Argument: The ICC lacks the power to ensure arrests

While the ICC has the power to issue arrest warrants, it does not have the coercive powers to ensure that those warrants are followed. Despite the fact that States that are parties to the Rome Statute are obliged to co-operate with the directions of the Court, there have been many instances where such States have failed to pursue those indicted. Cases that have been referred to the ICC by the United Nations Security Council allows the Court to extend its jurisdiction to include UN member States that are not parties to the Rome Statute. This enabled the ICC to issue an international warrant for the arrest of Sudan’s President Al-Bashir. Yet several of these countries obliged to arrest him have refused when the opportunities have arisen. [1]

[1] Rothe &amp; Collins, pp.198-9

Candidate 1: "The fact that the Sudanese president has been able to travel freely to several countries without being arrested does not indicate that he or other would-be criminals are undeterred by the threat. Though the African Union has strongly advised its member states to ignore the arrest warrant and most have obliged, more recently Malawi and Kenya prevented Al-Bashir from attending summits. Even when Nigeria allowed his attendance at an AU summit last year, Al-Bashir fled within a day of arriving, after local human rights groups filed a court action.

The Democratic Republic of Congo has surrendered several suspects to the ICC and this was enough to induce another suspect to surrender. [1]

[1] Roth, "Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court.""
Candidate 2: "Precisely because many rank and file perpetrators are easily controlled or manipulated by group leaders, their criminal responsibility is diminished. While Article 26 of the Rome Statute prevents prosecution of those under 18 years of age, this is designed to prevent injustices towards those who are often themselves victims of those in command. Article 33 specifically rejects the ‘Nuremberg defence’ that following orders absolves a person from criminal responsibility. But in keeping with International Humanitarian Law (Rule 155 of Customary IHL), child soldiers should not be prosecuted for crimes committed under severe coercion by leaders. Prosecuting those responsible for that coercion is the most powerful deterrent. [1]

[1] IRIN News, "Should child soldiers be prosecuted for their crimes?""
Candidate 3: "The Lubanga case took 6 years to reach a verdict owing to problems with the reliability of testimony and the sheer number of witnesses and victims involved in the proceedings. [1]

Although the Prosecutor sought a harsher sentence, these problems with the weight of evidence and difficulties ascertaining the number of child soldiers required the Trial Chamber to impose a more modest sentence. [2]

Therefore, even if the Lubanga conviction might not have a strongly deterrent effect by itself, the ICC is pursuing many other cases and it is these constant and cumulative investigations that deter others from committing similar crimes.

[1] Kammer, "Deconstructing Lubanga"

[2] Human Rights Brief"

The fact that the Sudanese president has been able to travel freely to several countries without being arrested does not indicate that he or other would-be criminals are undeterred by the threat. Though the African Union has strongly advised its member states to ignore the arrest warrant and most have obliged, more recently Malawi and Kenya prevented Al-Bashir from attending summits. Even when Nigeria allowed his attendance at an AU summit last year, Al-Bashir fled within a day of arriving, after local human rights groups filed a court action.

The Democratic Republic of Congo has surrendered several suspects to the ICC and this was enough to induce another suspect to surrender. [1]

[1] Roth, "Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court."
