>From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
>I think a reasonable answer to this is to restrict VACUUM on any
>table to be allowed only to the table owner and Postgres superuser.
>Does anyone have an objection or better idea?

In the dim and distant past I produced a patch that put vacuum
into the list of things that you could GRANT on a per-table
basis. I don't know what effort it would take to rework that
for current or if it would be worth it.

I think your suggestion above would be perfect if you never
need to allow anyone else to vacuum a table.

I'va attached the old patch below.

Keith.
Tue, 23 Nov 1999 22:18:53 +0000 (GMT)
Keith Parks <emkxp01@mtcc.demon.co.uk>
Re: [HACKERS] VACUUM as a denial-of-service attack
Keith Parks <emkxp01@mtcc.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
>> I think a reasonable answer to this is to restrict VACUUM on any
>> table to be allowed only to the table owner and Postgres superuser.
>> Does anyone have an objection or better idea?

> In the dim and distant past I produced a patch that put vacuum
> into the list of things that you could GRANT on a per-table
> basis. I don't know what effort it would take to rework that
> for current or if it would be worth it.

Thanks for the code, but for now I just threw in a quick pg_ownercheck
call: VACUUM will now vacuum all tables if you are the superuser, else
just the tables you own, skipping the rest with a NOTICE.  What you had
looked like more infrastructure than I thought the problem was worth...
I suspect most people will run VACUUMs from the superuser account
anyway...

			regards, tom lane

Sun, 28 Nov 1999 23:49:15 -0500
Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Re: [HACKERS] VACUUM as a denial-of-service attack 