Argument: The continuation of a conventional war would have been much costlier than an atomic attack

The US was planning for a massive invasion of the Japanese Home Islands (Operation Olympic). Nine divisions were to land on the southern Japanese island of Kyushu. However the Japanese had ten divisions in southern Kyushu by August, and 600,000 troops on the whole island. [1]

The US army widely disseminated a figure of half a million casualties for the conquest of Japan. This was however only the figure for public consumption and some calculations went much higher. [2] On top of the US losses the same amount and probably considerably more Japanese deaths would have to be added. The estimates of US losses were so bad that atomic bombs were actually considered for use in clearing the landing beaches.

Chief of Staff George C. Marshall argued “We had to visualize very heavy casualties unless we had enough atomic bombs at the time to supplement the troop action.” [3] Invasion was therefore not really an alternative to the A-bomb use at all. Although the use of the bomb in a battlefield situation might be more justifiable that it was considered shows the ignorance of the radiation effects that might well have been a disaster for US forces as well as Japanese.

[1] Edward J. Drea, ‘Intelligence Forecasting for the Invasion of Japan: previews of Hell, Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, (Columbia, 2007) p.59,71

[2] D. M. Giangreco, "A score of bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas": President Truman and casualty estimates for the invasion of Japan’, Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, (Columbia, 2007), p.88

[3] Edward J. Drea, ‘Intelligence Forecasting for the Invasion of Japan: previews of Hell’, pp.74-5.

Candidate 1: "It can be argued that conventional bombing could have brought about a Japanese surrender without the recourse to the use of the atomic bombs. Compared to conventional bombings the atomic bombs caused disproportionate amounts of civilian casualties. The Strategic Bombing survey estimated that in the 9 months prior to the surrender there were 806,000 Japanese civilian casualties inclusive of A-bombs, of which 330,000 were deaths. Therefore nearly a third of civilian deaths were as a result of the atomic bombings (and that is only counting those who died immediately). In Hiroshima 72% of buildings were destroyed, in Nagasaki 37.5% of buildings were destroyed. However in a conventional raid Yokohama was 47% destroyed in an hours bombing, for the comparatively light cost of 5,000 civilian fatalities. [1] Of course some conventional raids, particularly fireraids caused very heavy casualties, in particular the Tokyo firebombing of March 9th 1945 killed 100,000 and destroyed 15.8 square miles. However that is still three times the area destroyed of Hiroshima. Since the only possible justification for attack on cities is the destruction of infrastructure conventional bombing was similarly effective while being the cause of many fewer civilian deaths.

According to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey “Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.” [2] The accuracy of this prediction has since been called into question, [3] after all the allies dropped far more bombs on Nazi Germany without securing surrender. However the fact remains that the conventional bombing campaign was only just starting to get going and might have achieved decisive results.

Possibly even more important for the prospects of a conventional victory, and one not clouded by the stigma of massive bombing campaigns against civilians, was the maritime blockade. By the end of the war Japan had only 700,000 tons of shipping remaining, she had started the war with 6,337,000 tons. Of 122,000 sailors in the merchant marine 27,000 were killed 89,000 wounded. For an island nation reliant on imports not just to run its industry but also to keep its people fed this was devastating. The result was starvation in the Japanese home islands. After the war it was reported that up to 10 million would die of starvation without American food aid, as a post war report to the Diet (Japanese Parliament) put it ‘the greatest cause of defeat was the loss of shipping’. [4]

[1] United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War), http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm pp.20, 23-24.

[2] United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War), http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm p.26.

[3] Gian Peri Gentile, ‘Advocacy or Assessment? The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan’, in Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, (Columbia, 2007) pp.123-4.

[4] Joel Ira Holwitt, “Execute against Japan”: The US decision to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare, (College Station TX, 2008) pp.166-9"
Candidate 2: "Offering the preservation of the Monarchy was unlikely to have altered the outcome of the conflict by bringing peace before August 6th. This was the only concession to the Japanese that was even considered by the US government. It was thought that even this would be very hard for the American public to swallow. Truman’s personal feeling was also that nothing short of an unconditional surrender would do to avenge Pearl Harbour. [1]

[1] Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the enemy: Stalin, Truman and the surrender of Japan, (Cambridge, 2005) p.291."
Candidate 3: "Before Hiroshima and Nagasaki the use of the Atomic Bomb did not raise profound moral questions with allied policymakers. Civilians had been intentionally targeted from the air since the start of the war and both Japanese and German cities had been already subjected to relentless bombardment. There was no compelling reason for politicians to view the Atomic bomb any differently from the London blitz or the Dresden raid. [1]

The Hague conventions had been systemically honoured only in the breach for the previous six years and so would not have given Truman or his advisors any particular heartache. The radiation effects were as yet unknown and so there was no reason to treat atomic bombs as anything more sinister than a mighty conventional bomb would be. Had the radiation been known about then it might have moved them into a category akin to chemical or biological weapons, which were already frowned upon. Chemical weapons were banned by the Hague convention in 1899. [2] This did not of course prevent their widespread use in WWI but the horrified reaction to the use of mustard gas and other agents lead to the Geneva Protocol [3] which came into force in 1928 although the US was not a signatory. In practice Atomic weapons have not been since treated as equivalent to poison gas or other ‘analogous devices’ and thus the International Court of Justice has said that they do not breach the Hague conventions or the Geneva Protocol. [4] Therefore as these were the only international laws in force at the time of the action the dropping the bombs were not illegal acts.

[1] Barton J. Bernstein, ‘The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, vol.74, no.1, Jan.- Feb., 1995. p.135.

[2] Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases; July 29, 1899; http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/dec99-02.asp

[3] Geneva Protocol to Hague Convention http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Geneva_Protocol_to_Hague_Convention

[4] International Court of Justice advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, paragraphs 54-6. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf?PHPSESSID=61c346606e8c49..."
Candidate 4: "The alternatives to either invasion or atomic bombing are covered in the previous counterpoint. It can only be said that none of them are without a high human cost, though invasion spearheaded by an atomic barrage is surely the worst. The principle of advantage of the conventional bombing option being that it would be easily justifiable as only quantitively different to what the Japanese had already meted out themselves. The blockade similarly has easy justification in not being a deviation from any accepted standards as well as only indirectly attacking the home islands while putting the onus on the Japanese government to avoid starvation. Really in order to find a less costly alternative then diplomacy has to be raised for which refer to the second response argument."
Candidate 5: "Having a weapon is hardly a good argument for using one, society would fall apart if ‘I have a gun thus I must shoot someone’ became an accepted maxim. Since war is policy by other means the ultimate weapon is one that achieves its policy objectives without the need to be actually be used. As to the cost, the $2.2bn translates to a little below $7,000 for each Japanese life taken."
Candidate 6: "The justification for the second bomb relies principally upon the argument that Japan would presume there was only one A-bomb if another was not dropped, so the destruction of Nagasaki was a necessary evil to force surrender just as much as that at Hiroshima. Indeed senior Japanese figures did argue that there was only one bomb, and even in one case that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was not atomic at all, simply a very big conventional bomb. The Chief of the Naval General Staff Toyoda Soemu thought “it is questionable whether the United States will be able to use more bombs in rapid succession.” [1] This was a view that Anami Korechika, the army minister, shared until it was shattered by the second bomb although even then he said “The appearance of the atomic bomb does not spell the end of war” [2]

[1] Admiral Toyoda quoted by Sadao Asada, ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration’ in Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, p.37.

[2] Army Minister Anami quoted by Sadao Asada, ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration’ in Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, p.40."

The alternatives to either invasion or atomic bombing are covered in the previous counterpoint. It can only be said that none of them are without a high human cost, though invasion spearheaded by an atomic barrage is surely the worst. The principle of advantage of the conventional bombing option being that it would be easily justifiable as only quantitively different to what the Japanese had already meted out themselves. The blockade similarly has easy justification in not being a deviation from any accepted standards as well as only indirectly attacking the home islands while putting the onus on the Japanese government to avoid starvation. Really in order to find a less costly alternative then diplomacy has to be raised for which refer to the second response argument.
