It has sometimes been argued that the tactics of these British admirals were rash and would have proved disastrous if tried against more skillful opponents. But it has been remarked that "this is one of those criticisms which are of value only against those who think that there can be a magic efficacy in any particular attack, which makes its success infallible." That the tactics of British admirals of the great wars of 1793–1815 had in themselves no such virtue was amply demonstrated at the Battle of Lissa in 1811. They were justified because the reliance of admirals on the quality of their fleets was well founded. It should be borne in mind that a vessel, while bearing down on an enemy's line, could not be exposed to the fire of three enemies at once when at a distance less than 950 yards, because the guns could not be trained to converge on a nearer point. The whole range of effective fire was only a thousand yards or a very little over. The chance that a ship would be dismasted and stopped before reaching the enemy's line was small.