On 27 April 1915, with a French counterattack to the north of the salient materializing later and on a smaller-scale than promised, Smith-Dorrien recommended withdrawal to the more defensible "GHQ Line". French privately agreed with this analysis, but was angered that the suggestion came from Smith-Dorrien. French wanted the situation kept quiet so as not to distract from the upcoming attack upon Aubers Ridge by Haig's First Army (one historian describes this behaviour on French's part as "cretinous"). Smith-Dorrien wrote a long letter on 27 April 1915 explaining the situation to Robertson (then French's Chief of the General Staff BEF). He received in response a curt telephone message telling him that, in French's view, he had adequate troops to defend the salient. A few hours later written orders arrived, directing Smith-Dorrien to turn command of the salient over to Herbert Plumer and to lend Plumer his chief of staff and such other staff officers as Plumer required. (In practice this meant that Plumer's V Corps, already holding the salient, became an autonomous force reporting directly to GHQ, with Smith-Dorrien left only with II Corps south of the salient). Plumer immediately asked permission for a withdrawal almost identical to that proposed by Smith-Dorrien. After a delay whilst Foch conducted another counterattack, French consented to the action.