That country, obviously, is China. Today, China still falls well short of the level of power needed to assert regional dominance even in the absence of U.S. presence.113 Moreover, it is not clear that China will aspire to such regional dominance as its power increases. Yet a peaceful rise cannot be guaranteed, either, and China’s ability to pursue regional primacy could increase markedly in the decades to come. Explosive economic growth and a long-term military buildup have already had a pronounced impact on the military balance vis-à-vis neighbors like Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan. If Chinese economic growth continues apace, and if China’s defense budget continues to register annual increases of 10 percent or more, then other East Asian countries will eventually confront enormous difficulty in balancing Beijing’s power—even if they overcome collective action problems and their own historical antagonisms to cooperate in that undertaking. This prospect is one that is clearly recognized even by some leading proponents of American retrenchment. As one offshore balancer puts it, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.”114 Yet if this assessment is accurate—and there is every reason to think that it is—then offshore balancing becomes a highly risky and potentially counterproductive course of action. As noted, some analysts have argued that adopting that strategy would actually improve Washington’s ability to counter Chinese power, by strengthening U.S. flexibility, better leveraging the capabilities of local actors, and divesting America of distracting onshore commitments in other regions. But here again, this analysis glosses over a range of more worrisome possibilities. As mentioned earlier, U.S. retrenchment could motivate exposed local actors like South Korea or Japan to pursue their own nuclear arsenals, thereby impelling regional arms races and heightening tensions further. Or, perhaps more dangerously still, a U.S. pullback might facilitate the very outcome that offshore balancers aim to avert. As Robert Gilpin wrote in his classic work, War and Change in World Politics: Retrenchment by its very nature is an indication of relative weakness and declining power, and thus retrenchment can have a deteriorating effect on relations with allies and rivals. Sensing the decline of their protector, allies try to obtain the best deal they can from the rising master of the system. Rivals are stimulated to ‘close in,’ and frequently they precipitate a conflict in the process. Retrenchment can be carried out successfully, Gilpin acknowledges, but in a charged geopolitical environment it is usually a fraught and perilous path.115 This warning has particular salience in the East Asian context. In that region, U.S. allies as well as formally nonaligned countries count on American support and presence to help them manage their relationships with an increasingly powerful, and increasingly abrasive, Beijing. As analysts like Zachary Selden have observed, these countries seek visible U.S. backing and reassurance precisely because they fear that they could not otherwise balance a rising China. “America is now an alternative to China,” said one Vietnamese observer as early as 2000. “To counter the Chinese threat we must lean toward the West.”116 Similar comments have become ubiquitous in the years since then. In these circumstances, and contrary to what offshore balancers expect, a significant American retrenchment might not have the desired effect of compelling these countries to resist more determinedly and successfully potential Chinese expansion. Instead, it might incentivize them to acquiesce to, or perhaps bandwagon with, an assertive Beijing if they calculated that the odds of effective resistance were declining as Washington pulled back. If U.S. presence in Asia were weakened, one Thai commentator has predicted, Asian countries would have to conclude that “the region will no longer be a place where only one major power plays a dominant role,” and hedge their bets accordingly. Likewise, one analysis of U.S. security relationships concludes that while reducing the American military presence in the Pacific might bring some budgetary savings, “in Vietnam, Australia, or the Philippines . . . such a shift could prompt a wholesale reevaluation of national defense policy and have costly implications.”117 In sum, if one expects that Asian countries will have great difficulty checking Chinese power without U.S. assistance, then reducing Washington’s role in the area could actually discourage local balancing and pave the way for Beijing’s ascent.118 Offshore balancing could plausibly encourage this undesirable outcome in other ways, as well. As Gilpin notes, when retrenchment is viewed as weakness or lack of commitment, it can cause revisionist powers to push harder against the contours of the existing order. This danger cannot be ignored in the Asia-Pacific. There is evidence to suggest, as offshore balancers argue, that a desire to counteract U.S. presence and security commitments in the region has been an important motivator of China’s post-Cold War military buildup.119 Yet there is also evidence to suggest that U.S. presence and commitments nonetheless have had an overall tempering effect on Chinese behavior, by limiting opportunities for intimidation and expansion, and by raising the likely costs of aggressive or destabilizing behavior.120 If the United States were to now begin reducing that presence, it might logically undercut the tempering effect in the process, for a U.S. retrenchment would have the practical consequence of accentuating the growing power disparity between Beijing and its neighbors, and creating greater uncertainty in Chinese minds as to whether Washington would actually come to those countries’ defense in a crisis. The upshot could be to incentivize precisely the sort of expansionist behavior that would challenge the regional order.
China still short of the level of power needed to assert regional dominance it is not clear that China will aspire to regional dominance as its power increases Explosive economic growth and long-term military buildup have already had a pronounced impact If growth continues and China’s defense budget continues to increases then other East Asian countries will eventually confront enormous difficulty in balancing Beijing’s power even if they overcome collective action problems and historical antagonisms to cooperate This prospect is recognized by leading proponents The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves if this assessment is accurate then offshore balancing becomes a highly risky and potentially counterproductive course of action some have argued that adopting that strategy would improve Washington’s ability to counter Chinese power this glosses over a range of possibilities U.S. retrenchment could motivate local actors like South Korea or Japan to pursue their own nuclear arsenals impelling regional arms races and heightening tensions a U.S. pullback might facilitate the outcome offshore balancers aim to avert Retrenchment is an indication of relative weakness and declining power retrenchment can have a deteriorating effect Rivals are stimulated to ‘close in,’ and precipitate a conflict in the process in a charged geopolitical environment it is usually a fraught and perilous path This warning has salience U.S. allies as well as nonaligned countries count on American support and presence to help them manage relationships Beijing America is now an alternative to China a significant American retrenchment might not have the desired effect it might incentivize them to bandwagon with Beijing reducing Washington’s role could discourage local balancing and pave the way for Beijing’s ascent there is evidence to suggest that U.S. presence have had an overall tempering effect on Chinese behavior by limiting opportunities for expansion and raising the costs of aggressive If the United States were to now begin reducing that presence, it might logically undercut the tempering effect