Since the advent of nuclear weapons, there have been few wars among nuclear states. That is not the same as saying nuclear powers do not quarrel, threaten, or even fight proxy wars against one another - they do. But nuclear states rarely, if ever, fight wars against one another. Why? As previously mentioned, nuclear weapons seem to socialize leaders to the dangers of adventurism and, in effect, halt them from behaving recklessly. In short, the risk of nuclear war makes leaders risk- averse; they must act with deliberate restraint, carefully plotting their courses of action in terms of how other nuclear leaders might react, even if they would prefer not to. Along with the "democratic peace" theory - which has been touted as the closest thing we have to an empirical law of international behavior - the "long peace" among nuclear powers is impressive.30 Some might have difficulty imagining why nuclear leaders would behave in the manner described here, so a brief discussion on the role of structure in international politics is warranted. Structural analysis addresses the positioning of actors in social and political systems - the properties and relations that make them parts of a system.31 Within the field of international politics, most scholars accept Waltz's tripartite conception of structure (functional differentiation, ordering principles, and power distribution). In the standard Waltzian account, international systems are largely undifferentiated - and pretty much all the same. States are assumed to be "like units" made different only by their position among other states, strong states being privileged over weak ones. Anarchy is the "ordering principle" of international systems, meaning that there is no higher authority to which states can appeal to reconcile differences or ensure their survival. Power is distributed unevenly throughout the system, so states are unequal - making international systems unequal. To say structural theory provides a positional picture of politics is to say that states can be measured in terms of how they stack up against one another in terms of relative power. Few things affect this "stacking up" more than nuclear weapons, which is why statesmen pay attention to who has these weapons and if they might be used against them. To say that nuclear weapons socialize leaders to the dangers of adventurism is to say that leaders pay attention to survival, because no one else can do so for them; the structure of international life prohibits it. In this sense, the "survival motive" is law-like. All human conduct is shaped in some measure by what individuals believe to be general laws. In science, laws establish relations between variables. Kepler's laws of planetary motion described the orbits of the planets by proving that a planet "sweeps out equal areas of its ellipse in each equal interval of time."32 That is not how I use the term here, for in international politics there are no laws that operate with such fidelity. There are, however, softer, law-like relationships. "Such relationships are not based on a linkage that has been found, but on one that has been found repeatedly."33 To assert that democracies do not fight wars against one another is to make a law-like statement. Moreover, states, like humans, respond to signals and interpret them by putting them into some general category thought to be law-like. As Jacob Bronowski noted, "We then assume that the future will have some general likeness with futures we have met before which followed this kind of signal, and this is the kind of future we prepare for."34 Few things send a stronger signal to statesmen than the threat of nuclear war, and in this regard, the threat of nuclear war plays a socialization role. Since socialization is important to this discussion, we need to be clear about its meaning.35 Socialization refers to a relationship between at least two parties where "A influences ?. B, affected by Äs influence, then influences A. "As Waltz put it, "Each is not just influencing the other; both are being influenced by the situation their interactions create." Moreover, the behavior of the pair cannot be "apprehended by taking a unilateral view of either member."36 Each acts and reacts in accordance with the other. The "global teenager" provides an example of the socialization process that occurs throughout the world. No one tells all the teenagers in the world to dress alike, but most of them do most of the time. Likewise, no one tells all the states in the world to behave themselves, but most of them do most of the time. States are socialized to this idea by interacting with other states, particularly the great powers - whose role it is to set and enforce the rules of the game. In both instances, socialization is "a process of learning to conform one's behavior to societal expectations" and a "process of identity and interest formation."37 Socialization draws members of a group into conformity with its norms. Socialization also encourages similarities in behavior. Analogically speaking, nuclear relationships are like economic markets in that both are about self-help. They are also "individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and [may even be] unintended."38 But unlike markets, which can be left to their own devices to self-correct in times of disequilibrium, nuclear relationships must be corrected by leaders in times of crisis. This can be explained in terms of structural theory and the socializing effect of the survival motive. Because no higher authority exists to protect states from the harmful intentions of others, statesmen must pay attention to survival. Nothing threatens survival more than the threat of nuclear war, which is why nuclear statesmen are so highly sensitive to it. Even more importantly for this discussion, statesmen do not seem to be sensitive to the actual number of nuclear weapons a state might possess, only whether or not a state possesses any at all. From this, can one conclude that nuclear leaders act with law-like regularity? The Cuban missile crisis and the Kargil conflict are illustrative. During the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev sought solutions short of war, despite their sharp political, cultural, and economic differences.39 That the Soviets might have underestimated how the United States would react when confronted with a relatively small number of missiles based off the coast of Florida is not as telling as how both leaders behaved when they realized what was at stake. Secretary of State Dean Rusk's comment that "We were eyeball to eyeball" is illustrative for several reasons. First, the two sides were staring into the face of grave danger. Second, both grasped the importance of avoiding nuclear war. Lastly, even though the situation was riddled with ambiguity, the two sides recognized that the outcome of the crisis depended as much on the moves of one side as it did the other. One quotation is representative of many others.40 In a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Kennedy outlined what was on his mind: If we attack Cuban missiles, in any way, it gives them a clear line to take Berlin, as they were able to do in Hungary under the Anglo war in Egypt. We would be regarded as the trigger-happy Americans who lost Berlin. We would have no support among our allies. We would affect the West Germans' attitude toward us. And people would believe that we let Berlin go because we didn't have the guts to endure Cuba. If we go in and take them out in an air strike ... we increase the chance greatly, as I think - there's bound to be a reprisal from the Soviet Union, there always is - of their just going in and taking Berlin by force. Which leaves me one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons - which is a hell of an alternative - and begin a nuclear exchange, with all this happening.41 During the entire crisis, the number of Soviet nuclear weapons on Cuban soil was never the focal point of US concern; in fact, the true number of these weapons - strategic and tactical - was not known until many decades later. The avoidance of nuclear war was the focal point; the threshold easily recognized, best not crossed, and worth avoiding. As early as 1962, the superpowers understood that they could race to the brink but no further, lest they run the risk of nuclear war; a risk that neither side would willingly take. Following the crisis, both sides took steps to reduce uncertainty and improve crisis stability. As Kennedy and Khrushchev became increasingly socialized to the possibilities of nuclear war, the relationship that emerged was tempered by caution in that each leader sought solutions short of war. Something similar seems to have occurred during the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan. Prior to acquiring a relatively small nuclear capability, Pakistan fought three bloody wars with India. Today, with both parties possessing nuclear forces, the sharp differences that separate India and Pakistan have not been sufficient to drive either side to war.42 While the two sides actively engage in a game of tit-for-tat, nuclear weapons seem to have socialized leaders to the dangers of nuclear war, and as a result, the relationship between them has steadied. Far from perfect, relations between India and Pakistan can be summarized as tense but stable.43 The presence of nuclear weapons played a role in shaping the character of the Kargil conflict, the first conflict between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. A retrospective look indicates that neither side actually threatened the other with the use of nuclear weapons.44 This was not clear during the conflict, however. According to one source, nuclear threats were issued between Pakistan and India no fewer than 13 times.45 The most prominent of these was made by Pakistan's foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad when he stated, "We will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity."46 Additionally, it was believed that both sides increased their nuclear readiness levels.47 US intelligence agencies believed Pakistan had mobilized and was arming its missiles with nuclear warheads - a fact that caused President Clinton to lean heavily on Prime Minister Sharif to withdraw Pakistani forces and bring the conflict to an end.48 India, too, had reportedly placed its forces at "Readiness State 3" - preparing aircraft as well as short- and medium-range ballistic missiles for use.49 Whether overt threats were exchanged or nuclear forces mobilized seems to have mattered less than the presence of nuclear weapons. That is, nuclear weapons seem to have played a role in how each side fought during the conflict. Of the two states, India was most notable for the restraint it put on its armed forces. Unlike in previous military responses to Pakistani aggression, Indian leadership took great care to avoid sending Indian forces into Pakistani territory.50 According to P. R. Chari, Indian forces "were under strict orders not to cross the LoC of Control] under any circumstances. Hot pursuit of retreating enemy forces was not permitted, nor could their bases across the LoC be attacked."51 Additionally, though it may have been militarily prudent to divert Pakistani attention, India refrained from taking the fight outside of the immediate Kargil region.52 Although the cover of nuclear weapons may have played a role in convincing Pakistan it could get away with the initial incursion, when the miscalculation became apparent, Pakistan showed careful resolve to avoid further escalation. Like India, Pakistan may have benefitted from opening a second or multiple fronts, but even in the face of India's successful co unteroffensive, Pakistan limited the fighting to the Kargil region.53 Nuclear weapons also ensured that diplomatic channels remained open between Pakistan and India throughout the conflict. Pakistani and Indian leadership met both officially and in secret in attempts to defuse the situation and prevent further escalation.5 The presence of nuclear weapons almost certainly ensured the international community took a more active role in ending the conflict. The United States, in particular, went to great lengths to encourage both India and Pakistan to avoid escalation and end the conflict. As noted above, pressure from President Clinton may have been the final deciding factor in Sharif's decision to withdraw Pakistani troops. From the perspective of socialization, the behavior of India and Pakistan cannot be resolved into a simple set of two-way interactions. To say each side was interacting, with the action of one eliciting a reaction from the other, obscures the socialization effects produced by their interactions. "Each acts and reacts to the other. Stimulus and response are part of the story. But also the two of them act together in the game, which - no less because they have devised it - motivates and shapes their behavior. Each is playing to each other and to the tensions their interactions produce."55 Because socialization draws members of a group into conformity with its norms, it reduces variety. Conformity to group norms and reducing variety are essential elements in creating and sustaining persistent relations within and among states. The persistent characteristics of group behavior result in part from the qualities of its members and in part from the characteristics of the relationship their interactions produce.56 In this sense, nuclear relationships, as exemplified by the behavior of the United States, Russia, India, and Pakistan seem to be cautious ones. From this, one should not conclude that nuclear leaders behave with law-like regularity. But one can infer that nuclear leaders, even in times of crisis, tend to seek solutions short of all-out war, which is another way of saying the possibility of nuclear war makes them risk-averse.
Since the advent of nuclear weapons, there have been few wars among nuclear states nuclear states rarely, if ever, fight wars against one another Why As previously mentioned, nuclear weapons seem to socialize leaders to the dangers of adventurism and halt them from behaving recklessly the risk of nuclear war makes leaders risk- averse; they must act with deliberate restraint, carefully plotting their courses of action in terms of how other nuclear leaders might react, even if they would prefer not to. the "long peace" among nuclear powers is impressive Some might have difficulty imagining why nuclear leaders would behave in the manner described here, Structural analysis addresses the positioning of actors in social and political systems - the properties and relations that make them parts of a system Within the field of international politics most scholars accept Waltz's tripartite conception of structure international systems are largely undifferentiated States are assumed to be "like units" made different only by their position among other states, strong states being privileged over weak ones. Anarchy is the "ordering principle" of international systems there is no higher authority to which states can appeal to reconcile differences or ensure their survival. Power is distributed unevenly making international systems unequal. states can be measured in terms of how they stack up against one another in terms of relative power. ew things affect this "stacking up" more than nuclear weapons, To say that nuclear weapons socialize leaders to the dangers of adventurism is to say that leaders pay attention to survival, because no one else can do so for them the "survival motive" is law-like All human conduct is shaped in some measure by what individuals believe to be general laws I Few things send a stronger signal to statesmen than the threat of nuclear war, and in this regard the threat of nuclear war plays a socialization role. no one tells all the states in the world to behave themselves but most of them do States are socialized to this idea by interacting with other states, particularly the great powers - whose role it is to set and enforce the rules of the game Because no higher authority exists to protect states from the harmful intentions of others, statesmen must pay attention to survival Nothing threatens survival more than the threat of nuclear war which is why nuclear statesmen are so highly sensitive to it The Cuban missile crisis and the Kargil conflict are illustrative. During the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev sought solutions short of war, despite their sharp political, cultural, and economic differences If we attack Cuban missiles it gives them a clear line to take Berlin We would be regarded as the trigger-happy Americans We would have no support We would affect the West Germans' attitude toward us If we go in and take them out in an air strike ... we increase the chance to be a reprisal from the Soviet Union Which leaves me one alternative to fire nuclear weapons and begin a nuclear exchange the number of weapons on Cuban soil was never the focal point of US concern The avoidance of nuclear war was the focal point the threshold easily recognized, best not crossed and worth avoiding Something similar seems to have occurred during the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan. Prior to acquiring nuclear capability, Pakistan fought three bloody wars with India. Today, with both parties possessing nuclear forces, the sharp differences that separate India and Pakistan have not been sufficient to drive either side to war While the two sides actively engage in a game of tit-for-tat, nuclear weapons seem to have socialized leaders to the dangers of nuclear war, and as a result, the relationship between them has steadied. The presence of nuclear weapons played a role in shaping the character of the Kargil conflict A retrospective look indicates that neither side actually threatened the other with the use of nuclear weapons nuclear weapons seem to have played a role in how each side fought during the conflict India was most notable for the restraint it put on its armed forces Indian leadership took great care to avoid sending Indian forces into Pakistani territory Indian forces "were under strict orders not to cross the LoC of Control] under any circumstances pursuit of retreating enemy forces was not permitted, nor could their bases across the LoC be attacked India refrained from taking the fight outside of the immediate Kargil region Pakistan showed careful resolve to avoid further escalation Like India, Pakistan may have benefitted from opening a second or multiple fronts but even in the face of India's successful co unteroffensive, Pakistan limited the fighting to the Kargil region Nuclear weapons also ensured that diplomatic channels remained open between Pakistan and India throughout the conflict Pakistani and Indian leadership met both officially and in secret in attempts to defuse the situation and prevent further escalation The presence of nuclear weapons almost certainly ensured the international community took a more active role in ending the conflict From the perspective of socialization nuclear relationships seem to be cautious ones From this one can infer that nuclear leaders even in times of crisis tend to seek solutions short of all-out war which is another way of saying the possibility of nuclear war makes them risk-averse.