Alternate Theory of Chinas Rise ─ Defensive Realism The claims of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism are in contrast with Waltz’s defensive realism on several points. While Mearsheimer claims that great powers act aggressively and aim to gain so much power that they are the ultimate hegemons in the system, Waltz’s defensive realism sees the states as acting defensively to maintain rather than upset the balance of power. For Waltz, the states are primarily concerned with maintaining “their position in the system.”55 Defensive realists argue that offence-defence balance favours the defence. 56 Therefore, a robust defence and careful balancing should deter any aggressive impulses from great powers. Defensive realism argues that great powers are concerned with maintaining the status quo rather than maximising their power because often the cost of expansion outweighs the benefits. Defensive realism sees security dilemmas as a problem where an increase in the power of one state increases the insecurity of the other causing the latter to increase its power. Under the conditions of defensive realism, great powers would try to alleviate any security dilemmas rather than exacerbate it. China’s current policy seems to be firmly rooted in defensive realism. Its policy seems to be aimed at maintaining the balance of power rather than upsetting it. As the earlier section has argued, China is not a revisionist power but a status quo one. The analysts like Shiping Tang are convinced that China’s security strategy flows out of its realisation of the security dilemma whereby the Chinese leaders have understood that an aggressive expansionist strategy would just lead to counterbalancing alliances. “This recognition has led China to adopt a defensive realism-rooted security strategy emphasising moderation, self-restraint and security cooperation.”57 Moreover, China’s military modernisation, its Taiwan policy and its increased policies in the South China Sea also make more sense if seen through the lens of defensive realism. China’s Taiwan policy may be more geared towards preventing redistribution of power in the region. Since the US is providing arms assistance to Taiwan, China may be averse to the US aiding Taiwan’s independence ─ the latter issue is one where China has made clear that independence is not acceptable to China. Similarly, there is good evidence that China’s military modernisation programmes and training exercises since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 are aimed partially at dealing with the issue of the Taiwanese separation.58 On the question of whether China is balancing against the US, Johnston says, “There seems to be little doubt that China’s military modernisation programme since the mid-1990s has been aimed in large measure at developing capabilities to deter or slow the application of the US military power in the region.”59 It would then seem that China is not concerned with gaining power or projecting its powers but with balancing against a predominance of the US power in the region. China has not shown any signs of hegemonic behaviour as a lot of Western analysts feared. Instead of guided by offensive realism, China’s policies seem to be guided by defensive realism where it is concerned with survival and with maintaining its position in the system. Just as the US fears China’s hegemonic rise, China also fears the increase of the US influence in the region and its talk of containing China. China’s policy may change in the future to display hegemonic tendencies. However, at present, there is not much evidence to support the theory of offensive realism Conclusion Far from being a revisionist power maximising state, China’s behaviour seems to be more of a status quo power. Instead of being a threat and a source of instability, China can be a source of stability in the region. China’s foreign policy seems to be driven by defensive realism rather than principles of offensive realism as Mearsheimer argues. The conflict between China as a rising power and the US as a status quo power is not inevitable. It is possible to avoid the Thucydides’s Trap. China’s rise is not as much of a threat as the Western debates make it out to be. In many ways, it may provide opportunities rather than challenges. However, theories and analyses presented by scholars such as Mearsheimer would certainly lead to conflict if followed by the US policymakers. If Washington continues to believe and act on the assumption that increase in the Chinese power poses a threat to the US military and diplomatic presence and economic interests in the region and opts for a containment and encirclement policy towards China ─ it would amount to a self-fulfilling prophesy where the conflict would materialise between the two powers. Engagement rather than containment is the policy that would lead to a more stable and secure regional and global environment.
Alternate Theory of Chinas Rise ─ Defensive Realism defensive realism sees the states as acting defensively to maintain rather than upset the balance of power. For the states are primarily concerned with maintaining “their position in the system.”55 Defensive realists argue that offence-defence balance favours the defence Defensive realism argues that great powers are concerned with maintaining the status quo rather than maximising their power because often the cost of expansion outweighs the benefits. Defensive realism sees security dilemmas as a problem where an increase in the power of one state increases the insecurity of the other causing the latter to increase its powe China’s current policy seems to be firmly rooted in defensive realism. Its policy seems to be aimed at maintaining the balance of power rather than upsetting it. China is not a revisionist power but a status quo one. China’s security strategy flows out of its realisation of the security dilemma whereby the Chinese leaders have understood that an aggressive expansionist strategy would just lead to counterbalancing alliances China’s military modernisation, its Taiwan policy and its increased policies in the South China Sea also make more sense if seen through the lens of defensive realism. China’s Taiwan policy may be more geared towards preventing redistribution of power in the region. Since the US is providing arms assistance to Taiwan, China may be averse to the US aiding Taiwan’s independence ─ the latter issue is one where China has made clear that independence is not acceptable to China. It would then seem that China is not concerned with gaining power or projecting its powers but with balancing against a predominance of the US power in the region. China has not shown any signs of hegemonic behaviour as a lot of Western analysts feared. Just as the US fears China’s hegemonic rise, China also fears the increase of the US influence in the region and its talk of containing China. Far from being a revisionist power maximising state, China’s behaviour seems to be more of a status quo power China can be a source of stability in the region. China’s foreign policy seems to be driven by defensive realism rather than principles of offensive realism as Mearsheimer argues. China’s rise is not as much of a threat as the Western debates make it out to be. In many ways, it may provide opportunities rather than challenge