Argument: Sanctions will prevent escalation in cyber conflict

Cyber conflict favours the offence; when the defender is successful they gain nothing and impose no harm on the attacker who is free to try again elsewhere. The attackers are free to attack until they get past the defences somewhere. [1] That the attacks don’t risk lives helps to encourage an offensive mindset as makes it seem like there is no downside to attempting to dominate your opponent. [2] This means the only cyber response is to attack the attacker so that the same advantages apply.

The result is that cyber-attacks have a very real danger of long term tension or escalation. If one side is losing a conflict where both sides are attempting to steal the other's intellectual property (or the other has little to steal) the response may be something like the stuxnet attack that involves physical damage, this then would probably be considered an illegal use of force creating a thin line between a cyber-war and a real war. [3] When the cyber war involves physical damage as the US has warned there then may be a military response. Sanctions are a way to apply pressure without this risk of escalation into a military conflict.

[1] Lin, Herbert, ‘Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Fall 2012, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/fall/lin.pdf p.51

[2] Rothkopf, David, ‘The Cool War’, Foreign Policy, 20 February 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/20/the_cool_war_china_cyberwar

[3] Zetter, Kim, ‘Legal Experts: Stuxnet Attack on Iran Was Illegal ‘Act of Force’, Wired, 25 March 2013, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/03/stuxnet-act-of-force/

Candidate 1: "How do we determine what is proportionate? If some valuable intellectual property, such as part of the designs for the US's latest fighter jet the F35, which were hacked in 2009. [1] Then what can be the response to this? Can it simply be the cost of developing this design? If so then what about the strategic loss the state has suffered, how can that be calculated in? So long as it is excluded state sanctioned cyber-attacks will not be deterred.

[1] Gorman, Siobhan, Cole, August, and Dreazen, Yochi, ‘Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jen Project’, The Wall Street Journal, 21 April 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124027491029837401.html.html"
Candidate 2: "An asymmetric response to cyber-attacks in the form of sanctions may prevent escalation, but they could also simply encourage a cyber-attacker to do more knowing that sanctions cannot stop cyber-attacks. Sanctions in the past have rarely changed policy; Sanctions against Cuba did not result in overthrowing Castro, sanctions have not changed North Korea or Iran’s policy towards nuclear weapons, so there is little reason that sanctions would stop cyber-attacks. [1] Instead the country being sanctioned will find a way around and quite possibly escalate themselves much as North Korea has upped the stakes whenever new sanctions are imposed, most recently by cancelling a hotline to the South. [2]

[1] Friedman, Lara, ‘Getting over the sanctions delusion’, Foreign Policy The Middle East Channel, 14 March 2010, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/15/getting_over_the_sanctions_delusion

[2] Branigan, Tania, ‘Expanded UN sanctions on North Korea prompt rage from Pyongyang’, guardian.co.uk, 8 March 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/08/north-korea-rages-un-sanctions"
Candidate 3: "How can there ever be deterrence when the attacker believes they will not be caught, or that if they are the sanctions swill harm others not themselves? When the problem with preventing cyber-attacks is the difficulty of tracing the source [1] then deterrence becomes more and more difficult to apply. This is not like the Cold War where both superpowers could be certain that if they launched an attack there would be a devastating response. In this instance there is no certainly; the attacker believes they a, won't be caught, b, there will be no response and c, that the response won't affect them, and finally even if they are affected unless they are caught most times they will believe they will get away with it next time round.

[1] Greenemeier, Larry, ‘Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult to Trace Back to Hackers’, Scientific American, 11 June 2011, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=tracking-cyber-hackers"
Candidate 4: "Sanctions cannot be very finely targeted and will always hit other groups as well as the cyber attackers. The chances of knowing specific individuals who were responsible are next to zero so those individuals cannot be targeted directly. This is the whole problem with cyber-attacks; they are very difficult to pin down. In the best case then sanctions are applied against the right target and happen to hit others as well; for example hackers are not the only new who want advanced computer equipment. At worst the sanctions will completely miss their target; it would be a major embarrassment for a country to impose sanctions for a cyber-attack only for it to later be discovered that the sanctions are against an innocent party through whom the attack had been routed."

An asymmetric response to cyber-attacks in the form of sanctions may prevent escalation, but they could also simply encourage a cyber-attacker to do more knowing that sanctions cannot stop cyber-attacks. Sanctions in the past have rarely changed policy; Sanctions against Cuba did not result in overthrowing Castro, sanctions have not changed North Korea or Iran’s policy towards nuclear weapons, so there is little reason that sanctions would stop cyber-attacks. [1] Instead the country being sanctioned will find a way around and quite possibly escalate themselves much as North Korea has upped the stakes whenever new sanctions are imposed, most recently by cancelling a hotline to the South. [2]

[1] Friedman, Lara, ‘Getting over the sanctions delusion’, Foreign Policy The Middle East Channel, 14 March 2010, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/15/getting_over_the_sanctions_delusion

[2] Branigan, Tania, ‘Expanded UN sanctions on North Korea prompt rage from Pyongyang’, guardian.co.uk, 8 March 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/08/north-korea-rages-un-sanctions
