In addition to this "casus belli", several facts explain how Cato won the decision. Firstly, the influence of the princeps senatus Marcus Aemilius Lepidus was missed in the senate after his death in 152, because like Corculum, he favoured prudent diplomacy. Secondly, Corculum was not in Rome in 149, but in Greece, in order to investigate the situation after the Macedonian Andriskos had revolted against Rome and claimed to be Perseus' son; Corculum organised the defence there by levying an army of Achaean soldiers to hold until a Roman army was sent in 148. Münzer suggests he was sent abroad to weaken the opposition to the war in the senate. Astin furthermore shows that the decisive support for Cato came from Scipio Aemilianus—several later accounts underline their mutual respect—who could capitalise on the illustrious fame of his grandfather Scipio Africanus to get a majority of senators in favour of the destruction of Carthage. Aemilianus and some other leading senators, supported by the people, were probably attracted by the glory and enormous booty they could get by taking Carthage. He may even have sabotaged the peace negotiations between Massinissa and Carthage in 150, in order to make a Roman intervention more likely. Besides, Aemilianus was the friend of Manius Manilius—the consul of 149 who started the operations against Carthage—and personally directed the final assault on the Punic city (in 146). Zonaras wrongly tells that at this occasion Corculum advised sparing the Carthaginians once again.