text:                     United States Court of Appeals
                             FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
                                    ___________
  
                                    No. 05-2340
                                    ___________
  
  Vadim Vitalevich Suprun,              *
                                        *
               Petitioner,              *
                                        *
         v.                             * Petition of Review from the Board
                                        * of Immigration Appeals.
  Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General    *
  of the United States of America,      *
                                        *
               Respondent.              *
                                   ___________
  
                              Submitted: March 16, 2006
                                 Filed: April 5, 2006
                                  ___________
  
  Before MURPHY, BOWMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
                           ___________
  
  BENTON, Circuit Judge.
  
       Vadim Vitalevich Suprun challenges a final order of the Board of Immigration
  Appeals (BIA) affirming a departure order. Having jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §
  1252(b), this court affirms.
  
                                          I.
  
         Suprun, a Russian citizen, stayed in the United States beyond his authorized
  date as a "visitor for pleasure." The then-Immigration and Naturalization Service
  started removal proceedings. Suprun countered by requesting asylum, withholding
  of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture based on alleged
  past persecution for being Jewish.
  
         He asserted several incidents of past persecution beginning when he was a
  young boy in the Soviet Union during the 1970s. In school, he was often called anti-
  Semitic names and was once assaulted by another student. At college, he continued
  to suffer some verbal ridicule, and students destroyed his artwork. In 1980, his
  father's tombstone was destroyed. During military service, he continued to be called
  anti-Semitic names and was involved in a fight with another solider.
  
         In 1995, someone broke into Suprun's art studio and vandalized it with anti-
  Semtic graffiti, such as writing "Go to Israel" on his drawing paper. His studio was
  again vandalized in 1997, this time with a Star of David drawn on the door and the
  words "Go to Israel" written near it. The next year, a man came to the door of his
  studio asking for him. When Suprun appeared, the man punched him in the stomach,
  asking: "[F]or whom are you working Jewish man?" After the beating, two friends
  took him to an emergency room.
  
         Suprun's studio was vandalized a third time in 1999, with another Star of David
  drawn on the door. He reported the incident to the Russian Ministry of Justice, and
  left for the United States two weeks later.
  
                                           II.
  
         This court reviews the BIA's factual determinations for substantial evidence,
  and its decision is upheld unless any reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to
  conclude otherwise. See Mamana v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 2006).
  The Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to an alien who is unwilling to
  return to his home country because of "(1) past persecution or (2) a well-founded fear
  of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
  
                                           -2-
  social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1).
  Persecution means "a threat to one's life or freedom on account of one of [these] five
  protected grounds." Eta-Ndu v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 977, 983 (8th Cir. 2005), quoting
  Fisher v. INS, 291 F.3d 491, 497 (8th Cir. 2002). "The BIA has adopted, and we have
  approved as reasonable, a definition of 'persecution' that requires a harm to be
  'inflicted either by the government of [a country] or by persons or an organization that
  the government was unable or unwilling to control." Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d
  918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005), quoting Valioukevitch v. INS, 251 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir.
  2001).
  
         Suprun did not establish past persecution. Most of the incidents he describes
  do not involve threats to his life or freedom, but only name-calling. See Kondakova
  v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 792, 797 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Slurs and harassment do not constitute
  persecution."), citing Fisher, 291 F.3d at 497. He was not present when his studio
  was vandalized and never attacked at his own apartment. See In re O-Z- & I-Z-, 22
  I. & N. Dec. 23, 25–26 (B.I.A. 1998) (Jewish Ukrainian asylum seeker's apartment
  vandalized); cf. Alyas v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir. 2005) (alien whose
  store was vandalized denied asylum because court "recognized that harassment by
  private citizens does not rise to the level of persecution required for asylum
  eligibility"). The two physical fights he details – the first in the early 1980s and the
  second in 1998 – do not establish past persecution because racial slurs alone are not
  enough "to establish a nexus between the attacks and a protected ground." Ming
  Ming Wijono v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2006), citing Lie v. Ashcroft,
  396 F.3d 530, 535–36 (3d Cir. 2005); Halim v. Ashcroft, 109 Fed. Appx. 164, 165–66
  (9th Cir. 2004); see also Setiadi v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 710, 713 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Even
  minor beatings or limited detentions do not usually rise to the level of past
  persecution."). At most, he shows several periodic incidents of harassment which do
  not rise to the level of past persecution. See Salkeld v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 804, 809
  (8th Cir. 2005) (violence was "relatively sporadic" and thus did not "rise to the level
  
  
  
                                            -3-
  of persecution"); Zakirov v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 541, 546 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Low-level
  intimidation and harassment alone do not rise to level of persecution.").
  
         Suprun argues that because the question of whether a government is "unable or
  unwilling to control" private actors is a factual determination, this court must remand
  to the BIA and allow it to make specific findings. See Menjivar, 416 F.3d at 921.
  However, the asylum seeker bears the burden to demonstrate this unwillingness or
  helplessness by the government. See id. In his brief, Suprun alleges only one time
  when he contacted authorities: when he complained to the Ministry of Justice only two
  weeks before he left Russia. In his testimony before the IJ, Suprun indicates he made
  another complaint – this time to a police officer in the street – after his studio was
  broken into in 1997. The policeman told him he needed to go to the district police
  office to make a report, but it is unclear whether he ever did so. Even accepting his
  claims as true, Suprun has not provided any evidence that would compel a reasonable
  fact-finder to conclude that the government was unable or unwilling to control these
  private actors. See id.
  
          Because Suprun did not suffer past persecution, he is not entitled to a rebuttable
  presumption of future persecution. See Reyes-Morales v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 937,
  941 (8th Cir. 2006). "In order to prove a well-founded fear of future persecution, an
  alien must show both that he actually fears persecution and that a 'reasonable person
  in the alien's position would fear persecution if returned to the alien's native country.'"
  Berte v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 993, 996 (8th Cir. 2005), quoting Regalado-Garcia v. INS,
  305 F.3d 784, 788 (8th Cir. 2002). An applicant must establish this well-founded fear
  with "credible, direct, and specific evidence." Eta-Ndu, 411 F.3d at 984, quoting
  Shoaira v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 2004).
  
         Suprun has not provided any credible, direct and specific evidence that
  demonstrates a well-founded fear of future persecution. As explained, the harassment
  in the past by private individuals does not rise to the level of persecution, so neither
  
                                             -4-
  would its sporadic continuance in the future. Moreover, his family members continue
  to live in Russia without incident. See Ming Ming Wijono, 439 F.3d at 873.
  Additionally, the BIA found that "President Putin and top Kremlin officials have
  spoken out against anti-Semitism." Thus, a reasonable person would not fear
  persecution if returned to Russia.
  
         The BIA's determination that Suprun is not eligible for asylum is supported by
  substantial evidence. Because he fails to meet the lesser burden of proving eligibility
  for asylum, he also fails to prove a right to withholding of deportation. See Fisher,
  291 F.3d at 498. Finally, Suprun is not eligible for relief under the Convention
  Against Torture because he cannot show that it is more likely than not that he will be
  tortured if removed to Russia. See Ibrahim v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 1074, 1080 (8th Cir.
  2006).
  
                                           III.
  
        The judgment of the BIA is affirmed.
                       ______________________________
  
  
  
  
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