Argument: Even if it matters whether or not humans and animals are similar, humans and animals are in fact similar enough that both should be granted rights.

We have already noted that beings do not need to be similar in order to be equally morally considerable. Assuming but not conceding that this is false, we will prove that animals are in fact incredibly similar to human beings, so much so that we should grant them rights.

First of all, animals have an equal capacity to experience pain. While we are unable to know exactly what other humans or animals are experiencing, we can make inference from what we observe. According to Peter Singer: “Nearly all the signs that lead us to infer pain in other humans can be seen in other species...The behavioural signs include writhing, facial contortions, moaning, yelping or other forms of calling, attempts to avoid the source of pain, appearance of fear at the prospect of its repetition, and so on”. [1]

In addition we know that animals have nervous systems very like ours, which respond physiologically as ours do when the animal is in a circumstance in which we would feel pain—an initial rise of blood pressure, dilated pupils, perspiration, an increased pulse rate, and, if the stimulus continues, a fall in blood pressure. Although human beings have a more developed cerebral cortex than other animals, this part of the brain is concerned with thinking functions rather than basic impulses, emotions, and feelings. These impulses, emotions, and feelings are located in the diencephalon, which is well developed in many other species of animals, especially mammals and birds.” Animals therefore have the capacity for physical and emotional suffering, and so should be granted rights.

[1] Singer, Peter. "All Animals are Equal." Ethics for Everyday. (Benatar, D Ed.) McGraw Hill: New York. 2002

Candidate 1: "Most rights have no bearing for animals

The right to dignity would mean nothing to an animal. Animals are incapable of being humiliated and are not harmed by being reduced to human servitude. A dog is not ashamed of its nudity or having to eat out of a bowl and wear a leash. Animals happily copulate and defecate in front of humans and other animals. What exactly an undignified action might be for an animal it is difficult to say.

The right to education, to vote, to fair trial, to be innocent until proven guilty, to privacy, marriage, nationality, religion, property, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, workers rights and shelter all seem impossible to apply to animals.

If we specially tailor rights to animals then how is that different to the status quo where we have certain laws protecting animals?"
Candidate 2: "We are at the top of the animal hierarchy and should treat other animals accordingly in order to further our own species.

We have always been superior to animals. Just as a lion can kill antelope and a frog can kill insects, so too human beings have struggled their way to the top of the food chain. Why then can we not exercise the power we have earned? Animals exercise their power and we should do the same. It is our natural obligation to do so.

The reason we have always killed animals is because we need them. We need meat to be healthy and we need to test medicines on animals to protect our own race. We use animals to further our own race. This too is surely a natural obligation."
Candidate 3: "We only have indirect duties to animals

Philosophers such as Immanuel Kant argue that we only have indirect duties towards animals. This means that we may not treat animals in such a manner that our actions are in conflict with our duties towards human beings. A human has no duty towards a dog not to kick it but a human has a duty towards the dog's owner not to damage his property. Pigs and cows are not loved by any human being so we cause no harm when we kill and eat them. Though the farmer may have owned the cow before, the beef becomes our possession when we purchase it. Wild animals are not owned by any human being so we may do to them what we wish.

Some people argue that cruelty towards animals can lead to cruelty towards humans but there is no evidence that people who work in slaughterhouses are more violent towards other people. In fact, there seems little connection at all between how people treat animals and humans. A slave driver may adore and pamper his dog but beat and kill his slaves.

If we have no direct duties to animals how can we grant them legal protection in the form of rights? The law should only prevent us harming animals when that clearly harms other people. For example, by killing a dog we infringe another person's human right to property."
Candidate 4: "Animals are not moral agents

It makes no sense to give animals rights because they cannot makes decisions about what is right and wrong and will not try to treat us in an ethical manner in return. Why make them a moral agent by giving them rights?"
Candidate 5: "Even if animals are able categorize images in photographs and learn sign language, they are still phenomenally less intelligent than human beings. They will never study philosophy or perform brain surgery or even invent a wheel. Furthermore, intelligence does not prove the ability to self-actualise. Mourning others does not prove that animals value their own lives. Perhaps it implies that animals enjoy company but whether they consider the value of their companion's life and their future potential is questionable. Without the ability to value one's own life, life itself ceases to be intrinsically valuable.

The farming of animals does involve death but it is difficult to prove that death is intrinsically a harmful thing. Pain is certainly a harm for the living but animals are farmed are killed very quickly and they are stunned beforehand. Animals on farms do not know that they will be killed so there is no emotional harm caused by the anticipation of death.

There is no evidence that the painless killing of animals should carry any moral weight."
Candidate 6: "We agree that speciesism is wrong but we do not think that refusing animals rights is speciesist because there are relevant moral differences between animals and humans. And even if refusing animal rights is speciism, there is nothing wrong with speciesism in the first place. It is natural to value the lives of one's own species more than those of another species because we are programmed that way by evolution. We are expected to care more about our own families than about strangers and similarly to value the lives of our own species more than those of animals. It is only natural and right that if we had to choose between a human baby and a dog being killed we should choose the dog."
Candidate 7: "Animals have no interests or rationality

Some philosophers argue that only beings that are able to make rational choices can have moral rights because the function of rights is to protect choice. Animals are not able to make rational choices because they can only follow instinct, they cannot follow logic.

Some philosophers believe that the function of rights is to protect interests. An argument from R.G. Frey argues that animals do not have interests because they do not have language. In order to desire something one must believe that one does not currently have that something and therefore believe that the statement ‘I have x’ is false. One cannot have such a belief unless one knows how language connects to the world. Animals can’t talk so they certainly are unable to know what it is that the sentence ‘I have x’ means in the real world. Therefore animals cannot have desires. Without desires animals cannot have interests. If the function of rights is to protect interests then animal rights serve no purpose. [1]

[1] Frey, R,G. "Rights, Interests, Desires and Beliefs." Ethics for Everyday. (Benatar, D Ed.) McGraw Hill: New York. 2002"
Candidate 8: "First off, you are appealing to instincts which not everyone has. People who work on farms are happy to slaughter animals. A lot of people do not own pets simply because they do not feel any affection towards animals and care more for material objects. Many people do not care about the clubbing of seals. It is human beings of course who perform these clubbing, murder sharks, poach etc. Furthermore, it is irrational that people care about their pets because cows are equally as sentient as animals yet people are happy to eat veal and battery farmed beef and clearly do not care about the cow.

People treat pets as property. They buy and sell them, put them down when they contract illnesses that are too expensive to treat, give them away when they move houses etc. These are things that they certainly wouldn’t do to human beings. If you want to argue according to what humans do instinctively then we instinctively value humans more than animals and are happy to eat and kill animals.

Furthermore, we do not think that using a descriptive claim- what humans feel instinctively- means that you can then make a prescriptive claim – that all sentient beings deserve equal consideration.

In many ways we treat other human beings as only extrinsically valuable. Neo-Malthusians believe we should allow the poor to die of hunger to ensure that the current population does not suffer from the scarcity that arises from overpopulation. Many wars have involved killing lots of people to achieve political aims. Therefore, we often treat humans as extrinsically valuable."
Candidate 9: "We do not analyse human beings on a case by case basis but rather by what distinguishes human beings as a whole, as a species. Infants have the potential to become rational and autonomous etc. The profoundly retarded represent flawed human beings. Retardation is not a human characteristic just as being 3-legged is not a characteristic of a dog though there are both retarded humans and 3-legged dogs."
Candidate 10: "Equality requires that two beings are actually equal on some fundamental level. Human beings have certain essential similarities that make them equal. These do not stretch to animals. Human beings are able to distinguish right from wrong while animals have no notion of ethics. We are thus able to consider what kind of a society we want to live in and we are affected when we feel that there is social degradation. Animals, however, do not have this sense. We have fundamental dignity which animals do not. This is clear in the fact that animals do not experience shame or embarrassment, desire respect, or have a notion of self. Furthermore, human beings can consider their future and have particular desires about how they want their life to play out. These are different for every individual. This is why we are concerned with choice and protecting individualism and religion. Animals on the other hand are concerned only with immediate survival. They have only instincts, not individual desires and wants.

For these reasons, we can't consider animals to be equally morally considerable. As for the propositions standard of relevance for the criteria which distinguish animals from humans in any given case, we would argue that the fundamental individuality and humanity of our species is relevant in every case because it makes animal life fundamentally less valuable."

Even if animals are able categorize images in photographs and learn sign language, they are still phenomenally less intelligent than human beings. They will never study philosophy or perform brain surgery or even invent a wheel. Furthermore, intelligence does not prove the ability to self-actualise. Mourning others does not prove that animals value their own lives. Perhaps it implies that animals enjoy company but whether they consider the value of their companion's life and their future potential is questionable. Without the ability to value one's own life, life itself ceases to be intrinsically valuable.

The farming of animals does involve death but it is difficult to prove that death is intrinsically a harmful thing. Pain is certainly a harm for the living but animals are farmed are killed very quickly and they are stunned beforehand. Animals on farms do not know that they will be killed so there is no emotional harm caused by the anticipation of death.

There is no evidence that the painless killing of animals should carry any moral weight.
