title: Privilege escalation in Google Drive for Desktop on MacOS
description: An attacker can pre-create the `/Applications/Google\ Drive.app/Contents/MacOS` directory which is expected to be owned by root to be owned by a non-root user. When the Drive for Desktop installer is run for the first time, it will place a binary in that directory with execute permissions and set its setuid bit. Since the attacker owns the directory, the attacker can replace the binary with a symlink, causing the installer to set the setuid bit on the symlink. When the symlink is executed, it will run with root permissions. We recommend upgrading past version 64.0
problem types: CWE-264 Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls
affected:
{
vendor: Google LLC
product: Drive for Desktop MacOS
versions:
version: unspecified, lessThan: 64.0, status: affected, versionType: custom
}
metrics:
cvssV3_1: [
version: 3.1
vectorString: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
attackVector: LOCAL
attackComplexity: LOW
privilegesRequired: LOW
userInteraction: REQUIRED
scope: UNCHANGED
confidentialityImpact: NONE
integrityImpact: HIGH
availabilityImpact: LOW
baseScore: 5.6
baseSeverity: MEDIUM
]