title: Leaking sensitive user information still possible by filtering on private with prefix fields
description: Strapi is an open-source headless content management system. Prior to version 4.10.8, it is possible to leak private fields if one is using the `t(number)` prefix. Knex query allows users to change the default prefix. For example, if someone changes the prefix to be the same as it was before or to another table they want to query, the query changes from `password` to `t1.password`. `password` is protected by filtering protections but `t1.password` is not protected. This can lead to filtering attacks on everything related to the object again, including admin passwords and reset-tokens. Version 4.10.8 fixes this issue.
problem types: CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
affected:
{
vendor: strapi
product: strapi
versions:
version: < 4.10.8, status: affected
}
metrics:
cvssV3_1: [
attackComplexity: LOW
attackVector: NETWORK
availabilityImpact: NONE
baseScore: 8.6
baseSeverity: HIGH
confidentialityImpact: HIGH
integrityImpact: NONE
privilegesRequired: NONE
scope: CHANGED
userInteraction: NONE
vectorString: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
version: 3.1
]