Death is that possibility which is the absolute impossibility of "Dasein". As such, it cannot be compared to any other kind of ending or "running out" of something. For example, one's death is not an empirical event. For Heidegger, death is "Dasein"s ownmost (it is what makes "Dasein" individual), it is non-relational (nobody can take one's death away from one, or die in one's place, and we can not understand our own death through the death of other "Dasein"), and it is not to be outstripped. The "not-yet" of life is always already a part of "Dasein": "as soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die." The threefold condition of death is thus simultaneously one's ""ownmost potentiality-for-being, non-relational, and not to be out-stripped"". Death is determinate in its inevitability, but an authentic Being-toward-death understands the indeterminate nature of one's own inevitable death — one never knows when or how it is going to come. However, this indeterminacy does not put death in some distant, futural "not-yet"; authentic Being-toward-death understands one's individual death as always already a part of one.