2254
The system should account for security primitive behavior when cooled outside standard
temperatures.
MemberOf Relationships
This MemberOf relationships table shows additional CWE Catgeories and Views that reference this
weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits
within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name Page
MemberOf 1205 Security Primitives and Cryptography Issues 1194 2473
MemberOf 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability 1358 2502
MemberOf 1388 Physical Access Issues and Concerns 1194 2518
MemberOf 1405 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Check or
Handling of Exceptional Conditions
1400 2531
Related Attack Patterns
CAPEC-ID Attack Pattern Name
624 Hardware Fault Injection
625 Mobile Device Fault Injection
References
[REF-1181]Nikolaos Athanasios Anagnostopoulos, Tolga Arul, Markus Rosenstihl, André
Schaller, Sebastian Gabmeyer and Stefan Katzenbeisser. "Low-Temperature Data Remnanence
Attacks Against Intrinsic SRAM PUFs". 2018 October 5. < https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/
document/8491873/ >.
[REF-1182]Yuan Cao, Yunyi Guo, Benyu Liu, Wei Ge, Min Zhu and Chip-Hong Chang. "A Fully
Digital Physical Unclonable Function Based Temperature Sensor for Secure Remote Sensing".
2018 October 1. < https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8487347/ >.
[REF-1183] Urbi Chatterjee, Soumi Chatterjee, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay and Rajat Subhra
Chakraborty. "Machine Learning Assisted PUF Calibration for Trustworthy Proof of Sensor Data in
IoT". 2020 June. < https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3393628 >.2023-04-07.
CWE-1357: Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component
Weakness ID : 1357
Structure : Simple
Abstraction : Class
Description
The product is built from multiple separate components, but it uses a component that is not
sufficiently trusted to meet expectations for security, reliability, updateability, and maintainability.
Extended Description
Many modern hardware and software products are built by combining multiple smaller components
together into one larger entity, often during the design or architecture phase. For example, a
hardware component might be built by a separate supplier, or the product might use an opensource
software library from a third party.
Regardless of the source, each component should be sufficiently trusted to ensure correct, secure
operation of the product. If a component is not trustworthy, it can produce significant risks for
the overall product, such as vulnerabilities that cannot be patched fast enough (if at all); hidden
functionality such as malware; inability to update or replace the component if needed for security
purposes; hardware components built from parts that do not meet specifications in ways that can
lead to weaknesses; etc. Note that a component might not be trustworthy even if it is owned by
CWE Version 4.14
CWE-1357: Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component
CWE-1357: Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component