Title: On the System-Level Effectiveness of Physical Object-Hiding Adversarial Attack in Autonomous Driving. Abstract: In Autonomous Driving (AD) systems, perception is crucial for both security and safety. Among the different attacks on AD perception, the physical object-hiding adversarial attacks are especially severe due to their direct impact on road safety.
However, we find that all existing works so far only evaluate their attack effect at the targeted AI component level, without any evaluation \textit{at the system level}, i.e., with the entire system semantics and context such as the full AD system pipeline and closed-loop control. This thus inevitably raise a critical research question: can these existing research efforts actually effectively achieve the desired system-level attack effects (e.g., causing vehicle collisions, traffic rule violations, etc.) in the real-world AD system context?

In the paper, we thus perform the first measurement study on whether and how effective the existing designs can lead to system-level effects, where we take the STOP sign-hiding attack as our target. Our evaluation results show that all the representative prior works cannot achieve any system-level effect in a classical closed-loop AD setup in road speeds controlled by common STOP signs. With that, we then point out two limitation hypotheses that appear in all existing works: 1) the unpractical STOP sign size distribution in pixel sampling, and 2) missing particular consideration in system-critical attack range. Experimental results demonstrate that after overcoming these two limitations, the system-level effects can be further improved, i.e., the violation rate can increase around 70\%.