rationality | True and Reasonable
Evidence of Objective Moral Realism
Posted by Joe in atheism, Athesism Christianity, Catholic, christianity, logic, metaethics, Morality, philosophy, rationality, Uncategorized	
apologetics, Atheism, Christianity, logic, meta-ethics., morality, philosophy, rationality, reason, religion
A fellow blogger and sometime commentator here, Howie, asks some questions for theists.
https://truthiselusive.wordpress.com/2016/04/22/meaningful-sadness/
He wonders what effect would it have on our morals if we suddenly found out God did not exist. It’s a great question and I found I could spend allot of time answering this.
In my response I indicate that “I would highly doubt any objective morality exists in reality, and if it did exist I would not believe we had any reliable way of knowing what it was.”
I have blogged extensively about the second part of that statement:
Here I want to address the first part. I want to explain why “I would I highly doubt any objective morality exists in reality” if I found out God did not exist.
But first, I want to reiterate that I do not think there is any logical inconsistency with atheism and belief in objective morality. That said I am unaware of any actual evidence that an atheist would have for believing in objective morality. That is, if we were to know there is no God then all the evidence we have for objective morality goes out the window. It’s one thing to say objective morality is logically possible, it’s another to say we have some evidence that it is true.
To understand my position let’s start with a reverse question for atheists. Let’s say you suddenly find out that the Christian God exists. What would that mean for your views on morality?
I would think most people would agree that if the Christian God exists, then it’s very likely that objective moral realism is true. God orchestrated our existence and reality so that we might be ultimately judged and this judgment will be just. Reality would have been built with this moral feature.
From that, it follows that evidence that the Christian creator God exists is also evidence that objective morality is a feature of reality. The evidence that the Christian God exists would be things like the miracles recorded in scripture. Again people can debate whether this is strong evidence or weak evidence, and what if any burden of proof there is, but it is “some evidence.” This also happens to be the only evidence that our objective reality contains moral characteristics. (I don’t mean to exclude other religions that teach of a Creator God who had a hand in creating a moral reality. So yes evidence for Islam, or Judaism would also be evidence for objective moral realism but here for simplicity sake I am just taking Christianity versus atheism.) So the logic is exhibit A suggest exhibit B. Exhibit B Suggests exhibit C. A = miracles B=Christian God exists and C = Objective moral realism is true.
Do we have other evidence that objective morals are actually a feature of reality? I really don’t think so. Again because “wrongness” cannot be detected by our 5 senses it seems impossible to have evidence of it outside of testimonial evidence from someone who is not bound by our 5 senses.
The fact that we feel strong guttural emotional responses when we see certain “good” or “bad” actions is not, to my mind, evidence that there is actually a real objective truth to moral claims. However, if something with a supernatural understanding designed us then of course we might think our emotions are properly cued to these real moral truths.
So the Christian God existing would be strong evidence that real objective morals would exist. If we were to eliminate that evidence of objective moral reality existing (Say because we “find out” no God exists) then we are hard pressed to find *any* evidence of objective moral reality. That’s not to say its logically impossible for objective moral reality to exist without God. Nonetheless, it would be a huge blow to objective moral realism’s case to lose – exhibit B – the existence of God.
Dealing with Uncertainty in a Rational Way
Christianity, Clifford, James, Pascal, Pascal's wager, philosophy, rationality, reasonableness, religion
In my last blog I explained that I learned we need to deal with uncertainty. I have found that many people do a very bad job in dealing with uncertainty. They demand certainty and if they don’t get it, they sort of mentally turn off. I think rational people take actions (which I think can include holding beliefs or at least trying to hold certain beliefs) in light of uncertainty. That’s really what I think being rational is all about.
In doing this we not only need to consider the likelihood that a belief is true but also consider the consequences that would occur if our beliefs end up being right or wrong. Of course Pascal’s famous wager brings this up. I am not necessarily going to argue the wager in the same way Pascal did, but I do contend that rational people must weigh the consequences of the actions including the act of trying to believe something or other.
BTW I think Pascal’s wager is likely the victim of the more ill-founded criticisms than about any other philosophical argument. Here is a good paper on it by Lycan and Schlesinger if you are interested:
Click to access pascalswager.pdf
In my post discussing what it means to be rational I argued that Clifford’s claim “”it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” was illogical because it was self-defeating.
But I think there is at least one other problem. It seems to only view one of the essential aspects of making a rational decision to believe or not. It seems to only address the chance of the belief being true. It does not address the consequences of believing one thing and being right or wrong about it.
William James gives a good counter argument in this regard. He says that if it is the case that by believing I will survive cancer, I will actually increase my chances of surviving, then it is rational for me to believe I will survive cancer. This is so even if the evidence doesn’t suggest I will. So if my chance of survival doubles from 1% to 2% if I believe I will survive it’s hard to say I have sufficient evidence to believe I will survive. Yet it seems rational to go ahead and try to double my chances to survive by doing my best to believe.
Is that the only type of situation where this might come up? I don’t think so. I think in morals it comes up often. I believe every time we are tempted to do wrong it is easy to waiver unless we strongly commit to believe certain moral standards. Often we will commit to believing moral standards well beyond the “evidence” that the moral standards really exist. Whether there can even be “evidence” that a moral standard exists, and what such evidence would look like, will be the topic of another blog.
If anyone would like to comment on what they think evidence of objective moral standards would look like I would enjoy reading it. Also feel free to just put a link to it in the comments.
True and Rational
Clifford, definitions, evidence, logic, philosophy, rationality, reason, religion
What is rational is subject to a bit more controversy than how truth is understood. Accordingly I am just going to gloss over some ideas that I tend to believe about what it means to be rational.
First I think I would distinguish the irrationality of people who are insane. It seems to me that this sort of irrationality is beyond the person’s control. We are trying to be rational. To the extent we are trying to become rational we to some extent believe we have some control over this. Indeed I would say that an important part of being rational is recognizing what is beyond our control and acting accordingly.
I also tend to think of being rational in terms of game theory. That is make rational or irrational choices. This I think can extend to what beliefs we hold – to the extent we can choose them.
So just a quick outline of what it means to be rational would be:
1) Not be illogical
2) Not be overly concerned with things beyond your control
3) Make choices based on analysis of the risks and benefits of your alternatives
4) Rational people tend not to go on emotion.
Some people will notice that I do not include Clifford’s claim “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” Frankly this claim has always seemed self-defeating and therefore in violation of the first principle I outlined – don’t be illogical.
That is, I do not have sufficient evidence to believe “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” and so believing that principle would violate it.
This is just an off the cuff outline. Perhaps we could add some other concepts to this outline. For example I think rational people consider evidence for and against their position. But I think to the extent there is a difference between being “rational” and being “reasonable” I would say that belongs more along the lines of being reasonable, but think it could fit here as well. And the terms reasonable and being rational are very close anyway.