Daily Papers

Neuromorphic models take inspiration from the human brain by adopting bio-plausible neuron models to build alternatives to traditional Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL) solutions. The scarce availability of dedicated hardware able to actualize the emulation of brain-inspired computation, which is otherwise only simulated, yet still hinders the wide adoption of neuromorphic computing for edge devices and embedded systems. With this premise, we adopt the perspective of neuromorphic computing for conventional hardware and we present the L2MU, a natively neuromorphic Legendre Memory Unit (LMU) which entirely relies on Leaky Integrate-and-Fire (LIF) neurons. Specifically, the original recurrent architecture of LMU has been redesigned by modelling every constituent element with neural populations made of LIF or Current-Based (CuBa) LIF neurons. To couple neuromorphic computing and off-the-shelf edge devices, we equipped the L2MU with an input module for the conversion of real values into spikes, which makes it an encoding-free implementation of a Recurrent Spiking Neural Network (RSNN) able to directly work with raw sensor signals on non-dedicated hardware. As a use case to validate our network, we selected the task of Human Activity Recognition (HAR). We benchmarked our L2MU on smartwatch signals from hand-oriented activities, deploying it on three different commercial edge devices in compressed versions too. The reported results remark the possibility of considering neuromorphic models not only in an exclusive relationship with dedicated hardware but also as a suitable choice to work with common sensors and devices.

Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs) are a promising research direction for building power-efficient information processing systems, especially for temporal tasks such as speech recognition. In SNNs, delays refer to the time needed for one spike to travel from one neuron to another. These delays matter because they influence the spike arrival times, and it is well-known that spiking neurons respond more strongly to coincident input spikes. More formally, it has been shown theoretically that plastic delays greatly increase the expressivity in SNNs. Yet, efficient algorithms to learn these delays have been lacking. Here, we propose a new discrete-time algorithm that addresses this issue in deep feedforward SNNs using backpropagation, in an offline manner. To simulate delays between consecutive layers, we use 1D convolutions across time. The kernels contain only a few non-zero weights - one per synapse - whose positions correspond to the delays. These positions are learned together with the weights using the recently proposed Dilated Convolution with Learnable Spacings (DCLS). We evaluated our method on three datasets: the Spiking Heidelberg Dataset (SHD), the Spiking Speech Commands (SSC) and its non-spiking version Google Speech Commands v0.02 (GSC) benchmarks, which require detecting temporal patterns. We used feedforward SNNs with two or three hidden fully connected layers, and vanilla leaky integrate-and-fire neurons. We showed that fixed random delays help and that learning them helps even more. Furthermore, our method outperformed the state-of-the-art in the three datasets without using recurrent connections and with substantially fewer parameters. Our work demonstrates the potential of delay learning in developing accurate and precise models for temporal data processing. Our code is based on PyTorch / SpikingJelly and available at: https://github.com/Thvnvtos/SNN-delays

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions