General Paul D. Harkins, commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), made a much more optimistic assessment of the battle. He considered the operation to be a major success; after the VC abandoned their positions, the South Vietnamese units captured the hamlets of Ap Bac and Ap Tan Thoi. Harkins' evaluation of the battle's success was based on US military doctrine from World War II, in which opposing forces fought a conventional combined arms battle with the objective, on each side, of gaining control of the opponent's territory. The VC, however, were more interested in exposing the weaknesses of Diem's regime and its military. Moyar (2008) argues that Harkins' resolutely optimistic assessments based on conventional doctrine avoided recognizing shortcomings in tactics and battle readiness and in the arrangement under which ARVN commanders and their American counterparts and advisers were operating. Largely because of his attitude, neither the South Vietnamese nor the American commands learned useful lessons from the battle.