Bagramyan's 11th Guards Army (the renamed 16th Army) was tasked to take part in the offensive and was given an additional three infantry divisions and two tank corps, a force composed of fifteen divisions. Bagramyan, however, argued to STAVKA that its planning was too audacious in the hopes of repeating a successful encirclement like that in "Uranus". He claimed that his forces would be overstretched and would have difficulty in attacking the entrenched German positions in Bolkhov. To avoid a repetition of the failure in Kharkov the previous year, he instead asked that the 61st Army from the Bryansk Front aid his 11th Guards in destroying the German forces in Bolkhov, thus eliminating the Ninth Army's protection from the north. He appealed to his front commander Vasily Sokolovsky as well the Bryansk's M. A. Reyter, both of whom rejected his proposal. In April, STAVKA recalled the main commanders of the Fronts and Armies to Moscow on a briefing of the preparations for the battle. Against the protestations of Sokolovsky and Reyter, Bagramyan proposed his alternative plan to Stalin, who agreed that it would be the more correct course to follow. Bagramyan was given twenty days to prepare the 11th Guards Army and on 24 May reported that his forces were ready. The 11th Guards now was composed of 135,000 men, 280 armored fighting vehicles, 2,700 artillery pieces and several hundred planes to lend air support for the ground forces. Stalin, however, felt it necessary to further wear thin the fighting abilities of the German forces and delayed the offensive.