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Mar 11

UMD: Unsupervised Model Detection for X2X Backdoor Attacks

Backdoor (Trojan) attack is a common threat to deep neural networks, where samples from one or more source classes embedded with a backdoor trigger will be misclassified to adversarial target classes. Existing methods for detecting whether a classifier is backdoor attacked are mostly designed for attacks with a single adversarial target (e.g., all-to-one attack). To the best of our knowledge, without supervision, no existing methods can effectively address the more general X2X attack with an arbitrary number of source classes, each paired with an arbitrary target class. In this paper, we propose UMD, the first Unsupervised Model Detection method that effectively detects X2X backdoor attacks via a joint inference of the adversarial (source, target) class pairs. In particular, we first define a novel transferability statistic to measure and select a subset of putative backdoor class pairs based on a proposed clustering approach. Then, these selected class pairs are jointly assessed based on an aggregation of their reverse-engineered trigger size for detection inference, using a robust and unsupervised anomaly detector we proposed. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and Imagenette dataset, and show that our unsupervised UMD outperforms SOTA detectors (even with supervision) by 17%, 4%, and 8%, respectively, in terms of the detection accuracy against diverse X2X attacks. We also show the strong detection performance of UMD against several strong adaptive attacks.

Deep Networks Always Grok and Here is Why

Grokking, or delayed generalization, is a phenomenon where generalization in a deep neural network (DNN) occurs long after achieving near zero training error. Previous studies have reported the occurrence of grokking in specific controlled settings, such as DNNs initialized with large-norm parameters or transformers trained on algorithmic datasets. We demonstrate that grokking is actually much more widespread and materializes in a wide range of practical settings, such as training of a convolutional neural network (CNN) on CIFAR10 or a Resnet on Imagenette. We introduce the new concept of delayed robustness, whereby a DNN groks adversarial examples and becomes robust, long after interpolation and/or generalization. We develop an analytical explanation for the emergence of both delayed generalization and delayed robustness based on a new measure of the local complexity of a DNN's input-output mapping. Our local complexity measures the density of the so-called 'linear regions' (aka, spline partition regions) that tile the DNN input space, and serves as a utile progress measure for training. We provide the first evidence that for classification problems, the linear regions undergo a phase transition during training whereafter they migrate away from the training samples (making the DNN mapping smoother there) and towards the decision boundary (making the DNN mapping less smooth there). Grokking occurs post phase transition as a robust partition of the input space emerges thanks to the linearization of the DNN mapping around the training points. Website: https://bit.ly/grok-adversarial