Daily Papers

Overcoming the limited context limitations in early-generation LLMs, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has been a reliable solution for context-based answer generation in the past. Recently, the emergence of long-context LLMs allows the models to incorporate much longer text sequences, making RAG less attractive. Recent studies show that long-context LLMs significantly outperform RAG in long-context applications. Unlike the existing works favoring the long-context LLM over RAG, we argue that the extremely long context in LLMs suffers from a diminished focus on relevant information and leads to potential degradation in answer quality. This paper revisits the RAG in long-context answer generation. We propose an order-preserve retrieval-augmented generation (OP-RAG) mechanism, which significantly improves the performance of RAG for long-context question-answer applications. With OP-RAG, as the number of retrieved chunks increases, the answer quality initially rises, and then declines, forming an inverted U-shaped curve. There exist sweet points where OP-RAG could achieve higher answer quality with much less tokens than long-context LLM taking the whole context as input. Extensive experiments on public benchmark demonstrate the superiority of our OP-RAG.

As Large Language Models quickly become ubiquitous, it becomes critical to understand their security vulnerabilities. Recent work shows that text optimizers can produce jailbreaking prompts that bypass moderation and alignment. Drawing from the rich body of work on adversarial machine learning, we approach these attacks with three questions: What threat models are practically useful in this domain? How do baseline defense techniques perform in this new domain? How does LLM security differ from computer vision? We evaluate several baseline defense strategies against leading adversarial attacks on LLMs, discussing the various settings in which each is feasible and effective. Particularly, we look at three types of defenses: detection (perplexity based), input preprocessing (paraphrase and retokenization), and adversarial training. We discuss white-box and gray-box settings and discuss the robustness-performance trade-off for each of the defenses considered. We find that the weakness of existing discrete optimizers for text, combined with the relatively high costs of optimization, makes standard adaptive attacks more challenging for LLMs. Future research will be needed to uncover whether more powerful optimizers can be developed, or whether the strength of filtering and preprocessing defenses is greater in the LLMs domain than it has been in computer vision.

This technical report delves into an in-depth exploration of adversarial attacks specifically targeted at Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) utilized for image classification. The study also investigates defense mechanisms aimed at bolstering the robustness of machine learning models. The research focuses on comprehending the ramifications of two prominent attack methodologies: the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and the Carlini-Wagner (CW) approach. These attacks are examined concerning three pre-trained image classifiers: Resnext50_32x4d, DenseNet-201, and VGG-19, utilizing the Tiny-ImageNet dataset. Furthermore, the study proposes the robustness of defensive distillation as a defense mechanism to counter FGSM and CW attacks. This defense mechanism is evaluated using the CIFAR-10 dataset, where CNN models, specifically resnet101 and Resnext50_32x4d, serve as the teacher and student models, respectively. The proposed defensive distillation model exhibits effectiveness in thwarting attacks such as FGSM. However, it is noted to remain susceptible to more sophisticated techniques like the CW attack. The document presents a meticulous validation of the proposed scheme. It provides detailed and comprehensive results, elucidating the efficacy and limitations of the defense mechanisms employed. Through rigorous experimentation and analysis, the study offers insights into the dynamics of adversarial attacks on DNNs, as well as the effectiveness of defensive strategies in mitigating their impact.

When considering a model architecture, there are several ways to reduce its memory footprint. Historically, popular approaches included selecting smaller architectures and creating sparse networks through pruning. More recently, randomized parameter-sharing (RPS) methods have gained traction for model compression at start of training. In this paper, we comprehensively assess the trade-off between memory and accuracy across RPS, pruning techniques, and building smaller models. Our findings demonstrate that RPS, which is both data and model-agnostic, consistently outperforms/matches smaller models and all moderately informed pruning strategies, such as MAG, SNIP, SYNFLOW, and GRASP, across the entire compression range. This advantage becomes particularly pronounced in higher compression scenarios. Notably, even when compared to highly informed pruning techniques like Lottery Ticket Rewinding (LTR), RPS exhibits superior performance in high compression settings. This points out inherent capacity advantage that RPS enjoys over sparse models. Theoretically, we establish RPS as a superior technique in terms of memory-efficient representation when compared to pruning for linear models. This paper argues in favor of paradigm shift towards RPS based models. During our rigorous evaluation of RPS, we identified issues in the state-of-the-art RPS technique ROAST, specifically regarding stability (ROAST's sensitivity to initialization hyperparameters, often leading to divergence) and Pareto-continuity (ROAST's inability to recover the accuracy of the original model at zero compression). We provably address both of these issues. We refer to the modified RPS, which incorporates our improvements, as STABLE-RPS.

Backdoor defense, which aims to detect or mitigate the effect of malicious triggers introduced by attackers, is becoming increasingly critical for machine learning security and integrity. Fine-tuning based on benign data is a natural defense to erase the backdoor effect in a backdoored model. However, recent studies show that, given limited benign data, vanilla fine-tuning has poor defense performance. In this work, we provide a deep study of fine-tuning the backdoored model from the neuron perspective and find that backdoorrelated neurons fail to escape the local minimum in the fine-tuning process. Inspired by observing that the backdoorrelated neurons often have larger norms, we propose FTSAM, a novel backdoor defense paradigm that aims to shrink the norms of backdoor-related neurons by incorporating sharpness-aware minimization with fine-tuning. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method on several benchmark datasets and network architectures, where it achieves state-of-the-art defense performance. Overall, our work provides a promising avenue for improving the robustness of machine learning models against backdoor attacks.

Graph neural network (GNN), as a powerful representation learning model on graph data, attracts much attention across various disciplines. However, recent studies show that GNN is vulnerable to adversarial attacks. How to make GNN more robust? What are the key vulnerabilities in GNN? How to address the vulnerabilities and defense GNN against the adversarial attacks? In this paper, we propose DefNet, an effective adversarial defense framework for GNNs. In particular, we first investigate the latent vulnerabilities in every layer of GNNs and propose corresponding strategies including dual-stage aggregation and bottleneck perceptron. Then, to cope with the scarcity of training data, we propose an adversarial contrastive learning method to train the GNN in a conditional GAN manner by leveraging the high-level graph representation. Extensive experiments on three public datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of DefNet in improving the robustness of popular GNN variants, such as Graph Convolutional Network and GraphSAGE, under various types of adversarial attacks.

In the past few years, the field of computer vision has gone through a revolution fueled mainly by the advent of large datasets and the adoption of deep convolutional neural networks for end-to-end learning. The person re-identification subfield is no exception to this. Unfortunately, a prevailing belief in the community seems to be that the triplet loss is inferior to using surrogate losses (classification, verification) followed by a separate metric learning step. We show that, for models trained from scratch as well as pretrained ones, using a variant of the triplet loss to perform end-to-end deep metric learning outperforms most other published methods by a large margin.

Recent large language model (LLM) defenses have greatly improved models' ability to refuse harmful queries, even when adversarially attacked. However, LLM defenses are primarily evaluated against automated adversarial attacks in a single turn of conversation, an insufficient threat model for real-world malicious use. We demonstrate that multi-turn human jailbreaks uncover significant vulnerabilities, exceeding 70% attack success rate (ASR) on HarmBench against defenses that report single-digit ASRs with automated single-turn attacks. Human jailbreaks also reveal vulnerabilities in machine unlearning defenses, successfully recovering dual-use biosecurity knowledge from unlearned models. We compile these results into Multi-Turn Human Jailbreaks (MHJ), a dataset of 2,912 prompts across 537 multi-turn jailbreaks. We publicly release MHJ alongside a compendium of jailbreak tactics developed across dozens of commercial red teaming engagements, supporting research towards stronger LLM defenses.

Recent advancements in diffusion models have made generative image editing more accessible, enabling creative edits but raising ethical concerns, particularly regarding malicious edits to human portraits that threaten privacy and identity security. Existing protection methods primarily rely on adversarial perturbations to nullify edits but often fail against diverse editing requests. We propose FaceLock, a novel approach to portrait protection that optimizes adversarial perturbations to destroy or significantly alter biometric information, rendering edited outputs biometrically unrecognizable. FaceLock integrates facial recognition and visual perception into perturbation optimization to provide robust protection against various editing attempts. We also highlight flaws in commonly used evaluation metrics and reveal how they can be manipulated, emphasizing the need for reliable assessments of protection. Experiments show FaceLock outperforms baselines in defending against malicious edits and is robust against purification techniques. Ablation studies confirm its stability and broad applicability across diffusion-based editing algorithms. Our work advances biometric defense and sets the foundation for privacy-preserving practices in image editing. The code is available at: https://github.com/taco-group/FaceLock.

Despite extensive pre-training and fine-tuning in moral alignment to prevent generating harmful information at user request, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. In this paper, we propose AutoDefense, a response-filtering based multi-agent defense framework that filters harmful responses from LLMs. This framework assigns different roles to LLM agents and employs them to complete the defense task collaboratively. The division in tasks enhances the overall instruction-following of LLMs and enables the integration of other defense components as tools. AutoDefense can adapt to various sizes and kinds of open-source LLMs that serve as agents. Through conducting extensive experiments on a large scale of harmful and safe prompts, we validate the effectiveness of the proposed AutoDefense in improving the robustness against jailbreak attacks, while maintaining the performance at normal user request. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/XHMY/AutoDefense.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are attracting significant research attention due to their instruction-following abilities, allowing users and developers to leverage LLMs for a variety of tasks. However, LLMs are vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks: a class of attacks that hijack the model's instruction-following abilities, changing responses to prompts to undesired, possibly malicious ones. In this work, we introduce Jatmo, a method for generating task-specific models resilient to prompt-injection attacks. Jatmo leverages the fact that LLMs can only follow instructions once they have undergone instruction tuning. It harnesses a teacher instruction-tuned model to generate a task-specific dataset, which is then used to fine-tune a base model (i.e., a non-instruction-tuned model). Jatmo only needs a task prompt and a dataset of inputs for the task: it uses the teacher model to generate outputs. For situations with no pre-existing datasets, Jatmo can use a single example, or in some cases none at all, to produce a fully synthetic dataset. Our experiments on six tasks show that Jatmo models provide the same quality of outputs on their specific task as standard LLMs, while being resilient to prompt injections. The best attacks succeeded in less than 0.5% of cases against our models, versus over 90% success rate against GPT-3.5-Turbo. We release Jatmo at https://github.com/wagner-group/prompt-injection-defense.

As machine learning models grow in complexity and increasingly rely on publicly sourced data, such as the human-annotated labels used in training large language models, they become more vulnerable to label poisoning attacks. These attacks, in which adversaries subtly alter the labels within a training dataset, can severely degrade model performance, posing significant risks in critical applications. In this paper, we propose FLORAL, a novel adversarial training defense strategy based on support vector machines (SVMs) to counter these threats. Utilizing a bilevel optimization framework, we cast the training process as a non-zero-sum Stackelberg game between an attacker, who strategically poisons critical training labels, and the model, which seeks to recover from such attacks. Our approach accommodates various model architectures and employs a projected gradient descent algorithm with kernel SVMs for adversarial training. We provide a theoretical analysis of our algorithm's convergence properties and empirically evaluate FLORAL's effectiveness across diverse classification tasks. Compared to robust baselines and foundation models such as RoBERTa, FLORAL consistently achieves higher robust accuracy under increasing attacker budgets. These results underscore the potential of FLORAL to enhance the resilience of machine learning models against label poisoning threats, thereby ensuring robust classification in adversarial settings.

Backdoor attacks covertly implant triggers into deep neural networks (DNNs) by poisoning a small portion of the training data with pre-designed backdoor triggers. This vulnerability is exacerbated in the era of large models, where extensive (pre-)training on web-crawled datasets is susceptible to compromise. In this paper, we introduce a novel two-step defense framework named Expose Before You Defend (EBYD). EBYD unifies existing backdoor defense methods into a comprehensive defense system with enhanced performance. Specifically, EBYD first exposes the backdoor functionality in the backdoored model through a model preprocessing step called backdoor exposure, and then applies detection and removal methods to the exposed model to identify and eliminate the backdoor features. In the first step of backdoor exposure, we propose a novel technique called Clean Unlearning (CUL), which proactively unlearns clean features from the backdoored model to reveal the hidden backdoor features. We also explore various model editing/modification techniques for backdoor exposure, including fine-tuning, model sparsification, and weight perturbation. Using EBYD, we conduct extensive experiments on 10 image attacks and 6 text attacks across 2 vision datasets (CIFAR-10 and an ImageNet subset) and 4 language datasets (SST-2, IMDB, Twitter, and AG's News). The results demonstrate the importance of backdoor exposure for backdoor defense, showing that the exposed models can significantly benefit a range of downstream defense tasks, including backdoor label detection, backdoor trigger recovery, backdoor model detection, and backdoor removal. We hope our work could inspire more research in developing advanced defense frameworks with exposed models. Our code is available at: https://github.com/bboylyg/Expose-Before-You-Defend.

As generative models achieve great success, tampering and modifying the sensitive image contents (i.e., human faces, artist signatures, commercial logos, etc.) have induced a significant threat with social impact. The backdoor attack is a method that implants vulnerabilities in a target model, which can be activated through a trigger. In this work, we innovatively prevent the abuse of image content modification by implanting the backdoor into image-editing models. Once the protected sensitive content on an image is modified by an editing model, the backdoor will be triggered, making the editing fail. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks that use data poisoning, to enable protection on individual images and eliminate the need for model training, we developed the first framework for run-time backdoor implantation, which is both time- and resource- efficient. We generate imperceptible perturbations on the images to inject the backdoor and define the protected area as the only backdoor trigger. Editing other unprotected insensitive areas will not trigger the backdoor, which minimizes the negative impact on legal image modifications. Evaluations with state-of-the-art image editing models show that our protective method can increase the CLIP-FID of generated images from 12.72 to 39.91, or reduce the SSIM from 0.503 to 0.167 when subjected to malicious editing. At the same time, our method exhibits minimal impact on benign editing, which demonstrates the efficacy of our proposed framework. The proposed run-time backdoor can also achieve effective protection on the latest diffusion models. Code are available.

Recent advances in diffusion models have introduced a new era of text-guided image manipulation, enabling users to create realistic edited images with simple textual prompts. However, there is significant concern about the potential misuse of these methods, especially in creating misleading or harmful content. Although recent defense strategies, which introduce imperceptible adversarial noise to induce model failure, have shown promise, they remain ineffective against more sophisticated manipulations, such as editing with a mask. In this work, we propose DiffusionGuard, a robust and effective defense method against unauthorized edits by diffusion-based image editing models, even in challenging setups. Through a detailed analysis of these models, we introduce a novel objective that generates adversarial noise targeting the early stage of the diffusion process. This approach significantly improves the efficiency and effectiveness of adversarial noises. We also introduce a mask-augmentation technique to enhance robustness against various masks during test time. Finally, we introduce a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of methods in protecting against privacy threats in realistic scenarios. Through extensive experiments, we show that our method achieves stronger protection and improved mask robustness with lower computational costs compared to the strongest baseline. Additionally, our method exhibits superior transferability and better resilience to noise removal techniques compared to all baseline methods. Our source code is publicly available at https://github.com/choi403/DiffusionGuard.

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions

The vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial patches has motivated numerous defense strategies for boosting model robustness. However, the prevailing defenses depend on single observation or pre-established adversary information to counter adversarial patches, often failing to be confronted with unseen or adaptive adversarial attacks and easily exhibiting unsatisfying performance in dynamic 3D environments. Inspired by active human perception and recurrent feedback mechanisms, we develop Embodied Active Defense (EAD), a proactive defensive strategy that actively contextualizes environmental information to address misaligned adversarial patches in 3D real-world settings. To achieve this, EAD develops two central recurrent sub-modules, i.e., a perception module and a policy module, to implement two critical functions of active vision. These models recurrently process a series of beliefs and observations, facilitating progressive refinement of their comprehension of the target object and enabling the development of strategic actions to counter adversarial patches in 3D environments. To optimize learning efficiency, we incorporate a differentiable approximation of environmental dynamics and deploy patches that are agnostic to the adversary strategies. Extensive experiments demonstrate that EAD substantially enhances robustness against a variety of patches within just a few steps through its action policy in safety-critical tasks (e.g., face recognition and object detection), without compromising standard accuracy. Furthermore, due to the attack-agnostic characteristic, EAD facilitates excellent generalization to unseen attacks, diminishing the averaged attack success rate by 95 percent across a range of unseen adversarial attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become a cornerstone in the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP), offering transformative capabilities in understanding and generating human-like text. However, with their rising prominence, the security and vulnerability aspects of these models have garnered significant attention. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the various forms of attacks targeting LLMs, discussing the nature and mechanisms of these attacks, their potential impacts, and current defense strategies. We delve into topics such as adversarial attacks that aim to manipulate model outputs, data poisoning that affects model training, and privacy concerns related to training data exploitation. The paper also explores the effectiveness of different attack methodologies, the resilience of LLMs against these attacks, and the implications for model integrity and user trust. By examining the latest research, we provide insights into the current landscape of LLM vulnerabilities and defense mechanisms. Our objective is to offer a nuanced understanding of LLM attacks, foster awareness within the AI community, and inspire robust solutions to mitigate these risks in future developments.

Adversarial purification is a defense mechanism for safeguarding classifiers against adversarial attacks without knowing the type of attacks or training of the classifier. These techniques characterize and eliminate adversarial perturbations from the attacked inputs, aiming to restore purified samples that retain similarity to the initially attacked ones and are correctly classified by the classifier. Due to the inherent challenges associated with characterizing noise perturbations for discrete inputs, adversarial text purification has been relatively unexplored. In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of adversarial purification methods in defending text classifiers. We propose a novel adversarial text purification that harnesses the generative capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) to purify adversarial text without the need to explicitly characterize the discrete noise perturbations. We utilize prompt engineering to exploit LLMs for recovering the purified examples for given adversarial examples such that they are semantically similar and correctly classified. Our proposed method demonstrates remarkable performance over various classifiers, improving their accuracy under the attack by over 65% on average.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been found to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, raising security concerns about their deployment in mission-critical applications. While existing defense methods have demonstrated promising results, it is still not clear how to effectively remove backdoor-associated neurons in backdoored DNNs. In this paper, we propose a novel defense called Reconstructive Neuron Pruning (RNP) to expose and prune backdoor neurons via an unlearning and then recovering process. Specifically, RNP first unlearns the neurons by maximizing the model's error on a small subset of clean samples and then recovers the neurons by minimizing the model's error on the same data. In RNP, unlearning is operated at the neuron level while recovering is operated at the filter level, forming an asymmetric reconstructive learning procedure. We show that such an asymmetric process on only a few clean samples can effectively expose and prune the backdoor neurons implanted by a wide range of attacks, achieving a new state-of-the-art defense performance. Moreover, the unlearned model at the intermediate step of our RNP can be directly used to improve other backdoor defense tasks including backdoor removal, trigger recovery, backdoor label detection, and backdoor sample detection. Code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/RNP.

As a type of valuable intellectual property (IP), deep neural network (DNN) models have been protected by techniques like watermarking. However, such passive model protection cannot fully prevent model abuse. In this work, we propose an active model IP protection scheme, namely NNSplitter, which actively protects the model by splitting it into two parts: the obfuscated model that performs poorly due to weight obfuscation, and the model secrets consisting of the indexes and original values of the obfuscated weights, which can only be accessed by authorized users with the support of the trusted execution environment. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of NNSplitter, e.g., by only modifying 275 out of over 11 million (i.e., 0.002%) weights, the accuracy of the obfuscated ResNet-18 model on CIFAR-10 can drop to 10%. Moreover, NNSplitter is stealthy and resilient against norm clipping and fine-tuning attacks, making it an appealing solution for DNN model protection. The code is available at: https://github.com/Tongzhou0101/NNSplitter.

To detect the deployment of large language models for malicious use cases (e.g., fake content creation or academic plagiarism), several approaches have recently been proposed for identifying AI-generated text via watermarks or statistical irregularities. How robust are these detection algorithms to paraphrases of AI-generated text? To stress test these detectors, we first train an 11B parameter paraphrase generation model (DIPPER) that can paraphrase paragraphs, optionally leveraging surrounding text (e.g., user-written prompts) as context. DIPPER also uses scalar knobs to control the amount of lexical diversity and reordering in the paraphrases. Paraphrasing text generated by three large language models (including GPT3.5-davinci-003) with DIPPER successfully evades several detectors, including watermarking, GPTZero, DetectGPT, and OpenAI's text classifier. For example, DIPPER drops the detection accuracy of DetectGPT from 70.3% to 4.6% (at a constant false positive rate of 1%), without appreciably modifying the input semantics. To increase the robustness of AI-generated text detection to paraphrase attacks, we introduce a simple defense that relies on retrieving semantically-similar generations and must be maintained by a language model API provider. Given a candidate text, our algorithm searches a database of sequences previously generated by the API, looking for sequences that match the candidate text within a certain threshold. We empirically verify our defense using a database of 15M generations from a fine-tuned T5-XXL model and find that it can detect 80% to 97% of paraphrased generations across different settings, while only classifying 1% of human-written sequences as AI-generated. We will open source our code, model and data for future research.

Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed learning paradigm that enables different parties to train a model together for high quality and strong privacy protection. In this scenario, individual participants may get compromised and perform backdoor attacks by poisoning the data (or gradients). Existing work on robust aggregation and certified FL robustness does not study how hardening benign clients can affect the global model (and the malicious clients). In this work, we theoretically analyze the connection among cross-entropy loss, attack success rate, and clean accuracy in this setting. Moreover, we propose a trigger reverse engineering based defense and show that our method can achieve robustness improvement with guarantee (i.e., reducing the attack success rate) without affecting benign accuracy. We conduct comprehensive experiments across different datasets and attack settings. Our results on eight competing SOTA defense methods show the empirical superiority of our method on both single-shot and continuous FL backdoor attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/KaiyuanZh/FLIP.

Deep neural networks are prone to adversarial examples that maliciously alter the network's outcome. Due to the increasing popularity of 3D sensors in safety-critical systems and the vast deployment of deep learning models for 3D point sets, there is a growing interest in adversarial attacks and defenses for such models. So far, the research has focused on the semantic level, namely, deep point cloud classifiers. However, point clouds are also widely used in a geometric-related form that includes encoding and reconstructing the geometry. In this work, we are the first to consider the problem of adversarial examples at a geometric level. In this setting, the question is how to craft a small change to a clean source point cloud that leads, after passing through an autoencoder model, to the reconstruction of a different target shape. Our attack is in sharp contrast to existing semantic attacks on 3D point clouds. While such works aim to modify the predicted label by a classifier, we alter the entire reconstructed geometry. Additionally, we demonstrate the robustness of our attack in the case of defense, where we show that remnant characteristics of the target shape are still present at the output after applying the defense to the adversarial input. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/itailang/geometric_adv.

We present a training system, which can provably defend significantly larger neural networks than previously possible, including ResNet-34 and DenseNet-100. Our approach is based on differentiable abstract interpretation and introduces two novel concepts: (i) abstract layers for fine-tuning the precision and scalability of the abstraction, (ii) a flexible domain specific language (DSL) for describing training objectives that combine abstract and concrete losses with arbitrary specifications. Our training method is implemented in the DiffAI system.

Training deep neural networks on images represented as grids of pixels has brought to light an interesting phenomenon known as adversarial examples. Inspired by how humans reconstruct abstract concepts, we attempt to codify the input bitmap image into a set of compact, interpretable elements to avoid being fooled by the adversarial structures. We take the first step in this direction by experimenting with image vectorization as an input transformation step to map the adversarial examples back into the natural manifold of MNIST handwritten digits. We compare our method vs. state-of-the-art input transformations and further discuss the trade-offs between a hand-designed and a learned transformation defense.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

Large language models, despite extensive alignment with human values and ethical principles, remain vulnerable to sophisticated jailbreak attacks that exploit their reasoning abilities. Existing safety measures often detect overt malicious intent but fail to address subtle, reasoning-driven vulnerabilities. In this work, we introduce POATE (Polar Opposite query generation, Adversarial Template construction, and Elaboration), a novel jailbreak technique that harnesses contrastive reasoning to provoke unethical responses. POATE crafts semantically opposing intents and integrates them with adversarial templates, steering models toward harmful outputs with remarkable subtlety. We conduct extensive evaluation across six diverse language model families of varying parameter sizes to demonstrate the robustness of the attack, achieving significantly higher attack success rates (~44%) compared to existing methods. To counter this, we propose Intent-Aware CoT and Reverse Thinking CoT, which decompose queries to detect malicious intent and reason in reverse to evaluate and reject harmful responses. These methods enhance reasoning robustness and strengthen the model's defense against adversarial exploits.

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), enabling goal hijacking and data leakage. Prompt guard models, though effective in defense, suffer from over-defense -- falsely flagging benign inputs as malicious due to trigger word bias. To address this issue, we introduce NotInject, an evaluation dataset that systematically measures over-defense across various prompt guard models. NotInject contains 339 benign samples enriched with trigger words common in prompt injection attacks, enabling fine-grained evaluation. Our results show that state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%). To mitigate this, we propose InjecGuard, a novel prompt guard model that incorporates a new training strategy, Mitigating Over-defense for Free (MOF), which significantly reduces the bias on trigger words. InjecGuard demonstrates state-of-the-art performance on diverse benchmarks including NotInject, surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%, offering a robust and open-source solution for detecting prompt injection attacks. The code and datasets are released at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/InjecGuard.

Recent research demonstrates that the nascent fine-tuning-as-a-service business model exposes serious safety concerns -- fine-tuning over a few harmful data uploaded by the users can compromise the safety alignment of the model. The attack, known as harmful fine-tuning, has raised a broad research interest among the community. However, as the attack is still new, we observe from our miserable submission experience that there are general misunderstandings within the research community. We in this paper aim to clear some common concerns for the attack setting, and formally establish the research problem. Specifically, we first present the threat model of the problem, and introduce the harmful fine-tuning attack and its variants. Then we systematically survey the existing literature on attacks/defenses/mechanical analysis of the problem. Finally, we outline future research directions that might contribute to the development of the field. Additionally, we present a list of questions of interest, which might be useful to refer to when reviewers in the peer review process question the realism of the experiment/attack/defense setting. A curated list of relevant papers is maintained and made accessible at: https://github.com/git-disl/awesome_LLM-harmful-fine-tuning-papers.

Safety, security, and compliance are essential requirements when aligning large language models (LLMs). However, many seemingly aligned LLMs are soon shown to be susceptible to jailbreak attacks. These attacks aim to circumvent the models' safety guardrails and security mechanisms by introducing jailbreak prompts into malicious queries. In response to these challenges, this paper introduces Defensive Prompt Patch (DPP), a novel prompt-based defense mechanism specifically designed to protect LLMs against such sophisticated jailbreak strategies. Unlike previous approaches, which have often compromised the utility of the model for the sake of safety, DPP is designed to achieve a minimal Attack Success Rate (ASR) while preserving the high utility of LLMs. Our method uses strategically designed interpretable suffix prompts that effectively thwart a wide range of standard and adaptive jailbreak techniques. Empirical results conducted on LLAMA-2-7B-Chat and Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 models demonstrate the robustness and adaptability of DPP, showing significant reductions in ASR with negligible impact on utility. Our approach not only outperforms existing defense strategies in balancing safety and functionality, but also provides a scalable and interpretable solution applicable to various LLM platforms.

Caution: This paper includes offensive words that could potentially cause unpleasantness. Language models (LMs) are vulnerable to exploitation for adversarial misuse. Training LMs for safety alignment is extensive and makes it hard to respond to fast-developing attacks immediately, such as jailbreaks. We propose self-refine with formatting that achieves outstanding safety even in non-safety-aligned LMs and evaluate our method alongside several defense baselines, demonstrating that it is the safest training-free method against jailbreak attacks. Additionally, we proposed a formatting method that improves the efficiency of the self-refine process while reducing attack success rates in fewer iterations. We've also observed that non-safety-aligned LMs outperform safety-aligned LMs in safety tasks by giving more helpful and safe responses. In conclusion, our findings can achieve less safety risk with fewer computational costs, allowing non-safety LM to be easily utilized in real-world service.

Large Language Models (LLMS) have increasingly become central to generating content with potential societal impacts. Notably, these models have demonstrated capabilities for generating content that could be deemed harmful. To mitigate these risks, researchers have adopted safety training techniques to align model outputs with societal values to curb the generation of malicious content. However, the phenomenon of "jailbreaking", where carefully crafted prompts elicit harmful responses from models, persists as a significant challenge. This research conducts a comprehensive analysis of existing studies on jailbreaking LLMs and their defense techniques. We meticulously investigate nine attack techniques and seven defense techniques applied across three distinct language models: Vicuna, LLama, and GPT-3.5 Turbo. We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of these attack and defense techniques. Our findings reveal that existing white-box attacks underperform compared to universal techniques and that including special tokens in the input significantly affects the likelihood of successful attacks. This research highlights the need to concentrate on the security facets of LLMs. Additionally, we contribute to the field by releasing our datasets and testing framework, aiming to foster further research into LLM security. We believe these contributions will facilitate the exploration of security measures within this domain.

Recent works have shown that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples that find samples close to the original image but can make the model misclassify. Even with access only to the model's output, an attacker can employ black-box attacks to generate such adversarial examples. In this work, we propose a simple and lightweight defense against black-box attacks by adding random noise to hidden features at intermediate layers of the model at inference time. Our theoretical analysis confirms that this method effectively enhances the model's resilience against both score-based and decision-based black-box attacks. Importantly, our defense does not necessitate adversarial training and has minimal impact on accuracy, rendering it applicable to any pre-trained model. Our analysis also reveals the significance of selectively adding noise to different parts of the model based on the gradient of the adversarial objective function, which can be varied during the attack. We demonstrate the robustness of our defense against multiple black-box attacks through extensive empirical experiments involving diverse models with various architectures.

In data poisoning attacks, an adversary tries to change a model's prediction by adding, modifying, or removing samples in the training data. Recently, ensemble-based approaches for obtaining provable defenses against data poisoning have been proposed where predictions are done by taking a majority vote across multiple base models. In this work, we show that merely considering the majority vote in ensemble defenses is wasteful as it does not effectively utilize available information in the logits layers of the base models. Instead, we propose Run-Off Election (ROE), a novel aggregation method based on a two-round election across the base models: In the first round, models vote for their preferred class and then a second, Run-Off election is held between the top two classes in the first round. Based on this approach, we propose DPA+ROE and FA+ROE defense methods based on Deep Partition Aggregation (DPA) and Finite Aggregation (FA) approaches from prior work. We evaluate our methods on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and GTSRB and obtain improvements in certified accuracy by up to 3%-4%. Also, by applying ROE on a boosted version of DPA, we gain improvements around 12%-27% comparing to the current state-of-the-art, establishing a new state-of-the-art in (pointwise) certified robustness against data poisoning. In many cases, our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art, even when using 32 times less computational power.

Convolutional Neural Networks have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are known to locate in subspaces close to where normal data lies but are not naturally occurring and of low probability. In this work, we investigate the potential effect defense techniques have on the geometry of the likelihood landscape - likelihood of the input images under the trained model. We first propose a way to visualize the likelihood landscape leveraging an energy-based model interpretation of discriminative classifiers. Then we introduce a measure to quantify the flatness of the likelihood landscape. We observe that a subset of adversarial defense techniques results in a similar effect of flattening the likelihood landscape. We further explore directly regularizing towards a flat landscape for adversarial robustness.

Deep learning has transformed AI applications but faces critical security challenges, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, model theft, and privacy leakage. This survey examines these vulnerabilities, detailing their mechanisms and impact on model integrity and confidentiality. Practical implementations, including adversarial examples, label flipping, and backdoor attacks, are explored alongside defenses such as adversarial training, differential privacy, and federated learning, highlighting their strengths and limitations. Advanced methods like contrastive and self-supervised learning are presented for enhancing robustness. The survey concludes with future directions, emphasizing automated defenses, zero-trust architectures, and the security challenges of large AI models. A balanced approach to performance and security is essential for developing reliable deep learning systems.

Recent studies have revealed the vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) to adversarial examples, which can easily fool DNNs into making incorrect predictions. To mitigate this deficiency, we propose a novel adversarial defense method called "Immunity" (Innovative MoE with MUtual information \& positioN stabilITY) based on a modified Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architecture in this work. The key enhancements to the standard MoE are two-fold: 1) integrating of Random Switch Gates (RSGs) to obtain diverse network structures via random permutation of RSG parameters at evaluation time, despite of RSGs being determined after one-time training; 2) devising innovative Mutual Information (MI)-based and Position Stability-based loss functions by capitalizing on Grad-CAM's explanatory power to increase the diversity and the causality of expert networks. Notably, our MI-based loss operates directly on the heatmaps, thereby inducing subtler negative impacts on the classification performance when compared to other losses of the same type, theoretically. Extensive evaluation validates the efficacy of the proposed approach in improving adversarial robustness against a wide range of attacks.

Although LLM-based agents, powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), can use external tools and memory mechanisms to solve complex real-world tasks, they may also introduce critical security vulnerabilities. However, the existing literature does not comprehensively evaluate attacks and defenses against LLM-based agents. To address this, we introduce Agent Security Bench (ASB), a comprehensive framework designed to formalize, benchmark, and evaluate the attacks and defenses of LLM-based agents, including 10 scenarios (e.g., e-commerce, autonomous driving, finance), 10 agents targeting the scenarios, over 400 tools, 23 different types of attack/defense methods, and 8 evaluation metrics. Based on ASB, we benchmark 10 prompt injection attacks, a memory poisoning attack, a novel Plan-of-Thought backdoor attack, a mixed attack, and 10 corresponding defenses across 13 LLM backbones with nearly 90,000 testing cases in total. Our benchmark results reveal critical vulnerabilities in different stages of agent operation, including system prompt, user prompt handling, tool usage, and memory retrieval, with the highest average attack success rate of 84.30\%, but limited effectiveness shown in current defenses, unveiling important works to be done in terms of agent security for the community. Our code can be found at https://github.com/agiresearch/ASB.

AI agents aim to solve complex tasks by combining text-based reasoning with external tool calls. Unfortunately, AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks where data returned by external tools hijacks the agent to execute malicious tasks. To measure the adversarial robustness of AI agents, we introduce AgentDojo, an evaluation framework for agents that execute tools over untrusted data. To capture the evolving nature of attacks and defenses, AgentDojo is not a static test suite, but rather an extensible environment for designing and evaluating new agent tasks, defenses, and adaptive attacks. We populate the environment with 97 realistic tasks (e.g., managing an email client, navigating an e-banking website, or making travel bookings), 629 security test cases, and various attack and defense paradigms from the literature. We find that AgentDojo poses a challenge for both attacks and defenses: state-of-the-art LLMs fail at many tasks (even in the absence of attacks), and existing prompt injection attacks break some security properties but not all. We hope that AgentDojo can foster research on new design principles for AI agents that solve common tasks in a reliable and robust manner. We release the code for AgentDojo at https://github.com/ethz-spylab/agentdojo.

In light of the burgeoning success of reinforcement learning (RL) in diverse real-world applications, considerable focus has been directed towards ensuring RL policies are robust to adversarial attacks during test time. Current approaches largely revolve around solving a minimax problem to prepare for potential worst-case scenarios. While effective against strong attacks, these methods often compromise performance in the absence of attacks or the presence of only weak attacks. To address this, we study policy robustness under the well-accepted state-adversarial attack model, extending our focus beyond only worst-case attacks. We first formalize this task at test time as a regret minimization problem and establish its intrinsic hardness in achieving sublinear regret when the baseline policy is from a general continuous policy class, Pi. This finding prompts us to refine the baseline policy class Pi prior to test time, aiming for efficient adaptation within a finite policy class Pi, which can resort to an adversarial bandit subroutine. In light of the importance of a small, finite Pi, we propose a novel training-time algorithm to iteratively discover non-dominated policies, forming a near-optimal and minimal Pi, thereby ensuring both robustness and test-time efficiency. Empirical validation on the Mujoco corroborates the superiority of our approach in terms of natural and robust performance, as well as adaptability to various attack scenarios.

The notion of adversarial attacks on image classification models based on convolutional neural networks (CNN) is introduced in this work. To classify images, deep learning models called CNNs are frequently used. However, when the networks are subject to adversarial attacks, extremely potent and previously trained CNN models that perform quite effectively on image datasets for image classification tasks may perform poorly. In this work, one well-known adversarial attack known as the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) is explored and its adverse effects on the performances of image classification models are examined. The FGSM attack is simulated on three pre-trained image classifier CNN architectures, ResNet-101, AlexNet, and RegNetY 400MF using randomly chosen images from the ImageNet dataset. The classification accuracies of the models are computed in the absence and presence of the attack to demonstrate the detrimental effect of the attack on the performances of the classifiers. Finally, a mechanism is proposed to defend against the FGSM attack based on a modified defensive distillation-based approach. Extensive results are presented for the validation of the proposed scheme.

Most existing works focus on direct perturbations to the victim's state/action or the underlying transition dynamics to demonstrate the vulnerability of reinforcement learning agents to adversarial attacks. However, such direct manipulations may not be always realizable. In this paper, we consider a multi-agent setting where a well-trained victim agent nu is exploited by an attacker controlling another agent alpha with an adversarial policy. Previous models do not account for the possibility that the attacker may only have partial control over alpha or that the attack may produce easily detectable "abnormal" behaviors. Furthermore, there is a lack of provably efficient defenses against these adversarial policies. To address these limitations, we introduce a generalized attack framework that has the flexibility to model to what extent the adversary is able to control the agent, and allows the attacker to regulate the state distribution shift and produce stealthier adversarial policies. Moreover, we offer a provably efficient defense with polynomial convergence to the most robust victim policy through adversarial training with timescale separation. This stands in sharp contrast to supervised learning, where adversarial training typically provides only empirical defenses. Using the Robosumo competition experiments, we show that our generalized attack formulation results in much stealthier adversarial policies when maintaining the same winning rate as baselines. Additionally, our adversarial training approach yields stable learning dynamics and less exploitable victim policies.

Generative Language Models gained significant attention in late 2022 / early 2023, notably with the introduction of models refined to act consistently with users' expectations of interactions with AI (conversational models). Arguably the focal point of public attention has been such a refinement of the GPT3 model -- the ChatGPT and its subsequent integration with auxiliary capabilities, including search as part of Microsoft Bing. Despite extensive prior research invested in their development, their performance and applicability to a range of daily tasks remained unclear and niche. However, their wider utilization without a requirement for technical expertise, made in large part possible through conversational fine-tuning, revealed the extent of their true capabilities in a real-world environment. This has garnered both public excitement for their potential applications and concerns about their capabilities and potential malicious uses. This review aims to provide a brief overview of the history, state of the art, and implications of Generative Language Models in terms of their principles, abilities, limitations, and future prospects -- especially in the context of cyber-defense, with a focus on the Swiss operational environment.

Recently, Anil et al. (2024) show that many-shot (up to hundreds of) demonstrations can jailbreak state-of-the-art LLMs by exploiting their long-context capability. Nevertheless, is it possible to use few-shot demonstrations to efficiently jailbreak LLMs within limited context sizes? While the vanilla few-shot jailbreaking may be inefficient, we propose improved techniques such as injecting special system tokens like [/INST] and employing demo-level random search from a collected demo pool. These simple techniques result in surprisingly effective jailbreaking against aligned LLMs (even with advanced defenses). For examples, our method achieves >80% (mostly >95%) ASRs on Llama-2-7B and Llama-3-8B without multiple restarts, even if the models are enhanced by strong defenses such as perplexity detection and/or SmoothLLM, which is challenging for suffix-based jailbreaking. In addition, we conduct comprehensive and elaborate (e.g., making sure to use correct system prompts) evaluations against other aligned LLMs and advanced defenses, where our method consistently achieves nearly 100% ASRs. Our code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/I-FSJ.

Deep-learning based Automatic Essay Scoring (AES) systems are being actively used by states and language testing agencies alike to evaluate millions of candidates for life-changing decisions ranging from college applications to visa approvals. However, little research has been put to understand and interpret the black-box nature of deep-learning based scoring algorithms. Previous studies indicate that scoring models can be easily fooled. In this paper, we explore the reason behind their surprising adversarial brittleness. We utilize recent advances in interpretability to find the extent to which features such as coherence, content, vocabulary, and relevance are important for automated scoring mechanisms. We use this to investigate the oversensitivity i.e., large change in output score with a little change in input essay content) and overstability i.e., little change in output scores with large changes in input essay content) of AES. Our results indicate that autoscoring models, despite getting trained as "end-to-end" models with rich contextual embeddings such as BERT, behave like bag-of-words models. A few words determine the essay score without the requirement of any context making the model largely overstable. This is in stark contrast to recent probing studies on pre-trained representation learning models, which show that rich linguistic features such as parts-of-speech and morphology are encoded by them. Further, we also find that the models have learnt dataset biases, making them oversensitive. To deal with these issues, we propose detection-based protection models that can detect oversensitivity and overstability causing samples with high accuracies. We find that our proposed models are able to detect unusual attribution patterns and flag adversarial samples successfully.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable capabilities across various domains. Accompanying the evolving capabilities and expanding deployment scenarios of LLMs, their deployment challenges escalate due to their sheer scale and the advanced yet complex activation designs prevalent in notable model series, such as Llama, Gemma, and Mistral. These challenges have become particularly pronounced in resource-constrained deployment scenarios, where mitigating inference efficiency bottlenecks is imperative. Among various recent efforts, activation approximation has emerged as a promising avenue for pursuing inference efficiency, sometimes considered indispensable in applications such as private inference. Despite achieving substantial speedups with minimal impact on utility, even appearing sound and practical for real-world deployment, the safety implications of activation approximations remain unclear. In this work, we fill this critical gap in LLM safety by conducting the first systematic safety evaluation of activation approximations. Our safety vetting spans seven sota techniques across three popular categories, revealing consistent safety degradation across ten safety-aligned LLMs.

The advancement of large language models (LLMs) has significantly enhanced the ability to effectively tackle various downstream NLP tasks and unify these tasks into generative pipelines. On the one hand, powerful language models, trained on massive textual data, have brought unparalleled accessibility and usability for both models and users. On the other hand, unrestricted access to these models can also introduce potential malicious and unintentional privacy risks. Despite ongoing efforts to address the safety and privacy concerns associated with LLMs, the problem remains unresolved. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the current privacy attacks targeting LLMs and categorize them according to the adversary's assumed capabilities to shed light on the potential vulnerabilities present in LLMs. Then, we present a detailed overview of prominent defense strategies that have been developed to counter these privacy attacks. Beyond existing works, we identify upcoming privacy concerns as LLMs evolve. Lastly, we point out several potential avenues for future exploration.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in diverse applications, including chatbot assistants and code generation, aligning their behavior with safety and ethical standards has become paramount. However, jailbreak attacks, which exploit vulnerabilities to elicit unintended or harmful outputs, threaten LLMs' safety significantly. In this paper, we introduce Layer-AdvPatcher, a novel methodology designed to defend against jailbreak attacks by utilizing an unlearning strategy to patch specific layers within LLMs through self-augmented datasets. Our insight is that certain layer(s), tend to produce affirmative tokens when faced with harmful prompts. By identifying these layers and adversarially exposing them to generate more harmful data, one can understand their inherent and diverse vulnerabilities to attacks. With these exposures, we then "unlearn" these issues, reducing the impact of affirmative tokens and hence minimizing jailbreak risks while keeping the model's responses to safe queries intact. We conduct extensive experiments on two models, four benchmark datasets, and multiple state-of-the-art jailbreak benchmarks to demonstrate the efficacy of our approach. Results indicate that our framework reduces the harmfulness and attack success rate of jailbreak attacks without compromising utility for benign queries compared to recent defense methods.

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have been gaining a lot of interest due to their adaptability and extensibility in emerging applications, including communication networks. It is anticipated that ZSM networks will be able to support LLMs as a service, as they provide ultra reliable low-latency communications and closed loop massive connectivity. However, LLMs are vulnerable to data and model privacy issues that affect the trustworthiness of LLMs to be deployed for user-based services. In this paper, we explore the security vulnerabilities associated with fine-tuning LLMs in ZSM networks, in particular the membership inference attack. We define the characteristics of an attack network that can perform a membership inference attack if the attacker has access to the fine-tuned model for the downstream task. We show that the membership inference attacks are effective for any downstream task, which can lead to a personal data breach when using LLM as a service. The experimental results show that the attack success rate of maximum 92% can be achieved on named entity recognition task. Based on the experimental analysis, we discuss possible defense mechanisms and present possible research directions to make the LLMs more trustworthy in the context of ZSM networks.

We proposes a novel algorithm, ANTHRO, that inductively extracts over 600K human-written text perturbations in the wild and leverages them for realistic adversarial attack. Unlike existing character-based attacks which often deductively hypothesize a set of manipulation strategies, our work is grounded on actual observations from real-world texts. We find that adversarial texts generated by ANTHRO achieve the best trade-off between (1) attack success rate, (2) semantic preservation of the original text, and (3) stealthiness--i.e. indistinguishable from human writings hence harder to be flagged as suspicious. Specifically, our attacks accomplished around 83% and 91% attack success rates on BERT and RoBERTa, respectively. Moreover, it outperformed the TextBugger baseline with an increase of 50% and 40% in terms of semantic preservation and stealthiness when evaluated by both layperson and professional human workers. ANTHRO can further enhance a BERT classifier's performance in understanding different variations of human-written toxic texts via adversarial training when compared to the Perspective API.

This paper introduces FRACTURED-SORRY-Bench, a framework for evaluating the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) against multi-turn conversational attacks. Building upon the SORRY-Bench dataset, we propose a simple yet effective method for generating adversarial prompts by breaking down harmful queries into seemingly innocuous sub-questions. Our approach achieves a maximum increase of +46.22\% in Attack Success Rates (ASRs) across GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, and GPT-3.5-Turbo models compared to baseline methods. We demonstrate that this technique poses a challenge to current LLM safety measures and highlights the need for more robust defenses against subtle, multi-turn attacks.

With the rapid advancement of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), ensuring their safety has emerged as a crucial area of research. This survey provides a comprehensive analysis of LVLM safety, covering key aspects such as attacks, defenses, and evaluation methods. We introduce a unified framework that integrates these interrelated components, offering a holistic perspective on the vulnerabilities of LVLMs and the corresponding mitigation strategies. Through an analysis of the LVLM lifecycle, we introduce a classification framework that distinguishes between inference and training phases, with further subcategories to provide deeper insights. Furthermore, we highlight limitations in existing research and outline future directions aimed at strengthening the robustness of LVLMs. As part of our research, we conduct a set of safety evaluations on the latest LVLM, Deepseek Janus-Pro, and provide a theoretical analysis of the results. Our findings provide strategic recommendations for advancing LVLM safety and ensuring their secure and reliable deployment in high-stakes, real-world applications. This survey aims to serve as a cornerstone for future research, facilitating the development of models that not only push the boundaries of multimodal intelligence but also adhere to the highest standards of security and ethical integrity. Furthermore, to aid the growing research in this field, we have created a public repository to continuously compile and update the latest work on LVLM safety: https://github.com/XuankunRong/Awesome-LVLM-Safety .

Diffusion models (DMs) have achieved remarkable success in text-to-image generation, but they also pose safety risks, such as the potential generation of harmful content and copyright violations. The techniques of machine unlearning, also known as concept erasing, have been developed to address these risks. However, these techniques remain vulnerable to adversarial prompt attacks, which can prompt DMs post-unlearning to regenerate undesired images containing concepts (such as nudity) meant to be erased. This work aims to enhance the robustness of concept erasing by integrating the principle of adversarial training (AT) into machine unlearning, resulting in the robust unlearning framework referred to as AdvUnlearn. However, achieving this effectively and efficiently is highly nontrivial. First, we find that a straightforward implementation of AT compromises DMs' image generation quality post-unlearning. To address this, we develop a utility-retaining regularization on an additional retain set, optimizing the trade-off between concept erasure robustness and model utility in AdvUnlearn. Moreover, we identify the text encoder as a more suitable module for robustification compared to UNet, ensuring unlearning effectiveness. And the acquired text encoder can serve as a plug-and-play robust unlearner for various DM types. Empirically, we perform extensive experiments to demonstrate the robustness advantage of AdvUnlearn across various DM unlearning scenarios, including the erasure of nudity, objects, and style concepts. In addition to robustness, AdvUnlearn also achieves a balanced tradeoff with model utility. To our knowledge, this is the first work to systematically explore robust DM unlearning through AT, setting it apart from existing methods that overlook robustness in concept erasing. Codes are available at: https://github.com/OPTML-Group/AdvUnlearn

The objective of this paper is 'open-set' speaker recognition of unseen speakers, where ideal embeddings should be able to condense information into a compact utterance-level representation that has small intra-speaker and large inter-speaker distance. A popular belief in speaker recognition is that networks trained with classification objectives outperform metric learning methods. In this paper, we present an extensive evaluation of most popular loss functions for speaker recognition on the VoxCeleb dataset. We demonstrate that the vanilla triplet loss shows competitive performance compared to classification-based losses, and those trained with our proposed metric learning objective outperform state-of-the-art methods.

To accelerate research on adversarial examples and robustness of machine learning classifiers, Google Brain organized a NIPS 2017 competition that encouraged researchers to develop new methods to generate adversarial examples as well as to develop new ways to defend against them. In this chapter, we describe the structure and organization of the competition and the solutions developed by several of the top-placing teams.

Benefiting from the message passing mechanism, Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have been successful on flourish tasks over graph data. However, recent studies have shown that attackers can catastrophically degrade the performance of GNNs by maliciously modifying the graph structure. A straightforward solution to remedy this issue is to model the edge weights by learning a metric function between pairwise representations of two end nodes, which attempts to assign low weights to adversarial edges. The existing methods use either raw features or representations learned by supervised GNNs to model the edge weights. However, both strategies are faced with some immediate problems: raw features cannot represent various properties of nodes (e.g., structure information), and representations learned by supervised GNN may suffer from the poor performance of the classifier on the poisoned graph. We need representations that carry both feature information and as mush correct structure information as possible and are insensitive to structural perturbations. To this end, we propose an unsupervised pipeline, named STABLE, to optimize the graph structure. Finally, we input the well-refined graph into a downstream classifier. For this part, we design an advanced GCN that significantly enhances the robustness of vanilla GCN without increasing the time complexity. Extensive experiments on four real-world graph benchmarks demonstrate that STABLE outperforms the state-of-the-art methods and successfully defends against various attacks.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly in the face of stealthy and complex jailbreaks, presents a formidable challenge. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis Prompting (IAPrompt). The principle behind is to trigger LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) essential intention analysis, and 2) policy-aligned response. Notably, IAPrompt is an inference-only method, thus could enhance the safety of LLMs without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on SAP200 and DAN benchmarks across Vicuna, ChatGLM, MPT, DeepSeek, and GPT-3.5 show that IAPrompt could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in response (averagely -46.5% attack success rate) and maintain the general helpfulness. Further analyses present some insights into how our method works. To facilitate reproducibility, We release our code and scripts at: https://github.com/alphadl/SafeLLM_with_IntentionAnalysis

Large Language Models (LLMs) are known to memorize significant portions of their training data. Parts of this memorized content have been shown to be extractable by simply querying the model, which poses a privacy risk. We present a novel approach which uses prompt-tuning to control the extraction rates of memorized content in LLMs. We present two prompt training strategies to increase and decrease extraction rates, which correspond to an attack and a defense, respectively. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques by using models from the GPT-Neo family on a public benchmark. For the 1.3B parameter GPT-Neo model, our attack yields a 9.3 percentage point increase in extraction rate compared to our baseline. Our defense can be tuned to achieve different privacy-utility trade-offs by a user-specified hyperparameter. We achieve an extraction rate reduction of up to 97.7% relative to our baseline, with a perplexity increase of 16.9%.

Autonomous agents powered by large vision and language models (VLM) have demonstrated significant potential in completing daily computer tasks, such as browsing the web to book travel and operating desktop software, which requires agents to understand these interfaces. Despite such visual inputs becoming more integrated into agentic applications, what types of risks and attacks exist around them still remain unclear. In this work, we demonstrate that VLM agents can be easily attacked by a set of carefully designed adversarial pop-ups, which human users would typically recognize and ignore. This distraction leads agents to click these pop-ups instead of performing the tasks as usual. Integrating these pop-ups into existing agent testing environments like OSWorld and VisualWebArena leads to an attack success rate (the frequency of the agent clicking the pop-ups) of 86% on average and decreases the task success rate by 47%. Basic defense techniques such as asking the agent to ignore pop-ups or including an advertisement notice, are ineffective against the attack.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) have become essential backbones for multimodal intelligence, yet significant safety challenges limit their real-world application. While textual inputs are often effectively safeguarded, adversarial visual inputs can easily bypass VLM defense mechanisms. Existing defense methods are either resource-intensive, requiring substantial data and compute, or fail to simultaneously ensure safety and usefulness in responses. To address these limitations, we propose a novel two-phase inference-time alignment framework, Evaluating Then Aligning (ETA): 1) Evaluating input visual contents and output responses to establish a robust safety awareness in multimodal settings, and 2) Aligning unsafe behaviors at both shallow and deep levels by conditioning the VLMs' generative distribution with an interference prefix and performing sentence-level best-of-N to search the most harmless and helpful generation paths. Extensive experiments show that ETA outperforms baseline methods in terms of harmlessness, helpfulness, and efficiency, reducing the unsafe rate by 87.5% in cross-modality attacks and achieving 96.6% win-ties in GPT-4 helpfulness evaluation. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/DripNowhy/ETA.

Video generation models (VGMs) have demonstrated the capability to synthesize high-quality output. It is important to understand their potential to produce unsafe content, such as violent or terrifying videos. In this work, we provide a comprehensive understanding of unsafe video generation. First, to confirm the possibility that these models could indeed generate unsafe videos, we choose unsafe content generation prompts collected from 4chan and Lexica, and three open-source SOTA VGMs to generate unsafe videos. After filtering out duplicates and poorly generated content, we created an initial set of 2112 unsafe videos from an original pool of 5607 videos. Through clustering and thematic coding analysis of these generated videos, we identify 5 unsafe video categories: Distorted/Weird, Terrifying, Pornographic, Violent/Bloody, and Political. With IRB approval, we then recruit online participants to help label the generated videos. Based on the annotations submitted by 403 participants, we identified 937 unsafe videos from the initial video set. With the labeled information and the corresponding prompts, we created the first dataset of unsafe videos generated by VGMs. We then study possible defense mechanisms to prevent the generation of unsafe videos. Existing defense methods in image generation focus on filtering either input prompt or output results. We propose a new approach called Latent Variable Defense (LVD), which works within the model's internal sampling process. LVD can achieve 0.90 defense accuracy while reducing time and computing resources by 10x when sampling a large number of unsafe prompts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in various applications. As their usage grows, concerns regarding their safety are rising, especially in maintaining harmless responses when faced with malicious instructions. Many defense strategies have been developed to enhance the safety of LLMs. However, our research finds that existing defense strategies lead LLMs to predominantly adopt a rejection-oriented stance, thereby diminishing the usability of their responses to benign instructions. To solve this problem, we introduce the MoGU framework, designed to enhance LLMs' safety while preserving their usability. Our MoGU framework transforms the base LLM into two variants: the usable LLM and the safe LLM, and further employs dynamic routing to balance their contribution. When encountering malicious instructions, the router will assign a higher weight to the safe LLM to ensure that responses are harmless. Conversely, for benign instructions, the router prioritizes the usable LLM, facilitating usable and helpful responses. On various open-sourced LLMs, we compare multiple defense strategies to verify the superiority of our MoGU framework. Besides, our analysis provides key insights into the effectiveness of MoGU and verifies that our designed routing mechanism can effectively balance the contribution of each variant by assigning weights. Our work released the safer Llama2, Vicuna, Falcon, Dolphin, and Baichuan2.

Model Inversion (MI) attacks aim to reconstruct private training data by abusing access to machine learning models. Contemporary MI attacks have achieved impressive attack performance, posing serious threats to privacy. Meanwhile, all existing MI defense methods rely on regularization that is in direct conflict with the training objective, resulting in noticeable degradation in model utility. In this work, we take a different perspective, and propose a novel and simple Transfer Learning-based Defense against Model Inversion (TL-DMI) to render MI-robust models. Particularly, by leveraging TL, we limit the number of layers encoding sensitive information from private training dataset, thereby degrading the performance of MI attack. We conduct an analysis using Fisher Information to justify our method. Our defense is remarkably simple to implement. Without bells and whistles, we show in extensive experiments that TL-DMI achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) MI robustness. Our code, pre-trained models, demo and inverted data are available at: https://hosytuyen.github.io/projects/TL-DMI

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to Jailbreaking attacks, which aim to extract harmful information by subtly modifying the attack query. As defense mechanisms evolve, directly obtaining harmful information becomes increasingly challenging for Jailbreaking attacks. In this work, inspired by human practices of indirect context to elicit harmful information, we focus on a new attack form called Contextual Interaction Attack. The idea relies on the autoregressive nature of the generation process in LLMs. We contend that the prior context--the information preceding the attack query--plays a pivotal role in enabling potent Jailbreaking attacks. Specifically, we propose an approach that leverages preliminary question-answer pairs to interact with the LLM. By doing so, we guide the responses of the model toward revealing the 'desired' harmful information. We conduct experiments on four different LLMs and demonstrate the efficacy of this attack, which is black-box and can also transfer across LLMs. We believe this can lead to further developments and understanding of the context vector in LLMs.

Sequential recommender systems stand out for their ability to capture users' dynamic interests and the patterns of item-to-item transitions. However, the inherent openness of sequential recommender systems renders them vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where fraudulent users are injected into the training data to manipulate learned patterns. Traditional defense strategies predominantly depend on predefined assumptions or rules extracted from specific known attacks, limiting their generalizability to unknown attack types. To solve the above problems, considering the rich open-world knowledge encapsulated in Large Language Models (LLMs), our research initially focuses on the capabilities of LLMs in the detection of unknown fraudulent activities within recommender systems, a strategy we denote as LLM4Dec. Empirical evaluations demonstrate the substantial capability of LLMs in identifying unknown fraudsters, leveraging their expansive, open-world knowledge. Building upon this, we propose the integration of LLMs into defense strategies to extend their effectiveness beyond the confines of known attacks. We propose LoRec, an advanced framework that employs LLM-Enhanced Calibration to strengthen the robustness of sequential recommender systems against poisoning attacks. LoRec integrates an LLM-enhanced CalibraTor (LCT) that refines the training process of sequential recommender systems with knowledge derived from LLMs, applying a user-wise reweighting to diminish the impact of fraudsters injected by attacks. By incorporating LLMs' open-world knowledge, the LCT effectively converts the limited, specific priors or rules into a more general pattern of fraudsters, offering improved defenses against poisoning attacks. Our comprehensive experiments validate that LoRec, as a general framework, significantly strengthens the robustness of sequential recommender systems.

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) incidents stemming from the exploitation of smart contract vulnerabilities have culminated in financial damages exceeding 3 billion US dollars. Existing defense mechanisms typically focus on detecting and reacting to malicious transactions executed by attackers that target victim contracts. However, with the emergence of private transaction pools where transactions are sent directly to miners without first appearing in public mempools, current detection tools face significant challenges in identifying attack activities effectively. Based on the fact that most attack logic rely on deploying one or more intermediate smart contracts as supporting components to the exploitation of victim contracts, in this paper, we propose a new direction for detecting DeFi attacks that focuses on identifying adversarial contracts instead of adversarial transactions. Our approach allows us to leverage common attack patterns, code semantics and intrinsic characteristics found in malicious smart contracts to build the LookAhead system based on Machine Learning (ML) classifiers and a transformer model that is able to effectively distinguish adversarial contracts from benign ones, and make just-in-time predictions of potential zero-day attacks. Our contributions are three-fold: First, we construct a comprehensive dataset consisting of features extracted and constructed from recent contracts deployed on the Ethereum and BSC blockchains. Secondly, we design a condensed representation of smart contract programs called Pruned Semantic-Control Flow Tokenization (PSCFT) and use it to train a combination of ML models that understand the behaviour of malicious codes based on function calls, control flows and other pattern-conforming features. Lastly, we provide the complete implementation of LookAhead and the evaluation of its performance metrics for detecting adversarial contracts.

We present a novel defense, against backdoor attacks on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), wherein adversaries covertly implant malicious behaviors (backdoors) into DNNs. Our defense falls within the category of post-development defenses that operate independently of how the model was generated. The proposed defense is built upon a novel reverse engineering approach that can directly extract backdoor functionality of a given backdoored model to a backdoor expert model. The approach is straightforward -- finetuning the backdoored model over a small set of intentionally mislabeled clean samples, such that it unlearns the normal functionality while still preserving the backdoor functionality, and thus resulting in a model (dubbed a backdoor expert model) that can only recognize backdoor inputs. Based on the extracted backdoor expert model, we show the feasibility of devising highly accurate backdoor input detectors that filter out the backdoor inputs during model inference. Further augmented by an ensemble strategy with a finetuned auxiliary model, our defense, BaDExpert (Backdoor Input Detection with Backdoor Expert), effectively mitigates 17 SOTA backdoor attacks while minimally impacting clean utility. The effectiveness of BaDExpert has been verified on multiple datasets (CIFAR10, GTSRB and ImageNet) across various model architectures (ResNet, VGG, MobileNetV2 and Vision Transformer).

Federated learning is used to train a shared model in a decentralized way without clients sharing private data with each other. Federated learning systems are susceptible to poisoning attacks when malicious clients send false updates to the central server. Existing defense strategies are ineffective under non-IID data settings. This paper proposes a new defense strategy, FedCPA (Federated learning with Critical Parameter Analysis). Our attack-tolerant aggregation method is based on the observation that benign local models have similar sets of top-k and bottom-k critical parameters, whereas poisoned local models do not. Experiments with different attack scenarios on multiple datasets demonstrate that our model outperforms existing defense strategies in defending against poisoning attacks.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attack, which does not affect the network's performance on clean data but would manipulate the network behavior once a trigger pattern is added. Existing defense methods have greatly reduced attack success rate, but their prediction accuracy on clean data still lags behind a clean model by a large margin. Inspired by the stealthiness and effectiveness of backdoor attack, we propose a simple but highly effective defense framework which injects non-adversarial backdoors targeting poisoned samples. Following the general steps in backdoor attack, we detect a small set of suspected samples and then apply a poisoning strategy to them. The non-adversarial backdoor, once triggered, suppresses the attacker's backdoor on poisoned data, but has limited influence on clean data. The defense can be carried out during data preprocessing, without any modification to the standard end-to-end training pipeline. We conduct extensive experiments on multiple benchmarks with different architectures and representative attacks. Results demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art defense effectiveness with by far the lowest performance drop on clean data. Considering the surprising defense ability displayed by our framework, we call for more attention to utilizing backdoor for backdoor defense. Code is available at https://github.com/damianliumin/non-adversarial_backdoor.

Deep neural networks have been widely used in many critical applications, such as autonomous vehicles and medical diagnosis. However, their security is threatened by backdoor attacks, which are achieved by adding artificial patterns to specific training data. Existing defense strategies primarily focus on using reverse engineering to reproduce the backdoor trigger generated by attackers and subsequently repair the DNN model by adding the trigger into inputs and fine-tuning the model with ground-truth labels. However, once the trigger generated by the attackers is complex and invisible, the defender cannot reproduce the trigger successfully then the DNN model will not be repaired, as the trigger is not effectively removed. In this work, we propose Adversarial Feature Map Pruning for Backdoor (FMP) to mitigate backdoor from the DNN. Unlike existing defense strategies, which focus on reproducing backdoor triggers, FMP attempts to prune backdoor feature maps, which are trained to extract backdoor information from inputs. After pruning these backdoor feature maps, FMP will fine-tune the model with a secure subset of training data. Our experiments demonstrate that, compared to existing defense strategies, FMP can effectively reduce the Attack Success Rate (ASR) even against the most complex and invisible attack triggers (e.g., FMP decreases the ASR to 2.86\% in CIFAR10, which is 19.2\% to 65.41\% lower than baselines). Second, unlike conventional defense methods that tend to exhibit low robust accuracy (that is, the accuracy of the model on poisoned data), FMP achieves a higher RA, indicating its superiority in maintaining model performance while mitigating the effects of backdoor attacks (e.g., FMP obtains 87.40\% RA in CIFAR10). Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/retsuh-bqw/FMP.

Existing neural networks for computer vision tasks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks: adding imperceptible perturbations to the input images can fool these methods to make a false prediction on an image that was correctly predicted without the perturbation. Various defense methods have proposed image-to-image mapping methods, either including these perturbations in the training process or removing them in a preprocessing denoising step. In doing so, existing methods often ignore that the natural RGB images in today's datasets are not captured but, in fact, recovered from RAW color filter array captures that are subject to various degradations in the capture. In this work, we exploit this RAW data distribution as an empirical prior for adversarial defense. Specifically, we proposed a model-agnostic adversarial defensive method, which maps the input RGB images to Bayer RAW space and back to output RGB using a learned camera image signal processing (ISP) pipeline to eliminate potential adversarial patterns. The proposed method acts as an off-the-shelf preprocessing module and, unlike model-specific adversarial training methods, does not require adversarial images to train. As a result, the method generalizes to unseen tasks without additional retraining. Experiments on large-scale datasets (e.g., ImageNet, COCO) for different vision tasks (e.g., classification, semantic segmentation, object detection) validate that the method significantly outperforms existing methods across task domains.

Deepfake defense not only requires the research of detection but also requires the efforts of generation methods. However, current deepfake methods suffer the effects of obscure workflow and poor performance. To solve this problem, we present DeepFaceLab, the current dominant deepfake framework for face-swapping. It provides the necessary tools as well as an easy-to-use way to conduct high-quality face-swapping. It also offers a flexible and loose coupling structure for people who need to strengthen their pipeline with other features without writing complicated boilerplate code. We detail the principles that drive the implementation of DeepFaceLab and introduce its pipeline, through which every aspect of the pipeline can be modified painlessly by users to achieve their customization purpose. It is noteworthy that DeepFaceLab could achieve cinema-quality results with high fidelity. We demonstrate the advantage of our system by comparing our approach with other face-swapping methods.For more information, please visit:https://github.com/iperov/DeepFaceLab/.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaksx2013methods to elicit harmful or generally impermissible outputs. Safety measures are developed and assessed on their effectiveness at defending against jailbreak attacks, indicating a belief that safety is equivalent to robustness. We assert that current defense mechanisms, such as output filters and alignment fine-tuning, are, and will remain, fundamentally insufficient for ensuring model safety. These defenses fail to address risks arising from dual-intent queries and the ability to composite innocuous outputs to achieve harmful goals. To address this critical gap, we introduce an information-theoretic threat model called inferential adversaries who exploit impermissible information leakage from model outputs to achieve malicious goals. We distinguish these from commonly studied security adversaries who only seek to force victim models to generate specific impermissible outputs. We demonstrate the feasibility of automating inferential adversaries through question decomposition and response aggregation. To provide safety guarantees, we define an information censorship criterion for censorship mechanisms, bounding the leakage of impermissible information. We propose a defense mechanism which ensures this bound and reveal an intrinsic safety-utility trade-off. Our work provides the first theoretically grounded understanding of the requirements for releasing safe LLMs and the utility costs involved.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) inherit adversarial vulnerabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), which are further exacerbated by their multimodal nature. Existing defenses, including adversarial training, input transformations, and heuristic detection, are computationally expensive, architecture-dependent, and fragile against adaptive attacks. We introduce EigenShield, an inference-time defense leveraging Random Matrix Theory to quantify adversarial disruptions in high-dimensional VLM representations. Unlike prior methods that rely on empirical heuristics, EigenShield employs the spiked covariance model to detect structured spectral deviations. Using a Robustness-based Nonconformity Score (RbNS) and quantile-based thresholding, it separates causal eigenvectors, which encode semantic information, from correlational eigenvectors that are susceptible to adversarial artifacts. By projecting embeddings onto the causal subspace, EigenShield filters adversarial noise without modifying model parameters or requiring adversarial training. This architecture-independent, attack-agnostic approach significantly reduces the attack success rate, establishing spectral analysis as a principled alternative to conventional defenses. Our results demonstrate that EigenShield consistently outperforms all existing defenses, including adversarial training, UNIGUARD, and CIDER.

Despite the implementation of safety alignment strategies, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which undermine these safety guardrails and pose significant security threats. Some defenses have been proposed to detect or mitigate jailbreaks, but they are unable to withstand the test of time due to an insufficient understanding of jailbreak mechanisms. In this work, we investigate the mechanisms behind jailbreaks based on the Linear Representation Hypothesis (LRH), which states that neural networks encode high-level concepts as subspaces in their hidden representations. We define the toxic semantics in harmful and jailbreak prompts as toxic concepts and describe the semantics in jailbreak prompts that manipulate LLMs to comply with unsafe requests as jailbreak concepts. Through concept extraction and analysis, we reveal that LLMs can recognize the toxic concepts in both harmful and jailbreak prompts. However, unlike harmful prompts, jailbreak prompts activate the jailbreak concepts and alter the LLM output from rejection to compliance. Building on our analysis, we propose a comprehensive jailbreak defense framework, JBShield, consisting of two key components: jailbreak detection JBShield-D and mitigation JBShield-M. JBShield-D identifies jailbreak prompts by determining whether the input activates both toxic and jailbreak concepts. When a jailbreak prompt is detected, JBShield-M adjusts the hidden representations of the target LLM by enhancing the toxic concept and weakening the jailbreak concept, ensuring LLMs produce safe content. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superior performance of JBShield, achieving an average detection accuracy of 0.95 and reducing the average attack success rate of various jailbreak attacks to 2% from 61% across distinct LLMs.

Adversarial attacks have been a looming and unaddressed threat in the industry. However, through a decade-long history of the robustness evaluation literature, we have learned that mounting a strong or optimal attack is challenging. It requires both machine learning and domain expertise. In other words, the white-box threat model, religiously assumed by a large majority of the past literature, is unrealistic. In this paper, we propose a new practical threat model where the adversary relies on transfer attacks through publicly available surrogate models. We argue that this setting will become the most prevalent for security-sensitive applications in the future. We evaluate the transfer attacks in this setting and propose a specialized defense method based on a game-theoretic perspective. The defenses are evaluated under 24 public models and 11 attack algorithms across three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet). Under this threat model, our defense, PubDef, outperforms the state-of-the-art white-box adversarial training by a large margin with almost no loss in the normal accuracy. For instance, on ImageNet, our defense achieves 62% accuracy under the strongest transfer attack vs only 36% of the best adversarially trained model. Its accuracy when not under attack is only 2% lower than that of an undefended model (78% vs 80%). We release our code at https://github.com/wagner-group/pubdef.

Authorship identification has proven unsettlingly effective in inferring the identity of the author of an unsigned document, even when sensitive personal information has been carefully omitted. In the digital era, individuals leave a lasting digital footprint through their written content, whether it is posted on social media, stored on their employer's computers, or located elsewhere. When individuals need to communicate publicly yet wish to remain anonymous, there is little available to protect them from unwanted authorship identification. This unprecedented threat to privacy is evident in scenarios such as whistle-blowing. Proposed defenses against authorship identification attacks primarily aim to obfuscate one's writing style, thereby making it unlinkable to their pre-existing writing, while concurrently preserving the original meaning and grammatical integrity. The presented work offers a comprehensive review of the advancements in this research area spanning over the past two decades and beyond. It emphasizes the methodological frameworks of modification and generation-based strategies devised to evade authorship identification attacks, highlighting joint efforts from the differential privacy community. Limitations of current research are discussed, with a spotlight on open challenges and potential research avenues.

With increasingly more data and computation involved in their training, machine learning models constitute valuable intellectual property. This has spurred interest in model stealing, which is made more practical by advances in learning with partial, little, or no supervision. Existing defenses focus on inserting unique watermarks in a model's decision surface, but this is insufficient: the watermarks are not sampled from the training distribution and thus are not always preserved during model stealing. In this paper, we make the key observation that knowledge contained in the stolen model's training set is what is common to all stolen copies. The adversary's goal, irrespective of the attack employed, is always to extract this knowledge or its by-products. This gives the original model's owner a strong advantage over the adversary: model owners have access to the original training data. We thus introduce dataset inference, the process of identifying whether a suspected model copy has private knowledge from the original model's dataset, as a defense against model stealing. We develop an approach for dataset inference that combines statistical testing with the ability to estimate the distance of multiple data points to the decision boundary. Our experiments on CIFAR10, SVHN, CIFAR100 and ImageNet show that model owners can claim with confidence greater than 99% that their model (or dataset as a matter of fact) was stolen, despite only exposing 50 of the stolen model's training points. Dataset inference defends against state-of-the-art attacks even when the adversary is adaptive. Unlike prior work, it does not require retraining or overfitting the defended model.

Deep neural networks have been shown to be susceptible to adversarial examples -- small, imperceptible changes constructed to cause mis-classification in otherwise highly accurate image classifiers. As a practical alternative, recent work proposed so-called adversarial patches: clearly visible, but adversarially crafted rectangular patches in images. These patches can easily be printed and applied in the physical world. While defenses against imperceptible adversarial examples have been studied extensively, robustness against adversarial patches is poorly understood. In this work, we first devise a practical approach to obtain adversarial patches while actively optimizing their location within the image. Then, we apply adversarial training on these location-optimized adversarial patches and demonstrate significantly improved robustness on CIFAR10 and GTSRB. Additionally, in contrast to adversarial training on imperceptible adversarial examples, our adversarial patch training does not reduce accuracy.