One area in which U.S. President Donald Trump does not need to worry about making America great again is international arms sales. The United States accounts for 34 percent of all global arms sales (second place Russia remains a distant 23 percent), and has more than 40 defense companies in the top 100 globally. However, with civilian deaths caused by the Saudi-led war in Yemen estimated at between 16,000 and 50,000 by the end of 2018, calls for the United States to suspend arms sales to its largest client — Saudi Arabia — have understandably gained traction in both Congress and the public. More generally, several authors have penned articles in these virtual pages calling for more selective U.S. arms export decisions or outright embargos, governed less by economic motivations and more by concern about blowback, human rights, dispersion, and reducing technology transfer. I respectfully disagree with all of these recommendations. Whether it is delayed approval, as in the recent Kuwaiti F-18 purchase, an outright embargo, like Egyptian F-16s in 2013, or denial of technology transfer, as in the 2016 Turkish Patriot missile request, using the withholding of arms sales as a blunt force instrument of coercion is unlikely to produce desired strategic benefits and often backfires. Arms exports are best used for maintaining or strengthening relationships while  limiting adversary access to client states; a tool of nuanced influence, not outright coercion. In fact, threatening to withhold arms sales to coerce a state into changing its behavior often has the opposite effect, leading clients to diversify their arms sourcing instead of shifting course. Similarly, calls to restrict technology transfer and worries about demands for direct offsets mistake what is known as “design technology transfer” for the much more difficult “capacity” level of transfer. Both are explained in more detail below, but for now it is worth noting that design transfer, the level at which most of these offsets occur, does not lead to the creation of an independent defense industry, but instead provides the United States with a source of political power. The United States should not fear technology transfer, but with the appropriate end-user controls, encourage it. Additionally, while a large domestic market provides the United States the luxury of sacrificing financial gains for political influence, sometimes economics do matter; especially when it comes to preserving complex production lines for future flexibility. Finally, the United States should not look to use an arms embargo to coerce Saudi policy change, not for economic reasons, but simply because it is unlikely to work. Greasing the Skids, Not Twisting Arms Arms sales are useful tools for maintaining communication, strengthening relationships, and keeping potential adversary states at bay. Conversely, as a blunt instrument of coercion (i.e. if you do not do X, we will suspend Y), they are likely losers. Senior U.S. government officials involved in the arms transfer process that I interviewed over the past year during the course of my research have echoed similar sentiments. This is also borne out by previous research providing evidence that using arms transfers as situationally coercive tools is rarely successful. Interestingly, coercion attempts using arms transfers are least likely to be successful when used as a punishment or threat against an autocratic regime, such as Saudi Arabia. Instead, punishments in the form of an embargo can often push a client to diversify sourcing rather than to change behavior. Consider Indonesia and Egypt. In 2015, Egypt agreed to purchase nearly 50 Russian MiG-29M/M2s and more than two-dozen French Rafales. This represented a shocking turn of events after more than three decades of purchasing only American-made fighter jets. It was also driven largely by the U.S. embargo put in place in 2013, after the Egyptian army’s removal of then-President Mohamed Morsi, who had won the presidency in a 2012 election. The embargo caused significant tension between the two states driven by “an Egyptian sense that they were at a point of mortal peril” while the United States was moralizing about democratic reforms. Remarkably, the United States lifted the embargo in 2015 with virtually no change in Egyptian policies, no official U.S. “democracy certification”, and Egyptian military support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. The U.S. arms embargo as a tool of coercive change was an abject failure. A similar story played out in Indonesia more than a decade prior. A long-time arms client of the United States with no history of Russian imports, Indonesia announced a deal with Russia in 2003 to purchase Russian Su-27/30s. While Indonesia was always far more politically neutral than Egypt, this remarkable turnaround in arms sourcing diversification appears to be the result of a U.S. arms embargo implemented in 1999 in response to Indonesia’s apparent human rights violations carrying out heavy-handed military actions in East Timor. Furious at U.S. meddling in something the government considered a domestic issue, Indonesia looked instead to Russia with the specific intent to “overcome the effects of [U.S.] arms sales restrictions.” In other words, Indonesia looked to diversify, not capitulate. Indonesia continued sourcing Russian arms even after the United States lifted the embargo in 2005. Perhaps most remarkably, even after the United States agreed to give Indonesia 24 F-16s in 2012, the archipelago state still agreed to purchase 11 Russian Su-35s. The U.S. attempt at coercion not only failed but continues to perpetuate negative strategic effects today. Who’s Afraid of Technology Transfer? Another argument for a more restrictive arms export policy concerns direct industrial offsets (those economic agreements in which a supplier invests in the industry of a client state directly related to the arms being transferred) and technology transfer. However, these tools should not be feared. Technology transfer is unlikely to breed meaningful competition for the United States where it matters most, in the medium- to high-end markets, and instead gives the United States a source of political influence. The problem in many analyses is confusion over the type of technology transfer. There are three ideal-typical categories of transfer: material transfer, such as simple diffusion of weapons and machines; design transfer, like blueprints and schematics; and capacity transfer, which involves basic scientific knowledge and expertise within the industrial base. Most technology transfers ultimately fall into the first two categories, despite what a client state might hope for. Consider the 2003 Polish decision to purchase F-16s from Lockheed Martin with direct offsets valued at more than $6 billion. This represented 170 percent of the program value and the then-largest in commercial history. Despite this massive investment, Poland does not design and produce their own fighter jets today, but rather subsections of American-designed systems under license. In fact, direct offsets provided inroads for U.S. industry in the Polish defense industry in a manner that strongly incentivizes the Poles to continue purchasing U.S. aircraft, and indeed Poland appears poised to purchase the F-35 in the near future. Offsets and technology transfer may have helped revive portions of the Polish defense industry and provided some domestic job creation, but it did not create an independent competitor to the U.S. defense industry. This is exactly as expected with material and design levels of transfer. While some of the very largest industrial states, such as India or China, might eventually create a world-leading defense industry, it will remain out of the grasp of most states. Consider China, an unquestionable economic powerhouse of recent decades. Despite decades of arms purchases, technology transfer, blatant reverse engineering attempts, and hundreds of billions of dollars, China still turns to Russia for help with the most advanced weaponry such as fighter jets, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles, radars, and jet engines. If China, the second largest economy in the world struggles so mightily, what threat do smaller, less capable states pose? Capacity transfer, the acquisition of basic scientific knowledge and expertise crafted over decades, cannot simply be uploaded, emailed to another state, or hacked. Rather, it takes decades of intentional and costly investment. For high-end weaponry, where research and development costs remain a prohibitive barrier to entry, the United States and a handful of other advanced economies are likely to remain in the driver’s seat; even with generous technology transfer agreements. Finally, consider some of the negative second- and third-order effects that excessive restriction caused in American unwillingness to commit to selling the U.S.-made Patriot missile system and its underlying technology to Turkey. This was recently posited as a U.S. export restriction success. However, this restraint looks less successful each passing day. Even with significant design transfer, it is unlikely Turkey could obtain the requisite capacity transfer to be self-sufficient in surface-to-air and anti-missile defense systems anytime soon. Conversely, by using U.S. technology, the United States could have legally restricted Turkey’s future export of it. More importantly, Turkey has since agreed to purchase Russia’s advanced S-400 surface-to-air missile system, a blow to U.S. and NATO relations with Turkey. The S-400 purchase will put advanced Russian technology and military advisors inside a NATO ally and tier-two F-35 industrial partner that is a sole-source supplier on several F-35 components. As the Air Force Secretary said last year about Turkey’s S-400 agreement, “Sometimes it’s the United States that’s part of the problem.” Even worse, the United States has since approved the sale of the Patriot to Turkey, with the acting U.S. Defense Secretary recently commenting, “we need Turkey to buy the Patriot.” Was holding back on some surface-to-air missile technology worth the strategic cost? It appears unlikely.
The United States accounts for 34 percent of all global arms sales (second place Russia remains distant several authors have penned articles calling for more selective U.S. arms export decisions or outright embargos I disagree using the withholding of arms sales as a blunt force instrument is unlikely to produce desired strategic benefits and often backfires Arms exports are best used for  limiting adversary access to client states threatening to withhold arms sales to coerce a state into changing its behavior often has the opposite effect, leading clients to diversify their arms sourcing instead of shifting course Arms sales are useful for keeping potential adversary states at bay Senior U.S. government officials involved in the arms transfer process that I interviewed over the past year during the course of my research have echoed similar sentiments This is also borne out by previous research coercion attempts using arms transfers are least likely to be successful when used as a punishment or threat against an autocratic regime punishments push a client to diversify sourcing rather than to change behavior Consider Indonesia and Egypt In 2015, Egypt agreed to purchase Russian M2s . It was also driven largely by the U.S. embargo the United States lifted the embargo in 2015 with virtually no change in Egyptian policies A similar story played out in Indonesia more than a decade prior. A long-time arms client of the United States with no history of Russian imports, Indonesia announced a deal with Russia in 2003 to purchase Russian Su-27/30s Indonesia continued sourcing Russian arms even after the United States lifted the embargo Despite decades of arms purchases, technology transfer, blatant reverse engineering attempts, and hundreds of billions of dollars, China still turns to Russia for help with advanced weaponry consider effects that excessive restriction caused in American unwillingness to commit to selling the U.S.-made Patriot missile system to Turkey Turkey has since agreed to purchase Russia’s advanced system Even worse, the United States has since approved the sale of the Patriot to Turkey