But Mearsheimer then makes a giant and illogical leap, which drives his entire argument. He observes, plausibly, that the most secure state in a system is a regional hegemon. (Actually, there has only been one regional hegemon in modern history, the United States). Therefore, he asserts, “States quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system,” and therefore “only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system.” But this is wrong, and it does not flow from the five bedrock assumptions of the model. The fatal flaw in the theory of offensive realism is its failure to distinguish between the attractive aspects of being a regional hegemon and the perilous, mortal dangers of bidding for hegemony. Recall the assumptions that “survival is the number one goal of great powers,” and that they are rational (Mearsheimer 2001: 34, 46). Thus, the question is not whether being a regional hegemon would be attractive; rather, it is whether bidding for hegemony would make it more or less likely that the state will survive. And here any rational great power would draw the same conclusion: bidding for hegemony is perhaps the only thing that can possibly lead to its utter destruction, and thus such follies should be avoided.
The fatal flaw in the theory of offensive realism is its failure to distinguish between the attractive aspects of being a regional hegemon and the perilous, mortal dangers of bidding for hegemony. Recall the assumptions that “survival is the number one goal of great powers,” and that they are rational Thus, the question is not whether being a regional hegemon would be attractive; rather, it is whether bidding for hegemony would make it more or less likely that the state will survive any rational great power would draw the same conclusion: bidding for hegemony is the only thing that can possibly lead to its utter destruction, and thus such follies should be avoided