Currently, available data suggest that the trend of maritime interactions in the seas of East Asia is mirroring that seen during and after the Cold War. This would indicate that sustained low-level instability will continue to characterize the strategic picture, but that escalation is unlikely. Significant clashes did occur in the South China Sea in 1974 and 1988. However, in both cases, Chinese and Vietnamese forces clashed over the control of disputed features, not as a result of operations at sea. In 1974, China wrested control of the Paracel Islands from Vietnamese forces, and in 1988 the militaries of the two countries fought as they attempted to secure Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands. While this article focuses on the potential for escalation arising out of clashes resulting from incidents at sea, it also is worth noting that following both of these cases no substantial further escalation occurred. However, East Asia has a unique characteristic when it comes to strategic-level interactions. Unlike during the Cold War and the case of the Korean Peninsula, in East Asia the main crucible of interaction is located at sea. China and the United States have no forces opposing each other on land, and with the exception of Taiwan there are no arenas where the United States and China could clash that have significant populated areas. This arguably reduces the risk of a clash at sea spilling over onto land; therefore, the restraining effect of devastating war that was operative during the Cold War may be weaker. This may allow Chinese or U.S. commanders the freedom to escalate a clash, given that the potential strategic costs resulting therefrom would be lessened. 74 However, while there is no existential threat, conflict between the United States and China would mean conflict between the world’s two biggest economies in some of the world’s most economically vital seas. This places pressure on both sides to manage the instability caused by conflictual interactions. As Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated in 2017, “There cannot be conflict between China and the United States, as both sides will lose and both sides cannot afford that.” 75 Operationally, the increasing presence and prominence of civilian law enforcement actors such as coast guards and the role of paramilitary maritime militias are new phenomena. This introduces a variable that has not been seen previously. A clash between coast guard or militia vessels may escalate to the involvement of naval vessels. However, so far—despite substantial clashes at sea between maritime law-enforcement actors—such escalation has not occurred.
data suggest that the trend of maritime interactions in the seas of East Asia is mirroring that seen during and after the Cold War This would indicate that sustained low-level instability will continue to characterize the strategic picture, but that escalation is unlikely. Significant clashes in 1974 and 1988 over the control of disputed features, not as a result of operations at sea. Unlike during the Cold War and the case of the Korean Peninsula, in East Asia the main crucible of interaction is located at sea. China and the United States have no forces opposing each other on land there are no arenas where the United States and China could clash that have significant populated areas This reduces the risk of a clash at sea spilling over onto land; therefore, the restraining effect of devastating war that was operative during the Cold War may be weaker while there is no existential threat, conflict between the United States and China would mean conflict between the world’s two biggest economies This places pressure on both sides to manage the instability caused by conflictual interaction Chinese foreign minister stated There cannot be conflict between China and the United States, as both sides will lose and both sides cannot afford that. so far—despite substantial clashes at sea between maritime law-enforcement actors escalation has not occurr