The sale of Chinese arms has several implications for the LAC region. For one, arms exports are a symbol of a country's position in the global hierarchical system of arms production.4 Efficient arms production can provide revenue and balance costs related to defense research and development.5 On a functional level, armies must procure arms that have a maintainable life cycle. One can also argue that arms exports are a key component in a nation's foreign policy and can help secure influence, or "soft power" Simply put, the expansion of arms exports may provide multiple benefits and can reflect a nation's interests abroad. In Latin America, the increase in arms sales has complemented China's goals of "securing access to natural resources and exports markets"6 It is important to note that China's "complementing" differs from "facilitating" "If the latter becomes more prominent, it may be a worthy indicator or warning of a significant shift in the security environment"7 Given bureaucratic hurdles in expanding a nation's defense industry to compete in the global arms market, analyzing China's arms flows to Latin America can provide further specific insight into the maturity of Sino-LAC military relations. The most recent literature and data suggest there is an upward trend in Chinese exports to the LAC region, specifically in arms exports.8 But, what are the drivers behind the remarkable increase of Chinese arms exports to the region? In isolation, what unique characteristics exist in the Sino-Latin American relations that facilitated the increase in arms sales? This research intends to answer those questions. The research and data from 2000 to 2016 demonstrate that as political and economic relations increased, Beijing's arms sales also increased. A combination of factors including the countries' ideological tendencies, particularly in the Alianza Bolivarianapara los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, or ALBA) countries, and a comparative advantage in defense products facilitated the increase in arms sales.9 As such, this research seeks to understand the intricacies of China's Latin America policy and trends of its arms exports, both globally and with regard to the LAC region. The research concludes with strategic implications for the region and the United States while providing a forecast for future Chinese arms exports into the region. Background: Chinese Policy The evolution of China's policy papers toward Latin America demonstrates the importance of building relationships and engaging in arms sales. In its 2008 policy paper, China outlines its willingness to "provide assistance for the development of the army in Latin American and Caribbean countries"10 Its 2016 policy paper reiterates the importance of "actively carry out military exchanges and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries, increase friendly exchanges between defense and military officials of the two sides" and expand "professional exchanges in military training, personnel training and peacekeeping" Notably, the 2016 policy paper highlights "enhancing cooperation in military trade and military technology"11 Furthermore, China's official policy paper, "China's Military Strategy" specifically outlines the importance of raising the level of military relations, stating "it will continue the traditional friendly military ties with their African, Latin American, and Southern Pacific counterparts"12 Through analysis of its policy papers, it is evident that China's emergence in the region results from it having prioritized building military relations, specifically complemented by arms sales. Characteristics of Chinese Arms Exports Understanding the evolution of China's total global arms exports and its geographical distribution provides the necessary background to highlight the recent shift to the Latin America arms market. Both table 1 and figure 1 (on page 125 and 126) demonstrate the evolution of China's arms exports. The table shows the delineations of China's arms exports between years and percentages by geographical distribution. It is important to note the low amount of military sales and exchanges between China and Latin America prior to 2000, especially when considering the U.S. shift in foreign policy post-9/11. In contrast, the period after 2000 is characterized by significant expansion into both African and Latin American markets.13 Overall, China's increased global arms exports indicate an "emergence of a global strategy that attempts to extend China's economic, political, and possibly military outreach"14 Figure 1 demonstrates China's enormous increase in global arms exports from 1990 to 2016. When comparing in five-year periods, China's global arms exports saw a sharp increase of 88 percent from 1990 to 2015.15 Further, during the 2011-2015 period, China became "the third largest arms exporter with $8.5 billion in exports" behind both the United States and Russia.16 Although the top recipients of Chinese arm sales are Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, it also expanded its customer base to other regions, primarily Africa and Latin America.17 As noted in table 1 and figure 2 (on pages 125 and 127), China's entrance into the Latin American arms market is relatively new (since 2000) and can be considered as part of a new comprehensive strategy toward the region. As such, there are several noteworthy trends in China's expansion of military engagement in Latin America. Prior to 2000, Chinese arms sales were limited to low-level equipment and military supplies, such as small arms and uniforms.18 A closer look at the evolution of imports by country demonstrates that the growth in sales in the region is initially attributed to and facilitated by a country's ideological tendencies, particularly in the ALBA countries. As seen in figure 2, ALBA member states Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia comprise most of the market share of arms imports from China. In its own publications, ALBA identifies itself as an "anti-imperialist" and "anti-neoliberal" organization that advocates for a socialist economic model.19 As a U.S.-China Commission report notes, this highlights a possible correlation with "anti-U.S. foreign policy orientation of the purchasers"20 Further, China's "nonintervention" policy makes arms sales attractive for countries.21 Based on China's arms sales alone, one can infer its intention in the region is to expand its political influence while securing a future military presence in the region. Another factor that contributed to the increase in arms sales is China's relative comparative advantage. For one, China's products are less expensive than those offered by the traditional international arms suppliers, such as the United States and Russia. More recently, China continues to make inroads into other nations besides the ALBA member states.22 This indicates an emergence into the market as an important actor. In 2009, "Peru-a key economic partner for the United States in the region and supporter of the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership-purchased fifteen of China's FN-6 portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in a $1.1 million deal, along with ten more of its SAMs. Then, in 2013, it bought twenty-seven multiple rocket launchers in a $39 million deal"23 A potential breakthrough for Chinese arms sales in the region came in 2015 when then Argentine president Christina Fernández de Kirchner approved a major arms purchase. The agreement, near $1 billion in Chinese equipment, included "armored personnel carriers, fighter jets, and navy vessels."24 However, President Mauricio Macri, who is considered more pragmatic and moderate than his predecessor, has adjusted several Sino-Argentine initiatives, including placing the significantly large arms purchase on hold.25 Despite Argentina's deferment, these recent developments indicate Chinese arms sales continue to make inroads with Latin American militaries. The Case of China-Venezuela Arms Exports
The sale of Chinese arms has several implications for the LAC region. For one, arms exports are a symbol of a country's position in the global hierarchical system of arms production.4 Efficient arms production can provide revenue and balance costs related to defense research and development.5 On a functional level, armies must procure arms that have a maintainable life cycle. One can also argue that arms exports are a key component in a nation's foreign policy and can help secure influence, or "soft power" Simply put, the expansion of arms exports may provide multiple benefits and can reflect a nation's interests abroad. In Latin America, the increase in arms sales has complemented China's goals of "securing access to natural resources and exports markets"6 It is important to note that China's "complementing" differs from "facilitating" "If the latter becomes more prominent, it may be a worthy indicator or warning of a significant shift in the security environment" there is an upward trend in Chinese exports to the LAC region, specifically in arms exports China outlines its willingness to "provide assistance for the development of the army in Latin American and Caribbean countries"10 China's emergence in the region results from it having prioritized building military relations, specifically complemented by arms sales. China's increased global arms exports indicate an "emergence of a global strategy that attempts to extend China's economic, political, and possibly military outreach"14 Figure 1 demonstrates China's enormous increase in global arms exports from 1990 to 2016. When comparing in five-year periods, China's global arms exports saw a sharp increase of 88 percent from 1990 to 2015.15 Further, during the 2011-2015 period, China became "the third largest arms exporter with $8.5 billion in exports" behind both the United States and Russia.16 Although the top recipients of Chinese arm sales are Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, it also expanded its customer base to other regions, primarily Africa and Latin America.17 Prior to 2000, Chinese arms sales were limited to low-level equipment and military supplies, such as small arms and uniforms.18 growth in sales in the region is initially attributed to and facilitated by a country's ideological tendencies, particularly in the ALBA countries. As seen in figure 2, ALBA member states Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia comprise most of the market share of arms imports from China ALBA identifies itself as an "anti-imperialist" and "anti-neoliberal" organization that advocates for a socialist economic model.19 As a U.S.-China Commission report notes, this highlights a possible correlation with "anti-U.S. foreign policy orientation of the purchasers"20 Further, China's "nonintervention" policy makes arms sales attractive for countries.21 Based on China's arms sales alone, one can infer its intention in the region is to expand its political influence while securing a future military presence in the region China's products are less expensive than those offered by the traditional international arms suppliers, such as the United States and Russia 23 A potential breakthrough for Chinese arms sales in the region came in 2015 when then Argentine president Christina Fernández de Kirchner approved a major arms purchase. The agreement, near $1 billion in Chinese equipment, included "armored personnel carriers, fighter jets, and navy vessels." Chinese arms sales continue to make inroads with Latin American militaries.