The stakes in the validity of the diversionary hypothesis are deceptively high. As a domestic-level explanation of international conflict, it offers one of several important alternatives to rationalist explanations of war based on the state as a unitary actor.6 Strong empirical support for diversion would confirm another pathway to international conflict, complementing those based on rationalist approaches. By contrast, limited support for diversion would cast doubt on one class of second-image theories of international conflict. Despite two decades of renewed research, cumulative knowledge on diversion remains elusive. Quantitative studies contain mixed and often contradictory empirical results regarding the relationship between internal and external conflict. Some studies find a positive relationship between indicators of domestic dissatisfaction and threats or uses of force in analysis of U.S. behavior7 and in cross-national studies.8 By contrast, other research identifies a weak or nonexistent relationship between these same variables.9 Indeed, the gap between the intuition underlying diversion as a motive for conflict and existing quantitative research that Jack Levy noted in 1989 continues to characterize this research program today.10 Given the mixed empirical results in recent quantitative research, this article offers a different type of test of the diversionary hypothesis. In particular, I extend efforts to employ case study methods to test the hypothesis systematically and against alternative explanations in specific episodes of historical interest.11 Adopting a modified “most likely” approach to theory testing pioneered by Harry Eckstein, I examine two cases that should be easy for diversionary theory to explain: Argentina’s 1982 seizure of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus. In these episodes, high levels of domestic political unrest preceded the escalation of salient disputes that leaders could manipulate to rally public support or demonstrate their competence as statesmen. These cases should be homeruns for the diversionary hypothesis, but they are in fact quite difficult for it to explain. In these cases, the relationship between domestic political conflict and dispute escalation is weak at best, as the onset and magnitude of social unrest was only linked loosely with decisions to use force. Leaders’ statements and reasoning provide little evidence for diversion as a central motivation for escalation. Instead, a standard realist model of international politics and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy offer a more compelling explanation of Argentine and Turkish decision making.12 Leaders in these states chose force in response to external threats to national interests, not internal threats to their political survival.
stakes in the validity of the diversionary hypothesis are deceptively high limited support would cast doubt on one class of second-image theories of international conflict. Despite two decades of renewed research, cumulative knowledge on diversion remains elusive studies contain mixed and often contradictory empirical results research identifies a weak or nonexistent relationship between variables the gap between the intuition and existing quantitative research Levy noted continues to characterize this research program today Given mixed empirical results this article offers a different type of test I extend efforts to employ case study methods to test the hypothesis systematically , I examine two cases that should be easy for diversionary theory to explain: Argentina’s seizure of the Falkland nd Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus cases should be homeruns for the diversionary hypothesis, but they are in fact quite difficult for it to explain the relationship between domestic political conflict and dispute escalation is weak at best, as the onset and magnitude of social unrest was only linked loosely with decisions to use force. Leaders’ statements provide little evidence for diversion a standard realist model of international politics and coercive diplomacy offer a more compelling explanation Leaders chose force in response to external threats to national interests, not to political survival.