Argument: Give a choice, all rational individuals would prefer to live in a world in which behaviour prefered the choice to sacrifice one to save many

While Rawls did oppose utilitarianism, he generated a hypothetical scenario that is useful, even to the utilitarian, for evaluating moral theories. Imagine that all human beings were placed in a scenario where they knew nothing about their station in the world, and know only the basic laws of reasoning and human nature. They do not know what their level of intelligence, personality traits, gender, socioeconomic status, race or religion will be, nor even when or where they will be born; they are “behind the veil of ignorance.” Every single person who will ever exist is placed in this situation at the beginning of the universe. Next, these human beings are told they will decide which rules will govern human conduct when they come to inhabit the world. In such a situation, all rational human beings would ensure that they are treated fairly no matter who they are; they will have perfect sympathy for every human being ever, because they could end up being that person. Whatever rules they come up with in this situation are the rules that are ethically correct, because these rules will never treat anyone unfairly (as that would be an irrational move). [1] So how would people in this hypothetical treat the decision whether to kill one to save five? Rational actors would agree on the rule to kill the one and save the five. After all, any given person is five times as likely to end up as a member of the five rather than as the one. Thus, behind the veil of ignorance, the rational human being would proudly prescribe “Save the five and kill the one.”

[1] Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University press, 1971, p.136

Candidate 1: "The idea of a “right to life,” while appealing, is highly suspect. “Rights” are the highest order of human entitlements, things which one can reasonably expect will never ever happen to them, and which if violated represent a colossal failure of our moral and legal infrastructure. In reality, people die all the time for a variety of natural and artificial reasons, and while we certainly think that these deaths are unfortunate, we don’t think that someone’s human rights were infringed upon every time someone dies in a motor vehicle accident. By contrast, we do have an actual right not to be murdered. When one human being deliberately kills another human being, we rightly see that as an exceptional and grave violation of a basic human right. Therefore, it doesn’t violate anyone’s rights to let the five people die, but it certainly does violate the right of putative sixth person to actively murder them to save the others. Moreover, it may be questionable to assume that all lives are equally valuable; if we are going to engage in the grisly business of actually summing up human lives, why treat someone who we’d expect to only live for another year equal to someone we can expect to live for another sixty? If the advocate of killing the one is going to adopt a “maximizing” ethical view, they should at least commit to a true utilitarianism, rather than a view that is not necessarily supported by either utilitarianism or deontology; treating all deaths as equal, regardless of much they cut a life short, is not something a utilitarian would get behind."
Candidate 2: "Behind the veil of ignorance, human beings may not in fact side with what gives them the statistical greatest chance of survival. As Rawls himself notes, people are naturally risk-averse, and thus will select the rules that protect them from the worst possible situations, even if that sacrifice would help many others. Most people find the prospect of being actively killed by the conscious action of another human being worse than simply dying in an accident, and would seek to protect themselves against that worse outcome."
Candidate 3: "To weigh up human lives in this calculated manner inherently strips them of dignity and reduces them to mere numbers. This “aggregative” ethical standpoint, in which a loss of utility to one person can be compensated for by gains in utility to other people, fails to respect “the separateness of persons” [1] . We are all different people, and we do not all share in the alleged benefits to maximizing total utility. For this reason, our moral intuitions reject out-of-hand many variants on “killing one to save five”; for instance, we would think it abhorrent to abduct a random person and harvest their organs in order to save five dying people, even in the absence of side effects like people now being afraid of having their organs taken. Also, see “different lives weigh differently” argument below.

[1] Richardson, Henry S., ‘John Rawls (1921-2002)’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 18 November 2005, http://www.iep.utm.edu/rawls/"
Candidate 4: "Assessing the value of a life on the basis of family members and how much the person is worth to everyone else creates a perverse priority on those with large families and many connections. To do so makes an injunction: position yourself so that you’re important and well-connected, and suddenly you get priority when we are deciding who to save."

Behind the veil of ignorance, human beings may not in fact side with what gives them the statistical greatest chance of survival. As Rawls himself notes, people are naturally risk-averse, and thus will select the rules that protect them from the worst possible situations, even if that sacrifice would help many others. Most people find the prospect of being actively killed by the conscious action of another human being worse than simply dying in an accident, and would seek to protect themselves against that worse outcome.
