Argument: Tibetans want independence, not the 'Middle Way'

The Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way' is far from popular amongst the Tibetan population. Many ordinary Tibetans have criticised the Dalai Lama's conciliatory approach to China. His refusal to call for a boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games is symbolic of this conciliatory approach where the majority of the Tibetan population, particularly the young disagreed with him. "China does not deserve to host the Olympics. It's evident that they do not deserve the Olympics," said Tsewang Rigzin, the leader of the Tibetan Youth Congress, at Dharamshala in 2008. [1]

Tsewang Rigzin also stated “There is a growing frustration within the Tibetan community, especially in the [younger] generation... I certainly hope the Middle Way approach will be reviewed. As we can see from the protests here and all over the world, the Tibetan people remain committed to achieving independence.” [2]

The (sometimes violent) 2008 protests made it clear that many Tibetans don't support the Dalai Lama's peaceful, non-revolutionary, non-independence 'Middle Way'. The Dalai Lama even had to threaten to resign if violent protests continued. Clearly, these protests showed that the Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way' lacks support amongst the young of Tibet – the individuals who will comprise successive generations of political, religious and business leaders. [3]

Within Tibet, pro-independence protesters have recently had more leverage than 'Middle Way' voices. The 'Middle Way' is a nuanced approach to the Tibetan issue and, therefore, is a less potent rallying for Tibetans who have been marginalised or excluded by Chinese policies in the region. Calls for Tibetan Independence mobilise more support among grass-roots activists in other areas of the world. [4] This is valuable, and is an argument in favour of, at least, continuing to call for Tibetan Independence, not merely the 'Middle Way'; it has a greater impact.

In this situation, it makes no sense for the Dalai Lama to alienate so many of his young people, so many of the most dedicated to the Tibetan cause, by preaching his 'Middle Way' when he should be calling for what his people truly want and need -Tibetan independence.

[1] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582113/Tibetans-criticise-Dal...

[2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582113/Tibetans-criticise-Dal...

[3] The Economist. “Trashing the Beijing Road”. The Economist. 19 March 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/10875823?story_id=10875823&amp;CFID=1092371&amp;CF...

[4] The Economist. “A flaming row”. 9 Arpil 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/11003821?story_id=11003821

Candidate 1: "The Dalai Lama is the only solution for Tibet. His political advocacy as a leader and religious figure is imperative for the problem of Tibet. His commitment for non-violence and cohabitation and cooperation serves the peaceful interests of Tibet while accommodating for moderate changes. His 'Middle Way' platform is the bridge between China Tibet and world-wide international consensus on the Tibetans' right to self-determination. If resistance to China becomes more violent, as it did in 2008, then the Dalai Lama’s third way will become much more relevant as a solution that both sides can potentially sign up to. It may become the only way forward towards a compromise.

Irrespective of some discontent, the Dalai Lama still enjoys the loyalty and respect of most Tibetans. [1] During the 2008 protests in Tibet, the protesters regularly chanted the Dalai Lama's name, displayed his picture and recited a "long life" prayer for him. [2] He remains the undisputed moral leader of Tibetan people, and as such his 'Middle Way' path still has weight.

[1] The Economist. “A colonial uprising”. The Economist. 19 March 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/10880709?story_id=10880709&amp;CFID=1092371&amp;CF...

[2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582113/Tibetans-criticise-Dal..."
Candidate 2: "The average Tibetan does not actually want independence from China. For example, Dr. Lobsang Sangay, who was born in a refugee camp in India in 1968 and was named Prime Minister of the Cental Tibetan Administration (Tibetan exiles) on April 27, 2011, was once a militant of the Tibetan Youth Congress, a group that unequivocally supports Tibetan independence, but who now says he has matured and now supports the Middle Way Approach. [1] Certainly, many Tibetans want independence- of a type different to that proposed by the Dalai Lama- and some protest in favour of it. The Tibetan exile population is particularly vocal in this regard, but this should not be taken to mean that a majority of Tibetans want complete independence from China. Most Tibetans like everybody else would be happy with more freedoms within China rather than full independence. This is reflected in the views of the Dalai Lama, who seeks only greater freedoms and autonomy, but not independence, under the 'Middle Way'. [2]

[1] Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review. “Investigating the Candidates on the Middle Way”. The Tibetan Political Review. 15 March 2011. http :// sites . google . com / site / tibetanpoliticalreview / project - updates / investigatingthecandidatesonthemiddleway

[2] Barnett, Robert. “Seven Questions: What Tibetans Want”. Foreign Policy. 26 March 2008. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/03/25/seven_questions_what_ti..."
Candidate 3: "The opinions of foreign governments and the international community have frequently failed to have any real impact upon the situation 'on the ground' in Tibet. For example, The US joined most other UN members in condemning the Chinese 'aggression' and 'invasion' of Tibet in 1950, however the Chinese exerted their authority there anyway. [1] The international community will therefore acquiesce with whatever is decided between Tibet and China – they will applaud any deal or condemn any repression but this will not affect the positions of either side. Rather, what matters is what the Tibetan population support, and there is good reason to believe that the 'Middle Way' does not satisfy them. Many younger Tibetans would prefer that the Dalai Lama push for total independence, an regret that he did not pursue a more confrontational path with China over the 2008 Olympics. [2]

[1] The Office of Tibet, New York. “Historical Overview”. The Office of Tibet, New York. http://tibetoffice.org/tibet-info/historical-overview

[2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582113/Tibetans-criticise-Dal..."
Candidate 4: "The 'Middle Way' is no different from the current situation. Although, theoretically, the 'Middle Way' proposition offers the Chinese authorities and ordinary Tibetans a way to harmonise their conflicting interests, it is practically no different from the political accommodation that Tibet currently subscribes to. Under the ‘Middle Way’, the Dalai Lama has expressed willingness to accept socialist rule in Tibet. He has also dropped former Tibetan demands that their homeland be offered a political relationship as expansive as China’s offer in the early-1980s to Taiwan in favour of an insistence on a Hong Kong-style ‘association’ relationship with Beijing. Since the early 2000s, in keeping with the ‘Middle Way’, his hints about a residual international personality have been kept to a minimum. Further, the autonomy arrangement sought is an amalgam of the Hong Kong ‘one country, two systems’ formula and the existing autonomy provisions of the PRC Constitution. [1] This gradual dropping of Tibetan demands under the name of the ‘Middle Way’ means that it offers little improvement from the status quo.

The background in terms of political events that led to a proposition of a "Middle Way" sheds more light into the fact that his strategy is just a new name on the board for the same as the provisions currently existing within the PRC constitution. [2] If the PRC sees that the ‘middle way’ is slowly reducing the demands for more freedom for Tibet then they are unlikely to embrace it as they can equally wait for more concessions. Despite all these concessions to the PRC position there are still things that China will never accept such as any idea that Tibet will be transformed into a ‘zone of peace and non-violence’ or that there should be a popularly elected legislature – it would inevitably mean others in China would believe they should have more democracy. By giving away so many concessions before negotiations but still making it impossible for the PRC to accept the Dalai Lama makes it unlikely that his middle way will get anywhere in negotiations so it is not really ‘realistic’.

[1] Gupta, Sourabh. “The Dalai Lama’s Middle-Way approach needs re-adjustment”. EastAsiaForum. 8 March 2010. http :// www . eastasiaforum . org /2010/03/08/ the - dalai - lamas - middle - way - approach - and - the - need - for - re - adjustment /

[2] ChinaDaily. “What is Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way'”. ChinaDaily.com.cn 26 July 2007. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-07/26/content_649545.htm"
Candidate 5: "China will simply never accept independence for Tibet, and so it is not a reasonable alternative to hold up against the 'Middle Way'. Rather, whatever gains can be made by adopting the 'Middle Way' should be embraced, as the alternative is not independence but rather unchanged Chinese dominance and control."
Candidate 6: "China's supposed strategic interests in Tibet are also why the promised autonomy under the 'Middle Way' will never truly emerge. If China's need to hold onto Tibet is really so important as made out, China will always need to keep tight control over all happenings in Tibet so as to further guarantee its security. This of course assumes China really does have vital strategic interests in controlling Tibet (as the Chinese Government claims, and as is argued opposite), however it is not entirely clear exactly what these strategic interests are. The 'Middle Way' is just a smokescreen for perpetuating the predominance of China's security interests as the most important issue in Tibet. Thus, if China does have vital strategic interests in Tibet, it will never allow it true autonomy (and so the Middle Way is hopeless), and if it has no vital strategic interests in controlling Tibet then Chinese rule there is unjustified -and independence, not the ‘Middle Way’ should be adopted."

The average Tibetan does not actually want independence from China. For example, Dr. Lobsang Sangay, who was born in a refugee camp in India in 1968 and was named Prime Minister of the Cental Tibetan Administration (Tibetan exiles) on April 27, 2011, was once a militant of the Tibetan Youth Congress, a group that unequivocally supports Tibetan independence, but who now says he has matured and now supports the Middle Way Approach. [1] Certainly, many Tibetans want independence- of a type different to that proposed by the Dalai Lama- and some protest in favour of it. The Tibetan exile population is particularly vocal in this regard, but this should not be taken to mean that a majority of Tibetans want complete independence from China. Most Tibetans like everybody else would be happy with more freedoms within China rather than full independence. This is reflected in the views of the Dalai Lama, who seeks only greater freedoms and autonomy, but not independence, under the 'Middle Way'. [2]

[1] Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review. “Investigating the Candidates on the Middle Way”. The Tibetan Political Review. 15 March 2011. http :// sites . google . com / site / tibetanpoliticalreview / project - updates / investigatingthecandidatesonthemiddleway

[2] Barnett, Robert. “Seven Questions: What Tibetans Want”. Foreign Policy. 26 March 2008. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/03/25/seven_questions_what_ti...
