title: SK_LOAD timing side channel during AES module decryption in Texas Instruments OMAP L138
description: The AES implementation in the Texas Instruments OMAP L138 (secure variants), present in mask ROM, suffers from a timing side channel which can be exploited by an adversary with non-secure supervisor privileges by managing cache contents and collecting timing information for different ciphertext inputs. Using this side channel, the SK_LOAD secure kernel routine can be used to recover the Customer Encryption Key (CEK).
problem types: Observable Timing Discrepancy
affected:
{
defaultStatus: affected
vendor: Texas Instruments
product: OMAP
versions:
version: L138, status: affected
}
metrics:
format: CVSS
scenarios: GENERAL
cvssV3_1: [
version: 3.1
attackVector: LOCAL
attackComplexity: LOW
privilegesRequired: HIGH
userInteraction: NONE
scope: UNCHANGED
confidentialityImpact: HIGH
integrityImpact: HIGH
availabilityImpact: NONE
baseScore: 4.4
baseSeverity: CRITICAL
vectorString: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N/E:F/RL:U/RC:C/CR:H/IR:H/AR:H/MAV:L/MAC:L/MPR:H/MUI:N/MS:U/MC:H/MI:N/MA:N
]