Having described both the technological limitations as well as the strategic considerations for choosing a nuclear strategy over a conventional one, the first way that U.S. arms transfers can influence nuclear proliferation is by changing the military capabilities of the arms recipient country. The simpler case to consider is limiting arms sales. Arms embargoes can encourage nuclear proliferation. For conventionally weaker countries, decreasing military sales not only technologically restricts their conventional capabilities, but also heightens their insecurity by tilting the balance of power in favor of their adversaries. To countries that suffer a graver security threat and an even less feasible conventional deterrence option, developing nuclear weapons becomes more attractive. Short of proclaiming neutrality, ending hostilities, or seeking alliances, acquiring nuclear bombs is one of the most appealing strategic choice left for any country that wishes to rely on its own efforts to compete militarily with its adversaries.73 Arms embargoes, however, may only have a smaller effect on encouraging nuclear proliferation in conventionally stronger countries. Arms embargoes undercut the military advantage countries with stronger military capabilities enjoy. While the decrease in military capability could encourage proliferation, these countries may still possess sufficient capabilities to deter adversaries. Since conventionally strong countries have more to lose by nuclear proliferation, these countries may still prefer to maintain their conventional military advantage instead of embarking on continuing risky nuclear weapons programs that threaten their conventional arms supply and are not guaranteed to succeed. Nevertheless, one should still observe a general trend that is captured in the first hypothesis below. Hypothesis 1: Arms embargoes generally encourage nuclear proliferation. In contrast to arms embargoes, the effect of conventional arms sales on nuclear proliferation is more complex and depends on the original balance of power as well as military investment by the adversary. Providing arms to countries with conventional superiority discourages nuclear proliferation by maintaining the low incentives countries have to seek nuclear weapons. Developing nuclear weapons can start a nuclear arms race that can level the strategic playing field and destroy the stronger country's original conventional military advantage. Israel, for instance, fears starting a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that would cripple its current qualitative conventional superiority. This fear is a reason that Israel remains ambiguous about its nuclear capabilities.74 ' 75 For countries conventionally weak, arms imports may discourage proliferation by tilting the conventional balance of power, reversing situations of insecurity. The Czech-Egyptian arms deal of 1955 had the potential to triple Egyptian military capacity if all the Soviet equipment were adequately absorbed.76 Similarly, the 2010 $60 billion US-Saudi Arabia arms deal will allow Saudi Arabia to establish air superiority against all neighboring states except Israel.77
Arms embargoes can encourage nuclear proliferation decreasing military sales not only technologically restricts their conventional capabilities, but also heightens their insecurity by tilting the balance of power in favor of their adversaries To countries that suffer a graver security threat and an even less feasible conventional deterrence option developing nuclear weapons becomes more attractive. acquiring nuclear bombs is one of the most appealing strategic choice left for any country that wishes to rely on its own efforts to compete militarily with its adversaries Arms embargoes undercut the military advantage countries with stronger military capabilities enjoy one should still observe a general trend that is captured in the first hypothesis below. Arms embargoes generally encourage nuclear proliferation the effect of conventional arms sales on nuclear proliferation is more complex and depends on the original balance of power as well as military investment by the adversary. Developing nuclear weapons can start a nuclear arms race that can level the strategic playing field and destroy the stronger country's original conventional military advantage. Israel fears starting a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that would cripple its current qualitative conventional superiority This fear is a reason that Israel remains ambiguous about its nuclear capabilities For countries conventionally weak arms imports may discourage proliferation by tilting the conventional balance of power reversing situations of insecurity.