text:                             UNPUBLISHED
  
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                         FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
  
  
                              No. 10-6938
  
  
  CORNELL F. DAYE,
  
                  Plaintiff – Appellant,
  
            v.
  
  JIM RUBENSTEIN, Commissioner Department of Corrections
  (Under and up to the limits of the liability insurance
  coverage); CHARLENE SOTAK, Grievance Coordinator Department
  of Corrections (Under and up to the limits of the State’s
  liability insurance coverage); THOMAS MCBRIDE, Ex-Warden
  Mount   Olive   Correctional   Complex   (Individually  and
  Officially or Alternatively under and up to the limits of
  the State’s liability insurance coverage); DENVER RUSSELL,
  CO. 1 Mount Olive Correctional Complex (Individually and
  Officially or Alternatively under and up to the limits of
  the State’s liability insurance coverage),
  
                  Defendants - Appellees.
  
  
  
  Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
  District of West Virginia, at Charleston.  Joseph R. Goodwin,
  Chief District Judge. (2:09-cv-00909-JRG)
  
  
  Submitted:   February 10, 2011                Decided:   March 17, 2011
  
  
  Before WILKINSON and     GREGORY,   Circuit    Judges,   and   HAMILTON,
  Senior Circuit Judge.
  
  
  Vacated and remanded in part; affirmed in part by unpublished
  per curiam opinion.
  Cornell F. Daye, Appellant Pro Se.
  
  
  Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
  
  
  
  
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  PER CURIAM:
  
                 Cornell      F.   Daye       appeals       from    the     district      court’s
  
  order adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate
  
  judge    and    dismissing        his       42    U.S.C.     § 1983       (2006)    complaint
  
  pursuant       to   28    U.S.C.        § 1915A         (2006).          Daye    sued    prison
  
  officials,      challenging           his   treatment       at    his     prison    job.         On
  
  appeal, he raises two claims: (1) his complaint properly pled an
  
  equal protection claim and (2) his state retaliatory discharge
  
  claim    should       have       been       considered       as     a     First     Amendment
  
  retaliation claim, based upon his allegations that he was fired
  
  for   complaining        about        racial      discrimination.           We     vacate    and
  
  remand in part and affirm in part.
  
                 Pursuant to § 1915A, a district court shall dismiss a
  
  case at any time if it determines that the action is frivolous
  
  or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
  
  granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
  
  immune   from       suit.        28    U.S.C.         § 1915A(b).        Allegations        in    a
  
  complaint are to be liberally construed, and a court should not
  
  dismiss an action for failure to state a claim “unless after
  
  accepting       all      well-pleaded            allegations        in    the      plaintiff’s
  
  complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences
  
  from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor, it appears certain
  
  that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of
  
  his claim entitling him to relief.”                        De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330
  
                                                    3
  F.3d    630,    633    (4th      Cir.   2003).          Pro      se    filings      “however
  
  unskillfully pleaded, must be liberally construed.”                                 Noble v.
  
  Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994).                             We review de
  
  novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim
  
  pursuant to § 1915A.           Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d
  
  243, 248 (4th Cir. 2005).
  
                To succeed on an equal protection claim, a prisoner
  
  must first show that he was treated differently from others who
  
  were similarly situated and that the unequal treatment resulted
  
  from intentional or purposeful discrimination.                            Once he makes
  
  this showing, the prisoner must allege facts that, if “true,
  
  would      demonstrate         that      the        disparate          treatment         lacks
  
  justification under the requisite level of scrutiny.”                               Veney v.
  
  Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 2002).                        Racial discrimination
  
  in   prisoner    job   assignments          states      a   violation      of      the   Equal
  
  Protection Clause.            See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)
  
  (finding      violation     of      Equal   Protection           Clause   in       employment
  
  context);      Henry   v.     Van    Cleve,       469   F.2d     687   (5th     Cir.     1972)
  
  (finding equal protection claim where prisoner alleged racial
  
  discrimination in application of visiting privileges).
  
                Liberally     construing         Daye’s       complaint,        we    conclude
  
  that    his    allegations       are    sufficient          to   survive      the    initial
  
  review under § 1915A.               See De’Lonta, 330 F.3d at 633.                        Daye
  
  asserted that black inmates were ordered from their assigned
  
                                                4
  tasks    and    made    to   perform     more     degrading         tasks,       while    white
  
  inmates were allowed to take over the originally-assigned tasks.
  
  Daye asserted that these decisions were made on the basis of
  
  race    with    the     intent    to   humiliate         and    embarrass         the     black
  
  inmates.        While    Daye’s    complaint       may    be     inartfully         pled,   it
  
  appears without question that he could prove a set of facts that
  
  would entitle him to relief.               Specifically, if Daye could prove
  
  that    the    black    inmates    and    the   white         inmates    were      similarly
  
  situated; that the black inmates were routinely assigned less
  
  desirable tasks while white inmates received preferred tasks;
  
  and that these decisions were made on the basis of race, he
  
  would have shown a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
  
  Accordingly, the district court erred in dismissing Daye’s equal
  
  protection claim.
  
                 Daye next asserts that the district court should have
  
  liberally       construed        his   complaint         to     allege       a     claim    of
  
  retaliation.           Specifically,      he    claims        that    prison       officials
  
  retaliated against him for his exercise of his “First Amendment
  
  rights” in complaining to officials regarding his job placement
  
  and the related alleged discrimination.                       For an inmate to state
  
  a colorable claim of retaliation, the alleged retaliatory action
  
  must    have    been     taken    with    regard     to       the    exercise       of     some
  
  constitutionally         protected       right,    or     the       retaliatory          action
  
  itself must violate such a right.                 Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75
  
                                              5
  (4th Cir. 1994).          Furthermore, in a retaliation action alleging
  
  First    Amendment       violations,         a       plaintiff      must     show        that    the
  
  conduct       complained       of    adversely          affected       his    constitutional
  
  rights.       ACLU v. Wicomico County, 999 F.2d 780, 785 (4th Cir.
  
  1993).    It is insufficient to show a defendant’s conduct caused
  
  a mere inconvenience.               Id. at n.6.          Moreover, the plaintiff must
  
  allege specific facts supporting the claim of retaliation; bare
  
  assertions       of      retaliation         do       not      establish          a      claim      of
  
  constitutional dimension.                 Adams, 40 F.3d at 74-75.
  
                 We find that, even if the district court should have
  
  construed the complaint as raising a retaliation claim, any such
  
  claim    was    without        merit.        First,         prisoners        do       not    have   a
  
  constitutional right of access to the grievance process.                                     Id. at
  
  75.       Daye’s       verbal        complaints          to     prison       officials           were
  
  essentially       a      grievance,          and        thus,     contrary             to      Daye’s
  
  assertions,        his      expression             of       dissatisfaction              was      not
  
  constitutionally protected.                  Next, Daye failed to demonstrate
  
  that    the    conduct     of       prison    officials         adversely         affected        his
  
  constitutional         rights.              Daye        proceeded      to         file      written
  
  grievances       on      the     issue       and        then     filed        this          lawsuit.
  
  Accordingly,       his    access       to    courts       has    not     been         hindered      or
  
  chilled   in     any     way.        As    such,      Daye’s     retaliation            claim     was
  
  properly dismissed.
  
  
  
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              Daye’s      complaint    also        raised       claims      of     Eighth
  
  Amendment   and    state   law   violations,           as   well   as     conspiracy.
  
  However, on appeal, Daye does not address any of these claims in
  
  his   informal    brief.     Therefore,         consideration        of    any   other
  
  claims not discussed above is deemed waived.                   See 4th Cir. Local
  
  R. 34(b) ("The Court will limit its review to the issues raised
  
  in the informal brief.").
  
              For   the    foregoing   reasons,          we   vacate     the     district
  
  court’s dismissal of Daye’s equal protection claim and remand
  
  for   further     proceedings.       We       affirm    the    dismissal        of   the
  
  remainder of Daye’s complaint.                We dispense with oral argument
  
  because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
  
  in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
  
  decisional process.
  
                                                  VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART;
                                                               AFFIRMED IN PART
  
  
  
  
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