been privy to the secret hearings and then bound by court order to disclose nothing, that is not to say definitively there could have been no countervailing state concern of sufficient magnitude to overcome Ms. Guess' interest in a fair trial. Perhaps there is some concern or group of concerns that might demand secret hearings, but the court certainly owes Ms. Guess, the public, and future jurists an explanation as to what—in conceptual if not specific terms—those concerns are and what will qualify for the same secret treatment in the future. With secret trials being antithetical to the notion of a free and open society, it seems reasonable that their use should at least demand an explanation. In an interesting twist, the court may have injured itself, as the lack of any explanation for its decision has undermined the court's credibility with numerous observers who have suggested that improper pressure on the court from certain powerful figures in the Canadian government, as opposed to any compelling legal justification, was the real reason for holding the hearings in secret.