On the face of it, statement 3 seems able to handle both the epiphenomenal ectoplasm problem and the blockers problem. With regard to the former, statement 3 gives the correct result that a purely physical world is one at which physicalism is true, since worlds in which there is some extra stuff are positive duplicates of a purely physical world. With regard to the latter, statement 3 appears to have the consequence that worlds in which there are blockers are worlds where positive non-physical properties of "w1" will be absent, hence "w1" will not be counted as a world at which physicalism is true. Daniel Stoljar (2010) objects to this response to the blockers problem on the basis that since the non-physical properties of "w1" aren't instantiated at a world in which there is a blocker, they are not positive properties in Chalmers' (1996) sense, and so statement 3 will count "w1" as a world at which physicalism is true after all.