Argument: The harms related to a death extend beyond the loss of life

Every person who dies leaves behind people whose lives are made dramatically worse by the loss of a loved one. The average person, by continuing to live, helps those around them in a multitude of ways: love for their family, productive enterprise, and any philanthropic behavior in which they may engage. Out of sheer sympathy for the loved ones of the dead, and others who depend on their continued survival, one ought to minimize the number who die, and thus save the five.

Candidate 1: "The moral agent’s decision will not necessarily have such wide-ranging consequences. In many cases, the matter will remain fairly quiet (even if it is reported to the police). Furthermore, this is only dubiously a “killing” if one does not adopt a deontological take on the action; it’s simply a weighing of the benefits of who can be saved. In another sense, branding it as making “killing” acceptable is misleading, because this is not a moral license to commit wanton murders, but instead a sacrifice in a situation with no bloodless answer. Moreover, even if the decision becomes public knowledge, and is defined as killing, people will recognize that the circumstances of having to make this decision were truly exceptional."
Candidate 2: "To weigh up human lives in this calculated manner inherently strips them of dignity and reduces them to mere numbers. This “aggregative” ethical standpoint, in which a loss of utility to one person can be compensated for by gains in utility to other people, fails to respect “the separateness of persons” [1] . We are all different people, and we do not all share in the alleged benefits to maximizing total utility. For this reason, our moral intuitions reject out-of-hand many variants on “killing one to save five”; for instance, we would think it abhorrent to abduct a random person and harvest their organs in order to save five dying people, even in the absence of side effects like people now being afraid of having their organs taken. Also, see “different lives weigh differently” argument below.

[1] Richardson, Henry S., ‘John Rawls (1921-2002)’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 18 November 2005, http://www.iep.utm.edu/rawls/"
Candidate 3: "The idea of a “right to life,” while appealing, is highly suspect. “Rights” are the highest order of human entitlements, things which one can reasonably expect will never ever happen to them, and which if violated represent a colossal failure of our moral and legal infrastructure. In reality, people die all the time for a variety of natural and artificial reasons, and while we certainly think that these deaths are unfortunate, we don’t think that someone’s human rights were infringed upon every time someone dies in a motor vehicle accident. By contrast, we do have an actual right not to be murdered. When one human being deliberately kills another human being, we rightly see that as an exceptional and grave violation of a basic human right. Therefore, it doesn’t violate anyone’s rights to let the five people die, but it certainly does violate the right of putative sixth person to actively murder them to save the others. Moreover, it may be questionable to assume that all lives are equally valuable; if we are going to engage in the grisly business of actually summing up human lives, why treat someone who we’d expect to only live for another year equal to someone we can expect to live for another sixty? If the advocate of killing the one is going to adopt a “maximizing” ethical view, they should at least commit to a true utilitarianism, rather than a view that is not necessarily supported by either utilitarianism or deontology; treating all deaths as equal, regardless of much they cut a life short, is not something a utilitarian would get behind."
Candidate 4: "Firstly, it may well be the case that we are indeed morally obligated to donate all of our disposable to charity; the longer one considers how many people could be saved with the money one spends on a flat screen television, the less acceptable the purchase becomes. However, there are also meaningful distinctions between the thought experiment and donation to charity. In the thought experiment, there is no one else who can possibly come to the aid of the five. This is distinct from the complexities of a global economy where there are other possible moral saviors and the path to saving lives is far less clear."
Candidate 5: "Moral intuitions are even more unreliable than that. When the “kill one save five” dilemma is presented in the form of pulling a lever to divert a train onto a track with one person on it, most people say to do it. However, when it is presented as pushing a fat man onto the track in order to stop the train, most people say not to do it [1] . The two scenarios are morally identical; the only change is what physical act needs to be done in order to result in the one person getting hit by the train. This demonstrates that we cannot directly consult our intuitions on this question.

[1] Reiner, Peter B., ‘The trolley problem and the evolution of war’, Neuroethics at the core, 11 July 2011, http://neuroethicscanada.wordpress.com/2011/07/11/the-trolley-problem-and-the-evolution-of-war/"
Candidate 6: "Behind the veil of ignorance, human beings may not in fact side with what gives them the statistical greatest chance of survival. As Rawls himself notes, people are naturally risk-averse, and thus will select the rules that protect them from the worst possible situations, even if that sacrifice would help many others. Most people find the prospect of being actively killed by the conscious action of another human being worse than simply dying in an accident, and would seek to protect themselves against that worse outcome."
Candidate 7: "Consequences do in fact matter more. People ought to be morally judged by what occurred when they had the power to decide who lives or dies; fatal non-action is just as blameworthy. This is the reason why many countries, particularly those with a civil law tradition as is the case in most of continental Europe, have Good Samaritan laws creating a legal responsibility to provide help when one can. [1] Someone who stands by and watches someone drown, even though they could have thrown them a rescue line, is rightly thought of as being no less heartless than a murderer. As Sartre put it, choosing not to act is still choosing to act. [2] Moreover, defining an “active killing” is difficult; how direct must one’s involvement in the cause of death be to constitute a killing? A prohibition on active killing overemphasizes the physical rather than the moral aspect of the choice. Finally, an absolute prohibition on killing to save a larger number soon fails to square with our moral intuitions if we crank up the numbers: if the choice is whether to kill one person in order to save five billion, then almost no one would disagree with the act.

[1] The Dan Legal Network, ‘The Good Samaritan Law Across Europe’, http://www.daneurope.org/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=c09228f3-a745-...

[2] Daniels, Victor, ‘Sartre Summery’, Sonoma State University, http://www.sonoma.edu/users/d/daniels/sartre%20sum.html"
Candidate 8: "All the same harms apply if the moral agent lets the five die. They still must cope with the knowledge that their decision resulted in deaths, in fact, more deaths. Indeed, PTSD is brought on by experience with horrific death regardless of whether or not the sufferer caused the death [1] .

[1] Martynowicz, Daniel, ‘Afghanistan PTSD Worse Than Vietnam’, News By The Second, 1 July 2010, http://newsbythesecond.com/afghanistan-ptsd-worse-than-vietnam/2857/"
Candidate 9: "Assessing the value of a life on the basis of family members and how much the person is worth to everyone else creates a perverse priority on those with large families and many connections. To do so makes an injunction: position yourself so that you’re important and well-connected, and suddenly you get priority when we are deciding who to save."
Candidate 10: "That is exactly right: we cannot know who will be most valuable to the world, and to think otherwise is “playing god.” However, this is a point for side proposition; given that we don’t know who the really valuable people are, we ought to save the greater number because it statistically increases the chances that they will be saved. The only time this would not be true is if the average person had a net negative effect on the world, but if this were the case it would commit us to the implausible position that we ought to act in a manner so that the fewest people survive, which is absurd."

Assessing the value of a life on the basis of family members and how much the person is worth to everyone else creates a perverse priority on those with large families and many connections. To do so makes an injunction: position yourself so that you’re important and well-connected, and suddenly you get priority when we are deciding who to save.
