Argument: There needs to be action to deter more cyber attacks

At the moment the response to cyber-attacks has essentially been nothing. It is however clear that some response is needed as without a reaction there is no deterrence; the attacks will keep coming until something is done. The number of cyber-attacks and the sensitivity of the information stolen have been increasing over recent years and as more and more work is done online and more and more systems are connected to the Internet so cyber-attacks become more attractive. There needs to be a deterrent and the best deterrent is to make sure that such attacks are costly.

As these attacks are usually cross border (and in this debate we are only concerned with cross border attacks) then the only way to create a cost is through sanctions. These sanctions can either hit the assailant directly or else hit his government so encouraging them to crack down on hacking emanating from their country. It should be remembered that China argues that it does not launch cyber-attacks [1] meaning that any such attacks from China must duly be private. If this is the case then sanctions are the best way of prompting internal law enforcement. Sanctions therefore encourage all nations where there are cyber criminals to make sure they take such cyber-crime seriously. If they do not get their own cyber criminals under control then they may be affected by sanctions.

[1] China Daily, ‘China denies launching cyberattacks on US’, China.org.cn, 20 February 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-02/20/content_28003282.htm

Candidate 1: "How do we determine what is proportionate? If some valuable intellectual property, such as part of the designs for the US's latest fighter jet the F35, which were hacked in 2009. [1] Then what can be the response to this? Can it simply be the cost of developing this design? If so then what about the strategic loss the state has suffered, how can that be calculated in? So long as it is excluded state sanctioned cyber-attacks will not be deterred.

[1] Gorman, Siobhan, Cole, August, and Dreazen, Yochi, ‘Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jen Project’, The Wall Street Journal, 21 April 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124027491029837401.html.html"
Candidate 2: "Sanctions cannot be very finely targeted and will always hit other groups as well as the cyber attackers. The chances of knowing specific individuals who were responsible are next to zero so those individuals cannot be targeted directly. This is the whole problem with cyber-attacks; they are very difficult to pin down. In the best case then sanctions are applied against the right target and happen to hit others as well; for example hackers are not the only new who want advanced computer equipment. At worst the sanctions will completely miss their target; it would be a major embarrassment for a country to impose sanctions for a cyber-attack only for it to later be discovered that the sanctions are against an innocent party through whom the attack had been routed."
Candidate 3: "An asymmetric response to cyber-attacks in the form of sanctions may prevent escalation, but they could also simply encourage a cyber-attacker to do more knowing that sanctions cannot stop cyber-attacks. Sanctions in the past have rarely changed policy; Sanctions against Cuba did not result in overthrowing Castro, sanctions have not changed North Korea or Iran’s policy towards nuclear weapons, so there is little reason that sanctions would stop cyber-attacks. [1] Instead the country being sanctioned will find a way around and quite possibly escalate themselves much as North Korea has upped the stakes whenever new sanctions are imposed, most recently by cancelling a hotline to the South. [2]

[1] Friedman, Lara, ‘Getting over the sanctions delusion’, Foreign Policy The Middle East Channel, 14 March 2010, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/15/getting_over_the_sanctions_delusion

[2] Branigan, Tania, ‘Expanded UN sanctions on North Korea prompt rage from Pyongyang’, guardian.co.uk, 8 March 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/08/north-korea-rages-un-sanctions"
Candidate 4: "How can there ever be deterrence when the attacker believes they will not be caught, or that if they are the sanctions swill harm others not themselves? When the problem with preventing cyber-attacks is the difficulty of tracing the source [1] then deterrence becomes more and more difficult to apply. This is not like the Cold War where both superpowers could be certain that if they launched an attack there would be a devastating response. In this instance there is no certainly; the attacker believes they a, won't be caught, b, there will be no response and c, that the response won't affect them, and finally even if they are affected unless they are caught most times they will believe they will get away with it next time round.

[1] Greenemeier, Larry, ‘Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult to Trace Back to Hackers’, Scientific American, 11 June 2011, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=tracking-cyber-hackers"

How can there ever be deterrence when the attacker believes they will not be caught, or that if they are the sanctions swill harm others not themselves? When the problem with preventing cyber-attacks is the difficulty of tracing the source [1] then deterrence becomes more and more difficult to apply. This is not like the Cold War where both superpowers could be certain that if they launched an attack there would be a devastating response. In this instance there is no certainly; the attacker believes they a, won't be caught, b, there will be no response and c, that the response won't affect them, and finally even if they are affected unless they are caught most times they will believe they will get away with it next time round.

[1] Greenemeier, Larry, ‘Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult to Trace Back to Hackers’, Scientific American, 11 June 2011, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=tracking-cyber-hackers
