Argument: The use of drones makes the use of force easier to sanction.

Using drones encourages the use of lethal force rather than alternatives. The reason for this is obvious – it is much easier to resort to violence if you know there is no risk to yourself. With the operators thousands of miles away in the United States the only risk of using drones is the loss of equipment. As Christof Heyns, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, has said “The term 'targeted killing' is wrong because it suggests little violence has occurred. The collateral damage may be less than aerial bombardment, but because they eliminate the risk to soldiers they can be used more often.” [1]

The use of drones is also politically expedient in a way that otherwise the use of force would not be. Dennis Blair, the former director of national intelligence, points out that the strike campaign is dangerously seductive as it is “low cost, no U.S. casualties, gives the appearance of toughness… It plays well domestically, and it is unpopular only in other countries. Any damage it does to the national interest only shows up over the long term.” [2] The use of force therefore becomes the first choice not the option of last resort. Even those within the U.S. administration such as Secretary of state Clinton have worried about a drones-only approach that ignored other options and does not look at solving the larger problems. [3]

[1] Bowcott, Owen, ‘Drone strikes threaten 50 years of international law, says UN rapporteur’, guardian.co.uk, 21 June 2012.

[2] Becker, Jo, and Shane, Scott, ‘Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will’, The New York Times, 29 May 2012, p.8

[3] ibid, p.8

Candidate 1: "Because drones are not on the ground and can’t check the identities of those who are killed there is no way of knowing if they really do cause less civilian casualties; what the proposition calls ‘collateral damage’. We also do not know what damage would be caused by other forms of attack on the same targets. It is however definitely open to question whether these attacks really do cause less civilian casualties. Local activists believe that around 3,000 people have been killed in Waziristan of whom only 185 were named al Qaeda operatives – a very poor ratio of 16 civilians for every al Qaeda man killed. [1] The Brookings institution meanwhile estimates that for every al Qaeda and Taliban militant killed there are ten civilian casualties. [2] If either of these estimates are anywhere near the mark then there are very large number of civilian casualties, much higher than proposition believes, and probably higher than other forms of strikes would cause.

[1] Shackle, Samira, ‘Drones and the “bugsplats” they cause’, New Statesman, 13 June 2012.

[2] Byman, Daniel L., ‘Do Targeted Killings Work?’, ForeignPolicy.com, 14 July 2009."
Candidate 2: "It is wrong to simply make drones “a default strategy to be used anywhere”. Yes some of the time drones will be the right choice for catching terrorists and other militants but much of the time they won’t be. Instead of spurning institutions like the ISI and Pakistan’s Military we should be relying on them to fight extremism. This targeting of terrorists is happening in other countries sovereign territory. Their sovereignty should be respected wherever possible meaning that the Pakistanis, the Somalis and the Yemenis should be the ones who carry out these engagements.

Again here there is the difficulty of not knowing how many were killed in drone strikes (see counter to prop 1). We cannot compare other types of strikes unless we have more reliable figures. This is something that sending special forces in would help with; they would have much more accurate figures of who they kill and could check whether they really killed the person they were supposed to be targeting. This would prevent any attempt to inflate the kill count through including those they are not sure of as terrorists. [1]

[1] Becker, Jo, and Shane, Scott, ‘Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will’, The New York Times, 29 May 2012."
Candidate 3: "It is absolutely not the case that UAVs will mean unnecessary attacks that would not otherwise be made; all the targets are checked by a large number of national security experts and the attacks are signed off by the President himself. The attacks are therefore taken very seriously by the administration. Moreover that the attacks are low cost is exactly what we want – the capability to strike our enemies without losses to ourselves or any collateral damage should be prized not shunned."
Candidate 4: "This is a conflict situation, a war, pure and simple. While this is a new kind of conflict; when the opponent is a non-state actor states have to be able to strike at these groups that intend to attack them even when they are sheltering in other states. Such attacks should also not include the state where those groups are sheltering unless that state is supporting that group as was the case in Afghanistan.

Yes the distinction between civilian and combatant is blurred by this conflict but this is something that happens regardless of whether the United States uses UAVs. It is the terrorists themselves who through their horrific attacks by ‘civilians’ on civilian targets that strip away the distinction. The United States has to be able to respond with whatever method is most likely to prevent more of these terrorist attacks."
Candidate 5: "Any other nation seeking to take a precedent from the use of drones would have to be involved in a conflict against a terrorist organisation that poses a credible, clear, and present danger and not be able to fight those terrorists by other means. The situation in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia is in many ways unique in that these are states that have either failed or are near failure. As a result the sovereign government cannot be relied to combat terrorists on their own soil."
Candidate 6: "This is incorrect; It makes the assumption that UAVs could not be used at all if they were not being used to attack targets. They could still be used in a surveillance role so providing the same amount of time to deliberate before striking in a different fashion, one that is appropriate to the situation."
Candidate 7: "Today most forms of conflict do not have much risk to western militaries. While the attacks were carried out from high in the sky NATO did not suffer a single loss in combat operations over Kosovo in 1999. [1] Moreover this lack of danger with UAVs is potentially immoral; we no longer have a war in which both sides are at risk rather a shooting range for drones to kill ‘terrorists’. Having at least some danger is needed as a restraint on the use of force. A good litmus test to use for the authorisation of lethal force would be whether the public would find the goals of the action worthwhile even if it did result in the loss of several soldiers.

[1] Gallis, Paul E., ‘Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force’, CRS Report for Congress, 19 November 1999, p.8"
Candidate 8: "Getting special forces or allies on the ground is not always an option. In countries like Somalia and Yemen where there have been conflicts between factions the authorities will not always cooperate and even if they do they may not control the territory where the strike team would need to operate. There will also be many times where it is simply too dangerous to try and snatch someone. If that person is a danger they need to be stopped in the quickest way possible; and that will be by the use of the UAV that is already far above monitoring the target."

It is absolutely not the case that UAVs will mean unnecessary attacks that would not otherwise be made; all the targets are checked by a large number of national security experts and the attacks are signed off by the President himself. The attacks are therefore taken very seriously by the administration. Moreover that the attacks are low cost is exactly what we want – the capability to strike our enemies without losses to ourselves or any collateral damage should be prized not shunned.
