Shortly after the incident, CERN reported that the most likely cause of the problem was a faulty electrical connection between two magnets, and that – owing to the time needed to warm up the affected sectors and then cool them back down to operating temperature – it would take at least two months to fix. CERN released an interim technical report and preliminary analysis of the incident on 15 and 16 October 2008 respectively, and a more detailed report on 5 December 2008. The analysis of the incident by CERN confirmed that an electrical fault had indeed been the cause. The faulty electrical connection had led (correctly) to a failsafe power abort of the electrical systems powering the superconducting magnets, but had also caused an electric arc (or discharge) which damaged the integrity of the supercooled helium's enclosure and vacuum insulation, causing the coolant's temperature and pressure to rapidly rise beyond the ability of the safety systems to contain it, and leading to a temperature rise of about 100 degrees Celsius in some of the affected magnets. Energy stored in the superconducting magnets and electrical noise induced in other quench detectors also played a role in the rapid heating. Around two tonnes of liquid helium escaped explosively before detectors triggered an emergency stop, and a further four tonnes leaked at lower pressure in the aftermath. A total of 53 magnets were damaged in the incident and were repaired or replaced during the winter shutdown. This accident was thoroughly discussed in a 22 February 2010 "Superconductor Science and Technology" article by CERN physicist Lucio Rossi.