Another key problem is that primacy inadvertently increases the risk of conflict. Allies are more willing to confront powerful rivals, because they are confident that the United States will rescue them if the confron-tation turns ugly, a classic case of moral hazard, or what Barry Posen calls "reckless driving." Restraining our impulse to intervene militarily or diplomatically when our vital national interests are not threatened would reduce the likelihood that our friends and allies will engage in such reckless behavior in the first place. Libya and Georgia are only two cases of this problem. Plus, a more restrained U.S. foreign policy would provide a powerful incentive for allies to share the burden of defense. Primacy has not stopped rivals from challenging U.S. power. Russia and China, for example, have resisted the U.S. government's efforts to expand its influence in Europe and Asia. Indeed, by provoking security fears, primacy exacerbates the very sorts of problems that it claims to prevent, including nuclear proliferation. U.S. efforts at regime change and talk of an "axis of evil" that needed to be eliminated certainly pro-vided additional incentives for states to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. actions (e.g., North Korea). Meanwhile, efforts intended to smother security competition or hos-tile ideologies have destabilized vast regions, undermined our counter-terrorism efforts, and even harmed those we were ostensibly trying to help. After U.S. forces deposed the tyrant Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq descended into chaos and has never recovered. The situation in Libya is not much better; the United States helped overthrow Muammar el-Qaddafi in 2011, but violence still rages. The Islamic State, which originated in Iraq, has now established a presence in Libya as well. It is clear that those interventions were counterproductive and have failed to make America safer and more secure.
primacy inadvertently increases the risk of conflict. Allies are more willing to confront powerful rivals, because they are confident that the United States will rescue them if the confron-tation turns ugly, a classic case of moral hazard what Barry Posen calls "reckless driving." Restraining our impulse to intervene militarily or diplomatically when our vital national interests are not threatened would reduce the likelihood that our friends and allies will engage in such reckless behavior Libya and Georgia are only two cases of this problem restrained U.S. foreign policy would provide a powerful incentive for allies to share the burden of defense. Primacy has not stopped rivals from challenging U.S. power. Russia and China, have resisted the U.S. government's efforts to expand its influence in Europe and Asia by provoking security fears, primacy exacerbates the very sorts of problems that it claims to prevent, including nuclear proliferation efforts intended to smother security competition or hos-tile ideologies have destabilized vast regions, undermined our counter-terrorism efforts, and , Iraq descended into chaos and has never recovered