Argument: A European trade bloc can succeed without a political union

The European area only consists of liberal democracies, which consistently honour their agreements. While historically a political union might have been necessary to further strengthen the Coal and Steel Treaty (the EU as it originated) between recently belligerent states, these countries can now obtain the benefit of the trade union through multilateral agreements. They simply have to regulate protectionism and tariffs so countries can remain competitive and barriers to trade remain low. In the event that a country does not comply, the external pressure from the other countries, together with soft sanctions, is more than enough to keep the trade bloc functional.

Candidate 1: "It is important to remember that many areas of policy remain under national control and even those areas that are decided at the European level are agreed by the member states (9). The EU legislation, however, is important for creating trust between trading partners in the EU. Even if some of the laws seem trivial or unnecessary, it is the trust in the other countries’ compliance even in these laws, which creates a stable market in which actors can expect larger laws and agreements to be honoured. The political aspects of the union therefore complement the economic aspects.

As regards austerity, the British are implementing their own austerity policies, without Commission involvement, and are doing just as badly as anyone else (10). On the contrary, someone needed to sanitise the Greek economy, and it was evident that they were not going to do so themselves. EU decisions, as a whole, are preferable. We should remember that when countries agree to austerity as part of a bailout it is not a violation of sovereignty; they have the choice to say no and probably default as a result.

(9) Bache, Ian; Bulmer, Simon; George, Stephen. “Politics in the European Union”, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press. 17 February 2011.

(10) Giles, Chris; Bounds, Andrew. “Brutal for Britain”, The Financial Times. 15 January 2012. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5cc73ea0-3e04-11e1-91ba-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2igLfoxJI"
Candidate 2: "It is uncertain how many countries would realistically want remain in a trade bloc that does not support democracy as a core value.

Distilling the EU to a trade bloc that does not care about democracy and human rights would run the risk of allowing in non-democracies which in turn would merely alienate most of its current members. Many EU countries would not wish to be associated with non-democracies. Even only concerning trade, many would not want to make trade concessions to undemocratic countries whose regimes they cannot trust, as this might jeopardise the reliability of their trade with this country. (12) As such there would be very few potential new members as a result of moving back to a trade bloc. The better solution is to bring the standard of democracy in neighbouring countries up to the point where they can join the EU. To encourage other democracies such as Norway to join there could be concessions made such as on the common fisheries policy.

(12) Mansfield, Edward D.; Milner, Helen V.; Rosendorff, B. Peter. “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade”, American Political Science Review. Vol. 94, No. 2. June 2000. http://www.stanford.edu/class/polisci243b/readings/v0002547.pdf"
Candidate 3: "It is not true that not being fully representative makes a political entity undemocratic. In national politics we elect representatives to then make decisions on our behalf rather than have constant referenda, or even rather than require unanimity within Parliament. We expect not to have perfect representation. Furthermore, states that feel disenfranchised always have the option of leaving the EU; in fact it is much easier than it would be to leave an unrepresentative nation state. It is important to remember that Member States have consented to acting within this framework.

Even if the political entity is flawed, it can always be improved. Much more power could be given to the European Parliament, and there are already plans for the President of the Commission to be elected through the Parliament. Moreover if turnout is a problem for the elected legislature’s legitimacy then this is a question of encouraging turnout which might happen organically due to increased relevance but if not could be managed if necessary through compulsory voting. Finally not being a flawless democracy must be weighed against not having an entity at all."
Candidate 4: "The reason that there is such trust in the status quo lies in that these countries have collaborated in a political union for decades. Once this structure has been removed, it is easy to turn protectionist and to start trade wars. This is precisely the source of the failure of trade blocs such as NAFTA. Without the presence of a political body, it was possible for the US to develop protectionist policies within the trade bloc framework. By subsidising their agricultural products to outcompete Mexico’s in Mexico itself, the US severely harmed its trade partner’s economy (14). This is a harmful form of trade. The EU benefits from its current more balanced, controlled and mutually beneficial structure.

(14) Faux, Jeff. “How NAFTA Failed Mexico”, The American Prospect. 16 June 2003. http://prospect.org/article/how-nafta-failed-mexico"

The reason that there is such trust in the status quo lies in that these countries have collaborated in a political union for decades. Once this structure has been removed, it is easy to turn protectionist and to start trade wars. This is precisely the source of the failure of trade blocs such as NAFTA. Without the presence of a political body, it was possible for the US to develop protectionist policies within the trade bloc framework. By subsidising their agricultural products to outcompete Mexico’s in Mexico itself, the US severely harmed its trade partner’s economy (14). This is a harmful form of trade. The EU benefits from its current more balanced, controlled and mutually beneficial structure.

(14) Faux, Jeff. “How NAFTA Failed Mexico”, The American Prospect. 16 June 2003. http://prospect.org/article/how-nafta-failed-mexico
