text:                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
  
  
  
  
                                       IN THE
                ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                   DIVISION ONE
  
  
                                ALMA M., Appellant,
  
                                           v.
  
              DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.O., L.O., E.R.,
                   L.R., M.R., M.R., B.C., A.C., Appellees.
  
                                No. 1 CA-JV 17-0275
                                  FILED 10-31-2017
  
  
              Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                                No. JD 528882
                  The Honorable Arthur T. Anderson, Judge
  
                                     AFFIRMED
  
  
                                      COUNSEL
  
  Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
  By Suzanne W. Sanchez
  Counsel for Appellant
  
  Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa
  By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek
  Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety
                            ALMA M. v. DCS et al.
                             Decision of the Court
  
  
  
                        MEMORANDUM DECISION
  
  Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which
  Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined.
  
  
  C A M P B E L L, Judge:
  
  ¶1           In this appeal, Alma M. (“Mother”) challenges the juvenile
  court’s order terminating her parental rights to eight of her children.
  Mother argues the juvenile court failed to make and reduce to writing each
  of the required findings of fact and law necessary for termination. She
  contends the termination order is therefore invalid and must be vacated.
  We disagree and affirm.
  
               FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
  
  ¶2            Mother is the biological mother of eight children (“the
  Children”). The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) first took the
              1
  
  Children into custody in June 2015 due to allegations of sexual abuse
  perpetrated by Mother’s significant other against at least two of the
  Children. Mother was aware of the sexual abuse but she neither removed
  the abuser from contact with her Children nor alerted the authorities to the
  abuse. Mother was later incarcerated and deported to Mexico.
  
  ¶3            The juvenile court terminated the parent-child relationship
  between Mother and all eight of the Children in June 2017. The court
  ordered termination based on, among others, the statutory ground of
  neglect or willful abuse under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section
  8-533(B)(2).2
  
                                DISCUSSION
  
  ¶4           Mother does not argue that the juvenile court had insufficient
  evidence to terminate her parental rights to her children. On appeal, she
  argues only that the juvenile court failed to make and record in its written
  
         1None of the Children’s respective fathers are parties to this appeal.
         2If clear and convincing evidence supports any one of the statutory
  grounds on which the juvenile court ordered severance, we need not
  address claims pertaining to the other grounds. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
  Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251, ¶ 27 (2000).
  
  
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                             ALMA M. v. DCS et al.
                              Decision of the Court
  
  order each of the factual and legal findings required to support the
  termination of her parental rights.
  
  ¶5             Pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-538(A) and Rule of Procedure for
  Juvenile Court 66(F), the juvenile court is required to (1) conclude that at
  least one statutory ground for termination is met by clear and convincing
  evidence, (2) conclude that the petitioner has proved severance is in the
  child’s best interest by a preponderance of the evidence, and (3) specify at
  least one factual finding sufficient to support both of those conclusions of
  law. See Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 241, ¶¶ 21-22
  (App. 2012). These findings and any orders “shall be in the form of a signed
  order or set forth in a signed minute entry.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(F).
  
  ¶6             We generally do not consider objections raised for the first
  time on appeal—particularly as they relate to the alleged lack of detail in
  the findings of the juvenile court. Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214
  Ariz. 445, 452, ¶¶ 20-21 (App. 2007) (a mother waived her objection to the
  lack of specificity in a severance order by not raising the issue of deficiencies
  in the juvenile court). A party “may not sit back and not call the trial court’s
  attention to the lack of a specific finding on a critical issue, and then urge
  on appeal that mere lack of a finding on that critical issue as a grounds for
  reversal.” Id. at 452,¶ 21 (citation omitted).
  
  ¶7            When no objection is made, we review non-compliance with
  the juvenile court procedural rules (here, failure to make and record all
  necessary findings of fact in the signed minute entry serving as the
  termination order) for fundamental error. Monica C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
  Sec., 211 Ariz. 89, 94, ¶ 22 (App. 2005). To establish fundamental error,
  Mother must show that the error “goes to the foundation of [her] case, takes
  away a right that is essential to [her] defense, and is of such magnitude that
  [she] could not have received a fair trial.” Id. at, 94 ¶ 24 (citations omitted).
  Mother must also establish she was prejudiced by such error. Id. at 94-95,
  ¶ 25.
  
  ¶8              Mother did not challenge any of the court’s verbal findings
  made during the hearing nor object to any allegedly missing findings
  required for termination. Furthermore, Mother did not ask the juvenile
  court to amend its written termination order to correct or clarify what she
  claims were deficiencies. Because Mother failed to object to the juvenile
  court’s findings or alleged lack thereof below, her objections are waived.
  See Elliott v. Elliot, 165 Ariz. 128, 134 (App. 1990) (“A litigant must object to
  inadequate findings of fact and conclusions of law at the trial court level so
  
  
  
  
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                             ALMA M. v. DCS et al.
                              Decision of the Court
  
  that the court will have an opportunity to correct them . . . . Failure to do so
  constitutes waiver.”) (citations omitted).
  
  ¶9             Further, Mother has established neither fundamental error
  nor any prejudice caused by such error. Mother failed to appear at the
  hearing without good cause, but was represented by counsel. Our review
  of the record indicates that Mother had a fair hearing, that the juvenile court
  made detailed findings of fact from the bench, and that the juvenile court
  had sufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights.
  
  ¶10           Regardless of our decision to apply waiver here, we urge
  strict compliance with Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court
  66(F). See Ruben M., 230 Ariz. at 241, ¶ 24 (“The primary purpose for
  requiring a court to make express findings of fact and conclusions of law is
  to allow the appellate court to determine exactly which issues were decided
  and whether the lower court correctly applied the law.”).
  
                                 CONCLUSION
  
  ¶11          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s
  termination order.
  
  
  
  
                            AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                             FILED: AA
  
  
  
  
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