Although Eisenhower had sought to keep General Aleksei Antonov of the Soviet High Command fully informed of the progress of the surrender negotiations, no confirmation had been received from the Soviets that the text of the Act of Military Surrender was acceptable to them, or that Susloparov was empowered to sign it. Accordingly, Eisenhower extracted from Jodl an additional signed undertaking that the Chief of the German High Command and the Commanders in Chief of all three German armed services would attend in person and sign a "formal ratification" of the Act of Military Surrender, at a place and date to be specified. Some six hours after the signing, a response came from Antonov that the terms of surrender were unacceptable and that Susloparov could not sign it. Eisenhower promptly agreed and undertook to attend together with the rest of the SHAEF for the definitive signing in Berlin two days later. Antonov's response also noted that Friedeburg had been referring matters back to Dönitz over the radio; and that Dönitz, in direct breach of the signed surrender terms, had still not issued orders for German forces in the east to remain in their positions but was instead instructing them to continue their resistance and flee westwards. Antonov stated that, while the internal discussions of the German military in no way obligated the Allied Powers, Jodl's signature could not be accepted as valid if he was signing as Dönitz's representative, since Dönitz himself was clearly acting in bad faith. He proposed that the definitive act of surrender should make it clear that the Commanders in Chief of each of the German armed services were, in signing it, surrendering their forces on the authority of the German High Command - and not as delegated by Dönitz or the purported Flensburg government.