How, if at all, is this relevant to 21st century challenges of controlling the possession and use of the means of violence? Viewed narrowly as a policy-relevant and technocratic means of regulating military competition between states to minimize the risk of accidental violent conflict (or to reduce the overall risk of conflict), the arms control paradigm is intellectually, although not necessarily practically or politically, exhausted. There remains much practical negotiation and work to be done on such things as a fissile material cut off treaty, further reductions in the American and Russian nuclear arsenals (especially of tactical nuclear weapons), and efforts to maintain the somewhat shaky edifice of nuclear non-proliferation. Other initiatives, such as restrictions on the weaponization of space, or on ballistic missile defenses, seem less relevant to 21st century geopolitical realities, in which the risk of inter-state war is relatively minor, while the risk of large-scale intra-state and non-state violence remains. What the complete paralysis of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament and the non-events of the past two decades (since the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993) have highlighted is the way in which arms control as narrowly conceived was a product of particular geopolitical conditions and pressup- positions that gave rise to certain kinds of multilateral measures, based on shared understandings of the significance of stability and balance, transparency, equality, hierarchy, and the technological potential of nuclear weapons. All of these under- standings have been challenged in different ways by states such as India, Pakistan, China, Egypt, North Korea, or Iran, often for reasons of national or strategic interests, but also because they reject the way in which traditional arms control practices reinforced and legitimated particular sovereign understandings of who could (and could not) possess, use, or threaten to use, particular weapons.30 But I argue that arms control practices can also be viewed more broadly through the lens of governmentality.31 To begin, the regulation of and control over the use of lethal violence was not, since the early 20th century, just about inter-state military competition. It was also about a set of social and institutional practices that imposed certain understandings about the rules for the use of force in international society, that reinforced the state’s monopoly of legitimate use of force both internally and externally, and that manifest themselves through particular forms of management of a given territory, population and resources. Thus, even though some of the new frontiers of contemporary arms control do not have the same practical manifestations or targets, nor even the same actors engaged in promoting arms control, they can be understood as sharing the same premises about state power and violence. On this broader account, one could redefine arms control as being about who can possess, use, develop and transfer the technologies of violence, under what circumstances, against whom, and for what ends? And the (critical) scholarly question is then: what are the consequences and effects of the legitimization of particular configurations and distributions of technologies of violence? In this light, a wide range of contemporary international practices, include such things as the bans on anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, post-conflict weapons collection and destruction efforts, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (DDR), and security sector reform (SSR) initiatives all can be considered as new manifestations of arms control as governmentality. Some have argued that these types of measures reflect a shift towards humanitarian disarmament, or ‘disarmament as humanitarian action’, and aim to reclaim the disarmament side of the arms-control and disarmament divide.32 I would argue, however, that despite some significant differences in focus and targets, there is a great deal of continuity with the logic of governmentality that emerged in the latter stages of Cold War arms control practices.
relevant to 21st century challenges of controlling the possession and use of the means of violence technocratic means of regulating military competition between states to minimize the risk of accidental violent conflict (or to reduce the overall risk of conflict), arms control paradigm exhausted such as restrictions on the weaponization of space, or on ballistic missile defenses, seem less relevant to 21st century geopolitical realities, in which the risk of inter-state war is relatively minor, while the risk of large-scale intra-state and non-state violence remains. traditional arms control practices reinforced and legitimated particular sovereign understandings of who could (and could not) possess, use, or threaten to use, particular weapons. arms control practices can also be viewed more broadly through the lens of governmentality. regulation of and control over the use of lethal violence was not, since the early 20th century, just about inter-state military competition. It was also about a set of social and institutional practices that imposed certain understandings about the rules for the use of force in international society, that reinforced the state’s monopoly of legitimate use of force both internally and externally, and that manifest themselves through particular forms of management of a given territory, population and resources. promoting arms control, t can be understood as sharing the same premises about state power and violence. redefine arms control as being about who can possess, use, develop and transfer the technologies of violence, under what circumstances, against whom, and for what ends? disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (DDR), and security sector reform (SSR) initiatives all can be considered as new manifestations of arms control as governmentality. a shift towards humanitarian disarmament, or ‘disarmament as humanitarian action’, and aim to reclaim the disarmament side of the arms-control and disarmament divide. is a great deal of continuity with the logic of governmentality