text:        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                               FOURTH DISTRICT
  
   HADASSAH, THE WOMEN’S ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA,
                            INC.,
                          Appellant,
  
                                        v.
  
     STEPHEN G. MELCER, TRUSTEE, MARSHA E. GELT, ROBERTA
      GELT, JERILYN GELT and NATIONAL MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS
                            SOCIETY,
                            Appellees.
  
                                No. 4D18-623
  
                              [January 9, 2019]
  
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
  Beach County; Janis Brustares Keyser, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2017-CP-
  004190XXXXMB.
  
    William E. Boyes of Boyes, Farina & Matwiczyk, P.A., Palm Beach
  Gardens, for appellant.
  
    Richard S. Geller of Fishback Dominick, Winter Park, for appellee,
  Marsha E. Gelt, and Steven H. Kane of Kane and Koltun, Attorneys at Law,
  Maitland, for appellees, Marsha E. Gelt, Roberta Gelt and Jerilyn Gelt.
  
  KANNER, DANIEL J., Associate Judge.
  
      Three sisters, the current distributees of an irrevocable trust, dispute
  whether several charities are “qualified beneficiaries” of the trust under
  the Florida Trust Code (FTC). We reverse the grant of summary judgment
  to the sisters on our finding that under the plain language of the statute,
  the charities have the rights of qualified beneficiaries.
  
     The trust was created in 1989 by Sylvia Gelt. The trust instrument
  provided that upon her death, a portion of the trust fund was to be placed
  in a Credit Shelter Trust for her husband, Samuel. Upon his death, the
  balance of the Credit Shelter Trust was to be divided into three separate
  trusts for the benefit of their daughters.
     During their lifetimes, the daughters have the right to receive income
  and principal distributions from their respective trusts. They do not have
  general or testamentary powers of appointment over any portion of the
  principal or undistributed income of their respective trusts.
  
     The trust instrument provides that upon the death of each daughter,
  her trust terminates and the balance of the principal and any
  undistributed income is redistributed to the trust(s) of the remaining living
  daughter(s). When the last daughter dies, the trust terminates and the
  trustee is instructed to distribute the remaining principal and
  undistributed income to three named charities.
  
      Sylvia died first and Samuel died in 2016. Their three daughters are
  alive. The trustee filed this action seeking to resign. He named the
  daughters and the charities as defendants, alleging that the “defendants
  are the qualified beneficiaries of the Trust.”
  
     The daughters filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the
  charities are not qualified beneficiaries of the trust. The court found in
  favor of the daughters and Hadassah appealed. 1
  
     Having the rights of a qualified beneficiary of a trust is important
  because under the FTC, a trustee is only required to “inform and account”
  to a trust’s qualified beneficiaries. § 736.0813, Fla. Stat. (2017). Whether
  a charitable organization has the rights of a qualified beneficiary is a
  question of statutory interpretation. The relevant section of the FTC
  provides:
  
            (1) A charitable organization expressly designated to
        receive distributions under the terms of a charitable trust has
        the rights of a qualified beneficiary under this code if the
        charitable organization, on the date the charitable
        organization’s qualification is being determined:
            (a) Is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust
        income or principal;
            (b) Would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust
        income or principal on termination of the interests of other
        distributees or permissible distributees then receiving or eligible
        to receive distributions; or
            (c) Would be a distributee or permissible distributee of
        trust income or principal if the trust terminated on that date.
  
  1 Originally, two of the three charities appealed. However, one of the charities
  dismissed its appeal, leaving Hadassah the sole remaining appellant.
  
                                        -2-
  § 736.0110(1), Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphasis added). A “distributee” is a
  beneficiary who is currently entitled to receive a distribution. § 736.0103
  (6), Fla. Stat. (2017).
  
     We find the charities are qualified beneficiaries under section
  736.0110(1)(b). On the relevant date, the daughters were the only “other
  distributees or permissible distributees then receiving or eligible to receive
  distributions” of trust income or principal. Id. “[O]n termination of the
  interests” of the daughters, the charities “would be” distributees. Id.
  (emphasis added).
  
     The statute and the trust instrument are clear and unambiguous. If
  the daughters’ interests terminate, the charities take the remainder.
  Therefore, the charities are qualified beneficiaries under section
  736.0110(1)(b).
  
     The error in the lower court’s reasoning is found in paragraph 7 where
  the court found:
  
        7. Each daughter is the sole distributee or permissible
        distributee of her separate Trust. Upon the termination of
        each daughter’s separate trust, the only distributee or
        permissible distributee of trust income or principal would be
        the “Trusts created herein for Grantor’s surviving daughters,
        in equal shares, or to the Trust of the sole surviving daughter,
        as the case may be,” as provided in article 4, paragraph
        b.(2)(d) of the Trust.
  
     The lower court’s order contemplates the sequential termination of the
  daughters’ individual interests such that A’s interest passes to B and C;
  then B’s interest passes to C; then C’s interest passes to the charities.
  This interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the statute.
  
     The statute contemplates the simultaneous termination of the interests
  of the distributees (“termination of the interests of other distributees or
  permissible distributees then receiving or eligible to receive distributions”).
  If the interests of the distributees of the trust were simultaneously
  terminated, all of the daughters’ interests would terminate and the
  charities would be the distributees. Therefore, the charities are qualified
  beneficiaries under the plain language of the statute.
  
     Accordingly we reverse the trial court’s order of summary judgment and
  remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
  
  
                                       -3-
    Reversed and remanded.
  
  DAMOORGIAN and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.
  
                            *           *   *
  
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
  
  
  
  
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