Argument: There is a strong precedent for expansion

There is a strong precedent for letting Ukraine and Georgia join NATO. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are also former Soviet states, and Russia objected to their entry into NATO quite as much as it objects today about its Black Sea neighbours. [1] Yet Russia was not allowed a veto over their futures, and it soon got over its annoyance, continuing to participate in joint forums with NATO and to cooperate with the USA over Afghanistan, North Korea and nuclear non-proliferation. So NATO is already committed to the defence of states in Russia’s near-abroad, and should not fear further expansion.

[1] Black, Stephen J., ‘NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do’, Strategic Studies Institute, November 1997, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=146

Candidate 1: "Russian strength is illusory – the country’s wealth is highly dependent on the energy exports and its economy is very vulnerable to a fall in oil and gas prices. Russia needs to sell its oil at $115 per barrel for the budget to balance. [1] Despite recent hostility to foreign oil firms attempting to operate in Russia, in the long term the country also needs western investment and technology if it is to maintain its energy output by opening and exploiting new fields. Indeed, Europe cannot be held hostage to Russian energy policy – who else could Russia sell its oil and gas to? Russia’s apparent military strength is also deceptive – its army and air force actually performed badly in Georgia and are no match for the modern forces available to NATO.

[1] Nikishenkov, Oleg, ‘Oil muddles Russia’s budget debate’, themoscownews, 16 May 2011, http://themoscownews.com/business/20110516/188670156.html"
Candidate 2: "In retrospect, the decision to welcome the former Soviet states in the Baltic into NATO appears foolish. They continue to have a prickly relationship with Russia, which has some legitimate concerns about the treatment of large Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and about the siting of US nuclear defences. Their entry into NATO was forced upon Russia, which naturally saw it as an aggressive move designed to humiliate it, and marked the point when its pro-western policy shifted to a more nationalist and confrontational approach. [1] It also weakened the unity of NATO as there are quite legitimate doubts as to whether all the alliance’s members would really go to war with Russia over the integrity of, say, Estonia. Given this history, it would be madness to compound the problem by extending NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine.

[1] Fraser, Malcolm, ‘Ukraine: there’s no way out unless the west understands its past mistakes’, theguardian.com, 3 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/03/ukraine-theres-no-way-out-unless-the-west-understands-its-past-mistakes"
Candidate 3: "We do not need to buy Russia cooperation by sacrificing Georgian and Ukrainian sovereignty. The West would like Russian cooperation in a whole range of areas, but this isn’t a zero sum game where if one side wins the other must lose out. Russia should also worry about issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and the threat posed by failed states, so it is in its own interests to work with international partners to find global solutions. It also wants World Trade Organisation membership to continue its economic growth, especially if oil and gas prices should fall. For these reasons Russia will not make its whole foreign policy dependent on the expansion of NATO, but can be relied upon to continue existing partnerships because they are of mutual benefit."
Candidate 4: "It is far from the settled will of the Georgian and Ukrainian peoples that they wish to join NATO. Georgia’s President Saakashvili did wish to join, but after his disastrous attempt to regain control of South Ossetia was unable to bring his country with him. Saakashvilli was defeated in parliamentary elections and ran up against his term limit at the end of 2013 [1] opening the way towards better relations with Russia. Public opposition to NATO membership in Ukraine since the US-led war in Iraq 2003 outweighed support for joining the alliance. [2] Ukraine is split over NATO membership, with most of the Russian-speaking East of the country firmly opposed to the idea, and only about 30% support overall. [3] The crisis of Ukraine’s pro-western coalition over how to respond to the conflict in Georgia showed how divisive the question is; the President firmly supported Georgia while the PM kept quiet. [4] In any case, NATO membership should not automatically be extended to every nation which wishes it, but only offered when the current members of the alliance judge it to be in their strategic interest to do so.

[1] Traub, James, ‘The Georgia Syndrome’, ForeignPolicy, 13 August 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/13/the_georgia_syndrome

[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.

[3] Atwell, Kyle, ‘Two Different Paths to NATO: Georgia and Ukraine’, Atlantic Review, 7 November 2008, http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1206-Two-Different-Paths-to-NATO-Georgia-and-Ukraine.html

[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf , p.16

[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf , p.16"
Candidate 5: "Further expansion is not in NATO’s interests. The alliance is based on the principle that the security of one is the security of all, so that all members will go to war if any one member is attacked. This is a very serious commitment and should not lightly be extended to new nations. The irresponsible manner in which Georgia provoked a conflict with Russia, ignoring US warnings, shows the danger of being sucked into quarrels in which most NATO members have no strategic interest. It was obvious from this conflict that Georgia could not defend itself so the burden would fall on NATO. [1] Like the breakaway regions of Georgia, Ukraine also contains many Russian-speakers who look to Moscow for protection, especially in the Crimea which hosts Russia’s Black Sea fleet. [2] If Ukraine had been a member of NATO when Russia moved troops into Crimea then NATO would be a dangerous confrontation with Russia.

[1] Tayler, Jeffrey, ‘Russia: Back to the Future’, the Atlantic, September 2008, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/09/russia-back-to-the-future/7029/

[2] Varettoni, William, ‘Crimea’s Overlooked Instability’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.34, No.3, Summer 2011, pp.87-99, https://csis.org/files/publication/twq11summervarettoni.pdf , p.89"
Candidate 6: "Dramatic and depressing as events in Georgia in 2008 were, the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia actually make Georgia better suited to NATO membership than before. There would have been a clear danger of allowing Georgia into NATO if the status of these breakaway regions was unsettled, with the obvious potential for conflict with their Russian patron. Once Georgia can be brought to accept the permanent loss of these territories to Russia, then it becomes a much more united country, without any other obvious grounds for Russia’s future interference. This is similarly the case with Crimea; The Russian Black Sea Fleet based in a NATO member would have clearly been a risk."

In retrospect, the decision to welcome the former Soviet states in the Baltic into NATO appears foolish. They continue to have a prickly relationship with Russia, which has some legitimate concerns about the treatment of large Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and about the siting of US nuclear defences. Their entry into NATO was forced upon Russia, which naturally saw it as an aggressive move designed to humiliate it, and marked the point when its pro-western policy shifted to a more nationalist and confrontational approach. [1] It also weakened the unity of NATO as there are quite legitimate doubts as to whether all the alliance’s members would really go to war with Russia over the integrity of, say, Estonia. Given this history, it would be madness to compound the problem by extending NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine.

[1] Fraser, Malcolm, ‘Ukraine: there’s no way out unless the west understands its past mistakes’, theguardian.com, 3 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/03/ukraine-theres-no-way-out-unless-the-west-understands-its-past-mistakes
