More controversial than the distribution of commendations was the debate over Bridport's decision to withdraw from the battle while the remainder of the French fleet was still within reach. In his official dispatch, the British admiral wrote that "If the Enemy had not been protected and sheltered by the Land, I have every reason to believe that a much greater Number, if not all the Line of Battle ships, would have been taken or destroyed", going on note that "When the ships struck, the British squadron was near to some Batteries Groix, and in the Face of a strong Naval Port name="LG1"></ref> His subsequent concern for the Quiberon expeditionary convoy also demonstrates that he considered its protection his principal duty. But in the opinion of French admiral Kerguelen, ""S'ils avaient bien manouevré, ils auraient pu, ou prendre tous nos vaisseaux, ou les faire périr à la côte"" (If [the English had manoeuvred successfully they could have taken all our vessels, or made them perish on the coast). Historians have considered this view and most agree that Bridport's retirement was premature: In 1827 James noted that the scattered remains of the French fleet could easily have been attacked by the unengaged British rear with the advantage of the weather gage, while William Laird Clowes wrote in 1901 that "We may be pretty sure that had a Nelson, a Hawke or even a Boscawen commanded on the occasion, the fleet of Villaret would have been annihilated." Twenty-first-century historians Noel Mostert and Richard Woodman have compared Groix with the battles of Genoa and Hyères fought during the year in the Mediterranean, where in similar circumstances another elderly admiral, William Hotham, had also allowed scattered and retreating French fleets to escape when they might have been destroyed.