With chaos prevailing today in Libya, the idea of a coherent central government pursuing a sustained, well-organized effort to acquire nuclear weapons seems far-fetched. But even if a future government in Tripoli restored effective control over the entire country, it would face daunting obstacles to nuclear weapons acquisition. While Qaddafi had a nuclear weapons program and managed, with the help of the A.Q. Khan network, to procure sensitive equipment and materials for that program, it lacked the technical expertise needed to make real progress, and Libya still lacks that expertise. Without Qaddafi’s megalomania and eccentricity to motivate the acquisition of nuclear weapons, a future Libyan government may well see little reason to pursue a nuclear deterrent; its primary security threats are likely to remain internal rather than external.
With chaos prevailing today in Libya, the idea of a coherent central government pursuing a sustained, well-organized effort to acquire nuclear weapons seems far-fetched it would face daunting obstacles to nuclear weapons acquisition it lacked the technical expertise needed to make real progress, and Libya still lacks that expertise. Without Qaddafi’s megalomania and eccentricity to motivate the acquisition of nuclear weapons, a future Libyan government may well see little reason to pursue a nuclear deterrent; its primary security threats are likely to remain internal rather than external