2224
Testing of memory-device contents after clearing or erase commands. Dynamic analysis of
memory contents during device operation to detect specific, confidential assets. Architecture and
design analysis of memory clear and erase operations.
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
Testing of memory-device contents after clearing or erase commands. Dynamic analysis of
memory contents during device operation to detect specific, confidential assets. Architecture and
design analysis of memory clear and erase operations.
Potential Mitigations
Phase: Architecture and Design
Support for secure-erase commands that apply multiple cycles of overwriting memory with
known patterns and of erasing actual content. Support for cryptographic erase in self-encrypting,
memory devices. External, physical tools to erase memory such as ultraviolet-rays-based erase
of Electrically erasable, programmable, read-only memory (EEPROM). Physical destruction of
media device. This is done for repurposed or scrapped devices that are no longer in use.
Demonstrative Examples
Example 1:
Consider a device that uses flash memory for non-volatile-data storage. To optimize flash-access
performance or reliable-flash lifetime, the device might limit the number of flash writes/erases
by maintaining some state in internal SRAM and only committing changes to flash memory
periodically.
The device also supports user reset to factory defaults with the expectation that all personal
information is erased from the device after this operation. On factory reset, user files are erased
using explicit, erase commands supported by the flash device.
In the given, system design, the flash-file system can support performance-optimized erase such
that only the file metadata are erased and not the content. If this optimized erase is used for files
containing user data during factory-reset flow, then device, flash memory can contain remanent
data from these files.
On device-factory reset, the implementation might not erase these copies, since the file
organization has changed and the flash file system does not have the metadata to track all
previous copies.
A flash-memory region that is used by a flash-file system should be fully erased as part of the
factory-reset flow. This should include secure-erase flow for the flash media such as overwriting
patterns multiple times followed by erase.
Observed Examples
Reference Description
CVE-2019-8575 Firmware Data Deletion Vulnerability in which a base station factory reset
might not delete all user information. The impact of this enables a new owner
of a used device that has been "factory-default reset" with a vulnerable
firmware version can still retrieve, at least, the previous owner's wireless
network name, and the previous owner's wireless security (such as WPA2)
key. This issue was addressed with improved, data deletion.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2019-8575
MemberOf Relationships
This MemberOf relationships table shows additional CWE Catgeories and Views that reference this
weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits
within the context of external information sources.
CWE Version 4.14
CWE-1331: Improper Isolation of Shared Resources in Network On Chip (NoC)
CWE-1331: Improper Isolation of Shared Resources in Network On Chip (NoC)