An important difference between the Yogācāra conception of emptiness and the Madhyamaka conception is that in classical Yogācāra, emptiness "does exist" and so does consciousness, while Madhyamaka refuses to endorse such existential statements. The "Madhyāntavibhāga" for example, states "there exists the imagination of the unreal ("abhūta-parikalpa"), there is no duality, but there is emptiness, even in this there is that," which indicates that even though the dualistic imagination is unreal and empty, it does exist. Contra Madhyamaka, which was criticized by Vasubandhu and Asaṅga for being nihilistic (see "Vimśatikā" v. 10")", the Yogācāra position is that there is something that exists (the "paratantra-svabhāva" that is mere "vijñapti"), and that it is empty. The "Bodhisattvabhūmi" likewise argues that it is only logical to speak of emptiness if there is "something" (ie. "dharmatā") that is empty. Thus Asaṅga speaks of emptiness as "the non-existence of the self, and the existence of the no-self."