Nuclear war in Europe: A real possibility The disquiet along NATO’s eastern frontier has several intertwined drivers. One is Russia’s strategy, and the thinking behind it. Russia’s military doctrine envisages a first use of nuclear weapons “in the event of aggres- sion against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy” (President of the Russian Federation 2014). This “declaratory policy” is not new and was often explained as a deterrent, in the context of the overall conventional inferiority of Russia compared to hypothetical adversaries (Central Intelligence Agency 2000) – a mirror image of the situation during the Cold War when NATO had to rely on a first-use policy to deter conventional aggression by the numeri- cally superior Warsaw Pact forces. But in current circumstances, the Russian policy acquires a more nuanced – and sinister – character in the context of potential local and regional conflicts in which the balance of conventional forces overwhel- mingly favors Russia (such as the Baltic area). There is a vast difference, in terms of political legitimacy and practical implications, between a first-use “declaratory policy” as part of general deterrence on the one hand, and, on the other, the actual role of nuclear weapons as an instrument of strategy – “the use that is made of force and the threat of force” (Gray 1999, 17) – in pursuit of very specific political objectives in one’s neighborhood. In 2000, Russia started cultivating the notion of a limited nuclear strike – using low-yield tactical nuclear weapons – to deter involvement of the third parties in the conflicts in which Russia has vital interests at stake. This concept, known as “escalate to de- escalate” (Sokov 2014), would be part of Russia’s strat- egy of intra-war “deterrence by punishment,” signaling, for instance, that more pain is in store should NATO continue a military effort to reinforce and defend its frontline state(s) in the event of a war. This approach is now clearly an integral part of Russia’s plans and exercises (Norberg 2015), and Russia has preserved an arsenal of tactical nuclear warheads and continued to maintain – and even further develop – various means of their delivery for both strategic and battlefield uses (Weitz 2011). Last, but hardly least, all of these nuclear prepara- tions are accompanied by increasingly “loose” talk about nuclear war in Moscow’s circuit of talk shows, policy statements, and political posturing for internal and external audiences. This rhetoric has received sharp criticism from NATO (Barnes 2016). But the unthinkable has become thinkable in Russia, and the idea that Russia could initiate and prevail in a conflict by using nuclear weapons is entertained with the same ease that we, in NATO, might exhibit in speaking about things such as strategic airlift or precision-guided munitions. These Russian developments have given NATO real reasons for concern. First of all, the alliance still heavily relies on reinforcement by rapid response and follow- on forces as a primary way of dealing with the potential military crisis in the Baltic theater. NATO eFP units stationed in the Baltics can be a “speedbump,” but their value is largely political, acting as a tripwire that would ensure a larger response from NATO should they be attacked. But this emphasis on “deterrence by punish- ment,” which prevails in the strategic assessments of the United States (Samp 2017), is problematic when considered in light of Moscow’s capabilities and strat- egy. The aggregate conventional power of NATO might matter less than the ability to bring it to bear upon collective defense tasks in a particular theater and in a timely manner. The ability and will to gather and use that conventional power could in fact become severely impaired by nuclear threats and a propaganda and diplomacy campaign to diminish the intrinsic value of the Baltic states to their allies. This would be perfectly in the spirit, if not matching the letter, of Julian S. Corbett’s conditions for limiting a war: “A war may be limited physically by the strategic isolation of the object, as well as morally by its comparative unimportance” (Corbett 1911, p. 59). Also, while strategic nuclear arms have been under continuous spotlight during and since the end of the Cold War, the NATO has essentially disarmed itself unilaterally when it comes to tactical nuclear weapons (Weitz 2011). Some 180 aging B61 bombs and the dual-capable aircraft assigned to carry them in war are pretty much all that is left of a once-formidable tactical arsenal – and even these weapons have come under pressure from some allies demanding their removal from Europe (Schmidt 2010). In a meantime, Russia’s tactical arsenals – numbering some 2,000 war- heads (Kristensen and Norris 2017) – and repertoire of delivery methods remain mostly intact and, with the development and deployment of new cruise missiles – including in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (Gordon 2017) – this arsenal is even expanding. The cruise missiles must be of particular concern to European allies (Meier and Pifer 2017), as the range of land-based intermedi- ate-range cruise or ballistic missiles would allow Russia to reach targets across most of the continent from Russia’s own territory, rather than relying on ships and aircraft deployed outside the country. NATO’s options for dealing with Russia’s edge in tactical nuclear weaponry have narrowed considerably. Should the alliance have to respond to Russia’s threat to put the concept of “escalate to de-escalate” into practice, those options are essentially confined to the space between aircraft-delivered tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. It does not take a proverbial rocket scientist to see that NATO’s deterrence has a credibility problem as a result of this asymmetry: The dual-capable aircraft currently in operation will hardly be capable of penetrating Russia’s air defense systems to deliver a response, while using strategic nuclear weapons opens the Pandora’s box of an all-out nuclear exchange. Moscow is unlikely to think that the alliance might even entertain the possibility of a strategic nuclear response to, for example, an invasion of the Baltic countries. Robert E. Osgood rightly noted that the most intractable dilemma of military strategy in the nuclear age ... is that the principal nuclear antago- nists must ultimately base their security on a nuclear threat which, if carried out, would probably inflict a magnitude of destruction on themselves as well as on others that could scarcely be justified by any rational reason for resorting to war. (Osgood 1979, 27) It seems, however, that Russia’s approach to resolving this conundrum rests on its reading of the West’s profile: The side that gets entangled – morally, ethi- cally, politically, and psychologically – in this dilemma will become paralyzed by it, and back down. If Russia projects the image of willingness to brush this nuclear dilemma aside and to take risks, the West will blink.
Nuclear war in Europe: A real possibility Russia’s military doctrine envisages a first use of nuclear weapons “in the event of aggres- sion against the Russian Federation This “declaratory policy” is not new But in current circumstances, the Russian policy acquires a more nuanced – and sinister – character in the context of potential local and regional conflicts in which the balance of conventional forces overwhel- mingly favors Russia (such as the Baltic area). There is a vast difference between a first-use “declaratory policy” and the actual role of nuclear weapons as an instrument of strategy – “the use that is made of force and the threat of force” in pursuit of very specific political objectives in one’s neighborhood. In 2000, Russia started cultivating the notion of a limited nuclear strike to deter involvement of the third parties in the conflicts in which Russia has vital interests at stake. This concept, known as “escalate to de- escalate”  would be part of Russia’s strat- egy of intra-war “deterrence by punishment,” signaling that more pain is in store should NATO continue a military effort to reinforce and defend its frontline state(s) in the event of a war. This approach is now clearly an integral part of Russia’s plans and Russia has preserved an arsenal of tactical nuclear warheads and continued to maintain various means of their delivery for both strategic and battlefield uses all of these nuclear prepara- tions are accompanied by increasingly “loose” talk about nuclear war in Moscow’s circuit of talk shows, policy statements, and political posturing for internal and external audiences. But the unthinkable has become thinkable in Russia, the idea that Russia could initiate and prevail in a conflict by using nuclear weapons is entertained with ease These developments have given NATO real reasons for concern the alliance still heavily relies on reinforcement by rapid response and follow- on forces NATO eFP units stationed in the Baltics can be a “speedbump,” but their value is largely political The aggregate conventional power of NATO might matter less than the ability to bring it to bear upon collective defense tasks in a particular theater and in a timely manner The ability and will to gather and use that conventional power could in fact become severely impaired by nuclear threats and a propaganda and diplomacy campaign to diminish the intrinsic value of the Baltic states to their allies. Also NATO has essentially disarmed itself unilaterally when it comes to tactical nuclear weapons Russia’s tactical arsenals and repertoire of delivery methods remain mostly intact and, this arsenal is even expanding NATO’s options for dealing with Russia’s edge in tactical nuclear weaponry have narrowed considerably. those options are essentially confined to the space between aircraft-delivered tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. NATO’s deterrence has a credibility problem as a result of this asymmetry: The dual-capable aircraft currently in operation will hardly be capable of penetrating Russia’s air defense systems to deliver a response, while using strategic nuclear weapons opens the Pandora’s box of an all-out nuclear exchange. If Russia projects the image of willingness to brush this nuclear dilemma aside and to take risks, the West will blink.