to acquire and maintain factual knowledge. Next, there is a power-law relationship between training steps and forgetting of memorization and generalization of factual knowledge, and LLMs trained with duplicated training data exhibit faster forgetting. Third, training LLMs with larger batch sizes can enhance the models' robustness to forgetting. Overall, our observations suggest that factual knowledge acquisition in LLM pretraining occurs by progressively increasing the probability of factual knowledge presented in the pretraining data at each step. However, this increase is diluted by subsequent forgetting. Based on this interpretation, we demonstrate that we can provide plausible explanations for recently observed behaviors of LLMs, such as the poor performance of LLMs on long-tail knowledge and the benefits of deduplicating the pretraining corpus.

We study whether Large Language Models (LLMs) latently perform multi-hop reasoning with complex prompts such as "The mother of the singer of 'Superstition' is". We look for evidence of a latent reasoning pathway where an LLM (1) latently identifies "the singer of 'Superstition'" as Stevie Wonder, the bridge entity, and (2) uses its knowledge of Stevie Wonder's mother to complete the prompt. We analyze these two hops individually and consider their co-occurrence as indicative of latent multi-hop reasoning. For the first hop, we test if changing the prompt to indirectly mention the bridge entity instead of any other entity increases the LLM's internal recall of the bridge entity. For the second hop, we test if increasing this recall causes the LLM to better utilize what it knows about the bridge entity. We find strong evidence of latent multi-hop reasoning for the prompts of certain relation types, with the reasoning pathway used in more than 80% of the prompts. However, the utilization is highly contextual, varying across different types of prompts. Also, on average, the evidence for the second hop and the full multi-hop traversal is rather moderate and only substantial for the first hop. Moreover, we find a clear scaling trend with increasing model size for the first hop of reasoning but not for the second hop. Our experimental findings suggest potential challenges and opportunities for future development and applications of LLMs.

Meta-learning algorithms are able to learn a new task using previously learned knowledge, but they often require a large number of meta-training tasks which may not be readily available. To address this issue, we propose a method for few-shot learning with fewer tasks, which we call MetaModulation. The key idea is to use a neural network to increase the density of the meta-training tasks by modulating batch normalization parameters during meta-training. Additionally, we modify parameters at various network levels, rather than just a single layer, to increase task diversity. To account for the uncertainty caused by the limited training tasks, we propose a variational MetaModulation where the modulation parameters are treated as latent variables. We also introduce learning variational feature hierarchies by the variational MetaModulation, which modulates features at all layers and can consider task uncertainty and generate more diverse tasks. The ablation studies illustrate the advantages of utilizing a learnable task modulation at different levels and demonstrate the benefit of incorporating probabilistic variants in few-task meta-learning. Our MetaModulation and its variational variants consistently outperform state-of-the-art alternatives on four few-task meta-learning benchmarks.

We propose a meta-ability decoupling (MAD) paradigm, which brings together various object navigation methods in an architecture system, allowing them to mutually enhance each other and evolve together. Based on the MAD paradigm, we design a multiple thinking (MT) model that leverages distinct thinking to abstract various meta-abilities. Our method decouples meta-abilities from three aspects: input, encoding, and reward while employing the multiple thinking collaboration (MTC) module to promote mutual cooperation between thinking. MAD introduces a novel qualitative and quantitative interpretability system for object navigation. Through extensive experiments on AI2-Thor and RoboTHOR, we demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods on both typical and zero-shot object navigation tasks.

Large Language Models with transformer architecture have revolutionized the domain of text generation, setting unprecedented benchmarks. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs have been criticized for generating outcomes that deviate from factual accuracy or display logical inconsistencies, phenomena commonly referred to as hallucinations. This term, however, has often been misapplied to any results deviating from the instructor's expectations, which this paper defines as attention misdirection rather than true hallucinations. Understanding the distinction between hallucinations and attention misdirection becomes increasingly relevant in business contexts, where the ramifications of such errors can significantly impact the value extraction from these inherently pre-trained models. This paper highlights the best practices of the PGI, Persona, Grouping, and Intelligence, method, a strategic framework that achieved a remarkable error rate of only 3,15 percent across 4,000 responses generated by GPT in response to a real business challenge. It emphasizes that by equipping experimentation with knowledge, businesses can unlock opportunities for innovation through the use of these natively pre-trained models. This reinforces the notion that strategic application grounded in a skilled team can maximize the benefits of emergent technologies such as the LLMs.

Scaling high-quality tutoring remains a major challenge in education. Due to growing demand, many platforms employ novice tutors who, unlike experienced educators, struggle to address student mistakes and thus fail to seize prime learning opportunities. Our work explores the potential of large language models (LLMs) to close the novice-expert knowledge gap in remediating math mistakes. We contribute Bridge, a method that uses cognitive task analysis to translate an expert's latent thought process into a decision-making model for remediation. This involves an expert identifying (A) the student's error, (B) a remediation strategy, and (C) their intention before generating a response. We construct a dataset of 700 real tutoring conversations, annotated by experts with their decisions. We evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs on our dataset and find that the expert's decision-making model is critical for LLMs to close the gap: responses from GPT4 with expert decisions (e.g., "simplify the problem") are +76% more preferred than without. Additionally, context-sensitive decisions are critical to closing pedagogical gaps: random decisions decrease GPT4's response quality by -97% than expert decisions. Our work shows the potential of embedding expert thought processes in LLM generations to enhance their capability to bridge novice-expert knowledge gaps. Our dataset and code can be found at: https://github.com/rosewang2008/bridge.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

In various fields of knowledge creation, including science, new ideas often build on pre-existing information. In this work, we explore this concept within the context of language models. Specifically, we explore the potential of self-training models on their own outputs, akin to how humans learn and build on their previous thoughts and actions. While this approach is intuitively appealing, our research reveals its practical limitations. We find that extended self-training of the GPT-2 model leads to a significant degradation in performance, resulting in repetitive and collapsed token output.

We introduce RAM, an innovative RAG-based framework with an ever-improving memory. Inspired by humans' pedagogical process, RAM utilizes recursively reasoning-based retrieval and experience reflections to continually update the memory and learn from users' communicative feedback, namely communicative learning. Extensive experiments with both simulated and real users demonstrate significant improvements over traditional RAG and self-knowledge methods, particularly excelling in handling false premise and multi-hop questions. Furthermore, RAM exhibits promising adaptability to various feedback and retrieval method chain types, showcasing its potential for advancing AI capabilities in dynamic knowledge acquisition and lifelong learning.

We introduce Social IQa, the first largescale benchmark for commonsense reasoning about social situations. Social IQa contains 38,000 multiple choice questions for probing emotional and social intelligence in a variety of everyday situations (e.g., Q: "Jordan wanted to tell Tracy a secret, so Jordan leaned towards Tracy. Why did Jordan do this?" A: "Make sure no one else could hear"). Through crowdsourcing, we collect commonsense questions along with correct and incorrect answers about social interactions, using a new framework that mitigates stylistic artifacts in incorrect answers by asking workers to provide the right answer to a different but related question. Empirical results show that our benchmark is challenging for existing question-answering models based on pretrained language models, compared to human performance (>20% gap). Notably, we further establish Social IQa as a resource for transfer learning of commonsense knowledge, achieving state-of-the-art performance on multiple commonsense reasoning tasks (Winograd Schemas, COPA).

Language has long been conceived as an essential tool for human reasoning. The breakthrough of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked significant research interest in leveraging these models to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Researchers have moved beyond simple autoregressive token generation by introducing the concept of "thought" -- a sequence of tokens representing intermediate steps in the reasoning process. This innovative paradigm enables LLMs' to mimic complex human reasoning processes, such as tree search and reflective thinking. Recently, an emerging trend of learning to reason has applied reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to master reasoning processes. This approach enables the automatic generation of high-quality reasoning trajectories through trial-and-error search algorithms, significantly expanding LLMs' reasoning capacity by providing substantially more training data. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that encouraging LLMs to "think" with more tokens during test-time inference can further significantly boost reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the train-time and test-time scaling combined to show a new research frontier -- a path toward Large Reasoning Model. The introduction of OpenAI's o1 series marks a significant milestone in this research direction. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of recent progress in LLM reasoning. We begin by introducing the foundational background of LLMs and then explore the key technical components driving the development of large reasoning models, with a focus on automated data construction, learning-to-reason techniques, and test-time scaling. We also analyze popular open-source projects at building large reasoning models, and conclude with open challenges and future research directions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate erroneous outputs, known as hallucinations, due to their limitations in discerning questions beyond their knowledge scope. While addressing hallucination has been a focal point in research, previous efforts primarily concentrate on enhancing correctness without giving due consideration to the significance of rejection mechanisms. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive examination of the role of rejection, introducing the notion of model reliability along with corresponding metrics. These metrics measure the model's ability to provide accurate responses while adeptly rejecting questions exceeding its knowledge boundaries, thereby minimizing hallucinations. To improve the inherent reliability of LLMs, we present a novel alignment framework called Reinforcement Learning from Knowledge Feedback (RLKF). RLKF leverages knowledge feedback to dynamically determine the model's knowledge boundary and trains a reliable reward model to encourage the refusal of out-of-knowledge questions. Experimental results on mathematical questions affirm the substantial efficacy of RLKF in significantly enhancing LLM reliability.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

Solving complex mathematical problems via system-2 reasoning is a natural human skill, yet it remains a significant challenge for current large language models (LLMs). We identify the scarcity of deliberate multi-step reasoning data as a primary limiting factor. To this end, we introduce Enriched Instruction Tuning (EIT), a method that enriches existing human-annotated mathematical datasets by synergizing human and AI feedback to create fine-grained reasoning trajectories. These datasets are then used to fine-tune open-source LLMs, enhancing their mathematical reasoning abilities without reliance on any symbolic verification program. Concretely, EIT is composed of two critical steps: Enriching with Reasoning Plan (ERP) and Enriching with Reasoning Step (ERS). The former generates a high-level plan that breaks down complex instructions into a sequence of simpler objectives, while ERS fills in reasoning contexts often overlooked by human annotators, creating a smoother reasoning trajectory for LLM fine-tuning. Unlike existing CoT prompting methods that generate reasoning chains only depending on LLM's internal knowledge, our method leverages human-annotated initial answers as ``meta-knowledge'' to help LLMs generate more detailed and precise reasoning processes, leading to a more trustworthy LLM expert for complex mathematical problems. In experiments, EIT achieves an accuracy of 84.1% on GSM8K and 32.5% on MATH, surpassing state-of-the-art fine-tuning and prompting methods, and even matching the performance of tool-augmented methods.

Despite the remarkable advancements and widespread applications of deep neural networks, their ability to perform reasoning tasks remains limited, particularly in domains requiring structured, abstract thought. In this paper, we investigate the linguistic reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) by introducing IOLBENCH, a novel benchmark derived from International Linguistics Olympiad (IOL) problems. This dataset encompasses diverse problems testing syntax, morphology, phonology, and semantics, all carefully designed to be self-contained and independent of external knowledge. These tasks challenge models to engage in metacognitive linguistic reasoning, requiring the deduction of linguistic rules and patterns from minimal examples. Through extensive benchmarking of leading LLMs, we find that even the most advanced models struggle to handle the intricacies of linguistic complexity, particularly in areas demanding compositional generalization and rule abstraction. Our analysis highlights both the strengths and persistent limitations of current models in linguistic problem-solving, offering valuable insights into their reasoning capabilities. By introducing IOLBENCH, we aim to foster further research into developing models capable of human-like reasoning, with broader implications for the fields of computational linguistics and artificial intelligence.

Current LLM training positions mathematical reasoning as a core capability. With publicly available sources fully tapped, there is unmet demand for diverse and challenging math questions. Relying solely on human experts is both time-consuming and costly, while LLM-generated questions often lack the requisite diversity and difficulty. We present a design framework that combines the strengths of LLMs with a human-in-the-loop approach to generate a diverse array of challenging math questions. We leverage LLM metacognition skills [Didolkar et al., 2024] of a strong LLM to extract core "skills" from existing math datasets. These skills serve as the basis for generating novel and difficult questions by prompting the LLM with random pairs of core skills. The use of two different skills within each question makes finding such questions an "out of distribution" task for both LLMs and humans. Our pipeline employs LLMs to iteratively generate and refine questions and solutions through multiturn prompting. Human annotators then verify and further refine the questions, with their efficiency enhanced via further LLM interactions. Applying this pipeline on skills extracted from the MATH dataset [Hendrycks et al., 2021] resulted in MATH^2 - a dataset of higher-quality math questions, as evidenced by: (a) Lower performance of all models on MATH^2 than on MATH (b) Higher performance on MATH when using MATH^2 questions as in-context examples. Although focused on mathematics, our methodology seems applicable to other domains requiring structured reasoning, and potentially as a component of scalable oversight. Also of interest is a striking relationship observed between models' performance on the new dataset: the success rate on MATH^2 is the square on MATH, suggesting that successfully solving the question in MATH^2 requires a nontrivial combination of two distinct math skills.

We present a fundamental discovery that challenges our understanding of how complex reasoning emerges in large language models. While conventional wisdom suggests that sophisticated reasoning tasks demand extensive training data (>100,000 examples), we demonstrate that complex mathematical reasoning abilities can be effectively elicited with surprisingly few examples. Through comprehensive experiments, our proposed model LIMO demonstrates unprecedented performance in mathematical reasoning. With merely 817 curated training samples, LIMO achieves 57.1% accuracy on AIME and 94.8% on MATH, improving from previous SFT-based models' 6.5% and 59.2% respectively, while only using 1% of the training data required by previous approaches. LIMO demonstrates exceptional out-of-distribution generalization, achieving 40.5% absolute improvement across 10 diverse benchmarks, outperforming models trained on 100x more data, challenging the notion that SFT leads to memorization rather than generalization. Based on these results, we propose the Less-Is-More Reasoning Hypothesis (LIMO Hypothesis): In foundation models where domain knowledge has been comprehensively encoded during pre-training, sophisticated reasoning capabilities can emerge through minimal but precisely orchestrated demonstrations of cognitive processes. This hypothesis posits that the elicitation threshold for complex reasoning is determined by two key factors: (1) the completeness of the model's encoded knowledge foundation during pre-training, and (2) the effectiveness of post-training examples as "cognitive templates" that show the model how to utilize its knowledge base to solve complex reasoning tasks. To facilitate reproducibility and future research in data-efficient reasoning, we release LIMO as a comprehensive open-source suite at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/LIMO.

This study explores the capabilities of multimodal large language models (LLMs) in handling challenging multistep tasks that integrate language and vision, focusing on model steerability, composability, and the application of long-term memory and context understanding. The problem addressed is the LLM's ability (Nov 2023 GPT-4 Vision Preview) to manage tasks that require synthesizing visual and textual information, especially where stepwise instructions and sequential logic are paramount. The research presents a series of 14 creatively and constructively diverse tasks, ranging from AI Lego Designing to AI Satellite Image Analysis, designed to test the limits of current LLMs in contexts that previously proved difficult without extensive memory and contextual understanding. Key findings from evaluating 800 guided dialogs include notable disparities in task completion difficulty. For instance, 'Image to Ingredient AI Bartender' (Low difficulty) contrasted sharply with 'AI Game Self-Player' (High difficulty), highlighting the LLM's varying proficiency in processing complex visual data and generating coherent instructions. Tasks such as 'AI Genetic Programmer' and 'AI Negotiator' showed high completion difficulty, emphasizing challenges in maintaining context over multiple steps. The results underscore the importance of developing LLMs that combine long-term memory and contextual awareness to mimic human-like thought processes in complex problem-solving scenarios.

Despite exceptional capabilities in knowledge-intensive tasks, Large Language Models (LLMs) face a critical gap in understanding how they internalize new knowledge, particularly how to structurally embed acquired knowledge in their neural computations. We address this issue through the lens of knowledge circuit evolution, identifying computational subgraphs that facilitate knowledge storage and processing. Our systematic analysis of circuit evolution throughout continual pre-training reveals several key findings: (1) the acquisition of new knowledge is influenced by its relevance to pre-existing knowledge; (2) the evolution of knowledge circuits exhibits a distinct phase shift from formation to optimization; (3) the evolution of knowledge circuits follows a deep-to-shallow pattern. These insights not only advance our theoretical understanding of the mechanisms of new knowledge acquisition in LLMs, but also provide potential implications for improving continual pre-training strategies to enhance model performance. Code and data will be available at https://github.com/zjunlp/DynamicKnowledgeCircuits.

Knowledge tracing (KT) has recently been an active research area of computational pedagogy. The task is to model students' mastery level of knowledge concepts based on their responses to the questions in the past, as well as predict the probabilities that they correctly answer subsequent questions in the future. KT tasks were historically solved using statistical modeling methods such as Bayesian inference and factor analysis, but recent advances in deep learning have led to the successive proposals that leverage deep neural networks, including long short-term memory networks, memory-augmented networks and self-attention networks. While those deep models demonstrate superior performance over the traditional approaches, they all neglect the explicit modeling of the learning curve theory, which generally says that more practice on the same knowledge concept enhances one's mastery level of the concept. Based on this theory, we propose a Convolution-Augmented Knowledge Tracing (CAKT) model in this paper. The model employs three-dimensional convolutional neural networks to explicitly learn a student's recent experience on applying the same knowledge concept with that in the next question, and fuses the learnt feature with the feature representing her overall latent knowledge state obtained using a classic LSTM network. The fused feature is then fed into a second LSTM network to predict the student's response to the next question. Experimental results show that CAKT achieves the new state-of-the-art performance in predicting students' responses compared with existing models. We also conduct extensive sensitivity analysis and ablation study to show the stability of the results and justify the particular architecture of CAKT, respectively.

A longstanding goal of artificial general intelligence is highly capable generalists that can learn from diverse experiences and generalize to unseen tasks. The language and vision communities have seen remarkable progress toward this trend by scaling up transformer-based models trained on massive datasets, while reinforcement learning (RL) agents still suffer from poor generalization capacity under such paradigms. To tackle this challenge, we propose Meta Decision Transformer (Meta-DT), which leverages the sequential modeling ability of the transformer architecture and robust task representation learning via world model disentanglement to achieve efficient generalization in offline meta-RL. We pretrain a context-aware world model to learn a compact task representation, and inject it as a contextual condition to the causal transformer to guide task-oriented sequence generation. Then, we subtly utilize history trajectories generated by the meta-policy as a self-guided prompt to exploit the architectural inductive bias. We select the trajectory segment that yields the largest prediction error on the pretrained world model to construct the prompt, aiming to encode task-specific information complementary to the world model maximally. Notably, the proposed framework eliminates the requirement of any expert demonstration or domain knowledge at test time. Experimental results on MuJoCo and Meta-World benchmarks across various dataset types show that Meta-DT exhibits superior few and zero-shot generalization capacity compared to strong baselines while being more practical with fewer prerequisites. Our code is available at https://github.com/NJU-RL/Meta-DT.

We introduce "Method Actors" as a mental model for guiding LLM prompt engineering and prompt architecture. Under this mental model, LLMs should be thought of as actors; prompts as scripts and cues; and LLM responses as performances. We apply this mental model to the task of improving LLM performance at playing Connections, a New York Times word puzzle game that prior research identified as a challenging benchmark for evaluating LLM reasoning. Our experiments with GPT-4o show that a "Method Actors" approach can significantly improve LLM performance over both a vanilla and "Chain of Thoughts" approach. A vanilla approach solves 27% of Connections puzzles in our dataset and a "Chain of Thoughts" approach solves 41% of puzzles, whereas our strongest "Method Actor" approach solves 86% of puzzles. We also test OpenAI's newest model designed specifically for complex reasoning tasks, o1-preview. When asked to solve a puzzle all at once, o1-preview solves 79% of Connections puzzles in our dataset, and when allowed to build puzzle solutions one guess at a time over multiple API calls, o1-preview solves 100% of the puzzles. Incorporating a "Method Actor" prompt architecture increases the percentage of puzzles that o1-preview solves perfectly from 76% to 87%.

We propose cognitive prompting as a novel approach to guide problem-solving in large language models (LLMs) through structured, human-like cognitive operations such as goal clarification, decomposition, filtering, abstraction, and pattern recognition. By employing systematic, step-by-step reasoning, cognitive prompting enables LLMs to efficiently tackle complex, multi-step tasks. We evaluate the effectiveness of cognitive prompting on Meta's LLaMA models, comparing performance on arithmetic reasoning tasks using the GSM8K dataset and on commonsense reasoning benchmarks. Our analysis includes comparisons between models without cognitive prompting, models with a static sequence of cognitive operations, and models using reflective cognitive prompting, where the LLM dynamically self-selects the sequence of cognitive operations. The results show that cognitive prompting, particularly when dynamically adapted, significantly improves the performance of larger models, such as LLaMA3.1 70B, and enhances their ability to handle multi-step reasoning tasks. This approach also improves interpretability and flexibility, highlighting cognitive prompting as a promising strategy for general-purpose AI reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) like GPT-4, PaLM, and LLaMA have shown significant improvements in various reasoning tasks. However, smaller models such as Llama-3-8B and DeepSeekMath-Base still struggle with complex mathematical reasoning because they fail to effectively identify and correct reasoning errors. Recent reflection-based methods aim to address these issues by enabling self-reflection and self-correction, but they still face challenges in independently detecting errors in their reasoning steps. To overcome these limitations, we propose SuperCorrect, a novel two-stage framework that uses a large teacher model to supervise and correct both the reasoning and reflection processes of a smaller student model. In the first stage, we extract hierarchical high-level and detailed thought templates from the teacher model to guide the student model in eliciting more fine-grained reasoning thoughts. In the second stage, we introduce cross-model collaborative direct preference optimization (DPO) to enhance the self-correction abilities of the student model by following the teacher's correction traces during training. This cross-model DPO approach teaches the student model to effectively locate and resolve erroneous thoughts with error-driven insights from the teacher model, breaking the bottleneck of its thoughts and acquiring new skills and knowledge to tackle challenging problems. Extensive experiments consistently demonstrate our superiority over previous methods. Notably, our SuperCorrect-7B model significantly surpasses powerful DeepSeekMath-7B by 7.8%/5.3% and Qwen2.5-Math-7B by 15.1%/6.3% on MATH/GSM8K benchmarks, achieving new SOTA performance among all 7B models. Code: https://github.com/YangLing0818/SuperCorrect-llm

The capabilities and limitations of Large Language Models have been sketched out in great detail in recent years, providing an intriguing yet conflicting picture. On the one hand, LLMs demonstrate a general ability to solve problems. On the other hand, they show surprising reasoning gaps when compared to humans, casting doubt on the robustness of their generalisation strategies. The sheer volume of data used in the design of LLMs has precluded us from applying the method traditionally used to measure generalisation: train-test set separation. To overcome this, we study what kind of generalisation strategies LLMs employ when performing reasoning tasks by investigating the pretraining data they rely on. For two models of different sizes (7B and 35B) and 2.5B of their pretraining tokens, we identify what documents influence the model outputs for three simple mathematical reasoning tasks and contrast this to the data that are influential for answering factual questions. We find that, while the models rely on mostly distinct sets of data for each factual question, a document often has a similar influence across different reasoning questions within the same task, indicating the presence of procedural knowledge. We further find that the answers to factual questions often show up in the most influential data. However, for reasoning questions the answers usually do not show up as highly influential, nor do the answers to the intermediate reasoning steps. When we characterise the top ranked documents for the reasoning questions qualitatively, we confirm that the influential documents often contain procedural knowledge, like demonstrating how to obtain a solution using formulae or code. Our findings indicate that the approach to reasoning the models use is unlike retrieval, and more like a generalisable strategy that synthesises procedural knowledge from documents doing a similar form of reasoning.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

Large language models (LLMs) have a substantial capacity for high-level analogical reasoning: reproducing patterns in linear text that occur in their training data (zero-shot evaluation) or in the provided context (few-shot in-context learning). However, recent studies show that even the more advanced LLMs fail in scenarios that require reasoning over multiple objects or facts and making sequences of logical deductions. We propose a two-stage probabilistic inference paradigm, ThinkSum, which reasons over sets of objects or facts in a structured manner. In the first stage (Think - retrieval of associations), a LLM is queried in parallel over a set of phrases extracted from the prompt or an auxiliary model call. In the second stage (Sum - probabilistic inference or reasoning), the results of these queries are aggregated to make the final prediction. We demonstrate the possibilities and advantages of ThinkSum on the BIG-bench suite of LLM evaluation tasks, achieving improvements over the state of the art using GPT-family models on thirteen difficult tasks, often with far smaller model variants. We also compare and contrast ThinkSum with other proposed modifications to direct prompting of LLMs, such as variants of chain-of-thought prompting. Our results suggest that because the probabilistic inference in ThinkSum is performed outside of calls to the LLM, ThinkSum is less sensitive to prompt design, yields more interpretable predictions, and can be flexibly combined with latent variable models to extract structured knowledge from LLMs. Overall, our proposed paradigm represents a promising approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are currently at the forefront of intertwining AI systems with human communication and everyday life. Therefore, it is of great importance to evaluate their emerging abilities. In this study, we show that LLMs like GPT-3 exhibit behavior that strikingly resembles human-like intuition - and the cognitive errors that come with it. However, LLMs with higher cognitive capabilities, in particular ChatGPT and GPT-4, learned to avoid succumbing to these errors and perform in a hyperrational manner. For our experiments, we probe LLMs with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as well as semantic illusions that were originally designed to investigate intuitive decision-making in humans. Our study demonstrates that investigating LLMs with methods from psychology has the potential to reveal otherwise unknown emergent traits.

Research on LLM technologies is rapidly emerging, with most of them employing a 'fast thinking' approach to inference. Most LLMs generate the final result based solely on a single query and LLM's reasoning capabilities. However, with the advent of OpenAI-o1, 'slow thinking' techniques have garnered increasing attention because its process is closer to the human thought process. Inspired by the human ability to constantly associate and replenish knowledge during thinking, we developed the novel Chain-of-Associated-Thoughts (CoAT) framework, which introduces an innovative synergy between the Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) algorithm and a dynamic mechanism for integrating new key information, termed 'associative memory'. By combining the structured exploration capabilities of MCTS with the adaptive learning capacity of associative memory, CoAT significantly expands the LLM search space, enabling our framework to explore diverse reasoning pathways and dynamically update its knowledge base in real-time. This allows the framework to not only revisit and refine earlier inferences but also adaptively incorporate evolving information, ensuring that the final output is both accurate and comprehensive. To validate the effectiveness of our framework, we conducted extensive experiments across a range of generative and reasoning tasks. These experiments demonstrated that our framework outperforms conventional inference processes on accuracy, coherence, and diversity. The framework's ability to iteratively expand its search space while retaining contextually relevant information results.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown impressive capabilities in document understanding, a rapidly growing research area with significant industrial demand in recent years. As a multimodal task, document understanding requires models to possess both perceptual and cognitive abilities. However, current MLLMs often face conflicts between perception and cognition. Taking a document VQA task (cognition) as an example, an MLLM might generate answers that do not match the corresponding visual content identified by its OCR (perception). This conflict suggests that the MLLM might struggle to establish an intrinsic connection between the information it "sees" and what it "understands." Such conflicts challenge the intuitive notion that cognition is consistent with perception, hindering the performance and explainability of MLLMs. In this paper, we define the conflicts between cognition and perception as Cognition and Perception (C&P) knowledge conflicts, a form of multimodal knowledge conflicts, and systematically assess them with a focus on document understanding. Our analysis reveals that even GPT-4o, a leading MLLM, achieves only 68.6% C&P consistency. To mitigate the C&P knowledge conflicts, we propose a novel method called Multimodal Knowledge Consistency Fine-tuning. This method first ensures task-specific consistency and then connects the cognitive and perceptual knowledge. Our method significantly reduces C&P knowledge conflicts across all tested MLLMs and enhances their performance in both cognitive and perceptual tasks in most scenarios.

We investigate the ability of language models to perform compositional reasoning tasks where the overall solution depends on correctly composing the answers to sub-problems. We measure how often models can correctly answer all sub-problems but not generate the overall solution, a ratio we call the compositionality gap. We evaluate this ratio by asking multi-hop questions with answers that require composing multiple facts unlikely to have been observed together during pretraining. In the GPT-3 family of models, as model size increases we show that the single-hop question answering performance improves faster than the multi-hop performance does, therefore the compositionality gap does not decrease. This surprising result suggests that while more powerful models memorize and recall more factual knowledge, they show no corresponding improvement in their ability to perform this kind of compositional reasoning. We then demonstrate how elicitive prompting (such as chain of thought) narrows the compositionality gap by reasoning explicitly instead of implicitly. We present a new method, self-ask, that further improves on chain of thought. In our method, the model explicitly asks itself (and then answers) follow-up questions before answering the initial question. We finally show that self-ask's structured prompting lets us easily plug in a search engine to answer the follow-up questions, which additionally improves accuracy.

Procedural planning, which entails decomposing a high-level goal into a sequence of temporally ordered steps, is an important yet intricate task for machines. It involves integrating common-sense knowledge to reason about complex contextualized situations that are often counterfactual, e.g. "scheduling a doctor's appointment without a phone". While current approaches show encouraging results using large language models (LLMs), they are hindered by drawbacks such as costly API calls and reproducibility issues. In this paper, we advocate planning using smaller language models. We present PlaSma, a novel two-pronged approach to endow small language models with procedural knowledge and (counterfactual) planning capabilities. More concretely, we develop symbolic procedural knowledge distillation to enhance the implicit knowledge in small language models and an inference-time algorithm to facilitate more structured and accurate reasoning. In addition, we introduce a novel task, Counterfactual Planning, that requires a revision of a plan to cope with a counterfactual situation. In both the original and counterfactual setting, we show that orders-of-magnitude smaller models (770M-11B parameters) can compete and often surpass their larger teacher models' capabilities.

Recent works show that pre-trained language models (PTLMs), such as BERT, possess certain commonsense and factual knowledge. They suggest that it is promising to use PTLMs as "neural knowledge bases" via predicting masked words. Surprisingly, we find that this may not work for numerical commonsense knowledge (e.g., a bird usually has two legs). In this paper, we investigate whether and to what extent we can induce numerical commonsense knowledge from PTLMs as well as the robustness of this process. To study this, we introduce a novel probing task with a diagnostic dataset, NumerSense, containing 13.6k masked-word-prediction probes (10.5k for fine-tuning and 3.1k for testing). Our analysis reveals that: (1) BERT and its stronger variant RoBERTa perform poorly on the diagnostic dataset prior to any fine-tuning; (2) fine-tuning with distant supervision brings some improvement; (3) the best supervised model still performs poorly as compared to human performance (54.06% vs 96.3% in accuracy).

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

Scaling reasoning capabilities beyond traditional domains such as math and coding is hindered by the lack of diverse and high-quality questions. To overcome this limitation, we introduce a scalable approach for generating diverse and challenging reasoning questions, accompanied by reference answers. We present NaturalReasoning, a comprehensive dataset comprising 2.8 million questions that span multiple domains, including STEM fields (e.g., Physics, Computer Science), Economics, Social Sciences, and more. We demonstrate the utility of the questions in NaturalReasoning through knowledge distillation experiments which show that NaturalReasoning can effectively elicit and transfer reasoning capabilities from a strong teacher model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that NaturalReasoning is also effective for unsupervised self-training using external reward models or self-rewarding.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often encounter conflicts between their learned, internal (parametric knowledge, PK) and external knowledge provided during inference (contextual knowledge, CK). Understanding how LLMs models prioritize one knowledge source over the other remains a challenge. In this paper, we propose a novel probing framework to explore the mechanisms governing the selection between PK and CK in LLMs. Using controlled prompts designed to contradict the model's PK, we demonstrate that specific model activations are indicative of the knowledge source employed. We evaluate this framework on various LLMs of different sizes and demonstrate that mid-layer activations, particularly those related to relations in the input, are crucial in predicting knowledge source selection, paving the way for more reliable models capable of handling knowledge conflicts effectively.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

Critical thinking is essential for rational decision-making and problem-solving. This skill hinges on the ability to provide precise and reasoned critiques and is a hallmark of human intelligence. In the era of large language models (LLMs), this study explores the ability of LLMs to deliver accurate critiques across various tasks. We are interested in this topic as a capable critic model could not only serve as a reliable evaluator, but also as a source of supervised signals for model tuning. Particularly, if a model can self-critique, it has the potential for autonomous self-improvement. To examine this, we introduce a unified evaluation framework for assessing the critique abilities of LLMs. We develop a benchmark called CriticBench, which comprises 3K high-quality natural language queries and corresponding model responses; and annotate the correctness of these responses. The benchmark cover tasks such as math problem-solving, code completion, and question answering. We evaluate multiple LLMs on the collected dataset and our analysis reveals several noteworthy insights: (1) Critique is generally challenging for most LLMs, and this capability often emerges only when models are sufficiently large. (2) In particular, self-critique is especially difficult. Even top-performing LLMs struggle to achieve satisfactory performance. (3) Models tend to have lower critique accuracy on problems where they are most uncertain. To this end, we introduce a simple yet effective baseline named self-check, which leverages self-critique to improve task performance for various models. We hope this study serves as an initial exploration into understanding the critique abilities of LLMs, and aims to inform future research, including the development of more proficient critic models and the application of critiques across diverse tasks.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve remarkable performance across various tasks, they often struggle with complex reasoning tasks, such as answering mathematical questions. Recent efforts to address this issue have primarily focused on leveraging mathematical datasets through supervised fine-tuning or self-improvement techniques. However, these methods often depend on high-quality datasets that are difficult to prepare, or they require substantial computational resources for fine-tuning. Inspired by findings that LLMs know how to produce the right answer but struggle to select the correct reasoning path, we propose a purely inference-based searching method -- MindStar (M*). This method formulates reasoning tasks as searching problems and proposes two search ideas to identify the optimal reasoning paths. We evaluate the M* framework on both the GSM8K and MATH datasets, comparing its performance with existing open and closed-source LLMs. Our results demonstrate that M* significantly enhances the reasoning abilities of open-source models, such as Llama-2-13B and Mistral-7B, and achieves comparable performance to GPT-3.5 and Grok-1, but with substantially reduced model size and computational costs.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning abilities in complex tasks. However, they lack up-to-date knowledge and experience hallucinations during reasoning, which can lead to incorrect reasoning processes and diminish their performance and trustworthiness. Knowledge graphs (KGs), which capture vast amounts of facts in a structured format, offer a reliable source of knowledge for reasoning. Nevertheless, existing KG-based LLM reasoning methods only treat KGs as factual knowledge bases and overlook the importance of their structural information for reasoning. In this paper, we propose a novel method called reasoning on graphs (RoG) that synergizes LLMs with KGs to enable faithful and interpretable reasoning. Specifically, we present a planning-retrieval-reasoning framework, where RoG first generates relation paths grounded by KGs as faithful plans. These plans are then used to retrieve valid reasoning paths from the KGs for LLMs to conduct faithful reasoning. Furthermore, RoG not only distills knowledge from KGs to improve the reasoning ability of LLMs through training but also allows seamless integration with any arbitrary LLMs during inference. Extensive experiments on two benchmark KGQA datasets demonstrate that RoG achieves state-of-the-art performance on KG reasoning tasks and generates faithful and interpretable reasoning results.

The use of Large Language Models (LLMs) has increased significantly with users frequently asking questions to chatbots. In the time when information is readily accessible, it is crucial to stimulate and preserve human cognitive abilities and maintain strong reasoning skills. This paper addresses such challenges by promoting the use of hints as an alternative or a supplement to direct answers. We first introduce a manually constructed hint dataset, WikiHint, which is based on Wikipedia and includes 5,000 hints created for 1,000 questions. We then finetune open-source LLMs such as LLaMA-3.1 for hint generation in answer-aware and answeragnostic contexts. We assess the effectiveness of the hints with human participants who answer questions with and without the aid of hints. Additionally, we introduce a lightweight evaluation method, HintRank, to evaluate and rank hints in both answeraware and answer-agnostic settings. Our findings show that (a) the dataset helps generate more effective hints, (b) including answer information along with questions generally improves quality of generated hints, and (c) encoder-based models perform better than decoder-based models in hint ranking.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to hallucinations-outputs that are ungrounded, factually incorrect, or inconsistent with prior generations. We focus on close-book Question Answering (CBQA), where previous work has not fully addressed the distinction between two possible kinds of hallucinations, namely, whether the model (1) does not hold the correct answer in its parameters or (2) answers incorrectly despite having the required knowledge. We argue that distinguishing these cases is crucial for detecting and mitigating hallucinations. Specifically, case (2) may be mitigated by intervening in the model's internal computation, as the knowledge resides within the model's parameters. In contrast, in case (1) there is no parametric knowledge to leverage for mitigation, so it should be addressed by resorting to an external knowledge source or abstaining. To help distinguish between the two cases, we introduce Wrong Answer despite having Correct Knowledge (WACK), an approach for constructing model-specific datasets for the second hallucination type. Our probing experiments indicate that the two kinds of hallucinations are represented differently in the model's inner states. Next, we show that datasets constructed using WACK exhibit variations across models, demonstrating that even when models share knowledge of certain facts, they still vary in the specific examples that lead to hallucinations. Finally, we show that training a probe on our WACK datasets leads to better hallucination detection of case (2) hallucinations than using the common generic one-size-fits-all datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/hallucination-mitigation .

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

Intelligent tutoring systems optimize the selection and timing of learning materials to enhance understanding and long-term retention. This requires estimates of both the learner's progress (''knowledge tracing''; KT), and the prerequisite structure of the learning domain (''knowledge mapping''). While recent deep learning models achieve high KT accuracy, they do so at the expense of the interpretability of psychologically-inspired models. In this work, we present a solution to this trade-off. PSI-KT is a hierarchical generative approach that explicitly models how both individual cognitive traits and the prerequisite structure of knowledge influence learning dynamics, thus achieving interpretability by design. Moreover, by using scalable Bayesian inference, PSI-KT targets the real-world need for efficient personalization even with a growing body of learners and learning histories. Evaluated on three datasets from online learning platforms, PSI-KT achieves superior multi-step predictive accuracy and scalable inference in continual-learning settings, all while providing interpretable representations of learner-specific traits and the prerequisite structure of knowledge that causally supports learning. In sum, predictive, scalable and interpretable knowledge tracing with solid knowledge mapping lays a key foundation for effective personalized learning to make education accessible to a broad, global audience.

The utility of synthetic data to enhance pretraining data quality and hence to improve downstream task accuracy has been widely explored in recent large language models (LLMs). Yet, these approaches fall inadequate in complex, multi-hop and mathematical reasoning tasks as the synthetic data typically fails to add complementary knowledge to the existing raw corpus. In this work, we propose a novel large-scale and diverse Math Informed syNthetic Dialogue (MIND) generation method that improves the mathematical reasoning ability of LLMs. Specifically, using MIND, we generate synthetic conversations based on OpenWebMath (OWM), resulting in a new math corpus, MIND-OWM. Our experiments with different conversational settings reveal that incorporating knowledge gaps between dialog participants is essential for generating high-quality math data. We further identify an effective way to format and integrate synthetic and raw data during pretraining to maximize the gain in mathematical reasoning, emphasizing the need to restructure raw data rather than use it as-is. Compared to pretraining just on raw data, a model pretrained on MIND-OWM shows significant boost in mathematical reasoning (GSM8K: +13.42%, MATH: +2.30%), including superior performance in specialized knowledge (MMLU: +4.55%, MMLU-STEM: +4.28%) and general purpose reasoning tasks (GENERAL REASONING: +2.51%).

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

Recent studies have identified that language models, pretrained on text-only datasets, often lack elementary visual knowledge, e.g., colors of everyday objects. Motivated by this observation, we ask whether a similar shortcoming exists in terms of the auditory knowledge. To answer this question, we construct a new dataset called AuditoryBench, which consists of two novel tasks for evaluating auditory knowledge. Based on our analysis using the benchmark, we find that language models also suffer from a severe lack of auditory knowledge. To address this limitation, we propose AudioBERT, a novel method to augment the auditory knowledge of BERT through a retrieval-based approach. First, we detect auditory knowledge spans in prompts to query our retrieval model efficiently. Then, we inject audio knowledge into BERT and switch on low-rank adaptation for effective adaptation when audio knowledge is required. Our experiments demonstrate that AudioBERT is quite effective, achieving superior performance on the AuditoryBench. The dataset and code are available at https://github.com/HJ-Ok/AudioBERT.

As recent multi-modality large language models (MLLMs) have shown formidable proficiency on various complex tasks, there has been increasing attention on debating whether these models could eventually mirror human intelligence. However, existing benchmarks mainly focus on evaluating solely on task performance, such as the accuracy of identifying the attribute of an object. Combining well-developed cognitive science to understand the intelligence of MLLMs beyond superficial achievements remains largely unexplored. To this end, we introduce the first cognitive-driven multi-lingual and multi-modal benchmark to evaluate the general intelligence ability of MLLMs, dubbed M3GIA. Specifically, we identify five key cognitive factors based on the well-recognized Cattell-Horn-Carrol (CHC) model of intelligence and propose a novel evaluation metric. In addition, since most MLLMs are trained to perform in different languages, a natural question arises: is language a key factor influencing the cognitive ability of MLLMs? As such, we go beyond English to encompass other languages based on their popularity, including Chinese, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Korean, to construct our M3GIA. We make sure all the data relevant to the cultural backgrounds are collected from their native context to avoid English-centric bias. We collected a significant corpus of data from human participants, revealing that the most advanced MLLM reaches the lower boundary of human intelligence in English. Yet, there remains a pronounced disparity in the other five languages assessed. We also reveals an interesting winner takes all phenomenon that are aligned with the discovery in cognitive studies. Our benchmark will be open-sourced, with the aspiration of facilitating the enhancement of cognitive capabilities in MLLMs.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of LLaMA-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a striking functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context taking over abruptly in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token predominantly appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear exclusively in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong performance in handling complex tasks requiring both extensive knowledge and reasoning abilities. However, the existing LLM inference pipeline operates as an opaque process without explicit separation between knowledge retrieval and reasoning steps, making the model's decision-making process unclear and disorganized. This ambiguity can lead to issues such as hallucinations and knowledge forgetting, which significantly impact the reliability of LLMs in high-stakes domains. In this paper, we propose a new inference paradigm that decomposes the complex inference process into two distinct and clear actions: (1) memory recall: which retrieves relevant knowledge, and (2) reasoning: which performs logical steps based on the recalled knowledge. To facilitate this decomposition, we introduce two special tokens memory and reason, guiding the model to distinguish between steps that require knowledge retrieval and those that involve reasoning. Our experiment results show that this decomposition not only improves model performance but also enhances the interpretability of the inference process, enabling users to identify sources of error and refine model responses effectively. The code is available at https://github.com/MingyuJ666/Disentangling-Memory-and-Reasoning.

Making analogies is fundamental to cognition. Proportional analogies, which consist of four terms, are often used to assess linguistic and cognitive abilities. For instance, completing analogies like "Oxygen is to Gas as <blank> is to <blank>" requires identifying the semantic relationship (e.g., "type of") between the first pair of terms ("Oxygen" and "Gas") and finding a second pair that shares the same relationship (e.g., "Aluminum" and "Metal"). In this work, we introduce a 15K Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) dataset for proportional analogy completion and evaluate the performance of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs) in various knowledge-enhanced prompt settings. Specifically, we augment prompts with three types of knowledge: exemplar, structured, and targeted. Our results show that despite extensive training data, solving proportional analogies remains challenging for current LLMs, with the best model achieving an accuracy of 55%. Notably, we find that providing targeted knowledge can better assist models in completing proportional analogies compared to providing exemplars or collections of structured knowledge.

The impressive performance of recent language models across a wide range of tasks suggests that they possess a degree of abstract reasoning skills. Are these skills general and transferable, or specialized to specific tasks seen during pretraining? To disentangle these effects, we propose an evaluation framework based on "counterfactual" task variants that deviate from the default assumptions underlying standard tasks. Across a suite of 11 tasks, we observe nontrivial performance on the counterfactual variants, but nevertheless find that performance substantially and consistently degrades compared to the default conditions. This suggests that while current LMs may possess abstract task-solving skills to a degree, they often also rely on narrow, non-transferable procedures for task-solving. These results motivate a more careful interpretation of language model performance that teases apart these aspects of behavior.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities, understanding and validating their knowledge utilization remains challenging. Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting partially addresses this by revealing intermediate reasoning steps, but the knowledge flow and application remain implicit. We introduce IAO (Input-Action-Output) prompting, a structured template-based method that explicitly models how LLMs access and apply their knowledge during complex reasoning tasks. IAO decomposes problems into sequential steps, each clearly identifying the input knowledge being used, the action being performed, and the resulting output. This structured decomposition enables us to trace knowledge flow, verify factual consistency, and identify potential knowledge gaps or misapplications. Through experiments across diverse reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that IAO not only improves zero-shot performance but also provides transparency in how LLMs leverage their stored knowledge. Human evaluation confirms that this structured approach enhances our ability to verify knowledge utilization and detect potential hallucinations or reasoning errors. Our findings provide insights into both knowledge representation within LLMs and methods for more reliable knowledge application.

When humans read or listen, they make implicit commonsense inferences that frame their understanding of what happened and why. As a step toward AI systems that can build similar mental models, we introduce GLUCOSE, a large-scale dataset of implicit commonsense causal knowledge, encoded as causal mini-theories about the world, each grounded in a narrative context. To construct GLUCOSE, we drew on cognitive psychology to identify ten dimensions of causal explanation, focusing on events, states, motivations, and emotions. Each GLUCOSE entry includes a story-specific causal statement paired with an inference rule generalized from the statement. This paper details two concrete contributions. First, we present our platform for effectively crowdsourcing GLUCOSE data at scale, which uses semi-structured templates to elicit causal explanations. Using this platform, we collected a total of ~670K specific statements and general rules that capture implicit commonsense knowledge about everyday situations. Second, we show that existing knowledge resources and pretrained language models do not include or readily predict GLUCOSE's rich inferential content. However, when state-of-the-art neural models are trained on this knowledge, they can start to make commonsense inferences on unseen stories that match humans' mental models.

Since the recent prosperity of Large Language Models (LLMs), there have been interleaved discussions regarding how to reduce hallucinations from LLM responses, how to increase the factuality of LLMs, and whether Knowledge Graphs (KGs), which store the world knowledge in a symbolic form, will be replaced with LLMs. In this paper, we try to answer these questions from a new angle: How knowledgeable are LLMs? To answer this question, we constructed Head-to-Tail, a benchmark that consists of 18K question-answer (QA) pairs regarding head, torso, and tail facts in terms of popularity. We designed an automated evaluation method and a set of metrics that closely approximate the knowledge an LLM confidently internalizes. Through a comprehensive evaluation of 14 publicly available LLMs, we show that existing LLMs are still far from being perfect in terms of their grasp of factual knowledge, especially for facts of torso-to-tail entities.

Continual learning is a promising machine learning paradigm to learn new tasks while retaining previously learned knowledge over streaming training data. Till now, rehearsal-based methods, keeping a small part of data from old tasks as a memory buffer, have shown good performance in mitigating catastrophic forgetting for previously learned knowledge. However, most of these methods typically treat each new task equally, which may not adequately consider the relationship or similarity between old and new tasks. Furthermore, these methods commonly neglect sample importance in the continual training process and result in sub-optimal performance on certain tasks. To address this challenging problem, we propose Relational Experience Replay (RER), a bi-level learning framework, to adaptively tune task-wise relationships and sample importance within each task to achieve a better `stability' and `plasticity' trade-off. As such, the proposed method is capable of accumulating new knowledge while consolidating previously learned old knowledge during continual learning. Extensive experiments conducted on three publicly available datasets (i.e., CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny ImageNet) show that the proposed method can consistently improve the performance of all baselines and surpass current state-of-the-art methods.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

Large LMs such as GPT-3 are powerful, but can commit mistakes that are obvious to humans. For example, GPT-3 would mistakenly interpret "What word is similar to good?" to mean a homophone, while the user intended a synonym. Our goal is to effectively correct such errors via user interactions with the system but without retraining, which will be prohibitively costly. We pair GPT-3 with a growing memory of recorded cases where the model misunderstood the user's intents, along with user feedback for clarification. Such a memory allows our system to produce enhanced prompts for any new query based on the user feedback for error correction on similar cases in the past. On four tasks (two lexical tasks, two advanced ethical reasoning tasks), we show how a (simulated) user can interactively teach a deployed GPT-3, substantially increasing its accuracy over the queries with different kinds of misunderstandings by the GPT-3. Our approach is a step towards the low-cost utility enhancement for very large pre-trained LMs. Code, data, and instructions to implement MEMPROMPT for a new task at https://www.memprompt.com/.

Language models are known to encode a great amount of factual knowledge through pretraining. However, such knowledge might be insufficient to cater to user requests, requiring the model to integrate external knowledge sources and adhere to user-provided specifications. When answering questions about ongoing events, the model should use recent news articles to update its response; when asked to provide recommendations, the model should prioritize user specifications over retrieved product reviews; when some facts are edited in the model, the updated facts should override all prior knowledge learned by the model even if they are conflicting. In all of the cases above, the model faces a decision between its own parametric knowledge, (retrieved) contextual knowledge, and user instruction knowledge. In this paper, we (1) unify such settings into the problem of knowledge preference and define a three-level preference hierarchy over these knowledge sources; (2) compile a collection of existing datasets IfQA, MQuAKE, and MRQA covering a combination of settings (with/without user specifications, with/without context documents) to systematically evaluate how well models obey the intended knowledge preference; and (3) propose a dataset synthesis method that composes diverse question-answer pairs with user assumptions and related context to directly fine-tune LMs for instilling the hierarchy of knowledge. We demonstrate that a 7B model, fine-tuned on only a few thousand examples automatically generated by our proposed method, effectively achieves superior performance (more than 18% improvement across all evaluation benchmarks) in adhering to the desired knowledge preference hierarchy.