Other scholars have presented a more confident assessment of U.S. counterforce capabilities, however. Keir Lieber and Daryl Press argue that long-gestating technological trends rooted in the computer revolution have produced dramatic improvements in the accuracy and remote sensing required to conduct counterforce strikes, undermining the value of the hardening, concealment, and redundancy that states have typically pursued to ensure the survivability of their nuclear weapons. In particular, Lieber and Press posit that U.S. satellites can now use synthetic aperture radar to hunt mobile missiles much more effectively than in the past, which could have significant implications for the survivability of China’s arsenal.120 Austin Long and Brendan Green come to a similar conclusion through retrospective analysis, showing that even in the Cold War U.S. intelligence capabilities relevant to potential counterforce operations were much better than commonly understood and are probably quite a bit better today given continuing investments.121 Although Long and Green do not focus specifically on China, their analysis implies that the United States probably could use a combination of signals intelligence detected by satellites plus imagery intelligence provided by stealthy, high-altitude UAVs to locate Chinese mobile ICBMs, especially given that these missiles are substantially slower, larger, and more constrained in their movements and launch locations than Scud missiles were. They also are fewer in number and likely would have been monitored much more closely in peacetime.122 Long and Green note, for example, that “mobile ICBMs are not typically operated as single transporter erector launchers (TELs). There is a mobile command center, a support vehicle carrying supplies and a field kitchen for the crew, a massive fuel tanker, and at least one security vehicle. Communications between these vehicles can... potentially be intercepted and used to locate the vehicles.”123 Furthermore, in an all-out counterforce scenario the United States likely would be targeting these ICBMs with its own ICBMs, which move much faster to a target and have much lower accuracy requirements than the conventional munitions delivered by fighter-bombers in the Scud hunt.124 The United States also is continuing to develop and refine a variety of techniques that could enable it to pursue even more sophisticated approaches to hunting Chinese mobile missiles in the future. These include covertly attaching tagging, tracking, and location devices to TELs or related vehicles, and emplacing on likely transportation routes unattended ground sensors that could detect passing TELs and communicate the information to U.S. satellites using burst transmissions that would be hard to intercept.125 The implication is that hunting China’s mobile ICBMs would not be impossible and that this is a contingency for which the United States has prepared for several decades
scholars have presented a more confident assessment of U.S. counterforce capabilities long-gestating technological trends rooted in the computer revolution have produced dramatic improvements in the accuracy and remote sensing required to conduct counterforce strikes, undermining the value of the hardening, concealment, and redundancy have typically pursued to ensure the survivability of their nuclear weapons Lieber and Press posit that U.S. satellites can now use synthetic aperture radar to hunt mobile missiles much more effectively than in the past, which could have significant implications for the survivability of China’s arsenal. Long and Green come to a similar conclusion through retrospective analysis, showing that even Cold War U.S. intelligence capabilities relevant to potential counterforce operations were much better than commonly understood their analysis implies that the United States probably could use a combination of signals intelligence detected by satellites plus imagery intelligence provided by stealthy, high-altitude UAVs to locate Chinese mobile ICBMs these missiles are substantially slower, larger, and more constrained in their movements and launch locations than Scud missiles were. mobile ICBMs are not typically operated as single transporter erector launchers (TELs). There is a mobile command center Communications between these vehicles can... potentially be intercepted and used to locate the vehicles.” scenario the United States likely would be targeting these ICBMs with its own ICBMs, which move much faster to a target and have much lower accuracy requirements than the conventional munitions delivered by fighter-bombers The United States also is continuing to develop and refine a variety of techniques that could enable it to pursue even more sophisticated approaches e covertly attaching tagging, tracking, and location devices to TELs or related vehicles, and emplacing on likely transportation routes unattended ground sensors