Argument: North Korea is an irrational regime that is a strategic threat to numerous great powers

North Korea is an irrational and irresponsible regime that can’t simply be ignored. As the United States National Security Council spokesman Tonny Vietor said in response to the 12th December 2012 missile test “This action is yet another example of North Korea's pattern of irresponsible behavior.” As a power that is willing to defy international sanctions and resolutions such as “Resolution 1874, which demands the DPRK not to conduct "any launch using ballistic missile technology" and urges it to "suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme"” [1] it is essential that there is engagement to prevent the regime breaking more international norms.

It is impossible simply to ignore a regime with such a propensity to engage in provocative actions when it borders you, as is the case with China and Russia, or when it has tested missiles that can potentially hit targets 6000km away, so most of Asia, including numerous US bases. [2]

[1] ‘North Korea rocket: International reaction’, BBC News, 12 December 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20690762

[2] ‘North Korea’s missile programme’, BBC News, 12 December 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17399847

Candidate 1: "Negotiations to defuse the cause of the immediate tension, and sanctions to encourage North Korea to the negotiating table are sensible, proportionate responses to North Korean actions. It is difficult to see how sanctions can be seen as encouraging even if those sanctions are then eased when North Korea climbs down."
Candidate 2: "South Korea can handle the situation itself

The two Koreas should be able to solve the situation themselves without recourse to all the neighbouring powers – whose interest does not seem to have spurred a solution to the frozen conflict anyway. With the Cold War over South Korea is more than capable of handling its own security. South Korea is economically far ahead of the North with its economy thirty seven times bigger. [1] Its military is also more capable than the North’s as the International Institute for Strategic Studies argues “As measured by static equipment indices, South Korea’s conventional forces would appear superior to North Korea’s. When morale, training, equipment maintenance, logistics, and reconnaissance and communications capabilities are factored in, this qualitative advantage increases.” [2] So should be able to deter aggression on its own and pull its own weight in negotiations without the need of a multilateral process. Moreover no one would argue that an invasion should be ignored however the South should be the one who responds to North Korean actions on its own.

[1] Oh Young-Jin, ‘South Korean economy 37 times bigger than NK’s’, The Korea Times, 5 January 2011, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2011/01/123_79235.html

[2] ‘The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula’, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/the-conventional-military-balance-on-the-kore/"
Candidate 3: "North Korea is not an irrational regime, and is certainly not going to use its missiles to hit one of its neighbouring great powers. North Korea has shown time and time again that its number one objective is regime survival [1] and its provocations are one method it uses to try and ensure such survival through getting concessions and building deterrence against any possible pre-emptive attack either by the South or the United States. [2] North Korea will therefore never invite such retaliation from the surrounding great powers. All provocations it takes are just to the extent that it thinks it can get away with them. It is notable that since South Korea altered its stance from ‘controlled response’ to ‘manifold retaliation’ in the wake of the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island [3] the provocations from North Korea have been much less provocative i.e. missile testing rather than military actions.

[1] Lankov, Andrei, ‘Weep Not for Kim Jong Il’, Foreign Policy, 23 December 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/23/weep_not_for_kim_jong_il

[2] ‘The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula’, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/the-conventional-military-balance-on-the-kore/

[3] Mc Devitt, Michael, ‘Deterring North Korean Provocations’, Brookings, February 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/02/north-korea-mcdevitt"
Candidate 4: "The United States has its own interests in the North Korean question, not only does it have troops in South Korea and security guarantees to maintain with its ally but it is also concerned by nuclear proliferation. If there is a chance to get rid of North Korean nuclear weapons through negotiations, or even a peace treaty should the USA not take that when it is in the US national interest? [1]

[1] DiFilippo, Anthony, ‘Time for North Korea Peace Treaty’, The Diplomat, 11 April 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/11/time-for-north-korea-peace-treaty/3/"
Candidate 5: "Providing attention simply encourages the regime

North Korea has an attention seeking cycle on the go that was used by Kim Jong Il and now seems to be used by his son Kim Jong Un. Essentially North Korea takes a provocative action (as big or small as it thinks necessary – this may be a missile launch, right up to some kind of military attack) in order to grab the world’s attention. There is then a period where there are condemnations and threats to increase sanctions that usually don’t get anywhere as they are blocked by China. The North Korean regime will then proclaim a willingness to do business and negotiate giving minor concessions on the issue of the provocation in return for aid or whatever the regime happens to want at the time. Of course whatever concession it gives is easily reversible so setting up another round. [1] This is a good deal for North Korea as it essentially gets aid in return for bad behaviour, it is therefore not surprising that the North is willing to continue engaging in bad behaviour.

[1] Hong, Adrian, ‘How to Free North Korea’, Foreign Policy, 19 December 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/19/how_to_free_north_korea"
Candidate 6: "So far engagement has done little to resolve the situation in North Korea either; the regime is practically immune to pressure from those states that are willing to pressurise it. There are occasional hopes that China will put more pressure on North Korea but so far these have proven to be false hopes, and indeed China is investing heavily in North Korea, for example creating a port at Rason to serve Manchuria. [1] When the Korean question is resolved it will be through the collapse of the regime, something that is as likely to come about through ignoring it as engaging with it.

[1] Bloomberg News, ‘North Korea Investment Zone Promoted to Chinese as Next Shenzhen’, Bloomberg, 13 September 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-13/north-korea-investment-zone-promoted-to-chinese-as-next-shenzhen.html"
Candidate 7: "Ignoring North Korea wont resolve the situation

While the great powers can try to keep on with business as usual how will this be helpful? The situation is unstable and needs to be resolved which is something that ignoring the North will not do. Commentators thought that the North would collapse as a result of the withdrawal of support that was given by the USSR in the early 1990s but it did not happen. The regime will likely be able to hang on in the status quo situation pretty much indefinitely.

There is also no reason to believe that the provocations may not become bigger should smaller provocations be ignored. While North Korea can attract the world’s attention with a missile test launch it is likely to keep doing such small and relatively harmless actions. Should such actions fail the regime may resort to bigger incidents such as the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2010 which resulted in 46 deaths which may have been an attempt at coercive diplomacy against a regime that was unwilling to engage in negotiations. [1]

[1] Cha, Victor, ‘The Sinking of the Cheonan’, Center for Strategic &amp; International Studies, 22 April 2010, http://csis.org/publication/sinking-cheonan"
Candidate 8: "While the United Nations is about creating peace that does not mean that it needs to keep trying the same failed formula. It is clear that multilateral discussions and sanctions have not succeeded in creating positive change in relation to North Korea. Trying new tactics does not mean giving up on the goal of international peace and security."
Candidate 9: "Rounds of sanctions and engagement does not bring a solution any closer

The responses to North Korean provocations do not bring a solution any closer. North Korea has yet to sign a peace treaty with the South and the United States. It is however particularly interested in signing a treaty with the United States rather than the South. In 2010 the North Korean foreign ministry proposed that "If confidence is to be built between [North Korea] and the US, it is essential to conclude a peace treaty for terminating the state of war, a root cause of the hostile relations, to begin with". [1] The North wants a peace treaty with the US so as to drive a wedge between the USA and South Korea to prevent US support for the South in the event of war. [2] Ignoring such efforts at negotiating with the USA without South Korea in the room, and indeed all advances and provocations would force the North to accept that it has to negotiate with the south or with no one. Ignoring North Korean actions and reducing the number of allies negotiating while maintaining security guarantees prevents any chance of the North dividing the USA and South Korea.

[1] Walker, Peter, ‘North Korea calls for peace treaty with US’, guardian.co.uk, 11 January 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/11/north-korea-peace-treaty-us-nuclear-talks

[2] Cheon, Seongwhun, ‘Negotiating with South Korea and the I.S.: North Korea’s Strategy and Objectives’, International Journal for Korean Studies, Vol XVI No 1, Spring 2012, http://www.icks.org/publication/pdf/2012-SPRING-SUMMER/7.pdf p.153"
Candidate 10: "Pressure from other states acts as a force multiplier helping to show that the North has crossed a line with its actions. A lack of reaction from the Unites States, Japan, and other states around the world would show that these nations are no longer supporting the South as strongly as they were. The United States in particular has to be willing to engage with North Korea in order to present a united front with its South Korean ally."
Candidate 11: "North Korea is an unresolved conflict it can’t simply be ignored

Even if the provocations are sometimes relatively small and ineffective, such as the failed missile launch in April 2012, as a conflict zone they cant simply be ignored by anyone even if they themselves are unlikely to be drawn into any potential conflict. After Rwanda the United Nations promised never again would it allow genocide; [1] how much worse would it be to ignore something that could be a spark to a conflict that could cost millions of lives when we already know there is the potential. The United Nations was created “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace… to bring about … settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace” [2] therefore all nations should be attempting to resolve this frozen conflict that could so easily become a shooting war. Wars in Korea have in the past drawn in all the surrounding powers; the Imjin war involved China and Japan, China and Japan again fought over Korea in 1894-5, and the Korean War 1950-53 brought in both the USA and China while Russia and Japan were both involved as supply bases. Clearly the possibility of conflict is not something any power with a stake in Northeast Asia can simply ignore.

It is essential that there is a reaction to every incident just in case that is the incident that spins out of control.

[1] Power, Samantha, ‘Remember the Blood Frenzy of Rwanda’, Los Angeles Times, 4 April 2004, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/pdf/RememberBloodyFrenzyRwanda.pdf

[2] ‘Article 1 The Purposes of the United Nations are:’, United Nations, 26 June 1945, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml"

North Korea is not an irrational regime, and is certainly not going to use its missiles to hit one of its neighbouring great powers. North Korea has shown time and time again that its number one objective is regime survival [1] and its provocations are one method it uses to try and ensure such survival through getting concessions and building deterrence against any possible pre-emptive attack either by the South or the United States. [2] North Korea will therefore never invite such retaliation from the surrounding great powers. All provocations it takes are just to the extent that it thinks it can get away with them. It is notable that since South Korea altered its stance from ‘controlled response’ to ‘manifold retaliation’ in the wake of the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island [3] the provocations from North Korea have been much less provocative i.e. missile testing rather than military actions.

[1] Lankov, Andrei, ‘Weep Not for Kim Jong Il’, Foreign Policy, 23 December 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/23/weep_not_for_kim_jong_il

[2] ‘The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula’, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/the-conventional-military-balance-on-the-kore/

[3] Mc Devitt, Michael, ‘Deterring North Korean Provocations’, Brookings, February 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/02/north-korea-mcdevitt
