text:                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
  
  
  
                                   No. 98-31074
                                 Summary Calendar
  
  
  JOSEPH LIGHTELL; ELMER PEOPLES,
                                                               Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                                        versus
  
  EXXON CORPORATION,
                                                               Defendant-Appellee.
  
  
  
                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                                 (97-CV-1600-L)
  
  
                                     June 2, 1999
  Before POLITZ, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
  
  POLITZ, Circuit Judge:*
        In response to Exxon Corporation’s motion for summary judgment, Joseph
  
  Lightell and Elmer Peoples requested that the district court either deny the motion
  
  or delay ruling thereon until discovery had been completed. The district court
  
  effectively denied the delay request by granting summary judgment for Exxon, and
  subsequently refused to alter or amend that judgment. Lightell and Peoples
  
  
    *
      Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should
  not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set
  forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
  challenge the denials of their Rule 56(f) and Rule 59(e) motions. For the reasons
  assigned, we affirm.
  
                                  BACKGROUND
  
        In 1993, Lightell sued Exxon and others in Louisiana state court for damages
  after a boat in which he was traveling allegedly struck a submerged object,
  
  purportedly a well head. Lightell contacted the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
  
  investigate the submerged object but, according to Lightell, the Corps was unable
  
  to locate the object. In 1996 Lightell enlisted Peoples to ferry him to the location
  of the submerged object so that he could mark the spot with a buoy to facilitate the
  Corps’ investigation. While attempting to locate the submerged object Lightell and
  Peoples allegedly struck it and suffered injuries.
  
        In November 1995 Exxon moved for summary judgment in Lightell’s
  negligence action. The state court twice granted Lightell additional time to obtain
  
  evidence of Exxon’s custody, ownership, or control of the submerged object. In
  March 1996, by which time Lightell’s efforts had produced no such evidence, the
  state court granted Exxon’s motion and entered judgment in its favor. 1
  
        In May 1997 appellants filed suit against Exxon in state court which Exxon
  
  removed to the court a quo. In April 1998 Exxon moved for summary judgment
  because appellants had produced no evidence that it owned, placed, or maintained
  
  the submerged object. Later that month appellants requested that Exxon’s motion
  
  
  
    1
      Lightell v. Exxon Corp. et al., No. 93-22895 (Division “L”, Parish of Orleans,
  La., Mar. 18, 1996).
                                           2
  for summary judgment be denied or that the court’s ruling be delayed until the
  close of discovery. In August 1998 the district court granted summary judgment
  
  for Exxon. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration which the district court
  
  interpreted as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). Same was
  denied. Appellants appeal the district court’s denials of their Rule 56(f) and Rule
  
  59(e) motions.
  
                                      ANALYSIS
  
          We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion to
  continue to proceed with discovery.2 To obtain a continuance to proceed with
  discovery, a party must detail the need for additional discovery and how that
  discovery will create a genuine issue of material fact.3 Rule 56(f) provides that a
  
  continuance to allow for further discovery may be ordered as is “just.” Beyond this
  directive to be “just,” the text of the rule provides no further guidance. The
  
  relevant case law, however, provides ample direction for our inquiry.
          Discovery may be limited when dilatorily sought. Precedent reveals that the
  fact-bound determination whether discovery was dilatorily sought should be guided
  
  by several factors, including: (1) the period of the pendency of the case prior to the
  
  Rule 56(f) request; (2) whether and when plaintiff could have anticipated its need
  for the requested discovery; (3) the previous efforts, if any, made by plaintiff to
  
  obtain the needed information either through Rule discovery or otherwise; (4) the
  
     2
         Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 694 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1983).
    3
     Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., No. 97-30595, 1999 WL 137330 (5th Cir. Mar. 15,
  1999).
                                            3
  degree and nature of discovery already undertaken; (5) any limitations previously
  placed upon discovery by the trial court; (6) any prior solicitations of or provisions
  
  for discovery by the trial court; (7) any warning which plaintiff might have had
  
  that, absent a speedier request, discovery might be denied and his claim dismissed;
  and (8) whether the requested information was inaccessible to plaintiff, as when
  
  within defendant’s exclusive control, or whether alternative, accessible sources
  
  existed but were foregone.4
  
          Appellants maintain the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant
  their motion because (1) witnesses, who “might” have information linking Exxon
  and the submerged object, were scheduled to be deposed shortly after the date that
  the district court granted summary judgment for Exxon; (2) Exxon changed counsel
  
  during the pendency of the case, contributing to the delay in discovery; (3) the
  district court lulled them into believing that their Rule 56(f) motion had been
  
  granted because it had been pending for several months; and (4) the district court
  had recently granted Exxon’s motion to extend the discovery deadline.
          We find no abuse of discretion by the district court in its denial of appellants’
  
  Rule 56(f) motion. Appellants were required to detail the additional discovery that
  
  they sought to undertake; the record does not reflect that they provided the district
  court with such detail, and they have suggested to us only two witnesses, Marvin
  
  Smith and Charles Desporte. About Smith, we are told only that he is a fact
  
  witness. As for Desporte, according to appellants, he is a former Exxon employee
  
  
     4
         Paul Kadair, Inc., 694 F.2d at 1031.
                                              4
  who was familiar with Exxon’s construction activity in the area of the submerged
  object.   Appellants advise, however, that Desporte provided an affidavit in
  
  Lightell’s 1993 suit in which no connection between Exxon and the object was
  
  established. At the time appellants filed their suit, they obviously were aware of
  the importance of linking Exxon to the submerged object; and they were aware of
  
  Smith and Desporte, having included them on their witness list in January 1998.
  
  There is no indication in the record that Smith or Desporte were unavailable to
  
  appellants. There is no indication that appellants attempted to obtain the requested
  information despite possessing addresses for both as well as Desporte’s phone
  number.    We reject appellants’ contention that the district court abused its
  discretion by denying their Rule 56(f) motion when witnesses who might have
  
  linked Exxon and the submerged object were scheduled to be deposed shortly after
  the grant of summary judgment for Exxon.5
  
         Appellants’ remaining contentions might prove persuasive in another setting,
  but here, where appellants seek no discovery other than that described above, we
  find these contentions without force. We conclude that the district court did not
  
  abuse its discretion by denying appellants’ Rule 56(f) motion.
  
         In pressing their contention that the district court abused its discretion by
  denying their Rule 59(e) motion, appellants present arguments similar to those
  
  previously discussed. Having already rejected those arguments regarding the
  
  
     5
      Cf. First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968) (finding not
  improper the denial of Rule 56(f) discovery when additional discovery would
  amount to a fishing expedition and would unduly harass defendant).
                                           5
  district court’s denial of their Rule 56(f) motion, we find no abuse of discretion in
  the district court’s denial of their Rule 59(e) motion.
  
        For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment denying appellants’
  
  Rule 56(f) and Rule 59(e) motions is AFFIRMED.
  
  
  
  
                                           6
  